john has recently retired from the national park service career, which began 40 years ago at the manassas national battlefield park. he became the chief history doyenne and one of the many project there was the publication of an exhaustive research and map study of the troop movements showing where each unit was engaged and moved

about the battlefield. during that three day battle, i well remember meeting up with john in the early eighties as i hiked around those 5000 acres, preserve battlefield land. it was always a joy finding him in the midst of his tour. holding forth on the history and stories along the unfinished railroad. we're up on chin ridge explaining the last stages of the battle before nightfall ceased, the hostilities. i never failed to stop and to listen. and most importantly, to learn. it was a sad day when john got transferred right up to frederick, down to fredericksburg and spotsylvania, national military park, where in time he became the chief historian of not one but three major battlefield. for 40 wonderful years, john has again and again proved himself to be a dedicated, historic in telling the history.

but equally important, telling the personal stories of the men who fought in the battles and the civilians who had to deal with the carnage and misfortunes of that conflict. his book returned to bull run, the campaign of second manassas was written in 1993, and it has become the best volume ever written on that campaign. since we are starting the second year of this two year study of that campaign, i urge you to pick up that book if you do not own it. john has also written scores of articles on the various aspects of the american civil war and many of his video presentations are available on the internet. he is not only a great writer, but a fearless one who charges into controversial subjects without hesitation or regret. and i much admire him for that quality. so many of you are aware this

conference has now completed a three year study on gettysburg and a two year study on the maryland campaign. and when i made the decision to do this two year study on the manassas campaign, i made certain that i would have john hennessy with us to lead that effort. we are blessed to have him here with us today and tomorrow and for the tour on sunday. and please give him a well warm welcome as he talks to us tonight about architects of defeat. pope and margaret mcdowell at second manassas. childs you're always very kind and i. every year that i speak with, every time i speak to you, i'm i'm reminded of our several meetings on the battlefield. always seems like it was on a beautiful morning and a

memorable part of my time there. it's good to be here. child said i was fearless. i am rather fearless, i think in giving a talk about john pope and irving mcdowell to open a conference, it's challenging topic for sure. not a lot of charisma involved in this topic. i will say. and but it's an important one and i'm glad to be here tonight. and i'll be here tomorrow. talk about the book return to bull run and what i think of it after 30 years of consideration of it. but let's start with a trivia question. what two u.s. army's had the shortest life span during the american civil war. the army of virginia. i heard that mcdowell's and mcdowell's army. uh, what does that imply about a

partnership between irvin mcdowell and john polk, commander of the army of virginia? we know about grant sherman. we know about leon jackson. we know about lee and longstreet. they're close, intuitive partnerships with historic consequences. but it may be that the most dependent partnership of the war was between two men. you eat, you all know individually. irvin mcdowell and john pope. but probably them never thought of as a pair they would largely shape the events that we're going to talk about this weekend. now, how is it why is it that you've never heard of this partnership or considered it to be a partnership? well, the answer to that is pretty simple because it failed. it led to disaster or we'll see

if we can get sides going her okay. let's start with this man, john pope john polk assumed command of what would be called the army of virginia. on june 26th, 1862, after the pieces and parts of that army had already been in the field for several months. his army, which was the combination of three departments, three commands, one commanded by nathaniel banks, would become the second corps. the first corps, ultimately commanded by franz sigel. both of them had largely operated in the shenandoah valley and the third corps, or excuse me, the first corps of the army would be the largest and most consequential in so many ways, commanded by irvin mcdowell, john hope came to this new command charged with

changing what lincoln and stanton and many republicans on capitol hill considered to be the two timorous military and political culture in virginia. john hope enthusiastically embraced the role of a disruptor. i don't know how many of you have worked in organizations that had disrupters, brought in. it's a stressful circumstance. even when successful. pope was a disruptor in abraham lincoln knew it. it was a conscious decision on his part. jacob cox, who would serve under polk, wrote of him as in 1861, said that his reputation in 1861 was that of an able and energetic man, vehement and positive in character, out to be choleric and even violent toward

those who displeased him. i remember well that i shrunk a little coming under his immediate orders through fear of some chafing. but no one, cox said, had any right to question pope zeal for the national cause. um, a staff officer, david hunter strother if you have never read his diaries, they're absolutely excellent. who served under pope, spent a fair amount of time with pope and profiled him really quite well. he is a bright, dashing man, self-confident and clear headed. he had a good memory. and ben had been a topographical engineer. i observed that he has wonderfully quick to seize all information that comes before him. he remembers it all at once and all of it once told what it is and always wants new details. as he is irascible and impulsive of in his judgments of men. but in pleasant moods, jolly humorous and clever in

conversation, strother also noted that pope was voracious for information about maps and virginia and this is important because i think we overlook a couple of things. first, john pope was in command of his army in virginia for just 25 days longer than lee had been in charge of his army in virginia. but there's a big difference, of course, lee was from virginia. pope had no knowledge of the ground on the ground, john polk would spend exactly 36 days in the field in virginia. never having been there before. and that would be a major factor in this campaign. speaking of his personality, our reporter and observer henry villard said he had two very market things. first, he talked too much of himself of what he could do and

what a budget, what ought to be done. and secondly, he indulged contrary to good discipline in all propriety and very free comments upon his superiors and fellow commanders. and one of the crimes that anybody in business makes is to as a superior, to criticize peers or subordinates that instantly robs you of credibility with the people who work under you. his role as a disrupter was based not just on his personality, though, and this is really important. we have tended to see pope through the lens of personality as much as even we see mcclellan through the lens of personality. but in pope's case, his role as a disrupter was also rooted in politics and policies and an army full of mostly conservative. and i mean politically conservative men as the armies

and armies of america invariably are he was a liberal. he favored emancipation, and he recognized as the army would have to have something to do with emancipation. it's notable, though, that while in command, this disruptor, john polk, never said a word publicly so far as i can tell about the institution of slavery or the ongoing debate about emancipation that summer of 1862, he may have been a disruptor, but not on that issue. but his real mark came in. his approach to war. he wielded performative prose in a harsh, uncommon way. in early july, he issued an inflammatory proclamation that disparaged the methods and mindset that had dominated in

virginia since the beginning of the war. it was a problem mason targeted directly, although not obvious solely to not explicitly be toward george brinton. mcclellan, who was in font everything in many ways that pope was not then at lincoln in stand's behest, the government's behest and consistent with policies being issued nationwide. at that time, pope issued a spate of orders that required southern men within union lines to take the oath of allegiance that removed guards from southern property, protecting southern property, and ordered his commanders to, quote, subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. now, polk went to pains to explain that these orders did not alter the process by which property would be taken from

southerners. it was still intended to be orderly. it was not intended to be a spate of pillaging, but it definitely expanded under the circumstances by which those things might happen. his officers reacted coolly to these orders. they immediately the removal of guards, especially the combination of removing guards and subsist off the country to enlisted men, was a signal here we go. for about three weeks, pope lost control of his army with respect to the forging and taking of property, goods and crops. and the piedmont of virginia officers decried this not because they had any particular sympathy for civilians. very few of soldiers in the army of virginia did. they decried it because it threatened the discipline of the

army itself. um, john pope spent 36 days in the field with his army. these orders as much as a defeat at manassas, would define him in the public and in histories. eyes for for the enlisted men they saw in pope a man of action and energy. our boys are growing enthusiastic at the prospect of a general who has a little life. one of them wrote, another man from the third wisconsin said polk presents a person, a persona quite in keeping with the characters character of his orders full of energy, self-assurance, audacity and pitch and the intent of this is a new word for your pitch in itiveness. he is firm, set a trifle below medium height skin skin brimful with his long black hair heavy worcester whiskers and mustache and all the gloss of good

condition covering the greater part of his full face. he fit in right to right in today, wouldn't he? in today's facial styles? um, as if to add to the or emphasize the reality that very few in the army actually saw pope prior to the second battle of manassas, there was one soldier who described him thus, the general, as dashing a dashing, stylish marat of a fellow. speaking of napoleon as subordinate commander and with halleck to do the planning and strategy. the army of virginia will make its mark. well, just to give you a sense of of there's there's marat. so there's evidence that this man never laid eyes on jo pope before writing that description of him. as i said, the removal of guard, the orders to subsist unleashed the army for a time and the not

entirely uncontrolled spate of foraging and even some pillaging across rapid hand at county, culpeper county and faulkner county. but it was a long enough period of time that a defined pope and earned him the ending and to this day enduring enmity of southerners and at the time also conservative in the north. now, on the historical spectrum of treatment of civilians in wartime, this was mild stuff. indeed, compared to what would what had preceded it in europe and elsewhere and what would follow it in later wars. but in the context of 1862 and then the cont text of pope's language and demeanor, it was all rather startling and offensive and has often been pointed out by many people. lee took note and seemed to

events toward pope, an animosity that he did not necessarily express toward other commanders. now, as i'm about to mention, for the third time, john pope was in the field with his army for 36 days, which means he didn't know much about rappahannock county or culpeper county or faulkner county or stafford county. he needed some help. and so he quickly turned to the man who knew that area, the man in command who knew that area better than anyone else. thisellow. irving mcdowell. there's two images of mcdowell, one of him with mcclellan taking and i beeve late 1861, and en a sgle portrait a little bit later. now, if hope was certainly the

a.e. mcclellan, but in 1862, almost everybody he was a.e. mcdowell. he was, as was often written, one of the most unpopular men in american. he commanded an army that had had a life span shorter than the army of virginia's would be 59 days versus the 70 plus days. pope salmi existed. he bore mcdowell did the on the present weight of defeat at manassas at first manassas four years with stoicism and endurance. john said. well, i you and an army artillery men encountered mcdowell in san francisco. in 1866 after the war, and he recorded that boys on the street as mcdowell passed, would shoot at him yelling, bull, run, bull run!

just to torment him. um, ted ball wrote of a despair ring clumsy man. citizens laugh at him all because he strains too hard to be popular. and while he makes one doubt for friend, he creates a dozen enemies. now, one virtue of mcdowell that's interesting is that he accepted a reduced command. in fact, name for me. and the only commander of what would be the army of the potomac that didn't serve in a reduced command after the removal from command, burnside did write. harker did. he served in the western theater as a corps commander, the only one who did not was george burnham mcclellan, which is interesting. now, despite the defeat at first, bull run mcdowell clung

to the greased pole command with dutifulevotion, a modest, impolitic demeanor. that wilngness to serve a reduced role, and maybe most importantly, the ardent support of treasury secretary simon be chase of of ohio i hope would call mcdowell an intensely loyal man. another man called him or wrote of him. he was full of energy and patriotism, outspoken and in his opinions. he was a good conversationalist, hated chit chat, though he loved to talk about fishing or trotting, as he called it. so he was apparently something of a fly fisherman john ted ball and others wrote of a particular trait of his ted balls said that he cultivated eating to a fine art. uh, jane, james harrison wilson

said of mcdowell that he was a gargantuan eater. he was a gourmet and could cook. he could prepare gourmet meals, apparently, but he abstained from almost every habit that might be considered sociable. he did not use tobacco. he did not use alcohol. he didn't even drink tea. pope called him the most temperate man in the army. indeed, intemperate, to the verge of intemperance. he said. now, as much as porter, sir, excuse me, as much as pope embraced performance art and performative language, mcdowell disdains, and it he railed against histrionics. a one man said he had no use for regimental bands and objected to the barrels of lager and other

cases of wines and liquors that found their way into the army. ted ball would write of him having ne of the vices of ordinary mortals and but few of their weaknesses is he imagined himself on a higher plane than they, and thus imagining thought of himself as ranking with the gods and assumed a dignity accordingly. future predent james garfield wrote of mcdowell. hes frank open, manly, severe and sincere here, which is kind of a great quote. i think now, like most officers in the regular army, mcdowell never declared his politics contrary to what some historians have have asserted recently, he was not a republican, is not known to have been a democrat, but he is known to have supported a conciliatory war, and he is known to have opposed fundamentally abolition as a war.

aim for the united states army's, but he, like many others, subdued his politics in the interest of maintaining his job and out of respect for the american tradition of separating civil. millett tary affairs his approach to the nature of war was virtually identical based on his letters, virtually identical to the policy espoused not by john pope, but by george mcclellan. he was, without question, a conservative. he matched mcclellan in his determination to protect the farm, arms, fences and other property of southerners, the orderly protection of property meant the maintenance of discipline within the army, but more importantly to mcdowell, preventing pillaging and

marauding, as he wrote, would foster kind feelings among southerners. and this is a bedrock of the conciliatory policies practiced by the union army and espoused by men like mcdowell and mcclellan. in 1862, he wrote mccartan mcdowell did i find out that am respected and've always been by my enemies? he told his wife. and th, of course, later in the war would become no virtue at all. uh, to be respected by your enemies, his solicitous toward southern civilians made many in his command question his loyalty. they even question this hap that he wore here. he somehow acquired what appears to have been a pith helmet of some sort, a very distinctive light colored hat that he wore throughout the campaign. and soldiers at the front, soldiers and in his command came

to believe ardently. so some of them, as we shall see, that the hat was, in fact a signal to the confederates who could see it that he was on the scene and all would be well for the confederates. now we laugh at this and it is funny, but there's no question that this current of belief that mcdowall was a disloyal man ran deep in his command. and we'll talk a little bit about that later. he was deeply unpopular with the enlisted men in june of 1862, near manassas, junction, he was thrown from his horse and seriously injured. in fact, there were reports he might die from that injury. he did not, of course, but he was seriously injured. and the next day, a soldier in the 13th massachusetts road

home. in a letter he said, mcdowell was thrown from his horse yesterday in an injured but did not seem to get much sympathy. i heard one person propose three cheers for the horse that threw him. he was as, uh, corresponding journalists. george. alfred, tell townsend said the most unpopped beulah man in america in 1862. but there were good reasons for a pope to lean on him. he was one of only a handful of american officers who had commanded an army in the field and in some respects had done reasonably well at first. manassas, more than that, he had commanded either an army or a department. and in a department that was quite active in the field for more than a year, continuously since may 27th, 1861, and much

of his duty had called him to the virginia piedmont and the edges of the tidewater from fredericksburg to warrenton to the blue ridge, and eventually to culpeper. mcdowall's men operated throughout the spring and the summer of 1862, so mcdowall knew these roads. he knew these towns, knew these people who lived here better than anybody else of similar rank in the northern army. john polk there was another reason that pope chose to lean on mcdowell besides his experience, besides his knowledge of the landscape here. and that is that pope liked him, oddly enough, though, he conceded that mcdowell lacked that intangible thing called deportment in other words, charisma.

he called him one of the most loyal men on earth in all matters, a generous man, pope said of mcdowell. he is an accomplished soldier for the book knowledge of the science of war and full of energy and zeal. i have never known a man in whom the obligation of duty dominated to such a degree as irvin mcdowell and fitch. john porter, who of course, would run a foul of both pope and mcdowe during this campaign and wrote what is not an entirely unfair assessment of the two of them, though subordinates of pope mcdowell asserted his power and pope acknowledged it by ever consulting with him, deferring to him, accepting his opinion even to the extent of not acting until he heard of heard from mcdowell in sometimes changing his orders when made. if mcdowell advised him to pope general, he got all wrong when he was not in communication with mcdowell and his order, so that

he was ill at sea without mcdowell in short, mcdowell was the real power of this campaign. i that's a bit of an overstatement. john pope was clearly had control of and sufficiently to determine the outcome of the campaign as we shall see. but it was a close relationship and one that mcdowell was an active participant in. this is, if you i saw this not for the detail, but just for moste geometry. if you look, you can see here the outlines of jackson'ank marks tha'reoing to talk about the raft, indian river, the rappahannock river, the retreat from t rappahannock back by the union soldiers. so what was john pope's job in 1862? i'm sorry, john pope's job, his dominant his first task in 1862

was to see to the unification the juncture of his army, the army of virginia, with mcclellan's army, the army of the potomac, returning then from the peninsula. and the deeper in virginia that that happened, the better was for the union cause. but his first task was to see to the junction of those two armies. halleck warned him, henry halleck, who was the new general in chief, who was an abject failure in that role. we could actually include him as one of the architects here, but nobody likes to hear about henry halleck. halleck warned polk, don't let the enemy separate you from alexandria. and of course, polk would fail in that mandate as well. of all the steps of all the acts

that led to pope's defeat at second manassas, mcdowell was party to almost all of them in some way, shape or form, and he is active by any attempted to rectify really only one of them, so far as we know now early in the campaign as the army sparred along the rapidan first and then the rappahannock river, john pope and irvin mcdowell and notably john pope himself performed reasonably well, frustratingly along the rivers, withdrawing back across there are the rappahannock on the 18th are beginning that process on the 18th of august, on the morning of the 18th of august, colonel thorton brodhead, a man who will show up here in a little bit, commander of the first michigan cavalry with lead arrayed across the rapidan river and would nearly capture james stewart. that's what is famous for the

rates of dyersville nearly captured jeb stuart and did captured jeb stuart's hat. how about that? but what really mattered about the whole thing is that broadhead command capture and the orders, stewart's orders for the campaign and pope realize that lee intended to go after him the following day. and so very quickly, pope ordered a retreat back to the rappahannock river through culpeper county from raccoon ford on the rapidan and a summary of ford on the ramp and back to rappahannock station, kelly's ford and beverly's ford ford, mccloud excuse me, mcdowell was integral to that. there's a great story of mcdowell i had probably a crossing of great run just east or mountain run. excuse me, just east of culpeper mcdowell during the night it was raining and a poncho on during the night he positions himself

in the middle of the stream as the wagons are streaming by and he does a patton thing. he's got a whip. he whips almost every team of mules that goes by, keeps things moving, is hollering, yelling until he comes. one teamster comes along, doesn't know who this guy yelling at him is, objects to him throwing his or using his whip on his his his mules and starts yelling at mcdowell. in fact, he got so mad. the more you yell, he finally just jumped down off his wagon and started across to confront mcdowell directly, not knowing who he was. mcdowell at that point kind of unbuttoned his his poncho, revealing the buttons of a major general and the insignia and all that, and as one witness wrote, it was amusing to see the the wagoner's face. i don't think it took him 10 seconds, surmount his mule and out of there as fast as he could. perhaps retreat to the

rappahannock. or you can see the rappahannock on the lower part of this this image here wasise and consistent with his orders to everything necessary to join withhe army, the potac deeper and virginia better, but giving up ground at this point didn't really matter that much to the situation. and for five days excuse me, five days alon rappahannock river, pope parried lee and jackson until august 25th, when things started to unravel. on august 25th, jackson became began his famous flank march around john polk. and it is at this time, as the pressure is rising, as the stress is rising, adding in. imagine, if you will, the stresses involved. many of you probably managed

organizations in your career. you haven't probably done so with the eyes of the world upon you or the nation upon you. and you haven't. most of us never managed anything where someone else is out there actively trying to foil what you're trying to do. and you're also not doing it after only being with your command for a matter of weeks. engineering, managing yourself through a national crisis. in fact, on august 25th, within hours of jackson's march starting, john pope learned about it. but then he did something that he would repeat several times over the next couple of days. you know, people who get information and they will assess it realistically. they'll stand back and they'll say, okay, this could mean this is me now. i think this is what it's going to be. and then you also know people i had a daughter like this still

have a daughter like this who gets information and interprets it, interprets it in a way that most comports with what she hopes is about to happen happen. john pope, repeatedly over these five next days, in august of 1862, would interpret information in a way consistent with his hopes rather than the reality of the moment. the first word is that jackson might be marching toward the shenandoah valley. that's fine with john pope. not a problem. the next day, he dispatches mcdowell with virtually the entire army under his command back to the river at the park yourself for springs in orders mcdowell to figure out what's going on on the other side of the river, mcdowell writes back mid-day what the enemy's

purposes not easy to discover and of course, lee is doing all that he can to conceal his purpose. uh, somebody suggested to mcdowell. well maybe they're going to the valley. or maybe. they're flanking us, going to the rear of our army. mcdowell considered the ideas, but said either of these operations seems to me too hazardous for lee to undertake with us in his rear and his flank. and so on august 25th, an august 26th, pope's army remains concentrated around warrenton, between warrenton and the rappahannock river. by the evening of august 26th, 1862, jackson is at bristow station along the railroad and junction in the rear of the union army.

um, now the pope's response to all this, once he realizes what is happens, he turns his army away from the rappahannock river and starts. you can see the trees kind of sprawled across the landscape here, heading back after jackson from this point on. i got laid on the night of august 26th until well into the battle itself on august 29th and august 30th, pope really gives little thought to the other half of the confederate army under longstreet, which is following jackson'mn by about 18 hours o20 hours or so, about a day and a half. pope foces wholly on jackson. his calcn is thahe can beat jackson. we can bag the whole crowd, he said before a longstreet gets there.

and so he his attention and they brawl across the landscape, fan across the landscape from route 29 down to route 28, looking for thomas, jonathan jackson now doing this. you see thoroughfare gap right pope disregarded all of the possibilities that there might be some of you were at thoroughfare gap with us last year. how many of you were with us on the trip last year? quite a lot of you. the possibility of using we're calling the bull run mountains here in virginia, they're not really mountains, but they are fairly substantial obstacles to two troops using troops to block the gap and to extend the separation between lee and jackson. as lee is marching in and with longstreet t jacon, polk never considers that idea right?

at least not for more than a few. but mcdowell does. and on the morning of the 28th of august, 1862, mcdowell on his own initiative, detaches a division troops and sends them off to thoroughfare gap. all day, one soldier wrote, or one of his staff officers wrote, mcdowell was in an excited and exhilarated state of mind, very hopeful and confident. but savage. just a meat ax as one poor wisconsin private can testify to his head being half knocked out because he strangled that side of him, abusing that soldier and cited threats from the rank and file to shoot mcdowell at the next opportunity. of course they would not. but what exhilarated him that august 28th day was the possibility of getting to the gap and blocking longstreet's passage. but you know what?

the yankees were too late in getting there by the time the federal troops arrived at the gap, longstreet had already moved troops into the gap. and through the gap. and while there was a battle at thoroughfare gap, which has been accorded too much drama by a lot of historians, and while men gave their lives, their it in fact, the fighting there did nothing. it did not longstreet's progress toward the battlefield by one minute. longstreet did it to spend the night at the gap, west of the gap and the fighting there did not delay him at all. so the failed attempt to block thoroughfare gap, which entirely mcdowell's initiative might have been his high point of the campaign. so which is saying something the failure was a high point for him, but ricketts men who fought at the gap yielded longstreet

would march through the following morning to join jackson on the battlefield meanwhile, of coun th dowell's men engaged jackson of at the bronner far bate opens at jackson, trying to lure the federals into battle. he does not overwhelm. the federal troops at the bronner farm. it's a really quiet, remarkable battle. standing about a half a mile or so that runs to a stalemate. stopped by darkness. but there was another aspect to this battle from jackson's standpoint. that was important. and that is that by sailing this column along the warrenton turnpike and we're going to go we'll go to the bronner farm and sunday, jackson was really

sending a message to john pope saying, i'm ready, here i am, come and get me and john paul promptly did one of the worst things that you could do any commander in the civil war could do, and that was to do precise basically what jackson and lee wanted them to do. he ordered his army to concentrate it on the old bull run battlefield, setting the stage for the fighting. on august 29th, 1862. now, of course, longstreet would come through the gap here on the morning, come to ute 29, and then head toward the battlefield out here, joining jackson's line by extending it not simply reaching it, forcing it, but extending it. so here you got jackson along the unfinished river.

and up here, longstreet extending that line down to the south by about a mile. and a half down beyond what is today. wellington road, that was the w, one of this leads to one of the great mys of settlement and one of the great puzzles about urban mcdowell, because the morning of august 29th, 1862, john bufd, who had been operating with mcdowell for several days and who had been shadowing longstreet's column since the 27th of august. so twofold day's reporting to mcdowell on longstreet its movements on the morning of the 29th, buford reported seeing 17 ments of infantry, a battery ofrtillery and 500 cavalry pahrou gaines film. now, it was leap forcdowell or buford to recognize that this was longstreet arriving on the

battlefield a rather important piece of information for john polk to have perhaps one might think, and yet for some reason, an unexplained. it was 10 hours before mcdowell relayed that information to john pope on the battlefield. and meanwhile, longstreet's men took this position by what polk believed was, well, if street was going to arrive, belied he was going to support jackson directly up here and tendise. so polk believed he had the opportunity for a flank attack of hisn aust 29th and everything that happened here along the unfinishedoad on august 29th happenedecau pope and it's a long story. it won't make a very shor nsivpatent. something like this would happen

that porter's men and mcdowell's men would launch this flank attack against jackson's position. t in fact, porter never went rthen th and could not have gone any farther than that. and so this piece of information, not solely, but could of helped inform pope to avoid the mis assumption that created this impact possible plan for himself on august 29th, 1862. um, so yet another key mistake aspect of the battle, but the biggest event involving mcdowell on the battlefield itself excuse me, comes on august 30th, 1862. on the afternoon of august 30th, 1862. now. one of my disappointments about

writing a bo is that i ha hoped that it would spur other people to do work. and the only person who has and the only work that's really been done to follow up and improve on it is scott's work, scott patterson's work, and he's going to be with us on sunday as well. his book on the fighting on the afternoon of august 30th, 1862, is excellent. he if you want to know what happened on august 30th, 1862, and it's detail read scott's book because he improves on mine and significant ways without question. but on august 30th, 1862, you see here jackson's line, you see longstreet's line extending south as was true in the last one on the afternoon of august 30th, 1862, pope mounts a large attack right across these fields here that strikes the right of jackson's line and is driven back throughout the day, the federals have been skirmhing with longseeout here, but

and although mcdowell is told several tis that, well, longstreet's out there, he doesn't accept that, uh, even john reynolds, who served in this campaign under mcdowell, mcdowell became so frustrated at one pot. excuse me, reynolds, so frustrated at one point that he rode from here across the fields, back here, back to pope's headquarters, right back here. and it's notable that pope almost never left his headquarters during the battle. he probably very little knowledge of the field itself. but here, something very curious happened when reynolds gets back, he hops down off his horse. he walks up to pope and mcdowell and he says to nick to to general polk. general pope, the enemy is turning our left. he's talking about these people down here in polk, says, hmm, i don't think so. or i think the exact quote is, i guess not.

and reynolds gets a little exercise wise and says, i just ran a gantlet of fire and ran my horse almost into the ground to get here to tell you that the enemy is turning your life. and pope at that point. now, remember, reynolds had been serving with mcclellan's army tremendous mistrust between mcclellan and pope and rather. well, yes, between mcclellan and pope, but also between pope and mcclellan and not without reason. but that's in the book. and pope, finally, after reynolds, beseeches him, pope turns around and goes to the only officer in the army. the pope had appointed to command. and that was john buford. and he says, buford, you go out and see if the enemy's or left. and so buford assembled his brigade and headed out into the roads down here. but by the time he managed to do

that, it was too late. the confederates would attack. now, getting back supporters attack here. the big one. as porters men fall back. mcdowell is on chin ridge here. he's got reynolds command out reynolds division is out here. he's got nathaniel mclain's men, which scott will talk about and has written about autifully u here on chin ridge. and that's about it. and at thamoment, watching porter's men fall back and if there was ev a evidence tha didn't understand the tactical situation, he promptly a porter's men fall back here, mcdowell orders reynolds men off of ten off of the ground south of the turnpike to come up here and support porter's retreating men leaving by 4:00. that fewer federals in front of longstreet than in any other point in the battle.

it was, i think, without question, one of the most important, most significant tactical mistakes ever made by a corps commander on a civil war battlefield. certainly in virginia, and shortly thereafter, longstreet's men, as scott described in his book, and he will describe on the tour on sunday, are forward across this landscape and come very close to destroying pope's. they don't succeed in the end. they defeat it, but they don't destroy it. um, and credit to that in part goes to mcclellan excuse me, mcdowell and john polk, who work hard that afternoon to assemble a new line of defense back here along henry hill, which ultimately holds, at the end of the day. mcdowell's reputation is

destroyed by the events on this battlefield without question. one soldier wrote of mcdowell using the term the hat, speaking of his pith helmet, which became so famous, he said wherever it went, appeared on the front. it was a signal to the enemy to cease firing and reserve their ammunition for more on a more opportune moment on august 30th, wherever the hand appeared, defeat and disaster followed in quick succession. but the most -- indictment, all of irvin mcdowell, came from this man who met a little bit earlier. thornton had the colonel of the fit michigan cavalry. he was mortally wounded in fighting on the afternoon of august 30th, 1862, he would linger for some time long enough to write a farewell, last letter. and in that letter he chose to

say goodbye to his wife and his family. but most of the letter was devoted to an indictment of irvin mcdowell. i am passing now from earth, he wrote to his family, but i send you love from my dying house. i have fought manfully and now die fearlessly. i am one of the victims of popes, imbecility and mcdowall's treason. tell the president would you save the country? he must not give our hallowed flag to such hands. but the old flag will triumph. yet i had hoped to live longer. but i die amidst the ring and clanger of battle as i could wish farewell to you and the noble officers of my i can find my wife, my children. now, that's a dramatic letter which very quickly found its way into newspapers and even there was a song written about it that's sheet music about a

bright heads last letter. and when that appeared on the newspaper, mcdowell felt forced with this assault on his loyalty, accusing him of treason. he felt compelled to call for a court of inquiry to investigate the charges and ultimately examine or rate him. in fact, he was exonerated there was no evidence that he was ever disloyal, but the court of inquiry itself, which is a gold mine of information about this campaign, about irvin mcdowell, about conciliator or a war and changing war policies, bringing up all these things in public and having them published in the newspaper every day for two months, starting in november. absolutely destroyed any shred of reputation that mcdowell had in the eastern theater.

washington roebling gave a great final assessment, fair assessment of mcdowell during the second manassas campaign. mcdowell's a brave and courageous man who don't hesitate a moment to expose himself when necessary. and i followed him closely. it is true there is something wrong about mcdowell, but he is a jewel compared with the commander pope who was never to be found when wanted and men noticed. this pope was if if we get a chance, we'll drive by there and show you buckle. buckle is to hell, but it's in a hollow and i can only find evidence that maybe twice a pope emerged beyond the nearby bridges to see the battlefield in front of him. pope was never to be found when wanted in the not even expose himself enough to get a general view of the battleground and to see how affairs went on. mcdowell, in many places acted for him, uh, there is no denying

though that the civil war rarely, if ever, experience as consequential a partner ship as john pope and irvin mcdowell. uh, and for that, unfortunately, the army of virginia and the nation paid dearly. i'm glad to answer any questions that you might have. that eric is the dapper looking eric tonight got questions. john, so much of this comment i visited mcdowell's grave at the presidio several years ago and the ultimate insult is his name is misspelled on his on his headstone instead of it being spelled i r v i n. like it's supposed to be. it's air w i and it's the ultimate insult well, and if you google him, you if you really want to get all the references online, you get about 50%

spelled correctly and about 50% spelled with irwin. absolutely right. so the other questions. well, i'll see you tomorrow then. thank you so much.