and the clinton scandals and saga, if you write them down in a diary that can be produced through a subpoena and used against you. people started to refrain from putting their recollections down on paper. we know that in particular because they have told us that! one of the other flagship research programs at the north center is the presidential oral history program. it has conducted the official oral histories of presidents from gerald ford, all the way up through george w. bush. it is also doing a baraka obama oral history program. we know that these folks were skittish about putting their recollections, their memories, down on paper. because they might be reproduced! to pam's question, that is one challenge. the other challenges, what do you do with all of these emails? it

has just exploded over the years! how do we index, archive, make that available? and preserve it? i mean, there were thousands of emails that were lost -- forget about whatever you want to say about hillary clinton, during the bush 43 years themselves! there is effort to recapture some of those, but large amounts of them are still lost. that is an other challenge. the national archives, dare i say it, as hard as they are working to make this material available to generations of scholars, and to the american public, there is just more and more, mountains continue to build. it is going to be a real chore to process them and make them accessible in a way that allows them to be intelligible. >> last couple for you, you

mentioned the national archives. we have a question from ed, what role does the national archives play in preserving the tapes? >> hey ed, well the archives is the general custodian of these records. so, all of the presidential libraries which is where people would originally go to get the tapes, are part of the national archive system. the nixon library became part of the national archives i think in 2007. prior to that the nixon library stood outside of the national archive record administration system. so, there was a little bit of a wrinkle there. but the broad holding agency for all presidents. but, before the miller center did what it did and uploaded all of these

materials, and downloaded all these materials, you could write to the archives. ask for these tapes. or a small processing fee they would send them to you. or you could go there yourself and listen to them. yeah, people went largely to the presidential libraries to do that. prior to 2007, if you wanted the nixon tapes you would go to, i believe archives at the college park in maryland. all right. and last question to wrap up, a similar inquiry from both cleeve and rob, is there anything that you learn from the tapes that was recorded either intentionally or by accident that he would want to share ias an interesting story or a surprise of sorts? >> there are always surprises and they are all interesting. and i don't know why but as soon as you talked about a

particular story or something, i don't know why i thought of this one, but there is a kennedy cliff asking for the little blue pills. kennedy had his own doctor feel-good who shot him up with all kinds of things to keep him going. in addition to all the drugs he was taking for his many maladies. when we heard that kennedy was asking doctor george berkley, his physician, for one of those blue pills, that was something that we turned over as soon as we could. that is a fun one. the most famous tape of all, in addition to the smoking gun tape, which is the one that gives us all the rest of the tapes, because the smoking gun tape is what got nixon into the hottest of water in watergate. most famous tape is johnson's

hegar slacks tape. johnson, in the first week of august 1964, in the middle of all kinds of crazy stuff. signing the gulf of tonkin resolution, and there are church bombings, and he's about to go to atlantic city for a convention. he calls up the head of the hegar slacks company, can you make me a pair of pants. it is a graphic conversation about johnson's own personal needs, of where he needs these pants to be taken out and why. much. mark for staying great story. it is ten after eight. thank you very much for staying beyond the time that was scheduled. i know we all appreciate it and again, thank you very much, not only to those people that

register tonight for what was a great evening of information, but mark, for your time as well. and joining us and enlightening us as to presidential recordings program. and what you are doing. and as you said earlier, you have a book coming out. so, by all means, everyone should look for that. and i wish you good luck on that. and everything else. >> pleasure to be with you. thank you. >> thank you. take care. goodbye. >> weekends on c-span two are an intellectual feast. every saturday, american history tv documents america story. and on sundays, book tv brings you the latest in nonfiction books and authors. funding for c-span two comes from these television companies and more. including mediacom. >> at mediacom, we believe that whether you live here or right here or way out the middle

of anywhere, you should have access to fast, reliable internet. that is why we are leading the way and taking you to tennessee. mediacom, along with these television companies, supports c-span 2 as a public service. preorder your copy of the congressional directory for the 118th conference. it is your access to the federal government with bio and contact information for every house and senate members, important ation on congressional committees, the presidential candidate, ral agencies and state governors. scan the code at the right to preorder your copy today. for delivery in march, it is 29 95 plus shipping and handling and every purchase help support our nonprofit operations. at c-span shop dot org. are you a nonfiction book lover looking for a new podcast? this holiday season, try listening to one of the many podcast c-span has to offer.

on cue and a, you listen to interesting interviews with people and authors writing books on history and subjects that matter. learn something new on booknotes+ through conversations with nonfiction authors and historians. afterwards brings together nonfiction offers with influential interviews -- for wide ranging, hour-long conversations. and on about books, we talk about the business of books with news and interviews about the publishing industry and nonfiction authors. find all of our podcast by downloading the free c-span now app. or wherever you get your podcasts. john has recently retired from the national guard service career, which began 40 years ago at the manassas national battlefield park. he became the chief historian and one of the many projects there. with the publication of an exhaustive research and the study of the truth movements showing where each unit was

engaged and moved about the battlefield during that three-day battle. i well remember meeting up with john in the early 80s as i hiked around those 5000 acres of preserved battlefield land. it was always a joy finding him in the midst of his tour, holding forth on the history and stories along the unfinished railroad, or upon tint ridge, explaining the last stages of the battle before nightfall ceased the hostilities. i never failed to stop and to listen and most importantly, to learn. it was a sad day when john got transferred up to fredericksburg and spotsylvania national military park, where in time, he became the chief historian of not one, but three major battlefields. for 40 wonderful years, john has again and again proved himself to be a dedicated

historian, telling the history, but equally important, telling the personal stories of the man who fought in the battles and the civilians who needed to deal with the carnage and misfortunes of that conflict. his book, return to bull run. the campaign of second manassas. was written in 1993 and has become the best volume ever written on that campaign. since we are starting the second year of this two year study, of that campaign, i urge you to pick up that book if you do not own it. john has also written scores of articles on the various aspects of the american civil war and many of his video presentations are available on the internet. he is not only a great writer, but a fearless one, who charges into controversial subjects without hesitation or regret. and i much admired him for that

quality. so, many of you are aware, this conference is now completed a three year study on gettysburg and a two-year study on the maryland campaign. and when i made the decision to do this to your study on a massive campaign, i made certain that we would have john hennessy with us. we are blessed to have him here with us today and tomorrow and for the tour on sunday. please give him a warm welcome as he talks to us tonight about architects mcdowell and pope at second manassas. [applause] >> childs, you are always very kind. and every year that i speak with you, i am reminded of our several meetings on the battlefield. it always seems like it was on

a beautiful morning. and a memorable part of my time there. it is good to be here. childs said i was fearless. i am rather fearless and giving a talk about john pope and ervin mcdowell to open the conference. it is a challenging topic. not a lot of charisma involved in this topic, i will say. but it is an important topic. and i am glad to be here tonight and i will be here tomorrow, talking about the book, return to bull run, and what i think of it after 30 years. but let's start with a trivia question. what to u.s. army had the shortest lifespan during the american civil war? the army of virginia. i heard that. and mcdowell's army.

what does that imply about a partnership between mcdowell and pope, the commander of the army of virginia? we know about grant and sherman. lee and jackson as well. we know about lee and longstreet. they are close, intuitive partnerships with historic consequences. but it may be that the most dependent partnership of the war was between two man you all know individually, mcdowell and pope. but you've probably never thought of them as a pair. they would largely shaped the events that we are going to talk about this weekend. now, how is it, why is it that you've never heard of this partnership or considered it to be a partnership? well, the answer to that is pretty simple. because it failed.

it led to disaster. we will see if we can get slides going here. let's start with this man, john pope. pope assumed command about what would be the army of virginia in 1862. after the pieces and parts of that army had already been in the field for several months. his arm, the combination of three department, three commands, one commanded by nathaniel banks would become the second core. the first corps ultimately commanded by seagull. both of them had largely operated and the shenandoah valley. and the first core of the army would be the largest. and most consequential in so many ways, commanded by mcdowell.

john pope came to this new command charged with changing what lincoln and stanton and many republicans on capitol hill considered to be the two timorous military and political culture in virginia. john pope enthusiastically and braced the role of the instructor. i don't know how many of you have worked in organizations that had disrupters brought in. it is a stressful circumstance, even when successful. pope was a disruptor. and abraham lincoln knew it. it was a conscious decision on his part. jacob cox, who would serve under pope, wrote of him, in 1861, his reputation in 1861 was that of unable and energetic man, vehement and positive in character, out to

be choleric and even violent towards those who displaced him. i remember well that i shrunk a little coming under his immediate orders through fear of some chafing. but no one had any right to question pops zeal for the national cause. a staff officer -- if you have never read his diary, they are absolutely excellent. he served under pope. he spent a fair amount of time with pope and profiled him really quite well. he's a bright, dashing man. self confident and clear headed. he had a good memory and had been a topographical engineer. i observed that he is wonderfully quick to seize all information that comes before him. he remembers it all i want. and all of it, once told what it is, and always wants new details -- he is irascible and impulsive in his judgments of men. but in pleasant moods, jolly,

humorous, and clever in conversation. he also noted that pope was voracious for information about maps in virginia. and this is important because i think we overload a couple of things. john pope was in command of this army in virginia for just 25 days longer than lead had been in charge of his army in virginia. but there is a big difference of course. lee was from virginia. pope had no long wage off the ground. pope would spend 36 days in the field in virginia. never having been there before. and that would be a major factor in this campaign. speaking of his personality, a reporter and observer so that he had two very market things.

first, he talked too much of himself, of what he could do and what ought to be done, and secondly, he indulged, contrary to good discipline and all propriety, in very free comments upon his superiors and fellow commanders. and one of the crimes that anybody in business makes as a superior it is to criticize peers or subordinates. but instantly robs you of credibility with the people who work under you. his role as a disruptor was based not just on his personality, though, and this is really important. we have tended to see pope through the lens of personality as much as even we see mclelland through the lens of personality. but in pope's case his role as a disruptor was rooted in politics and policies as well. and an army full of mostly conservative, and i mean

politically conservative, man, as the armies of america invariably are, he was a liberal. he favored emancipation. and he recognized the army would need to have something to do with emancipation. it is notable, though, that while in command, this disruptor, jon pope, never said a world publicly as far as i can tell about the institution of slavery or the ongoing debate about emancipation that summer of 1862. he may have been a disruptor, but not on that issue. but he real mark came in his approach to war. he wielded performative pros in a harsh, uncommon way. in early july, he issued an inflammatory proclamation that

disparage the methods and mindset that had dominated in virginia since the beginning of the war. it was a proclamation targeted directly, although not obviously, not explicitly, towards george mcclellan, who was and thought that pope was not -- >> then, lincoln -- and consistent with policies being issued nation wide at that -- pope issued a state of orders that recovered southern men's -- that removed guards from the southern property, protecting southern property, and ordered his commanders to, quote, subsist upon the country on which their operations are carried on. now, pope went to pains to explain that these orders did not alter the process by which

property would be taken from southerners. it was still intended to be orderly. it was not intended to be a spate of pillaging. but it definitely expanded the circumstances by which those things might happen. his officers reacted coolly to these orders. they immediately -- the removal of cards especially, the combination of removing guards and subsist-ing of the country -- that was a signal. here we go! for about three weeks, pope lost control of his army with respect to the foraging and taking of property, goods, and crops in the piedmont of virginia. officers decried this, not because they had any particular sympathy for civilians. very few officers did. they decried it because it

threatened the discipline of the army. john pope spent 36 days in the field with his army. these orders, as much as the defeat at manassas, would define him in the public and in histories eyes. for the enlisted man, they saw in pope a man of action and energy. our boys are growing and they're sciatic at the prospect of a general who has a little life, one of them wrote. another man from the third wisconsin said, pope presents a person, a persona quite in keeping with the character of his orders, full of energy, self assurance, audacity and pitch -- there is a new nerd for you. he is firm set. a trifle below medium height,

his long length hair, heavy whiskers and mustache -- covering the greater part of his full face. he fit in today, wouldn't he? in today's facial styles. as if to add to -- emphasize the reality that very few in the army actually saw pope, prior to the second bottle of manassas. one soldier described to us. the general is dashing, stylish fellow. speaking of napoleon supporting it commander -- the army of virginiwill make its mark. well, just to give you a sense, there is more rat -- there is evidence that this man never laid eyes on john polk before writing that description. as i said, the removal of

guards, the orders to subsist, unleashed the army for a time. not entirely uncontrolled spate of foraging and even some pillage across many counties -- but it was a long enough period of time that it defined pope. and it earned him the unending, and to this day on during a multi-of southerners. another time also, conservatives and the north. on the historical spectrum of treatment of civilians in wartime, this was mild stuff indeed compared to what had preceded it in europe and elsewhere and what would follow it in later wars. in the context of 1862 and in the context of pope's language and demeanor, it was all rather startling and offensive.

and it is often been pointed out by many people, lee took note and seemed to advance towards pope and animosity that he did not necessarily express towards other commanders. now, as i'm about to mention for the third time, john pope was in the field with his army for 36 days, which means he did not know much about rappahannock county or -- or stafford county -- he needed some help. and so, he quickly turned to the man who knew that ar, the man in command, better than anyone else, this fellow, mcdowell. there are two images of mcdowell, one of them with mcclellan, ken in late 1861. and then a single portrait a little bit later. now, if pope was certainly the

anti mcclellan -- but in 1862, almost everyone was anti mcdowell. he was, as was often written, one of the most unpopular man in america. he commanded an army that had had a lifespan shorter than the army of virginia's would, 59 days versus the 70 plus days that pope's army existed. mcdowell bore the omnipresent weight of defeat at first manassas for years with stoicism and endurance. john tugboat -- and countered mcdowell in san francisco in 1866 after the war and he recorded that boys on the street, as mcdowell passed,

would who'd at him, yelling bull run! bull run! just to torment him. he wrote of a despairing, clumsy man. citizens lava him, all because he strains too hard to be popular. and while he makes one doubtful friend, he creates a dozen enemies. now, one virtue of mcdowell that is interesting is that he accepted a reduced to command. in fact, name for me the only commander of what would be the army of the potomac that didn't serve in a reduced command after their removal from command. -- hooker did. he served in the western theater. as a core commander. the only one who did not was george mcclellan, which is interesting.

w, despite e defeat at first ball run, mcdowell clung to decrease paul of command with dutiful devotion, a modest and politic demeanor, that willingness to serve a reduced role and maybe most importantly, the ardent support of treasury secretary sam chase of ohio. pope would call mcdowell an intensely loyal man. another man called him full of energy and patriotism, outspoken in his opinions. he was a good conversationalist, hated chitchat, though. he loved to talk about fishing or trout-ing as he called it. so, he was apparently someone of a fly fishermen. john -- and others wrote of a particular trait of his. he said that he cultivated

eating to a fine art. james harrison wilson said of mcdowell that he was a gargantuan eater. he was a quorum. and he could cook. he could prepare find meals, apparently. but he upstanding from almost every habit that might be considered sociable. he did not use tobacco. he did not use alcohol. he did not even drink tea. pope called him the most temperate man in the army. indeed, and temperate to the verge of intemperance. as much as pope embraced performance art and performative language, mcdowell the stained. he railed against histrionics. one man said he had no use for

regimental bands and objected to the barrels of lager and other cases of wines and liors that found their way into the army. -- would ride of him, having none of the devices ordinary mortals and but few of their weaknesses, he imagined himself on a higher planehat they. and that's imagining, thought of himself as ranng with the gods. d he assumed a dignity accordingly. future president james garfield wrote of mcdowell, he is frank, open, manly, severe and sincere. that is kind of a great quote, i think. now, like most officers in the regular army, mcdowell never declared his politics, contrary to what some historians have asserted recently. he was not a republican. he is not known to have been a democrat. but he is known to have supported a conciliatory war. and he is known to have opposed

fundamentally abolition as a war aim for the united states army's. but he, like many others, subdued his politics in the interest of maintaining his job. and out of respect, to the american tradition of separating civil and military affairs. his approach to the nature of war was virtually identical based on his letters to the policy espoused, not by jon pope, but by george mcclellan. he was, without question, a conservative. he matched mcclellan and his determination to protect the farms, fences, and other property of southerners. the orderly protection of property mans the maintenance of discipline within the army. but more importantly to mcdowell, preventing pillaging

and marauding, as he wrote, would foster kind feelings among southerners. and this is the bedrock of the conciliatory policies practiced by the union army and espsed by men like mcdowell and mclelland in 1862. he wrote, mcdowell did, i found out that i respected and have always been by my enemies. he told his wife that. and later in the war, that would become no virtue at all. to be respected by our enemies. his solicit isthmus towards southern civilians made many in his command question his loyalty. they even questioned his hat that he wore. he somehow acquired what appears to have been a pith helmet of some sort. a very distinctive, light colored hat that he wore throughout the campaign. and a soldiers at the front,

soldiers in his command, came to police, ardently so, some of them, as we shall see, that the hat was in fact a signal to the confederate, who could see it, that he was on the scene and all would be well for the confederates. now, we laugh at this and it is funny but there is no question that this current of belief that mcdowell was a disloyal man ran deep in his command and we will talk a little bit about that later. he was deeply unpopular with the enlisted man. in june of 1862, near manassas junction, he was thrown from his horse and seriously injured. there were reports that he might die from that injury. he did not, of course. but he was seriously injured. and the next day, a soldier in

the 13th massachusetts road home in a letter, he said mcdowell was thrown from his horse yesterday and injured. but did not seem to get much sympathy. i heard one person propose three cheers to the horse that threw him. >> [laughter] >> he was, as correspondent, journalist, -- the most unpopular man in america in 1862, but they were good reasons for pope to lean on him. he was one of only a handful of american officers who had commanded an army in the field. and in some respects, he had done reasonably well at first manassas. more than, that he had commanded either an army or a department and in a department that was quite active in the field for more than a year continuously since may 27th, 1861.

and much of his duty had called him to the virginia piedmont and the edges of the tidewater, from fredericksburg, to warrington, to the blue ridge, and eventually to -- his men operated throughout the spring and the summer of 1862. so, mcdowell knew these roads, new these towns, knew these people who live here better than anybody out of similar rank in the northern army. john pope, there was another reason that he chose to lean on mcdowell, besides his experience, besides his knowledge of the landscape here, and that is that pope liked him, oddly enough. though he conceded that mcdowell lacked that intangible thing called department, in

other words, charisma, he called him one of the most loyal men on earth, in all manners a generous man. pope set of mcdowell, he is an accomplished soldier, full of the book knowledge of the science of war and full of energy andeal. i've never known a man in whom the ligation of duty dominated to such a degree as mcdowell. and porter, who of course would run afoul of both pope and mcdowell during this campaign, wrote what is not an entirely unfair assessment of the two up. those subordinate to pope, mcdowell asserted his power and pope acknowledged it by ever consulting with him. deferring to him, accepting his opinion, even to the extent of not acting until he heard from mcdowell. and sometimes changing his orders when made -- if mcdowell advised him to. pope generally got all wrong when he was not in

communication with mcdowell. and his orders show that he was ill at sea without mcdowell and in short, mcdowell was the real power of this campaign. that is a bit of an overstatement. john pope was -- clearly had control sufficiently to determine the outcome of the campaign, as we shall see. but it was a close retiship and one that mcdollas an active participant and. this i if you -- i show this not for the detail, but just for mos likely the geometry. i feel like you can see here the outlines of jackson -- the river -- the retreat from the rappahannock back by the union soldiers. so, what was drawn popes job in 1862? john popes job, his first task

in 1862, was to see to the unification, the junction, of his army, the army of virginia, with mclelland's army, the army of the potomac, returning them to the peninsula. and, the deeper in virginia that that happened, the better it was for the union cause. but his first task was to see to the junction of those two armies. he warned him, the new general-in-chief, who was an abject failure in that role -- you could actually include him as one of the architects here. but nobody likes to hear about henry. he warned pope, don't let the enemies separate you from alexandria. and of course, pope would fail in that mandate as well. of all the staff, of all the

acts, that led to popes defeat at second manassas, mcdowell was party to almost all of them in some way, shape, or form. and he attempted to rectify only one of them, so far as we know. now, early in the campaign, as the army aspired -- jon pope and mcdowell, and notably, john hope himself, performed reasonably well. frustrating ali along the river, withdrawing back across the rappahannock on the 18th, or beginning that process on the 18th of august. on the morning of the 18th of august, colonel -- a man who will show up here in a little bit, commander of the first michigan cavalry, would lead a raid across the river and would merely capture

stuart. that is what he is famous for. -- and he did capture his hat! how about that? what really mattered about the whole thing is that brought heads command captured the orders for the campaign. and pope realized that lee intended to go after him the following day. and so, very quickly, pope ordered a retreat back to the rappahannock river, through -- county, from raccoon forward on the -- and the sommerville for it on the -- back to the station -- mcdowell was integral to that. there is a great story mcdowell at probably crossing the run -- the mountain run just released -- during the night, it was

raining, he had a poncho on. during the night, he positions himself in the middle of the stream as the wagons are streaming by and he does a -- he has a whip. he whips almost every team of mules that comes by, he is hollering and yelling. until it comes to one teamster. he doesn't know who this guy yelling at him or. he objects to him throwing his whip on his mules. and he starts yelling ott mcdowell. in fact, he got so mad, he finally just jumped out of his wagon and started across to confront mcdowell directly, not knowing who he was. mcdowell at that point, unbuttoned his poncho, revealing the buttons of a major general and insignia and all that. as one witness wrote, it was amusing to say the wagner's face. i don't think it took him ten seconds to his mule and get out of there as f he could.

pope's retrt to the rappahanyou n see the rappahannock on the lower part of this image here, was wise -- and consistent with his orders to do everything necessary to joined with the army of the potomac -- deeper in virginia it is better, but giving up gund at this point did not matter much of the situation. for five days, along the rappahannock river, pope parried lee and jackson, until august 25th, when things started to unravel. on the 25th, jackson began his famous flank march around jon pope and it is at this time, as the pressure is rising, as the stress is rising, and imagine if you will be stresses involved.

many of you have probably managed organizations in your career. you haven't probably done so with the eyes of the world upon you or the nation upon you. and you haven't, most of us, never managed anything where someone else is out there actively trying to foil what you are trying to do. and you are also not doing it after only being with your command for a matter of weeks. engineering, managing yourself through a national crisis, in fact. on august 25th, within hours of jackson's march starting, john pope learned about it. but then, he did something that he would repeat several times over the next couple of days. you know people who get information and they will assess it realistically. they will stand back and i will say, okay, let's do this, that. i think this is what it will

be. and then you also know people, i have a daughter like this, who gets information and interprets it in a way that most comports with what she hopes is about to happen. jon pope repeatedly, over these five next days in august of 1862, would interpret information and a way consistent with his hopes rather than the reality of the moment. the first word is that jackson might be marching towards the shenandoah valley. that is fine with john pope. not a problem. the next day, he dispatches mcdowell with virtually the entire army under his command, back to the river -- and he orders mcdowell to figure out what is going on on the other side of the river.

mcdowell writes back, mid day, what the enemies purpose is not easy to discover. of course, lee it's doing all that he can to conceal his purpose. somebody suggested to mcdowell, well, maybe they're going to the valley. or maybe they are flanking us, going to the rear of our army. mcdowell considered the ideas, but said, either of these -- and so, on august 25th, and august 26th, pope's army remains concentrated around warrington d e rappahannock river. by the evening of august 26th, 1862, jackson is along the railroad. and will soon be at manassas

junction. in the rear of the union army. now, pope's response to all of this, once he realizes what has happened, he turns his army away from the rappahannock river and starts, you can see the army is kind of sprawled across the landscape here, heading back after jackson. from this point, late on the night of august 26th, until well into the battle itself on august 29th and august 30th, pope really gives little bought tothe other half of the nfederate army under longstreet, which is following jacksonby about 18 hoursr 20 hours. aboutday and a half. pope focuses holy on jackson. his calculation is that he can beat jackson. we can back the whole crowd, he says, before longstreet gets

there. and so, he turns his attention and they sprawl across the landscape, then across the landscape, from route 29 down through 28, looking for thomas jonathan jackson. now, in doing this, we will see pope disregarded all of the possibilities that there might be -- some of you are with us last year. how many of? you quite a lot of you. the possibility of using -- we call them people run mountains here in virginia. they're not really mountains. but they are fairly substantial obstacles ops. using troops to block the gap and to exten the separation between lee and jackson as lee's march and with longstreet to join jackson --

pope never consider that idea. or at least, not for more than a few minutes. but mcdowell does. and on the morning of the 20th of august, 1862, mcdowell, on his own initiative, detach is a division of troops and sends them off to the gap. all day, one soldier wrote, or one of the staff officers wrote, mcdowell was in an exhilarated state of mind. very hopeful and confident. but savage as a meat axe. as one poor wisconsin private can testify, his head being half knocked out because he was -- that's light of him abusing that soldier -- to shoot mcdowell at the next opportunity -- of course, they would not. but what exhilarated him that august 28th day was the possibility of getting to the gap and blocking longstreet's

passage. but you know what? the yankees were too late and getting their. by the time the federal troops arrived at the gap, longstreet had already moved troops into the gap and through the cap. and while there was a battle at thoroughfare gap, which has been reported, too much drama by a lot of historians, and while men gave their lives there, in fact, the fighting there did nothing. it did not delay longstreet process towards the battlefield by one minute. longstreet intended to spend the night at the gap, or west of the gap. and the fighting there did not delay him. at all. so, the failed attempt to block their affair gap, which was entirely mcdowell's initiative, might have been his high point of the campaign. that is saying something. the failure was a high point for him.

camp yielded.who fought of t theyarch until the following morning join jaon t battlefield. meanwhileon the evening of 28th. some of mcdowell's been in jay jackson at the farm. the battle opens. jackson is trying to lure the federals into battle, does not overwhelm the federal troops at the farm. i would say really quite remarkable battle extending about half a mile or so that runs to a stalemate. stopped by gardens. there was another aspect to this battle, from jackson's standpoint. that was important. and that was, that by assailing this call him along the turnpike, and we're going to learn more about the farm on

sunday. jackson was sending a message to john pope, saying i am ready. here i am. come and get me. and john pope promptly did one of the worst things that you can do, any union commander in the civil war could do. and that was to do precisely what jackson and lee wanted him to do. he ordered his army to concentrate on the old battlefield. setting the stage for the fight on august 49th,1862. come through the gap on the morning, come to route 29 and come towards the battlefield. joining jackson's line by extending it, not simply reinforcing it, but extending

it. sohere, you've got jackson along the river here, longstreet extends that line down to the south by about a le and a half, wn beyond y wh is wellington road. was the actualsituation. this leads to one of the great mysteries of second manassas, and one of the great puzzles but urban mcdonald. on the morning of august 29th, 1862, john buford who had been operating with mcdonald for several days and had been shadowing longstreet's column since the 27th of august. so, two full days. reporting to mcdowell on long's mements. on the morning ofhe 29th, buford report id seeing 17 regiments of infantry and artillery, and five under cavalry passed through the gates. no, it was no leap for mcdowell

or buford to recognize that this was longstreet arriving at the battle. a rather important piece of information for jon pope to have, one might think, and yet for some reason that isn't explained it was ten hours before mcdowell relay that information to jon pope on the battd. andeanwhile, long streets men tookhat potion. they said well, if longstreet was going to arri, they believe he was going to support jason directly up here and not extend his line. pope believed he d th opportunity for a flank attack of his own on august 29th. and everhing that happened here, along the finied railroad on august 29th, happenedbecause pope, and it's a long story, we will make a very short, pope anticipated

something like this would happen. porter's man and mcdonald's men would launch this flank attack against jackson's position. but in fact, porter never went any farther than this. and could not have gone any farther than that. not solely, but certainly could have -- they created this impossible plan for themselves on august 29th, 1862. so, yet another key mistake and aspect in the bale. but the biggest ent involving mcdowell on the balefield itself comes on august 30th, 1862, on thefternoon of august 13th.

one of my disappointments about writing a book is that i had hoped that it would spur other people to do work. the only person who has, the only work that's really been done to follow up and improve on it is scott passions work. he will be with us on sunday, as well. his book on the fighting on the afternoon of august 30th, 1862, is excellent. if you want to know what happened on august 30th 1862, and it's detail, read scotts book. because he improves on mine in significant ways without question. but on august 30th, 1862, you see here, jackson's line. you see longstreet's line, extending south as was true in the last one. on the afternoon of august 30th, 1862, pope mounts a attack across these lines here that strikes th line, and is driven back. throughoutthe day, the

federals have been skirmish-ing alg here. although he was told several times that longstreet is out the, he doesn't accept that. even john reynolds who served in this campaign under mcdowell, mcdowell became so frustrated -- he became so frustrated that he wrote it from here, across the field, back here, back to -- right back here. and it's notable the pope almost never left his headquarters during battle. he probably had very little knowledge of the field itself. but here is something very curious that happens, when reynolds gets back. he hops down off his horse, he walks up to pope and mcdowell. and he says to general pope, general pope, the enemy is turning our left. he's talking about these people here. and pope says, i don't think so. or i think the exact quote is,

i guess not. reynolds gets a little exercise and says i just ran a gauntlet of fire and ran my course almost into the ground to get here to tell you that the enemy is starting your line. and pope at that point, now remember, reynolds had been serving where the mcclendon lines are. tremendous mistrust between maclean ill and pope. but also between pope and mcclendon. not without reason. that's in the book. and pope finally, after reynolds beseech's him, pope turns around and goes to the only officer in the army that pope himself had pointed to command. it is buford, you go out and see. he assembled his brigade down

here. but by the time he managed to do that, no it was too late. the confederates had attacked. now, getting back to porters attack hereas porters men fall back, and mcdowells on the ridge here. he has got reynolds coanng the division. he is out here, he hasn't nathaniel mcclain's men, who he has written about beautifully up here on the ridge. and tt'about it. and that moment, watching porters men fall bk, if there was ever any evidence that mcdowell didn't understand the tactical situation, he promptly, as porters men fall back here, mcdowell orders reynolds men off of the ground south of the turnpike to come up and support the retreating men. leaving, by 4:00 that afternoon, fewer federals in