chairman peters: in recent

years, the market for commercial use has rapidly expanded due to the affordability and utility of drones that are readily accessible to government, to industry, and to recreational users. the faa estimates that by 2020, about 2.3 million uas's, including 1.5 million recreational drones and model

aircrafts and about 800,000 commercial uas's, will be registered to fly in the u. s. between 2016 and 2019, airline pilots reported on average more than 100 drone sightings per month to the faa. the increase in the number of uas's operating in our airspace creates higher risk of rogue drones, either failing to obey safety rules or operating with nefarious intentions, threatening manned aircraft operations, airports, critical infrastructure facilities and high profile widely attended events such as sporting events, concerts and more. while most individuals operate their drones responsibly, we have already seen careless and malicious actors misuse these technologies to engage in reckless or criminal activities. in september of 2017, a privately operated drone in brooklyn, new york was intentionally flown beyond the

operator's line of sight and collided with a u.s. army blackhawk helicopter patrolling a temporary no-fly zone around new york city. thankfully, the blackhawk and its crew landed safely, but there was significant damage to the helicopter, and the incident created an unacceptable risk to the service members in that helicopter. in 2019, a drone significantly disrupted flight operations at newark liberty airport for 90 minutes, causing nine flights to be diverted, halting 43 planes inbound to the airport, and also causing significant delays for passengers. these events demonstrate the severity of the threat posed by uas, and if we do not act, it could only be a matter of time before someone who is recklessly operating this technology causes an accident that can have catastrophic effects. and as we work to avoid unintentional disasters, we must also account for the escalating threat of weaponized drones from

terrorists and criminal organizations, who could launch a domestic drone attack on mass gatherings, high profile landmarks, and buildings or federal property. this includes foreign adversaries who have deployed drones in conflicts abroad and could have the capability to deploy them here in the united states as well. we must also be prepared to counter drones operated by criminal organizations that are reportedly using uas's for illegal activities, including trafficking illicit drugs across our borders. i am grateful to my colleagues who have led past efforts to address these concerns and to improve the safe integration of uas and american airspace, including senator johnson for authoring the preventing emerging threats act since 2018. the authorities created by this law have bolstered our nation's ability to protect numerous large public events, including the super bowl, from uas

threats. today's hearing is an opportunity to discuss renewing and updating these authorities, which are set to expire this october. as well as the biden's administration's domestic counter uas national action plan, the first coordinated government plan to address the evolving security threats posed by uas. i'm working on bipartisan legislation that i plan to introduce in the coming weeks to reauthorize and strengthen counter us authorities to better tackle this threat today. i'm pleased that we have a panel of expert witnesses from dhs, doj, and the faa who can discuss what lawmakers can do to ensure the federal government is better equipped to safeguard against potential threats from uas's. i'd now like to recognize ranking member portman for his opening comments.

>> thanks, mr. chairman. thanks to the witnesses for being here. i look forward to hearing from you. we're here today to discuss the emerging threats posed by unmanned aircraft systems, or drones. in 2018, under the leadership of senator ron johnson who's here this morning, we provided as congress some new authorities to the department of homeland security and department of justice to counter the threats posed by the use of drones. unfortunately, those authorities are about to expire, and this expiration could not come at a worse time. cartels and transnational criminal organizations use drones to smuggle drugs and surveil u.s. law enforcement in furtherance of illicit cross border activity. these cartels have also begun to weaponize drones in order to commit attacks. so far, these attacks, as far as we know, have been in mexico. but i think weaponized drones along the border are now an emerging threat. to give you a sense of the scale of the problem, in joint testimony before the house committee on homeland security in march, representatives from dhs said that in a previous five month period, cbp identified

more than 30,000 individual flights near or at the southern border where half of those flights violated faa regulations. we know that at a minimum, these drones were used for surveilling our u.s. law enforcement efforts and for smuggling drugs into the country, including fentanyl, the deadly synthetic opioid. relatively small amounts of it can kill hundreds of thousands, millions of people. so it's subject to being smuggled in relatively small drones. my office has repeatedly asked dhs since february of this year for more information and statistics of these drone border incursions and how they plan to address this emerging threat. moreover, the biden administration's domestic counter drone national action plan provides no explicit additional authorities for dhs to counter unmanned aircraft systems as it pertains to the border. make no mistake, the mexican transnational criminal organizations will benefit from the lack of additional counter

drone authority for cbp and other agencies with responsibility for securing our nation's borders. for these reasons, i'm eager to hear how dhs, the doj, and the faa have used their existing authority to mitigate the threats posed by illicit use of drones. i also hope to discuss what new authorities this committee can give the administration to improve the counter drone mission, especially at the border. recently, the biden administration provided this committee with a comprehensive legislative proposal which seeks a number of changes and expansions to existing counter drone authorities. i look forward to working with senator peters, senator johnson, and other members of this committee to review this proposal. the committee has already done good work to address the threat to national security and economic competitiveness posed by chinese made drones when we reported out the bipartisan american security drone act last year. among other things, this legislation would prohibit the federal government from purchasing and using drones manufactured by our adversaries. i'm very concerned about reports of the purchase by dhs and the

doj, law enforcement of chinese drones and the national security risks that this poses. i'm pleased that the legislation that we reported out of committee, but has not yet gone to the floor, is included in the senate passed package. you seek a package and i urge our leadership, particularly speaker pelosi in the house, to swiftly pass so this can become law. with that said, i look forward to productive conversation about the current drone threats to our homeland and actions being taken to prevent them. i look forward to hearing from the witnesses. thank you again, mr. chairman, thank you. chairman peters: it is the practice of the homeland security and governmental affairs committee to swear in witnesses. so if each of you would please stand and raise your right hand. do you swear that the testimony you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god?

thank you. you may be seated. today's first witness is samantha vinograd, the acting assistant secretary for counterterrorism and threat prevention and law enforcement policy in the office of strategy policy and plans at the department of homeland security. ms. vinograd began her career serving president george w. bush as the deputy u.s. treasury attache to iraq, and subsequently served on president barack obama's national security council as director for iraq, director for international economics, and senior advisor to the national security advisor. previously, she was a cnn national security analyst, a senior adviser at the biden institute, and a visiting fellow at the university of chicago institute of politics. ms. vinograd, welcome. you may proceed with your opening remarks. ms. vinograd: chairman peters, ranking member portman, and distinguished members. thank you for inviting me to testify about the department of

homeland security's efforts to protect the homeland from the increasing threat posed by unmanned aircraft systems, often referred to as uas's, or drones. today, i will explain how the department has relied on authorities granted in the preventing emerging threats act of 2018 to counter the malicious use of drones and why we are asking congress to reauthorize and expand our counter drone authorities to fill specific gaps that are exposing the homeland to serious threats. we are committed to judiciously and responsibly implementing our authorities so that we can stay ahead of the threat while protecting privacy and civil rights and civil liberties and absolutely everything that we do. the threat landscape from drones is heightened and candidly escalating extremely fast. drones have been used to conduct dangerous counter attacks, have interfered with aircraft and airports, have been used to survey, disrupt, and damage critical infrastructure and services, and more.

nearly every day, transnational criminal organizations use drones to convey narcotics and contraband across u.s. borders. in fact, cbp has detected more than 8000 illegal cross border drone flights at the southern border just since august 2021. in light of this threat environment, it is critical the dhs had the authority to protect the homeland from uas threats consistent with our statutory missions. to date, dhs has relied on the preventing emerging threat act to carry out critical uas missions, including protecting the president and vice president, safeguarding sensitive assets, facilities and special events in the maritime sector, protecting federal facilities and personnel, and countering illicit narcotic and contraband trafficking. based on our experience through over 300 deployments, there's clear evidence that there are gaps in authorities which are exposing the american people to significant risk. for example, even though the transportation security

administration, or tsa, is responsible for protecting airports, it lacks authority to proactively and persistently protect transportation infrastructure from drone threats and invert disruptions and real tragedies. this is especially concerning since the tsa has reported nearly 2000 drone sightings near u.s. airports since 2021, several of which have resulted in pilots taking evasive actions. 65 evasive actions, in fact, and the disruption of airport operations. furthermore, state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement are often the first responders when a malicious drone incident occurs, but they are not currently authorized to detect or mitigate drone threats, thereby delaying a response. critical infrastructure owners and operators are often the victims of drone surveillance and have even been targeted for kinetic attacks, but they have no authority to detect drones or to request mitigation from authorized law enforcement. bottom line, our partners are

absolutely critical to protecting the homeland from uas threats, but lack the authority to do so, which, again, exposes the homeland and the american people to significant risk. dhs therefore strongly supports the administration's legislative proposal to reauthorize dhs and doj's current authorities, as well as to expand them to remedy the gaps that i've identified. it would grant tsa the authorities it needs to protect the nation's transportation system from uas's. threats would also authorize partners and critical infrastructure owners and operators to engage in detection of uas's. lastly, it would create a limited pilot program for law enforcement to engage in protection activities in their jurisdictions under the strict oversight of dhs and doj. the proposal would require that authorized critical

infrastructure owners and operators adhere to comparable safeguards and standards to those that federal entities follow. non-federal entities would be required to use federally approved equipment, receive standard standardized training and certification, conduct risk based assessments, coordinate with faa to ensure aviation safety, and very importantly, adhere to federal privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. we just cannot keep pace with this threat environment without these additional counter drone authorities. it just isn't possible, and we hope that this committee will champion them. congressional action is urgently required as our current authority will expire in less than three months, and the lapse would be catastrophic. i thank the committee for holding a hearing on this important topic and look forward to your questions. chairman peters: thank you miss vinograd. our next witness is brad wiegmann, deputy assistant attorney general in the national security division at the department of justice. mr. wiegmann brings a wealth of

government experience, having served in legal positions at the department of defense and the national security council over the span of two decades. previously, mr. wiegmann worked at the private law firm of shea and gardner, where he focused on civil litigation and legal policy matters. he's also served as a law clerk for judge patrick higginbotham on the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit. mr. wiegmann, welcome to the committee. you may proceed with your opening comments. mr. wiegmann: thank you, chairman peters. thank you ranking member and members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the department of justice. we strongly support the administration's legislative proposal to allow us to continue to protect major national events and important department facilities from the threat posed by misuse of drones. this legislation would also enable us, as assistant secretary vinograd just said, to expand our counter drone efforts, both in respect to the types of facilities that we can protect and to empower our state

and local partners to participate in this critical mission. so we understand at the doj that drones are bringing great benefits to our society and our economy, but like many advances in technology, drones also bring serious risks to the public when they're misused. as has been alluded to already in the opening statements, we're seeing an increase in the use of drones for a wide spectrum of criminal and other dangerous activities. they can be weaponized to conduct attacks using firearms, explosives, or other materials. they can conduct cyber attacks against wireless devices or networks, and they can conduct espionage or traffic in narcotics and contraband. beyond these nefarious uses, drones are often used carelessly to create hazards to the public. let me just give you a few recent examples. in february 2020, a subject was arrested and charged in connection with his efforts to use a drone to drop explosives near a georgia mobile home park. between september 2021 and february 2022, four defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to deliver contraband via drones into fort dix prison in new jersey. we've recently seen mexican drug cartels using drones to drop

bombs on their rivals in mexico, as well as to traffic drugs into the united states. in may of this year, a defendant was sentenced after using a drone to drop fliers over spectators at two separate nfl games in california, and it obviously could have been something much worse than flyers. under the current authority that congress has granted, the fbi has conducted 70 counter drone protection operations at large events, ranging from the super bowl to the new year's eve celebration in times square. that represents only .05% of the over 121,000 events during that time for which an assessment was requested so that counter drone support could be provided. so the demand for counter drone support has far outstripped the federal government's limited resources. during those 70 operations by fbi, our counter drone teams detected 970 for noncompliant drones in restricted airspace. they located the operator in 279 cases and attempted mitigation against 50 drones.

our current authority, as chairman peters mentioned, to counter drones expires in october if it's not extended by congress. the reason we need this authority is because our use of this technology would otherwise run afoul of various criminal statutes. so our proposal, our legislative proposal, would extend our current authority permanently and then expanded to address some critical gaps. now, i just want to talk about a few of those briefly in my opening statement. first, as has been mentioned, the legislation would authorize state and local law enforcement and owners and operators of critical infrastructure to use certain detection-only capabilities. we need to empower others to help us take on this responsibility. notably, the detection-only technology does not jam, or otherwise disrupt, drones, or other aircraft, and therefore, it does not pose any risk to the safety of the national airspace. this can be safely done today. second, the legislation would authorize a limited pilot program for up to 12 state and local law enforcement entities each year to engage in both detection and mitigation

activities. by mitigation, i mean actually interfering with the flight of the drone. this would allow our state and local partners to protect sensitive state facilities and mass gatherings in their jurisdictions. now, the participants in the program would be required to receive training and vetting and to follow the same rules as federal agencies must currently follow and all of their activities would have to be coordinated in advance with federal partners, including the faa, which could withhold approval if there was a risk to the national airspace. third, the legislation would enable the marshal service to protect high risk prisoner transports. current authority covers our prisons and courthouses, but it doesn't expressly address high risk prisoner transport, so it would fill that gap. i want to say a word about privacy and civil liberties. we are committed to ensuring that we respect all constitutional rights and privacy as we conduct our counter drone activities. the technologies we employ typically detect only communications being passed between the controller and the drone to direct its activities. they do not extract text messages, email or internet

search histories from phones or tablets used to control drones, nor do they allow us to listen to voice calls. we typically collect information such as the drone vendor and model, the controlling device, serial number, the geolocation of the drone, the location of the controller, and the most recent takeoff location. this is much like the information that's going to be required to be broadcast by the new remote id rule and is currently required for manned aircraft. as is required in current law, the doj will continue to have guidance that contains express protections for privacy and civil liberties. and state and locals would be required to follow the same rules. i appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward to answering your questions. chairman peters: thank you. mr wiegmann. today's final witnesses is tanya coultas, deputy associate administrator for security and hazardous materials safety at the federal aviation administration at the department of transportation. in her role, she provides executive oversight of national

security policies, plans, and programs involving manned and unmanned systems. in addition to several other security related topics. ms. coultas has over 30 years of combined federal executive, local, state, military, and international experience supporting defense intelligence safety, disaster response, and crisis management efforts. previously, ms. coultas served as a senior executive for the dhs national protection and programs directorate (now cisa), office of infrastructure protection and for fema. welcome to the committee. you may proceed with your opening remarks. ms. coultas: sure, okay, plan b.

chairman peters, ranking member portman, and members of the committee. thank you for inviting me to speak with you today about the faa's role ensuring safety, security and efficiency of the nation's airspace as it pertains to unmanned aircraft systems, or uas, or drones. at the faa, we are constantly working to welcome these beneficial new technologies into the national air system, while minimizing any impacts to our existing air transportation system and to the public. eevery day, commercially-operated uas contribute to our economy by inspecting infrastructure, supporting agriculture and other industries, assisting public safety agencies, and conducting a myriad of other tasks. congress has recognized these tremendous benefits to our economy and society and has been fully supportive as we integrate this technology into our airspace in a safe and secure manner. however, the faa does acknowledge the potential misuse of this technology poses unique security challenges that enable

malicious actors to exploit vulnerabilities or circumvent traditional ground-based security measures for our security partners. for that reason, congress authorized the department of defense, energy, justice and homeland security to use technologies designed to respond to uas that pose a threat within their mission responsibilities. you are directing the faa to work with these agencies to ensure that detection and mitigation measures do not compromise the safety and efficiency of the airspace. the faa's chief role is to support our partners' testing and eventual use of these detection and mitigation systems, many of which use radio frequency and other technologies that could potentially interfere with air navigational systems, communication avionics systems which are all critical to safety of flight. along with developing our plans

for certification of uas detection and mitigation systems, the faa is also tasked with testing and evaluating these technologies for potential use near airports. we and our security partners have developed agency specific and jointly agreed upon processes to determine when, how, and what detection or mitigation technologies can be safely used in a particular location. we also developed notification protocols to be used during an active detection or counter uas event. the administration's proposal to expand uas detection and mitigation authorities so that other federal departments and agencies, as well as other public and private critical infrastructure entities, will be able to use tested systems to safely protect sensitive facilities, operations, and people from the malicious or errant use of uas. the proposal, which the faa does support, would give limited uas

detection-only authority to the non-federal law enforcement community, as well as airports and critical infrastructure owners and operators. it would also create a temporary pilot program for non-federal law enforcement to begin using uas mitigation technologies under federal oversight. in addition, the faa would be authorized to assess civil penalties against those who use detection or mitigation technologies in an unauthorized manner that endangers the national airspace. all areas of new or expanded authorities include robust safeguards to ensure the current level of safety is preserved. we recognize that expanding uas mitigation authorities beyond our current federal partners will present challenges, and for that reason, the proposal for the pilot program reflects an incremental approach to evaluating such authorities and safeguards that include interagency coordination or participant selection training of system operators, and requires program participants to

work through dhs and doj in coordination with the faa. there is no question that a seamless security framework is critical to advancing the administration's goal of fully integrating us into the nasa, maximizing the public benefits from this technology. by taking deliberate steps to support those entities with duties to protect against emerging uas based threats. the united states will continue to lead the way in the full integration of uas while maintaining the safest, most efficient and most secure airspace system in the world. we thank the committee for its leadership on this issue and look forward to working together to balance safety and innovation with security. chairman peters: thank you, ms. caultus. well, this this committee is constantly focused on all of the threats that the homeland faces on on a daily basis.

and clearly, the three of you have outlined significant threats posed by uas's. but my question for you, mr wiegmannn, is how would the fbi assess the potential threat from uas's along the threat spectrum? is this low, is this medium or is this high? and what i think -- mr. wiegmann: i think what i would say is the fbi director has testified before that this is a very significant threat. given the easy ability to to buy a drone commercially, it's easy to get. they're easy, very easy to use and not that difficult to weaponize as we've talked about. and that's what we're seeing. the fbi director predicted a few years ago that we would see an attack, a drone attack, on a mass gathering. happily, we haven't seen one yet, but i think it's a matter of time until we do see that

type of misuse of drones or an attack in the united states. chairman peters: thank you, ms. vinograd. in your testimony, you discussed the potential use of uas's as weapons, as well as interference tools. they could target airports as well as other types of critical infrastructure here in the country. i would like you to explain for the committee more specifically what authorities does dhs currently lack to counter this this threat. and what should this committee focus on as we draft legislation to reauthorize the current legislation? ms. vinograd: senator peters, thank you. as my colleague just noted, the threat posed by the malicious use of drones represents a significant and increasing risk to the homeland and the american people. currently, under the preventing emerging threats act of 2018, we are authorized to engage in protective measures against credible threats posed by uas's to the safety and security of certain dhs protective missions. that includes, for example, the protection of government personnel, president, vice president, federal facilities, sensitive assets in the maritime sector and elsewhere, as well as mass gatherings.

what we have witnessed over the last four years as we have judiciously and responsibly implemented our existing authorities is that there are significant gaps in our ability to protect the homeland from drones. we have seen an increasing number of malicious drone incidents in and around airports. we have witnessed 2000 sightings of drones in and around airports since 2021. since 2021, aircraft have had to engage in 64 evasive actions that includes four commercial carriers doing so. there have been 30, on average 30, airport disruptions each year. and in these scenarios, seconds matter. what we are seeking for the transportation security agency or tsa is the ability, based upon this escalating threat environment, to engage in the proactive and persistent protection of the transportation

sector to include airports. this will literally help avert tragedy, both as it pertains to the potential loss of human life and economic impact. when airports have to shut down, that costs millions of dollars. so this will help avert tragedy. second, we are seeking authority for state, local, tribal, and this will help avert tragedy. second, we are seeking authority for state local tribal and territorial partners as well as critical infrastructure owners and operators to be authorized to engage in the detection of you a s. those authorities will be implemented under the supervision and oversight of federal departments and agencies we are also seeking the ability for time-limited, six-year pilot program for state, local, tribal, territorial partners to engage in mitigation of got ceo a s.

-- as a committee knows dhs relies on partners all around the country to help protect the homeland and we cannot be everywhere. what we know, the threat posed by uas is widespread across the country. it is critical that our parties have the authority to act of homeland. >> we know that state and local enforcement agencies need additional authority. certainly, it will be the tip of the spear when it comes to protecting our country from these threats and working closely with the federal government agencies. however there have been concerns that have been raised by folks that such an expansion rate some significant challenges in terms of training and preparedness.

mr. wiegmann, i want to ask a question. they want to establish a pilot program to test out these expanded authorities to state and local law enforcement. however, these entities need to have proper training, including how to protect individual rights to privacy as well as effectively executing this pilot program howard. the department of justice and sure that these entities have the necessary training to properly execute these authorities? >> thank you for the question. training is a big part of it as you recognize. we need to ensure that state and locals know how to do this they need to be operating under the right rules and one of the elements of our bill is to establish a training center that the fbi would operate in conjunction with the hms. all of the state and local -- we would work with each of

those and ideas that are designated to participate -- howell providing additional authority to state and local enforcement better repair the department of homeland security to protect -- let's focus on mass gatherings. such as national security special advance and special events assessment reading events. >> as i mentioned, dhs cannot be everywhere. we rely and other contacts and

state level to help us protect and to advance a variety of dhs missions ltd. pardons are granted this out authority, they can prevent catastrophic attacks against mass gatherings and inability of events as my colleague mentioned, these authorities would be implemented under strict supervision and oversight of the federal government including ensuring that these individuals we are operating under federal safeguards as it provides -- as i mentioned in the context of tsa in airports when we're witnessing a drone, threat seconds matter. currently scl tv a thorough days that are on the ground can't detect proactively drones. nor can they mitigate them. the second is that i mentioned

matter and the inability of the partners to respond could cost lives if the partners are granted these authorities. >> thank you. you are recognized for your questions. >> thank you to the witnesses for their testimony this is a serious issue and i agree with miss vinograd who said that a lapse in the authorization would be catastrophic. i think it would help these trans national organizations among others. and yet we need better data to write sound policy. we know what happens on the border with these drones we know that they're used for deliveries not just for drugs but for currency, firearms, and contraband. this committee has, among its responsibilities, oversight and these border activities. we have a particular --

the numbers are higher than ever. last month, and i fentanyl was seized which, is a synthetic opioid that's killing about two thirds of those who die from overdoses, a record level. we know that there is enough seized to kill about 200 million americans and one month. no one at the border things that we are seizing most and not even a significant percentage of what's coming across. it's a big issue. i've a question for mr. vinograd, understanding the increased threat from these transnational criminal organizations, how do you assess the current performance of dhs for encountering the use of drones for cross border illicit activity? >> thank you. i care i share the concern about the transnational criminal organizations and the muscles use of drones over the border. both as it pertains to smuggling carter band as well as surveillance of law enforcement. in addition to other threats.

currently, dhs the, secretary of homeland security has designated three areas of operation along the southwest border as covered facilities are assets. this allows dhs to engage in sea uas operations -- >> let me be more suspect specific you testify that from august 21 to may 22 and a detected more than 8000 drones lights at the southern border. of these 8000 flights how many were successfully mitigated? >> i can ask them to get back to you and your staff with the specifics. >> we have been asking since february. we are not getting the information. >> i think it's a part we have authorization, if we don't have the statistics today,, despite

many inquiries from us, that concerns me. i want to work with you on this reauthorization but we have to have better information to do it properly. with regard to drones, let's talk about china. recently the directors of the fbi and british m15 warned of the national security economic threats posed by china. our greatest long term threat, dominate our market, stealing technology. they talked about the u.s. drone market. they talked about the use of drones. here's an example, according to a report by washington post, the da i as a leading provider of drones to u.s. law enforcement agencies. they have servers in china and they have support from the chinese government. the chinese state security services is one of the customers. our own commerce department has

said that they have been added to a blacklist, -- so there is a report that last year the secret service purchased eight of dji's drones the fbi purchase 18 of them. let me ask you the question on the record. let's start with mr. wedeman, does the fbi currently purchase and use chinese maiden drones, yes or no? >> we. do >> you do. >> we miss vinograd, does dhs use chinese made drones? >> dhs is prohibited from the purchase of runway drones, small uas, absent waivers in a very specific circumstance. >> this report said that dhs purchased eight. >> with certain waivers, very

certain -- >> my question to, you are you purchasing dji drones? >> with specific waivers. >> are you purchasing dji drones? >> with certain waivers. >> you are? >> i can fall with more specific details. >> the answer is yes? >> in a closed hearing i can provide more details. >> miss coultas i, do not want to leave you out. does faa purchase chinese made? rounds >> the responsibility is for the -- to ensure it's a safety and its use in the nasa. we don't actually purchased rounds. >> thank you. again, given what the fbi has told us what, the commerce department told us, what we know from reports, i can't believe we have to write legislation to force u.s. agencies to ban the use of trials made drones. particular and service are in china, when chinese government is a part owner and supporter

of this particular company. we do have that in the bill. it is a requirement in the bill. helping get that legislation passed. if you cannot get it passed, which we all support, whatever do in terms of reauthorization -- >> i share your concerns about these drones. i would love a conversation specific lenders. >> mr. wiegmann? >> we share the concern as well. we want to shift away from the use of chinese drones and the fbi is working on other parts of doj are working on that objective. right now, they're dominating the market. we're working to shift our use of drones away from chinese drones to other alternatives. in the meantime, fbi takes steps to do thorough cybersecurity and supply chain are used to ensure that any risk posed by the use of the technology is mitigated. but we do want to shift away from it.

we definitely support the aims of the sponsors of the bill. i think we provided some technical assistance in some technical issues about things we need to change, just a bill that we could support it and contacts our mission comp system of the provisions. we share the objectives are shifting away from these drones and using alternatives that don't pose the same time supply chain risk. >> the administration supports our legislation. we did negotiated with the administration as well as democrats and republicans here in united states and. we appreciate your support. hope to continue to work with each of you on both of these issues. getting better data as to what is actually happening, we have a special interest in this committee. although with regard to the use of the drones in the potential for national security threat. and used against us. thank you, mister chairman. >> thank you senator, you're

recognized for questions, senator johnson. >> five years ago, we were drafting and passing and preventing emergency threats act of 2018, we obviously understood the threat that drones posed to this nation. a very serious threat. it was very frustrated at the time, that we cannot offer greater authority. five years later, i'm enormously frustrated that we have not made greater progress. we're still taking what i would consider barry baby steps. to me, it is out of control. 2000 sightings around airports. 69 evasive actions. let's get down to brass tacks, what the capabilities. are heavily, on to the current authorities, have we brought down drones around the types of events that dhs can counter? >> senator, dhs has engaged in detection and mitigation of drones in and around concurrence with the authority. >> we have taken down drones. have we advanced our technology

in five years? >> we have certainly advanced technology in five years, yes, sir. >> do we have the capability, right, now to prevent drones from entering restricted airspace around an airport? >> currently, dhs assesses that tsa could respond to an emergency in and around an airport. what we are seeking in the legislation is the ability for tsa to proactively -- >> i'm asking, what is the capability right now. if you have the authority. first, who's the has the authority to establish a restricted airspace? on an airport, stadium, power plants? who has that authority? >> the faa, sir. >> have we established that restricted airspace? we work with our federal partners as well as our non federal stakeholders when requested. >> is the airspace surrounded by an airport surge restricted

to drowning us. >> yes. >> i. airports we have the capability of locking down drones if they enter the restricted airspace? do they have the third capability? not the authority, capability? >> technologically, as. we have the ability to mitigate them. >> so in this legislation at a minimum grant to the authorities so we can almost immediately start knocking down drones when they enter that restricted airspace around airports? >> senator, dhs is deeply supportive of tsa getting the authority to mitigate drones around airports. >> let's start expanding. it that should be the number one priority. mr. wegman, there is no constitutional right to have a drone, correct? >> no. >> you mentioned civil liberties. what civil liberty issues are contemplating for knocking down drones entering restricted airspace? >> we would want to do so responsibly, only when it posed a threat. >> sure, we don't want to knock

them down and create a bigger problem. there be no civil liberties issues, if we establish restricted airspace, and somebody finds into a drone, they have no civil liberties to worry about. we will knock down the drone safely. >> i agree, senator, i don't think that presents civil liberties issue. >> i could not quite understand. you >> i don't think it poses -- >> again, when the drone is flying in restricted airspace, it's not a civil liberties issue, in my view. >> in the proposal in the administration, have we contemplated the priorities of stabbing restricted airspace and granting the authority to knocking down drones when they enter restricted airspace. for example, i'm contemplating around the stadium, on game day. establish that temporary, the restricted airspace, so state local authorities, working with dhs, have the ability to knock those stones down they come out of the skies before they pose a threat. >> we have that 30 now. raskin to extend it. >> have we knock down any

drones around stadiums? >> when you say knockdown, yet you just able, des moines river choir them to divert and land this, we have. we have done that, yes. >> my main point, we have got to move faster. it is great to have pilot programs. that is five or six years in the future. trust me, the public is going to demand that we act a whole lot quicker, or commercial aircraft hits a drone that's under the restricted airspace. i want to make sure in this piece of legislation, we have that authority. and then the funding and the personnel to start protecting -- restricted air spaces as soon as possible. is there anything that's going to prevent that from happening in this piece of legislation. >> that's why we're here,

senator we, agree with you, and are seeking the authority to do just that. >> i am concerned about a pilot program that's going to work with 12 state local and tribal -- it's going to take time. it's going to take some time to ramp up. it takes time to do training and you get up and make sure they're doing this and how to do it and get the technology. they will be able to do multiple missions. overtime, we think that's -- >> my point is, we've taken five years, which i find enormously frustrating. short takes time, we can ensure that it takes less time if we prioritize it as a serious threat and we establish this as a priority for putting more personnel to make sure it takes less time. >> do understand i'm saying? i think 12 pilot programs a year is completely too little. i'm hoping it won't be too late. let's look at this piece of

legislation and start wrapping it up. we have spent trillions of dollars during the federal government. we have to focus on this. this is a serious threat. again, i don't want to have it be too little. i don't want it to be too late on this. >> -- >> i appreciate you pushing this, i want to work with you to strengthen this. i don't think this is strong enough, yet. again, let's not have a piece of legislation that's too little too late. the bill we watched five years ago was too little. unfortunately, it has not been too late to get. let's make sure we do a good job in this. >> i salute, a senator, appreciate your continued leadership on this. issue >> senator hawley, you recognize your questions. >> miss bennett read, if i could start with you. you work in the office of strategy policy in plans, is

that right? >> let me just say, i had my first visit to the state of missouri on friday. >> where did you go? i was deeply impressed with your homeland security. yes, i work in the office of strategy, offices, and plans, you work with robert silver's. >> i do. >> your name is on a memo with mr. silver's dated september 13th 2021. the subject is organizing dhs efforts to counter disinformation. this is the memo that recommends the establishment of the disinformation board. it was turned over to me and to senator grassley by l whistleblower. i have to tell, you we've had the darndest time getting any information about this board out of your agency. we have asked, we have asked members of this committee, we would know virtually nothing had it not been for this whistleblower who turned over a trench of documents, all of which are now public. since i have you here, let me just ask you a question or two about it. whose idea was it to establish

this? >> senator, the department of homeland security has engaged in disinformation work pertaining to threats to the homeland and the american people for over a decade. with respect to this internal working group, there were discussions about the need to ensure that there were guardrails in place across the department to protect civil rights and civil liberties and privacy. as such, there are discussions about creating this internal working group. >> all that, i notice, it's in that passive, and passive ways. my question, is whose idea it was it to set up. you use the word working group. i notice that's not at all what the memo says. that directive that mr. mayorkas signed off on does not make this a working group. it had managers authority. it has directive authority. all that is in the documents. let's not go back to those tired and now disproven talking. points come back to my question. whose idea was it to establish it? >> is it yours? >> without going into internal

deliberations of the department home and security, there are series of discussions among -- >> i'm not going to go into the internal deliberations of the department. >> why not? you are under oath. >> i am, that, said these are internal deliberations at the department. as you know, the title assignments of secretary of homeland security. >> i only know that because of the whistleblower documents. we would not know that otherwise. >> senator the charter are sirens by the director of homeland security. the charter included, excuse, me the working hub included representation -- >> there's a charter call it a working group? >> this was a working group, sir. >> does the charter call it that? >> i don't recall -- >> >> >> know, it does not. was it your idea to establish? >> as i testified, senator, under oath, the establishment of the working group was a decision taken, a conversation that was had among multiple individuals at department.

>> you're not gonna answer my. question miss jon coates, nina jiang quits, she was going to point to run this information board. how is she chosen? >> miss zhang collects was chosen consistent with practices for the hiring and vetting a political appointees. >> walk me through the process. >> i don't know the full scope. >> you weren't involved? >> i was involved in one piece of that. process >> what part? >> i spoke with miss genk. it's >> at one point? >> as part of the standard process for political appointees. i spoke with miss zhengzhou it's. >> what timeframe? >> this would have been -- i don't to give you an incorrect answer. >> a timeframe. >> early 2021 -- >> january? >> i don't recall the exact date. >> generally february perhaps? that would be early 2021. secretary signed at the charter i believe in february of 2021. why did the secretary sign off on her being that the board? >> senator, i don't know that the secretary signed off on

miss genk it's or not. i'm not aware. >> he testified was his decision -- i believe he said he was responsible for it. >> i don't know the full scope. >> did you recommend favorably miss jankewitz to it? >> i was impressed by the expertise of miss jankewitz. i recommended her to others in the department. >> sounds like it's bs? >> you recommended favorably. >> did you, at the time that you spoke with her and recommended with her, were you aware of her long history of comments on twitter and other platforms of disinformation and anti-free speech rhetoric and so forth? it's safe to say -- >> senator, i was aware of the expertise of miss jankewitz in the field of disinformation. >> did you know about her many comments spreading disinformation about russia,

trump administration, conservatives, secretary mayorkas, -- by comparison. i was not aware of any of this at the time. were you aware when you recommend it hurt him? >> in my capacity as acting assistant secretary for counterterrorism that professor and long performance policy, i had not read all of miss jankewitz's treats. i was aware of her expertise -- >> when you did not read all, then i'm sure she is a lot, were you familiar with the ones that have since become public -- >> i was not. >> you are not aware of the time. did anyone bring those two attention at any time before they became publicly released? >> why not my recollection. >> somehow she got through the vetting process with no one, including all the way up to the secretary, apparently aware of what she had set on these public platforms. i find that sort of extraordinary. was the white house involved in the selection of his judgments?

>> i'm not aware the full scope of the process. the standard processes were followed. >> do you know it, the white house is not involved. >> the white house was involved in my process, so, i believe that is standard practice for the white house to be involved. >> okay, i think they were involved. >> i'm not aware the full scope. same as it pertains to other -- >> i'm trying to get what your knowledge is. to your knowledge, i'm not asking what you think may have, and to your knowledge, was the white house involved in selecting mistake about? yes or no? >> you have no idea. >> -- >> what's the current status of the disinformation board? >> it is on pause. >> does that mean? >> the disinformation governance board never met. the secretary has asked the homeland security advisory committee to review how the departments can most effectively address disinformation. and how to do so in a way that

protects civil rights and liberties. he is also asked that the review -- how the department could be as transparent as possible with the american public and increase trust in the work that. we do >> they are asked to conduct the review within 75 days. while that work is pending, the disinformation governance board is on pause. it's not meaning there's work on the way. >> last question. did the board ever meet, than any members of the board ever meet twitter executives? we have minutes of plans and meetings with twitter executives to ask for cooperation and tracking speech. did that ever happen? >> i disagree with your characterization. >> did the meetings with twitter executives ever happened here? knowledge >> if i can finish, i disagree the characterization of the purpose of meeting and that never happens. >> the meeting with twitter never happened. >> dear knowledge never happened. listen, i have to get let other senators question. i regret that it has taken

months to get the most basic information about this report. we would have none of this had not been for a whistleblower who turned over these documents. frankly, that is totally, totally unacceptable. thank you, mister chairman. senator carper, a recognized for questions. >> welcome to our witness. i want to start with miss coldness, do you pronounce it coultas? in your testimony, i believe, ma'am, you mentioned that i manned aircraft systems also known as drones represent the fastest growing sector in aviation to today. i understand that september 2020, two years ago, at 1.7 million drones registered with the faa. this number will only increase in the years to come. could you take a minute or two and explain to us how the

expansion of drone use as impacted the current threat landscape and how the faa plans to grapple with continue disruption to u.s. airspace by drone users? >> thank you for the question. what the faa currently does to contribute to the security of the airspace -- >> could you speak louder? >> that better? >> never been of houston speaking softly. the faa has been doing a number of things working with our security partners and our non federal stakeholders over the last several years as uas's continue the inter grid and grow across the economy both with industrial losers of the drones, it's obvious and industry. things that we have been doing to help mitigate and work with our security partners and ensure the safety of the nasa's

which is faa's number one priority. to ensure drones are integrated into the nasa. and it is done in a safe manner. and it does not affect the rest of the nas and other commercial flights. >> we put in 99 sevens and working with our security partners. we restrictions over certain events who meets security measures and needs. some of those maybe matt get gathering events. we've talked about stadiums and super bowls and other types of events. there other events that go on nationwide and we work with our security partners to put in the additional air restrictions around those events. we look at conducting tabletop exercises when we call t exes working with the state,, local, tribal, territorial and federal partners. when they're at these events and using such scenarios that

if -- if you heard of careless, colorless, or noncompliant, potentially a criminal act or of a drone, how would we actually respond, who has the authority, and what does the response in coronation look like and we have been working on that for the past several years. in addition, we have remote i.d. which starts in september of this year. manufacturers will be required to have all drones manufactured to have what we call self identified or license plates. i'll drones manufactured after september will have to have that on all drones. operators of drones will have to be compliance with the remote i.d. by september next year. >> thank you. my second question would be owed addressed to each of you. i will take a shot at it. protecting our homeland security is the utmost importance when it comes to addressing threats posed by

drones. ironically, last week, my family was at a beach. one of the visitors at the beach brought their drone. and set it down in front of us. send it out over the ocean. brought it back and took pictures and others. back home in wilmington a few days ago, we have a and are experiencing an epidemic of off road dirt bikes in wilmington. and all kinds of cities across the country. they ride their bikes all over the place and create mayhem and havoc. one of the tools to try to stop that is to track them using drones. drones can be used not just to

support criminal activities but to stop them. we need to be mindful of that. protecting our homeland security is the utmost importance when it's -- given that they can be used by criminals who conduct -- as such, close coordination with partners of homeland security, department of justice, federal aviation administration, . but each of you take a moment or two to explain how you respective agencies work together, not as a stovepipe, -- with your state and local counterparts to monitor and counter threats posed by drones. miss vinograd -- >> would you take the first shot? >> certainly, let me say, i

agree, the department of homeland security agrees that drones have a variety of beneficial uses. emergency response, deliveries, recovery, investigative purposes and so much more, what we are focused on is the most use of drones. whether intentional or unintentional. your question about cooperation is critical. the department of homeland security just could not utilize its current authorities, incredibly close fog -- to include, for example, the faa. as we seek the secretaries authorization to designate facility or assets, which would allow us to engage in activities, we are coordinating every piece of that authorization with the faa, for example. when we get a request for sea uas activities, to protect me events and mass gatherings,

that request goes into inter agency working groups that reviews the risks, threats, capabilities, who is best position to respond and more. we have a question earlier, i will stop here, about atf ours, temporary flight restrictions. dhs works incredibly closely with the faa when parts of dhs requested atf are, we are necessary to grant waivers to allow for authorization activity. >> thank you, ma'am. is it being? men >> wearing them. >> i would agree with. that counter drone is very much a team sport. everything we do, we work with dhs and faa, we have. too to argentina fires and so forth to get them. everything we do, we work together. horizontally, there's collaboration, we are starting to do more of, what i say vertical with our state local

partners, including in del mar. in my understanding, delaware is part of our state local working group on drone activity. that is a group that we have and canaan. if we get the authority that we are asking for, we will be working much more intensively with state locals all across the country. both on their detection, only activities, but also with the pilot program that we have described. this is an activity where law enforcement and homeland security officials are working together all the time together with faa. >> my time is expired. i have several more questions. thank you for joining with us today, thank you very collaboration commitment. >> thank you, senator carper, senator langford, you're recognized for questions. >> thank you to all the witnesses today and for the ongoing work. i have some questions about the collaboration you are discussing at this point. when i was -- several months ago, some of our

border stations that we're trying to get you escarpment up an operable, one of our areas along the border, we have over 10,000 incursions and just that area with uas coming across the border from mexico into the united states. they were very eager to be able to get. that when i asked what, is the issue, the equipment was there, the people were there, they were waiting on authorization, there is an ongoing dialogue between dhs and faa. to be able to discuss how we're going to get this up. the equipment, people, need, everything was there. my question is about this collaboration, how long does it take, in this particular instance, we had a situation where that same equipment along the border was being used in a different region of the border. and had been used for a while. in this particular region, it took months to actually get counter uas equipment up and working in that area. how do we speed up this process? where is the slowdown?

>> senator, as noted earlier, i share your concern about the malicious drone threat at the southwest border. i will turn to my colleague from faa in a moment. as you know sir, the secretary of homeland security has authorized three areas of operations on the southwest border as -- we have three up and running, if you will. there are four additional ar as they're pending. we have taken significant steps internally to make the process internally more efficient between cbp in the program management office, part of my team. in addition, we have started doing safely concurrent processes with faa such that this could move as expeditiously as possible. there are four areas of operation, i don't know if it's one of the ones that you visit in, for areas of operations still pending. i will tell, you it is a priority for me, it is a priority for the secretary to get in these authorized as quickly as possible. >> what is the holdup? this is months when that same

technology is used in other places along the border. where is the spot where it's getting stuck? >> i will turn to my colleagues in the faa in a moment. as these aor's are in the process of being authorized, there is a lot of coordination with the faa. each part, each facility is different. there are different complexities in each area of operations. now, again, we are committed to doing this quickly. the threat is significant. each area of operations is different. which is why we coordinate with faa -- >> back to the same spot. this seems to be quickly along a geologic time rather than clock time. it's taking months, when i've interacted with, secretary it's not a phased desk. i talk to faa, they said no it's on the secretary's desk and it just seems to be getting lost. when are figuring out, how to get this on stop. >> i can't go to further details except on one quick. >> on the aor, it's a matter of a few weeks at a maximum.

the others are a little bit more complex. i'd be glad to speak with you in a close session. to speak more specific about that looks. like >> we are committed to doing this with urgency and. care >> how much does it take to get one of these core nations down with the faa to be able to look at an existing technology that out there in the geographic region? >> it varies based on the technology in the location and the complexity of the request that we received. in some cases, and take a matter of days to issue atf. our others, it does take longer. depending on what the actual area is another tiaras that may be in the area. >> can you define longer for me? a matter of days i, can get, what is longer? >> i'm not in the area of issuing the if. ours it varies. we are working with our security partners now in other areas of the country where they're trying to get to if ours. you can vary or as long as we have the information, we are

working close with our security partners and getting that. i cannot give you a definitive of how long. the operations all very. >> here's my challenge on this. we'll take one specific region in the southwest border. when i go there i see the people, as equipment, everyone, strained everyone's ready to go, the writing on a piece of paper to be signed somewhere in washington. i got on the phone and start calling around and start saying where is this and how do we get this unstuck. because they're dealing with at that point thousands of uas coming across from mexico carrying narcotics and doing surveillance. we have the technology sitting there. i'm trying to figure out how we get this unstuck. it's on someone's desk and doing something. if there is a need, this committee is very engaged to be able to help the processes and get them on stuck. we're trying to figure out why it's unstuck. >> senator, i try and be in the business of and sticking things as. well i will tell you for the

one that i mentioned that is forthcoming, a small number of weeks, what we're waiting for in that particular context and in others is that this equipment can be safely used and operated in that airspace. i'm happy to follow up with more details. deeply committed to ensuring the first aor happens in a very small number of leaks. and that the other additional aor's that, again, are more complex when air space perspective or as that quickly as well. >> how long is that? it's going to get unstuck and weeks. how long from a neighbor? started >> i don't have the exact date. when you say first started, it has been just a few weeks since we could move to this next stage of basically looking at this particular airspace and the complexities they're not sharing the crime and can be safely years. i get you a more specific answer. >> very helpful. >> let me ask the same question when we deal with how this is

managed. obviously, it's a huge issue a cell phones, individuals that are actually operating in gangs in criminal activity, stalking, people that they had threatened outside of that facility from the inside of the facility. bringing ercot acts. this has been a break issue. what would slow us down now. those are fixed locations. most of them in remote areas. what would be the challenge of trying to get this counter uas across all of our prison facilities, starting with the most remote, why is that are not already happening? >> we are working on that. we have deployed technology at a number of prisons. i know it's several. there's another 20 that are going to be coming on board. it is a question of getting people trained and getting the technology and working with the faa on the tr's and so forth. , look i understand your patience and i will share. it we want to do this, it is a huge problem, i share your view. we're working with b.o.p.,

definitely a concern about this issue. we had charges this past week in texas. people were smuggling in contraband into prisons. it's not the first one. there are others. i share your concern. b.o.p. is ramping up. >> that is good, this is something we have talked about often around this dais, what is the slowdown? we're trying to figure out what is the issue. we will allocate funds and do the studies and pilots. we will approve all the process. it seems to be years to actually get to execution on something that should be pretty straightforward. especially in an area that's remote. not dealing the complexities of being in the city. this one should not be as far as it seems to be. thank you, senator langford, senator scott, you're recognized for questions. >> i want to thank chair peter 's hand ranking member portman for being here on a important topic.

clearly, from listening to all of, you the importance of this, you're taking it seriously. as we know, technology like drones can steal data. i propose legislation such as the counter chinese drone direct, and the american security drone act to help protect national security, and the privacy american citizens. i am proud to have led the effort, i think we have to go further. the legislation is the next step to ensure that the federal funds for the federal communication commission cannot be used to obtain communications, agreement, services, or provide, or produce -- like the gi. i have a few questions on the reauthorization and preventing the emergency threats act. >> mr. wyden, and i, say right? current law already waves certain provisions and prohibitions taken by doj against drones. this proposed bill waves all of title 18.

why do you need to waive all of title 18 and why not keep the existing waivers in place? >> a couple of things d.o.d. and do we have a broad waiver. it helps us into robert with them. if we have the same authority. that is one. to, while you are correct that our current authority for dhs and doj only extends to certain provisions in title 18, we have been able to use that effectively thus far. we can't predict, this is a changing technology landscape, other statutes could come into play the future. we would be back in congress asking, again, if there's some new technology that's going to give the might a difference that you are not thinking. up we think the cleanest approach, given that we don't think that law enforcement officials using this technology, that you talk about here today to prevent threats from drones, it should not be criminal at all. veteran of be any criminal for vision that they are subject to rather than just a few statutes. we just think it's a cleaner approach. we're happy to discuss that with the committee if that's

not their view. we think it's cleaner to have the same authority that d.o.d. ngo he have, a full suite. >> you have examples where you needed it? if this wasn't in place, where heavy use it and pass? >> thus far, i have said, we've been able to work with existing exemptions we have some specific statute, we can't protect necessarily weather in the future, as technology changes, whether other statutes could come into play. >> so, senator langford talked about the prisons. we know that you said rooms over presence is a real threat. they've been used to drop drugs, weapons, other contraband and two inmates. drug cartels, could be using drones for struggling contraband across borders and prisons. how will this bill improve law enforcement air force to counter this threat? >> drug? threats >> to deal with the prison facts, issues of our prisons. -- >> well, we already have the authority.

it would extend it. the key thing in, it expires in october if we don't extend it. we would not have the authority unless we get -- >> doesn't shane. >> i don't than that, we have the authority in prisons. we just need to extend that authority. >> mrs. vinograd, under the proposed reauthorization it authorizes a limited pilot program in which dhs and doj in consultation of the department of transportation could designate certain law enforcement and it used to use counter drone detection mitigation authorities. can you talk about a selection process for this pilot program? and how state and local agencies will be picked? >> senator, thank you, i will turn to my colleague in the department justice in a moment. we are seeing two things. number one, and the ability for s all t partners, excuse my acronym, to engage in detection or uas. in addition to, that compliant

with all federal standards and safeguards, in addition to, that what we are seeking is a six-year pilot program for sltt partners to engage in mitigation. that selection process would be an inter agency process, these individuals would comply by federal standards and certifications. and they would use equipment for authorize equipment less, as been coordinate with the faa. as well as the fcc. we believe that this is critical. such at the partners of sltt, first responders on the ground in florida and elsewhere, would be able to take urgently needed action to detect and mitigate drone threats. i will turn to my colleague. >> i'm going to look in the back row. >> is that typically through the sheriff's department? >> daytona hearing. we have talked to them about. this it's going to be -- as we select cities, around the country, to participate in the program, it's going to be their

level of interest. >> their expertise and so forth. they would apply. we would see how that process goes. we haven't figured out what the criteria is, how are going to select jurisdictions to do. it imaginable over the country. >> do any of you, i talked about with -- do you all have thoughts about whether -- for a chinese company to be able to sell drones in this country? >> where the federal government ought to be able to buy them or not? do you have any thoughts? >> from the departments perspective, we share your concerns. as well as china's manufacture drones, senator, dhs has issued guidance that prohibits the procurement of small uas, uas manufactured by foreign countries. there are some limited circumstances in which waivers may be granted. generally, we show your concern

about chinese manufacture drones. >> we are working, the problem is, right now they dominate the market. >> a huge shock on the market. if we need to use drones for law enforcement purposes, they are the main game. we are working to transition away from that. it is just, again, there's impatience, it's a question time. in the interim, are taking steps to mitigate whatever risks from the use of the drones. eventually, we transition away from it. the waivers that sam mentioned are necessary for that purpose. they do serve a useful purpose for all manner things that we do. it's not ideal. we are trying to transition away from it. >> from the faa's perspective, we are really responsible for the integration of drones into the national air space and testing of the drones to ensure the safety as they are integrated. we do not have a position on the purchasing of it. >> one quick question. do you see the stuff that came

out in ukraine that the gi drones were being tracked? have you looked into that it? all as i been classified? >> i have seen that. i would be glad to follow up and close hearing. >> thank you, senator scott, senator rosen you, recognized for questions. >> thank you, chairman peters, i appreciate let me holding the hearing. i appreciate all you being here today and what you have been working on. i am want to focus on protecting our stadiums. my home state of nevada, it is the entertainment capital of the world. we are quickly emerging as a sports capital of the world as well. we have a new allegiance stadium, home of the raiders, las vegas is the first city secure the nfl draft, the super bowl, and the probable. unfortunately, this continues to make las vegas a target for bad actors. since the september 11th terrorist attacks, congress, executive branch, you have

recognized the need to protect stadiums and sports events. the faa and initially opposed, like you talked about, temporary flight restrictions, tiaras over stadium events, including four and manned aircrafts. congress subsequently strengthened these requirements, however sports league have imported -- by drones. mister chairman, i ask that i'd be permitted to enter into the record a letter from a coalition of sorts organizations in support of the administration's counter uas proposal. >> without objection, it will be entered. >> miss cole this, as the faa considers new drone policies, do you think it's important to take into account these long-standing protections for stadiums and ensuring that federal policies keep up with evolving threats? how do you plan to do that? >> thank you your question, senator, the faa is, yes, we do agree that as the technology

continues to entered great drones into the airspace the, ability for the detection and mitigation is in place as well. we are working closely with our stakeholders to ensure, as you, mentioned we already do have the farmers for the nfl, major league baseball, nascar, as well as the division one colleges. and then we work very closely for the super bowl and other types of larger events to ensure that we put the appropriate restrictions around those mass gatherings events that are held at stadiums and other venues to ensure the safety of that event but also to ensure that the safety of the airspace over that event. >> let me ask you the follow-up. you have, this draft legislation from the administration that does extend for a critical infrastructure it doesn't specifically mention

stadiums. you are talking about all the things are already doing. shouldn't be specific and identified-ing stadiums and other types of critical infrastructures so we are sure that we don't avoid that we want to avoid confusion and we're sure that communities have the resources to protect themselves? miss coldest, miss nguyen grad. >> the legislation specifically says critical infrastructure. we did not to define exactly which sectors or entities within the critical infrastructure sectors, i would leave that up to congress if they wanted to give us more specifics. we take that as it's all entities critical infrastructure encompasses, and it is the stadiums, as you know, it's chemical facilities, it's the energy sector, it is dams, it is a whole host of other different sectors that may want to come and petitioned through dhs of the justice to faa to get temporary permit

restrictions in addition to being able to use detection equipment and then maybe mitigations. i would defer to my dhs colleagues wants to expand. >> i concur with my faa colleague. we have no objective to -- more specificity. we want to ensure that all critical infrastructures, owners, operators to include stadiums and sports venues that have the authority. >> there is going to be confusion, i am worried. maybe we can define as a minimum a certain group allowing for the flexibility of course to add more is needed. we will continue to work with you on that. i do want to build on what senator scott asked about the pilot program. to extend counter drone capabilities into work with state local law enforcement. and protecting all the critical infrastructure. first of all, do you agree that the pilot program should include stadiums?

you probably. do you are talking to florida. we have a great center in las vegas, we have a lot of things to protect their. have you've been speaking with anyone in nevada? do you believe that the training and surveillance should be shared across these long freshman agencies? that that is a good thing to involve communities? >> i want to look again in the back. we aren't touching with folks in nevada, we can only protect the super bowl, the world series, et cetera. one of the main purpose of the bill, there's thousands, a couple thousand nfl games every year. there's 20,000 baseball games every. there we're only covering tiny, super high profile. the big advantage of the state and local pilot is to allow that force multiplier, the people who are on the frontlines to be able to protect those venues for the ordinary game. that is a big piece in nevada. i fully expect that the

jurisdictions in the pilot we scattered across the country. >> that's the way we should look at our state and local communities. you can't do it all alone. i have about a minute left. i like to move on to cybersecurity. we know that the drones really present significant cybersecurity risks. of course, the country of origin, as we have talked about with china manufacturing, there is malicious actors. they can exploited data and can spoof or dps, they can hijack control of drones that are necessary. assistant secretary vinograd >> can you talk about the specific threats? could you list them and what you might think is the most, the highest, that's worst, to least? all threats might not all be equal. >> cyber security threats or drone threats? >> cybersecurity threats to the

drones. certainly, senator you mentioned several key ones. the exploitation of information on drones. information that is being transmitted between the command and control center. just to clarify, the hearing today is about counter uas authorities, questions more specifically about drones. moving back to the subject of the, hearing counter piece of it, how we stop the stuff we only when we are countering u a f intercept the signal between the control center. . in certain cases, we retain it. when we look at drones being used for religious purposes, we are concerned about -- to change the course of that drone or use it for malign

purposes. or intrusion, things of that nature. from a counter uas perspective, again, we are focused on the signal from the commander control center. we are very aware. -- >> we will have to work on that. i am concerned that making sure that our state local communities understand which threats they have to deal with, the highest threats going down, we can be sure to protect the ones we love. thank you, mister chairman. >> thank you, senator. rosen said under padilla, you're recognized for your questions. >> thank you, mister chair. before i ask my questions, i want to be clear that the potential threat posed by ua as it is one that congress must address before the existing authorities expire.

we absolutely agree on that. i know in california, we have seen how rogue uas can disrupt critical functions including wildfire suppression efforts. my questions are not related to the need for reauthorization, but making sure that we do so in a responsible way. the first area of questions -- it had to deal with the broad exemptions to title 18 that are called for the proposal. the back and forth -- is that currently the case? there's a lot of specific exemptions. it may not be easy. you're making it work. so, there is more than one way to get this done. instead of asking the question over again, i will follow up with this. title 18 for the code includes prohibitions against, for example, committing war crimes,

and tampa dating voters and engaging in the video voyeurism. i understand why the department of justice and dhs might need to be exempt from the wiretap act. why do you need to be exempt from prohibitions against the examples that i just gave? >> yeah, we don't, although, again none of those activities would be authorized by the statute. you can only take under the statutory regime those actions which are necessary to detect and then mitigate credible threats. it's hard for me to imagine boyer is a more war crime coming into play there. the statute would not be a protection against those offenses because of the way it structured. it would not exempted from those offenses. those were never come to play. >> i hear you, but senator as you've seen from an administration to administration interpretations the philosophies can shift and so what would you put into statute in terms of exemptions does matter an