over the past decade. and thanks to you, nancy, it's been real pleasure and privilege having thisi like to read you am

written in russian by ambassador dobrynin on his of january ninth, 1971, with henry kissinger. the president knows that one of the key issues to which the drive attaches great importance is the issue of the withdrawal of u.s. troops. he and the president are currently discussing with each other this possibility. call colon what if the u.s. were commit to withdrawal all its troops by some? absolutely deadline of which they inform the vietnamese paragraph at the same time, the americans could refrain from demanding a reciprocal

withdrawal of north vietnamese troops from south vietnam. it is important, however, that the north vietnamese their part, then commit to a ceasefire for the period of the u.s. troop withdrawal plus at least some brief amount of time after the withdrawal paragraph below, kissinger made a rather curious remark that ultimately will no longer be their war the americans concern, but that of the vietnamese themselves. if sometime after the u.s. troop withdrawal they start fighting with each other again. first of all, by that time the u.s. itself will no longer be there. and second, the administration is convinced that the south vietnamese will not be quickly defeated. now, if a war does break out again between north and south vietnam, it will be a lengthy affair. and in any case, such a new war will obviously spill over into the period after the nixon

administration left office unless. the vietnamese reach agreement among themselves on a reasonable. second document foreign relations. the united states memorandum of conversation this is what henry kissinger to his president participe anatoly dobrynin. henry kissinger. oh, by the way, most of the conversation between dobrynin and kissinger was to nuclear arms control, the balance of power, the arms race, berlin, things like that, the paragraphs on vietnam were at the end. they were short. we then turned to kissinger reporting nixon we then turned to vietnam. i said to dobrynin that we had read kosygin interview with the japanese newspaper with great interest. we had notice kosygin had listed the usual unacceptable hanoi demands, but he had also indicated it as soviet willingness to engage itself in the process of a settlement. this was stated, it seemed to me more emphatically than had been

said in the past. was i correct? dobrynin merely said that he noticed the sentence also, i asked whether the two statements were linked, in other words, whether the soviet willingness to engage itself was linked to our prior acceptance of hanoi's demands. dobrynin then said, wanted to ask me a hypothetical question if hanoi dropped its demands for a coalition government, would we be prepared to discuss withdrawal all separately? i as long as the matter was hypothetical, it was very hard to form a judgment, but i could imagine that the issue of withdrawals a lot easier to deal with than the future composition of a government in south vietnam. indeed, if he remembered an article i had written in 1968, published in foreign affairs, i had proposed exactly this procedure. dobrynin whether i still believe that this was a possible approach, i said it certainly was possible approach and indeed i had been of the view that it would be one that would speed up

matters. dobrynin said he would report this to moscow. so not a document, but two north vietnamese diplomats moving. and we again who wrote in vietnamese a book called leader, told kissinger negotiations paris, 1996. it was english translation of this book and on page. 165 a around the end of january, 1971, soviet ambassador sir because in hanoi, in a foreign prime minister from london that quote in mid-january kissinger told the following to the soviet ambassador dobrynin in washington if the u.s. undertakes to withdraw all its forces is in quotes now, if the u.s. undertakes withdraw all its forces by a certain time and possibly does not demand, a simultaneous withdrawal of the arvn forces from sbn, the north vietnamese could undertake to respect cease fire during the u.s. withdrawal, plus a certain

period of time too long after the withdrawal. the next document which we can discuss, i think gives the game away. the white house topsy sensitive eyes only memorandum may 25, 1971. participants dr. henry kissinger, mr. and mrs. john santini, brigadier general alexander haig, dix miser and lord placed dr. kissinger. office time luncheon may five, 1971. substantive portions. the luncheon conversation centered on vietnam and china. following are the highlights of mr. sentences observation. mr. santini, hanoi does not fully believe that the america will leave vietnam. if they were assured of that and of a certain number of seats for

the nlf, the vietcong in assembly, they would come to terms on p.o.w.s ceasefire and the of the two vietnams for a couple of years. now previous to this date, on april 12th, there's a memo i've, seen the book and you can get it from the nixon library proposing plan for a peace agreement under the name of win winston lord. what kissinger has in his memoirs house years that he was involved in coming up with this it's submitted it's it's dated april 12th on april 13 in the secret correspondence were only between bunker and kissinger. kissinger asked bunker to come up with a a plan, a peace plan. which bunker does. and in bunkers, plan in number five, little six, bunker says on

completion of withdrawal of u.s. forces and exchange of prisoners, all foreign troops would begin withdrawal from countries of indochina china. per in india from laos, cambodia, sd and thais from laos, such withdrawals would be completed within six months on. may 25, 1971, same day as he has lunch with anthony, kissinger sends. the following secret cable only to from kissinger to ambassador saigon. one other side is agreed to meet may 31 after taking almost three weeks to respond to our message. because we can use the channel only sparingly the president has decided to move ahead in the first meeting along the lines you suggested in rough tell. for the second meeting i can more about that and we open up on your package is one in three. we will not offer specific dates on your point six.

we will say that peoples of indochina should discuss this question among themselves, but we will not set date. he's informing bunker. the united states will no longer demand the withdrawal of north vietnamese troops from south vietnam, which by the way was a position at that time of president nixon and the public position of the united states. then a few days later, 28th, we have kissinger's memorandum to nixon as to what he's going tell the north vietnamese vietnamese. first, i will clarify recently ambiguous statements by the other side. secondly, i will lay out our package proposal, which includes already to set a terminal date for the withdrawal. all of our forces from south vietnam as part of an overall settlement in indochina, a cease fire in place, no infiltration of outside forces into the countries of indochina, international supervision of the cease fire, its provisions,

respect for the 54 and 62 geneva agreements. the packages accomplish the three objectives. first, by moving towards their position of a fixed date for our withdrawals, it should clearly establish if they have any interest at all in negotiate. second, i believe the package such provisions as cease fire, no infiltration, international supervision and p.o.w. release holds many attraction for us. if we could negotiate along these lines, i think we and the south vietnamese would be in a good position. third, if the other side remains intransigent, we will have laid out a forthcoming position and further improve our negotiating record. we could, at a time of our choosing, make our proposals publicly and strengthen our position both at home and around the world. then we have what kissinger says to the north vietnamese on may 31. here's our final proposal.

second, the vietnamese and the other peoples of indochina should discuss among themselves the manner in which all other outside forces would withdraw from the countries of. with down below, with respect to the second question, we believe that the proposal we have made reflects, the reality of the current situation when u.s. forces are finally withdrawn, the political future of south vietnam will have to be left to the vietnamese. in july. he has his secret trip to beijing in order to open up the relations ship, which will lead to nixon going to meet with mao to be done on his way to beijing. stops off in saigon on july four. that's i met him the only time i've ever met him at. the 4th of july party at the embassy. and he tells president to that there's nothing new in the paris

peace. then then he meets with joe in life on behalf of president. i want to assure the prime minister solemnly that the united states is prepared to make settlement that will truly leave political evolution of south vietnam to the vietnamese alone. we are ready to withdraw all of our forces by a fixed date and let objective reality shape the political future. then he writes in hand on the left margin, we need a decent interval. you have our assurance. well, he told nixon about discussion with joe in light regarding the vietnam war. is this on indochina as on taiwan, i noted the need for time for a political evolution and i reemphasize the link between the two questions especially after explained the position that we had taken in paris stressed chinese interest in an honorable exit for the us. in addition.

i reviewed the current situation in paris and pointed out that the talks were blocked because of hanoi's insistence on the overthrow of two and its refusal to agree to a cease fire. i warned that a breakdown in the negotiations would mean continuation of the war with incalculable consequences. now i would like to read to you from the recordings of the white house transcripts, a meeting on december 14th, 1972, between kissinger and nixon because it it's my that this is the first time that nixon realizes what kissinger has done now what has happened in the interim is in october 72 a piece basically along the terms that outlined we get out the north vietnamese behind and some language is negotiated in paris kissinger agrees to go to saigon to get president hu of south vietnam to sign sign the agreement then he

will fly to hanoi and in hanoi with the communists, he will announce to the world a peace. he flies to saigon shows the agreement the president until immediately sees the problem. oh, by the way, i've got to mention, in 1970, the viet cong 72 have been defeated. there are no viet cong basically left the the order of battle of the us defense attachés office in january three lists as independent cong forces 25,000 people. so the viet the the the creation of this war right the press peasants rising against you know loading german catholics and landlords in america they're down to 25,000 effective the south have a million in the army, a million in self-defense, 200,000 police and a whole bunch of village leaders and politicians and else. you do the math in terms of balance of power however hanoi invades in 72 to try to knock the south vietnamese out.

they sent 12 divisions down south and jay has just studied a lot this and and they they bloody south vietnamese but the south vietnamese don't break so tus army has up to this and then kissinger shows up saying you're going to have to keep these 12 to 13 north vietnamese divisions in your country indefinitely with ho chi minh trail supplying them to says no, i won't sign kissinger furious. he goes back to washington, nixon and haig. basically, though, everybody is talking carefully. if you read the transcripts, they basically take two side nixon. his memoir says he saw the problem immediately. what if the north vietnamese don't don't follow the peace terms? who's going to protect south vietnam? so nixon starts talking about a american commitment to use b-52 against the north vietnamese if they if they violate the treaty.

and he sends kissinger back paris in november and early december to renegotiate with later talk. it's after the american late october refuses to the day after this conversation. i think nixon is going to order the bombing of hanoi in haiphong in order to get the north vietnamese to compromise on december 14th a frustrated kissinger let slip from mouth a truth about what he had accomplished. quote, it seems to to sign an agreement which leaves whatever number they've got there let's say 150,000, which we think plus unlimited right of movement across the border and indeed not just the right to movement across the border, but abolishing the border. well, i think that's close to a sellout. a few minutes later, nixon, they were using these negotiate solely for the purpose not of that is not not for the purpose of ending the war but of continuing the war in a different form and not of bringing peace but of having

continuing war in this terribly difficult part of the country. war in south vietnam, peace in north vietnam. well, that their proposal peace for north vietnam and continuing war in south vietnam kissinger. so we have come to the reluctant conclusion that you have expressed it very well right now, mr. president, that this wasn't a peace document. this was a document for perpetual warfare in which they create nixon. perpetual warfare in, south vietnam. that's right. and peace in north vietnam. that's the way to put it. kissinger that's right. peace in north vietnam and perpetual warfare in south vietnam. and the united states and the united states cooperating with them in imposing a communist government on the people of south vietnam against will we, the party that wants peace in vietnam for sides. nixon and let the future of this poor suffering be determined by the people of south vietnam and not on the battlefield. that's what our proposal is. we call on the south and we call

on north to agree to this kind of thing calling them both to agree agree. i am not sure disposal i think have a walking mike sir i read i have read extensively on vietnam. i have once been there and this my suspicion and suspicion of without evidence but having not been forced from office, nixon would have on board of the bombers back in from blowing the nba to kingdom come that i mean there are a number of people my own gut feeling. well i should i should tell you something else too it's in the book is you're right. the other thing i was told various people after 75 is that in the final day you should talk about this. the north vietnamese divisions were in the open. you mean 10,000, 3/16 marching in the open, you know, were too

busy to b-52 planes could do the 10,000 troops along the road. we have wiped them out but but it was ford and there's also been the war powers act. i what put me on the hunt is getting of background and personal again was cable from kissinger to bunker of may 25 saying that we not no longer demand withdrawal of the north vietnamese troops. and i just smelled a i just i was working with bunker in 1980 so we knew the outcome. i just smelled a rat the way the phrasing was. i also had an instinct that his comment about how the president decided because he was stroking bunkers ego and i got very to bunker he was he was a wonderful man reserve elegant honest truthful. not a big ego at all but still

one has you know and he's and he's he was he was actually is another story to make the book on chords people know about he was actually sent to vietnam in in the spring of 1967 by lbj to turn the war over to the vietnamese so the whole policy of vietnamization was actually started by by lbj and there's a reason for it because mcnamara had sent this memo in, which has been in the pentagon and others in late october 66 saying, we're not convincing north vietnamese to give up. and i don't know what do in effect, he's going to lbj saying i don't know how to win this war. and lbj has got 250,000 american troops in vietnam, another 250,000 on the way. you know, and he said, we're not just we're not talking about, i would say, any secretary of defense. we're talking robert mcnamara. no, i. thomas schelling game, you know, brilliant man. he's saying as president. yeah you know so johnson then working with with walt rostow

who's never enough credit for this so we're going to turn this over to the vietnamese. so he sends johnson sends bunker out private meeting between bunker and lbj. bunker tells me this and says you know ellsworth, we need to turn the war over to the vietnamese. and then he sends out coma, the pacification side. abrams the military. so when kissinger writes that the president has decided bunker suspicions lulled in may of 71, bunker did not the implication in and he could not believe that kissinger would go against the public policy of president nixon. and so when i pointed this out to him that led to sort of some awkward things between the ambassador and myself but i i wanted to i decided after his book was not published but i decided that you know, for the sake of the record and history i

wanted to get to the bottom of this. so i so, i got to know richard nixon. so i got i got a bunch of letters from richard nixon. i spent a number of years cultivating him. and i have to admit in public, i had you know, i had an intent. you know, i, i, i had a private purpose in doing this because at some point i was going to ask him. and the point came in 1989, and i asked him if he had been of what kissinger had done had been in 1971, the between bunkers, plans and, kissinger's plans and nixon white to totally lost his composure. and you could just see in his face and everything like this he was he was just he was in agony because and then he didn't want to talk about it anymore. but my sense was to go to your point he was some burden because

we lost the war. what related to watergate his resignation, kissinger's negotiations. but he hadn't he hadn't connected all dots and on that afternoon in that in that moment, he the dots and and this was a man i felt just filled with with with with it was it wasn't anger so much it was something deeper to comment on back to your point, what else? yes, dr. thank you very much. you know, we had a conference here at the school last month on edward lansdale and his his success in the philippines within a few short years and his failure the vietnam war. can you explain why edward lansdale's views opinions and attitudes don't grow were rejected in vietnam and dewey's and more so.

do you think that they a chance to succeed. a two word answer robert mcnamara. if you read mcnamara's where he puts blame on failure whenever except himself, his bottom line was basically i was badly briefed. i was not properly about how weak the vietnamese were, about how courageous the north in one thing and another. and my going back to the story i told you earlier is, you know, mr. secretary, you had ed lansdale sitting the pentagon, 61, 62, and you never listened to him. he was right there. but going back to my dad's, the way lansdale thought and acted, you know what? didn't i still do in philippines again? in vietnam, he got out he went and he went talk to villagers, right? he got out there for mcnamara it

sort of i guess one might even say not comprehend not just incompetence. just wouldn't you wouldn't think i wouldn't go there. so so if if lance and i met lansdale in saigon was passing through, going back to thailand in, 66 spent a day or two with him. he was an advisor, i think, to cabot lodge was lodge the ambassador in 66. and and he had a little team. he had a house and he a dilettante. i mean, he knew what he was just he was just sort of decorations on a christmas tree, but he couldn't give up. but no one was listening to him. now, can you can fault ed lansdale. maybe for for lack of political skills, interpersonal skills, bureaucratic skills, maybe. but but i, i would argue and let me say in the background, everything i'm talking about, about this, we did it a second time only worse in afghanistan?

yes. how many years were we in afghanistan? 20 years? yes. and we and we never had a course program. i mean, i can give you a personal gossip on that kind of stuff. but i mean, it's just like what my? oh. kirby and his son, miles, my nephew. marine two tours in afghanistan. he taught himself pashtu. he wrote he wrote book. it's a book about a in afghanistan he consciously did not go into office training because he wanted to be a grunt, because that's what a man does anyway, he writes in this, you know his story about their how the little kids in the town would come up to him because he could speak their language. the sergeants, the other guys, the lieutenants, they had no clue what these people were like or what they were thinking. and so they went into this village for six months and they were 80. i'm making this up a little bit

there. 80 taliban up in the hills and they fight and they knock him down about 40. and then and the marine unit rotates out and there's still 40 taliban who come back into. the community. we never had a court program in afghanistan, in mcnamara, never listen never listened to ted lansdale right here. this and then back there. so so i'm not read your book. i read it not having me having your presentation earlier. i was under the impression that nixon speak to kissinger's betrayal meant meant nixon's visit to china. that was i was only in india environment americans in in we all reached overjoyed and over the american look at defeat and not vietnam and the indian

politicians always told the ohio senate republican ohio senator who was an ambassador to india that he would say, how can i relationship get better when you people get over that? i'm cooked. you so so the indian politics he told them that we believe you are just tonight a colonial power that has british war in india. so your defeat is thing to happen. but anyway, i don't know if you've done enough research to see kissinger not only betrayed united states and maybe nixon, i don't know, maybe wanted to become because i believe kissinger, nixon's to china was to reward china for bringing the situation in in vietnam, because more than 50% of viet cong to a chinese as vietnamese.

so given that my i believe americans would have lost that unless soviets convinced the chinese they must continue me close america would come for them. this war is lost would you that me that was also a victory. my my own sense and i'm not i'm a deep scholar. well, there's really more vietnam. southeast asia, china. it's ancient history, philosophy, jurisprudence things like that. my impression is and what i've read various and my conversations with nixon in the in the eighties is that the the move with china and there were parallel moves we need to remember china and moscow at the same time that was nixon's strategy and i think i can't remember when he has an article in foreign affairs in 65 or six or something like that, where this is sort of mooted.

and he was also resentful because he's mentioned that a couple of ways. he phrases things that kissinger tried to take all the credit for being the genius who orchestrated, you know, the detente and the rcep and turning the chinese and the russians sort of against each other other. and my sympathies are actually with nixon as a strategist. one of the other things, if i can comment that which i mentioned in the book in one place, kissinger observes in his memoirs that nixon never paid attention. the details. and so then if you look at everything that kissinger does like these memos i just read you, it's always in the details nixon's not going to this stuff kissinger knows it. so he's doing this stuff over here, you know, and then he gives nixon three or three bullet points. nixon looks at the bullet point, and i've had meetings with nixon where his mind is so fast and he's so self-confident that that he doesn't go down.

say, wait a moment, steve, what's your first point? what's your second point? so that kissinger was in a position to to, you know, a famous particularly with the opening to china, given the personnel of mao zedong as as to the indian position on colonialism, which was very much part of our anti-war movement. may i return to the my dad drafted for president eisenhower 19 1954 national ism. if we are supporting we ain't colonialist. what is the purpose? colonialism. what did the brits do to india for a couple of hundred years going? back to warren hastings. we are here, right? we're going to make into modern people and your best and brightest are going to go to oxford and. cambridge, right. and we're going to build an indian civil service which will be as good as our civil service. that's what that's not really

respecting hinduism or the muslims or anything like the french vietnam, by the way. and this was is totally missed again by the anti-war movement. they had a concept of colonialism, which they also used africa, and they had a word for it, misconceived as i said, trees, french colonialism was on a civilizing mission to civilize the heathen who were the heathens? the vietnamese, the you know, the people living in, etc., etc. the cambodians, the lao. we did that and the way i tried create and i feel that one of our intellectual failures as americans, our foreign policy elite leader by way, i hope i'm dropping names, but it's just part of what has happened to me. so i did my senior thesis at harvard college for sam

huntington. right? kind of a big name in political theory, political science and stuff. that and i also lucian is of the sole appeal but back we haven't figured out a conceptual framework of integrating what we americans do well with what other people do well now a person who did this kind of insights actively in vietnam. well there were two one was bill colby. i mean, the guy in doing this was a genius the other less intellect, actually, of facile but equally sensitive was ellsworth bunker, when when you were supporting nationalism, you're working in partnership with people. and i'm a lawyer by background and you can take the concept of a partnership everybody brings something to the partnership. right it's not a dictatorship the classic partnership is i

bring the money and publisher narain, who's sitting here with, carl buchanan, they do the work right. if i take away the money, they get --. if they don't do the work, i get --. i'm dependent on and they're dependent on me. that's what a partnership is. and we have fiduciary law about this. we've had it for centuries. we've never really incorporated that into our relationships with, let me say, smaller. i think the colonial epithet is usually associated with unilateralism. i show up in your country and i tell you what to do. and many in our military because this was this was a theme that our picked up from many are military ops and even even the guys who are the sergeants i was serving. you know, you're a nice vietnamese colonel. you're very nice get out of the way. i'm here to win the war. i'm going to defeat the viet cong and i'm going to turn that long back to you. it's like on what planet are you

living? right. so i thought of something called associate of power. how do we come up? a concept of power which allows you to collaborate and cooperate and what i think my dad had and when we were really good in vietnam and other dad did the same thing with the tie as i mentioned, colby did the same thing in in vietnam. i also brought along everybody wants to look at it the 1971 community defense and development plan of course, which was basically the piece de resistance of colby's work. write these pages are unclassified. i just i just took this when i left. i mean this is this is a combined action for the south vietnamese, the american military and civilian region, province, district, village and all these different programs and metrics for success. and guess what, by 72, the

vietnam had been defeated. and has any journalist has any academic written about this? yeah. oh, yes. back there. you no. my name is jean in and we american. i've been here for 15 years this changed 25 and next me is jim probably he's 20. he came from the philippines socialist vietnam and studying to be in the nation in editions tv that he's this interview i must first say one thing that professor young told me just and and i'm too old americans here the libyan gunboat so they'll leave athens will take that man and thank you for all that of

your service in vietnam. there seem to that you did not feel bad about how they were and there were mistakes and there were issues. but we need to move forward. and i must say thank, you, for taking in the vietnamese refugees and help us so and give us a chance to pay back. i must say thank you for helping the vietnamese socialist country for the change from the fact that we is here. i do hope that people still do well and bring change in vietnam. that's important. one thing i need to come to, professor young, is you kept talking about and right you put forth is perfectly correct. i need to bring it back to the

lessons at this time for ukraine and i believe what the americans do right now ukraine is the idea no concept that ukraine people are fighting for their own sovereignty that independence and we need to support them. i feel very sad that trump and the republicans, especially the ones in strongly against it. and i must say you told us from your story to begin with was kissinger talking the russian first before he come and talk to them and then he come and talk to north vietnamese. then somebody emerges as a directions instruction us just sign it. sign right away. so i believe that at this point in time, it's a lesson learned. and this is only feeding that

the institute of world politics many people here going to be leaders many teachers here please let the people of the country fight for themselves and support them. if you can naito is the other here and it's very important right now i salute here 51% americans wanting to quit the white people. if our could be if we can stay something as an american to i would say please keep on the value is the value that we share that the american values that you went to vietnam and you know to support your friend to win right against bush. but i also must come and bring back something, because what you said about usaid, i think that's very important i know that many

americans now saying that you need that support and you what countries and the are the countries in peace. but i appreciate all the ones that usaid had gone to vietnam and to countries, you know, and for example, thank you very much. i believe that that the values that, american values right now is important. and as our life and my brothers here, we see, we came here for the values. so we hope the lessons would be in vietnam. before and that the dispassionate president said there was a number of children that was exactly to be with and you doing, judy lbj johnson was actually the leader based on who

changed the name i the same thing that you knew was doing that i in 1960 up to the past bush ally not. and that's why it not vietnamese was very active that morning and you was killed supported by the u.s. that's meant everything to so i'm hoping you were talking about how partnership and asking for us vietnamese americans to be partnership with the u.s. to support the american values because right now the americans talking only to the vietnamese they could kill say thank you very much for a lot of your comments and i agree with some of them. i not so much in agreement with with others i think one of the points about vietnamese. well, i can share an anecdote

the vietnamese have to learn to speak for themselves. vietnamese in america, they're they're they're sort of withdrawn. one of the reasons, i think, is they lost the the refugees. they they've got. they're unhappy. one of the reactions to the book, to my book among vietnamese is it was like a rebirth. i mean, the first time i experienced it was instead of, say, the vietnamese in san jose, when i read the documents half in english, half in vietnamese at 200 vietnamese, a lot of senior retired officers and things. and they were physically in front of me. they were getting energized. so an older man on where you were runs a newspaper in in houston called me up out of the blue. just say, mr. young. don't know who i am. what? i'm just calling is old vietnamese. i'm just calling you to thank you because you have restored my

honor. and if you if you've been here for 50 years and you've been feeling this, you're not talking to the americans about your history, about this, about doubt, about the truth about ho chi minh. so, so well. but that's that's a task. and if i could put this back in the context of partnership associated power people have to listen each other but somebody's got to speak up if. you don't speak up. the other people aren't going to listen to you my story. if i can quickly it it's an anecdote with a very important vietnamese nationalist fan type. i usually was the vietnamese to join the divyanka party in 1938 and i got to know him and day i was in 71 or 72, i was closely with him in his house and he's getting very angry at me because he says, what is it, steve? why do you americans always support those those idiots in the government? they're not competent. they're not respected, etc., etc. your people are always hanging out at the six sportif messing

around with the high society. people. you know, what's what? what do you guys doing? it's in vietnamese. so i said to day, right. you know, respect the teacher, the vietnamese have to search for teeth, speak english. you don't speak. i'm here. i'm understanding. i think everything you're saying. because i spent a year studying vietnamese and the guy back like this and he said steve do you want me and us to turn into prostitutes? it's like those -- in hanoi. and then i said, excuse tell me right now in washington who has more political in saigon or hanoi? and he knew exactly what i was saying and he didn't have an answer. so let me add one thing. i think we're probably out of time, right? maybe one more question or something. a.

thank you, sir. i'd like to thank mr. young and all of you who have us here today. for those who are interested in learning more about iwp and the programs offer,. please speak with one of our staff members at the conclusion of today's event or please visit us online. this lecture will be posted our iwp youtube channel if you'd like to watch it again, we also encourage you to visit our youtube channel and to watch some of our other lectures that have posted. we'd also like to encourage you to check out iwp podcast, which can be found on applei am deliga

very special duty. our speaker this evening, as you all know,