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statesmanship in the james madison program at princeton university. formerly, he was professor of >> allen guelzo is the senior research scholar in the council of humanities and the director of politics and statesmanship at the james madison program at princeton university. formerly, he was professor of history at gettysburg college, where i attended two of his talks while visiting the battlefield. i was very impressed with his knowledge and his speaking skills. and he has been on my list of historians to have here at the art of command conference for sometime now. allen grew up in pennsylvania and focused his career on biblical studies, receiving his b s degree from karen university in bucks county. he earned his masters degree in divinity from the reformed episcopal seminary near philadelphia, where he taught church history for a number of years. while earning both his

masters and his doctors degrees in history from the university of pennsylvania. he became a member of the faculty of eastern university in st. david, 's pennsylvania. and the 2004, left there to join the faculty at gettysburg college, where he taught until his recent move to princeton. in 2018, allen was awarded the bradley prize for his outstanding contributions which have shaped important debate, thought and research about the most critical periods of american history. in 2013, he received that guggenheim lehrman prize in military history for his much acclaimed gettysburg, the last invasion. he's also been awarded the fletcher pratt award from the new york city civil war roundtable, and the richard hire well award from the atlanta civil war roundtable.

in addition, he has enjoyed a long and prolific relationship with that teaching company. since 2002, he has recorded the following courses, the american mind, the american revolution, the history of the united states second edition, mr. lincoln, the life of abraham lincoln, the american founding fathers into the great historians, how the great historians interpret the past. and he has published the following titles. robert e. lee, a life, reconstruction, a concise history, redeeming the great emancipator, lincoln, an intimate portrait, gettysburg, the last invasion and fateful lightning, a new history of the civil war and reconstruction, to name just a few of those titles. a columnist from the weekly standard has written that allen guelzo is one of the most accomplished civil war

historians and one of the country's foremost lincoln scholars. is the first two time winner of the lincoln prize, in 2004 abraham lincoln, redeemer president, and in 2005 for lincoln's emancipation proclamation, the end of slavery in america. guelzo's president both graceful and erudite, indeed poetic. he is uncomfortable with military topics as he has with political, social and economic aspects of the war and its aftermath. please give a warm welcome to allen guelzo as he speaks to us about the unhappy fate of fitz john porter. [applause] >> first of all, let me say how eagerly i have anticipated

being with you all at this art of command conference. not the least because it allows me to be part of a program organized by child burden, who has been trying to work me into one of these conferences for a number of years and now i'm finally here. better late than never. also not the least, for the fact that i have the pleasure once again of connecting with some old acquaintances from bygone battlefield traipsing expeditions. jim burgess and jon hennessy, mr. second manassas. also i'm grateful for the opportunity to share space with some people that i have admired greatly over the years. i miss jeffrey worse because of illness, but eric whiton burke is here and erik knows more about the civil war cavalry that the civil war cavalry knew about itself. i'm also happy to be able to make the acquaintance of two others.

scott pollack and i can't even write read my own writing, scott and kevin pollack. it's just great to be here and shared space with all of you to talk about the story of fitz john porter. the american civil war was a political war. that shouldn't matter hugely to those of us who study the art of command in the war, because it is one of the basic tenants of the american system of governance that the military remains in strict subordination to civilian authority. soldiers lead a political lives in uniform. military leaders who have forgotten the strictness of that subordination have, from andrew jackson to stanley mcchrystal, been reminded of it

in some very unpleasant ways. but the american civil war was different. it forced political decisions on american soldiers at the very beginning. at the gaping divisions, these decisions created. they fostered an atmosphere of political mistrust and conflict that inhabited every nook and cranny of military command. this is not the way we would prefer to remember the civil war, or would rather think of it. we, would i think, be happy to think of it strictly in terms of the strategic, the tactical or the logistical, as we usually do with the two world wars. but we cannot. george mcclelland, perhaps the most politically insubordinate general in american history, will not allow us. nor will the political leadership that he railed against. abraham lincoln,

stanton, the joint congressional committee on the conduct of the war. no one offers a more agonizing example of how politics elbowed its way into the art of command of the civil war then major general fitz john porter, whose court-martial and dismissal for his conduct at second bull run offers a brazen and bleeding example of the risks and follies of soldiering in a political war. fitz john porter was the child of a military family, all it was not an association from which he derive much profit. his grandfather had committed privateers in the american revolution but his deputation was clouded in the post war years by rumors to his prejudice, for keeping a public house of hill fame in boston. and losing a ship in such a way to induce suspicions of his integrity. porter's father,

david porter, yet another naval officer, managed to wreck his first command. and his career was plagued by quarrels, mismanagement and alcoholism. his wife, eliza clark porter, was the real life of the household and it was eliza porter who chiefly responsible for placing her second child, fitz john porter but, as a cadet in the u.s. military academy in 1841. where he graduated eight his class in 1845. in the same year as charles stone, another victim of civil war politics, and a year ahead of george mcclellan. porter was part of winfield scott's great inland march to mexico city in the mexican war. he earned two bread bit promotions to captain and major and returned to west point as an assistant professor and, temporarily, under the supervision of robert e. lee in

the 1850s, post adjutant. howard remembered porter's conduct as a precise and competent of man, managing the cadets on the parade ground. i was exceedingly pleased, howard said, with his military bearing. but if porter was confident, he was also dumb. his wife harry it reported that porter was shy and retiring and his daughter would recall that she never once heard her father laugh. when jefferson davis, secretary of war under franklin pierce, created two new light cavalry regions in 1845, porter was passed over for a command of them. only the urgent intercession of eliza clark porter won her son a belated

posting to the west. even then, it was only as abject tenth of the department of the west at fort levin worth and he only saw sidney johnson's bloodless exposition against more men utah. the outbreak of the secession troubles after lincoln's election sought porter buzzing from pillar to post. reporting to the war department on a flight visit to charleston on november, 1860. another flag visit to the gulf coast in february, 1861, to supervise the extraction of seven companies of u.s. troops from secessionist texas. trying to manage the forwarding of pennsylvania militia and the second u.s. cavalry to baltimore and washington in april. and then as adjutant to major robert pattinson's halfhearted advance it virginia in july of 1861. patterson's failure and subsequent shelving

might have put a period to porters civil war career. but on august 4th, 1861, porter wrote directly to george mcclelland, who had just been called from his successful campaign in western virginia to command the dispirited union forces around washington, d. c.. i can be of much use and render the country's essential services, porter pleaded. i cannot bear to see my companions, my juniors, rising to distinction and position while i must plot away in a beaten and sandy track. it is not clear exactly when porter first became an intimate of mcclelland's. there is nothing in their student record to suggest any connection and only one straight reference to porter in mcclelland's mexican war papers. but they did share quarters at west point, when both were on station there in

1850. and they evidently knew each other well enough in the small confines of the prewar army that porter would urge mcclelland to resign from his civilian job in 1861 and re-enter the service, well mcclelland would remember asking porter, as an adjutant, when he was first given command of the department of the ohio. in any, case the plea worked. on august 7th, porter found himself commissioned as colonel of the 15th u.s. infantry. three days, later he was a brigadier general of volunteers. by the fall, he was commanding one of mcclelland's divisions. it's not clear either what porters politics were, at first. like so much of the old army, porter cultivated a steady distance from politics. partly from the principle of subordination to civilian authority, but partly from the example of what

happened to soldiers like winfield scott when they crossed politicians like president james polk. but the outbreak of the civil war brought a tremendous influx of new volunteer officers into the service. in command of the new volunteer regiments. their appointments where the playthings of northern state governors and they often made no secret of their hostility to slavery and to the democratic party. when porter discovered that one of his volunteer kernels, john pickle of the 13th new york, had assisted a slave in taking flight from his master, porter ordered the slave expelled from his camps. slavery existed by law, porter explained, as though this was supposed to deal with any objections. we were in a slave state and the owner was entitled to his servant and now

officer had the right to use his rank to take property from a loyal owner. this tone deafness to the volatility of the slavery question might have stymied any further advancement for porter, and what became known as the army of the potomac, had not the armies commander been george mcclelland. who suffered from more than a little tone deafness of his own on the subject. instead, porter grew closer and more confiding to mcclellan, and mcclellan played porter more and more as a favorite. mcclelland cultivated new york democratic politicians and encouraged porter to do likewise. he also cultivated new york democratic newspaper

men like man tim marble of the new york world and, unlike unwisely, porter did so also. none of this went unnoticed in congress or the executive mansion. he ward mcclelland and may that it had become all well-known that you consult and communicate with nobody but general fitz john porter. when lincoln mandated a reorganization of the army of the potomac into french model army corpse, porter's name was not among the division managers promoted to core command. not campaign in the spring of 1862. mcclellan appointed fitz john porter, director of the siege of yorktown. and with his usual, methodical position, the operations were conducted with skill. but mcclelland favoritism infuriated pro administration officers, including porter's own corps commander samuel hines woman. who groused that mcclellan is giving great satisfaction in this army, particularly about general porter. no matter, on may 18th, 1862, mclelland

decided to sub divide the existing corps of the army of the potomac and handed one of the new commands, the fifth corps, deporter. the peninsula campaign did not end well for mcclelland, for whom the seven days battle into june concluded with the army of the potomac backed into a tight perimeter around harrison's landing on the james river. porter, however, did remarkably well in corps command. gallantly standing of a savage attack by robert e. lee's army of northern virginia at gainesville on june 27th, and mowing down leaves confederates from the heights of melbourne hill on july 1st. mcclellan evidently plan to cross from the south side of the james and, at reporters urging, renew his advance. but lincoln was having none of it. he had already appointed a new general-in-chief, henry -- to put a bit in his mouth, and was offended on a visit to

harrison's landing on july 8th by mcclellan's arrogant declaration that the president must abandon any thought of amidst a painting southern slaves, left the army of the potomac disintegrate. as the mcclelland would bear no responsibility for such disintegration. mcclelland was too much the darling of the democratic opposition. for lincoln to risk and outright dismissal., instead in late june, lincoln created a new army of virginia. from pieces of units that had been pummeled that spring in the shenandoah valley by stonewall jackson. and put them under the command of major general john hope. in august, lincoln ordered the withdrawal of the army of the potomac, piece by piece, from

the peninsula, and fed those pieces into the structure of the army of virginia. pope's official qualifications for command in the east rose from his success that april in forcing the surrender of a confederate post at island number ten in the mississippi river, which pride opened river to federal gunboats as far south as vicksburg. but israel qualifications for political. that's one of the one-time presiding judge overlook its old court circuit in illinois and one of the four officers who formed awakens personal bodyguard for his unnatural trip to washington, pope was smaller plea anti slavery and hence regarded as the coming man of the army. john pope was everything mcleod was not, and porter did not mind saying so. and late july, after pope had assumed command of the army of virginia, porter had described him as what the military world has long known, and asks, and

will reflect no credit on mr. lincoln. as july turned august, porter turned up the heat in his letters. describing pope to marble as a fool and, worse still, wishing that mcclellan was in command in washington to rid us of the incumbents ruining our country. by the time porter and the fifth corps had, by road, boat and rail, reported to pope on august 27th, porter was earnestly wishing myself away from pope, with all our old army at the potomac. and begging ambrose burnside, if you can get me away, please do so. porter's opinion of pope had not been approved by the beating which elements of the army of virginia received at

the hands of stonewall jackson at cedar mountain on august 9th. nor by the disastrous range of jackson and jeb stuarts staged on pokes communication is applies at manassas junction on august 27th. the next day, jackson drew off the bull run battlefield luring pope after him under the delusion that jackson portion of the army in northern virginia was sufficiently isolated that popes army could destroy it. marching through the ruins of manassas junction, porter and the fifth corps were ordered to take position southwest of the sublease brings turnpike across right at the center of the old 1861 battlefield. under the impression that porter would be able to turn jackson's right flank. but the order is pope issued for porters movement at once on the enemies right flank on august 29th, where they

confusing? and above all, complete. the order for porcher to attack jackson was written by pope at 4:30 in the afternoon, but did not reach porter in till 6:30, when dusk was already coming on. porter also was beginning to realize what pope did not, that the balance of the army of northern virginia under james longstreet was moving into position on jackson's right, ready to strike a devastating blow on pope. apprehensive, porter ordered a pullback of his -- a copy of his pullback order crossed popes for 30 attack order and pope promptly sat down at 8:50 that night and rode out yet another order, demanding that porter appear before him for an explanation. porter did side of the next morning, august 30th, and try to convince pope of the trap

waiting to spring on him. pope would hear nothing of it. i am positive that at 5:00 on the afternoon of the 29th, general porter had at his front no considerable body of the enemy. would later insist. every indication from the night of the 29th and up to 10:00 on e morning of the 30th pointing to the retreat of the enemyrom our front. pope could not have been more wrong. no orders of this cpan, porter later remarked, more erroneous lee stated the attitude of the opposing forces are led to more serious disaster. >> that afternoon, longstreet's 25,000 bravest moved in line by a single impulse over the fifth corps and everything else that composed popes left flank. by that evening, longstreet and

jackson had crushed the army of virginia and sent it fleeing in disarray towards washington. john pope, his army now a shambles had once flail around for excuses and found his principal target importer. >> i think it my duty to call your attention to the on soldierly and dangerous conduct manifested by officers of high rank, pope wrote to henry alec early on september 1st. he was particularly incensed that one commander of a core, who fell back to manassas without a fight, nor was there any mystery about whom pope had in mind. pope had his acolytes in the army of virginia, fully as much as mcallen had in the army of -- robert mill roy, an indiana abolitionist who commanded one of popes berate exposure that the defeat and goal of run was caused by the treachery and incumbency of the generals in the interest of mcclellan. especially general

fits john porter, most randomly paraded. george temple ten strong, the new york lawyer and treasurer of the u.s. sanitary commission hinted at what would emerge as a continuing theme. that mcmullen, after reporter, and others had long been personally friends, allies, and political convenience with jackson, lee, and joe johnston. that they were looking for an opportunity to agree on some compromise or adjustment, turn out lincoln and his black republicans, and use their respective armies to enforce their decision north and south. the new york tribune was even more -- to finger him for lying. >> i was with pope's army is a correspondent, wrote a new page, porter did not

intend to help pope win that battle. pope submitted a preliminary report on september 4th, the next day lincoln suspended porter from command in ordered the court of inquiry into pope's conduct at the run. that should have spelled the end for porter's military career. it didn't, because the crisis that prevailed in the wake of popes bowler and disaster was so brave that lincoln felt he had no choice but recall george mcclelland. first to supervise the defensive washington on september 2nd, then on september six to resume direction of the army of potomac with all of popes fragments securely under his command. lincoln explained that this was a recognition that mcallen is a good engineer and

that there is no better organizer. that he can be trusted to act on the defensive. behind that rationale was lincoln's fear that although there has been a design, a purpose in breaking down hope, there is no remedy at present. mcclelland has the army with him. with that restoration of the army of the potomac, mcclelland demanded and got the reinstatement of porter. first, for command of the capital fortifications on the south side of the district and then for the fifth corps again on september 11th. lee, had no intention of challenging the washington fortification. instead, he crossed into maryland in rallying slaveholding marylanders to take their state of the union and that venture grayson lee intoennsylvania where he

could inict political damage into the northern multiple it continue the war. good news for porter, was that mcclelland succeeded beyond almost every expectation in frustrating leads plans. in just two weeks times, mcclelland rallied up beaten and disorganized armies moral, resupply and reorganized it with new leadership at a core level, integrated and ill trained and ill prepared waves. in the set off in pursuit of confederates in maryland. mccallum in fact moved so fast that quarter only caught up with mike collins on september 14th with the division of george morale and george sykes. that was when he resumed complete command to the fifth core. on that day, -- then, one, at least in place victory in antietam three days later. the bad news was that none of this was sufficient to dispel the

clout of mistrust generated by second bull run over either mcclellan or porter. mcconnell and fell under immediate suspicion -- as well as for showing noticeably little enthusiasm for lincoln's issuance of the preliminary emancipation proclamation in 22nd. if anything, porter, who was even more explicit and his criticism of the proclamation to manchin marble on september 30th, fared even worse. throughout the entire day of antietam, mcclelland held porter in the fifth corps and reserve as his headquarters at the house and the optics of that reserve looked like nothing so much as a conspiratorial repeat up second bull run. david straw they're, a staff officer, notice that

porter spent the day with a telescope, surveying the battlefield and speaking to mclelland inwards so low toned and brief that the nearest bystanders had but little benefit from them, as though the battle was the drawing room ceremony. this arrangement was really not as -- as it looked. there is the day, pieces of the fifth corps had to prop up edwin summiteer's second corps, to support a tentative movement across the middle bridge across antietam creek and to cover the armies trains and reserve artillery so that by the close of the fighting, porters command was not than 4000 strong and perhaps what little over 3000 men. nevertheless, hostile newspaper correspondent saw only typical porter inaction. when four inside was pressed wrote the new york tribune's correspondent, george

small would, mccall interns to porter who 15,000 troops are lying, fresh, only impatient sarah share in the fight. porter only shakes his head slowly and one may believe that the same thought is passing through the heads of both generals. they are the only reserves of the army, they cannot be spared. even the times of -- correspondent. francis molly saying the same damning song, that general fits john porter with 15,000 men in reserve, became the only body on the federal side which was not engaged. nor did it help order that on september 20th, the fifth court was given the job of treading on the treating federal tiles across potomac, a shepherds -- only to receive a humiliating brush back. this,

this was only the beginning of sorrows for porter. mcallen'sailure to chase lead out after antietam heated linciron to a hot pitch in on november 7th, once passed the danger line of the congressional elections, lincoln dismissed mcallen once miles to the army potomacur montgomery tent, the uproar protest nearly crossed the boundaries of mutiny. as general mcmuassed along s front, whole regiments broke and flarou him. with chore tears not to leave him but to s word and they would soon settle matters wasngton. porter did not imagine that he would do any better than mcclellan, he may soon expect to hear that my head is locked, he wrote to manson marble on -- september 9th. two days after

mcclelland's departure, porter was once again relieved of command of the fifth court. the troops gave proof of their grief in many ways at the loss of the honored and beloved commander who had, by his heroic bravery batter battle and kindness of heart in camp endeared himself to them. remember the historian of the fifth court, william h. powell. there was nothing like the demonstrations that i try to persuade mcclellan to violate his orders. we are not aware, remarked the iconic chronicler of the pennsylvania reserve division, of there being any particular amount of weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth at the end. the engines of the post -- quarter court of inquiry began turning once more and on to number 17th, porter is placed under arrest and confined to the limits of his hotel in washington. on november 25th, the inquiry was

reconstituted as a court martial. the court-martial acquired -- to predict that outcome no crystal ball to require predicted outcome. he was found charged with nine -- of war. all centered on his disobedience of props orders on august 29th and 30th. mclaughlin called witness on january 2nd, testified to porters loyalty, efficiency, and fidelity. from mcclellan, those accolades were almost the case of death. when john pope appears as a witness, he was so confident of himself that he declared, had general port and fallen upon the flank of the enemy on the night of august 29th, we should have destroyed the army of jackson. from there, it was only a short distance to the testimony of popes aid, thomas c h smith, that he had been certain that fits john porter was a traitor and smith

was ready to shoot him that night so far as any crime before god was concerned if the law would allow me to do it. the law did not. it also did not prevent the court-martial from finding porter guilty of all but two of the specifications on january 10th, 1863. curiously, the new york times predicted that the trial would unanimously acquit general porter of the charges against him. even the new york tribune founded outside of public opinion acquits the general, but not the court, not certainly, abraham lincoln. he not only approved the verdict on january 26th, but was convinced that porters obedience of disobedience borders and failure to popes

eight apple run had occasioned our defeat and deprived us of a victory which would have terminated the war. blinken told his confidant, leonard sweat, that he had read every word in that record and i tell you, it's john porter's guilty and ought to be shot. he was willing the poor soldiers should die while he, from sphere jealousy, stood within hearing of the guns waiting for -- to be whipped. >> porters accident and hit him only made at worse, telling son robert that the case would've justified, in his opinion, ascendance of death. it's john porter said to work only wants to obtain a reversal of the verdict and his chief counsel at the court-martial, reverend e johnson posted a vague rigorous condemnation of the court martial proceedings, raging that a greater injustice was never done through the forms of proceeding then was done by the sentence of the court-martial in that gallant

officer. indeed, the entire trial can only be read and was so read, by every upton in 1879, as a kind of star chamber proceeding in which porter became the american version of admiral being. [speaking non-english] who might show insufficient enthusiasm for emancipation. wield and action with only two days notice by a general name john pope who very few people, even those who condemn porter, were unembarrassed and have to -- wonder may have been an imaginative in his decisions, but those decisions will now they're decisive in the outcome of second ball run. that judgment belongs on popes and mcdowell's. nor treason or to they call us. he supposedly baleful influence on element

antietam owes most of its force to the scandalous irresponsibility of the journalists who had already conceived a narrative to which porter was made to fit. we'll take, however, years for porter to get a re-hearing he demanded. he found employment in mining and civil engineering, even in 1871, assuming the corruption a fine boss tweet as head of public works in new york city. it was not until 1878 until the case was reopened by the war department and even then unburied partisanship announced general porters conduct that the second battle of bull run as essentially traitorous. jacob tolson cox, one of the rare abolitionist general officers in the army had served his

governor as ohio mediately after the war, wrote a particularly vindictive review of the portuguese in 1882. it declared porters disaffection to pope had let him beyond the verge of criminal insubordination. it was not until 1886 that president grover cleveland, the first democrat president since the war, signed a bill restoring porter to his original u.s. army rank of colonel. porter officially retired from the army for days later. we can buy the ravages of diabetes, he died on may 26th, 1901. the unhappy fate of fits john porter is the story of unfairness. even cruelty. meted out to a soldier who who is only military crime had been the same my opia in the fog of war that afflicts all but the

most acute possesses of the [speaking non-english] the coup of the i-. in those last days before antietam, frederick -- and hitchcock was impressed by his international border, a small, slim, young man with whiskers and keen black eyes who dressed very modestly. a high black chap and much rather gold tassel band. it may be difficult to say more than that about him. porter departed with a sincere regret of all of his soldiers, but not mere immunity. his humiliation, said one massachusetts soldier, was enough to move a heart of stone. by the time the old army had become heart of stone. porter did not move it much. he was neither a traitor nor an idol, nor was he, as otto eisen

show wanted to portray him, an american dreyfuss. so in the end, his condemnation says less about him than it does oppose the frailty of his contaminants. he's even his condemn any, in this case, a man more narrowly on malicious as abraham lincoln. yet, it's giron porter was also a man very much mistaken about the nature of the war that he was fighting. he had imagined that he could make pronouncements -- on arrival, general charged with implementing those policies which no one would notice that he could ally himself with anti administration associations without consequences. that he did not need to be concerned himself with whether tactical decisions were liable to be understood as political malingering. americans have -- to imagine that the principle of separation of power organizes the civil military

relationship as much as it organizes the branch to government. the truth of that relation here that it's really a one-way street. american soldiers may not dabble in politics unless taught early, as washington's confrontation with officers at noon berg. american politicians may, even must, exercise a controlling influence over the military. if we are not entirely left behind, earliest dread of -- the tyranny of men on horseback. perhaps, as a republic, we have rachel. several years ago, samuel p huntington warned that the absence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere. fits john porter and the american civil war may be our most enduring -- thank you

very much. a reminder of that reality. [applause] >> now i'm told it's question time. >> i'll start off. >> very good. >> did not james wall street get involved in the review of this contamination? >> i know of no commentary that longstreet often offered on the porter case. you might think he would have a thinker to say, but if he did, i'm not aware of it. robert e. lee did, curiously enough. not publicly though. porter wrote to lee directly after the war in an effort to get lees read on what happened to pope at second bull run and we responded to put his inquiry. it was a very ambiguous response. which made it clear that lee was telling porter that he did

not want to get involved. and so, he did not. i am not sure what it would have accomplished for porter to have invoked robert e. lee speaking on his behalf, but nevertheless, porter made the effort, and lead gave a response, but not a response that porters it will to use usefully, right? >> yes. >> provide us with details about the refinement of the 1878 reopening of the court-martial, to the court having a particular findings? >> the 1878 reopening of it had come after years and years and years of commentary, dispute, disagreement in public and in private overtly fits john porter affair. when a new court, a new inquiry is opened in 1878 under president hayes, a good deal of

the angsty and anxiety had leapt away over the years. and there was a more dispassionate attempts to understand what happened with portrait second bull run. nevertheless, the inquiry does not go far enough to actually recommend, and put into place some kind every institution of porter. that is going to have to happen by an act of congress, and that gets slowed down in congress for another eight years, as once again, the political partisanship comes out of hiding and manifest itself. it is not for another eight years after that the court of inquiry that legislation emerges out of congress and is signed by president cleveland. in the process, the, it is interesting that members of the original court of inquiry, which included the man that would be elected president in 1880, james garfield. emory upton route to garfield

after the reopening of the court of inquiry, and often really scored garfield severely for his participation in the original court of inquiry that condemned porter. upton made it very clear that from upton's point of view, anyway, and by this point in 1878, upton is a force to be reckoned with in professional military circles. up to meet a clear that garfield was just absolutely dead wrong about porter, and it should come clean and admit it. garfield writes back to porter, and once again, you get a real lawfully response. there may be some aspects that what you said is true, but basically garfield is not going to do anything about it. which puts something of a dark stain on garfield's reputation that way. garfield, of course, ted politics. coming up in the 1860s during

the war, he was something of a protegee. salem and chase, he was -- and he moves up through the ranks, into congress, it is very clear that he is into public where -- he referred to abraham lincoln as a secondary illinois lawyer. that gives you some idea of garfield's perspective of things. upton wants to take garfield to the proverbial little house to spank him. but garfield does not want to, really does not want to admit that a terrible injustice was done to fix john porter. it really has to take this agonizing process, restore importer and a president who wants to sign it. that takes a long, long time in the life of fitz john porter. yes?

>> i guess it is not at all coincidental that cleveland is the first democrat president after lincoln? >> yes, and one can draw a number of unpleasant conclusions from that. cleveland includes a confederate, former confederate general in his cabinet since captured confederate battle flag to the south. one can say, oh yeah, cleveland would do that, wouldn't he? yet, i think that is jumping too much to a conclusion. yes, cleveland did sign the bill, but the bill itself, the very fact that it passed both houses of congress was a recognition that something had gone disastrously awry as the court-martial in 1863. i think the sense that that was the case would probably have prevailed, even if a republican president has been in office.

in 1886, when cleveland receives this legislation from congress, enough tempers have cooled that people are able to see something more clearly that, what happened in that court martial was a kangaroo court in the worst sense of the word. that does not mean everybody agreed with it. jake up dole cox's review of the porter case in 1886 after the -- moved in recommending -- jacob -- about porter. and one can only read cox's comment, also the book that jacob dolson cox writes in the wartime series to which paul free writes about -- and says the same thing about porter that george small we put into his correspondence in the new york tribune. there are people who are

unreconciled to porter. they remained unreconciled. there are people today who remained and second tiled -- unreconciled to porter. my opinion is they are wrong. and i say this with some hesitation because, i am after all a link in person. there is a certain difficulty for lincoln people to say that abraham lincoln committed an injustice. i feel a certain degree of that reluctance. yet, a feeling of reluctance is not the same thing as historical fact. and i cannot review the porter case without coming to a conclusion that this was a political retaliation. and it was meant as mcclellan's

firing was meant to send a clear and unambiguous message to the army about who it should be obeying. the message, the message was sent, i don't know it was entirely well read. as late as 1863, you still have people like john cedric wanting to make the rounds of the army in the potomac to make a collection and stanage of stands in a court veto that -- they will be a lot of people who will walk in the army at the political direction that the war is taking, but their influence diminishes dramatically over the course of 1863. when grant takes charge in 1864, there were simply no question from that point onwards about the convergence of the political and military opinion on where the war should be had

a. but that takes time. to come back to the point, as a lincoln person, my first instinct is always to assume that abraham lincoln, a man who speaks about malice towards non-and cherokee, would not improve his hands in and to an officer like porter. even abraham lincoln as a human being and makes mistakes. this case, he made a mistake, it was a serious one. i have to say that. >> yes? >> is there any evidence to suggest that during a time that it -- fitz john porter was making these controversial statements he was writing, or verbally receiving any council or guidance to calm things down? was that in his internal constitution to do that? >> you might have wondered why some people did not tell him to cool it.

they did not. more often, there was a case that people would receive this correspondent case. marble is not publishing reporters correspondence. so there is a sense in which, the really incendiary thing that porter writes to matt and marble, do not get into public circulation. the very fact that he brought this to the editor of the new york newspaper however the trees if failure of wisdom and prudent importers part, makes you scratch your head. the moment he stepped away from that to offering political opinions, that is the moment in which you have to say that here is a catastrophic failure of common judgment. marble does not publish this kind of correspondence in the new york world. but that is not the only

correspondent. a number of letters, including the original litter in which porter suggests that pope isn't but. that goes to amber burnside. went to burnside because at that point in the campaign, burnside is in alexandria, he is acting as a relay point for communications for the army of virginia back to washington d.c. burnside gets this letter which porter says he is a long burnside as a friend. burns eyes passes it onto halep. oh, that the north and we'll. he takes this to lincoln, lincoln is reading, this idea saying see. they are trying to under-undercut the registration, undercut the war effort. and that respect, somewhat unwillingly, burnside acts as a person who communicates

porter's opinion, and so the become fairly widely known. some people suggested that it was that action of burn sides that caused makayla lynn to turn on him during the maryland campaign. i don't know there is any hard and fast evidence for that, that's a supposition more than anything you would easily assert. but you can see where if porter is a favorite of mclaughlin, and mcclellan finds out that in fact the burnside was responsible for passing on what was responsible for private communication. mcclellan will take a poor view of burn. i think there are other ways and rationales for mclelland's relationship with burnside in the marilyn campaign. it is intriguing suggestion more than one person made that suggestion, but it was a serious lapse of judgment on porters part. simply to assume when he was writing to burnside was going to be kept entirely between the

two of them i have to say, it's a little bit like sending email today. we assume that we are sending an email and it is in private to someone, and in fact, no it is not, that whole system is owned by gravel or by whoever you use, or whatever server you use. and can easily be subpoenaed and appear in a court of law. then you find yourself in difficulty. we have got into the points today we are a lot of people always write an email assuming that someone else, quite conceivably could be reading this later on, you better phrase it that way. perhaps porter should have thought about that before he was writing to burnside. he did not, and the results were fatally damaging to portrush career. i see a question in the back. >> just clarification on lincoln's role, did you say

lincoln knew it was an injustice? the court martial. or was it more of he did not have the integration? or he knew, and he thought it was for the greater good for making sure he kept it political? i'm just curious. >> i think lincoln made a serious mistake in judgment. i think lincoln already had concluded, as early as july of 1862, if not before that, that mcclellan had to go. but also concluded that anyone who was joined at the hip with george mcclellan, they will probably have to go as well. is he conscious of doing an injustice? lincoln is not the sort of person who gets up in the morning and says what kind of injustice can i do to somebody today? he can be convinced that it is so because of a long train of actions which have gotten him to the point of believing that, in fact, the leadership of the army in potomac is politically

hostile, and he is willing to betray the administration to serve its own purposes. once you arrived at that point, then you will read anything that is fatally negative, any suggestion that is fit me adverse, as gospel truth, and you will act on it accordingly. because you don't feel you have much choice. there is an interesting question though, did lincoln actually read the court martial proceedings before he confirms them on january 21st of 1863? lincoln claimed that he had, bill maher val, i think with more substance is suspicious that lincoln ever had the time to wait your 900 pages of the court martial proceeding, that lincoln was relying on a digestive it presented to him by, who knows whom. stanton, halleck. people who had already been

sharpening their knives for mcclellan and anyone of his guys. that hangs out as a possibility. lincoln claims he read the inquiry proceedings, but there is some questions if that was the case. did he read the whole thing? did he skim it? we just don't know. the action that he finally takes reporter is a defensive, because he believes that the leadership of the army at the potomac could conceivably be construed as a threat. he is doing it because he is protecting the constitutional government of the united states. he is protecting the anti slavery cause. you can talk yourself into a number of positions when you believe you are under the kind of threat that it seems was the case. i was saying to john hennessy before we started here, it seems to me for a long time that one of the most critical

moments in the history of the civil war is the six weeks between the battle of antietam, and lincoln's decision to sack mcclellan. i say it's a critical period, and people say how can it be a critical period? a battle was seeking, no major battle was taking place. yes, there is perryville, but people in the east of course pretend that nothing happened west of the appalachians in the civil war. [laughs] that is our mistake. in that six weeks, i think there are some real question as to what -- mcclellan thought they were going to do. he had already given lincoln his opinion in the harrison landing letter in july 8th. the harrison's landing letter is, as observed in earlier content, one of the most insubordinate things a military officer has ever delivered to his civilian commander and

chief. basically telling lincoln, don't dream about emancipating slaves. what a business of it was mcclellan's? the answer was not. and then the business that mcclellan goes into that if you make a decision like that, it will disintegrate the army. wait a minute, you are in command of the army. so you have a little bit of responsibility about whether the army disintegrate or not? here is mcclellan trying to push off into lincoln. he goes back into washington, tells his cabinet, we have to emancipate the sleeves. when thing you did not due to abraham lincoln's paint him to -- that was always a big mistake. when you move to that period between september 17th and november 7th, there are a lot of voices suggesting to mcclellan that he should take unilateral action. when mcclellan, for instance receives the official word of the emancipation proclamation,

which comes to him as a war department order. he actually delays having it read to the army. he delays it so he can consult with his new york democratic political friends. what should i do? they are horrified of the question. no, you have to implement this! and he does, he does so with an order that which, it is fatally ambiguous. well, you know, we have to obey the civilian authority. if you disagree with the emancipation proclamation, proper place to take your decision is to the polls. that does not sound like a running endorsement of the commander-in-chief. then there is the question that i have seen a crop up increasingly, i saw it first in the columns written by union veteran henry goddard, in the years after the war, and the two columns he wrote in 1904,

-- it was sent on the 18th of september, the day after the battle of -- a letter supposedly sent by mcclellan to robert e. lee suggesting that the events of september 17th and demonstrated that the two armies fought themselves to a standstill. and that it was now time for mcclellan and lincoln, sorry mcclellan and lee to join hands, march on washington, and go to war. when i read that in goddard's column, my first reaction was skepticism. this was 1904, we are good along with off of this, this is hearsay of hearsay of hearsay. i don't pay any attention to it. venue began to find newspaper reporting about this letter. in other places, it keeps cropping up.

and while i don't think there is ever going to be any absolute evidence of this, the fact that people that something could happen could says a lot just on its own. about mcclellan in that six-week period about what he might have contemplated doing. well, being george mcclellan, he spent most of this time contemplating rather rather than doing. [laughs] so he finally does walk away from the army. of course, he walks away from the army all lead to walk into politics and run against lincoln in 1864. but it does raise these awful questions. when we think about critical periods of the civil war, we tend to think in terms of battlefields and armies. i would like to suggest that we think about a six-week period that is not dominated by a battle, it is framed by one,

antietam. i would like us to think about that period as a period of when it all could have gone very, very, very badly. and the history that we now know is the result of the civil war, might have taken disastrously different turn [applause] if you are enjoying memory in history tv, they sign up to our newsletter using the qr code on the screen to receive the weekly schedule of upcoming programs like lectures in history, the presidency, and more. sign up for the american history tv newsletter today, be sure to a watch american history tv every saturday or anytime online at c-span dot org slash history. c-span now is a free mobile app featuring your unfiltered view of what is happening in

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