for joining us and enlightening us as to presidential recordings program, and what you are doing. as you said earlier, you have got a book coming out. by all means, everyone should look for that and i wish you good luck on that and everything else. >> thanks. a pleasure to be with you. >> thank you. take care, --

john has recently retired from the national park service career, which began 40 years ago >> john has recently retired from the national park service career. which began 40 years ago. at the manassas national battlefield park. he became the chief historian and one of the many projects there. it was the publication of an exhaustive research and matt study of the truth movements. showing where each unit was engaged and moved about the battlefield during that three-day battle. i well remember meeting up with

a john in the early 80s as they hiked around those 5000 acres of preserved battlefield land. it was always a joy finding him in the midst of his tour. holding for us on the history and stories along the unfinished railroad upon xin ridge. explaining the last stages of the battle before nightfall ceased the hostilities. i never fail to stop and to listen and most importantly, to learn. it was a sad day when john got transferred up to -- down to fredericksburg in spots spotsylvania national park where in time he became the chief historian at not one but three major battlefields. for 40 wonderful years, john has again and again proved himself to be a dedicated historian. telling the history but equally important, telling the personal stories of the men who fought

in the battles and the civilians who had to deal with the carnage in misfortunes of that conflict. his book return to -- the campaign of second manassas was written in 1993 and has become the best volume ever written on that campaign. since we are starting the second year of this two year study of that campaign, i urge you to pick up that book if you do not own it. john is also written scores of articles on the various aspects of the american civil war and many of his video presentation aren't visible on the internet. he is not only a great writer but a fearless one. who charges into controversial subjects without hesitation or regret. and i much admire him for that quality. many of you are aware, this conference is now completed a

three year study on gettysburg and a two-year study on the maryland campaign. when i made the decision to do this to your study, on the manassas campaign, i made certain that i would have john hennessy with us to lead that effort. we are blessed to have him here with us today and tomorrow and for the tour on sunday. and please give him a well -- a welcome as he talks about architects of defeat, pope and mcdowell at second manassas. [applause] >> you are always very kind. and every year that i speak, every time i speak to you, i'm reminded of our several meetings in the battlefield. always seems like it was on a beautiful morning. and a memorable part of my time there. it's good to be here.

child said i was fearless, i am rather fearless, i think of giving a talk about jon pope and irving mcdowell to open a conference. it's a challenging topic for sure. not a lot of charisma involved in this topic. i will say. and but it's an important one. i'm glad to be here tonight and i'll be here tomorrow to talk about the book, return to bull run and what i think of it after 30 years. of consideration of it. but let's start with a trivia question. what to u.s. army's had the shortest lifespan during the american civil war? the army of virginia, i heard that. and mcdowell's army. what does that imply about a partnership between irvin mcdowell and jon pope,

commander of the army of virginia? we know about grand sharma, and we know about lee in jackson. we know about lee and longstreet. they're close intuitive partnerships with historic consequences. but it may be that the most dependent partnership of the war was between two men, you all know individually. ervin mcdowell and jon pope. but probably you had never thought of as a pair. they would largely shape the events that we're going to talk about this weekend. now, how is it, why is that you've never heard of this partnership or considered to be a partnership? the answer to that is pretty simple. because it failed. it led to disaster. see if we can get slides going

here. okay. let's start with this man. john pope. john pope would assume command of whatever be called the army of virginia on june 26, 1862. after the pieces and parts of that army had already been in the field for several months. his army which was the combination of three departments, three commands. one, the commanded by nathaniel banks would become the second core -- the first goal ultimately come into a frenzy go. both of them i largely operated in the -- valley. and the third core, excuse me, the first core of the army would be the largest. most consequential and so many ways. commanded by ervin mcdowell. jon pope came to this new command. charged with changing what lincoln and stanton and many

republicans on capitol hill consider to be the two timorous military and political culture in virginia. and john pope enthusiastically embrace the role of disruptor. i don't know how many of you have worked in organizations that had disruptor is brought in. it's a stressful circumstance. even when successful. pope was a disruptor. abraham lincoln knew it. it was a conscious decision on his part. jacob cox would serve under pope wrote of him. as in 1861 said that his reputation in 1861 was that of unable and energetic man. vehement and positive in character. out to be choleric and even violent towards those who displeased him. i remember well that ice shrunk

a little coming under his immediate order through fear of some chafing. but no one had any right to question popes zeal for the national cause. a staff officer, david hunter, you have never read his diaries, they were absolutely excellent. who served under pope. spent a fair amount of time with pope. and profiled him really quite well. he is a bright, dashing man. self and clearheaded. he had a good memory and had been eight topographical engineer. i observed that he is wonderfully quick to seize all information that comes before him. he remembers it all at once. and all of it once told what it isn't always wants new details. he is a -- irascible and impulsive and judgments of men. but unpleasant moods, jolly, humourists and clever in conversation. he also noted that pope was

voracious for information about maps in virginia. this is important because i think we overlook a couple of things. first, jon pope was in command of his army in virginia for just 25 days longer than we had been in charge of his army in virginia. but there is a big difference of course. lee was from virginia. pope had no knowledge of the ground. john pope would spend exactly 36 days in the field in virginia. never having been there before. and that would be a major factor in this campaign. speaking of his personality. a reporter and observer, henry volaris, that he had two very market things. for us he talk too much himself. of what he could do and what ought to be done. and secondly, he indulge

contrary to good discipline and all propriety in very free comments upon his superiors and fellow commanders. one of the crimes that anybody in business makes is to as a superior -- to criticize peters or subordinates. that instantly robs your credibility with the people who work under you. his role as a disruptor was based not just on his personality. this is really important. we have tended to see pope for the lens of personality. as much as even we see -- through the lens of personality. but pope's case, his role as a disruptor was also rooted in politics and policies. an army full of mostly conservative and i mean politically conservative men as the armies of america unbearably are. he was a liberal.

he favored emancipation. and he recognized the army would have to have something to do with emancipation. it's notable that while in command, this disruptor, jon pope, never said a word publicly so far as i can tell about the institution of slavery or the ongoing debate about emancipation that summer of 1862. he may have been a disruptor. but not on that issue. but his real mark came in his approach to war. he wielded performative pro is in a harsh uncommon way. in early july, he issued an inflammatory proclamation that disparage the methods and mind sets that it dominated in virginia since the beginning of the war. it was a proclamation targeted

directly although not obviously to -- not explicitly towards george mcallen who was -- in many ways that pope was not. then, at lincoln and stands by has, the government's behest and consistent with policies being issued nationwide at that time. pope issued a spate of orders that required southern men with -- to take the oath of allegiance. that removed guards from southern properties. protecting southern property. and ordered his commanders to quote subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. pope went to pains to explain that these orders should not alter the process by which property would be taken from southerners. it was intended to be orderly,

it was not intended to be a spate of pillaging. but it definitely expanded the circumstances by which those things might happen. his officers reacted coolly to these orders. they immediately, the removal of guards especially, the combination of removing guards and subsist-ing of the country was a signal, here we go. for about three weeks, pope lost control of his army with respect to the foraging and taking of property, goods and crops in the -- virginia. officers decried this. not because they had any particular sympathy for civilians. very few of the soldiers in the army of virginia did. but they decried it because it threaten the discipline of the army.

john pope spent 36 days in the field. with his army. these orders, as much as the defeat at manassas, would it define him in the public and in histories eyes. for the enlisted men, they saw in pope a man of action. and energy. our boys are growing enthusiastic at the prospect of a general who has a little life, one of them wrote. another man from the third wisconsin said pope reasons a person, a persona quite in keeping with the characters of his orders. full of energy, self assurance, and asked of the and -- pitch in a toughness, he has -- skin brim full as long black hair heavy whiskers and mustache. and all the gloss of good condition covering the greater part of his full face.

he fitted right in today, wouldn't he? in today's facial styles. as if to add to the emphasize the reality that very few in the army actually saw pope prior to the second battle of analysis. there was one soldier who described him this. the general is dashing. a dashing stylish -- speaking of napoleon subordinate commander. and th how i like to do the playing and strategy, the army of virginia will make its mark. just to give you a sense of, their morale at. there is evidence of this man never laid eyes on john pope before writing that description. of him. as i said, the removal of guards. the orders to subsist. unleash the army for a time. not entirely uncontrolled speed

of foraging. and even some pillaging across -- but it was a long enough period of time that it defined pope and earned him the unending -- to this day, enduring empty of southerners. at the time, also, conservatives in the north. on the historical spectrum of treatment of civilians in wartime, this was mild stuff indeed compared to what would -- what had preceded it. europe and elsewhere. and what would follow it in later wars. in the context of 1862, in the context of popes language, and demeanor. it was all rather startling. and offensive. as often been pointed out by many people, lee took note. and it seemed to advance

towards pope on animosity that he did not necessarily express towards other commanders. as i'm about to mention for the third time john pope was in the field with his army for 36 days. which means he did not know much about -- or stafford county. he needed some help. and so he quickly turned to the man who knew that area. the man in command who knew that area. beer than anyone else. this fellow. ervin mcdowell. there's two images of mcdowell. one of him with mccaul and taking in i believe leading teen 61. then a single portrait a little bit later. if pope was certainly the anti mcmullin. in 1862, almost everybody was

anti mcdowell. he was, as was often written, one of the most unpopular man in america. he commanded an army that had had a lifespan shorter than the army of virginia would be. 59 days versus the 70 plus states that copes army existed. he bore mcdowell did the omnipresent weight of defeat at manassas, at first manassas. for years with stoicism and endurance. john -- in army artillery men encountered mcdowell and san francisco in 1866 after the war. and he recorded that boys on the street as mcdowell passed would who'd at him yelling full run of, bull run. just to torment him.

he wrote of a despairing clumsy man, citizens laugh at him. all because he strains too hard to be popular. while he makes one doubtful friend, he creates a dozen enemies. one virtue of mcdowell that's interesting is that he accepted a reduced command. in fact, from -- not for being the only commander of the potomac that didn't serve in a reduced command after the removal. from command. burnside did. parker did, he served in the western theater. as a core commander. the only one who did not was george mcaleenan. which is interesting. despite the defeat at first bull run, mcdowell clung to the crease pl of command.

with do the full devotion. a modest in politics demeanor. that willingness to serve a reduced role. maybe most importantly, the ardent support of treasury secretary samuel chase of ohio. pope would call it mcdowell and intensely loyal man. another man called him or wrote of him, he was full of energy and patriotism. out smoking in his opinions. he was a good conversationalist. hated should chet. he loved to talk about fishing or trotting as he called it. so he was apparently something of a fly fishermen. and john and others road of a particular trade of his. he said that he cultivated eating to a fine art. james harrison wilson said of mcdowell that he was a

gargantuan eater. he was a gourmet and could cook. he can from paraguay may meals. apparently. but he abstain from almost every habit that might be considered sociable. he did not used tobacco. he did not use alcohol. he didn't even drink tea. pope called him at the most tempered man in the army. indeed, intemperate to the verge of intemperance, he said. now, as much as border, excuse, me as much as pope embrace performance art in performative language. mcdowell disdained it. he railed against histrionics. one man said he had no useor regintal bands and objectives of the barrels of lager another case of winds and liquors that found their way into the army.

he would write ofim, having none of the voic of ordinary mortals and a few other weaknesses, he imagine himsel on a higher plane than they. and thus, imaging, thought of himself as ranking with the gods in he assumed a dignity accordingly. future president james garfield wrote of mcdowell. he is frank, open, mainly, severe and sincere. which is kind of a great quote i think. like most officers in the regular army, mcdowell never declared his politics contrary to what some historians have asserted recently. he was not a republican. he's unknown to have been a democrat. but he is known to have supported a conciliatory war. and he is known to have a pose fundamentally abolition as a war aim for the united states army.

but he, like many others, subdued his politics in the interest of maintaining his job and out of respect for the american tradition of separating civil and military affairs. is approach to the nature of war was virtually identical. based on his letters. virtually identical to the policy espoused not by john pope but by george mcclellan. he was without question a conservative. he matched mccaul and in his determination to protect the farms fences and other properties of southerners. the orderly protection of property men the maintenance of discipline within the army. but more importantly to mcdowell preventing pillaging and marauding as he wrote would foster kind feelings among the

southerners. this is the bedrock of the conciliatory policies. practice by the union army and a spouse by men like mcdowell and mick colin in 1862. he wrote mcdowell -- i find out that i am respected and of always been by my enemies. he told his wife. that, of course, later in the war would become no virtue at all. to be respected by your enemies. his solicitous towards southern civilians made many in his command question his loyalty. they even question this hat that he wore. he somehow acquired what appears to have been a pith helmet of some sort. a very distinctive light colored hat that he wore throughout the campaign. and soldiers at the front, soldiers in his command came to believe ardently so some of

them we shall see. that the had was in fact a signal to the confederates who could see it that he was on the scene and all would be well for the confederates. we laugh at this. it is funny. but there is no question that this current belief that mcdowell was the disloyal man ran deep in his command. we'll talk a little bit about that later. he was deeply unpopular with the enlisted men. in june of 1862, near manassas josh an, he was thrown from his horse and seriously injured. in, fact of reports that he might die from that injury. he did not, of course. but he was seriously injured. in the next day, the soldier in the 13 massachusetts road home in a letter. he said mcdowell was thrown from his horse yesterday. an injured.

but did not seem to get much sympathy. i heard one person proposed three cheers for the horse that threw him. he was, as correspondent journalist george salford townsend said. the most unpopular man in america in 1862. there were good reasons for pope to lean on him. he was one of only a handful of americans officers who had committed an army in the field. and in some respects had done reasonably well. at first manassas. more than that, he had commanded either an army or a department. in a department that was quite active in the field for more than a year, continuously. since may 27 1861. and much of his duty had called him to the virginia team aunt

in the edges of the tidewater. from fredericksburg to warrenton to the blue ridge and eventually to call peppermint. owls men operated throughout the spring and the summer of 1862. so mcdowell knew these roads. new these towns. new these people who lived here. better than anybody else of similar rank in the northern army. john pope was another reason that pope chose to lean on mcdowell besides his experience. besides his knowledge of the landscape here. that is that hope liked him. oddly enough. though he conceded that mcdowell lacked that intangible thing called deport mint. in other words, charisma. he called him one of the most loyal men on earth. in all matters, a generous man.

pope said of mcdowell, he was an accomplice soldier. full of the book knowledge of the science of war and full of energy and seal. i've never known a man in whom the obligation of ty dominated to such a degree as ervin mcdowell. -- who had run afoul of th pope and mcdowell. during this campaign. he rode what it is not an entirely unfair assessment of the two of them. those subordinate to pope and mcdowell asserted his power and pope acknowledged by ever consulting with him. deferring to him. accepting his opinion. even to the extent of not acting until he heard of -- from mcdowell. sometimes changing his orders when it made. if mcdowell advice from two. pope generally got all wrong when he was not in communication with mcdowell. in his order show that he was ill at sea without mcdowell.

in short, he was the real power of this campaign. that's a bit of an overstatement. john pope was clearly had control of men sufficiently to determine the outcome of the campaign. as we shall see. but it was a close relationship. and tha mcdowell was an active ipant in. i show this not for the but just for most of the geometry. if you look, you can see here. at the outlines of jackson's flank that we're going to talk about. the river, the retreat from the rappahannock back by the union soldier. and what was john post job in 1862? sorry. john post job -- his first hassan 1862 was to see to the unification, the

junction of his army, the army of virginia, with mike owens army, the army of the potomac returning than from the peninsula. , the deep or invention into that happen at the better it was for the union cost but its first task was to see to the junction of those two armies. henry halleck, who is a new general-in-chief, who was an abject failure in that role. we could actually include him as one of the architects here. but nobody likes to hear about henry had a kick. how like warren pope don't let the enemy separate you from alexandria. of course, pope would fail in that mandate as well. of all the steps, of all the acts that led to popes defeat at second manassas, mcdowell was party to almost all of them

in some way shape or form. he attempted to rectify really only one of them so far as we know. early in the campaign, as the army sparred along the rapid and first of the rappahannock river. john pope and rving mcdowell notably john pope himself performed reasonably well. frustratingly along the rivers. withdrawing back across the rappahannock. on the 18 through beginning that process on the 18th of august. on the morning of the 18 of august, colonel 14 broad head, a man who we all show up here or in a little bit. commander at the first michigan cavalry. would it lead a rate across the rapid and river. and would nearly capture jeff stewart. that's what he's famous for. the rates of rigorous fill. nearly captured jeff stewart. and did capture jump stewart's

had. how about that? what really mattered about the whole thing is that broad heads command captured the orders. stewards orders for the campaign. and pope realized that only intended to go after him the following day. so very quickly. pope ordered the retreat back to the rappahannock river. threw cold pepper county. from raccoon forward onto rapid and. in the summer of the rappahannock back to rappahannock station. kelly's ford in beverly hills ford. mcdowell was integral to that. there's a great story of mcdowell. probably a crossing of great ranch a cease or mountain run. just east of called pepper. mcdowell during the night. it was raining, he had a poncho on. during the night. he positions himself in the middle of the stream as the wagons or streaming by.

and he does a patent thing. he's got a web, he whips almost every team of mules that goes by. keeps things moving. he's, hollering yelling. until he comes to the one -- doesn't know who this guy yelling at him is. objects to him throwing his -- using his whip on his mules. and starts yelling at mcdowell. he got so mad, the more he, yelled he finally just jump down off his wagon and started across to confront mcdowell directly. not knowing who he was. mcdowell at that point kind of unbuttoned his poncho. revealing the buttons of a major general and the insignia at all that. and as one witness wrote it was amusing to see the wagner's face. i don't think it took him ten secondsto mount his meal ended out of there. as fast as hecould. postretreat to the ahanck. you can see therappahannock on the lower part of this.

this image here. waswise. and consistent with hisorders. to do everything necessary to draw in withthe army of the mac. the parade virginiabetter. but giving up ground at this point didn'treally matter that much to the situation. for five days, excuse me. five days along the rappahannock river. pope parried lee and jackson. until august 25th. when things started to unravel. on august 25th. jackson became -- began his famous flank march around jon pope and it is at this time as the pressure is rising. as the stress is rising. imagine if you will be stresses involved. many of you have probably manage organizations in your career. you haven't probably done so

with the opportunity, or the nation upon you. you haven't most of us never managed a thing or someone else is out there actively trying to foil what you're trying to do. you also are not doing it after only being with your command for a matter of weeks. engineering, managing yourself through a national crisis in fact. on august 25th. within hours of jackson's march starting, john pope learned about it. but then he did something that he would repeat several times over the next couple of days. you know people who get information. and they will assess it realistically. they'll stand back and i'll say okay. it could mean this it, coming that, i think this is what it's going to be. then you also know people i had a daughter like this. still have a daughter like this. who gets information and

interprets it in the way that most comports with what she hopes is about to happen. jon pope repeatedly over these five next days in august of 1862 would interpret information in a way consistent with his hopes rather than the reality of the moment. the first word is that jackson will be marching towards the shenandoah valley. that's fine with john pope. not a problem. the next day, he dispatches mcdowell with virtually the entire army under his command. back to the river at -- springs. orders mcdowell to figure out what's going on on the other side of the river. mcdowell writes back midday, but -- what the enemies purposes is not easy to discover.

of, coarsely is doing all that he can to conceal his purpose. somebody suggested to mcdowell, well, maybe they're going to the valley. or maybe they're flanking us going to the rear of our army. mcdowell consider the idea but said either of these operations seems to be too hazardous for a levy to undertake with us in his rear in his flank. so on august 25th, and august 26th, pokes army remains concentrated around warrington and the annock river. by the evening of august 26 1862, jackson is a -- along the railroad. and will soon be administers junction. in the rear of the union army. now, pope's response to all

this, once he realizes what is happened. he turns his army away from the rappahannock reverend stars, you can see the armies kind of sprawled across the landscape here. heading back after jackson. from this point, late on the night of august 26th. until well into the battle itself on august 29th and august 30th. thought to the other half of confederate army unu longstreet. which is following jack column. about 18 or hours or so. about a daa ha. pope focus is whole on objection. his calculation is that he can beat jackson. we can bag the whole crowd, he said. before longstreet gets there. he turns the tension and they

sprawl across the landscape. fanned across the landscape from re-29 down to route 28. looking for thomas jonathan jackson. in doing that, -- pope disregarded owe the possibility so there might be some of you were with us. i'm not sure how many of you are with us on her bossier. quite a lot of you. the possibility of using the bull run mountains here in virginia. they're not really mountains but they are fairly substantial obstacles to troops. using troops to blockthe gap and to ext the separation between lee and jackson. as lee is marching with longstreet to join jackson. pope never considers that idea at least not for more than a few minutes.

but mcdowell does. on the morning of the 28th of august 1862. mcdowell on his own initiative detaches a division of troops and sends them off to -- all day, one soldier wrote, one of his staff officers. mcdowell isn't excited and exhilarated state of mind. very hopeful and confident. but savage as a meat ax. as one or wisconsin private can testify, his head being half knocked out because he struggled. that sight of him abusing a soldier cited threats from the rank and file to shoot mcdowell at the next opportunity. of course, they would not. but what exhilarated him that august 28th day is a possibility of getting to the gap and walking along the streets passage. the mps were too late. by the time the federal troops

arrived at the gap, longstreet had already moved into the gap and through the gap. while there was a battle at the gab which is reported too much from a by a lot of historians. while men gave their lives there, it in fact, the fighting there did nothing, it did not delay long streets progress towards the battlefield by one minute. longstreet had intended to spend the night at the gap or rest of the gap. the fighting there did not delay him at all. so the failed attempt to block the gap which is entirely mcdowell's initiative. might have been his high point of the campaign. which is saying something. the failure was a high point for him. -- who fought at the gapyielded. the following morning tojoingh

jackson on thebattlefield. meanwhile, of course, on the evening of the 28. of mcdowell's men engage jackson at the broader farm. the battle opens. jackson trying to lure the federals into battle. he does not overwhelm. the federal troops at the broader farm. it's a really quite remarkable battle extending about a half a mile or so that runs to a stalemate. stop why darkness. there was another aspect of this battle from jackson standpoint that was important. that is that by sailing this column along lawrence turnpike. we are going to the from her farm on sunday. jackson was really sending a message to jon pope saying i'm ready.

here i am. come and get me. john poe promptly did one of the worst things that you could do. any union commander in the civil war could do. and that was to do precisely what jackson lee wanted them to do. ordered his army to concentrate on the battlefield. setting the stage for the fighting on august 29th, 1862. of course, ngstreet would come through the gap. here onhe morning. come to route 29 and then head towards the battlefield out here. joining jackson's line by extending it. not simply reinforcing it. but extending it. we got jackson along the -- longst extends that line dothe south by about a

mile and a half down beyond what is today wellington road. that was the tual situation re. one ofthe -- this leads to one of the great mysteries on a -- one of the great puzzle of unnerving mcdowell. on the morning of august 29th, 1862, john buford who had been operating with mcdowell for several days and who had been shadowing longstreet's column since the 27th of august. so two full days. reportin to mcdowell longstreet's movements. on theng of the 29. buford port seeing 17 regiments of inventory. a battery of artillery and 500 cavalry passed through gainesville. it was no leap for mcdowell or before to recognize that this was longstreet arriving on the battlefield. a rather important piece of

information for jon pope to have perhaps one might think and yet, for some reason, but explains, it was ten hours before mcdowell relayed at information to john a pope on the battlefield. meanwhile, stre's men took thi position. butwoulput believed was that we'll, if stre was going to arrive, pope believed he was going to pporjackson directly u and not extend his ne. so papa leave he had the opportunity a pac attack of his o on august 29th. everything that happened ale unnished railroad on august 29th happened because make it very short.tory, i'll like this would happen.thing that porter's men and mcdowell's men would launch

this flank attack against jackson's position. but in fact. porter never went any further than this. and could not have gone any further than that. and so this piece of information. not slowly but certainly could have helped inform pope to avoid the assumption that created this impossible plan for himself on august 29th 1862. so yet another key mistake aspect of the battle. but the biggt event invoin mcdowell on the battlefield itself, excuse mecos on august 30th 1862 on the afternoon of august 30th, 1852. one of my disappointments about writing a book as i had hoped that it would spur other people

to do work. the only person who has, the only work that's really been done to follow up and improve on it is scotts -- scott patterson's work and he's gonna be on sunday as well. in his book on the fighting on the afternoon of august 30th a visit to his excellent. if you want know what happened on august 30th, 1862. it's detail. reed scott's book. he improves on mine significant ways. without question. but on august 30th, 1862, you see here jackson's line. you see longstreet's line extending south. as was during the last one. on the afternn august 30, f-18s exce two, pope mnt a large attack right across these fields here that strikes the right of jackson's line and is driven back. throughout the day, the federals have been skirmish-ing with longstreet out here. although mcdowell is told several times that longstreet's

out there. he doesn't accept tt. even john reynolds who served in this campaign under mcdowell -- mcdowell became so frustrated -- rentals became so frustrated at one point that he wrote from here, across the fields, back here, back to pope said quarter, right back here. it's notable that pope almost never left his headquarters during the battle. he probably had very little knowledge of the field itself. but here is something very curious happened when reynolds gets back, he huffs town office for us, he walks up to pope and mcdowell. and he says to general pope, general pope, the enemy is turning our left. he's talking about these people down here. and pope says, i don't think so. or i think the exact quote is, i guess not. and reynolds gets a little exercise, he says i just ran a

gauntlet of fire. ran my horse almost into the ground to get, here to tell you that the enemy is turning around. pope, at that point, remember, reynolds had been serving with mclelland's army. tremendous distrust between mcclelland and pope, rather, yes between them, but also between pope and mclelland. not without reason, that's in the book. and pope finally, after reynolds beseech's him, pope turns around and goes to the only officer in the army that pope himself had appointed to command. and that was john buford. he says, buford, you go out and see if the enemy is turning our left. so, buford assembled his brigade and headed out into the roads town here. but by the time he managed to do that, it was too late.

the confederates would attack. getting back to porters attack here, the big one, as porters men fall back, mcdowell is on e chin ridge here. he's got reynolds out, reynolds division is out here. he has nathanielmcclain's man, ich god will talk about and haswritten about beautifully, appear on chin ridge. and that's about it. at that moment, watching porters men fall back, if there was ever any evidence that mcdowell didn't understand the tactical situation, he promptly, as porters men fall back here, mcdowell orders reynolds's men off of the ground south of the turnpike. come up here and support porters retreat. leading by later that afternoon fewer generals that longstreet than any other point in the battle. it was, i think, without

question, one of the most important and significant tactical mistakes ever made by a core commander on a civil war battlefield. certainly in virginia. shortly thereafter, longstreet's men, as scott described in his book at will describe on the tour on sunday, roll forward across this landscape and come very close to destroying pope's army. they don't succeed in the end, they defeat it, but they don't destroy it. credit to that, in part, goes to mcdowell and john pope. who work hard that afternoon to assemble a new line of defense back here along henry hill. which ultimately holds at the end of the day. mcdowell's reputation is destroyed by the events on this

battlefield, without question. one soldier wrote of mcdowell, using the term the hat, speaking of his pith helmet, which became so famous. he said, wherever it appeared on the front, it was a signal to the enemy to seize firing and save their ammunition for a more opportune moment. on august 30th, wherever the hat peared, defeat and disaster followed th quick succession. but the most damning indictment of all of mcdowell came from this man, who we met a little bitearlier, thornton braun had. the colonel of the first michigan cavalry. he was mortally wounded in fiting in 1862. he would linger for sometime, long enough to write a farewell note, the last letter. and that he chose to say goodbye to his wife and family.

but most of the letter was devoted to an indictment of her event mcdowell. i am passing now from earth, he wrote to his family, but i send you love from my dying couch. i have fought manually and now die fearfully. i'm one of the victims of mcdonald's treason. tell the president, when he saves the country, he must not give our flag to such hallowed. hands but the old flag will triumph yet. i chose to live longer but i will die among the ring and clamor of battle, as i could wish farewell to you and the noble officers of my regiment. i can find my wife and my children. now that is a traumatic letter, which very quickly found its way into newspapers. and there was even a song written about it, that's sheet music about broad head last letter.

when that appeared in a newsletter, mcdowell felt forest with this assault on his loyalty, accusing him of treason, he felt compelled to call for a court of inquiry to investigate the charges. and ultimately exonerate him. in fact, he was exonerated, there's no evidence that he was ever disloyal. but the court of inquiry itself, which is a gold mine of information about this campaign, about urban mcdowell, about conciliatory war, changing war policies, bringing up all these things in public and having a published in a newspaper every day for two months. starting in november. it absolutely destroyed any shred of reputation that mcdowell had in the eastern theater. washington rogue laying gave a great final assessment, a fair

assessment of mcdowell during the second manassas campaign. mike dahl is a brave and courageous man doesn't hesitate -- i followed him closely. it's true that is something wrong about mcdowell but he is a jewel compared with the commander, pope. who is never to be found when wanted, and men notice this. pope was, if we get a chance will drive by there and show you, buck hale. it's a hill but it's in a hollow. i can only find evidence that maybe twice pope merged beyond the nearby ridges to see the battlefield in front of him. pope was never to be found one wanted and did not even expose himself enough to get a general view of the battleground and to see how a fares went on. mcdowell, in many places, acted for him. there is no denying though that the civil war rarely, if ever, experienced as consequential a

partnership as jon pope and irvin mcdowell. for that, unfortunately, the army of virginia and the nation paid dearly. i'm glad to answer any questions that you might have. [applause] is that eric? the dapper looking eric tonight. >> [inaudible] i visited mcdowell's grave at the port city yosemite years ago. and the ultimate insult is his name is misspelled on his headstone. instead of it being spelled ir v i again, it's i are wxin. the ultimate insult. >> if you google, him want to get all the results online, you get about 50% spelled correctly and %