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download it for free today. c-span now, your front row seat to washington. anytime, anywhere. >> weekends on c-span two are an intellectual feast. every saturday, american history documents america story. and on sundays, book tv brings you the latest in nonfiction books and authors. funding for c-span two comes from these television companies and more, including mediacom. >> the world changed in an instant, but mediacom was ready. internet traffic soared and we never slowed down. schools and businesses went virtual and we powered a new reality. because at mediacom, we are built to keep you ahead. >> media, come along with these television companies, support c-span 2 as a public service. >> allen guelzo is the senior research scholar in the council

of humanities and the director of politics and statesmanship at the james madison program at princeton university. formerly, he was professor of history at gettysburg college, where i attended two of his talks while visiting the battlefield. i was very impressed with his knowledge and his speaking skills. and he has been on my list of historians to have here at the art of command conference for sometime now. allen grew up in pennsylvania and focused his career on biblical studies, receiving his b s degree from karen university in bucks county. he earned his masters degree in divinity from the reformed episcopal seminary near philadelphia, where he taught church history for a number of years. while earning both his masters and his doctors degrees in

history from the university of pennsylvania. he became a member of the faculty of eastern university in st. david,'s pennsylvania. and the 2004, left there to join the faculty at gettysburg college, where he taught until his recent move to princeton. in 2018, allen was awarded the bradley prize for his outstanding contributions which have shaped important debate, thought and research about the most critical periods of american history. in 2013, he received that guggenheim lehrman prize in military history for his much acclaimed gettysburg, the last invasion. he's also been awarded the fletcher pratt award from the new york city civil war roundtable, and the richard hire well award from the atlanta civil war roundtable. in addition, he has enjoyed a long and prolific relationship

with that teaching company. since 2002, he has recorded the following courses, the american mind, the american revolution, the history of the united states second edition, mr. lincoln, the life of abraham lincoln, the american founding fathers into the great historians, how the great historians interpret the past. and he has published the following titles. robert e. lee, a life, reconstruction, a concise history, redeeming the great emancipator, lincoln, an intimate portrait, gettysburg, the last invasion and fateful lightning, a new history of the civil war and reconstruction, to name just a few of those titles. a columnist from the weekly standard has written that allen guelzo is one of the most accomplished civil war historians and one of the

country's foremost lincoln scholars. is the first two time winner of the lincoln prize, in 2004 abraham lincoln, redeemer president, and in 2005 for lincoln's emancipation proclamation, the end of slavery in america. guelzo's president both graceful and erudite, indeed poetic. he is uncomfortable with military topics as he has with political, social and economic aspects of the war and its aftermath. please give a warm welcome to allen guelzo as he speaks to us about the unhappy fate of fitz john porter. [applause] >> first of all, let me say how eagerly i have anticipated being with you all at this art of command

conference. not the least because it allows me to be part of a program organized by child burden, who has been trying to work me into one of these conferences for a number of years and now i'm finally here. better late than never. also not the least, for the fact that i have the pleasure once again of connecting with some old acquaintances from bygone battlefield traipsing expeditions. jim burgess and jon hennessy, mr. second manassas. also i'm grateful for the opportunity to share space with some people that i have admired greatly over the years. i miss jeffrey worse because of illness, but eric whiton burke is here and erik knows more about the civil war cavalry that the civil war cavalry knew about itself. i'm also happy to be able to make the acquaintance of two others. scott pollack and i can't even

write read my own writing, scott and kevin pollack. it's just great to be here and shared space with all of you to talk about the story of fitz john porter. the american civil war was a political war. that shouldn't matter hugely to those of us who study the art of command in the war, because it is one of the basic tenants of the american system of governance that the military remains in strict subordination to civilian authority. soldiers lead a political lives in uniform. military leaders who have forgotten the strictness of that subordination have, from andrew jackson to stanley mcchrystal, been reminded of it in some very unpleasant ways.

but the american civil war was different. it forced political decisions on american soldiers at the very beginning. at the gaping divisions, these decisions created. they fostered an atmosphere of political mistrust and conflict that inhabited every nook and cranny of military command. this is not the way we would prefer to remember the civil war, or would rather think of it. we, would i think, be happy to think of it strictly in terms of the strategic, the tactical or the logistical, as we usually do with the two world wars. but we cannot. george mcclelland, perhaps the most politically insubordinate general in american history, will not allow us. nor will the political leadership that he railed against. abraham lincoln, stanton, the joint congressional committee on the conduct of the war. no one offers a more agonizing

example of how politics elbowed its way into the art of command of the civil war then major general fitz john porter, whose court-martial and dismissal for his conduct at second bull run offers a brazen and bleeding example of the risks and follies of soldiering in a political war. fitz john porter was the child of a military family, all it was not an association from which he derive much profit. his grandfather had committed privateers in the american revolution but his deputation was clouded in the post war years by rumors to his prejudice, for keeping a public house of hill fame in boston. and losing a ship in such a way to induce suspicions of his integrity. porter's father, david porter,

yet another naval officer, managed to wreck his first command. and his career was plagued by quarrels, mismanagement and alcoholism. his wife, eliza clark porter, was the real life of the household and it was eliza porter who chiefly responsible for placing her second child, fitz john porter but, as a cadet in the u.s. military academy in 1841. where he graduated eight his class in 1845. in the same year as charles stone, another victim of civil war politics, and a year ahead of george mcclellan. porter was part of winfield scott's great inland march to mexico city in the mexican war. he earned two bread bit promotions to captain and major and returned to west point as an assistant professor and, temporarily, under the

supervision of robert e. lee in the 1850s, post adjutant. howard remembered porter's conduct as a precise and competent of man, managing the cadets on the parade ground. i was exceedingly pleased, howard said, with his military bearing. but if porter was confident, he was also dumb. his wife harry it reported that porter was shy and retiring and his daughter would recall that she never once heard her father laugh. when jefferson davis, secretary of war under franklin pierce, created two new light cavalry regions in 1845, porter was passed over for a command of them. only the urgent intercession of eliza clark porter won her son a belated posting to the west. even then, it was only as

abject tenth of the department of the west at fort levin worth and he only saw sidney johnson's bloodless exposition against more men utah. the outbreak of the secession troubles after lincoln's election sought porter buzzing from pillar to post. reporting to the war department on a flight visit to charleston on november, 1860. another flag visit to the gulf coast in february, 1861, to supervise the extraction of seven companies of u.s. troops from secessionist texas. trying to manage the forwarding of pennsylvania militia and the second u.s. cavalry to baltimore and washington in april. and then as adjutant to major robert pattinson's halfhearted advance it virginia in july of 1861. patterson's failure and subsequent shelving might have put a period to porters civil

war career. but on august 4th, 1861, porter wrote directly to george mcclelland, who had just been called from his successful campaign in western virginia to command the dispirited union forces around washington, d.c.. i can be of much use and render the country's essential services, porter pleaded. i cannot bear to see my companions, my juniors, rising to distinction and position while i must plot away in a beaten and sandy track. it is not clear exactly when porter first became an intimate of mcclelland's. there is nothing in their student record to suggest any connection and only one straight reference to porter in mcclelland's mexican war papers. but they did share quarters at west point, when both were on station there in 1850. and they evidently knew each other well enough in the small

confines of the prewar army that porter would urge mcclelland to resign from his civilian job in 1861 and re-enter the service, well mcclelland would remember asking porter, as an adjutant, when he was first given command of the department of the ohio. in any, case the plea worked. on august 7th, porter found himself commissioned as colonel of the 15th u.s. infantry. three days, later he was a brigadier general of volunteers. by the fall, he was commanding one of mcclelland's divisions. it's not clear either what porters politics were, at first. like so much of the old army, porter cultivated a steady distance from politics. partly from the principle of subordination to civilian authority, but partly from the example of what happened to soldiers like winfield scott when they crossed politicians

like president james polk. but the outbreak of the civil war brought a tremendous influx of new volunteer officers into the service. in command of the new volunteer regiments. their appointments where the playthings of northern state governors and they often made no secret of their hostility to slavery and to the democratic party. when porter discovered that one of his volunteer kernels, john pickle of the 13th new york, had assisted a slave in taking flight from his master, porter ordered the slave expelled from his camps. slavery existed by law, porter explained, as though this was supposed to deal with any objections. we were in a slave state and the owner was entitled to his servant and now officer had the right to use his rank to take property from a loyal owner. this tone deafness to the

volatility of the slavery question might have stymied any further advancement for porter, and what became known as the army of the potomac, had not the armies commander been george mcclelland. who suffered from more than a little tone deafness of his own on the subject. instead, porter grew closer and more confiding to mcclellan, and mcclellan played porter more and more as a favorite. mcclelland cultivated new york democratic politicians and encouraged porter to do likewise. he also cultivated new york democratic newspaper men like man tim marble of the new york world and, unlike unwisely, porter did so also. none of this went unnoticed in congress or the executive mansion. he ward mcclelland and may that it had become all well-known that you consult and communicate with nobody but

general fitz john porter. when lincoln mandated a reorganization of the army of the potomac into french model army corpse, porter's name was not among the division managers promoted to core command. not that they seem to matter once the army of the potomac finally embarked on his great peninsula campaign in the spring of 1862. mcclellan appointed fitz john porter, director of the siege of yorktown. and with his usual, methodical position, the operations were conducted with skill. but mcclelland favoritism infuriated pro administration officers, including porter's own corps commander samuel hines woman. who groused that mcclellan is giving great satisfaction in this army, particularly about general porter. no matter, on may 18th, 1862, mclelland decided to sub divide

the existing corps of the army of the potomac and handed one of the new commands, the fifth corps, deporter. the peninsula campaign did not end well for mcclelland, for whom the seven days battle into june concluded with the army of the potomac backed into a tight perimeter around harrison's landing on the james river. porter, however, did remarkably well in corps command. gallantly standing of a savage attack by robert e. lee's army of northern virginia at gainesville on june 27th, and mowing down leaves confederates from the heights of melbourne hill on july 1st. mcclellan evidently plan to cross from the south side of the james and, at reporters urging, renew his advance. but lincoln was having none of it. he had already appointed a new general-in-chief, henry --

to put a bit in his mouth, and was offended on a visit to harrison's landing on july 8th by mcclellan's arrogant declaration that the president must abandon any thought of amidst a painting southern slaves, left the army of the potomac disintegrate. as the mcclelland would bear no responsibility for such disintegration. mcclelland was too much the darling of the democratic opposition. for lincoln to risk and outright dismissal. , instead in late june, lincoln created a new army of virginia. from pieces of units that had been pummeled that spring in the shenandoah valley by stonewall jackson. and put them under the command of major general john hope. in august, lincoln ordered the withdrawal of the army of the potomac, piece by piece, from the peninsula, and fed those pieces into the structure of

the army of virginia. pope's official qualifications for command in the east rose from his success that april in forcing the surrender of a confederate post at island number ten in the mississippi river, which pride opened river to federal gunboats as far south as vicksburg. but israel qualifications for political. that's one of the one-time presiding judge overlook its old court circuit in illinois and one of the four officers who formed awakens personal bodyguard for his unnatural trip to washington, pope was smaller plea anti slavery and hence regarded as the coming man of the army. john pope was everything mcleod was not, and porter did not mind saying so. and late july, after pope had assumed command of the army of virginia, porter had described him as what the military world

has long known, and asks, and will reflect no credit on mr. lincoln. as july turned august, porter turned up the heat in his letters. describing pope to marble as a fool and, worse still, wishing that mcclellan was in command in washington to rid us of the incumbents ruining our country. by the time porter and the fifth corps had, by road, boat and rail, reported to pope on august 27th, porter was earnestly wishing myself away from pope, with all our old army at the potomac. and begging ambrose burnside, if you can get me away, please do so. porter's opinion of pope had not been approved by the beating which elements of the army of virginia received at the hands of stonewall jackson

at cedar mountain on august 9th. nor by the disastrous range of jackson and jeb stuarts staged on pokes communication is applies at manassas junction on august 27th. the next day, jackson drew off the bull run battlefield luring pope after him under the delusion that jackson portion of the army in northern virginia was sufficiently isolated that popes army could destroy it. marching through the ruins of manassas junction, porter and the fifth corps were ordered to take position southwest of the sublease brings turnpike across right at the center of the old 1861 battlefield. under the impression that porter would be able to turn jackson's right flank. but the order is pope issued for porters movement at once on the enemies right flank on august 29th, where they confusing?

and above all, complete. the order for porcher to attack jackson was written by pope at 4:30 in the afternoon, but did not reach porter in till 6:30, when dusk was already coming on. porter also was beginning to realize what pope did not, that the balance of the army of northern virginia under james longstreet was moving into position on jackson's right, ready to strike a devastating blow on pope. apprehensive, porter ordered a pullback of his -- a copy of his pullback order crossed popes for 30 attack order and pope promptly sat down at 8:50 that night and rode out yet another order, demanding that porter appear before him for an explanation. porter did side of the next morning, august 30th, and try to convince pope of the trap waiting to spring on him.

pope would hear nothing of it. i am potive that at 5:00 on the afternoon of the 29th, general porter had at his front no considerable dy of the enemy. he would later insist. every indication from the night of e 29th and up to 10:00 on the morning of the 30th pointi tthe retreat of the enemy from our front. pope could not have been more wrong. no orders of this campaign, porter later remarked, more erroneous lee stated the attitude of the opposing forces are led to more serious disaster. >> that afternoon, longstreet's 25,000 bravest moved in line by a single impulse over the fifth corps and everything else that composed popes left flank. by that evening, longstreet and jackson had crushed the army of

virginia and sent it fleeing in disarray towards washington. john pope, his army now a shambles had once flail around for excuses and found his principal target importer. >> i think it my duty to call your attention to the on soldierly and dangerous conduct manifested by officers of high rank, pope wrote to henry alec early on september 1st. he was particularly incensed that one commander of a core, who fell back to manassas without a fight, nor was there any mystery about whom pope had in mind. pope had his acolytes in the army of virginia, fully as much as mcallen had in the army of -- robert mill roy, an indiana abolitionist who commanded one of popes berate exposure that the defeat and goal of run was caused by the treachery and

incumbency of the generals in the interest of mcclellan. especially general fits john porter, most randomly paraded. george temple ten strong, the new york lawyer and treasurer of the u.s. sanitary commission hinted at what would emerge as a continuing theme. that mcmullen, after reporter, and others had long been personally friends, allies, and political convenience with jackson, lee, and joe johnston. that they were looking for an opportunity to agree on some compromise or adjustment, turn out lincoln and his black republicans, and use their respective armies to enforce their decision north and south. the new york tribune was even more -- to finger him for lying. >> i was with pope's army is a correspondent, wrote a new page,

porter did not intend to help pope win that battle. pope submitted a preliminary report on september 4th, the next day lincoln suspended porter from command in ordered the court of inquiry into pope's conduct at the run. that should have spelled the end for porter's military career. it didn't, because the crisis that prevailed in the wake of popes bowler and disaster was so brave that lincoln felt he had no choice but recall george mcclelland. first to supervise the defensive washington on september 2nd, then on september six to resume direction of the army of potomac with all of popes fragments securely under his command. lincoln explained that this was a recognition that mcallen is a good engineer and that there is no better organizer.

that he can be trusted to act on the defensive. behind that rationale was lincoln's fear that although there has been a design, a purpose in breaking down hope, there is no remedy at present. mcclelland has the army with him. with that restoration of the army of the potomac, mcclelland demanded and got the reinstatement of porter. first, for command of the capital fortifications on the south side of the district and then for the fifth corps again on september 11th. lee, had no intention of challenging the washington fortification. instead, he crossed into marylandin rallying slaveholding marylanders to take their state of the union and that venture grayson lee in pennsylvania where he could inflict political damage into the northern multiple it continue the war.

good news for porter, was that mcclelland succeeded beyond almost every expectation in frustrating leads plans. in just two weeks times, mcclelland rallied up beaten and disorganized armies moral, resupply and reorganized it with new leadership at a core level, integrated and ill trained and ill prepared waves. in the set off in pursuit of confederates in maryland. mccallum in fact moved so fast that quarter only caught up with mike collins on september 14th with the division of george morale and george sykes. that was when he resumed complete command to the fifth core. on that day, -- then, one, at least in place victory in antietam three days later.

the bad news was that none of this was sufficient to dispel the clout of mistrust generated by second bull run over either mcclellan or porter. mcconnell and fell under immediate suspicion -- as well as for showing noticeably little enthusiasm for lincoln's issuance of the preliminary emancipation proclamation in 22nd. if anything, porter, who was even more explicit and his criticism of the proclamation to manchin marble on september 30th, fared even worse. throughout the entire day of antietam, mcclelland held porter in the fifth corps and reserve as his headquarters at the house and the optics of that reserve looked like nothing so much as a conspiratorial repeat up second bull run. david straw they're, a staff officer, notice that porter

spent the day with a telescope, surveying the battlefield and speaking to mclelland inwards so low toned and brief that the nearest bystanders had but little benefit from them, as though the battle was the drawing room ceremony. this arrangement was really not as -- as it looked. there is the day, pieces of the fifth corps had to prop up edwin summiteer's second corps, to support a tentative movement across the middle bridge across antietam creek and to cover the armies trains and reserve artillery so that by the close of the fighting, porters command was not than 4000 strong and perhaps what little over 3000 men. nevertheless, hostile newspaper correspondent saw only typical porter inaction. when four inside was pressed wrote the new york tribune's

correspondent, george small would, mccall interns to porter who 15,000 troops are lying, fresh, only impatient sarah share in the fight. porter only shakes his head slowly and one may believe that the same thought is passing through the heads of both generals. they are the only reserves of the army, they cannot be spared. even the times of -- correspondent. francis molly saying the same damning song, that general fits john porter with 15,000 men in reserve, became the only body on the federal side which was not engaged. nor did it help order that on september 20th, the fifth court was given the job of treading on the treating federal tiles across potomac, a shepherds -- only to receive a humiliating brush back. this, this was only the

beginning of zeroes for porter. mcallen's failure to chase lead out after antietam heated lincoln's irono a hot pitch in on november 7th, once passed nger line congressional ons, lincoln dismissed mcallen once and for all. he bit is four miles to the army c mogomery tent, the uproar t nearly crossed boundaries mutiny. as general mcmullin pa along its front, whole regiment broke and d around him. with chore not to leave him to say the word and they woon settle matters porter did not imagine that he would do any better than mcclellan, he may soon expect to hear that my head is locked, he wrote to manson marble on -- september 9th. two days after mcclelland's

departure, porter was once again relieved of command of the fifth court. the troops gave proof of their grief in many ways at the loss of the honored and beloved commander who had, by his heroic bravery batter battle and kindness of heart in camp endeared himself to them. remember the historian of the fifth court, william h. powell. there was nothing like the demonstrations that i try to persuade mcclellan to violate his orders. we are not aware, remarked the iconic chronicler of the pennsylvania reserve division, of there being any particular amount of weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth at the end. the engines of the post -- quarter court of inquiry began turning once more and on to number 17th, porter is placed under arrest and confined to the limits of his hotel in washington. on november 25th, the inquiry was reconstituted as a court

martial. the court-martial acquired -- to predict that outcome no crystal ball to require predicted outcome. he was found charged with nine -- of war. all centered on his disobedience of props orders on august 29th and 30th. mclaughlin called witness on january 2nd, testified to porters loyalty, efficiency, and fidelity. from mcclellan, those accolades were almost the case of death. when john pope appears as a witness, he was so confident of himself that he declared, had general port and fallen upon the flank of the enemy on the night of august 29th, we should have destroyed the army of jackson. from there, it was only a short distance to the testimony of popes aid, thomas c h smith, that he had been certain that fits john porter was a traitor

and smith was ready to shoot him that night so far as any crime before god was concerned if the law would allow me to do it. the law did not. it also did not prevent the court-martial from finding porter guilty of all but two of the specifications on january 10th, 1863. curiously, the new york times predicted that the trial would unanimously acquit general porter of the charges against him. even the new york tribune founded outside of public opinion acquits the general, but not the court, not certainly, abraham lincoln. he not only approved the verdict on january 26th, but was convinced that porters obedience of disobedience borders and failure to popes eight apple run had occasioned our defeat and deprived us of a victory which would have

terminated the war. blinken told his confidant, leonard sweat, that he had read every word in that record and i tell you, it's john porter's guilty and ought to be shot. he was willing the poor soldiers should die while he, from sphere jealousy, stood within hearing of the guns waiting for -- to be whipped. >> porters accident and hit him only made at worse, telling son robert that the case would've justified, in his opinion, ascendance of death. it's john porter said to work only wants to obtain a reversal of the verdict and his chief counsel at the court-martial, reverend e johnson posted a vague rigorous condemnation of the court martial proceedings, raging that a greater injustice was never done through the forms of proceeding then was done by the sentence of the court-martial in that gallant

officer. indeed, the entire trial can only be read and was so read, by every upton in 1879, as a kind of star chamber proceeding in which porter became the american version of admiral being. [speaking non-english] who might show insufficient enthusiasm for emancipation. wield and action with only two days notice by a general name john pope who very few people, even those who condemn porter, were unembarrassed and have to -- wonder may have been an imaginative in his decisions, but those decisions will now they're decisive in the outcome of second ball run. that judgment belongs on popes and mcdowell's. nor treason or to they call us. he supposedly baleful influence

on element antietam owes most of its force to the scandalous irresponsibility of the journalists who had already conceived a narrative to which porter was made to fit. we'll take, however, years for porter to get a re-hearing he demanded. he found employment in mining and civil engineering, even in 1871, assuming the corruption a fine boss tweet as head of public works in new york city. it was not until 1878 until the case was reopened by the war department and even then unburied partisanship announced general porters conduct that the second battle of bull run as essentially traitorous. jacob tolson cox, one of the rare abolitionist general officers in the army had served his governor as ohio mediately after the war, wrote a

particularly vindictive review of the portuguese in 1882. it declared porters disaffection to pope had let him beyond the verge of criminal insubordination. it was not until 1886 that president grover cleveland, the first democrat president since the war, signed a bill restoring porter to his original u.s. army rank of colonel. porter officially retired from the army for days later. we can buy the ravages of diabetes, he died on may 26th, 1901. the unhappy fate of fits john porter is the story of unfairness. even cruelty. meted out to a soldier who who is only military crime had been the same my opia in the fog of war that afflicts all but the most acute possesses of the

[speaking non-english] the coup of the i-. in those last days before antietam, frederick -- and hitchcock was impressed by his international border, a small, slim, young man with whiskers and keen black eyes who dressed very modestly. a high black chap and much rather gold tassel band. it may be difficult to say more than that about him. porter departed with a sincere regret of all of his soldiers, but not mere immunity. his humiliation, said one massachusetts soldier, was enough to move a heart of stone. by the time the old army had become heart of stone. porter did not move it much. he was neither a traitor nor an idol, nor was he, as otto eisen show wanted to portray him, an american dreyfuss. so in the end, his condemnation

says less about him than it does oppose the frailty of his contaminants. he's even his condemn any, in this case, a man more narrowly on malicious as abraham lincoln. yet, it's giron porter was also a man very much mistaken about the nature of the war that he was fighting. he had imagined that he could make pronouncements -- on arrival, general charged with implementing those policies which no one would notice that he could ally himself with anti administration associations without consequences. that he did not need to be concerned himself with whether tactical decisions were liable to be understood as political malingering. americans have -- to imagine that the principle of separation of power organizes the civil military relationship as much as it

organizes the branch to government. the truth of that relation here that it's really a one-way street. american soldiers may not dabble in politics unless taught early, as washington's confrontation with officers at noon berg. american politicians may, even must, exercise a controlling influence over the military. if we are not entirely left behind, earliest dread of -- the tyranny of men on horseback. perhaps, as a republic, we have rachel. several years ago, samuel p huntington warned that the absence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere. fits john porter and the american civil war may be our most enduring --

thank you very much. a reminder of that reality. [applause] >> now i'm told it's question time. >> i'll start off. >> very good. >> did not james wall street get involved in the review of this contamination? >> i know of no commentary that longstreet often offered on the porter case. you might think he would have a thinker to say, but if he did, i'm not aware of it. robert e. lee did, curiously enough. not publicly though. porter wrote to lee directly after the war in an effort to get lees read on what happened to pope at second bull run and we responded to put his inquiry. it was a very ambiguous response. have they made it very clear that porter did not want to get involved and so he didn't.

i'm not sure what it would've accomplished for porter to invoke robert e. lee, speaking on his behalf, but porter at least made the effort and lee gave him response. not a response that porter was able to use any useful degree. yes? >> duke finally kenny provided a details about the finding of the 1878 reopening of the court-martial? did the court have any particular findings? >> the 1878 reopening of it had come after years and years of commentary, dispute, disagreement, public, private over v john porter affair. when a new court, new inquiry, is opened in 1870 under president hayes. a good deal of the anger and

anxiety had led the way over the years and there was a more dispassionate attempt to understand what happened with second bull run. nevertheless, the inquiry does not go far enough to actually recommend and put into place a reinstallation of porter. that is going to have to happen by an act of congress and that gets slowed down in congress for another eight years as, once again, political partisanship competitive hiding and manifest itself. is now for another eight years after that court of inquiry that legislation emerged out of congress and is assigned by president cleveland. in the process, though, it is interesting that members of the original court of inquiry, which included the man that was elected president in 1880, james garfield. henry upton wrote to garfield after the reopening of the

court of inquiry and upton really scored garfield severely for his participation and the court inquiry that condemned porter. made a clear from upton's point of view, anyway, that -- at this point option is a force to be reckoned with in professional military circles. up to make clear that car field was just absolutely dead wrong about porter and should come clear clean and admit. garfield writes back to porter and once again, you get a real woefully response. like, well, there may be some aspects to what you say that's true, but basically garfield is not going to do anything about it. and put something of a dark stain on garfield for him to touch it that way. garfield -- was politics. coming up in 1860 during the war, he was something of a

protegee and ohio win, for one thing. he moved up to the ranks in congress and very clear that he's very sympathetic to radical republicanism. he was referred to abraham lincoln as a second rate illinois lawyer. that's, thank gives you some idea garfield perspective on things. upton wants to take garfield to the proverbial little house to spank him, but garfield does not want to, really does not want to admit that a terrible injustice to fits john porter. it really has to take this agonizing process, going through congress, repeated attempts to get bills passed in congress, restoring porter, then a president who's willing to sign it. that takes a long, long time for the life of its john porter. yes? >> i guess it's not all

coincidental that cleveland was the first democrat president. the one could draw a number of unpleasant conclusions from that. cleveland includes a confederate general in his cabinet, sends can federer it captured battle flags back to the south. you can say, of course leave it would do that, wouldn't he? and yet, i think that's jumping too much to a conclusion. cleveland did sign it. but the bill itself, the very fact that it passed for members of congress was recognition that something had gone disastrously a wry for the court martial in 1863. i think the sense that that was the case would probably prevail even if republican president had been in office. by 1886, when cleveland receives this legislation from

congress, enough tempers have cooled that people are able to see somewhat more clearly that what happened in that court martial was a kangaroo court in the worst sense of the word. it doesn't mean that everybody agreed with it. jacob dolan caucuses review of the porter case in 1882, after the court, the substance quaint quarter require had moved -- jason tulsan cox came back and same saying the same of a trial like song about porter. one can only read cox's comment and then also the book that cox writes in the wartime series to which paul reed writes the book about antietam, and says the same thing about porter that george smaller put into his correspondent for the new york tribune. there are people who are simply unreconciled to work. they remain unreconciled and

people today who remain and unconscious unreconciled reporter. my opinion is that they are wrong and i say this with some hesitation. i am, after all, a lincoln person. there is certain difficulty for lincoln people to say that abraham lincoln commit an injustice. there they feel a certain degree of this reluctance. a feeling of reluctance is not the same as historical fact and i cannot review a porter case without coming to the conclusion that this was a political retaliation investment as mcclellan's -- was meant to send a very clear and unambiguous message to the

army about who it should be obeying. the message was sent. i don't know if it was entirely well read. as latest 1863, you still have people like john cedric wanting to make the rounds of the army, the potomac, to pick up monuments for mcclellan. -- there will be a lot of people who will continue to walk in the army the political direction that the war is taken. there are influence changes dramatically, diminishes, over the course of 1863. when grant takes charge in 1864 there were simply no question from that point words about the convergence of the political and military opinion on where the war should be heading. that takes time. to come back to the point, as a

lincoln person i, my instinct was to always assume that abraham lincoln, a man who speaks of malice toward none and charity for all would not in brood his hand in injustice for an officer like quarter. yet, even abraham lincoln makes mistakes. in this case he made a mistake, it was a serious one. i must say that. many >> yes? >> isn't evidence suggests that during the time that john porter was making these rather controversial statements, in writing over blame, that he was sending any counselor guidance to -- or was just not in his internal constitution to do that? >> you might have wondered why some people didn't tell -- and they did not, more often it

was a case that people who receive the correspondent -- well in the case of marble he is not publishing correspondents. the really incendiary things that porter writes to matt in marble do not get into public circulation. the very fact that he wrote them to the editor of new york newspaper, however, betrays a failure of wisdom and prudence on porter's part that makes you scratch your head. you might even find the officers point of view. the moment stepped away from that to offer political opinions, that is the moment at which you have to say that there was a catastrophic failure of comic judgment. marble does not publish this correspondence in the new york world. that is not the only correspondent. a number of letters including the letter, the original,

letter in which porter suggests that pope's an ass went to burnside. it went to burnside because at that point in the campaign, burnside isn't alexandria and acting as somewhat and reload point for communications for the universal region near back to washington, d.c.. burnside gets this letter which porter assumes he is writing to burnside as a friend and were inside just passes along the help. who. that didn't end well. -- takes us a lincoln, lincoln's reading list and saying, see? they are trying to undercut the administration. they are trying to undercut the war effort. in that respect, someone unwittingly, but burnside acts as the person who communicates porters opinions and so they

become fairly widely down. some people have suggested that it is that action of burn sides that caused mcclellan to turn on burnside during the maryland campaign. i don't know that there is any hard and fast evidence for that. that is a supposition more than someone you could easily assert. you could see where, if porter is a more favorable to mcclellan and find out that burnside has been responsible for passing on what was otherwise private medication, that mcconnell was hard to take on a somewhat him view of poor burn. i think there are other ways, other rationales, for the relationship with my calendar the campaign. there is an intriguing suggestion and more than one person has made that suggestion. it was a serious lapse of judgment on voters part to simply assume that what he was running to burnside was going to be kept entirely between the two of them. it is, i have to say, a bit

like sending emails today to other people. we assume that we're sending an email and it's in private to someone and know it's not. that whole system is owned by google or whoever you use, whatever server you use. they can easily be subpoenaed and, if you're on a court of law, you'll find yourself in difficulty. we've gotten to the point today were a lot of people always write an email assuming that someone else, quite conceivably, could be reading this later on and you better phrase that way. perhaps porter should've thought about that when he was writing to burnside. he didn't and the results were fatally damaging for porter's career. >> i see a question in the back. is -- >> the verification on blinken's role are you saying that lincoln knew it was an

injustice or was it more that he didn't have the information -- or he knew and he thought it was for the greater good or that it was -- [inaudible] >> i think lincoln made a very serious lapse of judgment. i think lee and i conclude as early as july 1962, not for, that that mcclellan had to go. also concluded that anyone who joined at the hip of george mcclelland was going to have to go as well. is he conscious of doing an injustice? lincoln is not the sort of person who says what kind of injustice can i do today, but he can be convinced that it's so because of a long train of actions that have the leadership of the party of the automakers particularly hostile

and ready to portray the administration disservice on purposes. when you arrive at that point, then you will be anything that is faintly negative -- as gospel truth and you are going to act on it accordingly. you don't feel yahweh's. there is an interesting question, though, did lincoln actually have proceedings before you concern firms him on january 1st, 1863? lincoln claims that he had. bill marvel is, i think with more than a little substance, suspicious that lincoln ever had the time to wait to 900 pages of that court martial proceeding. when lincoln was in fact reply relying on a digest that had been presented to him by who knows whom, stanton, howick, people who had already been sharpening their knives for

mcclellan and mcclellan-ites. that hangs out there as possibility. he claims he read the proceedings, but there is questions as to whether that was the case. did he read the whole thing? to the scam at? we just don't now. the action he finally faced with porter's defensive because he believes that the leadership of the army of the potomac could conceivably be construed as a threat. he is doing it because he is protecting the constitutional government of the united states. he's protecting the anti slavery cause. you can talk yourself into a number of positions like you might believe that you are under the kind of threat that it seemed was the case. i was saying to john hennessy just before we started here that it seems to be for a long time that one of the critical moments in the history of the civil war is the six weeks

between the battle of manta and lincoln's decision to sack mcclellan. i say this was a critical period. they say how can this be a critical period when there's no major battle taking place. people in the east pretend there is nothing happening west of appalachians in the civil war. that is our mistake. in the six weeks, i think there are some real question as to whether mcclellan thought he was going to do. he had already given lincoln's opinions of things in the harrison's landing's on july 8th. the harrison's landing ladder is, as observed earlier context, one of the most in supporting it thing a military officer has delivered to a civilian commander in chief. basically telling lincoln, don't even dream about

emancipating slaves. what business of it was mcclellan's? the answer was none, then it is business mcclelland goes into about if you make a decision that is going to disintegrate the army. wait a second, you are in command of the army. don't you have responsibility for the army disintegrate turn of? here's mcclellan trying to push it on lincoln and -- put it in his pocket telescope's cabinet that he's going to have to emancipate the slaves. one thing you did not do when ling for lincoln was painted in a corner. that was always a big mistake. when you move to that period between september 17th november 7th, there are a lot of voices suggesting mcclellan that he should take unilateral action. when mclelland, for instance, receives the official word of the emancipation proclamation which comes to him as a work of

order he actually delays having it read to the army. he delays so that he can consult with his new york democratic political friends friends, what should i do? they are horrified of the question. no, you have to -- and he does. he does so with a noted which is fatally ambiguous. it is like, we have to obey. the subject already and if you disagree with the emancipation proclamation, the proper place to take your disagreement is to the polls. it doesn't really sound like a ringing endorsement of the commander-in-chief and then there is this question that i have seen crop up increasingly. i saw it first in the columns written by union veteran henry goddard in the years after the war and the two columns that he wrote in 1904. goddard talks about the rumor

of a letter that was sent on the 18th of september, the day after the battle of -- a letter supposedly sent by mcclellan for robert e. lee suggesting that the events of september 17th had demonstrated that the two armies had fought to a standstill and that it is now time to have mcclellan and lincoln, formula 1 anne-marie, to join hands. march on washington. and put an end to a war the war. whenever that in goddard's comment, my first reaction was skepticism. this is 1904, we are good way off from this. this is hearsay of hearsay of hearsay. you can't really pay attention that. and you begin to find newspaper reporting. about this letter in other places. it keeps cropping up. while i don't think there is never going to be any absolute

evidence of this, the fact that people thought that something like that could happen says a lot just on its own. about mcclellan in that six-week period about what he might have contemplated doing. being george mcallen, he spent most of his time contemplating rather than doing. so he finally does walk away from the army but of course he walks away from the army only to walk into politics and regrets lincoln in 1864. it does raise these awful questions. when we think about critical periods in the civil war, we, tended think about terms of battlefields. i would like to suggest that we think about it a six-week period that is not dominated by battle. it is framed by one, antietam. i'd like us to think about that

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