morning. he does court all day. then he is on the foin call -- phone call at night. then he goes to a fundraiser and then he starts making more phone calls. i had an opportunity to work as a corporate officer, chairman in public companies for over 20 years. i never in my career saw a c.e.o. in any industry work as hard as he works every single day, and when he is working that hard, he is working that hard for all of you and for our country. that's why he is doing it. i think one question you could ask when you are talking to your neighbors that might be undecided about where to go in this thing is this classic question ronald reagan was the one that really brought it up, which said one of the most powerful questions we can ask in an election year is where you -- are you better off than you were

four years ago? if this person is honest about living in joe biden's america, what is the answer going to be? the answer is going to be no. that alone should be the strongest indicator that if you had a regular election, don't vote for the incumbent, take a chance on the next person, but what do we have going on here? we have something that's never happened in our lifetime -- >> we will leave this here with a reminder you can watch our programs online. live now to a discussion on the global implications of the russia-china partnership from the council on foreign relations. live coverage on c-span 3. >> silence all mobile devices. if you are called on, please stand, make sure to speak into the microphone and state your name before asking your question. thank you. >> good morning, everybody.

thanks for braving the streets of washington, d.c. after two days of snow to make it this morning. i am rush doshi, fellow for asia studies here at the council. we are excited to welcome you for what i think will be a fantastic symposium on the china-russia relationship. i want to start that by saying today's part is the inaugural event of the china 360 program, one of the four programs under the china strategy initiative we launched last year. the guiden questions are what is china doing around the world and how are countries responding to china's growing global profile? one of the most important questions when you think about china's global ambitions, its behavior is its relationship with russia, which is why that will be our critical focus today. we have convened to discuss an important report by ambassador bob blackwell and richard

fontaine. blackwell, after a distinguished career across four administrations, and as ambassador to india. richard fontaine is a c.e.o., long-time policy advisor to john mccain and worked on the senate foreign relations committee. after having published their co-authored book last year, these two strategists decided to team up again for another collaboration, this time on china-russia. this report is significant. it's hefty. it has 226 footnotes and that length of footnote is a signature of any collaboration involving a master. do look at the footnotes. a lot of time went into them. anyway, this conversation will begin in just a minute. it will be moderated by one of our members, one of my friends, bay fong, the president of radio free asia. they spent more than two decades

in journalism. also a deputy assistant secretary at the state department. after that conversation, please stay around. we have coffee but more importantly, we have a panel with c.f.r. fellows elliott abrams, liana fix, shannon o'neil. we will discuss the global profile, how are countries around the world looking at this relationship? what are these countries doing in all of thee -- these regions? thank you all for joining us. i would like to welcome now bay fong and richard fontaine to the stage. thank you. bay: thank you all for joining

us today. this will be a really interesting conversation. i have the pleasure of moderating this opening keynote session entitled no limits, the china-russia relationship and u.s. foreign policy. with my good friend, richard fontaine here in the room, and ams consider -- ambassador bob blackwill on the screen. we will have half an hour of conversation and you guys will be able to ask questions. so i wanted to start actually with ambassador blackwill. if you could lay out for us how you guys decided to write this report. >> thank you, bay. good to see all of you if only remotely. richard and i in the summer of 2003 were hard at work on our book on the pivot, and realized that an important subject which we would not have time to address in the book was the one

which is the subject of our discussion today. so we launched and co-chaired a c.f.r. study on the subject. we had eight meetings from october, 2003, to may, 2004, and as soon as the book was published in june, we went to work on the writing of this report, although we and our terrific research associates had been working on research. you will see when you have a chance to look at it that it is data rich, as rush said. mike bloomberg has a mantra for applications for assistance which is in god we trust, everybody else bring data. there's lots of data in here on the collaboration.

we try not to discuss what china and russia are doing unilaterally with respect to the united states and world order, but what they're doing together and we did try to vacuum what is available in the public domain on this subject. but to conclude, we want to stress that although we hope you'll find the report impressive and disturbing, it is only a shadow of all these two countries do together daily to undermine u.s. national interests. they can keep secrets. there exists no public record of most of their bilateral meetings, and only scant knowledge of their joint activities and mutual support, which they discuss, plan, and carry out. in short, what the report

illuminates is a faint rendering of full scope of what these two adversaries jointly undertake to undermine the foreign policies and national interests of the united states. bay: thank you. richard, we had an interesting conversation in the greenroom just about how you actually came up with the sort of key idea of this report, which is that this alliance is the greatest threat to u.s. national interests in 60 years. how did you come up with the 60 years and what is the strategic aim of the alliance? if they are the joint architects of a revisionist international order, what does this order look like? richard: i think one could always offer various instances from history about what has been most dangerous. certainly the cuban missile crisis about 60 years ago was a particularly dangerous time, and

this one, too, is a particularly dangerous time. so hence the 60 years since the cuban missile crisis. but if one looks at what the challenge is presented by china and russia working together closely, sort of the highest level of abstraction we have a little quote in our report, who said in a world of five great powers, you should try to be one of three, not two. in a world of three great powers, one of one, not two. so what multiple administrations, certainly starting with the nixon administration forward, tried to do is ensure that the soviet union and russia and china were both more distant from each other than either was from the united states. they are both closer to each other by far than either is with the united states. so that's kind of a major strategic challenge, but has

very operational manifestations. russia is more dangerous to u.s. interests and some of the things we trying to accomplish in the world because of its closeness to china. russia would not be able to conduct the war in ukraine the way it is without chinese support for that war. the same is true of china. china's military is highly dependent on the transfer of russian arms and technology and therefore makes the problem of deterrence from a u.s. stand point in east asia more difficult than it would be in the absence of that relationship with russia. you can look at this on the economic side, on the technology transfer side, on the diplomatic coordination side and so forth. and then the fact that these two are working together and are really glued together by a shared opposition to what they believe is an anachronistic, unfairly western dominated international order that does

not accord for them the space and the status and the influence that they believe they deserve by virtue of their history and their civilization and their interest and geography and power means that they're now alternatives they're trying to put on offer, not just for russia and china itself, but of course also for iran and north korea and other rejectionist powers that would not -- would be much more isolatessed in a world where russia and china were not working together and trying to articulate alternatives to the current international order. bay: so ambassador blackwill, richard spoke about how china's support of russia has affected the ukraine war. i was wondering if you could look ahead and if you can talk about how the military cooperation between the two might look in a conflict over, say, taiwan?

robert: let me first say -- i will do this in a general way -- it's discussed in great detail in the report. china's assistance, its diplomatic assistance to russia, its military assistance to russia and its economic assistance to russia is indispensable to the conduct of the war on russia's part, and we could go into the details if you all wish, but with respect to taiwan, one of the things of course that we don't know, in fact, but we can speculate is that china is learning the lessons of russia's combat against ukraine in ukraine more than simply as we do reading the

morning papers. one would guess that china is intensively briefed by the russians of the conclusions they draw. of course, china will have its own view of that, but the battlefield experience that the russian armed forces have had, especially from the syrian civil war onward, is indispensable to an army, military force which is not fought in decades. so lessons learned must be an important dimension of china's interaction with russia as the war progresses. just one other point about russia and china and the war, it's striking to us that despite the fact that china has paid a

price in europe obviously for the war and china's support of russia, despite that, beijing's support of russia and the war is increasing, not decreasing, despite europe's penalties which it's now exacting on european china relations. bay: so you think that their influence will be in sort of the lessons learned as well as sort of support militarily? is that in the game? robert: this is a broader question and a good one, which is if the united states and china go to war over the taiwan straits, for example, and that's obviously the most likely

contingency, it seems unlikely that russia and iran and north korea will sit on the sidelines and say, well, let's see how this turns out. we are not involved. that doesn't mean that they will send forces to the taiwan straits, but there are many things in the regions that -- where they're located, beginning with europe, that can distract or complicate the u.s. military performance if there is such a war. bay: so, richard, you actually coined the term axis of evil, i think, in a foreign affairs article earlier this year. what -- you were talking about how china and russia are increasingly working with iran and north korea. i am wondering if you can just

tell us more about this cooperation. richard: sure. my colleague and i wrote a long piece for foreign affairs to try to look in some detail at this emerging set of relationships among russia, china, north korea, and iran. even since we wrote that article and certainly since we started writing that article, we have seen this increase in dramatic ways. i think if a year ago most people had said, well, in 2024 you will have thousands of north koreans fighting on behalf of them, that's an unusual prediction but here we are. you see this axis of upheaval, they're really seeking an upheaval of this international order. there are plenty of things that divide them.

they believe this is an unfair western dominated international order which has concrete manifestations with the long arm of u.s. military, alliance system around the world that rejectionist fear of influence, the imposition of sanctions, insistence on a uniformed definition of democracy which they reject. russia's war in ukraine has been the primary catalyst. you see not only north korean ammunition and weapons and troops party to that war, but also chinese components and diplomatic protection and support and you see iranian drones and missiles and of course the other countries

that -- they get things in return for this. so we only know some of what hear getting for return, but we know that it's cut rate energy supplies, it's north korea's side, for example, north korea is having its assets in russian banks that were frozen under u.n. security council resolution direction, being unfrozen, a diplomatic lifeline being thrown to the north koreans where previously china had the prerogative there. and so you see each of these countries becoming potentially more dangerous than they would be on their own because of the support they can rely on from the other members, and then again in this broader sense, you see a place for other rejectionist countries to defect to. so if you don't like the way the world is ordered now, for many years you could sort of shake your fist at the world or become

something of a rogue state, but there wasn't this sort of viable alternative to it. and now these four countries plus others are trying to construct what they believe to be a viable alternative to it and that's one to which other dissatisfied countries could add weight. bay: yeah, that's really interesting. ambassador blackwill, can you speak more about the alliance on the economic front and what the implications are for u.s. policy interests there? robert: the economic assistance that china is giving russia has had a major part in russia being able to manage of course with difficulties the many western sanctions that have been applied from the beginning of the war, and just to give you an example,

in the first year of the war, china provided russia with about 40% of its total imports. in a year and a half, that doubled. many of the consumer goods that russia would not get otherwise, for example, automobiles, telephones, and so forth, are now being supplied by china, by the end of 2023, china had become the largest importer of russian crude oil at of course discounted prices, at 2.3 million barrels per day, up from 1.6 million barrels just two years earlier. so this is, of course, in this

context we are now discussing it of great assistance to russia, but the discounted oil of course is also of considerable benefit to china as it struggles with its current economic difficulties. bay: can we talk about your -- you guys' policy prescriptions? richard, if you could start us off, what should the u.s. and its allies do to counter this axis? richard: being completists, we have no less than 14 policy prescriptions for those who wish to see chapter and verse. but i won't go through all 14. i will hit a couple of them. one, i think from a defense perspective, we need to rise to the challenge and increase defense spending in a significant way. we are now at about 3% of g.d.p. of defense spending which is more or less where we were

toward the end of the 1990's at the height of the peace dividend after the end of the cold war. the world has changed in a major way. we need to make investments in defense that will be commensurate with the challenge that we face. another one is creating new relationships with countries that are these global swing states that are in the middle here, so brazil, india, turkey, south africa, saudi arabia, these countries that are sort of g-7 western europe and canada aligned, not this group of upheaval or china-russia aligned but have different relationships. so focusing on ways to engage more effectively with those countries in a fashion that will ultimately add on particular

issues their weight to the preferences that we have rather than the other i think is important. it's probably tilting in a windmill to say that we should have a trade policy -- well, i guess we will have a trade policy but an affirmative, assertive trade policy, one that actually is looking for opportunities, particularly with countries that see economic benefits on offer from -- especially from china. if we wish countries to not be as aligned as closely with russia or china, then we have to offer something ourselves we actually have as the world's biggest market and biggest source of investment lots of things we can offer. so if we build on that, then that's a set of possibilities that i think we would be wise to exploit. and then the other is to sort of take on the challenge that is arising at home, with the

seriousness that it seems to me it deserves. if we are half right about the consequences down the road here of increasing china-russia cooperation, sort of global impacts, impacts on u.s. interests and values around the world and the availability to either side of other countries sort of joining in these configurations, then frankly we should be focused on what it is we need to do with our allies and ourselves in different scenarios in order to reduce that influence in areas that matter most, which would suggest at a minimum a certain level of increased seriousness to our foreign policy discussions. bay: ambassador blackwill, do you have any to add to the policy prescriptions? robert: i do, just to reinforce what richard said about defense spending, it's striking that there seems to be a near

consensus, that's a singularity these days in washington, about the threat of china and russia pose for the united states, but that's not translated into increased defense spending, which is absolutely necessary. so our rhetoric is fine, but the past administrations and the ones before that don't translate that into defense budget proposals to the congress consistent with the rhetoric and the congress does not take the lead in trying to insist that the defense budget be substantially increased. that's the first point i would make. second is we urge despite the concern that's reflected in the report to intensify bilateral interaction with both moscow and

with beijing, we think it was a mistake to cut off all interaction with vladimir putin for the last 2 1/2 years, and think it should be initiated as soon as possible after the inauguration. the last point i would make is that we address in the subject -- in the report of subject that's oft discussed in washington, which is whether there is an opportunity for trilateral kissingerrian diplomacy which would separate the two over time, and we call this a delusion and explain why we think that's the case. richard: if i can add one thing at the risk of maybe hitting all 14 that i said we wouldn't do, but there's also an important

set of discussions to be had with our european allies on a priority basis. if god forbid the united states were to find itself at war with china in the western pacific, one, the geographical boundaries of that conflict are unclear, but the resource intensity from the american side is much clearer. this would be an all-in sort of thing. it would put a very significant demand on the entire global footprint of america's military forces. that in turn opens the possibility of opportunistic aggression in europe, and so the kind of conversations we need to be having with our european allies is we imagine that nightmare scenario what are the capabilities europe should be investing in now to deter war in that circumstance so that the nightmare scenario doesn't become a double nightmare scenario? that's one and lastly to pick up for a second on bob's point

about wedge driving as -- sometimes we will see pieces and can cut this deal and we will flip china and together we are take on russia and not many people talk about a reverse flipping russia. or more modest things. russia and china have this sort of competitive spirit in central asia, where they have historic claims to influence, and maybe we can dial that up somehow or north korea is a potential wedge now that it's friendly with both china and russia and i think we are pessimistic about even at a more tactical level the ability of the united states to try to heighten these tensions between the two in a way that would drive wedges sufficient to actually improve the balance here and improve the situation. bay: can i just take my

moderator's prerogative with my radio free asia hat on to add a 15th policy prescription, which is there's also so much insidious cooperation and mutual reinforcement on the disinformation front between china and russia and i think it is really important for us to push back on that and to put some resources towards it. richard: that's one of the 14, so you will be happy to see that. again completist, but yes, you are absolutely right. bay: thank you very much. so at this time, i would like to invite c.f.r. members to join our conversation with questions. this meeting is on the record. please go ahead. please identify yourself. >> thank you very much. guiellermo, former c.i.a., was a fellow at the council. a quick observation to your

first question, the information that we got. i would be more skeptical about the lessons the chinese are learning from the russians because in my experience the russians don't learn lessons well internally, their secrecy. it would be interesting to know how much they're sharing with the chinese especially given the lack of battlefield success they've had in many areas. conversely, on the u.s. side and the europeans, this is a start-up war and it's incredible to see how many small u.s. businesses are deeply ingrained in the ukrainian defense sector teaching and learning. it's an interesting topic and perhaps something you could loo. perhaps something that you can look at. my question is directed to ambassador blackwill. the one country that you didn't touch on yet that i would be curious about is the perspective from new delhi. this presents a relationship between china and russia and the conflict of the united states

presents india with some interesting challenges and opportunities which they spent the last 70 years trying to navigate. right now, it is both more interesting and more challenging. curious to see where you see new delhi vis-a-vis what it is doing with china, russia and then balancing with the u.s. thank you. robert: good question and one that is worthy of a prolonged discussion. of course, now, india tries to profit from, in material terms, too, with its relationship with both washington and moscow. that is not going to change. just to remind, the soviet union was india's closest partner and supporter throughout the cold war. unlike americans, indians have

very long memories. moreover, they are highly dependent on the russians for spare parts for their military. with respect to china, i have perhaps a somewhat heretical view of this. i think there is some evidence that india, which came in a decade ago, full bore in the u.s.-india relationship, more than a decade ago, is now beginning to ask itself, did we make a good bet on the americans? for reasons having to do with our faltering foreign policy in the last 10 to 15 years, all the mistakes we have made. but also because they ask, especially in the military balance, and china has had an enormous impact on that in east

asia to america's disadvantage. well the americans do what is necessary to balance chinese power? that is the overall strategic context of the recent quasi agreement on borders which is more ephemeral than is perhaps portrayed but is a step forward in the bilateral relationship. i think they are watching very closely what this new administration will do with respect to ensuring that the u.s. is to the long-term china challenge, and they are not sure. >> my question is to ambassador blackwill. you have emphasize the importance of data and there is a lot of data in the report, but

sometimes it is not really scaled well to put into context. the economic relationship is a part of this global transformation that the report addresses. but if you look at bilateral trade between china and russia, it is still only half of the trade between china and the united states, and it is only 1% of global trade. so i don't see this trade relationship becoming a very important part of this global transformation that you address. robert: i don't quarrel with your fingers but i think more pertinent figures are what is the economic assistance that china is giving russia? it may be tied in terms of global trade but it is indispensable to russia dealing with the sanctions that have been brought against them. at least that is what we argue in the report.

>> mark kennedy, wilson center. you had mentioned that the access of autocracies may want to gather more disaffected people to increase their weight. what do we see the role as brics setting up, being a counter file to the g7? richard: yes, it is one of the most ardent proponents of brics. when you talk to officials from governments who have recently joined brics, they will say that is not really what this is, this is opportunity for trade, relationships, things like that. but if you look at certainly china and russia, iran's interest in these things, to have a visible, quasi alternative structure instead of

preferences to point to, he's important now in this battle of narratives. they are making a lot about brics diplomacy and to show, for example, you thought russia was isolated. russia is not as isolated as you would have thought. you would have thought the g7 tells the world what things will look like. that is a majority of the world's population. look at our combined economic weight. the specifics and the concrete aspects of that are still not quite there. what is the positive agenda of the brics? you can find some things, brics development bank, they don't like the dollar denomination of the global financial infrastructure, things like that. some of these things are pretty nascent. but as a directional move, certainly, it is being seen by russia and china in particular as one, probably the most visible alternative to this g7,

western-led, rules-based order that we talk so much about. robert: could i chime in on that just to support what richard said? last year, as you know, there was a brics summit. 34 countries attended it. 20 heads of state. if you look at the communique on the war in ukraine, it could have been written in moscow, and probably was written in collaboration with the russians and the chinese with respect to the war. it was consistent with china's 12-point quote unquote peace proposal. if you read it, you would have thought, like venus on a halfshell, the war suddenly

sprung up and nobody knows why or how. this was signed on by these 34 countries. we know what the intent of russia and china are with respect to brics, as richard said, and they are working very hard on it. there are five or six more applicants to join it with the result that i just described going forward. >> thank you. good morning. paul saunders, center for the national interest. i look very much forward to reading the report. i am very much with you on the idea that it is delusional to try and split china and russia, now or certainly any time in the near future. at the same time, it seems to me that relationship is going to evolve over time.

as a non-economist, i guess i see russia with a sort of limited stock of technology that it can provide to china. i see china in a position moving forward to generate a lot more new technology than russia can generate. i see china taking over russia's economy in many respects, creating a deepening dependence. i wonder how you view that. more broadly, how you view that relationship. richard: if you look at the percentage of trade, for example, that russia conducts with china and the rest of the world pre-war, pre-invasion of ukraine, dramatic difference.

on the technology side, there are areas in which russia is probably still ahead of china, has some technology china is interested in, especially on the military side. air defense systems, submarine quieting technology, jet engines, things like that. although some of these areas china is likely closing the gap between itself and russia. but even if you imagine all the technology that chana wants -- china watts, transferred to china, what is the value proposition for china of being in this relationship with russia? there are things that go beyond just adding up the numbers of the economic relationship, who is dominated by who. for example, china has a strong interest in having its flow of hydrocarbons, overland through russia as opposed by sea through

the middle east where they are potentially vulnerable to the u.s. navy if they ever got into conflict. you could look at the numbers but that is a qualitative difference that is in the interest of both countries, russia to sell, china to buy. russia has a veto in the un security council. also is sort of, the message from russian leaders to chinese leaders with respect to things like the war in ukraine, if we lose in ukraine, the west will try to foment a revolution in moscow, and guess who is next. russia has a little bit of a frontal role in that. that is in china's interest. there are ways where they divide certainly in their risk tolerance, dissatisfaction with the way things are.

but i think the economic relationship will involve but i don't know that that will significantly change the glue that has these countries being drawn together. one last point on this, what i often hear, this will inevitably fall apart because putin can never psychologically accept that russia will be a junior partner with china. one, what alternative does putin and russia have? two, in some ways, it is not clear that that is how the russian leaders are chinese leaders necessarily see this. certainly by economic weight, population, all these other things, china is the bigger and more powerful country. russia is dependent on china in ways that china is not dependent on russia. but who is standing up for this alternative vision and pushing back most vigorously against the west?

it is russia, not china. in that respect, it is not clear to me that they see themselves as russian partners and at some point russian greatness will not allow us to sustain that posture. bay: we have a question in coming from in from a member online. >> we will take the next question from robert hormetz. >> i would like to follow-up up richard's point on the trade issue. because one of the most important elements in trying to contain this grouping particularly in china, and to get other countries who you mentioned might be more attracted to china because of trade relations, the united states needs to have a coherent trade policy with countries other than the g7 oecd countries , which means a number of the

emerging markets, global south. the problem is, in this administration, which you would have thought would have been inclined in that direction, it has been the opposite. like the previous administration, they opted out of tpp. as the chinese and others have developed closer trade ties not just through build and road but to other various groupings, they have used those for strategic collaboration as well. the problem in the united states is, a, we have not done that in the last eight years. b, the political environment in this country is very negative on any trade deals at all it appears. but has never really been educated to the point that you made, that if you want to have a long system of alliance and give

other countries alternatives to dealing with china or other countries, you need to have some glue holding them together with united states and others. that is largely in the area of trade. so my question is not just saying that we need closer trade ties, but trying to make an educational case to the american people that these are not just of economic importance but strategic importance. that lesson seems to be totally lost in washington and there seems to be virtually no one of any stature in washington who makes that geo-economic, geo-strategic link and argues that trade will be important if you want a coherent strategy to contain what we are seeing between china, russia, and other groups. richard: i really agree with

what you are saying with one potential caveat, which is i think sometimes those of us who see the strategic link with trade agreements overdo the strategic part and it ends up leading more casual observers to believe that the u.s. needs to take an economic hit in order to contain china or something like that. in 2016, most of the arguments, when it looked like tpp at a shot of making it through congress, most of the arguments were not made on economic grounds. if we don't set the rules, china most of the rules. if we don't solidify trade relations with these countries, china will be in the ascendance somehow. in retrospect, i wonder if that left, in some minds, including on capitol hill, the notion that we would actually be left behind

economically, when in fact the opposite would have been the case. it would have been an economic benefit as well as strategic benefit. that said, despite the fact that some of us would love to see tpp go through, we have to live in political reality and that is not going to happen anytime soon or not at all. but that doesn't mean that you cannot do nothing on an affirmative trade agenda. we could have a digital trade agreement with multiple countries in east asia tomorrow if we wanted to do so. other agreements we could strike with countries around the world that are neither china nor russia, critical minerals, or potentially clean technology, things like that that probably would not ruffle too many feathers politically. not talking about ag, autos. but to do something would be nice. we will see what happens with tariffs and everything else. bay: thank you so much, richard,

ambassador blackwill. thank you all for joining this meeting. i hope you can all stay and join us for our plenary discussion at 10: 30. global discussions on the china-russian relationship. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2025] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

>> live coverage of a discussion on the global implications of the relationship between china and russia. it is hosted by the council on foreign relations. a brief break while we wait. we will show you a portion of the conversation from earlier today. thank you all for joining us today. this will be a really interesting conversation. i have the pleasure of moderating this opening keynote session entitled no limits, the china-russia relationship and u.s. foreign policy, with my good friend richard fontaine here in the room, ambassador bob black will on our screen. i will just dive right in, we have half an hour of conversation and then you'll be able to ask questions. i wanted to start with ambassador blackwill, if you could just lay out for us how you decided to write this report

. robert: thank you, bay, and good to see you it only remotely. richard and i in the summer of 2003 were hard at work on our book on the pit and realized that an important subject which we would not have time to address in the book was the one which is the subject of our discussion today. so we launched and cochaired a cfr study on the subject. we had eight meetings from october 2003 to may 2004, and as soon as the book was published in june, we went to work on the writing of this report, although we and our terrific search associates at cfr were working on research.

you will see when you have a chance to look at it that it is data-rich. mike bloomberg's philanthropic arm has an arm for assistance, which is, in god we trust, everything else, we bring data. there's lots of data in here on the collaboration. we try not to discuss what china and russia are doing unilaterally with respect to the united states and world order, but what they're doing together and we did try to vacuum what is available in the public domain on this subject. but to conclude, we want to stress that although we hope you'll find the report impressive and disturbing, it is only a shadow of all these two countries do together daily to

undermine u.s. national interests. they can keep secrets. there exists no public record of most of their bilateral meetings, and only scant knowledge of their joint activities and mutual support, which they discuss, plan, and carry out. in short, what the report illuminates is a faint rendering of full scope of what these two adversaries jointly undertake to undermine the foreign policies and national interests of the united states. bay: thank you. richard, we had an interesting conversation in the greenroom just about how you actually came up with the sort of key idea of this report, which is that this alliance is the greatest threat to u.s. national interests in 60 years. how did you come up with the 60 years and what is the strategic aim of the alliance?

if they are the joint architects of a revisionist international order, what does this order look like? richard: i think one could always offer various instances from history about what has been most dangerous. certainly the cuban missile crisis about 60 years ago was a particularly dangerous time, and this one, too, is a particularly dangerous time. so hence the 60 years since the cuban missile crisis. but if one looks at what the challenge is presented by china and russia working together closely, sort of the highest level of abstraction we have a little quote in our report, who said in a world of five great powers, you should try to be one of three, not two. in a world of three great powers, one of one, not two. so what multiple

administrations, certainly starting with the nixon administration forward, tried to do is ensure that the soviet union and russia and china were both more distant from each other than either was from the united states. they are both closer to each other by far than either is with the united states. so that's kind of a major strategic challenge, but has very operational manifestations. russia is more dangerous to u.s. interests and some of the things we trying to accomplish in the world because of its closeness to china. russia would not be able to conduct the war in ukraine the way it is without chinese material support for that war. the same is true of china. china's military is highly dependent on the transfer of russian arms and technology and therefore makes the problem of deterrence from a u.s. stand point in east asia more difficult than it would be in the absence of that relationship with russia.

you can look at this on the economic side, on the technology transfer side, on the diplomatic coordination side and so forth. and then the fact that these two are working together and are really glued together by a shared opposition to what they believe is an anachronistic, unfairly western dominated international order that does not accord for them the space and the status and the influence that they believe they deserve by virtue of their history and their civilization and their interest and geography and power means that they're now alternatives they're trying to put on offer, not just for russia and china itself, but of course also for iran and north korea and other rejectionist powers that would not -- would be much more isolated in a world where russia and china were not working together and trying to articulate alternatives to the current international order. bay: so ambassador blackwill,

richard spoke about how china's support of russia has affected the ukraine war. i was wondering if you could look ahead and if you can talk about how the military cooperation between the two might look in a conflict over, say, taiwan? robert: let me first say -- i will do this in a general way -- it's discussed in great detail in the report. china's assistance, its diplomatic assistance to russia, its military assistance to russia and its economic assistance to russia is indispensable to the conduct of the war on russia's part, and we could go into the details if you all wish, but with respect to

taiwan, one of the things of course that we don't know, in fact, but we can speculate is that china is learning the lessons of russia's combat against ukraine in ukraine more than simply as we do reading the morning papers. one would guess that china is intensively briefed by the russians of the conclusions they draw. of course, china will have its own view of that, but the battlefield experience that the russian armed forces have had, especially from the syrian civil war onward, is indispensable to an army, military force which is not fought in decades. so lessons learned must be an

important dimension of china's interaction with russia as the war progresses. just one other point about russia and china and the war, it's striking to us that despite the fact that china has paid a price in europe obviously for the war and china's support of russia, despite that, beijing's support of russia and the war is increasing, not decreasing, despite europe's penalties which it's now exacting on european china relations. bay: so you think that their

influence will be in sort of the lessons learned as well as sort of support militarily? is that in the game? robert: this is a broader question and a good one, which is if the united states and china go to war over the taiwan straits, for example, and that's obviously the most likely contingency, it seems unlikely that russia and iran and north korea will sit on the sidelines and say, well, let's see how this turns out. we are not involved. that doesn't mean that they will send forces to the taiwan straits, but there are many things in the regions that -- where they're located, beginning with europe, that can distract or complicate the u.s. military

performance if there is such a war. bay: so, richard, you actually coined the term axis of evil, i -- upheaval, i think, in a foreign affairs article earlier this year. what -- you were talking about how china and russia are increasingly working with iran and north korea. i am wondering if you can just tell us more about this cooperation. richard: sure. my colleague and i wrote a long piece for foreign affairs to try to look in some detail at this emerging set of relationships among russia, china, north korea, and iran. even since we wrote that article and certainly since we started writing that article, we have seen this increase in dramatic ways. i think if a year ago most

people had said, well, in 2024 you will have thousands of north koreans fighting on behalf of them, that's an unusual prediction but here we are. you see this axis of upheaval, they're really seeking an upheaval of this international order. there are plenty of things that divide them. they believe this is an unfair western dominated international order which has concrete manifestations with the long arm of u.s. military, alliance system around the world that rejectionist fear of influence, the imposition of sanctions, insistence on a uniformed definition of democracy which they reject. russia's war in ukraine has been the primary catalyst.

>> good morning, everybody. welcome back. we are excited to begin our next session. during the session we have convened senior fellows at cfr to reflect on the china-russian relationship and its implications around the world. i will introduce our distant was penniless in a moment. i will ask some general questions and then go into specific questions for each region before turning over to the audience in the room and online. starting from my left we have shannon o'neill, our senior vice president, director of studies, our chair at cfr, in addition to leading our david rockefeller's program, oversees over 14 fellowship programs. when she is not putting out fires at cfr or joint pain also like this one she is also a

leading authority on global trade, supply chains in latin america. we will have questions for her about latin america, china, russia shortly. next to shannon is michelle gavin, senior fellow for africa policy studies here at cfr. from 2011 to 2014, michelle with the u.s. ambassador to botswana and served concurrently as the u.s. representative to the southern african the community. before her ambassadorship, michelle was senior director for africa on the national security council and stop director on the senate foreign relations committee on african affairs. to my left, elliot abrams, senior fellow for middle eastern studies at cfr. in addition to his time in congress as chief of staff to senator moynahan, assistant secretary of state, also served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser to the george w. bush administration, and in the trump administration, special representative for iran and venezuela. on the screen we have liana fix,

an expert in european security. liana has been a fellow across the united states and europe including the german marshall fund, german institute for international and security affairs, also been a fellow for international affairs at the german federal office. and the delegation into please see payment as well as the carnegie, moscow center. we have an incredible panel today. looking forward to a very rich discussion on the global dimensions of the china-russia relationship all building on this fantastic csr that you saw it earlier today from richard fontaine. this is a printed copy that i stole from elliott's office. they are so scarce, they are sold out, and they are free. we will begin with some general questions. really the big one on my mind, probably on many of yours, is each of these reasons of the world, middle east, latin america, africa, europe seeing

the china-russia relationship? we talk about it in the u.s. but others may see it differently. do they see china and russia as pursuing different interests, similar interests, do they regard those ties with concern or apathy or in some cases perhaps enthusiasm? i want to begin on my far left with the liana and then we will work our way down the line with this general question. if you could start us off. liana: thanks so much, a pleasure to be here with my colleagues and speak at this symposium. i am here in berlin right now, so a good spot to start on the china-russia relationship. just a general remark from the beginning, there is a very clear lack of analytical depth and awareness when it comes to the china-russia relationship here in europe. we read newspaper articles that there is an autocratic alliance between china and russia and that a deep have common goals

but there is no translation of this perception in policymaking. in conceptual terms, it's very clear russia is perceived as a security threat. what else after the invasion of ukraine in 2022? but china conceptually in the framework of the european union and its member states, is seen as an economic competitor, increasingly an economic threat, but europe is far away from seeing china as a security threat and seeing the link between russia and china, and a linkage of the lines which can be a security threat in europe. and that is surprising because russia's invasion of ukraine in 2022 and the long years that followed after the war would not have been possible without china's support for russia. from the european side, an acknowledgment that china is an enabler of russia's war. but that has been very much the

rhetoric. there is very little action from the european side that tries to address either directly china support for russia, or directly the depth of the russian-chinese relationship. europeans are in the perception of china, very much stuck in the first year of the invasion of ukraine, where china is perceived as an actor who can be used to help russia, can still be used for a nuclear threat on the cease-fire. this will be my last point. this comes together with the perception of china being a power that possibly you don't even need to interfere in the alliance between russia and china. but that this alliance is short-lived anyway. there is an incredibly good job at showing us this is an illusion, this alliance. it will not just disappear

because of internal differences. it is not an alliance that can easily be driven apart. but this is something which very much still exists in the minds of europeans. what have russia and china just don't get along with each other anymore? do we really have to interfere? isn't this something that will not last anyway? there will not be strategic moves to break this alliance apart, but this is the hope which covers up the lack of european action. the last point, let me go back to one of the shapers of this russia and china approach in germany for a long time, angela merkel. there is also a perception of china especially in economic circles in europe that still sees china in pre-xi jinping times, still thinks about china as a main economic exporter that underestimates the utilization

of china and also underestimates the military links between russia and china. that is something angela merkel has written about. just to quote her in the end, she said xi jinping has become an actor that wants to see china as a military power but xi has not acted on that. rush: i will say to the audience, liana has written a number of articles recently about how china and russia pose a significant challenge for european security, try to wake up public awareness in europe of that reality. i want to ask one quick follow-up if you could be brief. it is this particular dimension of the question. what is the thinking in europe right now about the possibility of simultaneous multi-theater provocations in asia and europe, stressing european security? the possibility of a horizontal linkage between a ukraine or baltic scenario and a taiwan, south china sea scenario. in asia it does not seem so

far-fetched anymore. how are europeans thinking about that? liana: the answer will frustrate you, even if it is a brief answer. this is very much perceived as a u.s. problem, not two conflicts that your past to address. the question is how do we prevent the u.s. from abandoning, for going for taiwan rather than estonia? had to be keep the united states in? but there is no european thinking on how to address these conflicts. rush: thank you. that is very reassuring. [laughter] obviously, you need to write more foreign affairs articles on the subject, and the person who could authorize that is shannon o'neill. >> editorially independent from the rest of the council. rush: i don't have to be so careful. let me ask you, shannon, broadly how is the region looking at the china-russia relationship. more specifically, how are latin american companies -- countries

thinking about some of these new institutional arrangements meant to challenge western-led institutions, as well? shannon: i will start a bit with russia and china in the region. they have been historically on more parallel tracks and tightly combined. russia came in predominately on the security side. richard brought up the cuban missile crisis. that is the big entry. still russia has had long-standing ties with cuba, with venezuela, nicaragua, many other authoritarian regimes, supplying arms, military training and the like. there is not a huge commercial relationship in the region. some have come into the energy sector because many of the companies were sanctioned, it is the one place they could go. probably the most significant

trait is fertilizer with brazil. china, on the other hand, has come into latin america on a very commercial side. a lot of investment, finding resources they needed for their growth over the last 25 years. a lot of investment in infrastructure and the like. more recently moving into telecommunications, electricity grids, other things. but we are seeing china begin to come in on the security intelligence side. there is a big base in southern argentina that is potentially dual use. hard to know what is happening there. not sure that the argentines know because they are not allowed in to see what's happening. there have been reports of china coming into cuba with intelligence surveillance, questions about dual use ports. so you are starting to see a little more conversations if not direct coordination between the two. what was brought up in the last panel, both are pretty active in

the disinformation campaign. russia has rtv, others are quite strong in latin america, social media that are picked up broadly. china, too. you are seeing it looser in other places but there is some motivation and conversations there. let me turn to the brics because this is interesting. brazil is very proud of being one of the founders of brics. i think it's been a tough year for latin america in the brics. they were not particularly pleased about the expansion of brics for a couple of reasons. it brought in a lot of authoritarian governments, not democracies. brazil has stood many tests of that in recent years. and it also brought in a lot of countries that had close ties with china but not necessarily with the other brics. so becoming more of a hub and

spoke. lots of trading ties, diplomatic ties but not necessarily with brazil or india, south africa, the other founding members. beginning to see the brics become a more politicized, anti-west then brazil would like. brazil holds themselves as they want to be nonaligned. they want to play on the global stage and work with everyone. all of a sudden, high jacked too strong a word, but they are worried about the leanings. we saw the last round in sochi, both cuba and venezuela wanted to apply for membership, and brazil pushed back on that, stopped that process. they are pretty much playing rearguard. brazil is the next host for the brics in 2025, so they will try to pull that organization back to a different agenda, different approach, but they are seeing this combination of china and russia as difficult for their ambitions on the global stage. rush: maybe one follow-up

question. as you look at china's growing engagement in latin america, do you see -- two people in the region see any conflict between the relationship, any places where china displaces russia? shannon: i would say the russian influence has diminished in the last couple years as they have been preoccupied with other parts of the world, let's say. many latin american countries signed on to the condemnation of the invasion of ukraine, even if they didn't follow through with more robust participation and the like. i think what we are seeing there is really china at the forefront or latin america, thinking about finances and money and investment on the one side, but also the worries of them pushing their diplomatic weight around in the region as countries become more dependent on them in

terms of debt, trade, in terms of other things. we have seen cases like that. the previous brazilian governments have stood up to china on various things. china slow walked sending them vaccines early on. so there were some lessons. and that government let, let huawei into telecommunications grid. yes, they need foreign direct investment, financing and the like, but there is also some wariness of what china does once they are there. rush: thank you. i want to turn to michelle know if we could. the broader question of, africa has a lot of different perspectives, so it is difficult to say how does africa view the china-russia relationship? related to that, there is some description in the report suggesting that we are seeing states that benefit from chinese

assistance over russia in the u.n., so we are seeing this triangular coordination across international institutions. how do african countries in general see the china-russia relationship, are we seeing influence by one power benefit the other? michelle: you are right, of course, there is always a diversity of views. broadly speaking, for most african governments and societies, these are two very distinct partners. both have long histories on the continent. china offering is much more robust in terms of what that partnership can look like with african states. obviously, the famous investments in infrastructure. but it goes well beyond that to technology, smart cities investments but also help more authoritarian governments keep

track of urban opposition, a wealth of economic ties. the chinese foreign minister is on the continent right now, consistently making his first trip every year, a trip to africa. there are political party trainings. it is kind of a full suite of engagements. if you look at popular opinion, china is reasonably popular throughout the continent. people see it as very influential in their own economies and tend to have a largely positive view. it sort of goes china, the u.s. not far behind, and then russia much lower. of course, that varies depending on countries so that is a broadbrush. whereas with russia, there are these very important historical linkages, but really russia is

an arms supplier and a supplier of regime security in the central african republic, some of the states that have had military coups. that is what the offer is. we can keep this capital from being overrun. not we can provide security for the country or reestablish the ability to control this land within your borders. that is not the offer. russia has gotten a black eye in mozambique. most of the continent is aware that their security offering in mali, burkina is not delivering. it's actually more difficult for people in those countries. they are experiencing the insecurity but there is a

tremendous repression of actual information. that brings me to the information space, similar to what shannon said, both actors are extremely active, not just with these conventional media houses, but paid influencers on social media who are very effective at amplifying preferred messages. the one place from the african perspective, these two partners come together, is in the brics, in this broader anti-status quo sentiment. there is a political framing that is used in many, many parts of the continent about how the international structure is designed to disadvantage africans. therefore, the most powerful

actor on the international scene for a long time, the u.s., must wish it to be so, and therefore these forces pushing back through brics, rhetorically, our forces to align with for change. and this is, i think, the real danger for the u.s. when it comes to these votes at the u.n., there are easy ways to explain, most african missions are wildly understaffed. they are looking for a leave to follow. because china and russia have aligned themselves in this way on those votes, and many african states are very concerned about maintaining their access to china, we see what we see. rush: one theme i wanted to pick up on that was interesting, something i focused on when i was in government, nsc, was the

idea that china is also a security provider within africa, regime security. russia tries to do that with wagoner, but try tries to do that with counterterrorism operations. it is interesting because china is new to that game and russia has been there for a while. is there any indication that african countries are trying to pick and choose between china and russia when it comes to security assistance? is there any competition between china and russia to provide this incredibly valuable good, or is it not an issue? michelle: i don't see a lot of competition. what i do see is a tension in the way that they understand security and their interests. china thrives on stability. their interests on the continent sort of depend on it. whereas for russia, the opportunity is in the chaos. those are two very different value propositions, different

ideas. rush: so possibly some tension on that particular issue. i want to turn to elliott to talk about the middle east in particular. in general there is a broad question, how does the region look at the china-russia relationship. there is also a specific question i've been wondering about and maybe you can help us think through. we see china and russia worked together similarly with iran including military exercises in the gulf. gulf states should be concerned about that. do we see this growing as a worry even as they pursue stronger ties with china and russia? elliott: yes. listening to this and the previous session, what has struck me is, middle east is different because the local partner, iran, it is such an active force in the whole region

and has been hurt badly in the last year. if you are looking at that trio, russia, china, iran, they are weaker than they were a year ago. a few years ago, we would have all said, this is not only a growing relationship but a very successful one in building its influence throughout the region. then, there goes in syria, iran's only arab state partner, and hezbollah, it's most important proxy. so they look quite different right now. for other countries in the region, jordan, egypt, the gulf states, i think their view would be, well, we have to reevaluate. i don't think this leads them to build closer or less close relationships with russia and china. they are doing it directly with iran.

the question that i think they are really asking is, what do we need to do with respect to iran, given that russia and china are not providers of security? and they are not. there is nothing the russians or the chinese could really do. you might have thought, surely the russian will be able to maintain their position in syria, a position that goes back to the beginning of the cold war. not so. it just collapsed overnight. you know the news of the last three or four days is about russian equipment being moved out of syrian ports, perhaps to libya, going over to you. so from the gulf point of view, they have seen a real change. they have to wonder how the russians will react. maybe it is simply by being a less important country in the

middle east. then there is something else they have to ask. yes, but what is american policy? we don't know yet. . rush: following up on that on the economic side, we have seen china build strong ties with saudi arabia and the uae in particular, with a focus on technology. the u.s. has come back with this deal on artificial intelligence, suggesting that the leaders of a i have a lot to offer, but still the region has an affinity for china's authoritarian model. . maybe thatis overstated when we think about the economic dimension, is there a way in which that this places russian influence? elliott: they do have very different interests and one fundamental way. china is an importer of oil and russia is an exporter. as an example, following up on

what was just said, chaos versus order. suppose there is a dustup in the persian gulf. israel-iran. u.s.-iran. oil prices double, maybe triple. this is wonderful news for putin. not wonderful news for xi jinping. they have very different interests. as of now, we don't see that having very much of an impact. for years, go back 5, 10 years. chinese-israeli relations were quite good, china was investing a fair amount of money in israel. high tech stuff. and russian-israeli relations were good. they collaborated to make sure they did not get in each other's way in syria. the israelis were bombing syria

all the time to try prevent ringing arms going to hezbollah. they do not get in the way of russians in syria. that has changed now in 2024. and i would say it has changed because both of them had to ask, china and russia, that is, what is the game here, what are we doing here? and the key issue is the united states. the key issue is to diminish american influence. for example, it is good for china to have a high tech relationship with israel, but it is being destroyed. they are willing to take that destruction because there is a bigger game. the bigger game is u.s. influence on the world. rush: i think that sounds right. thank you to the panelists. i will turn out to the audience. we have all of you in the room, several hundred online. we will start with questions in the room and then move online. who would like to ask the first set of questions?

you can direct them generally or to a panelist. thank you. >> thank you. rush, you have written about china's attempt to impact the multilateral rules-based system. it sounds like from everything we've been hearing today, observing in the world, we might be careening more toward richard's axis of upheaval more so than any effort to reform post-world war ii institutions based institutions. i wonder if you could comment on the evolution of those institutions as we go forward. rush: thanks. question to the moderator are certainly appreciated although irregular. i will ask the panelist or jump in with thoughts. very quick point. i was struck on the discussion of brics, something i've been thinking about. we've had interesting conversations with our chinese friends in government, about the need for expansion.

the joke was the u.s. was expanding all across the region in asia and they said these are exclusive clicks and we are not a part of it. that is unfair. then we would say what about brics? my question is if it gets so big, isn't really all that different from the g7 which of course is more than 77 countries. does it underline the efficacy. in some ways the harder it is to kind of get a consensus preyed as we consider the zeitgeist in these forms lived ask ourselves are the going to get anything done. i want to turn to our panelists to give you a set of answers. if everyone wants to jump in. i can put you on the spot. since your not in the room a bible ask you. >> very quickly, from a european perspective the temptation for europe now especially after the fallout is to see themselves as the last continent to oppose the

arms and were so dear to us. this is a moral high ground that i do think it would be dangerous for europeans to hang up on. that's something you can discuss in the think tank event you want. but you have to and i talked with a colleague before this you have to get your hands dirty. you cannot only talk about and lament the demise and fear what trump might do to institutions, you have to shape the new environment that's emerging even if you don't like how it looks. >> anyone else? shannon: i look at institutions and the like. they were, they are not created to deal well with great power competition, especially

integrated great power competition. russia was very separate. the economy was separate and so it was for the rest of the world and that sort of when they worked and deepened and developed and became powerful. now we are back in a time of great power competition where the commercial rules, china doesn't follow the commercial rules these follow. so don't think they are fit for purpose. the question we are grappling with is can we make them fit, do we search for other ones and i think what's happening which in my view there's a lot of meetings and photo ops but not a lot of stuff there, just shows how hard it is in world great power competition how to create something that's much more comprehensive. >> rush: it is not just the postwar institutions that aren't fit for purpose but the new institutions either. china and india for example. or in the shanghai cooperation organisation which is stalled

which is a mistake china should've thought about. michelle: there is this interesting sort of paradox where there is a tremendous amount of real resentment of the bretton woods institutions as sony afton country struggle with a total absence of fiscal space and frustrations around debt relief and how slow it is and the u.n. itself because there's a lot of u.n. activity very visible on the african continent and when it does not deliver, it breeds tremendous amount of resentment it's why you see people demanding peacekeepers go home so there's all this anger and resentment. at the same time a lot of enthusiasm for multilateralism. and because that's where african voice gains power. because there are some in the african states, it becomes a

draw for other powers then to engage diplomatically and really think about african interests if they are worried about those votes in multilateral forums. this is one of the reason why brics has a lot of appeal on the continent. and yes, it is kind of a nonsensical grouping of countries, but this idea that yes we want to be multilateral and we are pushing back against any idea of the unicorn world, but none of these institutions were made, designed with our equities in mind and they have failed us. elliott: listening to all of this, it does not bode well for the effectiveness of either the general assembly or the security council. rush: i think that sounds about

right. we will go online for a question and come back in just a moment. >> we will take the next question from tara. >> thank you so much. i'm from nw i. my question which perhaps directed to shannon and rushes about the status of china's ambitions and internationalization and russia has notably led the way as a big adopter of the one and most of china and russia bilateral trade is security use of the dollar. even if that intent remains the general primacy of the dollar remains uncontested especially given china's domestic power struggles right now. but what are the prospects according to the panelists for the adoption of the one in global trade particularly in developing nations, thank you.

shannon: you've thought a lot about this yourself, but you have to replace something with something. you can replace something with nothing and if you're not cannot let the yuan flow and provide the fluidity and the flexibility then you just can't be the first reserve currency. so yes there's a lot of talk about this. it's not just china that wants to do this, brazil for 25 years has talked about replacing or finding alternatives it is very hard to do if no one else wants to step up. we found the euro at one point maybe would replace it. it doesn't have the flow with the deepness of capital markets. until we see something come up that somebody is willing and able to deepen those capital markets to provide that flow to the world i think the dollar will be the reserve currency. rush: i'll just add one interesting factor which as we

have seen china and russia worked together on building alternative parallel infrastructure, so the reserve currency question is one question but the payments question is another one. in the two end up being related down the road. what we are seeing is certainly beginning in 2009 with the financial crisis accelerating after russia's seizure of crimea and after 2022, countries working together to build out that infrastructure. a russian effort is underway but the chinese effort with chips essentially is the acronym, is particularly advanced and able to do messaging and so again it doesn't get you a reserve currency around potentially the u.s. ability to track and therefore weakens one critical pillar of american power. america has this great advantage , you can complete we dislodge it but you can undermine it. maybe a question now from the room if i could.

>> evolution space, had a quick question for shannon and michelle. particularly with president trump getting inaugurated soon and president sheinbaum starting her turn -- term, how do you see mexico approaching the china russia duopoly vis-a-vis the united states. for michelle, usually we hear about how the u.s. is not doing well in africa and how china and russia are eating their lunch, is there anywhere the u.s. is doing a good job that could be a model for other ways to approach other parts of the continent? or is it just more of a wholesale policy. michelle: it's interesting. claudia sheinbaum -- shannon: it's interesting, claudia

sheinbaum has a subset that is sympathetic, but that said, every signal from this administration is that they will throw their lot in with the united states and particularly seeing that on the commercial space so over the course of this last year plus you have seen mexico put up 500 different tariffs on chinese steel or aluminum from countries without trade agreements with mexico, i.e. china. you saw them just recently they put a tax on all sort of e-commerce small packages and coming in to mexico. you are seeing the economy ministry there go around to various companies that import a lot from china. using imports come up over the last couple of years. you seen them going to other companies. saying what you importing, they are starting to think about sort

of china and supply chains i would argue is the thing about gearing up for what was technically a review will be a pretty deep renegotiation once we get those in place. michelle: great question. where are things going right. i struggle. and it's not because everything we do is wrong. it's because we don't do nearly enough. there is this sort of very anachronistic set of ideals about what kind of engagement matters on the continent. you know high level visit does nothing for that except mess up their traffic for a few days. and so much of our foreign assistance budget is very tightly prescribed, we don't have a lot of flexibility there. and even when we are the

creditors who are the problem on debt relief we will absolutely continue to get the blame. i would say one place where things, a piece of the agenda was moving really well was kenya , hence the state visit and the major non-nato ally, we were on the right track with much more vigorous commercial diplomacy, but where things kind of went off the rails was a real failure to reckon with the issues of corruption that so infuriate kenyans. and it's just even where there was this tremendous push and i give ambassador whitman a lot of credit for that, all of these relationships are complex and it just takes more attention, more effort, more resources, both

financial and human capital resources. but if the signals being sent from the highest levels continue to be just keep a lid on it there and we will do some high-level visits and maybe once every eight years we do a summit. these summits are presented on the comet -- continent. an idea of it's well past its sell by gate. and i get how much work it takes to do and i have tremendous respect for people who did all that work but we just still have this sort of africa as extra credit project approach to our policy whereas africa is strategically incredibly important to china. it is very important to russia. it is super important to a bunch of gulf states as well. africa figures prominently in their long-term foreign policy

strategies and we are just still not there. rush: maybe one follow-up question if i could and then maybe we go online, i'd one question for michelle, you said these kinds of u.s. plus 40 summits are not really appreciated for a bilateral summit pray china does them as well. does russia do them to. >> indonesia does them in saudi arabia does them. and all these african heads of state are moving around all year to all these africa plus one summits where they sit and maybe the head of state comes for that and their loaded onto a bus and what is the point and it feels demeaning. >> do they feel that way about the chinese as well. michelle: china usually comes with a check so they've seen results. rush: the russians do they also do this. michelle: yes they do and you can peruse military equipment while you're at the summit.

kick the tires on that tank. rush: let's take two questions. online first and then back here. >> will take the next question from jim gilmore. jim: on the former governor of virginia and former united states ambassador to osce in austria. and in that capacity had the chance to interact with 56 other ambassadors in countries is the european security organization. this is my question. i think everything in the previous panel and in this panel agrees that china and russia and by extension north korea and iran are committed to a change in the world order. that seems to be the policy the u.s. is confronting today. i think deterrence has failed.

the ukrainian incursion demonstrates that. so my question to the panel is this. it looks to me like the united states is being confronted with the choice and the choice is either appeasement or war. my question to the panel is is that the united states have any other options besides those two choices which i think are being forced upon the united states. rush: before we answer that we will take one more question from the room. here in the back. >> jacket from the german marshall fund. you also not only today given some reality checks but also in your article in september that you quote, would you mind speculating about where the leadership will come from for those reality checks and does in specifically that come from the

next administration in berlin. rush: maybe we'll start with you liana. liana: thank you so much. it is true there -- you cannot come to any other conclusion. if you look at the domestic turmoil in germany, but there are some bright -- or for optimism with policy entrepreneurship and the leadership entrepreneurship which is unrivaled. but the most powerful presence of the european commissions. she has pushed to an agreement is one of the instruments to push back against china in 2023, feeling very creative in europe

and then also we have up or he promising situation in poland where after the discussions we have a lot of experience as prime minister in the u.k. and then we will have presidential elections but the context, who needs to deliver, it's germany. and they are also optimistic looking at the next government because a conservative led government -- those of -- a relationship with donald trump , but not only on that point, also on the relationship with brussels, with paris, of the engagement of ukraine, the relationship with warsaw. they have been strong and outspoken and might have the backing of the german parliament with the coalition of the

democrats to secure himself a space in the history books of europe that puts him on the same level so i'm quite optimistic about germany. shannon: i'm more of a glass half-full person in the choice between appeasement and war and i'm assuming you're more war than we are today. i think as i look at what's happening. and we can spend a whole panel talking about the woes here in the united states and europe in the challenges but it hasn't really been a great year i would say either for the house of up people. iran sle it well knows has been on the back foot and the challenges. coming more from an economic point of view. russia's economy is a war economy but it has huge dislocations and problems and they don't seem to mind putting 1500 people into coffins every day on the front but how long can you do that and this brain drain that's happened.

we all know china this is not been a great couple of years for china and where it's headed and it's about to go into a demographic cliff and all kinds of things not just the short-term challenges for the economy but for real longer-term challenges. the other thing i would say, i don't know if michelle you have a similar experience in the work you do, but there is -- it's not as if the whole global south is rah rah, they have, at relationships with both of these countries. i think the next 12 months will be even more complicated as china seems to be the way they will get out of their economic doldrums is exporting everything that they make and undermining the manufacturing sectors of all these countries, you are seeing it in countries like brazil pushing back in all kinds of ways. we were singing in mexico and other kinds of middle powers and countries that have aspirations

to also be manufacturing players in the world. i would like to think what is this third path. we know multilateralism is very difficult but there's a lot of enthusiasm about it in various parts of the world so maybe there are groups that can come together around particular issues that we can form their, we do know the united states for all of our challenges as one of the best most robust balanced economies in the world today and it is a place people want to invest back to the dollar. people are -- they're looking for safety in the world so here is the place. i guess what i would say there is i think there probably is a very messy middle path that hopefully doesn't lead us into world war iii but doesn't necessarily mean appeasement. it actually mean standing up to some of this. i would go back to the report, there's a lot of how to stand up to this as well and there. i would encourage you to read

that. there's a space that doesn't leave us on the two sides. >> i have similar thoughts between war and appeasement, there's also as opposed to defensive crouch, and evolution where we recognize the world order some of these institutions clearly don't work anymore. and the -- be willing to get serious about some reforms that some of which may mean a little loss here or there for the u.s.. but gains over here or inability to build a much broader coalition of like-minded states over there. i think that is real. african populations need jobs more than anything else. the continent needs jobs and none of these powers can solve that problem for africans.

it is not a kind of foregone conclusion that everyone that this desire to change the status quo means alignment better increasingly antagonistic. but it is the case that the change people seek, they will want to see reflected in some of the efforts of the u.s. as we go forward to try and re-create an international institutional architecture that is fit for purpose. elliott: i would only go back to the beginning to a bob blackwell said, ingredient to this is raw power. and what troubled me, what worries me is the united states is absolutely not making the needed investment in straight military power.

rush: i would just add the question of whether the accommodation or war is a perennial question politics for anything. war happens because a country wants to achieve a certain name through the threat or use of military force. for us in the cold war it was fought between those extremes and so the question is if we are in an era of extremely intense peacetime competition how do we win that. the foundations are america's strength in here at cfr on the china question we've china policy accelerator focus on what happens -- has to happen at home. how do you make your critical info searcher can get hacked. it's not new but it's news today. how do you fix your economy. i think you're able to do those

things you can shape that piece in a direction you want it to go. that is the question. the adversary gets a vote on whether they use force. we have time for more questions. here in the center one of my colleagues, if anyone has a question we will take two. >> good morning and thank you for this outstanding panel. so many things to pick up. senior fellow, if i may raise three points, three points in particular. the first is to know in addition to the competition we see in the countries that you all are experts on, we also see a competition in our global -- where was he when the greatest changes sing the arctic should be managed by arctic countries. so that's one area of interest.

the second is to ask you do you think we have enough of a diplomatic investment. we need investment in our military, we also need our investment in our diplomatic services. do we have enough people in brazil, indonesia, that we need sustained engagement in those areas. as we look at the different types of international structures out there what we haven't talked about is today's the g20. it includes many of the countries we talked about. what do you expect and what should we do as the host, 2020 60 96 will host the g20 can we use this as an opportunity. rush: anyone want to jump in. schmidt -- michelle: our embassies are famously understaffed. people see that and they also

see the very robust staffing at the chinese mission and it looks like an indicator of what we think is important. and so it's not that i think just throwing bodies into the field fixes everything but yes we need a much more serious diplomatic investment. on the g20 i would just say it's a really interesting question. obviously this is south africa's year to host and i was recently in south africa and spending some time trying to understand the degree to which their views of the u.s. had moved overtime. as far as the anc is concerned and the anc continues to insist it will dominate with more policy in the g20, the u.s. is the kind of counterrevolutionary

enemy and so i think in addition to thinking about how to frame 2026. you should be thinking very carefully about what's going to be focused burn -- be the focus. elliott: i think the point about diplomacy is a good one. it's not only the embassies. it's the state department. i mean between elon musk and marco rubio we will see how that turns out. i met yesterday with u.s. ambassador for the european -- who was here for a few weeks. consultations and all and i ask this ambassador you been in the building a lot. how many people are there, 25%. that's not going to work. the state department populated by 25% of its employees, no, knocking to work. i would ask another question.

is the state department organized for the challenge of china you have a china desk in the east asian bureau and should there be -- there's no perfect answer but, what i think there should be a lot more thinking about how the department is modernized maybe is the word for the challenges we now face. >> i think elliot you are right, there's an interesting question about how the u.s. will restructure on -- what will the apartment of commerce look like, element being shared with ustr. all these questions not just -- i don't think it's organized completely for china competition i think this effort underway with china house and they also thing the larger usg constellation of agencies is not quite suited to the economic statecraft challenge we have as well. we have time for one question if

everyone can give 10 second answers. and then we will close out so if there's a final question in the room now is the time. i see with that caveat. >> i have one shameless cfr plug. bringing up one of the places of great competition is the arctic which it is. there's another one that the place of great power and competition and that is space. and cfr under the able hands of mr. as a project director is a task force coming out where we delve into this issue coming out of the next month. so much to be done there. >> the space task force has done fantastic work. we are basically at time now so i'm sorry about that. i will end by saying this discussion shows the regional development that we've had serious conversations about multiple in the world in the context of the report on china and russia this is what we endeavor to do. thank you for joining us today.

[applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2025] >> later today the director for the centers for disease control and prevention talks about the agency's outlook from the center for strategic and international studies, watch live at 1:00 p.m. eastern on c-span three, c-span now or onne at c-span.org. this afternoon the outgoing chair of the federal trade commission lena con will discuss the agency's antitrust and consumer protection role under her leadership and the future of the agency from the brookings institute. live on c-span three. c-span now our free mobile video app or online at c-span.org.

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>> buckeye broadband supports c-span as a public service along wi these other television providers giving your front row seat to democracy. >> mor now from president-elect trump's nominees in their o words. we continue our look at interior secretary nominee doug burm from earlier this year talking about the economy and why in his mind it would benefit from a new trump administration. >> thanks so much for joining. you ran a great campaign for president and infused the campaign with amazing ideas on energy and development, the fact you are a businessman is something that is greatly

lacking in this administration. tell us your assessment of things and i'm sure you will be working over the next four months to get donald trump elected but how do you see the world right now. gov. burgum: thank you so much for being here. good morning everybody. i wanted to start with gratitude , the committee to police prosperity, all you're doing and the work that happens because of your support and participation all of you are here because you care about our country are here because you care about your communities and you care about your kids and your grandkids and you know their future depends upon how we do as a country, our strength has always been rooted in our economic strength and so the ideas that are being discussed in the work being done by this committee is so important, so i want to say thanks to all of you. thanks for being in the arena and what an amazing panel. i'm honored to be included with these icons of american history up here.