chairman peters: in recent

years, the market for commercial use has rapidly expanded due to the affordability and utility of drones that are readily accessible to government, to industry, and to recreational users. the faa estimates that by 2020, about 2.3 million uas's, including 1.5 million recreational drones and model aircrafts and about 800,000 commercial uas's, will be registered to fly in the u. s. between 2016 and 2019, airline pilots reported on average more than 100 drone sightings per month to the faa. the increase in the number of

uas's operating in our airspace creates higher risk of rogue drones, either failing to obey safety rules or operating with nefarious intentions, threatening manned aircraft operations, airports, critical infrastructure facilities and high profile widely attended events such as sporting events, concerts and more. while most individuals operate their drones responsibly, we have already seen careless and malicious actors misuse these technologies to engage in reckless or criminal activities. in september of 2017, a privately operated drone in brooklyn, new york was intentionally flown beyond the operator's line of sight and collided with a u.s. army blackhawk helicopter patrolling a temporary no-fly zone around new york city. thankfully, the blackhawk and its crew landed safely, but there was significant damage to the helicopter, and the incident created an unacceptable risk to

the service members in that helicopter. in 2019, a drone significantly disrupted flight operations at newark liberty airport for 90 minutes, causing nine flights to be diverted, halting 43 planes inbound to the airport, and also causing significant delays for passengers. these events demonstrate the severity of the threat posed by uas, and if we do not act, it could only be a matter of time before someone who is recklessly operating this technology causes an accident that can have catastrophic effects. and as we work to avoid unintentional disasters, we must also account for the escalating threat of weaponized drones from terrorists and criminal organizations, who could launch a domestic drone attack on mass gatherings, high profile landmarks, and buildings or federal property. this includes foreign adversaries who have deployed drones in conflicts abroad and

could have the capability to deploy them here in the united states as well. we must also be prepared to counter drones operated by criminal organizations that are reportedly using uas's for illegal activities, including trafficking illicit drugs across our borders. i am grateful to my colleagues who have led past efforts to address these concerns and to improve the safe integration of uas and american airspace, including senator johnson for authoring the preventing emerging threats act since 2018. the authorities created by this law have bolstered our nation's ability to protect numerous large public events, including the super bowl, from uas threats. today's hearing is an opportunity to discuss renewing and updating these authorities, which are set to expire this october. as well as the biden's administration's domestic counter uas national action plan, the first coordinated

government plan to address the evolving security threats posed by uas. i'm working on bipartisan legislation that i plan to introduce in the coming weeks to reauthorize and strengthen counter us authorities to better tackle this threat today. i'm pleased that we have a panel of expert witnesses from dhs, doj, and the faa who can discuss what lawmakers can do to ensure the federal government is better equipped to safeguard against potential threats from uas's. i'd now like to recognize ranking member portman for his opening comments. >> thanks, mr. chairman. thanks to the witnesses for being here. i look forward to hearing from you. we're here today to discuss the emerging threats posed by unmanned aircraft systems, or drones. in 2018, under the leadership of senator ron johnson who's here this morning, we provided as congress some new authorities to the department of homeland

security and department of justice to counter the threats posed by the use of drones. unfortunately, those authorities are about to expire, and this expiration could not come at a worse time. cartels and transnational criminal organizations use drones to smuggle drugs and surveil u.s. law enforcement in furtherance of illicit cross border activity. these cartels have also begun to weaponize drones in order to commit attacks. so far, these attacks, as far as we know, have been in mexico. but i think weaponized drones along the border are now an emerging threat. to give you a sense of the scale of the problem, in joint testimony before the house committee on homeland security in march, representatives from dhs said that in a previous five month period, cbp identified more than 30,000 individual flights near or at the southern border where half of those flights violated faa regulations. we know that at a minimum, these

drones were used for surveilling our u.s. law enforcement efforts and for smuggling drugs into the country, including fentanyl, the deadly synthetic opioid. relatively small amounts of it can kill hundreds of thousands, millions of people. so it's subject to being smuggled in relatively small drones. my office has repeatedly asked dhs since february of this year for more information and statistics of these drone border incursions and how they plan to address this emerging threat. moreover, the biden administration's domestic counter drone national action plan provides no explicit additional authorities for dhs to counter unmanned aircraft systems as it pertains to the border. make no mistake, the mexican transnational criminal organizations will benefit from the lack of additional counter drone authority for cbp and other agencies with responsibility for securing our nation's borders. for these reasons, i'm eager to hear how dhs, the doj, and the faa have used their existing authority to mitigate the threats posed by illicit use of drones. i also hope to discuss what new

authorities this committee can give the administration to improve the counter drone mission, especially at the border. recently, the biden administration provided this committee with a comprehensive legislative proposal which seeks a number of changes and expansions to existing counter drone authorities. i look forward to working with senator peters, senator johnson, and other members of this committee to review this proposal. the committee has already done good work to address the threat to national security and economic competitiveness posed by chinese made drones when we reported out the bipartisan american security drone act last year. among other things, this legislation would prohibit the federal government from purchasing and using drones manufactured by our adversaries. i'm very concerned about reports of the purchase by dhs and the doj, law enforcement of chinese drones and the national security risks that this poses. i'm pleased that the legislation that we reported out of committee, but has not yet gone to the floor, is included in the

senate passed package. you seek a package and i urge our leadership, particularly speaker pelosi in the house, to swiftly pass so this can become law. with that said, i look forward to productive conversation about the current drone threats to our homeland and actions being taken to prevent them. i look forward to hearing from the witnesses. thank you again, mr. chairman, thank you. chairman peters: it is the practice of the homeland security and governmental affairs committee to swear in witnesses. so if each of you would please stand and raise your right hand. do you swear that the testimony you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god? thank you. you may be seated. today's first witness is samantha vinograd, the acting assistant secretary for counterterrorism and threat prevention and law enforcement policy in the office of strategy policy and plans at the

department of homeland security. ms. vinograd began her career serving president george w. bush as the deputy u.s. treasury attache to iraq, and subsequently served on president barack obama's national security council as director for iraq, director for international economics, and senior advisor to the national security advisor. previously, she was a cnn national security analyst, a senior adviser at the biden institute, and a visiting fellow at the university of chicago institute of politics. ms. vinograd, welcome. you may proceed with your opening remarks. ms. vinograd: chairman peters, ranking member portman, and distinguished members. thank you for inviting me to testify about the department of homeland security's efforts to protect the homeland from the increasing threat posed by unmanned aircraft systems, often referred to as uas's, or drones. today, i will explain how the department has relied on authorities granted in the preventing emerging threats act

of 2018 to counter the malicious use of drones and why we are asking congress to reauthorize and expand our counter drone authorities to fill specific gaps that are exposing the homeland to serious threats. we are committed to judiciously and responsibly implementing our authorities so that we can stay ahead of the threat while protecting privacy and civil rights and civil liberties and absolutely everything that we do. the threat landscape from drones is heightened and candidly escalating extremely fast. drones have been used to conduct dangerous counter attacks, have interfered with aircraft and airports, have been used to survey, disrupt, and damage critical infrastructure and services, and more. nearly every day, transnational criminal organizations use drones to convey narcotics and contraband across u.s. borders. in fact, cbp has detected more than 8000 illegal cross border drone flights at the southern border just since august 2021.

in light of this threat environment, it is critical the dhs had the authority to protect the homeland from uas threats consistent with our statutory missions. to date, dhs has relied on the preventing emerging threat act to carry out critical uas missions, including protecting the president and vice president, safeguarding sensitive assets, facilities and special events in the maritime sector, protecting federal facilities and personnel, and countering illicit narcotic and contraband trafficking. based on our experience through over 300 deployments, there's clear evidence that there are gaps in authorities which are exposing the american people to significant risk. for example, even though the transportation security administration, or tsa, is responsible for protecting airports, it lacks authority to proactively and persistently protect transportation infrastructure from drone threats and invert disruptions and real tragedies. this is especially concerning since the tsa has reported

nearly 2000 drone sightings near u.s. airports since 2021, several of which have resulted in pilots taking evasive actions. 65 evasive actions, in fact, and the disruption of airport operations. furthermore, state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement are often the first responders when a malicious drone incident occurs, but they are not currently authorized to detect or mitigate drone threats, thereby delaying a response. critical infrastructure owners and operators are often the victims of drone surveillance and have even been targeted for kinetic attacks, but they have no authority to detect drones or to request mitigation from authorized law enforcement. bottom line, our partners are absolutely critical to protecting the homeland from uas threats, but lack the authority to do so, which, again, exposes the homeland and the american people to significant risk. dhs therefore strongly supports the administration's legislative proposal to reauthorize dhs and

doj's current authorities, as well as to expand them to remedy the gaps that i've identified. it would grant tsa the authorities it needs to protect the nation's transportation system from uas's. threats would also authorize partners and critical infrastructure owners and operators to engage in detection of uas's. lastly, it would create a limited pilot program for law enforcement to engage in protection activities in their jurisdictions under the strict oversight of dhs and doj. the proposal would require that authorized critical infrastructure owners and operators adhere to comparable safeguards and standards to those that federal entities follow. non-federal entities would be required to use federally approved equipment, receive standard standardized training and certification, conduct risk

based assessments, coordinate with faa to ensure aviation safety, and very importantly, adhere to federal privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. we just cannot keep pace with this threat environment without these additional counter drone authorities. it just isn't possible, and we hope that this committee will champion them. congressional action is urgently required as our current authority will expire in less than three months, and the lapse would be catastrophic. i thank the committee for holding a hearing on this important topic and look forward to your questions. chairman peters: thank you miss vinograd. our next witness is brad wiegmann, deputy assistant attorney general in the national security division at the department of justice. mr. wiegmann brings a wealth of government experience, having served in legal positions at the department of defense and the national security council over the span of two decades. previously, mr. wiegmann worked at the private law firm of shea and gardner, where he focused on civil litigation and legal

policy matters. he's also served as a law clerk for judge patrick higginbotham on the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit. mr. wiegmann, welcome to the committee. you may proceed with your opening comments. mr. wiegmann: thank you, chairman peters. thank you ranking member and members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the department of justice. we strongly support the administration's legislative proposal to allow us to continue to protect major national events and important department facilities from the threat posed by misuse of drones. this legislation would also enable us, as assistant secretary vinograd just said, to expand our counter drone efforts, both in respect to the types of facilities that we can protect and to empower our state and local partners to participate in this critical mission. so we understand at the doj that drones are bringing great benefits to our society and our economy, but like many advances in technology, drones also bring serious risks to the public when they're misused. as has been alluded to already in the opening statements, we're seeing an increase in the use of

drones for a wide spectrum of criminal and other dangerous activities. they can be weaponized to conduct attacks using firearms, explosives, or other materials. they can conduct cyber attacks against wireless devices or networks, and they can conduct espionage or traffic in narcotics and contraband. beyond these nefarious uses, drones are often used carelessly to create hazards to the public. let me just give you a few recent examples. in february 2020, a subject was arrested and charged in connection with his efforts to use a drone to drop explosives near a georgia mobile home park. between september 2021 and february 2022, four defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to deliver contraband via drones into fort dix prison in new jersey. we've recently seen mexican drug cartels using drones to drop bombs on their rivals in mexico, as well as to traffic drugs into the united states. in may of this year, a defendant was sentenced after using a drone to drop fliers over spectators at two separate nfl games in california, and it obviously could have been something much worse than flyers.

under the current authority that congress has granted, the fbi has conducted 70 counter drone protection operations at large events, ranging from the super bowl to the new year's eve celebration in times square. that represents only .05% of the over 121,000 events during that time for which an assessment was requested so that counter drone support could be provided. so the demand for counter drone support has far outstripped the federal government's limited resources. during those 70 operations by fbi, our counter drone teams detected 970 for noncompliant drones in restricted airspace. they located the operator in 279 cases and attempted mitigation against 50 drones. our current authority, as chairman peters mentioned, to counter drones expires in october if it's not extended by congress. the reason we need this authority is because our use of this technology would otherwise run afoul of various criminal statutes. so our proposal, our legislative proposal, would extend our current authority permanently

and then expanded to address some critical gaps. now, i just want to talk about a few of those briefly in my opening statement. first, as has been mentioned, the legislation would authorize state and local law enforcement and owners and operators of critical infrastructure to use certain detection-only capabilities. we need to empower others to help us take on this responsibility. notably, the detection-only technology does not jam, or otherwise disrupt, drones, or other aircraft, and therefore, it does not pose any risk to the safety of the national airspace. this can be safely done today. second, the legislation would authorize a limited pilot program for up to 12 state and local law enforcement entities each year to engage in both detection and mitigation activities. by mitigation, i mean actually interfering with the flight of the drone. this would allow our state and local partners to protect sensitive state facilities and mass gatherings in their jurisdictions. now, the participants in the program would be required to receive training and vetting and to follow the same rules as

federal agencies must currently follow and all of their activities would have to be coordinated in advance with federal partners, including the faa, which could withhold approval if there was a risk to the national airspace. third, the legislation would enable the marshal service to protect high risk prisoner transports. current authority covers our prisons and courthouses, but it doesn't expressly address high risk prisoner transport, so it would fill that gap. i want to say a word about privacy and civil liberties. we are committed to ensuring that we respect all constitutional rights and privacy as we conduct our counter drone activities. the technologies we employ typically detect only communications being passed between the controller and the drone to direct its activities. they do not extract text messages, email or internet search histories from phones or tablets used to control drones, nor do they allow us to listen to voice calls. we typically collect information such as the drone vendor and model, the controlling device, serial number, the geolocation of the drone, the location of the controller, and the most

recent takeoff location. this is much like the information that's going to be required to be broadcast by the new remote id rule and is currently required for manned aircraft. as is required in current law, the doj will continue to have guidance that contains express protections for privacy and civil liberties. and state and locals would be required to follow the same rules. i appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward to answering your questions. chairman peters: thank you. mr wiegmann. today's final witnesses is tanya coultas, deputy associate administrator for security and hazardous materials safety at the federal aviation administration at the department of transportation. in her role, she provides executive oversight of national security policies, plans, and programs involving manned and unmanned systems. in addition to several other

security related topics. ms. coultas has over 30 years of combined federal executive, local, state, military, and international experience supporting defense intelligence safety, disaster response, and crisis management efforts. previously, ms. coultas served as a senior executive for the dhs national protection and programs directorate (now cisa), office of infrastructure protection and for fema. welcome to the committee. you may proceed with your opening remarks. ms. coultas: sure, okay, plan b. chairman peters, ranking member portman, and members of the committee. thank you for inviting me to speak with you today about the faa's role ensuring safety, security and efficiency of the nation's airspace as it pertains to unmanned aircraft systems, or

uas, or drones. at the faa, we are constantly working to welcome these beneficial new technologies into the national air system, while minimizing any impacts to our existing air transportation system and to the public. eevery day, commercially-operated uas contribute to our economy by inspecting infrastructure, supporting agriculture and other industries, assisting public safety agencies, and conducting a myriad of other tasks. congress has recognized these tremendous benefits to our economy and society and has been fully supportive as we integrate this technology into our airspace in a safe and secure manner. however, the faa does acknowledge the potential misuse of this technology poses unique security challenges that enable malicious actors to exploit vulnerabilities or circumvent traditional ground-based security measures for our security partners. for that reason, congress authorized the department of defense, energy, justice and

homeland security to use technologies designed to respond to uas that pose a threat within their mission responsibilities. you are directing the faa to work with these agencies to ensure that detection and mitigation measures do not compromise the safety and efficiency of the airspace. the faa's chief role is to support our partners' testing and eventual use of these detection and mitigation systems, many of which use radio frequency and other technologies that could potentially interfere with air navigational systems, communication avionics systems which are all critical to safety of flight. along with developing our plans for certification of uas detection and mitigation systems, the faa is also tasked with testing and evaluating these technologies for potential use near airports. we and our security partners have developed agency specific and jointly agreed upon

processes to determine when, how, and what detection or mitigation technologies can be safely used in a particular location. we also developed notification protocols to be used during an active detection or counter uas event. the administration's proposal to expand uas detection and mitigation authorities so that other federal departments and agencies, as well as other public and private critical infrastructure entities, will be able to use tested systems to safely protect sensitive facilities, operations, and people from the malicious or errant use of uas. the proposal, which the faa does support, would give limited uas detection-only authority to the non-federal law enforcement community, as well as airports and critical infrastructure owners and operators. it would also create a temporary pilot program for non-federal law enforcement to begin using uas mitigation technologies under federal oversight.

in addition, the faa would be authorized to assess civil penalties against those who use detection or mitigation technologies in an unauthorized manner that endangers the national airspace. all areas of new or expanded authorities include robust safeguards to ensure the current level of safety is preserved. we recognize that expanding uas mitigation authorities beyond our current federal partners will present challenges, and for that reason, the proposal for the pilot program reflects an incremental approach to evaluating such authorities and safeguards that include interagency coordination or participant selection training of system operators, and requires program participants to work through dhs and doj in coordination with the faa. there is no question that a seamless security framework is critical to advancing the administration's goal of fully integrating us into the nasa, maximizing the public benefits

from this technology. by taking deliberate steps to support those entities with duties to protect against emerging uas based threats. the united states will continue to lead the way in the full integration of uas while maintaining the safest, most efficient and most secure airspace system in the world. we thank the committee for its leadership on this issue and look forward to working together to balance safety and innovation with security. chairman peters: thank you, ms. caultus. this is a closed captioning test. this is a closed captioning test. this is a closed captioning test. this is a closed captioning test. and clearly, the three of you have outlined significant threats posed by uas's.

but my question for you, mr wiegmannn, is how would the fbi assess the potential threat from uas's along the threat spectrum? is this low, is this medium or is this high? and what i think -- mr. wiegmann: i think what i would say is the fbi director has testified before that this is a very significant threat. given the easy ability to to buy a drone commercially, it's easy to get. they're easy, very easy to use and not that difficult to weaponize as we've talked about. and that's what we're seeing. the fbi director predicted a few years ago that we would see an attack, a drone attack, on a mass gathering. happily, we haven't seen one yet, but i think it's a matter of time until we do see that type of misuse of drones or an attack in the united states. chairman peters: thank you, ms. vinograd. in your testimony, you discussed the potential use of uas's as weapons, as well as interference tools. they could target airports as well as other types of critical infrastructure here in the country. i would like you to explain for the committee more specifically what authorities does dhs

currently lack to counter this this threat. and what should this committee focus on as we draft legislation to reauthorize the current legislation? ms. vinograd: senator peters, thank you. as my colleague just noted, the threat posed by the malicious use of drones represents a significant and increasing risk to the homeland and the american people. currently, under the preventing emerging threats act of 2018, we are authorized to engage in protective measures against credible threats posed by uas's to the safety and security of certain dhs protective missions. that includes, for example, the protection of government personnel, president, vice president, federal facilities, sensitive assets in the maritime sector and elsewhere, as well as mass gatherings. what we have witnessed over the last four years as we have judiciously and responsibly implemented our existing authorities is that there are significant gaps in our ability to protect the homeland from drones.

we have seen an increasing number of malicious drone incidents in and around airports. we have witnessed 2000 sightings of drones in and around airports since 2021. since 2021, aircraft have had to engage in 64 evasive actions that includes four commercial carriers doing so. there have been 30, on average 30, airport disruptions each year. and in these scenarios, seconds matter. what we are seeking for the transportation security agency or tsa is the ability, based upon this escalating threat environment, to engage in the proactive and persistent protection of the transportation sector to include airports. this will literally help avert tragedy, both as it pertains to the potential loss of human life and economic impact. when airports have to shut down, that costs millions of dollars. so this will help avert tragedy.

second, we are seeking authority for state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as critical infrastructure owners and operators to be authorized to engage in the detection of uas's. those authorities would be implemented under the supervision and oversight of federal departments and agencies. we are also seeking the ability for a time-limited, a six-year pilot program for state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to engage in mitigation of uas as it pertains to state, local, tribal, and territorial partners and critical infrastructure owners and operators. as the committee knows, dhs relies on partners all around the country to help protect the homeland. we can't be everywhere. what we know is that the threat posed by uas is widespread across the country, and it is critical that our partners have the authority to help protect the homeland, in addition to the tsa getting the authority to

critically protect the transportation sector. chairman peters: thank you. well, certainly, we know that state and local enforcement agencies need additional authorities. certainly they're gonna be, you know, the tip of the spear when it comes to protecting our country from these threats and in working closely with the federal government agencies. however, there have been concerns that have been raised by folks that such an expansion creates some significant challenges in terms of training and preparedness. so, mr. wiegmann, i want to ask this question. the administration's proposal would establish a pilot program to test out these expanded authorities to to state and local law enforcement. however, these entities need to have proper training, including how to protect individual rights to privacy, as well as effectively executing this this pilot program. how would the department of justice ensure that these entities have the necessary training to properly execute these authorities?

mr. wiegmann: thanks for that question, senator. training is a big part of it. we need to ensure that the state and locals are going to do this, they know how to do it and they need to know be operating under the right rules. so one of the elements of our bill is to establish a training center that the fbi would operate in conjunction with dhs. all of the state and locals would only be under the pilot up to 12 entities per year. but we would work with each of those entities that are designated to participate in the pilot program. during the training, they would have to learn what equipment could be used, learn how to operate it, learn what the rules are. because they would have to follow the same federal rules in terms of any data they collect, how it can be retained, disseminated, and used, when they can engage in mitigation activity, what the rules of engagement are. all those are things they would have to be trained on and then certified. and then even after that point when they are doing their risk-based assessments as to which facilities or events they're going to protect, that's all subject to federal oversight as well.

so this is not the kind of thing where we just hand it off to the states and let them take over. it's something that we, the federal authorities, would continue to be actively involved in, both in training and making sure they're using the authorities appropriately. chairman peters: how will providing additional authorities to state and local enforcement better prepare the department of homeland security to protect. let's focus on mass gatherings such as national security, special events and special event assessment rating events. ms. vinograd: senator, as i mentioned, dhs cannot be everywhere. we rely on other state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to help us protect and to advance a variety of dhs missions. if partners are granted this authority, they can help prevent catastrophic attacks against mass gatherings of a variety of size and in a variety of venues. as my colleague mr. wiegmann just mentioned, these authorities would be implemented

under strict supervision and oversight of the federal government, including ensuring that these individuals authorized to conduct these operations are operating under comparable federal safeguards as they pertain to privacy and civil rights and civil liberties. as i mentioned in the context of the tsa and airports, when we're witnessing a drone threat, seconds matter. currently, authorities that are on the ground can't detect proactively drones, nor can they mitigate them. those seconds that i mentioned, senator really matter and the inability of our partners in their jurisdictions to respond could cost lives if our partners are not granted these authorities. chairman peters: thank you, ranking member portman. you're recognized for your questions. sen. portman: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to the witnesses for their testimony. this is obviously a serious issue, and i agree with ms. vinograd, who said that a lapse in the authorization would be catastrophic. i think it would help these

transnational criminal organizations among others. and yet we need better data to be able to put together the right authorization to write sound policy. we know already what happens on the border with these drones. we know they're used for deliveries, not just for drugs but also narcotic, also currency and firearms other contraband. this committee has among its responsibilities, oversight of dhs and these border activities and we have a particular interest. and this issue of the synthetic opioids that are streaming across our border today, the numbers unfortunately are higher than ever. last month, enough fentanyl was seized, which is a synthetic opioid that's killing about two thirds of those who die from overdoses, which is at a record level, we know that there was enough seeds to kill about 200 million americans in one month and no one in the border thinks that we are seizing most and not even a significant percentage of what's

coming across. so it's it's a big issue. this is a great question for you understanding this increased threat from these transnational criminal organizations. how do you assess dhs's current performance encountering the use of drones for cross border illicit activity. ms. vinograd: senator, thank you. i share your concern about transnational criminal organizations and the malicious use of drones over the border, both as it pertains to smuggling contraband as well surveillance of law enforcement in addition to other threats. currently d. h. s. the secretary of homeland security has designated three areas of operations along the southwest border has covered facilities or assets. this allows dhs cbp more specifically to engage in c. u. s. operations in these areas of operations.

>> let me be be more specific as i don't have much much time. um in your testimony you stated from august 21 to may 22 cbp detective, more than 8000 illegal cross border drone flights at the southern border of these 8000 flights. how many were successfully mitigated by dhs? ms. vinograd: i can ask cbp to get back to you and your staff with the specific numbers. >> we have been asking them for this since february persistently and we are not getting the information. it's important we have an authorization but we have to have information if we don't have the statistics today. if you don't have it, despite many, many inquiries from us that concerns me. i want to work with you again on this reauthorization but we've got to have better information to be able to do it properly . let's talk about china for a moment. recently, the directors of the fbi and british m 15 warned of the national security and economic threats posed by

china. they identified it as our longest are our greatest long term threat stealing our technology dominated our markets. and they talked about the us drone market? they talked about the use of drones. here's an example, according to a report by washington post china is the leading provider of drones to u. s. law enforcement agencies. they have support from the chinese government. here's our own commerce department saying it has been added to an export blacklist last year after bloomberg reported that it supplied surveillance technology to chinese security forces in xinjiang where millions of muslims have been forced into internment camps. so there's a report that last year that the secret service purchased eight of dj's drones. the fbi purchased 18 of them. so let me just ask you these questions on the record.

i'll start with mr. wiegmann. does the fbi currently purchase and use chinese made drones, yes or no? mr. wiegmann: we do. >> does dhs currently purchase and use chinese made drones? ms. vinograd: dhs has prohibited the purchase of foreign made drones, small uas, absent waivers in very specific circumstances. >> okay, so this report that i mentioned said that the secret service had purchased eight of the drones. you're saying that's inaccurate. ms. vinograd: i'm saying that with certain waivers. >> with specific waivers, dhs can purchase -- ms. vinograd: with certain waivers, we are purchasing certain foreign made -- >> so you are. ms. vinograd: i can follow up with more specific details. >> the answer is yes.

ms. vinograd: in a closed hearing, i can provide more specific details sir. okay. >> i don't want to leave you out. does the faa currently purchase and use chinese made drones? ms. caultus: the faa's responsibility is for the integration of uas's into the nasa and testing of the u. s. technology to ensure its safety and its use in the nest. what thank you. again, given what the fbi has told us, what the commerce department has told us, what we know from reports. i can't believe we have to write legislation to -- occasionally we have to write legislation and force u.s. agencies to ban the use of drones, check over the servers and china where chinese government is part owner and a supporter of this particular company. but we do have that in the sikh of bill, it's a requirement of the sikh bill. i hope we get that legislation

passed. if we cannot get that legislation passed would you also support this legislation with what we do with authorization. miss -- ? >> i share your concerns about these drones and would welcome a conversation in specific language. >> just to be clear, we share the concerns as well senator. we want to shift away from the use of chinese drones and we're working at other parts of the markets. we're looking to shift our use of chinese drones to other drones. in the meantime, the fbi take steps to do thorough side chain reviews to ensure that any risks by the use of the technology is mitigated. but we do want to shift away from it. we definitely support the aims of the sponsor of the bill and we have provided some technical assistance about changes to the bill to make sure that we could support it. and we can conduct our mission

consistent with the provisions we share the objectives of shifting away from these drones and using other alternatives that don't pose the same supply chain. risk >> the administration supports the legislation, and we did negotiated with the administration as well, as well as democrats and republicans in the united states senate. we appreciate your support. of the broader legislation and hope we continue to work with each of you on both of these issues. getting better data as to what's actually happening. -- >> thank you mr. portman. senator johnson, you are recognized for questions. >> -- we obviously understood the threat the drones posed to this nation. the very serious threat. i was very frustrated at the time that we can offer greater authority. five years

later, i'm enormously frustrated that we haven't make raider progress and was still taking what we are taking baby steps, went to meets out of control. 2000 sightings around airports, 69 invasive actions. let's get down to brass tax. let's find out what our capabilities are. have we under the current authorities brought down drones around the types of events that the dhs can counter? >> senator, dhs has engaged in detection and mitigation of drones in and around, concurrent with the authority -- >> so we have taken controls? have we advanced our technology in five years? >> we certainly have advanced technology in five years. yes sir. >> do we have the capability right now to prevent drones from entering restricted airspace around airports? >> currently, dhs assesses the tsa could respond

to an emergency in around an airport. what we are seeking in the legislation is the ability for tsa to proactively -- >> i'm asking. is our capability right now, if you have the authority, first to have to find out who has the authority to establish a restricted airspace around an airport, around the stadium, around power plants, who has that authority? >> the faa's. >> the faa. have we established that restricted airspace? >> we work with our federal partners as well as or non federal stakeholders when requested -- >> is the airspace around an airport restricted to drone use right now? >> yes. >> all airports? >> yes. >> do we have the capability of knocking down drones if they enter that restricted airspace? do we have that capability? maybe not the authority, but the capability technologically? >> technologically yes. we have the ability to mitigate militias drone threats. >> so

shouldn't this at a mininimum grant you the authority almost immediately so you could start knocking down some drones around airports? >> dhs is very supportive of the receiving the authority to mitigate drone threats around airports. >> that would be the priority.--but several liberty issues are contemplated for knocking down drones entering a restricted airspace? >> we would want to do so responsibly. >> sure we. don't want to knock the down and create a greater problem. but they'd be no several liberties issues if we establish restricted airspace, and somebody flies in and drone, they've got no civil liberties to rebound, we're gonna knock down the drone safely if we can. >> i agree. i don't think that presents a civil liberties issue. >> i agree with you

senator. -- >> so, in the proposal beat ministration gave, us have re-contemplated the priorities of establishing restricted airspace and granting the authority to be knocking down drills when they enter restricted airspace? i i'm complaining around the stadium on game day. establish a temporary restricted airspace, so the state and local authorities, working with dhs, have the ability to knock the doors down take them out of the skies before they pose a threat? >> we have that authority now senator. that's what we're asking to extent. but yes. >> have we knocked out many drones around stadiums? >> when we say knockdown, yes, we've disabled, and we've required them to divert and land. yes we have. enough at a number of events as i mentioned. we have done that. yes. >> my main point here is

we've got to move faster. it's great to have pilot programs. that's five, six years in the future. trust me the public is gonna demand that we act a whole lot quicker if a commercial aircraft hits a drone that is entered restricted airspace. so, i want to make sure in this piece of legislation, we've got that authority. and then the funding in the personnel to start protecting our restricted airspace as soon as possible. is there anything that is gonna prevent that from happening in this piece of legislation? >> that's where we hear senator. we agree with you. we are seeking the authority to do just that. >> but again, i'm concerned about the pilot program that's gonna work with 12 state and local and tribal -- >> it's gonna take some time. >> that's a pretty slow roll out. isn't? it >> it's gonna take some time to do the training and make sure they're

up into do this -- they will be able to do multiple missions. overtime -- >> my point, is we've already taken five years, which i find enormously frustrating. and sure takes time. but we can ensure that it takes less time if we prioritize as a serious threat, and we establish this is a priority for moving more personnel to make sure it takes less time. you understand what i'm saying? i think 12 program, 12 pilot programs a year is too little maybe too late. -- we spent trillions of dollars during the federal government. we have to focus on this. this is a serious threat. again, i don't want to have it be too little. and i don't want to still be too late on this. i

appreciate you mister chairman. i want to work with you to strengthen this. i don't think this is strong enough yet. let's not have a piece of legislation that is too little too late. the bill we passed five years ago with two little. fortunately, it hasn't been too late yet. let's make sure we do a good job on this one. absolutely senator. we look forward to working with you on this. one we appreciate your leadership on this issue. thank you senator johnson. senator hawley, you're recognized for your questions. >> thank you. miss vinograd, if i can start with you, you work in the office of policy -- >>'s first let me say senator i made my first visit to the state of missouri on friday. i was very impressed by your homeland security. i look forward to going back. yes i work for the

office of strategy of policy -- >> -- >> your name is on a memo with mr. silver's date it's september 13th 2021. the subject is -- this is the memo that recommended the establishment of the disinformation board. he was turned over to me and to senator grassley by whistleblower. we have the darndest time getting any information of this board out of your agency. we've asked and we passed. members of this committee has asked. we would virtually know nothing if not had been for this whistle blower that turned over these documents, all of which are not public. -- let me ask you a question too about. whose idea was to establish the sport? >> senator, the department of homeland security has been declared engaged disinformation work pertaining to homeland and threats to the american people for over a decade. -- there were discussions about the need to ensure that there were

guardrails in place across the department to protect civil rights and civil liberties and privacy and as such, there were discussions about creating this internal working group. >> all of that i noticed is in the passive voice. >> my question is whose idea was to set up the committee? you use the term working group, but that is not what the memo. says it doesn't call it a working group. the directive that mr. -- signs of. does not make this a working group. it has managerial authority, directive authority, so let's not go back to those tired analogies, proven talking points. whose idea was to establish the board? was it yours? >> there is a series of discussions among personnel -- >> who? >> i'm not gonna go into the internal deliberations of the department. >> why not? you're under oath. >> i am under oath sir. that said, these are internal deliberations at the department. as you know sir,

the charter was signed by the secretary of homeland security. >> i only know that by the way because of the whistleblower documents. we will not know that otherwise. >> senator, the charter was signed by the secretary of homeland security. the charter include, excuse, me the working group included representation -- >> does the treasure called it a working group, since you bring up the charter? >> this was a working group sir. >> does the charter calling it a working? group >> no. i don't recall. >> -- the answer is that it does not. was established established the board? >> as i testified under oath, the establishment of the working group was a decision taking, a conversation that was had among multiple individuals about the department -- >> so you're not gonna answer my question. -- how is she chosen? >> miss genk awaits was chosen consistent with practices for the hiring and vetting of appointees. >> walk me through that process. who was involved? >> i don't know the full scope of that process. >> you earned

involved? and >> i was involved in one piece of that process. >> what was your piece? >> i spoke with miss -- >> about what? >> as part of the standard -- >> what timeframe with this event? >> i don't want to give -- >> just give me a timeframe? >> early 2021. >> january february time period perhaps, early 2021. the secretary signed the charter in february 2021. when did the secretary sign off on miss -- being head of the port? >> senator, i don't know if that the secretary signed off on miss genk awaits at all. i'm not aware. >> he testified it was his decision. >> i believe the secretary testified that he was ultimately responsibility for this decision. >> so it wasn't his decision? >> oh -- i don't know >> ross -- >> -- i

was impressed by her expertise and i noticed -- >> that sounds like a. yes you're recommended favorably. at the time, that you spoke to her in recommended with, or were you aware of or long history of comments on twitter and other platforms of disinformation, anti free speech rhetoric and so forth which has to think i safe to say infamous? >> senator, i was aware miss genk witnesses expertise in the field of disinformation. >> did you know about her many comments spreading disinformation about russia, about the trump administration, about conservatives? secretary mayorkas, said he was not aware of any of this at the time. were you aware at the time you recommended her to him? >> in my capacity at acting assistant

secretary of -- i have not read all of her tweets. >> -- >> -- >> did anybody bring those to your attention at any time before they can became publicly released in this vetting process? >> not to my knowledge. >> so somehow she got through the vetting process with no one, including all the way up to the secretary, unaware of what she said on these platforms. i found that extraordinary. was the white house involved in the selection of miss genk awaits? >> i'm not aware. as a political appointee, the standard processes were followed. >> so to your

knowledge, the white house was not involved? >> the white house was involved with my process. so i believe that that is standard practice for the right has to be involved. >> so you think that they were involved in the selection of miss jankowicz? >> i'm not aware of the full scope of the hiring in vetting process. it was the same as other -- >> and trying to get to what your knowledge. is to your knowledge, was the white house involved in selecting the strength of? it's just yes or no? >> i really don't know. sir >> okay. you have no. idea was the current status of the disinformation board? >> it's on pause. >> what does that mean exactly? >> it means the disinformation governments were never met. the secretary has asked homeland security advisory committee to review how the department did most effectively address disinformation and how to do so in a way that protects civil rights and civil liberties. he's also asked that the -- -- review how the department can be as transparent as possible with the american public increase the trust in the work that we do. -- while that workers, pending the disinformation governments borg

is on pause. it's not meeting. there is not work underway. >> last question. did the board ever meet members, of the board ever meet with twitter executives? we have minutes of planned meetings with twitter executives task for cooperation and tracking speech, did that ever happen at any point your knowledge? >> i disagree with your characterization. >> did the meeting with the twitter executives never happened? >> i disagree with your characterization of the purpose of a meeting that never happened. the meeting with twitter never happened. >> dear knowledge never happened. i've got a lot other senators questions. i would say i regret that it has taken months to get the most basic information about this report. we would know none of this, none, had it not been for whistled who turned over these documents. frankly, that is totally, totally unacceptable. thank you mister chairman. >> thank you senator hawley. senator carper you are recognized for your questions. >> i will start with

miss coultas. you pronounce your name coultas? >> that is correct. senator >> in your testimony, i believe you mentioned that the unmanned aircraft, also known as drones, represent the fastest growing sector in aviation to today. i understand that of september 2020, two years ago, there were 1. 7 million drones that were registered with the faa. and this number will only increased in years to come. and that said, could you take a minute or two and explain to us how the extension of the drone use has impacted the current threat landscape and how the faa plans to grapple with continue disruption to u.s. airspace by drone users? >> like you senator for that question. what

the faa currently does to contribute to the security of the airspace -- >> can you just speak a little bit louder? >> is that? better >> that's better. >> never been accused of speaking softly. thank you senator. the faa has been doing a number of things working with our security partners and our non federal stakeholders over the last several years as uas continue to be integrated and grow across the economy, both with industrial users of the drones as well as hobbyists and industry. things that we have been doing to help mitigate and work with our security partners and ensure the safety of the nas, which is obviously a phase number one priority, is to make that drones are integrated into the nas and it is done safely and it does not affect the rest of the nas as well as passenger commercial flights. we authorize and we put an existing, what we call temporary 1997, working with

our security partners, temporary air restrictions over eastern events, who meet certain security measures and needs necessary. some of those may be mascara ring offense. we talked about stadium, super bowl, other types of events, the, borders other events go on nationwide throughout the year, that we work with our security partners to put in. also additional air restrictions around those events. we also look at conducting table top exercises, and also what we call t t exodus again, working with state, local, tribal and territorial and federal partners, when they are at these events and using such an that if a drone would come into the airspace, or if as you heard them, say careless or clueless or noncompliant or potentially criminal actor of a drone, how would we actually respond? who has those authorities? what does that response in coordination look? like we have been working on that for the last several years. in addition, we have

remote i. d., which starting september of this, year manufacturers will be required to have all drugs manufactured to have what we have a self identifier or license plate. so all drones manufactured after september will have to have that on all drones. and operators of drones will have to be compliant with the remote i. d. rule by september of next year. >> all right. thank you. with my second question will be one i can address to each of you. we'll take a shot at it if you would all take a shot and. protecting our homeland security is of the utmost importance when it comes to addressing threats drone posed by drones. last week my family was at a beach. and one of the visitors joining us at the beach brought their drone. set it down in front of us. centered over the ocean. some

distance. almost out of sight. and brought it back. taking pictures. of us and others. pretty amazing. two or three days ago, i was back home in wilmington, delaware, and we have experiencing a an epidemic of off road dirt bikes in wilmington, all kinds of cities across the country. these people get on the streets and ride their bikes all over the place, or even know -- one of the tools to try to stop that is to track them using drones. a drone can be used not just to support criminal activities but actually stop them. and i think we need to be mindful of that. protecting our homeland security is of utmost importance when it comes to address threats posed by drones. given that they can be by criminals to conduct illegal -- as well as trafficking of

drugs and firearms. as such, close coordination with the departments of close to home on security, department of justice, federal aviation administration is critical when it comes to mitigating these threats. could each of you take a moment or two to explain how you respective agencies work together, not as a stovepiped, but as a work together. and with your state and local counterparts and monitoring color threats posed by drones? miss vinograd o, is it vinograd? >> it is. sir sorry it's a tough one. >> could you take a first shot at. that >> the department of security homeland security agrees that drones have variety of beneficial uses, emergency responses, deliveries, a vest to get a purposes and so much more. what we're focused on is the militias use of drones, whether intentional or unintentional. your question of cooperation is critical. the

department of homeland security could not utilize its current cuas authorities -- to include for example the faa. as we seek the secretaries authorization for example to designate a covered facility or asset which then will allow us to engage in cuas activities, we are recording every piece of that authorization with the faa for example. when we get a request for cuas activities to protect a no -- or and -- event too -- temporary flight restrictions. dhs works closely with the faa

-- and written essay to grant waivers to love for authorized activity to include the first amendment protected activity as well. >> thank you ma'am. mr. wiegmann. >> i would just heartily agree with that. the counter drone business is a team sport. everything we do, we work with dhs and faa. we have. to that we want to or not. -- everything we, do we work together. horizontal horizontally there's a lot of collaboration. and we are also starting to work vertical with our state and local partners. including delaware. we deliver state police is part of her working group on state and local drone activity, so that the group that we have -- if we get the authority were asking for today, we are working much more intensely with state and local authorities across the country. -- also the pilot

program that we described. this is an activity that law enforcement -- >> thank you. my time's expired. we'll have opportunities to submit questions for the. record of several more. thank you for joining us today. for your collaboration in for your commitment. thank you so much. >> thank you senator carper, senator lankford recognized for questions. >> chairman thank you. thank you for all the witnesses today. and for the ongoing work. address them questions about the collaboration you were discussing at this point. when i was visiting with some of the folks at our southern border several months ago, there were some of our border stations that we're trying to get counter uas equipment out it up and running in operable. in whatever areas on the border, there were 10,000 incursions in just that area of uas coming in across the border from mexico to the united states. they were

very eager to be able to get. that when i asked, was the issue? the equipment was there. the people right. there they were waiting on authorization and there was an ongoing dialogue between dhs and faa to be able to discuss how we're gonna get this up? so literally the, equipment, people, the need everything was there. so my question about this collaboration is, how long does it take? in this particular instance, we had a situation where that same equipment along the border was being used in a different region of the border and had been used for a while, but in this particular region it took months to actually get counter uas equipment up and working in that area. how do we speed up the process? where is the slowdown? >> senator, as noted earlier, i share your concern about the militia strong threat at the southwest border. i'll turn to my colleague to buy if they fa in a moment. the secretary of homeland security has authorized three areas of

operations along the southwest border as covered facilities or assets. we have three up and running if you will. there are four additional aor as that are pending. we have taken significant steps eternally to make sure the process internally more efficient -- which is part of my team. in addition, we have started doing safely concurrent processes with the faa, such that this can move as expectations sly as possible. there are four areas of operations still pending. the priority for me, it's a priority for the secretary to get things authorized as quickly as possible. >> so what is the holdup? this is months when that same technology is used in other places along the border. where is the spot that is getting stuck? >> i'll turn to my colleague anna to the faa in a moment, but as these aor as they're being in the process of being authorized, there is a lot of authorization with the faa. each coverage facility or

acid is different. there are different complexity in each areas of operation. we are committed to doing this quickly. the threat is significant. but each area of operation is different. which is why we coordinate with the faa -- >> mr. go back to the same. spot dividing quickly along geologic time rather than clock time anna. it's taking months in process and when i have interacted with the secretary, it's on faa's desk and they talked when i talk to the faa, they say no, it's on the secretary's desk. it seems to get lost. 100 figuring out a ton to get this unstuck? >> i can't go to further details in this very except on one thing. and one aor sir, it's a matter of a few weeks and a maximum. the others are little bit more complex. a big lad to speak to you in a close session to talk more specifically about what that looks. like we are committed to doing this with urgency and care. to be able to look at an existing technology out there in the geographic

region? >> it varies based on the technology and a location and the complexity of the requests that we receive. and some questions cases it could take a matter of days to issue atf, are in other days it could take longer depending on what that area is another t f r's -- >> can you define longer for me? >> so, i'm not in the area of issuing of the atf are's. it varies. we are working with our security partners and also other areas where they're trying to get. tfrs. -- it >> is my challenge on. this will just take one -- when i go, there i see people, i see

equipment, everyone's ready to go in there waiting for piece of paper to be signed by someone in washington. i get on the phone and i'm, saying where is this? how do we get the sun stuck? because they're dealing with thousands of uas coming across from mexico, carrying, narcotics carrying -- how do we get this done stop? because it's on someone's desk moving doing something. if there's a need to assist in this process, this committee's very engaged to be able to help get processes unstuck. but we are trying to figure out what still stuck? >> senator, i tried to be in the business of and sticking things as well. i will tell you that for the one that i mentioned that is forthcoming within just a small number of weeks, we what we are waiting for in that particular context, and in others, is to ensure that this equipment can be safely used and operated in that airspace. i'm happy to follow up with more details in a close session. again, we are

deeply committed to ensuring the first aor happens in a very small number of weeks and the decisional we a o r inspects as quickly as well. >> how long has that one's been pending? the one that you say it's gonna get unstuck in weeks. when did it first start? >> i don't have the exact date in front of me, when you say first started, it's been just a few weeks since we can move to this next stage of basically looking at this particular airspace and the complexities there isn't ensuring the equipment can be safely used. >> let me ask another question. -- this is a huge issue with self onscreen -- individuals that are operating their gangs and criminal activity, stalking people that they have threatened outside of that facility from inside the facility. bringing narcotics and. this is been a big issue for the bureau of prisons. what would solace down now, those

are fixed locations, and remote areas, what would be the challenge of trying to get this counter uas across all of our bureau president facility, starting with the most remote? why isn't already happening? >> we are working on. that we've deployed technology have a number of prisons. i know several. there is another 20 that are going to be coming on board. it's really just a question of getting people train, getting the technology, working with the faa on the tee a farce, tfrs and so forth. i understand your impatience and i share. we want to do. this it's a huge problem. i share your view. we will be working with the -- we are deafening concern about this issue. we had charges this past weekend of president texas, where people were smuggling contraband into the prison. that's not the first. one there are. others i share your concern. we are ramping up. >> i would say good. except that

this is something we've talked about often around this -- what is the slowdown? rose trying to figure out what is the issue? will allocate funds will, do the studies, we'll do the pilot, will prove all the process, and it seems to be years to actually get the execution on something that should be pretty straightforward, especially if you have prisons in this remote -- that we're not dealing with the complexities of being in a city. this one just shouldn't be as hard as it seems to be. mister chairman thank. you >> thank you senator lankford, senator scott we recognize you for your questions. >> thank you -- legislation such as the counter chinese trona, and the american securities drone, to protect -- a proud to lead the effort on the to pass the american cities drone. i think

we have to go further to -- the next chapter is to ensure that federal funds for the federal communication commission cannot be used to obtain -- have got a few questions on the re-authorization of the preventing emergencies threat. facts mr. wiegmann, corey law already with certain proves the to the visions entitle a sheen -- this proposed bill waves all of title 18. so what do you need to waive all of title 18 and why not just keep the existing waivers in place? >> so a couple of things. d. o. d. and d. o. e. has a broad title 18 waiver. it helps us operate with them if we have the same authority they have. that's. 12, while we are correct you are correct that our current

authority of the d o dhs and doj only extends to certain provisions of title 18, we have been able to use that effectively thus far, we can't prove that this is a changing technology landscape relative statutes could come to play in the future. we will be back in congress asking again. we think the cleanest approach, given that we don't think law enforcement officials using this technology we all talked about here today to try to prevent threats from drones, should be criminal at all. there shouldn't be any criminal provision that they are subject to read, than just a few statutes. we just think it's a cleaner approach. we are obviously fee to discuss that with the committee. if that's not their view. we think it's cleaner to have the same authority that the d. o. d. and the d. o. e. have. which is a full suite. >> you have examples where you needed it? if this wasn't in place, where have you needed this in the? plus >> thus far we've been able to work with existing exemptions that we have for a specific statute. we can predict in the future, as

technology changes, whether the statues would come into play. >> so, senator lankford talked a bit about the prisons. we know drones over presidents is a real threats. they've been used to drop drugs, weapons, other contraband inmates. drug cartels have been using drugs -- across the border in prisons. how this bill improved law enforcement efforts to counter this threat? to deal with the prison fight, issues over prison, how will this -- >> we already have the authority to protect our prisons. so keeping it. it expires on october if we don't extended. so we would not have the authority if we don't get extended. other than, we have the authority for presidents for good. we just need to extend that authority. >> -- in consultation with the department of transportation,

can designate certain state and law enforcement, to use counter drone detection medication authorities. can you talk about the selection process for this pilot program? and i'll state and local institutions will be selected? have you talked to agencies from florida? >> senator thank you. i'll turn to my colleague from the department of justice in a moment. what we are seeking in this justice, two things for state, local, tribal, and territorial partners. number one, is the sltt partners, excuse my acronym, -- in addition to that, i should say complying with all federal standards and safeguards. in addition to that, we are seeking a six-year pilot program for sltt partners to engage in medication. that's process would be an inter

agency process. these individuals would comply with federal standards and certifications. they would use equipment, from unauthorized equipment list that was coordinated with faa and fcc. we believe this is critical. such that the sltt partners as the first responders on the first down in florida and elsewhere would be able to take urgently needed action to detect and mitigate drone threats. i will turn to my colleague. >> i'm gonna look okay fellow can the back row, if we're talking about anyone florida. >> is that typically through the sheriffs departments for the police? >> we have talked to -- as we select cities, around the country, to participate in the program, it's gonna be their level of interest. >> they're going to -- >> their expertise and so forth. we'll see how the process works. we haven't exactly figured out that criteria. i imagine it will be locations all over the country

in buildup. >> do any of you, you know i talked about the -- you all have thoughts about whether we are just blanket all of the ability for chinese company to be able to sell drones in this country? >> or whether the federal government ought to be able to buy them or not? you have any thoughts on that? >> from the departments perspective, we share your concerns about china generally. and chinese manufactured drones. senator, dhs has issued guidance internally that us prove it prohibitive procurement by of uas, from foreign countries. -- generally reassure your concern about chinese manufactured drones. >> the problem is now they dominate the market. >> they've gone all down a little bit. >>

we have a huge chunk of the market. if we can use drones for law enforcement purposes, they're kind of the main game. we are working to transition away from. that there is impatience. it's a question of. time were in the instagram, we're taking steps to mitigate whatever risk -- from the use of the drones. but we won eventually transition away from the. -- they do serve a useful purpose for all manner of things that we do. it's not ideal. but we are trying to transition away from them is how i would say it. >> from the faa's perspective, we are really responsible for the integration of drones into the national air space and testing of the drones to ensure the safety, as they are integrated, but we don't have a position on the purchasing of or acquiring. >> miss vinograd, did you see the stuff that came out in ukraine that the gi drones were being tracked? have you got looked into that at all? or is that classify? do you know? >> i had seen that. a big lead to follow up in a closed hearing. >> i'd love to know what happened on that. >> certainly. >> thank you senator scott.

senator rosen you are recognized for questions. >> thank you chairman peters. i appreciate you holding the hearing and appreciate you all for being here today in what you're working on. i want to focus on protecting our stadiums. my home state of nevada, is the entertainment capital of the. world we are quickly emerging as the sports capital of the world as well. we have a new allegiance stadium, home at the raiders. las vegas is the first city to secure the nfl draft, the super bowl, and the pro bowl all at once. it's unfortunately continues to make las vegas a target rich environment for bad actors. since this september 11th terrorist attack, congress, executive branch you have recognized the need to protect stadiums and sporting events and the faa initially imposed, as you talked about temporary flight restrictions tfrs over stadium events including unmanned aircraft, and congress subsequently strengthened codified these requirements. however sports leagues have

reported an increase in violations in -- by drones. -- i would like to enter a letter from the coalition of sports organizations in support of the administration's counter uas proposal. we >> -- >> as the faa continues considers new drone policies, do you think it's important to take into account these long-standing protections for stadiums, to ensure federal policies keep up with evolving threats? how do you plan to do that? >> thank you for your question senator. the faa, we do agree that as the technology is continuing inter granting drugs into the airspace, that the ability for

the detection and then when necessary mitigation, is in place as well. we are working closely with our stadium, stakeholders, to ensure as you mentioned, we already do it standing tfrs for the nfl, major league baseball, nascar, as well as division one colleges win and we also worked for the super bowl another types of large events to ensure that their restrictions around those mass gathering events that are held to stadium in other venues to both ensure the safety of that event and the security. but to also ensure the safety in air space over that event. so let me ask you this fall. there is that legislation from the administration that does extend the authorities for critical infrastructure. but it doesn't specifically mentioned stadiums. we are talking about all the things that you are doing and shouldn't be specific and identifying stadiums another critical infrastructure so we are sure and we want to avoid confusion. we are sure that communities have the resources to protect themselves. -- critical infrastructure we didn't define which sectors are entities. i would say would leave that up to congress if they wanted to

give us more specifics. we take it is all entities. we take this in addition for chemical facilities, energy sectors. it's a whole host of sectors that may want to come and petition to get both temporary strict shuns in addition to using detective equipment in the litigation. i prefer my colleague if she wants to expand on that. >> i can click my colleague, we have known more objections to specificity. we want to ensure that all critical infrastructure owners,

operators include stadiums and sports venues have the authority. >> there might be confusion but we might be able to define as a minimum a certain group allowing for the flexibility to add more as needed. so, we will continue to work with you on that. i do want to build on what senator scott asked about the pilot program. we want to extend the local law enforcement, protecting all of the critical infrastructure. first of all, to get the proper program should include stadiums? we've been talking a florida, we have a great fusion center to protect their. have you been speaking with anyone in nevada? do you believe that the training and surveillance should be shared across multiple law enforcement agencies? that's a good thing to involve communities. >> i want to make sure montages >>

disagreements gonna look in the back are to see if we are in touch with folks in nevada. right now we can only protect the super bowl the world series. a couple thousand nfl games every year, 20,000 baseball games every year. we are only covering the super high profile. so the big advantage of the staying local is to allow that people in the frontlines to be able to protect those venues for the ordinary game. so, that's a big piece of it including in the ballot. i fully expect the jurisdiction to participate the path would be scattered across the country. >> this is the way we should look at the state and local communities. as for smoke multipliers.

you can't do it all alone. i would decide to quickly move on to cybersecurity because we know there are specific cyber security risks, country of origin as we talked about for manufacturing but there is malicious actors can hijack control of drones that are necessary. law enforcement drones. can you talk about some of the specific threats? could you deal with what we're looking at from worst to least. it might not be quite equal. >> drone threats more broadly? >> cyber security threats. >> certainly, well senator you mentioned several people and the exploitation of information on the john that is being transmitted between the commanding control center. just

to clarify, the hearing today's about counter authorities. moving back to the subject of the hearing, and how we stop the stuff. we only intercept the signal between the command and control center. that is the only information that we in certain cases retain. when we look at john's been used for malicious purposes, we are concerned to change the course of that drone. use it for all and purposes, surveillance, intrusion for not authorize facility in that nature. so for a counter perspective, again we are focused on the signal between the command and control center. and then for the actual

drum perspective, we are very aware of the cybersecurity risks that could be manipulated for arrange purposes. >> we will have to work on that with cisa. i'm just concerned that the state and local communities understand which threats they have to deal with. the highest that's going down. that's just we can be sure to protect the ones we love. thank you, mister chairman? >> senator padilla you are recognized for your questions. >> thank you mister chair. >> before i asked my question, i'm just gonna be very clear that the threat posed by u.s. is one congress must address before the authorities expire. i don't california we've seen how this can disrupt critical function, so my questions are not related to the need for authorization, but making sure that we do so

now responsible way. now, the first question is already been covered by senator scott. that had to do with a broad exemption for 18. it's a call for the administration proposal. it went back and forth those currently the case. through a lot of specific exemptions. there is more than one way to get this done. instead of asking that question over again, i will follow up with this. that latina includes prohibitions. there are intimidating voters, engaging in video loitering some. some i understand how they want to big stem from the wiretap. but what they need to be exempt from probation or the examples i just gave? none of those

activities would be authorized by staff. you can only take statutory resume and they're necessary to detect and mitigate the incredible threat. we there's voyeurism and work from coming into play there. the statue would not give protection against those offenses because of the way it is structured. it would not exempt you from the offenses. they would never come into play. >> sadly we have seen for the interpretation of philosophy is it shifts and puts into statute. these exemptions do matter. >> fair enough. >> i think it's important. >> questioning a different area whether it's broad exemption, i'm exemptions. we are also discussing the proposal to have a reauthorization that's

permanent. not one of the sunset provision. the usage has rapid development of technology. this demonstrates why the government is to have clear authority in my opinion we to engage in the mitigation activities. the pace of technological development in the ever growing uses for drones, including for valuable engagement purposes. it seems to suggest that is regularly revisiting this area of the law. the administration proposes to say the authorities rather than having it sends a provision that would require -- the executive branch will come together to evaluate how well

the exapnded authorities call for in the statute are working. happy debate whether three or five years, whatever timeframe makes sense. but why shouldn't we all visit the broad authorities being granted in this bill in a few years. >> senator to be clear we are seeking this in the sunset clause for most of the authorities and the pilot program we are not requesting indefinite authorities for these sunset clause. as it currently stands, it's impeding the ability to use our authorities. it makes it incredibly difficult for us to engage in multi your testing and things of that nature. we agree that there's a critical need with how these are being exercised. it's under the threat act of 2018, we required to report to congress every six

months. dhs has done but in addition to this bill vessel ttp to program two years after the enactment of this bill we're also required to report to congress and adjust the pilot program. >> so, you may disagree but it might be a longer or shorter one. i still believe in the power of -- to force these conversations. it keeps us from talking every, day not just every two years about the preface here is a continuously evolving technology. it makes additional performance and capabilities with the growing number of uses in technology. i think a regular conversation from administration to

administration would be worthwhile. i know it's been a long morning for all three of you and i will leave my questions at that. i look forward to working with u.s.'s proceeds. thank you mister chair. >> thank you senator pedias. senator --, recognize your questions. >> thank you for our witnesses for joining us today. a counter drone of his experience october is critical to our homeland up -- its authorities allow dhs to protect critical infrastructure and communities. as chair of the committee and the commerce committee, i'm keenly aware of the threats posed by drones to our nations, borders and airports. in arizona they're using drones to smuggle drugs across the border, trying to avoid law enforcement. and of course, they're too many examples of jones blocking flight paths and shutting down airports. we must maintain this capabilities, so uas

capabilities, while safeguarding privacy and legitimate john users. i look forward to working with my colleagues to do just that. my first question about future threats is from -- . drone technology is rapidly evolving. while most runs currently rely on our technology, more advanced drones may become the norm. at dhs, what are you doing prepare for the strong related threat? including the drone swarms that could conduct synchronized operations. and as congress considers reviewing the c u.s. authorities, what can you do to research and mitigate these threats? >> we have designated research testing [inaudible] >> sorry, senator we agree that the

technology is evolving incredibly rapidly. what the department of homeland security is committed to is trying to stay involved ahead of that threat. we do so through our director where we are engaged in a significant amount of research testing and evaluation. such that we can try to stay ahead of the curve. in addition is mr. wegman mentioned we are seeking exemption from title 18. we want to be able to keep ahead as the technology rapidly increases. it proliferates the kind of threats that drones may pose to the american people in the homeland. >> yeah, we obviously work with our colleagues and technology working groups to make sure we are doing the best we can do the state-of-the-art technology to counter the threat. >> as chair of a border subcommittee,

i'm particularly concerned about the threat that drones posed to our border an airport. if the current authorities expire in october, can you discuss the impact would have on our border security? >> the expiration of this would be catastrophic for border security perspective. our counter-authorities currently allow for operations at our borders. the expiration of those authorities would allow adversaries to increase their malicious use of drones to engage in smuggling, surveillance and other malicious activities. >> my third question, can you describe how the administration program would help with slight pass for drones. specifically,

how do the authorities hinder your agencies from achieving this? >> i will say that of all the things accumulate at night when that is foremost in my mind is a potential for major tragedy. we currently have the department of homeland security working close partnership with the faa at airports. however, tsa locks the authority to engage in proactive or persistent operations at airports. what that means is tsa cannot be all around airports engaging in proactive detection. i will tell you just in the threat perspective, we've had 2000 sightings of drones in iran airports since

2021. in 2021 and 2022, we have had 64 evasive actions by aircrafts with four commercial carriers. we've had 30 airport disruptions just in 2021. this already amounts and significant economic damage. there is potential for real loss of human life. i'm very concerned about the lack of explicit authority in airports and that's why we are seeking this to engage in proactive detection and mitigation and close partnership with faa. >> to build off of my colleague, obviously the number one priority for the faa is a safety and security of the airspace. we too are concerned about the number of jobless sightings that we consistently see across the country. the faa is supportive of expanding the authorities to tsa. giving them the authority to be able to do

not just the detection but the mitigation if necessary. >> my next question is like all technologies, drones hold promise and peril. the same grounds if they want to have in the facility could be used by journalist to shed footage for the news and hold government accountable. i know doj has had time and resources to ensure the privacy and civil liberties are protected during these operations. could you discuss some of the safeguards? how did our drones in a restricted airspace -- and when they, our data is intercepting for how long? >> okay under the statute we can only intercept data that is necessary for countering a threat. so, as i mentioned i have the list here of the types of data. the drone serial

number, the geolocation of the drone. the location of the controller and we are talking about metadata, the information of the drone is generating to find out where it is, where it's going and we can hopefully interdict it. once we collect that information, if it's not of any use we discard that information right away. you can only keep it as long as it's necessary. this is unless it's necessary to keep it longer for purpose of criminal investigations if someone is violating their space to pursue a prosecution. all of this is laid out in the law, the statues and what you can collect, how you can retain when you disseminated is on the statue. those are carried over

into the new bill, so we continue the privacy protections of the new bill. so, to the extent that they are under the activity of the pilot program there with the privacy protections. i don't know that answers your question. >> yes, thank you mister chairman. >> i'd like to take this opportunity to thank our witnesses once again for participating in today's hearing. in discussing the of this live coverage of this committee here on c-span 3.