view of government. including mediacom. >> the world changed in an instant, but mediacom was ready. internet traffic soared, and we never slowed down. schools and businesses went virtual, and we powered a new reality. because it media come, we are built to keep you ahead. >> mediacom supports c-span as a public service, along with these other television providers, giving you a front row seat to democracy. a justice department official said, it's only a matter of time before there is a drone attack in the u.s., that comment came during a hearing on unmanned aircraft. more than 2 million drones are authorized to fly in the u.s. aerospace. security experts from the faa and homeland security also warned about the growing threat to these unmanned aircraft systems posed to the u.s..

the committee will come to order. i would like to thank our witnesses for joining us for their continued service to the american people. today's hearing will highlight the threat posed by unmanned aircraft systems, or uas, commonly known as drones. and discuss how federal agencies are working together to combat this evolving threat. we will also examine additional authorities and resources that the department of homeland security, the department of

justice need to successfully counter the uas, while working together with the federal aviation administration. in recent years, the market for a commercial uas has rapidly expanded, due to the affordability and utility of drones that are readily accessible to government, to industry, and two recreational users. the faa s estimates that by 2024, about 2.3 million uas, including one and a half 1 million recreational drones and model aircraft, and about 800,000 commercial uas will be registered to fly in the u.s. airspace. between 2016 and 2019, airline pilots reported an average of more than 100 drone sightings per month that the faa -- the increase in the number operating in our airspace creates a higher risk of drones,

either failing to obey safety rules or operating with nefarious intentions. threatening a man and aircraft operations, critical infrastructure facilities, and high profile events such as sporting events, concerts, and more. while most individuals operate their drones responsibly, we have already seen careless and malicious actors misuse these technologies to engage in reckless or criminal activities. in september of 2017, privately operated drone in brooklyn, new york, was intentionally flown beyond the operators line of sight and collided with a operator controlling a no-fly zone around new york city. thankfully, the black hawk and its crew landed safely. there was significant damage to the helicopter and the incident created an unacceptable risk to the service members in that helicopter.

a drone significantly disrupted flight operations at newark liberty airport for 90 minutes, causing nine flights to be diverted. and also causing significant delays for passengers. these events demonstrate the severity of the threat posed by uas, and if we do not act it could only be a matter of time before someone who is recklessly operating this technology causes an accident that can have catastrophic effects. as we work to avoid unintentional disasters we must also account for the escalating threat of weaponized drones from terrorists and criminal organizations who could launch domestic drone attacks on mass gatherings. this includes foreign adversaries, who could employ drones and conflicts abroad. they could have the capability to deploy them here in the united states as well.

we must also be prepared to counter drones operated by criminal organizations that are reportedly using uas for illegal activities, including trafficking illicit drugs across our borders. i am grateful to my colleagues who have led past efforts to address these concerns, and to improve the safe integration in the u.s. airspace, including senator johnson for offering the emerging threats act. since 2018, the authorities created by this law have bolstered our nation's ability to protect numerous large public events, including the super bowl from uas threats. today's hearing is an opportunity to discuss renewing and updating these authorities, which are set to expire this october, as well as biden's administration counter uas's counter action plan. the first, coordinated government plan to address the evolving security threats posed

by uas. working on a legislation, the plan is introduced in the coming weeks to reauthorize and strengthen counter uas authorities to better tackle this threat. today, i am pleased that we have a panel of expert witnesses from a a chance, from the faa who can discuss what lawmakers can do to ensure the federal government is better equipped to safeguard against potential threats for uas. i would now like to recognize a ranking member -- for his opening comments. >> thank you, mister chairman. thank you to the witnesses for being here, we look forward to hearing from you. we are here to discuss the emerging threats posed by unmanned aircraft systems, or drones. and 2018, under the leadership of senator ron johnson, who is here this morning, we provided congress some -- unfortunately, those authorities are about to expire.

and this expiration could not come any worse time. the cartels and national organizations, these drones can smuggle drugs in cross border activity. these cartels have also begun to weaponize drones, or committed attacks. so far, these attacks, as we, know have been in mexico. but these weaponized drones are on the border now, they are an emerging threat. to give you a sense of the scale of the problem in joint testimony before the testimony -- representatives from a dhs said that in the previous pipe five month period, cbp identified more than 30,000 individual flights near or at the southern border. half of those flights violated faa regulations. again, we know that at a minimum, these drones raise for surveilling for law enforcement efforts, and for struggling drugs into the country.

relatively small amounts of it can kill hundreds of thousands, for millions of people. so it's subject to being smuggled in relatively small drones. my office has repeatedly asked dhs since february of this year for failure -- on how they plan to address this emerging threat. moreover, the biden administration's action plan provides no explicit additional authorities for dhs to counter unmanned aircraft systems as it pertains to the border. make no mistake, they mexican transnational authority benefits from the lack of drone authority, four cpd and other agencies at the nation's borders. for these reasons, i'm eager to hear how dhs, d ha, and the fhfa have used their existing authority to mitigate threats from drones. i also hope to discuss what new authorities this committee can give the administration to approve the counter drone

mission, especially at the border. recently, the biden administration provided this committee with comprehensive legislative proposal, which received a number of changes and expands to existing counter drone authorities. i look forward to working with senator peters, senator johnson of the members of the committee, to review this proposal. the committee's already done good work to address the threat to national security posed by chinese made drones. when we reported the bipartisan american security drone act last year. among other things, this legislation would prohibit the federal government from purchasing and using drones manufactured by our adversaries. i am very concerned about the purchase by dhs and doj law enforcement of chinese drones, and the national security risks this poses. i am pleased to have legislation has not yet gone to the floor. it is included in the senate, which passed this income package. and i urge our leadership,

particularly leader pelosi in the house, to -- this can become law. with that said, i look forward to productive conversation with a current drone threats to our homeland, and the actions being taken to prevent them. i look forward to hearing from the witnesses. thank you again, mister chair. >> thank you, ranking member. it is the practice of homeland security and governmental affairs committee to swear in witnesses. if you two would please stand and raise your right hand. do you swear that the testimony will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god? thank you, he may be seated. today's first witness is the acting assistant secretary for counter-terrorism and threat prevention at law enforcement policy in the office of strategy, policy, and plans at the department of homeland security. she began her career serving

george w. push as the u.s. deputy attaché to iraq and subsequently served on president obama's national security council as director for iraq director for economics and senior adviser to the national security adviser. previously, she was a cnn national security analyst -- and a visiting fellow at the university of chicago institute of politics. welcome. you may proceed with your opening remarks. >> chairman peters, ranking member portman and distinguished members. thank you for inviting me to testify about the department of 's efforts to protect the homeland from the increasing threats from unmanned aircraft systems, also referred to as drones. -- we in the preventing emerging threats act of 2018 to counter

the malicious use of drones. and why we are asking congress to reauthorize and expand our counter drone authorities to fill specific gaps that aren't exposing the home and to serious threats. we are committed to judiciously in response to bentley implementing our -- purview process protecting privacy and civil rights and civil liberties and absolutely everything that we do. -- and escalating extremely fast don't groans have been used to conduct dangerous kinetic attacks, have been used to -- serve a disrupt and damage critical infrastructure and services and more. nearly every day transnational criminal organizations use drones to convey narcotics -- across our borders. in fact -- we 8000 illegal cross border drone flights just since august

2021. -- consistent with their statutory missions. to date, dhs has relied on the preventing of emerging threat act -- including protecting the president and vice president, safeguarding sensitive assets, protecting federal fitted liberties and personnel, encountering -- based on our experience to over 300 deployments, there's clear evidence that there are gaps in our authority which are exposing the american people to significant risks. for example, even though the transportation, tsa, is responsible for protecting airports, it lacks authority to proactively and persistently protect transportation infrastructure from drone threats. and every tragedy. this is especially concerning, since tsa has reported nearly 2000 drilled sightings near u.s. airports since 2021,

several of which have involved pilots taking evasive actions. 65 evasive actions in fact. -- furthermore, state, local tribal and territorial law enforcement is off in the first responders when malicious drone -- there by delaying a response. critical infrastructure, owners and operators are often the victims of drone surveillance and have even been targeted for kinetic attacks, but they have no authority to detect drones or -- bottom line. our partners are absolutely critical in protecting the homeland from the uas threats, but like the authority to do so, which again exposes the homeland in the american people to significant risk. dhs therefore strongly supports the administration's legislative proposal to reauthorize, doj's current snow

coas authorities, as well as to expand them to remedy the gaps i have outlined. -- protects the nations transportation systems from uas threats you would. also authorize some sltt partners who -- to engage in detection of you cuas. you -- go to engage in cuas activities and their jurisdictions, under the strict oversight of doj and the ace. -- adhere to comparable safeguards and standards to those that we fellow entities follow. non federal entities will be required to use -- conduct risk based assessment, coordinated with the faa to ensure aviation safety, and very importantly adhere to

federal privacy, civil rights and civil liberties protections. we cannot keep pace with this threat environment without these additional counter drone authorities, it just is impossible. we hope this committee will champion them. congressional action is urgently required as our current authority will expire in less than three months. and the laps would be catastrophic. i thank the committee for holding the hearing on this important topic and look forward to your questions. >> thank you. our next oh, thank you samantha vinograd. >> our next guest is mr. brad wiegmann. -- having served in legal positions of the department of defense and the national security council over the span of two decades. previously he worked at the private law firm -- where he focused on -- he also served as a law clerk

for judge patrick -- mr. wiegmann welcome to the committee. you may proceed with your opening comments. >> thank you -- for the opportunity to testify today on the behalf of the department of justice. we strongly supported administrations legislative proposal to allow us to continue to protect major national events -- to the threat posed by the misuse of drones. this legislation will also, as secretary vinograd just, said to expand our counter drone efforts them -- and to empower our state and local partners to participate in this critical issue. we understand the geo day drones are bringing great benefits to our society and our economy. they are also providing serious risk to the public when misused. we are seeing an increase in the drug use of drones for a wide spectrum of criminal

another dangerous activities. they can be weaponized to conduct attacks, using firearms another explosive materials. -- they can conduct espionage and trafficking narcotics-ing contraband. apart from these nefarious uses, drones are often used terrorist carelessly to create hazards to the public. -- it let me give you an example. in february 2020 a subject was charged -- between september 2021, in february 2022, four defendants pled guilty to a conspiracy to deliver contraband to a prison -- used to drop bombs on their rivals in mexico. -- in may of this year, a defendant was sentence after using a drone to drop flyers over spectators at two separate nfl games in california. it obviously could've been something much worse than flyers. under the current authority, the congress has, granted the

fbi has conducted 70 counter drone operations -- related to the super bowl celebration in times square. -- 121,000 events during that time of which an assessment was requested so color don't support could be provided. the demand for a counter drone supporters far outstripped the federal governments limited resources. during the 70 operations by fbi, are counted drones detected 974 noncompliant drones and restricted space. -- our current authority to -- expires in august. -- our proposal, we'll extend our current authority prominently and will expand to address some critical gaps.

i want to talk about a few of those briefly in my opening statement. first, as it has been, mention the legislative is authorized state and local enforcement, as well as owner and operator of critical infrastructure, to use -- we need other powers to help us take on this responsibility. -- it is not jammer the wise disruptor i'm sort of their aircraft. and does not pose any risks to the safety of national airspace. this can be safely done today. it also authorized a-limited pilot program for up to 12 data and local law enforcement each year to dedicate the engagement book detection and mitigation activities. by medication i mean interfering with the flight of the drone. this can help us protect sensitive -- the participants of the program will be required to receive training, vetting, and follow the same rules that the agency

currently follows. -- federal partners, including the faa, which could withhold approval if there is a risk in the national airspace. -- all constitutional rights and privacy as we conduct our counter drone activities. finally, i will say word about privacy and civil liberties. we are committed to ensuring our civilian booties -- the technologies we employ, typically detect only communications being passed between the controller and the drone to direct its activities. they do not extract text messages, email, or internet search histories from phones or tablets used to control drones. nor do they allow us to listen to voice calls. we typically collect information such as the drone vendor model, the controlling device serial number, the geolocation of the drone, the location of the controller, and the most recent -- takeoff location. it is much like the information

that will be required for broadcast by the new remote i.d. rule and is currently required for manned aircraft. the doj will continue to have guidance that can a -- state and local o -- i appreciate the opportunity to testify today. i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you, mister wiegmann. today's final witness is tonya coultas now -- at the federal aviation administration at the department of transportation. enroll, she provides executive oversight of national security policies, plans, and programs involving, manned and unmanned systems, in addition to several other security related topics. miss coultas, over 30 years of combine local, federal, state and -- supporting defense, intelligence, safety disaster

response and crisis management efforts. previously, this coultas served as a senior executive for the dhs national -- and the program director, now -- and for fema. welcome to the committee. you may proceed with your opening remarks. >> oh can you hear? sure. okay. plan b. chairman peters, ranking member portman and members of the committee. thank you for inviting me to speak with you today about the faa's role in ensuring safety security and efficiency of the nation's airspace as a pertains to a ninth of craft systems, or you a, fc or drones. at the faa, we are constantly working to welcome these

beneficial new technologies into the national air system, while minimizing any impacts to our existing air transportation system into the public. every, day commercially operated uas contribute to our economy by inspecting infrastructure, supporting agriculture and other industries, is assisting public safety agencies and conducting a myriad of other tasks. congress has recognized these tremendous benefits to our economy and society and has been fully supportive as we integrate this technology into our airspace in a safe and secure manner. however, the fear acknowledges the potential misuse of this technology poses unique security challenges that enable militias actors to exploit vulnerabilities or circumvent traditional, ground based security measures, for our security partners. for that reason, congress authorized the department of defense, energy justice and homeland security, to use technologies designed to respond to the uas the pose a

threat within their mission of responsibilities. you are directed the -- to work with these agencies to ensure that detection and mitigation measures do not compromise the safety and -- of the airspace. -- the eventual use of these detection and mitigation systems, many of which use radio frequency and other technologies that could potentially interfere with air navigation systems. communication, avionics systems, which are all critical to the safety of flight. -- the faa also tasked with testing and evaluating these technologies for potential use near airports. we and our security partners have develops agency specific and jointly agreed upon processes to determine when, how, and what detection of

mitigation technologies can be safely used in a particular location. we also develop notification protocols to be used during an active detection or counter uas event the. the ministration's proposal to expand uas protection and mitigation authorities, so that other federal departments and agencies, as well as other private and public critical infrastructure entities, will be able to use and testy systems to safely protect sensitive facilities operations and peoples from the malicious use of uas. the proposal, which the faa supports, which among other, things give limited uas authority to the non federal law enforcement communities, as well as airports and critical infrastructure owners and operators. it will also created temporary pilot program for non federal law enforcement to begin using uaf, uas technologies --

against those who use those -- technologies in an unauthorized manner that endangers the national airspace. all areas of new or expanded authorities include -- we recognize that expanding uas medication authorities be on our federal partners will present challenges. for that reason, the proposal for the pilot program reflects an incremental approach to evaluating such authorities and safeguards on include inter agency coordination or participants election training of system operators, and requires program participants to work through dhs and doj in coordination with the faa. there is no question that a seamless security framework is critical to advancing the administration's goal of fully integrating the uas into the nas. -- by taking deliberate steps to

support those entities with duties to protect emerging uas base threats, the united states will continue to lead the gray with the full integration of uas while maintaining the safest and more sufficient and secure a space system in the world. we thank the committee for his leadership on this issue and look forward to working together to balance safety and innovation with security. >> thank you. miss coultas. this committee is constantly focused on all of the threats that the homeland faces on a daily basis. clearly, the three of you have outlined significant threats posed by uas. my question for you mr. wiegmann, how would the fbi assess the potential threat from uas along the threats spectrum? is that low, medium, or high? and why? >> i would say that is the affair director has testified before, this is a very

significant threat. given the easy ability to buy a drone, from originally, it's easy to get. the very easy to use. they're not that difficult to weaponize. as we talked about. that's what racing some already. the fbi director predicted a few years ago that we would see an attack a drone attack on a mass gatherings. happily, we haven't seen one yet. but it's a matter of time before we do see that type of which drones for attack on the united states. >> miss vinograd, in your testimony, you discuss the potential use of uss, we uas as both weapons that interference tools that can target airports as other types of critical infrastructure here in the country. i'd like you to explain for the committee more specifically what authority does dhs currently like to counter this threat and what should this committee focus on as we draft legislation to authorize the current legislation? >> senator peters, thank you.

as my colleague just noted, the threat posed by the malicious use of drones represents a significant and increasing risk to the homeland and the american people. currently, under the preventing emerging threats active 2018, we are authorized to engage in protective measures against credible threats posed by uas to the safety and security of certain dhs protected missions. including the protection of government personnel, president, vice president, federal facilities, sensitive assets in the maritime sector as an elsewhere as well as mass gathering, like sears and and it's a cease. what we have witnessed over the last four years is that we have judiciously and responsibly implemented our existing authorities, and there are significant gaps in our ability to prevent our homeland from drones. -- we have seen an increasing

number of malicious incidents in and around airports. we have witnessed we have -- 2000 sightings of drones in and around airport since 2021. since 2021, aircrafts have had to engage in -- invasive action, including commercial carriers. they have been three airport disruptions on average each year. in the scenario, seconds matter. what we are seeking for the transportation sick, the -- tsa, is the ability based on the o -- mr. engage in their proactive protection -- this will literally sir help address our tragedy. tragedy both as it pertains to the potential loss of human life and economic impact. when airports have to shut down, that cost millions of dollars. this will help for tragedy. second, we are seeking authority for state, local,

tribal and territorial partners, as well as critical infrastructure owners and operators, to be authorized to be gauged in the detection of uas. those authorities will be implemented under the supervision and oversight of the federal departments and agencies. we are also seeking the ability of time-limited, six-year pilot program, for state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to engage in medication of cuas. as it pertains to state, local, tribal, interchangeable partners and we state and national operators -- we know the threat posed by is uas widespread across the country. it is critical or partners have the authority to protect our homeland. in addition to t a as getting the authority to protect the transportation sector.

>> we certainly know that state and local enforcement agencies need additional authorities. certainly they are going to be the tip of the spear when it comes to protecting our country from these threats in working closely with federal government agencies. however, there are been concerns that have been raised by folks at such an expansion creates some significant challenges, in terms of training and preparedness. so, mr. wiegmann, i will ask this question. the administration's proposal would establish a pilot program to test out these expanded authorities to state and local law enforcement. however, these entities need to have proper training, including how to protect individual rights to privacy, as well as effectively executing this pilot program how with the department of justice ensure that these and seize have the necessary training they need to probably execute these authorities? >> thanks for that question senator.

training is a big part of it. as you recognize the need to ensure that the state and locals are gonna do, if they need to know how to do it. and they have to know the rules. one of the elements of our bill is to establish a training center, that the fbi would operate, in conjunction with the dhs. all of the state and local, it would only be up to piloting 12 inches tease the year. we would work at these entities designated to participate in the pilot program. do the training. learn what equipment could be. you learn how to operate it. learn what the rules are. they would have to follow the same federal rules in terms of any data they would have to collect. how it can be retained, disseminated and use. and when they engage in mitigation activities, what the rules of vindication. are they will have to be certified. and when they are doing their risk based assessments, as to which facilities and events are gonna protect, that will also go to federal oversight as well. this is not the kind of thing that we will hand it off to the states and look them takeover.

it would be something that we, the federal authorities, will be continued to be actively involved. -- >> miss vinograd, how will providing additional authorities to state and local enforcement better prepare the homeland security to protect, let's focus on mass gatherings, and national security events? >> senator, as i mentioned, dhs cannot be everywhere. we rely on other whip state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to help us protect -- if sltt partners are granted this authorities, they can help prevent catastrophic attacks against mass gatherings a variety of size deliberative venues. as my colleague mr. wiegmann just mentioned, these authorities will be implemented under strict supervision and oversight of the federal

government, including ensuring that these individuals authorized to conduct peace operations are operating under comparable federal safeguards as they pretend to privacy and civil rights and civil liberties. as i mentioned's tsa in airports, when we're witnessing a dual drone threat, seconds matters. currently sltt authorities that are on the ground cannot detect proactively drones, nor can they mitigate them. those seconds that i mentioned senator really matter. in the inability of our sltt partners and their jurisdictions to respond could cost lives, if their partners are not grounded these authorities. sen. portman: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to the witnesses for their testimony. this is obviously a serious ranking member -- recognized. >> thank you. this is a serious issue. i agree with miss vinograd that a lapse in the authorization would be catastrophic. i think it would help these not transnational criminal

organizations among others. yet we need better data to be able to put together the right authorization to rights and policy. we know, already, what happens on the border with these drones. we know they're used for deliveries, not only for drugs, but currency in fire arms and other contraband. this committee has amongst responsibilities oversight of dhs and its border activities. we have a particular interest. i certainly do. in this issue of the synthetic opioid rates that are streaming across our border today. the numbers unfortunately are higher than ever. last month, enough fentanyl seized, which is a synthetic opioid that is killing two thirds who died of overdoses, which is that a record level, there is enough to kill 200 million americans in one month. no one on the border thinks that we are seizing most and not even a significant percentage of what is coming across. so, it's a big issue.

this vinograd, a question for you, understanding these increased threats from these criminal organizations, how do you assess dhs's current performance -- ? >> senator thank you. i share your concern about transnational criminal organizations and the militias use of trump drones -- both as the use of -- in addition to the threats. currently, dhs the secretary of homeland security has designated three areas of operations along the southwest border has covered facilities or assets. this allows dhs, cbp more specifically, to engage in uas operations -- >> that may be more specific, because they don't have that much time. in your testimony you stated that in august 20 12 --

of these 1000 flights, how many risks excessively mitigated by dhs? >> senator, i can ask cbp to get back to you and your staff with the specific -- >> we have been asking for this since february and persistently and we are not getting the information. i think it's important we have information. if we don't have this just a six today. if you don't have. it despite many inquiries from us, that concerns me. i want to work with you on this reauthorization, but we have to have that information to be able to do it properly. with regard to drones, let's talk about china for a moment. recently, the directors of the fbi and british and 15 warned of a national security threats posed by china, our greatest long term threat they

identified. stealing our technology -- they talked about the use of drones. here's an example according to a report by washington post, china's dji is a leading provider of drones to the u.s. law enforcement agencies they say. it has served in china. they have support from the chinese government. chinese state security services is one of their customers. here's our own commerce department saying they have been added to an export blacklist last year after reported they provided 16 already -- where millions of uyghur muslims have been forced in internment camps. there is a report that last year, that the secret service purchased eight of their drones. fbi purchased 18 of the. let me just ask you these questions on the record. we'll start with mr. wiegmann, does the fbi currently

purchased and used chinese made drones, yes or no? >> we. do >> you do. >> miss vinograd does the pentagon purchase and used chinese made? drones >> pentagon is prohibited from using foreign made drones -- for very specific circumstances. >> this report that i mention mentioned the secret service repo'd purchased eight drones chinese made drones -- >> my question to you is caused with specific waivers >> are you purchasing chinese? veterans >> with certain waivers, we are purchasing chinese made drones. >> does the faa currently used chinese made? drones >> affairs responsibilities for the integration into the nas

testing of technology for its safety and used in the nas. we do not actually purchased. rounds we do the testing of the drones. >> thank you. again what the fbi has told us, what -- what we know from reports. i cannot believe we have to write legislation to force u.s. agencies to banned the use of chinese made drones, particularly when the services are in china, where the chinese government is part owner and supporter of these particular company. but we do have that in the u seek a bill. it's a requirement in that bill. i hope we can get that legislation passed. if we cannot get it, passed -- this vinograd. >> i share your concern about these drones and will welcome a

conversation and specific language sir. >> just to be clear. whisks share the concern as well. we want to shift away from using chinese drones. the fbi is working, and other parts of you doj are working on that objective. right now they are dominating the market. we are working to shift away from chinese drones to other alternatives. in the meantime, the fbi take steps to -- church or any risk by the use of the technologies mitigated. but we do want to shift away from. it we definitely support the aims of the sponsors of the bill. we've provided some technical assistance on some technical issues of changes that we need to make to the bill that we need to support it and could conduct our mission consistent with the provisions. we share the objectives of shifting away from these drones and using other alternatives that don't pose the same supply chain. risk >> the administration supports the legislation, and we did negotiated with the administration as well, as well

as democrats and republicans in the united states senate. we appreciate your support. of the broader legislation and hope we continue to work with each of you on both of these issues. getting better data as to what's actually happening. -- >> thank you mr. portman. senator johnson, you are recognized for questions. >> -- we obviously understood the threat the drones posed to this nation. the very serious threat. i was very frustrated at the time that we can offer greater authority. five years later, i'm enormously frustrated that we haven't make raider progress and was still taking what we are taking baby steps, went to meets out of control. 2000 sightings around airports,

69 invasive actions. let's get down to brass tacks. let's find out what our capabilities are. have we under the current authorities brought down drones around the types of events that the dhs can counter? >> senator, dhs has engaged in detection and mitigation of drones in and around, concurrent with the authority -- >> so we have taken controls? >> that we advance our technology in five years? >> we certainly have advanced technology in five years. yes sir. do we have the capability right now to prevent drones from entering restricted airspace around airports? >> currently, dhs assesses the tsa could respond to an emergency in around an airport. what we are seeking in the legislation is the ability for tsa to proactively -- >> i'm asking. is our capability right, now if you have the authority, first

to have to find out who has the authority to establish a restricted airspace around an airport, around the stadium, around power plants, who has that authority? >> the faa's. or >> the faa. have we established that restricted airspace? >> we work with our federal partners as well as or non federal stakeholders when requested -- >> is the airspace around an airport restricted to drug use right now? >> yes. >> all airports? >> yes. >> do we have the capability of knocking down drones if they enter that restricted airspace? do we have that capability? maybe not the authority, but the capability technologically? >> technologically yes. we have the ability to mitigate militias drone threats. >> so shouldn't this win -- grant you the authority almost immediately so you could start

knocking down some drones around airports? >> dhs is very supportive of the receiving the authority to mitigate drone threats around airports. >> -- but several liberty issues are contemplated for knocking down drones entering a restricted airspace? >> we would want to do so responsibly. >> sure we. don't want to knock the down and create a greater problem. but they'd be no several liberties issues if we establish restricted airspace, and somebody flies in and drone, they've got no civil liberties to rebound, we're gonna knock down the drone safely if we can. >> i agree. i don't think that presents a civil liberties issue. >> i agree with you senator. -- >> so, in the proposal beat ministration gave, us have

re-contemplated the priorities of establishing restricted arabs faith in granting the authority to be knocking down drills when they enter restricted airspace? i i'm complaining around the stadium on game day. establish a temporary restricted airspace, so the state and local authorities, working with dhs, have the ability to knock the doors down take them out of the skies before they pose a threat? >> we have that authority now senator. that's what we're asking to extent. but yes. >> have we knocked out many drones around stadiums? >> when we say knockdown, yes, we've disabled, and we've required them to divert and land. yes we have. enough at a number of events as i mentioned. we have done that. yes my main point here is we've got to move faster. it's great to have pilot programs. that's five, six years in the future. trust, me the public is gonna demand that we act a whole lot quicker if a commercial

aircraft hits a drone that is entered restricted airspace. so, i want to make sure in this piece of legislation, we've got that authority. and then the funding in the personnel to start protecting our restricted airspace as soon as possible. is there anything that is gonna prevent that from happening in this piece of legislation? >> that's where we hear senator. we agree with you. we are seeking the authority to do just that. >> but again, i'm concerned about the pilot program that's gonna work with 12 state and local and tribal -- >> it's gonna take some time. >> that's a pretty slow roll out. isn't? it >> it's gonna take some time to do the training and make sure they're up into do this -- they will be able to do multiple missions. overtime -- >> my point, is we've already taken five years, which i find

enormously frustrating. and sure takes time. but we can ensure that it takes less time if we prioritize as a serious threat, and we establish this is a priority for moving more personnel to make sure it takes less time. you understand what i'm saying? i think 12 program, 12 pilot programs a year is too little maybe too late. -- we spent trillions of dollars during the federal government. we have to focus on this. this is a serious threat. again, i don't want to have it be too little. and i don't want to still be too late on this. i appreciate you mister chairman. i want to work with you to strengthen this. i don't think this is strong enough yet. let's not have a piece of

legislation that is too little too late. the bill we passed five years ago with two little. fortunately, it hasn't been too late yet. let's make sure we do a good job on this one. absolutely senator. we look forward to working with you on this. one we appreciate your leadership on this issue. thank you senator johnson. senator hawley, you're recognized for your questions. >> thank you. miss vinograd, if i can start with you, you work in the office of policy -- >>'s first let me say senator i made my first visit to the state of missouri on friday. i was very impressed by your homeland security. i look forward to going back. yes i work for the office of strategy of policy -- >> -- >> your name is on a memo with mr. silver's date it's september 13th 2021. the subject is --

this is the memo that recommended the establishment of the disinformation board. he was turned over to me and to senator grassley by whistleblower. we have the darndest time getting any information of this board out of your agency. we've asked and we passed. members of this committee has asked. we would virtually know nothing if not had been for this whistle blower that turned over these documents, all of which are not public. -- let me ask you a question too about. whose idea was to establish the sport? >> senator, the department of homeland security has been declared engaged disinformation work pertaining to homeland and threats to the american people for over a decade. -- there were discussions about the need to ensure that there were guardrails in place across the department to protect civil rights and civil liberties and privacy and as such, there were discussions about creating this internal working group. >> all of that i noticed is in

the passive voice. >> my question is whose idea was to set up the committee? >> you use the term working group, but that is not what the memo. says it doesn't call it a working group. the directive that mr. -- signs of. does not make this a working group. it has managerial authority, directive authority, so let's not go back to those tired analogies, proven talking points. whose idea was to establish the board? was it yours? >> there is a series of discussions among personnel -- >> who? >> i'm not gonna go into the internal deliberations of the department. >> why not? you're under oath. >> i am under oath sir. that said, these are internal deliberations at the department. as you know sir, the charter was signed by the secretary of homeland security. >> i only know that by the way because of the whistleblower documents. we will not know that otherwise. >> senator, the charter was signed by the secretary of

homeland security. the charter include, excuse, me the working group included representation -- >> does the treasure called it a working group, since you bring up the charter? >> this was a working group sir. >> does the charter calling it a working? group >> no. i don't recall. >> -- the answer is that it does not. was established established abort? >> as i testified under oath, the establishment of the working group was a decision taking, a conversation that was had among multiple individuals about the department -- >> so you're not gonna answer my question. -- how is she chosen? >> miss genk awaits was chosen consistent with practices for the hiring and vetting of appointees. >> walk me through that process. who was involved? >> i don't know the full scope of that process. >> you earned involved? and >> i was involved in one piece of that process. >> what was your piece? >> i spoke with miss -- >> about what?

>> as part of the standard -- >> what timeframe with this event? >> i don't want to give -- >> just give me a timeframe? >> early 2021. >> january february time period perhaps, early 2021. the secretary signed the charter in february 2021. when did the secretary sign off on miss gentle with being head of the port? >> senator, i don't know if that the secretary signed off on miss genk awaits at all. i'm not aware. >> he testified it was his decision. >> i believe the secretary testified that he was ultimately responsibility for this decision. >> so it wasn't his decision? >> oh -- i don't know >> ross -- >> -- i was impressed by her expertise and i noticed -- >> that sounds like a. yes you're recommended

favorably. at the time, that you spoke to her in recommended with, or were you aware of or long history of comments on twitter and other platforms of disinformation, anti free speech rhetoric and so forth which has to think i safe to say infamous? >> senator, i was aware miss genk witnesses expertise in the field of disinformation. >> did you know about her many comments spreading disinformation about russia, about the trump administration, about conservatives? secretary mayorkas, said he was not aware of any of this at the time. were you aware at the time you recommended her to him? >> in my capacity at acting assistant secretary of --

i have not read all of her tweets. >> -- >> -- >> did anybody bring those to your attention at any time before they can became publicly released in this vetting process? >> not to my knowledge. >> so somehow she got through the vetting process with no one, including all the way up to the secretary, unaware of what she said on these platforms. i found that extraordinary. was the white house involved in the selection of miss genk awaits? >> i'm not aware. as a political appointee, the standard processes were followed. >> so to your knowledge, the white house was not involved? >> the white house was involved with my process. so i believe that that is standard practice for the right has to be involved. >> so you think that they were involved in the selection of miss genk awaits? >> i'm not aware of the full scope of the hiring in vetting process. it was the same as other --

>> and trying to get to what your knowledge. is to your knowledge, was the white house involved in selecting the strength of? it's just yes or no? >> i really don't know. sir >> okay. you have no. idea was the current status of the disinformation board? >> it's on pause. >> what does that mean exactly? >> it means the disinformation governments were never met. the secretary has asked homeland security advisory committee to review how the department did most effectively address disinformation and how to do so in a way that protects civil rights and civil liberties. he's also asked that the -- -- review how the department can be as transparent as possible with the american public increase the trust in the work that we do. -- while that workers, pending the disinformation governments borg is on pause. it's not meeting. there is not work underway. >> last question. did the board ever meet members, of the board ever meet with twitter executives?

we have minutes of planned meetings with twitter executives task for cooperation and tracking speech, did that ever happen at any point your knowledge? >> i disagree with your characterization. >> did the meeting with the twitter executives never happened? >> i disagree with your characterization of the purpose of a meeting that never happened. the meeting with twitter never happened. >> dear knowledge never happened. i've got a lot other senators questions. i would say i regret that it has taken months to get the most basic information about this report. we would know none of this, none, had it not been for whistled who turned over these documents. frankly, that is totally, totally unacceptable. thank you mister chairman. >> thank you senator hawley. senator carper you are recognized for your questions. >> i will start with miss coultas. you pronounce your name coultas? >> that is correct. senator >> in your testimony, i believe you mentioned that the

unmanned aircraft, also known as drones, represent the fastest growing sector in aviation to today. ago, theri understand that of r 2020, two years ago, there were 1.7 million drones that were registered with the faa. and this number will only increased in years to come. and that said, could you take a minute or two and explain to us how the extension of the drone use has impacted the current threat landscape and how the faa plans to grapple with continue disruption to u.s. airspace by drone users? >> like you senator for that question. what the faa currently does to contribute to the security of the airspace -- >> can you just speak a little bit louder? >> is that? better >> that's better. >> other ridiculed of speaking

softly. thank you senator. the faa has been doing a number of things working with our security partners and our non federal stakeholders over the last several years as uas continue to be integrated and grow across the economy, both with industrial users of the drones as well as hobbyists and industry. things that we have been doing to help mitigate and work with our security partners and ensure the safety of the nas, which is obviously a phase number one priority, is to make that drones are integrated into the nas and it is done safely and it does not affect the rest of the nas as well as passenger commercial flights. we authorize and we put an existing, what we call temporary 1997, working with our security partners, temporary air restrictions over eastern events, who meet certain security measures and needs necessary. some of those may be mascara

ring offense. we talked about stadium, super bowl, other types of events, the, borders other events go on nationwide throughout the year, that we work with our security partners to put in. also additional air restrictions around those events. we also look at conducting table top exercises, and also what we call t t exodus again, working with state, local, tribal and territorial and federal partners, when they are at these events and using such an that if a drone would come into the airspace, or if as you heard them, say careless or clueless or noncompliant or potentially criminal actor of a drone, how would we actually respond? who has those authorities? what does that response in coordination look? like we have been working on that for the last several years. in addition, we have remote i.d., which starting september of this, year manufacturers will be required to have all drugs manufactured to have what we have a self identifier or

license plate. so all drones manufactured after september will have to have that on all drones. and operators of drones will have to be compliant with the remote i.d. rule by september of next year. >> all right. thank you. with my second question will be one i can address to each of you. we'll take a shot at it if you would all take a shot and. protecting our homeland security is of the utmost importance when it comes to addressing threats drone posed by drones. last week my family was at a beach. and one of the visitors joining us at the beach brought their drone. set it down in front of us. centered over the ocean. some distance. almost out of sight. and brought it back. taking pictures. of us and others. pretty amazing. two or three days ago, i was back home in wilmington,

delaware, and we have experiencing a an epidemic of off road dirt bikes in wilmington, all kinds of cities across the country. these people get on the streets and ride their bikes all over the place, or even know -- one of the tools to try to stop that is to track them using drones. a drunk can be used not just to support criminal activities but actually stop them. and i think we need to be mindful of that. protecting our homeland security is of utmost importance when it comes to address threats posed by drones. given that they can be by criminals to conduct illegal -- as well as trafficking of drugs and firearms. as such, close coordination with the departments of close to home on security, department of justice, federal aviation administration is critical when

it comes to mitigating these threats. could each of you take a moment or two to explain how you respective agencies work together, not as a stovepiped, but as a work together. and with your state and local counterparts and monitoring color threats posed by drones? miss vinograd o, is it vinograd? >> it is. sir sorry it's a tough one. >> could you take a first shot at. that >> the department of security homeland security agrees that drones have variety of beneficial uses, emergency responses, deliveries, a vest to get a purposes and so much more. what we're focused on is the militias use of drones, whether intentional or unintentional. your question of cooperation is critical. the department of homeland security could not utilize its current cuas authorities --

to include for example the faa. as we seek the secretaries authorization for example to designate a covered facility or asset which then will allow us to engage in cuas activities, we are recording every piece of that authorization with the faa for example. when we get a request for cuas activities to protect a no -- or and -- event too -- temporary flight restrictions. dhs works closely with the faa -- and written essay to grant waivers to love for authorized

activity to include the first amendment protected activity as well. >> thank you man. mr. wiegmann. >> i would just heartily agree with that. the counter drone business is a team sport. everything we do, we work with dhs and faa. we have. to that we want to or not. -- everything we, do we work together. horizontal horizontally there's a lot of collaboration. and we are also starting to work vertical with our state and local partners. including delaware. we deliver state police is part of her working group on state and local drone activity, so that the group that we have -- if we get the authority were asking for today, we are working much more intensely with state and local authorities across the country. -- also the pilot program that we described. this is an activity that law enforcement -- >> thank you. my time's expired.

we'll have opportunities to submit questions for the. record of several more. thank you for joining us today. for your collaboration in for your commitment. thank you so much. >> thank you senator carper, senator lankford recognized for questions. >> chairman thank you. thank you for all the witnesses today. and for the ongoing work. address them questions about the collaboration you were discussing at this point. when i was visiting with some of the folks at our southern border several months ago, there were some of our border stations that we're trying to get counter uas equipment out it up and running in operable. in whatever areas on the border, there were 10,000 incursions in just that area of uas coming in across the border from mexico to the united states. they were very eager to be able to get. that when i asked, was the issue? the equipment was there. the people right. there they were waiting on authorization and there was an ongoing dialogue between dhs and faa to be able to discuss

how we're gonna get this up? so literally the, equipment, people, the need everything was there. so my question about this collaboration is, how long does it take? in this particular instance, we had a situation where that same equipment along the border was being used in a different region of the border and had been used for a while, but in this particular region it took months to actually get counter uas equipment up and working in that area. how do we speed up the process? where is the slowdown? >> senator, as noted earlier, i share your concern about the militia strong threat at the southwest border. i'll turn to my colleague to buy if they fa in a moment. the secretary of homeland security has authorized three areas of operations along the southwest border as covered facilities or assets. we have three up and running if you will. there are four additional aor as that are pending. we have taken significant steps

eternally to make sure the process internally more efficient -- which is part of my team. in addition, we have started doing safely concurrent processes with the faa, such that this can move as expectations sly as possible. there are four areas of operations still pending. the priority for me, it's a priority for the secretary to get things authorized as quickly as possible. >> so what is the holdup? this is months when that same technology is used in other places along the border. where is the spot that is getting stuck? >> i'll turn to my colleague anna to the faa in a moment, but as these aor as they're being in the process of being authorized, there is a lot of authorization with the faa. each coverage facility or acid is different. there are different complexity in each areas of operation. we are committed to doing this quickly. the threat is significant. but each area of operation is different. which is why we coordinate with the faa --

>> mr. go back to the same. spot dividing quickly along geologic time rather than clock time anna. it's taking months in process and when i have interacted with the secretary, it's on faa's desk and they talked when i talk to the faa, they say no, it's on the secretary's desk. it seems to get lost. 100 figuring out a ton to get this unstuck? >> i can't go to further details in this very except on one thing. and one aor sir, it's a matter of a few weeks and a maximum. the others are little bit more complex. a big lad to speak to you in a close session to talk more specifically about what that looks. like we are committed to doing this with urgency and care. it varies based on to be able to look at an existing technology out there in the geographic region? >> it varies based on the technology and a location and the complexity of the requests that we receive. and some questions cases it could take a matter of days to

issue atf, are in other days it could take longer depending on what that area is another t f r's -- >> can you define longer for me? >> so, i'm not in the area of issuing of the atf are's. it varies. we are working with our security partners and also other areas where they're trying to get. tfrs. -- it >> is my challenge on. this will just take one -- when i go, there i see people, i see equipment, everyone's ready to go in there waiting for piece of paper to be signed by someone in washington. i get on the phone and i'm, saying where is this? how do we get the sun stuck?

because they're dealing with thousands of uas coming across from mexico, carrying, narcotics carrying -- how do we get this done stop? because it's on someone's desk moving doing something. if there's a need to assist in this process, this committee's very engaged to be able to help get processes unstuck. but we are trying to figure out what still stuck? >> senator, i tried to be in the business of and sticking things as well. i will tell you that for the one that i mentioned that is forthcoming within just a small number of weeks, we what we are waiting for in that particular context, and in others, is to ensure that this equipment can be safely used and operated in that airspace. i'm happy to follow up with more details in a close session. again, we are deeply committed to ensuring the first aor happens in a very small number of weeks and the decisional we a o r inspects as quickly as

well. >> how long has that one's been pending? the one that you say it's gonna get unstuck in weeks. when did it first start? >> i don't have the exact date in front of me, when you say first started, it's been just a few weeks since we can move to this next stage of basically looking at this particular airspace and the complexities there isn't ensuring the equipment can be safely used. >> let me ask another question. -- this is a huge issue with self onscreen -- individuals that are operating their gangs and criminal activity, stalking people that they have threatened outside of that facility from inside the facility. bringing narcotics and. this is been a big issue for the bureau of prisons. what would solace down now, those are fixed locations, and remote areas, what would be the challenge of trying to get this counter uas across all of our

bureau president facility, starting with the most remote? why isn't already happening? >> we are working on. that we've deployed technology have a number of prisons. i know several. there is another 20 that are going to be coming on board. it's really just a question of getting people train, getting the technology, working with the faa on the tee a farce, tfrs and so forth. i understand your impatience and i share. we want to do. this it's a huge problem. i share your view. we will be working with the -- we are deafening concern about this issue. we had charges this past weekend of president texas, where people were smuggling contraband into the prison. that's not the first. one there are. others i share your concern. we are ramping up. >> i would say good. except that this is something we've talked about often around this -- what is the slowdown? rose trying to figure out what is the issue? will allocate funds will, do the studies, we'll do the pilot,

will prove all the process, and it seems to be years to actually get the execution on something that should be pretty straightforward, especially if you have prisons in this remote -- that we're not dealing with the complexities of being in a city. this one just shouldn't be as hard as it seems to be. mister chairman thank. you >> thank you senator lankford, senator scott we recognize you for your questions. >> thank you -- legislation such as the counter chinese trona, and the american securities drone, to protect -- a proud to lead the effort on the to pass the american cities drone. i think we have to go further to -- the next chapter is to ensure that federal funds for the

federal communication commission cannot be used to obtain -- have got a few questions on the re-authorization of the preventing emergencies threat. facts mr. wiegmann, corey law already with certain proves the to the visions entitle a sheen -- this proposed bill waves all of title 18. so what do you need to waive all of title 18 and why not just keep the existing waivers in place? >> so a couple of things. d.o.d. and d.o.e. has a broad title 18 waiver. it helps us operate with them if we have the same authority they have. that's. 12, while we are correct you are correct that our current authority of the d o dhs and doj only extends to certain provisions of title 18, we have been able to use that effectively thus far, we can't prove that this is a changing

technology landscape relative statutes could come to play in the future. we will be back in congress asking again. we think the cleanest approach, given that we don't think law enforcement officials using this technology we all talked about here today to try to prevent threats from drones, should be criminal at all. there shouldn't be any criminal provision that they are subject to read, than just a few statutes. we just think it's a cleaner approach. we are obviously fee to discuss that with the committee. if that's not their view. we think it's cleaner to have the same authority that the d.o.d. and the d.o.e. have. which is a full suite. >> you have examples where you needed it? if this wasn't in place, where have you needed this in the? plus >> thus far we've been able to work with existing exemptions that we have for a specific statute. we can predict in the future, as technology changes, whether the statues would come into play. >> so, senator lankford talked a bit about the prisons. we know drones over presidents

is a real threats. they've been used to drop drugs, weapons, other contraband inmates. drug cartels have been using drugs -- across the border in prisons. how this bill improved law enforcement efforts to counter this threat? to deal with the prison fight, issues over prison, how will this -- >> we already have the authority to protect our prisons. so keeping it. it expires on october if we don't extended. so we would not have the authority if we don't get extended. other than, we have the authority for presidents for good. we just need to extend that authority. >> -- in consultation with the department of transportation, can designate certain state and law enforcement, to use counter drone detection medication

authorities. can you talk about the selection process for this pilot program? and i'll state and local institutions will be selected? have you talked to agencies from florida? >> senator thank you. i'll turn to my colleague from the department of justice in a moment. what we are seeking in this justice, two things for state, local, tribal, and territorial partners. number one, is the sltt partners, excuse my acronym, -- in addition to that, i should say complying with all federal standards and safeguards. in addition to that, we are seeking a six-year pilot program for sltt partners to engage in medication. that's process would be an inter agency process. these individuals would comply with federal standards and certifications. they would use equipment, from unauthorized equipment list that was coordinated with faa and fcc. we believe this is critical. such that the sltt partners as the first responders on the

first down in florida and elsewhere would be able to take urgently needed action to detect and mitigate drone threats. i will turn to my colleague. >> i'm gonna look okay fellow can the back row, if we're talking about anyone florida. >> is that typically through the sheriffs departments for the police? >> we have talked to -- as we select cities, around the country, to participate in the program, it's gonna be their level of interest. >> they're going to -- >> their expertise and so forth. we'll see how the process works. we haven't exactly figured out that criteria. i imagine it will be locations all over the country in buildup. >> do any of you, you know i talked about the -- you all have thoughts about whether we are just blanket all of the ability for chinese company to be able to sell drones in this country?

>> or whether the federal government ought to be able to buy them or not? you have any thoughts on that? >> from the departments perspective, we share your concerns about china generally. and chinese manufactured drones. senator, dhs has issued guidance internally that us prove it prohibitive procurement by of uas, from foreign countries. -- generally reassure your concern about chinese manufactured drones. >> the problem is now they dominate the market. >> they've gone all down a little bit. >> we have a huge chunk of the market. if we can use drones for law enforcement purposes, they're kind of the main game. we are working to transition away from. that there is impatience. it's a question of. time were in the instagram, we're taking steps to mitigate whatever risk -- from the use of the drones. but we won eventually transition away from the.

-- they do serve a useful purpose for all manner of things that we do. it's not ideal. but we are trying to transition away from them is how i would say it. >> from the faa's perspective, we are really responsible for the integration of drones into the national air space and testing of the drones to ensure the safety, as they are integrated, but we don't have a position on the purchasing of or acquiring. >> miss vinograd, did you see the stuff that came out in ukraine that the gi drones were being tracked? have you got looked into that at all? or is that classify? do you know? >> i had seen that. a big lead to follow up in a closed hearing. >> i'd love to know what happened on that. >> certainly. >> thank you senator scott. senator rosen you are recognized for questions. >> thank you chairman peters. i appreciate you holding the hearing and appreciate you all for being here today in what you're working on. i want to focus on protecting

our stadiums. my home state of nevada, is the entertainment capital of the. world we are quickly emerging as the sports capital of the world as well. we have a new allegiance stadium, home at the raiders. las vegas is the first city to secure the nfl draft, the super bowl, and the pro bowl all at once. it's unfortunately continues to make las vegas a target rich environment for bad actors. since this september 11th terrorist attack, congress, executive branch you have recognized the need to protect stadiums and sporting events and the faa initially imposed, as you talked about temporary flight restrictions tfrs over stadium events including unmanned aircraft, and congress subsequently strengthened codified these requirements. however sports leagues have reported an increase in violations in -- by drones. -- i would like to enter a letter

from the coalition of sports organizations in support of the administration's counter uas proposal. we >> -- >> as the faa continues considers new drone policies, do you think it's important to take into account these long-standing protections for stadiums, to ensure federal policies keep up with evolving threats? how do you plan to do that? >> thank you for your question senator. the faa, we do agree that as the technology is continuing inter granting drugs into the airspace, that the ability for the detection and then when necessary mitigation, is in place as well. we are working closely with our stadium, stakeholders, to ensure as you mentioned, we already do it standing tfrs for the nfl, major league baseball, nascar, as well as division one colleges win and we also worked

for the super bowl another types of large events to ensure that their restrictions around those mass gathering events that are held to stadium in other venues to both ensure the safety of that event and the security. but to also ensure the safety in air space over that event. so let me ask you this fall. there is that legislation from the administration that does extend the authorities for critical infrastructure. but it doesn't specifically mentioned stadiums. we are talking about all the things that you are doing and shouldn't be specific and identifying stadiums another critical infrastructure so we are sure and we want to avoid confusion. we are sure that communities have the resources to protect themselves. -- critical infrastructure we didn't define which sectors are

entities. i would say would leave that up to congress if they wanted to give us more specifics. we take it is all entities. we take this in addition for chemical facilities, energy sectors. it's a whole host of sectors that may want to come and petition to get both temporary strict shuns in addition to using detective equipment in the litigation. i prefer my colleague if she wants to expand on that. >> i can click my colleague, we have known more objections to specificity. we want to ensure that all critical infrastructure owners, operators include stadiums and sports venues have the authority. >> there might be confusion but we might be able to define as a

minimum a certain group allowing for the flexibility to add more as needed. so, we will continue to work with you on that. i do want to build on what senator scott asked about the pilot program. we want to extend the local law enforcement, protecting all of the critical infrastructure. first of all, to get the proper program should include stadiums? we've been talking a florida, we have a great fusion center to protect their. have you been speaking with anyone in nevada? do you believe that the training and surveillance should be shared across multiple law enforcement agencies? that's a good thing to involve communities. >> i want to make sure montages

folks in nevada. right now we can only protect the super bowl the world series. a couple thousand nfl games every year, 20,000 baseball games every year. we are only covering the super high profile. so the big advantage of the staying local is to allow that people in the frontlines to be able to protect those venues for the ordinary game. so, that's a big piece of it. i fully expect the jurisdiction to participate the path would be scattered across the country. >> this is the way we should look at the state and local communities. you can't do it all alone. i would decide to quickly move on to cybersecurity because we know there are specific cyber security risks, country of origin as we talked about for manufacturing but there is

malicious actors can hijack control of drones that are necessary. law enforcement drones. can you talk about some of the specific threats? could you deal with what we're looking at from worst to least. it might not be quite equal. >> drone threats more broadly? >> cyber security threats. >> certainly, well senator you mentioned several people and the exploitation of information on the john that is being transmitted between the commanding control center. just to clarify, the hearing today's about counter authorities. moving back to the subject of

the hearing, and how we stop the stuff. we only intercept the signal between the command and control center. that is the only information that we in certain cases retain. when we look at john's been used for malicious purposes, we are concerned to change the course of that drone. use it for all and purposes, surveillance, intrusion for not authorize facility in that nature. so for a counter perspective, again we are focused on the signal between the command and control center. and then for the actual drum perspective, we are very aware of the cybersecurity risks that could be manipulated for arrange purposes. >> we will have to work on that with cisa. i'm just concerned that the state and local communities understand which threats they

have to deal with. the highest that's going down. that's just we can be sure to protect the ones we love. thank you, mister chairman? >> senator padilla you are recognized for your questions. >> thank you mister chair. >> before i asked my question, i'm just gonna be very clear that the threat posed by u.s. is one congress must address before the authorities expire. i don't california we've seen how this can disrupt critical function, so my questions are not related to the need for authorization, but making sure that we do so now responsible way. now, the first question is already been covered by senator scott. that had to do with a broad exemption for 18.

it's a call for the administration proposal. it went back and forth those currently the case. through a lot of specific exemptions. there is more than one way to get this done. instead of asking that question over again, i will follow up with this. that latina includes prohibitions. there are intimidating voters, engaging in video loitering some. some i understand how they want to big stem from the wiretap. but what they need to be exempt from probation or the examples i just gave? none of those activities would be authorized by staff. you can only take statutory resume and they're necessary to detect and mitigate the

incredible threat. we there's voyeurism and work from coming into play there. the statue would not give protection against those offenses because of the way it is structured. it would not exempt you from the offenses. they would never come into play. >> sadly we have seen for the interpretation of philosophy is it shifts and puts into statute. these exemptions do matter. >> fair enough. >> i think it's important. >> questioning a different area whether it's broad exemption, i'm exemptions. we are also discussing the proposal to have a reauthorization that's permanent. not one of the sunset provision. the usage has rapid development of technology.

this demonstrates why the government is to have clear authority in my opinion we to engage in the mitigation activities. the pace of technological development in the ever growing uses for drones, including for valuable engagement purposes. it seems to suggest that is regularly revisiting this area of the law. the administration proposes to say the authorities rather than having it sends a provision that would require -- the executive branch will come together to evaluate how well the authorities call. they're happy debate whether three or five years, whatever timeframe makes sense. but why shouldn't we all visit

the broad authorities being granted in this bill in a few years. >> senator to be clear we are seeking this in the sunset clause for most of the authorities and the pilot program we are not requesting indefinite authorities for these sunset clause. as it currently stands, it's impeding the ability to use our authorities. it makes it incredibly difficult for us to engage in multi your testing and things of that nature. we agree that there's a critical need with how these are being exercised. it's under the threat act of 2018, we required to report to congress every six months. dhs has done but in addition to this bill vessel ttp to program two years after the enactment of this bill we're also required to report to congress and adjust the pilot program.

>> so, you may disagree but it might be a longer or shorter one. i still believe in the power of -- to force these conversations. it keeps us from talking every, day not just every two years about the preface here is a continuously evolving technology. it makes additional performance and capabilities with the growing number of uses in technology. i think a regular conversation from administration to administration would be worthwhile. i know it's been a long warning for all three of you and i will leave my questions at that. i look forward to working with u.s.'s proceeds. thank you mister chair.

>> thank you senator gravity is your, recognize your questions. >> thank you for our witnesses for joining us today. a counter drone of his experience october is critical to our homeland up -- its authorities allow dhs to protect critical infrastructure and communities. as chair of the committee and the commerce committee, i'm keenly aware of the threats posed by drones to our nations, borders and airports. in arizona they're trying to avoid law enforcement. and of course, they're too many examples of jones blocking flight paths and shutting down airports. we must maintain this capabilities while safeguarding privacy and legitimate john users. i look forward to working with my colleagues to do just that. my first question is -- john technology is rapidly

evolving. while most runs currently rely on our technology, more advanced drones may become the norm. a dhs, what are you doing prepare for the strong related threat? including the drone swarms that could conduct synchronized operations. >> it's reviewing the existing authorities, what can we do to help you mitigate these threats? >> we have designated research testing [inaudible] >> sorry, senator we agree that the technology is evolving incredibly rapidly. what homeland security is committed to is trying to stay involved ahead of that threat. we do so through our director where we are engaged in a significant amount of research

testing and evaluation. it's so we can say ahead of the curve, in addition is mr. wegman mentioned we are seeking exemption from title 18. we want to be able to keep ahead as the technology rapidly increases. it proliferates the kind of threats that drones may pose to the american people in the homeland. >> yeah, we obviously work with our colleagues and technology working groups to make sure we are doing the best we can do the state-of-the-art technology to counter the threat. >> as chair of a border subcommittee, i'm particularly concerned about the threat that drones posed to our border an airport. if the current authorities

expire in october, can you discuss the impact would have on our border security? >> the expiration of this would be catastrophic for border security perspective. our counter-authorities currently allow for operations at our borders. the expiration of those authorities would allow adversaries to increase their malicious use of drones to engage in smuggling, surveillance and other malicious activities. >> my third question, can you describe how the administration program would help with slight pass for drones. specifically, how do the authorities hinder your agencies from achieving this? >> i will say that of all the

things accumulate at night when that is foremost in my mind is a potential for major tragedy. we currently have the department of homeland security working close partnership with the faa at airports. however, tsa locks the authority to engage in proactive or persistent operations at airports. what that means is tsa cannot be all around airports engaging in proactive detection. i will tell you just in the threat perspective, we've had 2000 sightings of drones in iran airports since 2021. in 2021 and 2022, we have had 64 evasive actions by aircrafts with four commercial carriers. we've had 30 airport disruptions just in 2021.

this already amounts and significant economic damage. there is potential for real loss of human life. i'm very concerned about the lack of explicit authority in airports and that's why we are seeking this to engage in proactive detection and mitigation and close partnership with faa. >> to build off of my colleague, obviously the number one priority for the faa is a safety and security of the airspace. we too are concerned about the number of jobless sightings that we consistently see across the country. the faa is supportive of expanding the authorities to tsa. giving them the authority to be able to do not just the detection but the mitigation if necessary. >> my next question is like all technologies, drones hold promise and peril. the same grounds if they want

to have in the facility could be used by journalist to shed footage for the news and hold government accountable. i know doj has had time and resources to ensure the privacy and civil liberties are protected during these operations. could you discuss some of the safeguards? how did our drones in a restricted airspace -- and when they, our data is intercepting for how long? >> okay under the statute we can only intercept data that is necessary for countering a threat. so, as i mentioned i have the list here of the types of data. the drone serial number, the geolocation of the drone. the location of the controller and we are talking about

metadata, the information of the drone is generating to find out where it is, where it's going and we can hopefully interdict it. once we collect that information, if it's not of any use we discard that information right away. you can only keep it as long as it's necessary. this is unless it's necessary to keep it longer for purpose of criminal investigations if someone is violating their space to pursue a prosecution. all of this is laid out in the law, the statues and what you can collect, how you can retain when you disseminated is on the statue. those are carried over into the new bill, so we continue the privacy protections of the new bill. so, to the extent that they are

under the activity of the pilot program there with the privacy protections. i don't know that answers your question. >> yes, thank you mister chairman. >> i'd like to take this opportunity to thank our witnesses once again for participating in today's hearing. in discussing the proposal to both extend and expand current authorities to counter them and posing serious threats for unmanned programs. as we heard clearly today from each of our witnesses, they could deploy a catastrophic incident at anytime. we cannot must not wait for that incident to occur. i work to ensure that these authorities do not laps in october. so, our federal law enforcement continues to work out their

crucial missions to protect us from the sets. i also plan to introduce legislation in the very near future with senator johnson. it extends and provides a careful expansion of these authorities. >> the record of this hearing will remain open until 5 pm in 2022 for the submission of statements. this hearing now stands adjourned.

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