before i, our next speaker, i

wanted to mention that i did live in chattanooga for about eight years and. for a while there i was a member of the friends of the chickamauga and chattanooga national military and my job on that committee was to say, i agree, with everything that jim says. jim james, a ogden staff historian, chickamauga in chattanooga military park, he speaks regularly on aspects of the civil war to historical associations across the eastern half of the united states, including the civil roundtables new york, new york, chicago. minneapolis. atlanta. birmingham. new orleans and austin. you've got a big territory there, jim. jim has published number of short articles and several publications that has appeared on greystones communications and entertainment network. civil war journal. the history channel.

civil war. combat. pbs's history detectives and c-span. he has earned numerous awards in recognition of his contributions to civil war history and preservation. let's give jim a warm welcome. so thank you, jerry and and thank you all for for being here today. for those of you all who are long time regular attenders of this seminar and, who help to want to direct subjects. over the years. i appreciate your coming up with today's or this weekend's subject and and being able to be here today to want to speak with you. on the evening of november. the 25th, 1863, just a couple of hours after dark.

and while in many ways, the battle of missionary ridge was still going on. ulysses grant, the commander of the military division of the mississippi, telegraphed his boss. and in washington, dc, henry halleck. although the battle lasted from early dawn until dark this evening, i believe i am not premature in announcing a complete victory over bragg lookout top all the rifle in chattanooga valley and and missionary ridge and tire have been carried and now by us. i have no idea of finding bragg here tomorrow. the next morning, the assistant secretary war. charles, dana, who was was present in chattanooga at the direction of of stanton, tho secretary war and was essentially there as a spy in

the field had first been sent to spy on grant the mississippi river valley in the summer and, then sent to spy on rosecrans in late summer. and now he's back with grant and is and is at chattanooga the the. he was a newspaperman and and recognized by many for exactly what he in fact one of the army of the cumberland's corps commanders, gordon granger will describe him as the despicable pimp. however dana on the morning of the the 26th of november, before out with union forces in pursuit of bragg telegraph to come to stanton, prisoners taken yesterday report this morning at 3500 but probably not over 3000 with 52 cannon 5000 stands a small arms ten flags. among the prisoners large proportion of officers colonels

down the of the ridge by our was one of the greatest miracles in military history. no man who climbs the ascent by any of the roads that along its front can believe that 18,000 men were moved. it's broken and crumbling face. and last it was his fortune to witness the deed. it seems as awful as a visible interposition of god that same 26, the fourth thursday of november, halleck acknowledged grant's telegram of the evening before i congratulate you you and your army on the victory at chattanooga and this is truly a day of thanks giving that thanksgiving night the end of the 26th and just after.

the 27th of november had begun. grant telegraph halleck again. i am just in from the front. the root of the is most complete abandon wagons, caissons, occasional pieces, artillery are everywhere to be found. i think bragg's loss will fully reach 60 pieces of artillery. a large number of prisoners fallen into our hands. the pursuit will continue to red clay in the morning. for which place i shall start in a few hours. and on the eighth he summed up the last several days operations the pursuit of the enemy beyond. ringgold shows their great defeat demoralization. prisoners must amount to 6000 or more. over 40 pieces of artillery have fallen. our hands. the roads everywhere are strewn with wagons. caisson, small arms and ammunition. the troops are now on their way

to the relief of burnside. granger goes to knoxville or until he knows long street has left east tennessee. sherman goes to the high cross and will be sent further if it becomes necessary over the next few days. many of the spoils, many of the proofs of this stunt in union victory at chattanooga would be arrayed as trophies in front of army headquarters. chattanooga in particular, apiece at the richardson house where george had the headquarters of the of the cumberland along walnut street and the 300 block. the and just two blocks from grant's headquarters and this long row of of more than than 30 cannon, 99 of which were the

state of the art artillery piece of the civil war period, £12 napoleon, all 19 of those being prado six of confederate cannon foundries, became quite a a scene for four participants. and the newspaper correspondent theodore davis, who was in chattanooga at the time, produced a version of that scene for harper's weekly to communicate the complete victory that grant had reported it to halleck, to the people of the united. and davis in the caption to come to, this image will write that each numbers of the soldiers and officers may be seen gathered about the spot and if space could be given their stories, the manner in which each battery or gun was taken would be of exceeding interest to their many who are readers. this weekly.

it had indeed been an impressive scene on that wednesday afternoon, november the 25th, when from his command post on arise and chattanooga valley orchard knob, ulysses s grant had sent george thomas's army of the cumberland forward in a demonstration. grant's word of the week because so often his of that week would be prefaced as a demonstration. but he had sent george thomas's army of the cumberland forward in a demonstration against the confederate positions along missionary ridge, a to the east of orchard knob. the army. the cumberland, has four divisions to each of gordon granger's fourth corps and john palmer. 14th corps had moved forward in multiple lines. 20,000 men strong and had captured the rifle pits.

the base of missionary ridge that grant had originally intended, but then not knowing any better, not knowing the limited extent that grant had intended for attack, had charged on up the side of missionary ridge and as and charge up that that steep that dana had described as the broken broken and come crumbling face of missionary ridge and had broken the confederate lines on top and captured several thousand confederate soldiers and those more than 30 artillery pieces that would be captured just on the ridge itself. it was indeed to observers at at fort wood and at orchard knob and at other points in chattanooga valley, a deed that might rightly fit that

description that that dana gave as and a visible interposition of god. the in franks talk last night we heard about the appearance of the aurora or aurora borealis on the night of december the. 1862 at at fredericksburg and being read by the confederates as a sign of providence and and here dana is is invoking some of those same thoughts and ideas similar to one to confederate great view of the eclipse of the moon occurred on the night of the 24th and the early morning hours of the 25th as being a a bad omen. too often, i think, as we write and read history of our civil war, we we don't remember to read into that history enough any longer.

the religious aspects of that that era, the course, the the battle of missionary ridge is just one of the several battles. in november of 1863, the battles for chattanooga as they are are largely known collectively. the battle of missionary ridge being the the closing or final battle of any size in that six month struggle for of chattanooga. the the gateway the deep south and as i suggested a minute ago by by talking about grant's word the week of demonstration and the end. grant's going to win the battle for chattanooga in november of 1863, almost back from what he had originally. now on, your handout. you've got a copy of this map as well.

and and grant as, he had planned the operations around chattanooga having arrived in the city on october the 23rd. and and then ordered the implementation of a plan to open a new supply line to chattanooga. what would become known as the cracker line. and so as to not to steal any thunder from from next. if you want to know more about about brown's fairy wall hatching and the cracker line, come back next year, because i see that you have a speaker on that subject next year. so so maybe that'll get you a couple of participants there. there's but but the grant after getting that new supply line open wanted to take the

offensive as quickly as possible. he had however had had to wait until the arrival of troops under william tecumseh sherman from here, from what had been grant's own army, the army of the tennessee, some of the same troops that we we heard talked about earlier today and the the the talk on the battle of atlanta in 1864. he had to await arrival of of those troops and and the plan that that grant designed was that as sherman's man march into the immediate chattanooga area from the west, what would essentially be lower left hand corner of of this map. they would move through lookout valley on the west side of lookout mountain, cross the pontoon bridge, browns ferry, and then go into hiding in the hills of stringer's ridge and on

order move over to the banks of the tennessee river opposite the mouth of south chickamauga creek, kind of near the upper right of the the map where you see. sherman marked on the map and there cross the the tennessee river and then turn southward attack the confederate right flank. now at the time that grant develops this plan and and sherman learns of it, when when he arrived for a reconnaissance in mid-november, the confederate right flank was located. where? on the map. if you see here on the map, you see blue block for absalom baird's division and a red block for benjamin franklin, chatham's division. if you look right there, you'll see the symbol on the map for for confederate earthworks or field fortifications. and at the time that grant

developed his plan, that was the right flank, the the confederate. and that's what he envisioned that sherman would would attack grant's for sherman to do this all associated with with grant's concern for the state of the small force under ambrose burnside, who had occupied knoxville back early september and, who by by no or mid-november was being threatened by a confederate force under james longstreet that bragg had detached from chattanooga and sent northeastward to, want to recapture knoxville. and so grant knowing that abraham lincoln was very concerned about retaining control of of east tennessee as part of lincoln's desire to possess of a seceded state, to

come to legitimately reestablish a loyal government grant, want it to be able to as quickly possible, open a way for a relief force to be sent to one to knoxville to ensure that burnside was able to hold to to knoxville. and so grant's main effort be an attack with troops from left sherman's man across the tennessee river and against the the confederate right, the however sherman's march to chattanooga the and the whole move of any of the army of the tennessee from the vicksburg, mississippi area to. chattanooga was delayed by by something that we're hearing about in news right now. and that is a drought caused low water condition on the mississippi river.

it took longer for grant and then to move these troops from, the vicksburg area, to memphis and and part because the water that is where they have to start their trip to chattanooga on foot. it's a long way from memphis to chattanooga on foot and particularly it rains 99 of the 53 days during which they are making that that march. but as a result of some of sherman's the delay in sherman's advance grant has to postpone his his attack until such time that that sherman's men do in the but by the third week of of november sherman's troops are arrive and grant will will get ready want to launch his

offensive to drive confederates away from chattanooga and to be able to send that relief force to knoxville. but for all that grant and thomas and hooker and more important lee their men did the men of the army of the cumberland and a division of the 12th corps. the army of the potomac and a division of the 15th corps of the army of tennessee. for all that those men had had done and not taking away anything at from the deeds that those men had performed on the slopes of lookout mountain. and then ridge or, even the the efforts of the man that sherman had had used against the confederate right flank, repositioned right flank in the end, it is not really so much a union victory at at chattanooga

as a stunning confederate defeat largely because of the that braxton bragg had not done. and in in perdue in being able successfully defend the the city of chattanooga. now i could be mistaken but this could be a meeting of the old chattanooga civil war roundtable because apparently the bylaws of that organization require that every meeting have at least one obligatory a swipe at braxton bragg and i believe we've already had three at least two or three and and this program and and bragg wasn't even really the subject of those talks bragg of course is a an easy character

to to denigrate and but certainly in this fall of 1863, some his his shortcomings really significant factors in the story of what happens and doesn't happen here in chattanooga in november of 1863. and in particular on the on on and along missionary ridge of course what i'm really referring to here is something that we could do an entire suppose idiom on and that the command situation within, the confederate army of tennessee, the dissension between braxton bragg and the his senior subordinates, the host and almost ever cast of characters that were his his senior subordinates and. of course that cast of characters includes a man who comes in the midst of the chattanooga operations that that

jeffry wert has written on. james longstreet. the that dissension and bragg's desire to want to try to to win the the battle over his enemy and gray his recalcitrant subordinates. well will put the army into a very sad state, so much so that by early president davis is omnibus man is within with the army colonel. james chestnut, the husband mary chestnut chestnut will write to jefferson davis that he needs to come to chattanooga, try to resolve this worsening between bragg and, his senior subordinates, and davis. indeed, make the visit he spent october from the evening of october the ninth to the morning of october the 14th with the army of tennessee. spent much of that time at

bragg's headquarters on missionary reviewed the army went to the top of lookout mountain and took the view the the union army cooped up in chattanooga was given a tour of the army of tennessee battleground victory at at chickamauga but when when davis left on october the 14th this command situation was really in no better than it than it had been before davis visit the that the as a result of that visit there are some plans laid with between davis and brag about courses of action and and bragg will implement those the loss lookout valley to the federals in late october and in the the

federal seizure of brown's ferry and while hatching that peter cousins will speak about next year here and in early november bragg sent james longstreet off to war to try to recapture knoxville, eventually detaching from his army. chattanooga, 23,000 soldiers, others for long streets effort against knoxville at the same that sherman is doing what with for of the army of tennessee marching towards chattanooga. and so as as as the union army is getting stronger. bragg's army gets weaker. and this command dissension is going to manifest itself in some other ways as well. if you read much army of tennessee, particularly under braxton bragg, you'll know that one thing that braxton bragg liked to do with his army was reorganize it.

and on november the 12th, he reorganized the army yet again. and said and this is a cynic eloquent reorganization shifting not just divisions from one corps to another, but in this reorganization he broke up divisions and distribute it brigades to one to other division command hours and and even broke up some brigades and created new brigade aides. the it is one of the most extensive reorganizations of the army of tennessee even for braxton bragg, who in the 14 day time period that ends with september 20th, 1863. what you'll recognize as the final day of the battle of chickamauga there had been 11 different organizations in that 14 day time period.

but this is a very significant one. the reorg is usually seen as an effort by braxton bragg to break up the anti bragg within the the army. the divisions on land in particular by benjamin franklin cheatham largely tennessee formation and the division led by the former united states vice president john kable breckinridge, but my colleague at chickamauga, chattanooga national military park, lee white, some of you all know, lee postulates a another interesting observation. it's not so much look at the the anti bragg division that bragg broke up, but look at braxton bragg succeeding each division in, the army with at least one non-pro bragg brigade aid, as if he was hoping that the pro bragg

sent of that brigade would somehow the the other brigades that that division. but it is a significant reorganize zation and along with that is going to come to calm many of the of the other that that you might the army going to at this time lined up with two corps commanders william joseph hardy will back to the army at tennessee having been in mississippi since july and he will have have one corps commanded or four divisions and. john kable breckinridge, who bragg recognize rises as a not on his his side will have temporarily command of the other corps because. bragg is expected getting this

other corps of his army to go to. we saw him earlier today john bel hood who is recuperating from the amputation of arm of his on his right leg, is hoping that john bel hood will will soon recover and be in the field. the and in addition to the overall reorganization, if you just look at the they are the divisions on the battlefield and this very graphic here of the seven divisions of infantry of the army of tennessee and in november at the time of the battle or at the time of the fighting on missionary ridge, on november the 25th, they're listed here from north south. and so clyburn's division is on the confederate right on november the 25th, and stewart's

division is on the on the confederate left. the the two corps commanders do not even command their own table of organization divisions, all in one sector. in fact, if noticed on the the previous william joseph hardy is initially commanding left of the line a mixture of his own divisions and some of breckinridge is. and so bragg's reorganized nation is a a scientific factor and it really did nothing to want to solve any of that command dissension and that command dissension is resulting in officers doing less towards the the care of their man as every day. in fact, if you'll notice this graphic, several of other divisions are listed with to

commanders names. william henry talbot shot pouch walker who we heard of earlier today. walker takes leave on the 12th. the same of the reorganization. and he is in his hometown of, augusta. by august the 13th. and the senior brigade commander within that division states rights guest takes command of the division cheatham is on on furlough or as well largely because of the deteriorating condition of the relationship with bragg and the senior brigade commander john k jackson commands the division. now you notice i have jackson in parentheses there and that's because on the night of november the 24th, cheatham actually returns and will command the division on missionary ridge on.

november the 25th, thomas carmichael heinemann is one of the three officers bragg had placed in arrest in the immediate aftermath of the battle of chickamauga and heinemann is not present with the the army in november and. james patton anderson, one of the senior brigade commander in the division, is commanding the division and breckinridge acting as corps. the senior brigade commander and breckinridge is division william b bate takes takes command. so who you work for? who do you speak to? and in trying to conduct operations on the on the field. maybe i should have set this up as a test and then you all could all be members of of staff to try to communicate in the in the face of this federal advance and one actually bragg was in the

process of sending off two more divisions. james longstreet, when began his operations in november. and as you note at the simon bolivar buckner division, then temporarily under the command of brigadier general bush, rod ross, that division actually will largely be be sent to long straight to operate against burnside and patrick claiborne division was the other one that was tapped to go knoxville, but it will be recalled just in in time. but but what it is real what really is important about what bragg had not was that he had not darvel kept a true defensive position along missionary ridge. now you might notice that i've been using word a long missionary ridge, because

initially when bragg came up from the chickamauga battlefield in late september and found the union army fortifying itself in the one square mile zone and, the band of the tennessee river there, where on the map you can see the the union fortifications right around. the city of chattanooga, bragg, had deployed army along the western base of missionary ridge, not on missionary ridge itself, along the western base of the ridge, and then across the valley between ridge and lookout mountain and over the northern tip of mountain. and so bragg's siege of chattanooga was not a true encirclement, but it was more strangulation. and he was hoping to to choke the union army into submission. but time was not on. bragg side. union reinforcements are on their way, but the confederate position along missionary ridge

from late september through november or through october into november, was a line of rifle pits that had been developed on a low rise ground at the western base of missionary ridge and a couple of hundred yards out from the west, the western base of the ridge, or at least where ridge begins to get really steep and and rise up. now, this the middle period of the war where field fortifications are beginning to really be developed and used by by the the the armies, most specifically by the soldiers themselves. the rise of field fortifications and in the the war. and eventually, to the extent what you see here on the grounds pamplin historical park that is that really starts from the soldier and works up and as codified the armies themselves in 1864 when the armies began to

actually provide tools for the soldiers to build true field fortification. so the line of rifle pits bragg initially constructs is actually limited and and they are variously described as rifle breast works trenches but also frequently ditches all of these phrases really suggest the kind of limited nature of those on those rifle pits, the the in front of that line rifle pits, the they had clear fields of observation, fields of cutting down trees and vegetation and some places able to incorporate existing agricultural fields. and typically where that was the

case. there was greater fields of observation and fields of fire in front of the line of rifle. the but the the turning the ridge itself into a fortified position was something that was not done in late, late september, october and early november to now missionary. ridge is a significant feature. it's more than 40 miles in length. and fortunately, we have a number of photographs of the ridge taken in 1864 and 1866, and that gave some sense of missionary in the area where the november of 1863 action occurs as the unfortunately finding good quality copies of of all these these images is not not

easy it's something that i am always on the lookout for an institution or an individual that has one of these it's in a better and better and hence a better image. this is one that's at the national archives, but it is not a very, very good image. and that may just be the condition, the original of it, but there are some others that are are much better. now, i do have to one to note these images are all taken after troops camped around chattanooga from late 1863 to may of 1864, before the atlantic campaign, there had been winter camps. there had been cutting of timber for, additional fortification, construction, chattanooga timber cut for the solemn hills in chattanooga, build warehouses

and like and and so they do not fully depict the battlefield as would have been in 1863. but even looking at these these images, you can see that that missionary has. varying elevations to it. and in fact, the the ridge will rise from as little as 280 feet above the the valley to as much as 425 feet above the above the valley. and typically the the the the lowest the low spots are are a saddles through which the some of which roads ran. these photographs apparently taken as a panorama. and i can get pretty confident three of them the line up

looking from chattanooga valley looking north eastward towards the north and of missionary ridge and then looking southward along ridge the the one on the right apparently looking due east over missionary ridge. but what the pictures really is some of the features of the battlefield and this is not always evident based on the quality of the image that might be be used, but on the better quality ones. look at the the vegetation on the slope, the ridge, it was the ridge was mostly wooded, although it was a very open woods. and the and and some of these the the the plate the print has

been manipulated by literally everything that sticks up above the the ridgecrest having been off. but in those if you can get a good quality scan of them or an original that you can look at with a magnifying glass, you can actually see where the tree sticking up above the top of the ridge line has been wiped off. you can just a little bit of the stump sticking above the right. there's one with the farm field partly extending up the side of the ridge so. this view is from orchard knob looking towards missionary ridge and the area where braxton bragg had his headquarters on ridge. if you've been there, you would be looking towards the notch in the ridge that has been deepened through which today interstate

24 runs. and if you have been to to orchard knob the in foreground here that union trench line is is the the trench line that's right at the edge of mowed area on the other orchard nob reservation. zooming in a little bit and that image from orchard knob and this image taken by george bernard on the on right in 1866, in this particular image actually is up on the ridge and kind of shooting north along the spine of the ridge. and it's interesting because on the right edge, it appears to show some of the the confederate field fortifications. but as valuable as those are, they don't don't show us everything about the ridge. they do show us the varying

elevations, but they don't necessarily show the the undulating or slope of the in a lot of ways missionary ridge is more a series hills that have been pushed all together and typically under those high points there is a ball edge or a projection on the side or face of the the ridge and typically underneath the slope points there's a draw or a ravine. and on the other side, the ridge, these images also show us that the ridge is tooth or razor back, that it immediately up on its western face the most sharply defined part of, the ridge, and then drops down distance on the eastern side. there's really no space up on top it literally is a saw that i saw tooth or hog back on ridge line and on the eastern side it drops a little ways, then rises up to another crest that is

lower, drops down again, rises up a still lower crest. and in fact, missionary ridge in the area where the november occurred about two miles wide east to west, the important thing to recognize about the the ridge itself is is just how how difficult a feature it would be to defend, to turn in, to a true defensive position, particularly if you don't do anything before your enemy attacks on the night on november the 23rd, when grant had had to postpone yet day the launch of his offensive the launch of sure and across the tennessee river against the confederate right flank because sherman's were still not in position. grant had ordered george and the

army of the cumberland to conduct a demonstration. very good. we'll get this down pat here in just a minute. and and thomas, this man had advanced and occupied orchard knob and and with that, it finally became obvious to the confederates that they need it to now turn missionary ridge into a defensive position after on november the 23rd, after they have lost orchard knob to more than 28 fouls and union soldiers and, and james patton anderson commanding heineman. this division will will write on the night of the 23rd the lieutenant general commanding the corps hardy returned from lookout mountain on our extreme left, where he had been the military operations up to that

time in person. he remained during the night, me at my tent, and gave such directions in regard to the disposition of troops as he thought necessary. three in the premises in company with myself, he wrote along the whole extent of my at the brest works at foot of the ridge and directed that the command to which reynolds brigade of buckner's division had now been at it should be divided that one half under brigadier general days to deploy and occupy the brest works at the foot of the ridge and the other half my immediate supervision to occupy the crest of the ridge some 400 yards in rear. he directed his engineer officer captain john w green to lay off a line of rest works on the crest of the ridge and for me to furnish details from the the troops to construct rapid lay such defensive works as the limited number of tools at our

would allow. he also directed the artillery be withdrawn from the works at the foot the ridge and that the whole of artillery be disposed along the crest of the ridge at such favorable points as major courtney commanding should select. so not until that night do they even begin to consider construction of field fortifications. the ridge itself and and green and a few other engineers begin laying out that and and in hyman's or anderson's division the division of the troops is made with half of of them typically by regiments parts of brigades being deployed to the crest and the man put to work. but the of tools is a real issue arthur middleton manago one of

hyman's or anderson's brigade commanders well will say that for. the 700 or so men that he has on the field fortifications on the top of the ridge. he was given 30 or 40 tools and after they had had for for a couple of hours, the engineer officer came back, said, i'm sorry, sir, the tools were not meant for and they were collected up and moved elsewhere. and manago said after that he had but four axes to one to use to construct any field. now manago also not satisfied with where the engineer had designated the line. it was on the geographic crest of the ridge and manago and his brigade sector. he he went to the engineer officer and he said, i see you have a lot to do, if you will.

if you will allow me, i will lay out the law and my brigade sector and the engineer officer took him up on that and manago actually moved his line on to more of the crest of the of the ridge, the point where he could see down that western slope better with his has the. but with this shortage of time and the the limited number of of tools truly turning the ridge into a defensive position is going be be difficult. and in particular they couldn't do such to such things as build a road along the crest of the the ridge on that eastern slope again ridge going up and and peaking on building a road along the the eastern face of the ridge just below the crest to

facilitate lateral movement. they also didn't have time and tools to build roads to facilitate a moving wheeled vehicles and particular the caissons for the artillery carrying ammunition and the ordinance wagons carrying the ammunition for the the and the infantry soldiers as as the commander of, the mississippi brigade wrote the if they deserve the name. i'm on the top of the ridge were so constructed as to not command a view of the front part of a high projecting point about the center of my brigade again. they're up on the the geographic crest where they do not have the the view down the slope in front william b bay. well we're we're late when has

moved to a new position on the the 25th the 20 the temporary earthworks thrown up at these points was a hindrance to the successful use of the pieces of artillery of the the artillery being too or the works being too close the crest of the hill to admit of being placed in front them and being necessarily in rear could not be sufficiently depressed to command the slope of the hill in front again with the ridge being razor back the there's no real flat place up there and if the works are on the very crest of the ridge, then where the artillery going to go? if you put the artillery behind the works on the crest, the artillery is literally going to be starting down that that back slope of the ridge, also because of the the limited number of of

troops, there are going to be intervals and the line of fortification options that are being constructed sometimes several hundred yards in and out. and when when the troops deploy, they are mostly going to be deployed in single rank formation. and some places not even the density of a skirmish, a skirmish line had had man at four paces intervals. and in some of these these sectors, the men are going to be deployed at much greater than four paces between the between the man. but at two of while, field fortifications are placed were limited and their placement was was difficult. the worst thing was the division of the the command along the the

ridge and in half and in many both and assignment or anderson's deviation and in in stuart's division half of the troops are left in the rifle pits at the base of the the ridge and the other half were were placed in the the new incomplete new fortifications on the other top of the ridge, the command or and in heineman or anderson's of the force at the base of the ridge was zachariah days and days where all will write that on the examination of the ground, i became satisfied. this position was very desired, contagious, especially with the orders i had, which at that time were to hold the position to the last for the reason that if the man made a subject stubborn

resistance as ordered and were overpowered by number as capture or annihilation, the alternatives as retreat with the enemy close on us up the steep ascent of the hill behind would have been impossible for this and other reasons. i went to general anderson and begged that he would order the troops and the flat to the crest of the ridge where. i was satisfied a much better fight could be made, he told that he was satisfied of this also and wish to make the change, but could not do so without orders. he then went to ask this permission, but the answer was no remain as you are now subsequently at least the the order to war to fight to the last at the base of the ridge was lifted. but that was not community made it down the chain to all the the troops and again in part because

the the reorganization and so when when grant will attack on on the 25th the finally launching his main offensive the previous morning before dawn on the 24th was sherman's troops crossing. but by time the confederate right flank had been moved further to the north, the line along the ridge is and having lost look out mount and the day before bragg had abandoned the positions. and in chattanooga valley and had positioned all of his troops just along missionary ridge with the weight of his force to, his right against sherman. he had at least read grant's intention correctly about about sherman's force, but he has in

the process also thinned out much of the rest. his line and grant also now incorporates another assault with hooker's troops having captured mountain the day before they are moved over. as you see on the map from mountain to roseville and missionary ridge and hooker is to north from ross gap in 1866. image of the at the western entrance to crossville gap at south if you visited there the iowa monument stands in front of that that hill in the center of the image and you may not recognize is that that the that in the previous image and this one are actually a panorama of roseville gap and the john ross house is on the right edge the

the right image and there's the ross house in slightly different form still today been moved back off of road some but but it's still there so hook but hooker is to attack come over from lookout mountain then attack from the south to north from roseville gap northward while sherman continues to attack the confederate right flank now reposition considerably further to the north along the missionary ridge. but when, when, when harty and clayburn stymie sherman's attacks at the north end of the ridge at tunnel hill and hooker is is delayed by destroyed bridges over flood chattanooga creek and late afternoon as the sun gets low in the western sky

a frustrated elsie is asked grant having not been able to again send troops towards knoxville he will turn to george thomas and order a demonstration and the army the cumberland are to go forward against the rifle at the base of the ridge and of course grant watching this from from orchard knob will see roughly thousand union soldiers of four army of the cumberland divisions on a two mile front where they have a of skirmishes in front and most of the two mile front each brigade deployed in two lines. some brigades had even a third line of troops and the signal of six guns fired in rapid succession from orchard knob. the army of the cumberland troops will forward believing that they are executing the last that they had received, which was hold themselves in readiness

attack. missionary ridge. and they will well go forward and capture the rifle pits at the the base, the ridge and. exactly as as zachariah days had feared. the confederates retreating from the rifle pits at the base of the ridge, will expand so much of their energy that by the time they reach the crest, they are or exhausted. some of them so debilitated that they actually will be carried to the. rear rear by the infirmary corps. and so in many brigades, half of potential combat power is is lost and the army cumberland troops will charge forward, finding many places where confederate fire did not cover the slope of the ridge and troops of the army. the cumberland like man of the second minnesota here will work their way up the the steep slope of the ridge and the confederate

works at the top of the ridge. it is a grand assault for the man of the the army of the cumberland. it will bring victory ulysses as grant chattanooga in many ways it will be the final making of ulysses s grant and the the war. it will bring grant sherman and sheridan back together again and. it will will be one of the most disastrous defeats of the year, the confederate of tennessee, as evidenced by the trophies lined up along walnut street in in chattanooga, a union victory and a stunning confederate defeat. thank you. i'll take any question. any questions at.

how much credence? do you give the the animus that supposedly exists between grant and thomas and a reason why the of the army of the cumberland didn't stop where they were supposed to stop but kept going up the ridge and wouldn't if they where they were supposed to stop wouldn't that put them in a position of danger. and so they went right up right to the grant's grant of course has been been been learning more about that george thomas from from the beginning of the war on to this period of the war. but but a lot of of grant's view of thomas is going to be more

from events of 1864 things that occur after this. remember it is ulysses s grant who places in command of the army of the cumberland upon relieving william stark rose. so i, i don't think grant's is fully made up on george thomas this time. he is disappointed when he learns that the army, the cumberland, cannot immediately take the offensive. the cracker line is is open, but that is is just the nature of the situation. more than 10,000 of the army of the cumberland's, 5000 horses and mules have have been work to death or starve to death. the month cooped up in chattanooga, another probably 20,000 are now too weak work any longer and army the cumberland is almost literally immobile

because of a shortage of animals to move move vehicles in fact to get some of the army the cumberland to support sherman's crossing. they had to borrow horses from from hooker this will color somewhat grant's view thomas but at this time the grant doesn't have the same concerns that he will by by late 1864. now the certainly the man of the army, the cumberland have some desire to redeem from what some perceive as a defeat at chickamauga they did not see it that way. but the the biggest biggest is that most of the and regimental commanders in those four army the cumberland divisions never learned of grant's limited intent for that forward

movement. they they had been given previously the orders to hold themselves in readiness to to assault and the signal being the rapid discharge of guns from from orchard knob. and that's that's what they thought they were were executing. but you are correct, if grant envisions a limit, it attack demonstration. what if they do get to the rifle pits with 50 confederate cannon on the top is that a position where they can stay? but as it turns out that confederate artillery fire is of relatively short duration because the the guns mostly while pound napoleons quickly fire up their 32 rounds of ammunition and are essentially out of action because the horses there are no roads to easily get the caissons up and the confederate horses and mules are in very poor shape as well. so the union troops didn't know that that that's the the army,

the cumberland troops did not know that. but the big thing is that that they believed they were simply executing the order to salt missionary ridge. so any other questions. given that the union troops going missionary ridge or in waves did the first wave carry the entire ridge or when they stop at the rifle pits, in the second wave and so on. yeah they they they do initially advance in the heavy line of skirmish and then typically two lines within each per day. the that once they seize the rifle pits the skirmish ers do push through the couple of hundred yards, which is where most of the confederate camps. so they push through amongst the little huts and hovels the confederates had to where the ridge really starts to rise up

the main line stops at rifle pits but the second main line and generally closed on that first main main line. well this is actually one of the issues with any of column assault the intermingling of commands. and you certainly see in other column assaults in the war. but since they've thought that that they still had go on, they then began to come to work forward again and they those places on the western of the ridge where the confederate fire doesn't cover that well and, observers at orchard knob and fort on the edge of chattanooga said it looked as if there were a series. these going up the side of the ridge typically they're in the drawers or ravines under the low spots. and each one of these these was

tipped by a cluster of flags. the national and regimental colors of several of the regiments of the brigade, with the color bearers leading the way up the side of the ridge, and they work their way up close. the confederate line near the top of the ridge and in covered area, stop to catch their breath, a little strength. and then rush that that last little bit and break the confederate line at that point because the ridge immediately drops back down on the back side. this is another issue. the had not provided enough time to address. if there is a penetration there. the confederate line to seal off the penetration on either side is going to go down that back of the ridge, which means federals who have penetrated the line here can have the opportunity putting a plunging fire on. the the the confederate line of trying to seal that off. they don't a reserve line or a

second line prepared or traverse as or anything to want to be used to counter a penetration and so union troops then begin to turn left and right and peel that the confederate line off of the ridge where they capture a artillery battery or confederate artillery piece, if there is ammunition and if there are implements which to potentially load that piece, they will turn that piece of on the confederates and thereby and the confederate line to either the north or south, in one case, union troops seize a gun. they find that it is loaded, but that the confederate artillery men had run off with the with the implements, in particular there no friction primers to ignite the artillery piece. and so if a soldier pulls out a

cartridge, tears the end of the cartridge open, pour some powder, the vent of the gun, leaves, little pile around the vent. and then with his loaded musket steps back and, fires it and the flash of the discharge of his musket ignites that powder and sets the the artillery piece off, not recommended way to discharge discharge an artillery piece. however, that is not bad way as as other potential ways one confederate artillery sergeant it was sad want to be able to get the of his gun suppressed to fire down the slope of the ridge in front. he picked the trail up rested it on his shoulder and then had had his number four man pull the lanyard to discharge to the the gun so the the ridge the ridge

is really a very difficult feature. what the confederates really needed was to develop true converging interlocking fields of fire. the ridge could be a very strong defensive feature, but it takes time to develop so. at this time joseph hooker and ambrose burnside were playing significant roles the union army. but george mcclellan still awaiting orders what was the reason for that. well you know mcclellan has has has gotten the ire of abraham lincoln and and so lincoln is hasn't hasn't found a place for for george at this point versus having some use for for burnside

and and joseph hooker and all out in burnside has received some some criticism last evening. and and today i'm actually somewhat of a burnside defender not for fredericksburg, but the his his capture of knoxville and in late august and early september is a masterful campaign with a small force with an extremely limited sustainment, capable so burnside is in some ways out there redeeming and remember who did joseph hooker stop and on his way west to chattanooga. abraham lincoln and had lengthy friendly conversation with lincoln while passing on through washington.

lincoln was not ready to get rid what is joseph hooker fighting hooker so i assume the confederacy destroyed all the bridges on the tennessee river. so i was wondering, how did sherman get his across? well, there are no on the tennessee river except for the railroad bridges at bridgeport, alabama is 25 miles to the west of. and another one at dater, decatur which is even further west. sherman's are going to cross in an amphibious assault and mostly pontoon boats that were constructed at at chattanooga. and by the first michigan engineers and mechanics and let's see here maybe i can set you up for a question this stump peter with next year so the but there are 116 pontoon boats will

be used for sherman's amphibious assault over the tennessee river floating down the river from the mouth of north chickamauga creek and then landing on side of the mouth of south chickamauga. and i don't think north creek is on that map. no, it is not. it'd be there under the legend chattanooga campaign and only 25 of those hundred and 16 boats were the standard u.s. army copy of the battle style boat like the ones used at fredericksburg the other. what would that be? 91 were ones were of apparent fox's design in chattanooga. so one but anyone. just a second gordon so.

being being a burnside supporter the question is burnside didn't really need saving it knoxville because he he kind of held his own there and my other is the famous exchange between grant and thomas at orchard knob when grant to thomas and he said ordered those men up the hill and thomas turned grant and said not i. so now thomas did relay order for a limited offense or a demonstration to gordon granger, the fourth corps commander, and john palmer, the 14th corps commander. and they tried to communicate that to their four division commanders. but before that order had really

filtered below division. the signal for the advance was given and brigade and regimental commanders never learn of that. that limited assault. you are correct that the situation at knox war was not dire as as some would say that burnside was making it out be. but ulysses s grant in in a reflection of his greatest strength and that recognizing that he is the to to to achieve national policy grant understood that lincoln's concern about east tennessee and regardless of of of of the actual in in knoxville lincoln was worried about burnside and knoxville

therefore. grant is worried about burnside and knoxville is going to do everything to relieve the boss's stress. so. but. well i'll be around the rest of the afternoon, noon and tomorrow. so if you have any questions, feel free to to ask and come visit the chattanooga area battlefields.

good evening, everyone, and thank you for joining us and welcome to tonight's panel

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