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ukraine, titled the history of the president. and which we are trying to go back into the past to do our very best to understand events that are happening before our eyes. in the present tense. today's class is going to be and overview of the war, with our typical back and forth between past and present. and i'm going to try to explain, not a mathematics class, but a rather simple formula on the blackboard for those who can see it. formula is a is not equal to b plus c. i'll explain that more with that rather mysterious mathematical formula, what it means. a is a variable that stands for russian aspirations, with foreign policy, that's one side of the equation here. b as the foreign policy and military aspirations of ukraine, and c are the military and

foreign affairs aspirations of the united states. b and c have gone along pretty well for the last six months, he witnessed a very close partnership between ukraine and the united states. so, in that sense, b plus c adds up to something significant. what it does not add up to is a, and there is been a very significant clash between the aspirations of the united states and ukraine. on the one hand. and the aspirations of russia on the other. so, that is what i'll try to exploit in short form in today's class, for the next 40, 45 minutes or so. and then we'll see if there are questions before we drown today's class to a close. let me start, before going into a, b and c, with some words about the war itself that began on the 24th of february. it would be deeply inaccurate to say that the war in ukraine, as we've come to refer to it, is unique to our times. that is a first major war since 1945, or even the first major

european conflict since 1945. if you look back over the history of the last 60, 70 years, we will see nothing that quite amounts to a second world war. but you will see one major conflict after another. now just a can get american terms. if the war in korea from 19 50 to 54, you have vietnam from the late 19 50s until 1974, 75. you have the war in iraq that began in the spring of 2003. the war in afghanistan that began not too long after the september 11th attacks in 2001. if you look at the history of asia over the last 40, 50 years, you will see many conflicts. and i think anybody who would look at the history of it as, 40 50 years would see many conflicts as well. multiple wars, civil wars, upheavals et cetera. if it were in the southeast of europe in the 1990s, in the

balkans. we have a russian invasion of the country of georgia and the south caucus in 2008. indeed, what we have witnessed over the last six months has in fact been the second bucket chapter of the war in ukraine, which begins in 2008. do not forget the 2022, this ominous here that we're living through, we've entered an entirely new or different era. there have been wars and many places. in yemen recently. ethiopia. conflicts in sri lanka and other places. ukraine is really one among many international conflicts that are occurring at the present moment. but it, is i would argue, i say this by way of introduction, quite a dramatic departure from the recent past. both in europe, in ways that i'll try to explain in a moment, but also globally. i would argue, perhaps a little bit of exaggeration, not intentional, but part of what i'm saying that the events of february 2022, the beginning of

the war in ukraine, are on par with the events of that december of 1914. and the events of the fall of 1939. which is to say it's on power at the beginning of the first world war of the second world war. in the late 1940s, the beginning of the cold war, which doesn't have such a precise moment of origin but is a four-year conflict that was very consequential and significant. and i think that we are facing something of similar size and scope and stature with the current war in ukraine. so, let me say first about why this war matters as much as it does for europe. and then a few words for why the war minutes as much of it does globally. and that we can move into our mathematical equation of a not equaling b plus c. europe has not seen a war of this kind, truly, since 1945. we have an engagement between

the largest military in europe, the russian military, and the ukrainian military, which is not the same size of the russian military. the two countries are not comparable in terms of economic heft and population. ukraine, a bit less than 40 million, russia around 140 million people. the russian economy is bigger than the ukrainian. but the military is a significant one as well. if you subtract the russian economy from the equation, you could see that ukraine has one of europe's biggest and most battle-tested armies in all of europe yep. it is a confrontation between two major militaries, not quite on par with each other on paper but two large-scale military's. it is not, as we might've expected ten or 15 years ago, a war that primarily takes place in cyberspace. not a war of machines and computers as much as a war of soldiers.

much the way the venetian war was of soldiers, or the conquest of the roman empire where wars of soldiers. it's a very traditional war and that regard. not all countries are equal in terms of geography. not all countries are equal in the scheme of things, but they're not all equal in terms of geography. so, it matters very much where a war takes place. if the united states fights war incarnated as it did in the 1980s, that matters for grenada. it matters for the united states. but it may not matter for the world. ukraine is a very different kind of thing. from the small country of grenada. uk comprises a very, very important piece of global real estate. it is to the north of the black sea, the black sea unites turkey with europe. turkey with russia. ukraine with turkey. it's a major transit point. and it's a great strategic fleet evidence.

ukraine has many countries abroad as to the last of the european union, hungary, slovakia and poland, as well as romania. so, for countries within the european union. ukraine has bellow wrist to its southern border, which is an independent country but very closely tied with russia. if ukraine has a huge, huge land border with russia. so, ukraine as one of these countries, if you think of the world as jenga blocks, ukraine is one of the countries where if you pull it out it's very likely that the whole tower comes tumbling down. it's connected to many different places. and as a great deal to do with the world economy. if you think of the chinese belt and road initiative that begins in china, has destinations that europe and other places. it runs through the country of ukraine. if you think back to the first and second world wars, although there wasn't identified a country called ukraine, and those towards the territory of

contemporary ukraine is integral to both of those wars. many, many battles on the first world war that are fought on the territory of ukraine. and that, if anything, is you more toward the second world war. they were instrumental to the collapse of the soviet union. it was uganda votes the socialist republic as a part of the soviet union. as ukraine's vote in the fall of 1991 that top of the soviet union. ukraine has perhaps been a little bit less of a gun after 1991 in terms of the history of conflict that is until 2013, 2014 but what revolves around ukraine is simply very important. in that, sense also we can fold into this story, the importance of geography. the fact that russia is one of the combatants in the world. worship is one of the countries that touches upon many other countries with part of russia and asia. part of russia and central asia. part of russia and europe. and now because this too is an area of contestation, and

important -- in the arctic. russia is in many ways at the center of the world and russia is one of the world's two major nuclear powers. any conflict that involves russia involves all of us, it involves humanity because of the nuclear dimension. that raises the stature the war in ukraine i would say to a very high level. let's also understand the stakes of this war. there are times when countries skirmish with one another. they have a conflict over a piece of territory, over an issue and able to contain that skirmish within certain boundaries. those can be terrible affairs, they can be terrible episodes but it's possible to have what you could describe as a-limited war. maybe that's what russia had in 2008. but it's not what ukraine and russia had at present moment. this is a no holds barred existential war for both

countries. if putin loses this war, i feel safe making this prediction, if putin loses this war, his presidency will be over. it is not impossible that his entire government could fall if the war is lost. there is evidence for this in a way that -- two presidents in russian history. one that i would imagine press quite considerably on putin's -- putin being a student of history among other things. and this is the war that russia fought against a panda 1905. it's settled in new hampshire by teddy roosevelt in the summer of 1905. russia lost this war in japan that began the long progression of nicholas the second, last saar of the russian empire towards revolution and towards the loss of power which he experience in 1917. russia and 1917 was in the process of losing the first

world war. -- nicholas the second lost two wars, you could say, and then he lost his government. then after that, he lost his life. and you could also point to the macallan gorbachev who died yesterday, stories are now being written. he lost the war in afghanistan, soviet union lost the war in afghanistan in the 1980s. it was a part of his own power eventually. loss of the war in afghanistan 1987. soviet union cracks up in 1991. not because of these words alone but there is a relationship. putin is there for acutely aware that if he fails in ukraine and he can fill in ukraine, -- -- -- it's a war he can certainly lose. if he does, it will not be a trivial loss. it will not be a loss that he cannot probably survive politically it. we'll be game over for vladimir

putin. i feel in that, sense whenever -- it's a war he has to win the stakes if anything are higher in ukraine. we have seen from the nature of the russian occupation of various territories -- the reporting is never perfectly crist, sometimes murky. but i think that these are safe generalizations. the russian army has committed numerous atrocities. that there have been forced programs of versification of the population that has been forced to take on different kinds of classes and use different language at times. because of the russian occupation. there are reports of tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of ukrainian children have been deported. to russia. and i think it's no secret that it -- effusion has the ability to assassinate or in some ways to limit the ukrainian government, i think that's probably what he was trying to do in the first two days of the war. if that was possible for him, this is something that he would

do. so ukraine faces the prospect -- of a very -- the loss of freedom in a really every respect i think in that sense, you can say for ukraine as well this is a next essential conflict. if you agree with those two assumptions, those two statements, there is an existential conflict for russia and ukraine simultaneously, it means that these countries are going to give it everything. they're going to push as hard as they can push. to stave off defeat or to achieve victory. this is not going to be some kind of-limited small-scale skirmish. when a country's dispute, little bit like india and pakistan have disputed territory in kashmir for the last couple of decades. but they're not gonna use their weapons against each other because of this dispute. it's a dispute there able to contain. not so in ukraine in the case of ukraine and russia. and therefore, the final point i made before getting into a review of russian ukrainian aspirations at the present

moment or over the last year or so. and that is very possible and conflict -- other countries. more likely then the possibility that ukraine can contain this conflict is the possibility of the conflict will spread to include additional countries. other than ukraine or russia. already you have countries including the united states that are involved in the conflict from a certain distance. it's an open question whether they contain that distance. in that sense, this could be very melodramatic and hopefully not irresponsibly so. in that sense, the war in ukraine runs the very real risk of becoming a world war. that is unfortunately the precedent with these kind of wars in europe because of the density of countries that are so closely connected and related. they draw one another into these conflict so we have two examples of the 20th century of what were the beginning kind of smaller scale conflicts that

developed very quickly into world war. that's something to worry about, something to bear in mind in this case. all of what i'm trying to say. speculative unfactual. all of them trying to say is that the event that has happened before our eyes over the last seven months is one that is of immense significance. so that by way of introduction. if we are to understand the immense significant of this event. we need to understand our the motivations of the primary actors. this is what i will turn our attention to at the moment. what motivates the three major participants in this conflict. the three major participants, a b and c. in radical form or russia, with started the war, that's what we had to begin the story. the war being fought on the territory of ukraine. so that's of equal importance in terms of understanding the conflict. and one might walk down the streets of washington d.c. on a pleasant late summer early fall day in october or rather august

of 2022 and say that this country is nothing to do in the war in europe. the country engaged in its own business, getting ready for midterm elections. back to school, sentiment and mood in washington d.c.. sort of the city still sort of at a rhythm of its late summer vacation. that might all be the optics of washington d.c. at the present moment. but make no mistake, washington d.c. or rather the united states is an unbelievably important participant in the war in ukraine. it would not be unfolding as it is unfolding if the united states were not the kind of participant that it is. that's something -- another piece of the puzzle. even though the war is quite distant, possibly -- american sullivan had any awareness of gun force upon us. although a very distance, the united states is not distant from the war. we understand the motivations as well.

>> what motivated vladimir putin to pull the trigger on the 24th of february, 2022. i think the first thing that we have to say in the spirit of being careful and rigorous is that there is a great deal that we do not know. we don't have access to the inner symptoms of the kremlin. we never making that access. we don't have a historians like to have a good trail of documents were to really lay out the thinking of putin, the decision-making process. the in the vigil advisers, the military planning, et cetera. there's a lot of data that we might wish to have, a lot of the factual information that we might wish to have. then we don't have. putin -- put an asterisk or anything that is said by me or anybody else in terms of putin's motivations, put an asterisk next to that. and have that asterisk indicate that what it's being said is guesswork. and guess what is different from factual analysis. since we can't do a factual analysis in the way that we could have say -- thinking at the time of the

first world war or will helms thinking or woodrow wilson's or anybody else is at that time. we don't have that advantage. we'll have to just do the best we can by guessing. in that spirit, i'm going to guess as methodically and as carefully as i can about the motivations russia has had for initiating the brutal war and has been prosecuting ukraine over the last six and a half months. one of the keys to understanding russian foreign policy is an ambiguous relationship within russian foreign policy between offense and defense. it is very difficult to disentangle these two things in russian foreign policy. and what outside of her service can look like pure offense made from the inside, from the kremlin's perspective be perceived as defense. and what is perceived as defense in the kremlin can be acted upon in an offensive

manner. i'll try to make this as clear as they can. this point about russian foreign policy but i wanna begin with the somewhat abstract generalization. about russian foreign policy which goes deep back into russian history. one of the constants foreign policy going back not decades but centuries is an equation of security and territory. security and territory. it is a commonly made observation and an important one. a commonly made observation that russia is not great britain or japan. or the united states. it is not a country that it's bounded by oceans. it is not switzerland, not bounded by mountains. there are no natural orders to the russian land mass in historically, russia is one of those countries that has always had enemies. sometimes the enemies have been to the east. some as the enemies have been to the west, typically have come from the south.

now much of the come from given how far north russia's. so historically, the enemies of russia have come from the east in the west. and a response to kind of foreign policy response to that situation has been to build the defense of russia to. really build a great wall of china or hater in this wall around russian -- lead offensive strategy has been to add territory. to make russian territory large. you can say the success of that project has to be measured by the circumstances. the largest country in the world. is russia. second largest country in the world is i believe canada. but that's barely northern real estate. as well. but russia is by far i think ten or 11 time zones. and by far the world's largest country. how is it that you build terrell tory. how is it to expand territory -- empire and conquests.

so in a sense. this is again the dilemma or this paradox perhaps that offensive defense are intertwined. in russian foreign policy. if you think that you make yourself more secure by having more territory. you defend yourself by becoming bigger. you only way that he could do that has been going on the offense to acquire that territory. so you can study. if we had a computer graph we can sort of do it officially. the growth of the russian empire into siberia and the 18th and 19th century is very far to the east. such that the russian border surprisingly with north korea. not just with china and mongolia but it goes so far as to be a border state to north korea. and then at the height of the russian empire. in the late 19th century, early 20th century. you have portions of poland that are part of the empire. the baltic republic as far as finland and very far down to the south. such that the russian empire

was sort of there on the edge of the southeast of europe or of the balkans. this became a massive empire. that developed territorially. and speaking in the past tense. bring this forward in just a moment. but the paradox of russian history or russian foreign policy has been that in acquiring these territory through conquest, new enemies have been created. you defend yourself, you hold enemies by acquiring territory. in the acquisition of these new territories, you also create new enemies for yourself. it's never been able to -- never been a situation of great sort of continuous security for russia. always been a case or a situation of continuous insecurity. it's very often has been -- peripheral in the sense of denigrating everybody. the populations or territories of the russian empire that have brought it down at different times.

it was in part the difficulty of defending all of the periphery's and the first world war that was a dilemma for russia and certainly in the collapse of the soviet union. it was peripheral parts of the empire that create the both republic that is all the soviet union in the late 19 80s or in 1991. that sort of the coalition of becoming more secure through territorial acquisition has not >> stability at best from a russian perspective has led to a kind of managed instability. bear at this point in mind. when i tried to hone in now on vladimir putin's reasons for invading ukraine of the 24th of february. i think what putin judged in february of military planning begins at least -- two years before february 2022. i think what he judged is his point of view, ukraine was drifting out of the russian orbit. we in this class will go much further in the discussion and

description of ukraine policy. there was a revolution there in 2014. but that meant -- to put that aside for a moment just concentrate our decision-making and the war. i think putin's assistant was that ukraine was drifting out of the red orbit. westerly direction. that it was forming an ever closer military relationship with nato, not as a member but as a kind of partner -- then it was forming an ever closer military relationship with the united states. i think putin's assumption here is that there was a trend at work. a circuit 19 -- 2022. 2021 when he made the decision to begin planning for the war. that there was a trend or a pattern at work that was very chronological in nature. that in 2014, ukraine had

initiated a close relationship with the west. by 2022, the relationship was far more advanced. and i think he was -- 2032 or 2042 and saying if nothing is done, then that relationship will be very advanced indeed. what russia will have is a non friendly or possibly hostile country. on its more than thousand mile border. with ukraine it will be a kind of platform or area for military development and that area will be used by the united states its allies and partners for their purposes. in that sense, russia has or president putin sort of put it this way, either a real vulnerability in real time in 2022. it's a little bit harder for me to imagine because nobody was poised to invade russia in 2022, far from it. it doesn't seem quite a threat in realtime. but i think for putin, it was a potential threat.

there is this potential threat, potential source of danger that's there for us on our border. and that danger is a foreign presence or if putin had to put a face on it it's the presence of u.s. influence parties and groups. we might disagree with this assessment. you might feel that this is incorrect. this is paranoid. that this is a misreading of ukraine. it's a misreading of american politics. all of that is possible. it's certainly highly debatable. all of these points and conclusions. if we are to understand putin's decision-making, we have tried to enter into his mind let's say that that is the problem as he understands it. is at the best i can do, if there are other ways of configuring it. best best i can understand terms of his deepest motivation for thinking about war in ukraine. if his assessment is that ukraine is a potential vote ability for russia. the second part of the equation that we have to understand for putin's why would he choose to

respond with military force he could put the squeeze on ukraine economically. he could go to the un to try to come up with some argument as to why this is not a good situation for russia. he could conceivably, it's possible he could sit with biden and say let's work out something different. in terms of your position and posture towards ukraine. he could attempt to do something with europeans and say at the u.s.'s got a wrong, u.s. is two forward leaning militarily when. it comes to ukraine. let's even, i europeans and i work on something better. some other kind of arrangement. these are all theoretical possibilities. there's a lot of other things that putin couldn't. other than to invade. in other words, he could've proceeded to vulnerability but the invasion was particularly -- answered that vu why? i think it goes back to this issue of territory. if you equate territory with security in a sense of you quite going on offense --

with even see how putin is solving the problem that he put before himself it's not for most american observers. non russian observers a lot of this doesn't make much sense. and it will just be the fever dreams of putin or kind of eternal russian imperialism. or just the evil of the kremlin that's your explanation. but that to me is not a very sort of serious we are trying to analyze these issues. i think there has to be more to it. and so i think. i think with offensive problem that putin identified or associated with ukraine, the russian vulnerability, it is one that he believed he had to solve in an offensive manner. territorial acquisition. in the course of the war, this is both 2014 and 2022 for russia. russia now controls between 20 and 25% of ukrainian territory. ukraine is under the size of texas. it's not a small country. there is quite a significant

territorial component to what's happened and i'm going to guess that russia will do everything it can to hold on to this territory or perhaps to acquire more. that is what putin is winning in the course of the war. cannot win political control ukraine, he'd love to have that. he may not have that but i would not underestimate the importance of the territory as such. thinking about foreign -- and i think it probably is the way that putin looks at the world. it's a very interesting question blasting all say about the russian side. the story, it's a very interesting question -- very important to try to -- a lot of us for the beginning, observers analysis putin said. --

maybe that's based on misinformation. maybe that's based on what people describe as war optimism. possibly, if he believes he is winning. the final thing that i'll say on this if he believes that he's winning, he may be measuring his successes in territorial terms. other words, not as every battle gone, not what president zelenskyy is saying in kyiv, not how many weapons is the u.s. providing. how much territory is under our control. because in the circular reasoning, the greater the territory that we have around the more secure that we are at home so let's draw a line and say that is variable a. let's switch our case and perception to the country that has been the victim of these two wars in 2000 innate and 2014 and 2022. let's turn our attention now to the country of ukraine.

let's try to understand what i'm going to describe as the ukrainian predicament. because i think that this helps us understand the nature of ukrainian foreign policy. it's motivation in the present tense. let me just say some words about ukraine in the 1990s. so ukraine has been a piece of the soviet union. go back and earlier history and we will, and there's much more to it than just the soviets story. circa 1991, it has been a piece of the soviet union since the end of the second world war. parts of ukraine apart of the soviet union from earlier times. in 1991, ukraine acquires its independence. its own -- capital city, its own currency, its own -- no less independent or sovereign in the united states. or canada or britain or other long-standing and very familiar countries. ukraine is not politically connected to russia in a formal

sense. it's its own country. that's what i wish to be in 1991. and in the 1990s. but the story that we can tell about the three baltic republics, latvia, with the way, nia and estonia. they were also a part of the soviet union since 1945. it's a very different story from the story of ukraine in the 1990s. and so, by discussing just a little bit of this diverge between these former soviet pieces of the soviet union. i think we can get to a sharp understanding of ukraine's situation in the 1990s. lastly, ellisville when, estonia, they're all quite small countries population wise. we're on the track in the 1990s. we only got there in the first -- they were on the track to join the european unan the nato alliance. these were countries that very much perceived themselves as european. had deep ties through the

diaspora population to western europe. and the united states. and they also seemed as smaller countries very manageable as countries that could be brought into the european union. and nato. they made a lot of the internal reform is legal and economic reforms that were necessary to join these two western institutions of the european union and nato. they were sort of objects of desire joining this western clubs. and at a certain point they entered into the -- institutions. that gave these three countries a great feeling of connectedness and security. not least because when you enter nato, as i'm sure all of you now. when you enter nato, you get what is called the article five commitments. that the united states or any other nato member will come to the defense if there is a threat to, -- if there is a threat to the security of one of these countries. so the paths of these three -- latvia, lithuania, estonia. it was a path to the west. if you can put it that way.

it was a path into these western institutions. unambiguous populations were in favor of this. they got into the club. i think with very few are survey shuns, they've been very sort of happy and proud members of the club ever since. i believe a student -- they bang of nato expansion with the three baltic republics entered into nato. also bear that in mind. that's one possible post-soviet destiny. but ukraine describes a very different post soviet destiny. a very different state of affairs. ukraine does not join the european union or joined the nato alliance. in the 1990s. in fact, if you go into polling data with the population. there were a significant divisions. within the population. now more than 50% population wanted to join nato. and the european union was often similar. it wasn't necessarily the chosen paths. it was one of several possible path. and it was also on the side of

the eu and nato. a great reservation about incorporating ukraine. large population, big border with russia. many russian speakers they are just felt different from the baltic republic. it felt like more of a challenge. the predicament of ukraine then. how to be autonomous, safe, secure, independent. everything that a country which is to be. its own agent. its own decision-maker in the world. you are not a part of one of these larger clubs. when you are a -- economies relatively small and when you live in a dangerous neighborhood. people have started to make the comparison over the last year with the -- very illuminating line between israel and ukraine. likewise, israel is not the world's biggest economy. certainly not the world's biggest population. and it lives in a tough neighborhood. it's had to figure out how to do that. one of these really answers been to really invest a lot in

military affairs. of course, israel has a close partnership with the united states. ukraine has had a much more different time of it or much more difficult challenge has face ukraine. and this predicament was sustainable as long as russia kept a certain and of distance. and the catch 22 of ukraine in foreign policy goes as follows. if ukraine was differential towards russia. if it made certain contributions. if it didn't rock the boat. things would basically be fine, -- the different presidents of ukraine. and they all kind of manage this a bit differently. but if you -- if they were differential towards russia. they would have peace, security and freedom. but there was a nagging philosophical question that came with that which is do you have the security and freedom if you're being differential? is that truly autonomy?

if you have to acknowledge that your brother is going to push around or not he around, if you go off course or do something that bigger brother doesn't like. are you truly being free? are you truly independent? and so ukraine us at this great challenge of dealing with a neighbor that has all kinds of strengths. and all kinds of interests and ukraine. and it is expecting a certain kind of difference. without going into details about why this is the case. let me simply say that it is the case that 2013, the difference comes to an end. ukraine difference comes to an end. was a good thing or bad thing? that's for the ukrainians to say. we can evaluate and discuss the debate and academic away. but the fact of the matter is the difference came to an end. and when the difference came to an end, russia shows a policy of different kinds of aggression vis-à-vis ukraine it was definitely the bigger brother and i felt like it had a right to push around ukraine

for the sake of its agendas and its aspirations in the region. remember, trying to intertwined things a little bit -- russian national security story. so russia feels it has a stake or maybe something more than a stake in ukraine. and it is entitled to sort of push for the outcomes which is to have in ukraine. so the difference stops in 2013. and you get a gradual uptick in military pressure coming from moscow. this first takes the form we're going to study in much greater detail -- the form of the annexation of crimea. a part of ukraine in march of 2014. then you have an outright war between ukraine and russia for about a year roughly, february march 2014 till january, february of 2015. and then you have a very uneasy nervous stalemate after that. from 2014 forward.

t melet me just mention a finalo the details in terms of the ukrainian predicament. i don't think it's -- anything is resolved in the moment in terms of this issue or this subject. i just want to describe it as clearly as i can. the last seven -- have been some of the most complicated. i don't mean difficult, that goes without saying. but i've also been some of the most complicated in ukrainian history for the following reasons. ukraine has done something that it was never able to do in the 1990s. it has got real military partners. most importantly the military partner of the united -- partnership with the united states. that was not for coming at you or go. that is very much a fact a life of the present moment. even germany which is a country that very much to find itself as a pass of the country after 1945, not a military power. didn't invest much money defense. doesn't like military activity. really trying to keep distance from that. even germany is sending its

pans or tanks and other forms of military hardware to ukraine. even the countries that were self-declared pacifist before the war. 78 months ago, they're now military partners of ukraine. norway, striking details recently at the beginning of the war davidson -- entire artillery to ukraine. can you imagine? giving an entire branch of your military hardware to another country. norway is only one of many countries that are now currently assisting ukraine. the complexity is as follows. the complexities that ukraine now has bona fide military partners. not necessarily a part of. nato but it's billions upon billions of military assistance from the u.s.. and many other countries. that's going to continue i think for quite perhaps even indefinitely. in a sense, ukraine's become a member of the club. but the price it's paying for this is astonishingly high in the sense that the war is not finished. it's not over. we don't know how it's going to go.

and the war is being fought on the territory of ukraine. another cost, another way of humanize the cost of the war for ukraine's summit 12 to 30 million refugees are internally displaced people. that's out of a country of a little bit less than 40 million. that would be like one third of america with the number being 78 million people. one third of americans losing their homes. fleeing to canada or mexico or to other countries. sort of unfathomable when you put it in those local terms. the cost of the economy has clearly been immense. even when you look at those new york times and other maps of the war in ukraine, you can kind of see that now it's only, only the southeast of the country. it's involved in direct military activity. even if a looks like it's a fifth of the country that are engaged in the war. the war is being fought all over the country the. bombs are dropping on cities in the west. every family of course is affected and we can go deeply into the economic details of

the war. which are very, very disturbing for the society and for the people of ukraine. you can imagine how schools -- next generation of children in the country so torn apart by war. the war is robbing ukraine of its future. not completely of course. there are many people try -- to an extent, the war -- that is the price that is being paid for the war. and at the same time, the war is making impossible for ukraine to resolve one of these outstanding problems of this independence was the problem of where do we stand? where are our alliances? where are our partners that. question has become clear. much more favorable to ukraine. but of course, the war hangs very heavily over the country. and we have no idea what those clouds are going to lift. that is b. that is the predicament of ukraine.

where does it fall? where to sort of organized itself in terms of its foreign policy. what relationships and alliances to build. the last six months have changed enormous amounts in that regard. we come now to the last part of the equation. the sea part of the equation. that if the united states and let me sort of begin by inverting things. by turning things inside out. and speculating as to why less -- about a warm ukraine. why is it that -- it would look like for the ukraine to be different to the war in ukraine. americans could easily argue that ukraine is very -- far away. many thousands of miles away from the united states. americans could argue that the u.s. has almost no economic equities in ukraine. it's true. it is not a country that does much to determine the course of the american economy. it's neither provides many goods to the u.s. nor does it

by many goods from the u.s.. you could sort of pointed to the two gulf wars in 1991 and the iraq war 2003 and you can see that there was an economic component to both of those wars. in ukraine. you could argue from an american perspective that the u.s. has been -- militarily in the last 20 years. it has waged two wars overseas in iraq and afghanistan. paid greatly for those wars financially and in human cost. and a lot of americans felt very frustrated with the outcomes of those two wars. why begin another overseas for if you have that bitter aftertaste in your mouth. that might be end of the reason for american indifference towards the war. and a final reason might be thinking sort of abstractly or perhaps boldly about this. that the war in ukraine matters less to the united states then a decent workable relationship with russia.

for the simple reason that the united states and russia are the world to major nuclear powers. what is the threat we have from this region. it's not russians taking xyz cities in ukraine. the threat that americans faces that the whole conflict will get out of control. you could acquire a nuclear dimension. and then the u.s. might somehow probe into this sort of nuclear catastrophe. so you could also say on that basis that the u.s. might preserve relations with russia for the sake of its own security. when sacrifice ukraine on the altar of american security. those are all to me imaginable arguments. it's very interesting to note that none of those arguments have done anything. gone anywhere or even been a part of the vitamin astray shuns thinking about ukraine or the war in ukraine. that might be the case for other administrations. it might be the case for presidential candidates in 2024. that's very possible but for those who have the key piece of the foreign policy kingdom. they're making the decisions.

these have not had any traction whatsoever. the question we have to answer than. not the full question of i americans are not indifferent to the war in ukraine. the question we need to answer is why is there such a high level of commitment and concern. for a country that is far away. for which there are no real economic interests. and that does involve or support of this country involves conflict with the world's major nuclear powers. the u.s. is in many ways putting itself on the line in the war in ukraine. we have to figure out why this might be the case. let me try to explain as best as i can. i try to do this with much intellectual empathy as i can for the kremlin. and for the ukrainian government. let me try to explain the motivations of the united states in of the white house. we have a brother conversation about american public opinion. very important that the complicated conversation to have. but the decision-making powers there in the white house. let's privilege that for

today's purposes and just focus on decision-making there. why does the white house care as much this about this conflict. why hasn't made the decision that it's made both during the conflict and in the lead up to the conflict. we need to go back in time for this. history of the president. we're speaking about the president going to go back into history to think about this question to understand the answer to this question. american foreign policy is formed. modern american contemporary foreign policy is formed in the memory of the two world wars. prior to world war i. u.s. had a very small federal government with really not that much in the foreign policy business. yes, western hemisphere was. spanish american war of 19 -- pulling the u.s. into the world. but still, in many ways the u.s. was pursuing its own business. prior to the first world war. it's the first world war. the second world war that pulls the united states into the world. that makes the united states a

global power that engages the united states in the affairs of the world. it is a conclusion of the makers of american foreign policy after 1945. that the u.s. has to act very seriously. very creatively to prevent a world war three. to -- first world war was very costly. for europe, for the united states. for the world. second world war was immeasurably costly. the u.s. paid a huge price. maybe not quite the price of the soviet union but paid a huge price for the second world war. and so the lone star of american foreign policy, driving force of american foreign policy is no world war iii. we need to have something better. we need to have a different system in mind. we need to have a different state of affairs. where does the first world war begin. they begin in europe. they are european wars. what's the american interpretation as to why these wars began? it's that you have two little democracy in the one hand. and too little deliberation and

corporation on the other hand. it is necessary to build a structures of cooperation. and deliberation. it's necessary to spread democracy for the sake of preventing those kinds of circumstances that created the first and second world war. in the american reading of things. this is precisely what the united states does for western europe after 1945. western europe is in ruins. it's in rubble, the french and the germans had always been at war. the germans and the prince had always been a war. we really need to figure out something better for western europe. this is to be sure a great success stories of american foreign policy. what do you get of a 1950. you have a martial plan that is helped europe get off of its feet. western europe get out of its feet economically. by 1949 you have the nato alliance that instead of perceiving pizza from european countries as adversaries. they have become partners and friends. especially friends in germany. they're both members of nato. the adversity in the sense is gone.

and the partnership has been built up. this partnership, this piece which brings prosperity to western europe lasts until 1989 or 1991 when it comes to an end. but it's sort of comes to a new stage. the poor when wall falls. the soviet union vanishes overnight. and europe is really dramatically at peace. then the tact of american foreign policy. western europe has a defect we saw western europe. putting things will be cruelly. we saw what's coming up now we have to solve eastern europe. we've done the job in western europe. now we have to translate -- the nature of this success into eastern europe. and so there are a lot of success stories in 1991 in this regard i mention three of them. the three baltic republics the european union and join nato. you have the expansion of the eu and the expansion window to include for many former countries that were soviet that were under soviet control and a

lot of the same benefits follow the prosperity, the movement to population. the ways in which the adversaries think of germany and poland for many hundreds of years and adversaries in poland and germany become members of the european union. and then the nato alliance. in a sense, that a recipe that has worked between france and germany, it works between poland and germany and other countries after 91. the premise of the united states is a little bit more practical in a way. the premise of the u.s. is the sacrosanct thing in europe are the borders of these different european countries. it is absolutely crucial that countries be able to maintain their borders. and as a corollary of this probably one of the most important points or you can consider in terms of what understanding the american response of the war in ukraine. the corollary is that a smaller country is not what's important the bigger country. and so thethe borders of a righ.

one and a half million people. if germany wanted to spin and rearrange the borders of lafayette, certainly could. in theory. but according to the american reading of europe. the border is a lot of you are not less important than the borders of germany. the borders of the small countries have to be preserved. why? it's nice for the small countries. that's part of the answer. but the more important part of the answers that if you allow this to happen. you're going to just get the competition, the contest, the back and forth, the resentment, the grievances, the military settling of scores gonna bring you back to a world war i or world war ii. it has to keep the structure intact. you have to keep the integrity of these borders. you have to ensure that the small countries are no less secure than the big countries. this is the american recipe for peace accordion prosperity in europe. bear all that in mind in terms of what's happening in the last year in ukraine. think of the war in ukraine as

a contest between russia and the united states to see which proposition is true. you russian proposition is ukraine's close to us. historically connected. we have a right to figure out ukraine and the surrounding areas, what works for us. we have the military in power to do so. if you can't stop, us you have to accept it. it's not the perfect paraphrase but it's something like a russian proposition at the present moment. the american proposition, the u.s. for position is that if we allow ukraine to be a rearranged, for us to be rearranged. if we allow russia to re--- change the government of ukraine and started dominated from the outside. makes ukraine a colony or russia, what will happen said is the worst possible precedent for europe. we will have gone back in the american reading of things to the 1890s or to the immediately before the first world war when all of the stuff was constantly being re-arranged, divided up,

partitioned, report-ish, and colonize, re-colonized. et cetera. if we go back to that ugly pass, ukraine that's not going to be the only european war, it's going to be the first of many european wars. and for the u.s., i won't linger over this point, i just mention it for your consideration. there is a lot of significance for asia as well. because if the rules in europe or that might makes right. then that borders don't care. and other countries are significant. that is gonna be something terrible for taiwan. cause taiwan is a country that's smaller than china doesn't have the military and if china draws the conclusion from ukraine that these kinds of wars are open season for these kinds of wars, the not only would we lose stability in europe, but we'll lose stability in asia, as well. there's a way in which ukraine matters. certainly, that is the case that the white house cares but the citizens of ukraine. they don't want to see displaced people, don't want to

see -- it is a moral american response, as there has been to the european response and with many who supported ukraine since the war began. the whole u.s. vision of europe is at stake with the war in ukraine. if you accept a point of view, it will be costly to send a billion dollars worth of ukraine. i think the numbers are even higher than that at the present moment. three billion, four billion from us. i think it's something like that, in terms of u.s. military assistance. those are big numbers. is it costly to send that amount of military assistance to ukraine? if what i've said a moment ago is true, that the future of europe is at stake, then it's not expensive at all. in some respect, it's very cheap when you consider the alternative. so the united states, the essential thing is not so much that russia be defeated, or that russia lose. that, of course, is the

preferred outcome for the war in ukraine. but the more financial thing for the u.s. is that the old system with the importance of small countries, meant deliberative rather than military solutions to problems in europe. that that be kept off and running. that is the crucial american motivation. so interesting ali, not that we would perceive this in the campaign in 2020, ukraine has risen to the stop of the agenda of the biden administration. i think it will be the most important issue for biden's first term, if that is all that there is. and a relatively obscure part of europe, which the ukraine was ten years ago. it has come to be the central terrain, the central battlefield of the 21st century. for moscow on the one side, and

russia on the other. so a, russian aspirations gain greater control. and that leads to greater security, to the domination of a certain amount of ukrainian territory. that runs directly counter to the ukrainian desire for sovereignty, and independents. and russia's aspirations run directly counter to the division of the united states. a does not equal b plus c. that is not equal to the war that we see before us. let me draw to a close on that disturbing note. of course, i am now u.s. for whatever questions you asked to ask. >> you mentioned earlier how many countries like united states, england, germany have contributed a lot of weapons and ammunitions to ukraine. if ukraine has an offensive in the south, does that end up being successful?

i know it's kind of speculative, but when you see me a lower amount of weapons and ammunition being donated by certain countries like norway, sweden, england, germany. right, now the u.s. is the main contributor. >> that's an excellent question. i think there's a lot to unpack in that question. i think that as long as ukraine 's under duress, that the military will keep flowing, and i think that it is as important for european countries as it is for the u.s.. i think even the failure of counteroffensive. -- i think what the failure of a counter offensive would change though are the stated objectives, the kind of endgame that is attached to that support. i think instead of the

reclamation of territory, it's sort of official u.s. policy, semi official u.s. policy that ukraine's goal is to reclaim all the territory that was taken for the 24th of february. so, u.s. military assistance is going for that purpose. to bring it back to the status quo before the 24th of february. i think if there would not have been a successful counteroffensive that would be given up and there would've been a line between russia and ukraine at that, point like north and south korea. they wanted to be advantageously positioned so they need to be as forward as possible. so the military assistance is still important but it's more for that reason then bringing the country back to where it was prior to the 2022 war. it's very significant but the whole issue of a counteroffensive, it's not the whole game. please? >> you mentioned how russia has used territory by offense as a way of defense. but i'm wondering, how through a historical lens you understand

the present united states's approach to defend, ukraine by using territory and more ideological manners, by having its allies preserve the status quo of the world and avoid that world war iii you mentioned. >> that's a very interesting question. i think that what it points up is something of a big structural difference between the united states and russia. the united states, terrorism can change the perception, but feels pretty territorially secure. it matters a lot that the united states has good relationships with canada to the north and mexico to the south. and good relationships, in a different sense, with the atlantic and pacific oceans. the idea that the u.s. would use territory to advance security is very low. and that's, and i think you're right. the u.s. tendency when it comes to its global outlook as to build up these global structures of alliances, nato is one example. you use the

term idealogue eulogy, filthy here and there is exceptions when it comes to foreign policy. but the u.s. feels most comfortable with fellow democracies. there's a long tradition, going back to the american revolution, of supporting democracies for the sake of supporting american security. of course, when you look at russian foreign policy, you will see a very different rhythm to it. the soviet union deathly used idea and ideology to build influence and enhanced its power. but that has not been the story in russia after 1991. i think their territory as we classically understand it through these hard national security issues, that has driven everything. and ideas and ideology have been less significant. it's helpful to understand the, understated this, what contrasting security cultures of the united states and russia. because they play off of each other in ways that

matter a lot to this war. please? >> i was going to ask, so, u. s. foreign policy has been very different throughout the years, obviously. but specifically it changed a lot in the cold war. since they were kind of playing dirty by using the cia to then get them to trade other people inside countries. do you think the u.s. would pull that maneuver again? if so, do you think that would lead to another, possibly, cold war? >> that's a very interesting question about rough tactics and, as you say, playing 30. i would argue in a way that the u.s. has always been pretty comfortable with tough tactics. well before the cold war, certainly the conquest of native american land is not a matter of genteel politeness.

the mexican american war of 1848 was a war of conquest in which texas, california, new mexico, nevada were taken from mexico by force. 1890, eight i mentioned the spanish american war that makes the united states, for a time, formally an empire. those are brutal military campaigns at that time. so, brutality and toughness are not foreign or non native to american foreign policy. by any means. i think that you are asking about a revival of a cold war, i think we're kind of there already in many ways, at least in the european domain. i think where they're in the sense that this is a war that is being fought on multiple planes, as the cold war was. there is the battlefield dimension, an economic dimension. you are mentioning ideas and ideology. the united states positions itself as a friend of ukrainian democracy and is very critical

of russia's authoritarianism and autocratic nature. that is certainly very reminiscent of the cold war, lots of russian rhetoric about the united states as hegemonic and aggressive and arrogant. it's very reminiscent of the cold war as well. so, in many respects, i think we're already there. the only distinguishing point out make between now and, then between the cold war and the present moment in terms of u.s. russian conflict is that it's not as global as it was then. it sort of works differently. in a sense, during the cold war, the soviet union at the u.s. for the world's two major powers far and away. what they contested over in the middle east and africa, latin america and asia, that determined a great deal. now you have china, india, brazil, you have many countries that are independent and important players. you can't say that the

u.s. and russia, they're both less powerful than they were during the cold war. so, it's not quite the global structuring conflict that the cold war was, but in europe it feels like a cold war. to come full circle with your question, you are asking about brutality and toughness. in a way, that's what all wars evoke. but if it's a new cold war, very likely there will be a tough and brutal edge to it. >> -- the fact that all these actors have very mutually exclusive goals in a higher nature, is -- is there any hope of a peaceful outcome, democracy working to resolve a conflict? >> this question is a crucial question, it's a very hard one to answer. but since we concluded today's lecture with the white house, the biden administration, let's think about it from their angle of vision. there can be a total triumph over, russia a world war ii style defeat, i don't think it's possible. not because russia's kick not

capable of failing about because their nuclear power, you can't really defeated uglier power and let less it defeats itself, like the soviet union did a 1991. so, that's not an option. the defeat of russia as such as not an option. i think what the biden administration hopes for is a combination of two things in ukraine. this is at least the best-case scenario for the u. s.. that there will be a set of battlefield setbacks in ukraine that will just make the whole thing very difficult for russia, and that will intertwined with a second dynamic, which will be a changed political atmosphere in russia itself. when the war becomes less popular. this happened in afghanistan, in the 1980s for the soviet union. they fought the, war it didn't go, well the war became quite unpopular. in 1987, after a meeting in 1970, nine the soviet union withdrew. that is the optimistic, that's case area for the biden

administration. but i think they recognize that that is probably not a likely outcome and that there will probably be some messy finish to the war. where neither side gets everything it wants, but it will be either some stalemated situation of a kind of endless froze and conflict or it will be a very unsatisfying negotiated settlement, that could well result and other wars down the line. not a very optimistic answer i'm afraid, but it's the best i can do. please? >> this question refers back to the podcast that we listened to on russia's plan for referenda. could you explain how this plan demonstrates that russia doesn't want to negotiate with ukraine? >> right, that's a good question, for those who haven't heard the podcast. this was that conversation about the state of war between ryan evans and michael kaufman, two experts. it was discussed, the possibility of sort of referendum that would be held in occupied territory in ukraine, occupied by the russian military. and these

referenda would start to make these territories, at least in russian eyes parts of russia administratively, russian land, like crimea has been made. and this would be completely intolerable to the ukrainian government. so, your question is spot on. if this does happen, i think for the ukrainian government to negotiate, it is that much more difficult. and the negotiations were not going well beforehand.re not going wel this rushes show any signs of the present moment of wishing to negotiate? i certainly don't see them. the rhetoric is maximalist, the invasion is certainly ongoing. and these kinds of measures, referenda, are deeply provocative. does that mean that negotiation is off the table forever? no. i mean, i think all wars reflect, including the second world war, including the cold war, including at the first world war, all wars reflect the sort of simultaneous will to

negotiate and the will to do battle. there is always the kind of balance there. and there's very little negotiation at the present moment. but if something really does start to change on one of the two sides are both of the sides, the negotiations will return. the war serves certain eads for russia, perceived needs, and it certainly throwing everything behind. it if not a war that ukraine can afford to lose. but just think of all the incentives. if you could think beyond the kremlin, just think of all the incentives to stop the war. all the ways in which people would benefit from stopping the war. so, that has to play a role in the scheme of things and may work and the favor of some kind of negotiated settlement down the road. but prospects for negotiations in the short to medium term seem absolutely bleak. please? >> can you elaborate further as to why it was so easy for the baltics states to join the eu and organizations like that? as

opposed to ukraine, and why it was so hard for them to assert their own independence within the freedom that was allotted to them after the fall of the soviet union? >> yeah, this is another excellent question as to why, for some countries, it was easy to join the club, and for other countries it was very hard. it's definitely the case, taking a step back from your question, that for the eu and for nato, it's not as if they had a roadmap or a blueprint. they didn't expect the berlin wall to fall when it fell, they don't expect the soviet union to collapse, nobody did. that created such good conditions for the eu and nato, but it was unexpected. what you see after 1991 is very typical of diplomacy and international affairs, there's a lot of improvisation. this country might apply, why not. it's a good idea for it to apply, why not apply. pressure is employed at czechoslovakia had such good conditions for applying is not because these countries had all

the perfect marriage to enter nato in the 1990s, but because they had very beloved leadership in the 90s, -- were really popular in washington. when they came knocking on the door and said, please let us into nato, they had a lot of clout in washington, d. c.. so, that could be a factor, geography was certainly a factor. and it just happened haphazardly in a sense. part of the answer to your question is that it was a very anarchic process of how various countries entered into the eu and nato. it was not a top, down rationally planned process. but why it was easier for the baltic republics, i think size, as i mentioned earlier, plays a big role in this. lithuania is a little bit less than 3 million. latvia and estonia are about half. that's easier to manage than a country than 40 million. turkey is a nato member, very large

country. painted the neck for washington often but it is a nato member. it has never been a member of the eu for a similar reason, it's just a big country to begin and the eu has never been able to an edge that. i think there are other answers when it comes to ukraine that officials would give you from the eu and nato. one of the things they would have pointed to, before the current war, is that corruption, rule of law was a problem in ukraine in a way that it was not in poland or the baltic republics, hungary, czech republic, slovakia. other countries that don't enter nato, bulgaria, they work that out better than ukraine did. and ukraine was a problematic candidate in that regard. but i think the ultimate, answer and it's very frustrating to stay from a ukrainian point of view, but the ultimate answer is the proximity to russia. the baltic republic on the map, they're not further from russia than ukraine's. they felt in some ways further from russia. don slavitt populations, predominantly not orthodox christian, however you wish to demonize these things. perhaps

perceived as more european than ukraine was. but that that ukraine was somehow tied to russia was problematic for the western europeans and others who are contemplating membership in nato and the eu. that of course likes different at the high inside of the last 12 months, that was an important part of the story in the 1990s and their after. well, i would like to thank you for your wonderful questions that they take this audience and our other audiences for their attention over the past hour and 20 minutes. thank you very much. much. if you are enjoying american history tv, sign up for a newsletter using the qr code on the screen, to receive the weekly schedule of upcoming programs. like lectures in history, the presidency, and more. sign up for the american history tv newsletter today, and be sure to watch american history tv every saturday. or anytime online, c-span.org slash history.

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