potential security threat posed by drones. you're watching live coverage on c-span 3. >> the purpose of this is the growing threat of unmanned it aerial systems. more commonly known as uases or drones. we will hear from three panels. good afternoon. i'd like to welcome you all to today's important hearing. on the threats posed by unmanned aircraft or aerial systems, uas or drones. in the threat to u.s. national

security. and the policy solutions that could mitigate these risks. before we begin, i'd like to personally recognize two individuals. congressman dan bishop. and anthony desposito. and i wish them well in future endeavors. [ applause ] as we sit here today, we're at a critical juncture. cyber security. uases have become a transportive force. they have been used in countless ways, including revolutionizing logistics, film and others. while improving cape. however, as with any powerful technology, uas has also had recent challenges. recently, serious concerns

regarding potential misuse in threats to u.s. national security. from fort evers, seeking to exploiture is veilance and intelligence gathering, to the growing risk of uas being weaponized for critical infrastructure, sports stadiums, our vulnerabilities are clear. the risks posed by commercial and military grade uas. in terrorist organizations and even individuals, cannot be overstated. there have already been several troubling incidents, where uas have been used compromising not only our national security. a glaring example that the widespread use of drones manufactured by dajang innovations, dji, critically embedded in critical

infrastructure. these include risk of unauthorized data access and systemic vulnerabilities. >> multiple partners and u.s. agencies have already admonished or banned originating in the people's republic of china, and recognition of the threats they pose. just this past october, reported that cvc produced by cji. of president uyghur force implementation act. with we must work to protect u.s. communications equipment, while strengthening u.s. supply chains while ensuring it u.s. technology cannot operate in u.s. networks. the threats posed by uas continue to present challenges remember the u.s. border is one of the most significant vulnerabilities when it comes to this typed of threat.

uas has already been used to circumvent boards, walls. and surveil cbp to ven evade detection. raised concerns that mexican narco gangs are doing this only a short distance from the border. and in many cases, operating inside the u.s. also poses a significant threat to critical infrastructure. including power grids, oil refineries, airports, water treatment plants and transportation systems. a single uaf could cause widespread damage, interrupt and cause significant loss to our homeland. state on state conflict and asymmetric engagement. such as those in ukraine and israel. and those in sensitive military

operations at home and abroad. we must use these to help protect our homeland security. dand d.o.j. became law as part of the faa reauthorization act of 2018. the current authorities under the act are set to expire on september 20, 2024, just one week from now. over the past years, they have used these to engage to protect facility. against credible facility. could otherwise limit such activities. it's imperative that we not only make sure that the current authorities are extended to protect our national security, but also work together to responsibly reform the current legal authorities that provide federal agencies with critical tools to mitigate credible threats posed by uas. i'd like to applaud chairman

green, as well as ranking member thompson for their bipartisan work, along members, for introducing hrs. this will renew and reform current counter uas legal authorities. legislation will also improve counter uas, enhance important protections for the civil liberties of americans, using uas in a legal and responsible manner and strengthening countries throughout this in addition. for instance, requires uas to produce a counter-uas. to approve court-uas systems and mitigate on covered entities on a number of sites each.

today, we'll hear from national security, law enforcement, defense and technology, who will provide insights into threats posed by the u.s. and family assistance to our homeland. and efforts to address these challenges. i want to say, if you're watching the news today, we have had several incidents that have occurred and are occurring right now. in places like new jersey. recently, we had an incident at langley air force base. the threat is real. this hearing, i think, will address many topics. maybe we don't have all the answers that come out of this hearing. but my mope is that by having this hearing. by asking both the government and nongovernmental panel, that we can get to the right questions. and if we don't have the right policies in place, then let's get those policies in place. if we do, and authorities are there. let's fb figure out what we can continue to do to keep our homeland safe. there's many aspects to this. but the most important is the safety and security of every american citizen. i look forward to hearing from

our distinguished panel and working in a bipartisan manner. i now recognize the ranking member. the gentleman fromrhode island. >> why, thank you chairman pfluger. the prolivation of unmanned aircraft systems has cretted a technical arms race, between criminals who use uas security. and other illegal substances and invade the privacy television ordinary americans. and those tasked with the united states. both are increasing the a rapid rate. and it is important that the federal government is keeping up. time has come for r for almost r federal, staid and role law

enforcement agencies to patrol the borders, large government events while also ensuring the civil liberties of drone operators. this is the goal of hr8610. the county security safety and reauthorization act, authored by chairman green and ranking member thompson, which i am proud to have cosponsored. if are years, uas, doj and other having briefed on these committees. we have seen drones shot down at airports around the country and around the world. major sporting events have been interrupted with players rushed from the fields when unauthorized drones with unknown motives, entered restricted air space. and just weeks ago, arrested a white supremacist. however, must also be said that drones are useful tools for

many occupations and hobbyists. and these positive aspects must remind that we take positive results from the issue. i look forward to hearing how to balance the benefits and risks of uas. moreover, i hope this lays getting the groundwork of this. >> thank you, gentleman. the chair recommends gentleman from florida. mr. jimenez. >> thank you, mr. chair. today, we're addressing the issue of unmanned aerial systems, uas, or drones. the popularity of drones has skyrocketed in recent years today. there are more than 880,000 registered drone operators in the us. with countless other operating

drones without proper regalation or training. while they use these for purposes, recreational or otherwise, there is an undeniable threat for those who misuse the technology. either through ignorance or malicious intent. others encroach on safety areas. while uninformed operators present a risk, their potential impact is negligible compared to those with nefarious actors. nefairls actors, including transaction. can exploit drones to evade security measures, gather intelligence, smuggle contraband, disrupt transportation systems or even launch attacks on our homeland. the threat is both real and escalating. along our borders, drugs are to

smuggle drugs. we must consider all appropriate actions to make sure foreign adversaries like the foreign commune first party are not using drones to relay sensitive information back to china or seek to harm others in the united states. critical infrastructures, such as airports, power plants, face growing concern of causing disruption or carrying out acts of sabotage. these risks are not hypothet cal. since 2021, the transportation administration has documented nearly 2,000 drone sightings near airports. with drone incursions almost daily. furthermore, between 2021 and 2022, the fbi reported 235 incidents of suspicious drone flights at or near u.s. nuclear plants. also at oil storage facilities in oklahoma and natural gas facility unless texas. highlighting it the thritd to

growing critical energy infrastructure. both sides have employed drones for reconnaissance, targeting and targeted attacks. transforms the dynamic of conflict. these lessons, from international conflicts should suffer as a wake-up call for us to bolster our defenses against the misuse of drones against the united states. looking ahead, mistakes will only continue to rise, with global events such as the 2026 fifa world cup, which many games will be played in myself hometown of miami. and with many sum summer olympics coming to the united states. we must be ready to say guard critical infrastructure and safeguard the safety of participants and travelers. we now have the need for drone threats. and the need is clear we must act swiftly. today is a chance to

understand. and to explore innovative solutions to mitigate these risks. i want to thank my colleague from texas, representative pfluger. thank you to our witnesses, deputy executive commission are jones. deputy attorney general and wheeler for appearing before the subcommittees. i look forward to how we can better counter rogue drones and ensure our policies keep pace with this evolving technology and i yield back. >> chair now recognizes the director of transportation subcommittee. >> good afternoon. and thoomption to both gentlemen and ranking member magaziner as well as two of our witnesses for joining us. over the past few year, the use of unmanned aerial systems,

also known as drones has become common across wide ranging applications. dropes have become affordable and useful in agriculture, search and rescue, photography and other industries. however, as the air space becomes more and more crowded with unmanned aircraft, we must ensure that the government is prepared and empowered to protect the safety and security of u.s. critical infrastructure and the american public. in 2018, congress enacted initial authorities for the executive branch to begin testing and operating counter- drone technologies, also known as cua technology. those have kick-started the interagency coordination and ticknology development, needed to carry out such a complex effort. but the authorities remain

unlimited. and have relied on one extension after another. i hope congress will act early next year to advance legislation to extend and expand these authorities. as we do so, we must ensure the government's counter-drone activities, appropriately protect privacy and civil liberty. and do not have unintended impacts on the safety of the national air space. as ranking member of the transportation and mar time security subcommittee, i am especially interested in making sure airports are protected from threats posed by drones already, we have seen major airports shut down due to errant drones, causing significant delays. introducing new technologies that affect radio signals is

especially sensitive, within the airport environment. and other urban environments. we must ensure such technologies are carefully tested. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how congress can push our counter- drone efforts into a new phase in a measured, yet meaningful manner. again, i thank our witnesses and my colleagues, and i yield back. >> other members ever the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. i'm pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses today. and i ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right hand. do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give before the committee on homeland security will be the truth, whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you god? thank you. let the record reflect, the

witnesses have answered in the affirmative. i'll now introduce the witnesses. mr. keith jones is the deputy executive assistant for air and marine operations. he has over 32 years of law enforcement experience. notably, he helped found the san diego sector border patrol search-and-rescue team and was the primary driver of this national expansion. mr. robert wheeler serves as assistant director of the critical response group. his expertise includes responding, tactical operations, behavioral assessment, and aviation. he joined the division in july of this year. and dr. bragman. serves department of justice. he has spent his career at the department of defense, department of state, and at the national security council. we thank all of you federal being here today. we will now begin with opening statements. i know you have submitted

written statements as well. and thank you for that. if you'll please adhere to the five-minute summary of your statements. we'll start with mr. jones. you're now recognized. >> thank you, chairman. good afternoon, chairman pfluger, chair gimenez, and distinguished subcommittee. it's an honor to be here to discuss the authorities and capabilities dedicated to threats countered and imposed by malicious use of unmanned air systems, commonly caw l caughted uas or drones. with my 30 years, i've witnessed national malicious actors to circumvent law enforcement. recent years, i've devoted significant time to understanding the threat to border security and coordinating cvp's response. air and marine is cvp.

we work alongside field counter parts to detect, track and mitigate the threat along our borders. we also cooperate with doj and fbi partners in investigation. along with technology director. department of defense. to identify technologies that can improve. i'd like to emphasize three important aspects of this subject today. first, the current state of uas threats to border security. second, how critical enables us to respond. and finally, technology to detect uas threat. first, uas activity is increasing rapidly. recorded 6900 drone flights within close proximity of our

borders. these flights, particularly in areas of high threat. diminish security of our border operation. sool intent cannot be derived, through our intelligence processes, cvp has presented a large percentage of these flights with nefarious intent on the ground. of most concerned to cvp is the wide use of drones to conduct reconnaissance of cp personnel. this technology enables smugglers to guide noncitizens or transportation, without encountering any law enforcement. additionally, tco has flown drones. average recollection recreational thrown drones.

few pads of narcotics, specifically fentanyl or now pounds of explosive could cause serious harm. the increasing use of uas brings me to my flex point t. if the emerging threat act. are essential to counter this threat. in accordance with the act, guidance and policy, conduct counter-uas operations, in 10 high-risk sectors as authorized by the dhs secretary. while safeguarding privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. obtaining authorization to implement counter u.s. operations is rigorous and precise operation. is baaed on extensive analysis. along with coordination. cvp mitigated 86 threats. and 60 in fy 24.

also mitigated 16uas, as special assessment rating and fy 2023. and 49 in fq2024. mitigated unmanned. finally, tcos are mitigating larger pay loads and the ability to fly longer, higher and farther. also drones with firearms or weapons of mass destruction. we are see drones counter. maintain the strategic advantage and maintain commitment to commitment. cvp is dedicated to our security mission, and with your support, we will continue to encounter these and risk-based implementation. thank you for the opportunity to appear today. i look forward to your

questions. >> thank you, mr. jones. the chair now recognizes mr. wheeler for his opening statement of five minutes. >> thank you. and good afternoon, chairman pfluger, ranking member gimenez. fbi. i currently serve as the assistant director of our critical instant response group in quantico, virginia. i've done that since july be, as you mentioned. in that past, i lead the fbiests in response to critical incidents and major investigations, which includes responsibility for to critical incidents and major investigations which includes responsibility for our counter unmanned aircraft program. as the u.s. continues to grow among the law enforcement sectors this technology also lends itself to increase malicious use by state,

non-state and lone actors as you know. this technology poses some unique security challenges for us. for using a uas to conduct espionage and the u.s. naval facility in january. we believe uas are being flown for similar purposes over sensitive facilities across the united states. >> just last month the suspect was arrested and charged for intending to use a uas with an explosive device. that subject was driven by an ideology to disrupt society to collapse the national power grid. those are two examples of the evolving ways that uas are being used to harm us and our interests. with the enactment of the 2018 preventing emergency threats

act, and the fbi was granted the authority necessary to mitigate a range of uas threats and the protection of special, vens and emergency response, federal investigations and personnel and facilities, specifically the legislation authorizes doy and our partners at dhs to conduct counter uas operations in limited circumstanceses to identify, track and mitigate credible threats. i'd stress the importance for reauthorization of the counter u.s. authorities as you know expired december 20th and failure to extend the authorities beyond that would cause significant impacts of our ability to protect the public. a durable extension is also, treatmently important. our experience has taught us that short-term extensions to counter uas authority effectively prevent the bureau and our partners from budgeting and staffing in ways which would allow us to execute a long-term strategy. we know that congress is considering extensions of five years or more and we thank you

for that consideration. the fbi strongly supports pursuing expanded counter uas authorities for state, local, tribal and territorial partners as robustly and swiftly as prudently possible. sltt partners have repeatedly informed us that existing counter u.s. authorities are inadequate. since our counter u.s. authority was granted in 2019 the u.s. has adopted 69 operational missions using this authority and provided limited support to 121 other events. we detected a thousand uas in violation of federal law during these missions and one example of the boston marathon this past april our team mitigated a uss threat which resulted in the capture and prosecution of the subject. the fbi can't have the special assessment rating annually held in the u.s. along with other requests for counter ua support at mass gatherings. the use of counter uas to protect against this situation

is crucial and can only be fully addressed by expanding the capability to include our state and local partners. in closing i remain committed to protecting americans by the use of this technology, the reauthorization or long-term extension of the legislation is essential to continue our mission in combatting the evolving threat. we look forward to working with you in establishing sustainable strategies to mitigate the threat going forward. thank you. >> thank you, mr. wheeler. the chair now recognizes mr. wagman for his opening statement of five minutes. >> thank you. good afternoon chairman pflueger, chairman jimenez, and thank you for the opportunity to testify before the department of justice. as my colleagues said we continue to work hard to protect the american people from the threat of illicit drone use, but to do so effectively we need

additional lethal authority. as drones become more relevant in our airspace, it is insufficient to address the current scale of the threat. more than two years ago, i and others from the dhs and the faa testified before the senate committee about the need for a growing threat and the need for a significantly expanded legal framework. since that time the congress has provided extensions of existing counter drone authority while considering how best to expand it. we are very grateful that both the house and the senate continue to agree that this authority must not lapse. the department is eager to share with you the lessons gained from our experience to help reach consensus about how much and in what way to expand the existing law. the reason we need legal authority is that without it, use of the most effective types of drone detection and counter drone technologies can violate criminal laws including those that prohibit, destroying or disabling aircraft in flight and intercepting signals of communications. as has just been said our current authorities have lapsed

within the last ten days unless reauthorized. >> i know that this committee and others have also been working on legislation to go well beyond that and we are eager to work with congress on a bill that will help keep the american people safe. as described in the written testimony the two most important issues for us are number one, broadening the types of sites that law enforcement can protect from nefarious and suspicious drone uses. as was mentioned in the opening statements airports and power plants and critical facilities. then number two as my colleague from the fbi just mentioned, it's about empowering state and local law enforcement and operators of critical infrastructure to engage in counter drone efforts themselves nationwide. this is not a job the federal government can do alone. the fbi can only cover a tiny fraction, less than half of 1% of the tens of thousands of events throughout the country each year that might need

counter drone support to protect public safety. so the demand for protection across the country just vastly exceeds federal resources. to be clear, this activity can and must be done while safeguarding americans' privacy and civil liberties. the technologies that we employ typically detect only communications being passed between the operator's controller and the drone to detect its activities -- to direct its activities. they do not extract text messages, email or internet search histories from phones or tablets used to control drones nor do they allow law enforcement to listen to voice calls. we collect information such as the drone vendor and model, the drone and controlling device serial number, the geolocation of the drone, the location of the controller and the most recent takeoff and home location. this is very much like the information required to be broadcast by manned aircraft and which is now required under

faa's remote i.d. regulation to be broadcast by drones, as well and we use this information to further investigate when a crime involving a drone is suspected. as required in current law, doj will continue to have guidance that contains explicit protections with liberties and training. it would be required to adhere to the same rules. i appreciate the opportunity to testify today. i would be happy to answer your questions. >> i thank the witnesses for their opening statements and members will now be recognized by order of seniority for five minutes of questioning and an additional round of questioning may be called and also noting that we have a second panel. i now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. let's just start with current events, and i'll ask an open-ended question. what is going on in new jersey?

>> so, sir, the fbi and our newark field office along with state and local partners, there are -- the bureau is actively investigating the situation you mentioned and just the unexplained sighting of drone activity over that part of new jersey including proximity to sensitive sites and areas of concern so the -- we do not attribute that to an individual or a group yet. we're investigating, but i don't have an answer of who is responsible for that, one or more people who are responsible for those drone flights, but we're actively investigating what the bureau has done to aid our state and local partners is when we generally do, enlist the

help of the interagency and enlist the help of the public and there's a tip line there, the 1-800-call fbi tips for information from the public that can help us resolve this. it is concerning -- >> is the public at risk? is public safety at risk? are we concerned that there are nefarious intentions that could cause a national security or a public safety incident that would put americans at risk? >> there is nothing that is known that would lead me to say that, but we just don't know and that's the concerning part. >> the fact that we have these unknown drones, uass that are flying over either critical or sensitive facilities is exactly why we're having this hearing. mr. jones, actually, for anybody on the panel, let me just say we

go back to last year there were incidents including langley air force base where for a week we had unknown drones flying over a sensitive installation with f-22s and weapons systems on the ground, and i think that was cause for concern. so from a dhs standpoint, either on a border mission or from an fbi or doj, you mentioned mr. wheeler, we don't necessarily have the authorities we need. why can't we take action against these drones that are flying over sensitive sites. why are we not taking action over drones flying over sensitive sites some. >> it exists to mitigate a uas in flight when authorized and that could certainly apply to a sensitive site. i would be measured in speaking for the department of defense for those sites that are in

question here, but i will say that from the fbi in a position, closely liaison relationship with the department of defense and those areas that you mentioned and it will help in every way possible, but for securing those particular sites in this way, and it is a dod equity. >> mr. jones, for the border, i was down in the rgv last year and they told me that they had over 20,000 incidents just in a quarter of drones that were being operated by cartels. what's the danger along the southern border to our citizens, the safety of our citizens from drones? >> thank you, chairman. so you touched on the volume. the volume of activity within the the 500 yards our contiguou border from the south and even the north is staggering. we have technology. you mentioned 20,000. the significant threat is counter su surveillance.

they are surveilling our law enforcement activities. they are doing this 24/7, 365. historically, they've had to have high ground or terrain and now everywhere is high ground. >> they can see what's going on. do you have the authority to mitigate those fidzecly or by other many manies. >> the secretary has facilitated it, so yes, the capability exists and that exists in those covered areas. have those types of mitigation have taken place? >> we are actively mitigating, yes, sir. how many events are we experiencing per year along the soern southern border? >> last year, if you look at 45,000 detections, plus or minus, actually made an inversion, and a lot of it is

taking place outside of our jurisdiction in foreign airspace and that makes it difficult. >> my time has expired and i recognize the ranking member for five minutes of questioning. >> i'll pick up the same line of questioning. when we visited the border we heard from your officers about the challenges drones are posing. i understand they're used primarily by the cartels for surveillance to see where officers are so they can more effectively traffic people, narcotics and firearms across the border. do you see evidence of the cartels using drones to actually move some of that contraband? i'm thinking specifically of fentanyl. are they using uass to move fentanyl moved across the border? >> we have yet to see uas move fentanyl. it's not as effective for cartel

because the payload capacity is so small they'd have to make multiple trips. we have seen cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine. we've seen weapons, so there is a threat of moving contraband across our borders. >> so -- the numbers, of course, are staggering. at one point in your written testimony you alluded to periods of as many as a thousand detections a week, but the number of mitigations at the southern border was 86 in fiscal year '23 and 60 in fiscal '24. why so few of the percentage of the whole? what are the barriers that you're facing? >> again, many of these -- many of these detections occur on -- in foreign airspace and we cannot mitigate. for example in the southwest border, only 5% of the large number actually affect an

incursion. of that we have very strict criteria and they met the criteria and the 60 that we mitigated in fy-24 met the criteria of mitigation. >> the 95% and the 5% that do come into our airspace is the criteria to narrow and bring them down and why again, so few? >> again, one of the things that's notable here is that those are not 25 wife 00, unique identifiers. we take down and mitigate the large drone of the large number. these are, vent, not necessary fda drones, the statistics. >> that's correct. >> on 100% even if you don't have the ability to bring them down those over foreign airspace, do you still have the ability and the technological

ability to track where the operators are and to alert mexican or canadian authorities as to where the operators are and can you explain that that process is like? >> absolutely. and we do communicate directly with our foreign partners and our communication is healthy. our sharing of information is healthy, and so what you just describe side exactly what we do. >> is it working? does it happen? when you notify mexican authorities, for example, that hey, we've got a drone and we know where the operator is. i mean, are they pursuing the operators? do you have success stories? are there gaps that need to be filled in that process? can you elaborate? >> again, so in the case of the government of mexico we'd r have to this provide them that are not, they're highly prop populated and controlled by cartels, so by the time they respond, it's a critical

environment. >> with the minute i have left, on the issue of events, can you elaborate more about why it is so important that the state and locals have expanded authorities and what should the appropriate guardrails be for those expanded authorities? >> yes. each year the fbi can cover a number of special events and dhs covers some, as well. we're talking big events like the super bowl, the world ries and the indianapolis and that sort of thing and they could be subject to a drone threat. you have many other football games, world cup, if you add them, just on folks with sporting events, forgetting about new york times and all manner of events and we can only cover a tiny fraction of those in any given year. so if congress gives the authority to state and local, that vastly expands the scope of what counter drone protection.

>> i understand the need to expand the authority for the state and locals for these special events. i want to highlight, training is very important in this because there are plenty of people who fly drones at high school football games for legitimate reasons and we'll need to make sure that the state and locals have the training to know how to go after the bad guys without overly penalizing the bad guys and i yield back. >> that's a big part of the training. >> the entleman's time has expired and the chair recognizes mr. jimenez. >> thank you. i know we face significant threats now from the technology that we have now right around the corner if not already here is a.i. so some of the techniques that we use to mitigate current drones won't work on a.i. because they won't be piloted. they'll be given a mission and parameters what to hit and they'll hit it themselves and they don't need to be piloted.

do we have capabilities to go kinetic and actually knock these things down either through some kind of a projectile or with high energy that fries the systems. do we have anything like that available anywhere? >> thank you for the question. so without tipping our hand to our adversaries we look forward to providing you details on the capabilities of where our heads are at and we share your concern. >> that not only concerns me in as far as customs and border protection and our personnel, but also airports, large event, et cetera where these drones can be used for really destructive purposes and i'm really, really worried about that. mr. jones, you said you had legal authority to disable and areas. we have about a 2,000-mile-long border. those areas, how many miles of the 2,000 do you have the

authority to mitigate these drones? >> chairman, we're starting to get into an area i'm not comfortable with in an open forum, but we'd love to talk about those details with you behind closed doors. >> i take that to mean, there's not too many miles. okay. so that's fair enough. have you seen any kind of -- especially cartels are working with the ccp and the communist chinese party. the ccp provides the chemicals that produces fentanyl that kills thousands of americans every year. do you see any link between -- we see that link, do we see any links between the ccp and china and the drones, the technology that's being used to surveil our border and it's being used to help the cartels in their quest

to transport people, drugs, guns anything into the united states. >> it is no secret that the preponderance of the u.s. technology is manufactured in china and that the cartels are using that very technology. we share your concerns. there's a reason why we don't use chinese drones and whether they knowingly or unknowingly are potentially checking information for the government of china. >> that's it. that's all the questions i have. yield back. >> the chair recognizes mr. tanadar with his question. >> thank you. the operation of the cus technologies to intercept drones is sensitive as it generally requires seizure of property without a warrant.

to do so, the operators must hack into the signal used to control the drones which aufrp involves hacking into a cell phone or computer. congress has waived certain wiretapping and other privacy protections for agencies to carry out these activities, as dhs and doj continues to operate technologies, what have your agencies done to formally enshrine protections for privacy and civil abilities? any one of you. >> sir, i can speak for the way that the fbi conducts the mission. we are very sensitive to those concerns. the information that is captured electronically and our technology that we use is just

the information that has to do with the control of the drone. the flight and the telemetry data, if you will, even if it is from -- if it is being operated by a personal device like a cell phone, for example. the technology that we use does not capture any information from there and we're very sensitive to how that is collected and whatever that information that we collect, we don't maintain it, if it's not a threat. if it's not part of a case. if it is part of something that we investigate, then our regular guidelines of legal process and how we would maintain evidence apply, but we're very sensitive to privacy concerns and making sure we get it right and do it correctly. >> thank you so much. >> congress is currently considering authorizing a pilot

program for state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement agencies to operate cus technologies. expanding these authorities must be done carefully as doing so requires waving wiretapping protections and other critical protections to place -- to protect privacy and civil liberties. how can we ensure the operation of such technologies potentially by a large number of law enforcement agencies will be closely coordinated with and overseen by federal authorities. most critically, how can we protect privacy and civil liberties? >> thank you for the question. so if the pilot program, the state local pilot program that you mentioned is adopted there would have to be -- the law would require training for all state and local officials and it

would require them to follow the same procedures that my colleague mentioned in terms of the type of technology they can use and the type of data that they can collect. the rules of engagement so if they do it safely they'd have to work with the faa and all of their activities would have to be approved by the department of justice or faa and it's a process under the state and local pilot program to basically get state and local authorities up and running so they can do the same things that we do at, at their level and that is producing civil liberties. >> thank you. thank you so much. the gentleman yields and the gentleman recognizes the gentleman from north carolina, mr. bishop. >> thank you. >> how do i pronounce your last name? is it weidmann?

>> wi gishgsman, -man. i believe i got this right is that the effective technologies to deal with this could violate laws on intercepting aircraft in flight and intercepting transmissions. did i get that correct? >> that's right. if you have one that's been raised and you also said several of you have made the point that how you intercept data to prevent intruding on privacy and certainly certain types of data why not have a rule that the drone will be destroyed in the

air, is that something that would be hard to do and then why do you need to intercept data in order to do that. if the object is there, destroy it. >> so, it's a good question. if you had, say a football game and you would have a perimeter, it would be declared as a temporary flight-restricted area. around that you will have a buffer zone. you have an area that's a no go and a larger area where you might want to detect what's flying and a larger area where you might be tracking and regular commercial drone use is okay. so as they're getting closer and closer to the facility, if you're detecting originally the signals to see what is that drone and you're trying to identify the drone. oh, is that an -- >> like a long-distance radar. >> is that a ups drone delivering a package somewhere, let it go on its way. is it getting closer into the zone why you would have to do

something against it? so it's a calibrated thing and as you get closer and closer, that's where you take the opportunity to jam it is mosty from yently rather than destroy the drone and you're interfering with it that requires it to land and that's what they do to make it land somewhere rather than it's not the same as shooting it out of the sky is my understanding of how it works and that's essentially how it works. >> first, i've asked in a a hearing a couple of years ago and there was lost are around the room about the naive tee of destroying the thing in the air. >> it could be dangerous also, i think, if you were to just kinetically destroy it. i would imagine there would be hazards with that. >> the average person trying to understand it believe that -- that these technologies where you can use electronics to force

the device to land are successful or have a high degree of reliability and maybe i'll direct that to mr. jones. >> there's also non-destructive capabilities and from a law enforcement perspective, where if we can capture a drone there is a forensic capability that allows us information and so that's important to us as well as avoiding or minimizing collateral damage and we have to be careful to force in public areas, responsible law enforcement, do no harm. is any witness able to testify and we've had a series of short-term reauthorizations and the authorities that now exist and i have concerns especially after a variety in ways in which government authority has misused power to intercept information or learn information about the

american people and has gone too far. can anybody describe what the hesitancy is and why they're not significant? or why they should be overruled and proceed with this expanded authority. mr. wigman? >> hesitancy in adopting the expanded authority or -- >> yeah. >> that's kind of hard for us to answer because we support expanding the authority. it's important when you talk about intercepting signals and as i mentioned in my opening statement as director wheeler mentioned, the type of signals that we're getting are the same types of information that's required to be broadcast that anyone can pick up with a drone today as the faa's rule. so we're not talking -- i guess there is a privacy interest and it's the same type of information that we are now requiring and some new regulation and requiring the drone or anyone to pick up because it's about the communications between the drone and the controller so we can

figure out where is that person and what's the registration? what's the model and how do we deal with it? the privacy interest the chair now recognizes the gentleman from california. >> thank you mr. crith. i want to thank the witnesses here today. it's a very timely issue, your testimony and the questions show that little bit of a tension here between private property and public rights and protecting public safety. a couple of times back home i had the chance to see some drones flying over my house looking in my backyard. frustrating, angry, didn't have any kinetic weapons with me so they came and went, but on a serious note, i'm home to

disneyland. worldwide, it's still viewed as an american private enterprise center. i've got the anaheim ducks arena, the anaheim duck, sofi stadium nearby. world soccer cup coming to our area very soon, olympics coming soon and a target-rich environment, so to speak. what you're saying mr. wegman more specifically is the federal government doesn't have the bandwidth to protect all of these sites yet we're still not at a point where we can share the authority information with state, local ral authority, and i hope we don't have to wait for a federal law to go get there. it has a fusion center federal,

local, state, collaborated and shared information because when it comes to these drone, time is of the essence. authority to neutralize these things is of the essence, and i guess my question to each and every one of you starting with mr. jones, do you know of any efforts right now to coordinate with our locals to begin sharing and creating the local authority to be more effective at protecting our citizens, mr. jones. >> i can speak broadly outside of the county uas, we are working with our federal, state and local partners on a daily basis. there's counter fentanyl, counter uas and just general public safety and they're all partners and we're all on the same team. we need the authority -- >> go ahead.

>> we need the authority to select a state and local law enforcement and then with approved equipment. >> you need a federal law. >> yes, we do. >> some of us being probably do something like that, mr. chairman. i hope we can also -- i didn't hear it. i know, mr. jimenez questioned and talked a little bit about mexico, cooperation, any there? this is something that deals with both sides of the border. >> like i stated earlier. our relationship and information sharing with mexico are healthy both with the local border patrol as well as our communications with mexico city. >> thank you very much. mr. wheeler, same question to you. do you know of any efforts to coordinate past laws to help us work with the locals to protect

our citizenry? >> sure. i would illustrate as maybe a good example for the situation in new jersey and our newark division we talked about earlier. the fbi newark jttf comprised of a lot of state and local officers that work with jttf are people that are actively investigating this matter. >> are there any efforts to pass legislation that you're aware of to give the locals the authority to neutralize and monitor these aerial vehicles? >> well, that's not my purview for the legislation. >> if you were aware. support capacity building -- >> mr. wegman, my last 30 seconds. >> that's what we're here for, congressman. there is a senate bill. there are a couple of house bills. >> good. >> two different degrees and we provide additional authority to the states and both at the minimum to do detection only and

then -- so that's what we are here for. >> beyond those bills any other authorities that are needed to be vested in the locals to do their job? >> the chair anyway recognizes the gentleman from louisiana, mr. higgins. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, thank you for being here today. it's been referenced that there are federal laws against intercepting aircraft or intercepting communication signals, and it's been cited today regarding the absence of a specific federal law authorizing local law enforcement to use existing technologies to mitigate against an unmanned aerial system threat or drone threat. let me say that, mr. chairman, i believe the 10th amendment already extends such rights to disarming states, and let me say that the current law, the

current federal law that authorizes specific federal law enforcement agencies to use existing and emerging technologies to mitigate against unmanned aerial systems, yes, that authorizes those specific federal agencies to deploy their technology, but in no way does the current law prohibit the rights of the sovereign state to authorize their own state and local law enforcement to use existing technologies and emerging technologies in a law enforcement capacity. and local enforcement to use existing technologies and emerging technologies in a law enforcement capacity. mr. wegman, is it against the law for one american to strike another american? yes, it is. it's want a trick question.

is that against the law? >> obviously in the context. >> of course, there is a general law against that. >> yeah. >> is it allowed for a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to detain you or arrest you, is it allowable for him to strike you in order to effect that arrest? yes, of course, it can. is there a law against me crashing my car into yours purposefully? yes, there is, but mr. jones, are you familiar with the pit maneuver? of course, law enforcement has been using this for decades. we use our vehicle to crash into a suspect vehicle in a particular manner f our training in order to effect an arrest. we are using current training standards and the technology of our vehicle that we have deployed to effect an arrest.

that's not a vehicle crash. it's a law enforcement action. that's broadly known, everyone knows, it's against the law for one american to shoot another one, but a law enforcement officer, in order to effect arrest, if he needs so yes, there's plenty of laws, you guys love to cite these laws that exist that we cannot intercept an aircraft. we understand that. but if intercepting the aircraft is a law enforcement action, which using existing technology to mitigate against an unmanned aerial threat, mr. chairman, these technologies exist, and absolutely our local and state law enforcement entities should have access to the same technologies that we seem to be protectively reserving for only select federal agencies.

so, mr. jones, you had stated earlier, good sir, and thank you for wearing the badge, my brother. you stated earlier that, yes, you're deploying these systems, but please clarify for america that the great restrictions on actually deploying the technology to land a drone, you're using the technology primarily to track from drones, but you're not using the technology primarily to land drones, which is what the technology does. am i correct in that assessment or not, mr. jones? >> both are true. we are using technology to track the drones. we are also using technology and electronic means to intercept and land the drone at a place of our discretion. >> give us the numbers, by percentage. if you track 100 drones, how many are you landing?

>> like i stated earlier, for fy24, we actually landed 60 of them, mitigated 60 of the aircraft. >> 60 of the 45,000 that you encountered? well, there you go. that's what i'm saying. you're using the technology to track, but you're not using the technology to fully mitigate. so this is what we've been talking about for a year, mr. chairman. this technology by 10th amendment right belongs to the sovereign states, and they should be allowed to fully deploy it. thank you, mr. chairman, i yield. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas, mr. gonzalez. >> thank you, chairman. sometimes i feel like i'm in the twilight zone up here, months after months people come before us, they testify, you up don't get a lot of answers. it's concerning. it's frustrating. you're telling me we don't know

what the hell these drones are in new jersey, is that correct? >> that's right. >> that's crazy. i mean, that's crazy. that's madness that we don't know what these drones are. you're telling me that a lot of these, mr. jones, you're telling me that 90%, 95% of these drones along the u.s.-mexico border we can't interact because they're not in u.s. territory? >> that is correct. a large portion of them stay in foreign airspace. >> i tell you what, there are a lot of americans that are frustrated right now, that are essentially questioning, where are my taxpayer dollars going? you know this doge craze that's starting to take hold, this is very real. i mean, this is going to come. people are going to have to come before the carpet, and they're going to have to explain every single line item. what do you do here? what does this get? let me ask a very specific question. mr. wheeler, how much of the f.b.i. budget goes to counter u.a.s.? >> the technical part of

operational budget that i have within the response groups, less than 500,000. >> 500,000, that's nothing. why is it so low? we don't know what the hell is going on, 500,000. that number doesn't capture the f.b.i. newark investigation, for example. the budget allocation for what we're doing investigatively is not captured in that number. but for the technology we use and the way we deploy it, just under 500,000. >> we want to help you. this is a committee, you know, the chairman is putting this together because we want to know these topics. the american people deserve to know the truth on this, and we also deserve to have actions on it. and if it's a budget issue, no problem. but it's also what is our money getting us? clearly not a whole locality. and something needs to change though. i'm trying to figure out what that something is.

month after month, it's the same old, same old, from a standpoint, do you know what the current budget of c.v.b. is for counter u.a.s.? >> i can tell you that direct appropriations for counter u.a.s. was zero last year. >> zero. >> v.c.p. took it out of hyde. we will continue to do that. i can't tell you what that exact number is. i have a general ballpark. but i provide that back to you. >> another committee that i sit on is appropriations, so i see a lot of things through the lens of dollars and cents. if you're putting zero on the board, you're probably not going to get a lot of success. and it's not fair. a lot of people talk about the border, i represent the border, nearly half of the southern border. i've been out there with these agents in the middle of nowhere that are essentially alone and afraid make doing with what they have. it's not fair to them, and ultimately it's not fair to us to have them combat against some

of the drones that are happening with zero budget. i mean, it's madness. i have other line of questioning, but i don't want to embarrass anyone. i will just say, i'll be very interested in partnering up and figuring out what we need to do in order to answer some of these questions. what resources do you need? the technologies -- drones, this isn't new. drones are 100 years old. this isn't state of the art. i mean, drones are old technology. the fact that we don't know what's flying in our airspace is only the tip of the iceberg of what's to come. we have to fix this. i want to partner up to fix this. part of that is finding out the proper resources you need, training, authorities. i get the authorities piece, but this is a cradle to grave type of situation. it cannot just be -- the answer can't be we don't know. and the answer can't be zero. i mean, we got to do better than that. and if we don't, i suspect not

good things will happen. so thank you, gentlemen, for coming before us to testify, and i look forward to partnering with all your agencies. i yield back. >> the gentleman yields. the chair recognizes the gentleman from new york, mr. d'esposito. >> thank you, i sort of feel the same way as my good friend, mr. gonzales. this is deja vu. we've been talking about this a long time, and seem to not get many answers much the chairman and i visited new york city probably close to two years ago am we met with the leadership in the nypd. it was probably one of the most rapidly growing drone use in the country. any visions may be different from others here, but first, i think it's important to quickly focus on stuff back at home. these drones over new york and new jersey are flying over critical infrastructure, flying over some of, whether it's the

verrazzano bridge or others, i have to agree with my colleagues. the fact that we continue to say that we don't know what they are, we don't know what they're doing, i mean, the american people are looking at us, and they think we're lying to them because they think how could you possibly not have answers to drones flying over some of the most critical airspace in the country? if we're expecting the american people to believe in the information that we're giving them, i think we do need to do better. that's none of your fault. i mean, the fact that there's only a half, what is it, half a million dollars in drone expenditures appropriations, i mean, that's absolutely insane. i hope that it's something that my colleagues work on. as many have already pointed out, drones continue to rapidly advance and become more readily available. along with the expansion,

threats from drones being used by bad actors have only increased. right now counter u.a.s. authorities are restricted from local law enforcement agencies, leaving it largely in the hands of federal agencies. mr. wigman or mr. wheeler, very simple questions. do federal agencies have the ability to assist local law enforcement agencies with their counter u.a.s. capabilities everywhere and every time it's needed? >> not today. that's what we're seeking from congress. >> that's absolutely correct. >> are there events and places that would benefit from counter u.a.s. capabilities that federal agencies are simply not able to cover? >> absolutely, there are, yes. >> in your submitted statement you both said, "we need to empower state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies across the country, which are primarily responsible for keeping our citizens safe at the local level to take the steps needed to protect their communities from the emergency threat." this past year, right in my

district, in the middle of my district in nassau county, we hosted the 2024 international cricket world cup, including the india-pakistan match. while there were drone-related threats from isis ahead of the tournament, the federal government was only able to assist with their capabilities for a small portion of the tournament. what is the current impact of local law enforcement not having these authorities? i'll leave that to any of you. >> well, i think that's the main thing, capacity. we need more capacity to be able to do the mission. we strongly support state and local jurisdictions having that capacity and authority and ability to help. >> and i think -- i'm sorry. >> that's right, just to answer your question, mr. gonzales as well, i think all of us on the panel share your view that we need to do more, more resources, if we too get the authorities, we will certainly need more resources, even if local resources are doing. that will require additional training. more resources, more

authorities, those are all things we would support. >> and i think it's important to point out and spread the message, because i think there's a lot of false information being spread about law enforcement agencies trying to stay, well, they don't want this added enforcement. they don't want to take on this responsibility. i mean, we had a hearing in this room just hours ago where the commissioner of the nassau county police department was here, and he had been advocating in his position as commissioner, as his position as a member of the major city chiefs, that this is something that local law enforcement agencies, not only do they need it, they want it. and i think that we have the opportunity throughout this country to make sure that law enforcement agencies, there is some sort of consolidation. there are many agencies that border one another, that can help each other deal with this, i'll call a burden, but this added burden. but they're willing to do it. why? because it makes sure that

people can be kept safe. we can make sure that in instances like the world cup back in my district, or as mr. jiménez was talking about the summer games in miami, i mean, to depend on the federal government and the federal government is telling us, well, we can only help you some of the time, even when you have threats from isis, that's a huge problem. it's one that we need to address, not only here today, but moving forward. mr. chairman, my time has accidents fired, but thank you for continuing to bring this to light. >> the gentleman's time is expired. the chair recognizes the gentleman from arizona. >> thank you, mr. chairman, for holding this hearing today. thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. i got an article right here, mystery drones spotted over new york, new jersey, prompt calls for federal investigation. i believe this was breitbart news. i want to start with you, mr. wheeler, from the f.b.i. what can you tell us about what you guys do know?

>> the public reports and what we have from eyewitness sightings, some of those very credible police personnel and others are what we describe as unidentified drones. we do not know the particular specifics of what those drones are. some of some are described as being slightly larger than a commercial available drone. fixed wing, as well as rotary. we have helped analyze with our partners video and pictures of what those look like. they would have been submitted. part of that is over 3,000 tips from the public, to look at that. but as i previously stated, we don't know the people responsible behind that. and that's what we're working on. >> yeah. what did you say, you gabe, the

f.b.i. was spending on counter drone? >> my budget that would specifically include the technology that we use -- >> is ited ads hundred,000? >> $500,000. >> that doesn't seem nearly adequate. why do you feel like there isn't a push within the f.b.i. to keep up with modern warfare and modern threats? what is the budget for the f.b.i. right now? >> roughly $11 billion. >> ok. why do you think is warfare changes, as you know, sir, warfare is changing drastically right now overseas, especially with ukraine and russia and the development of drone technology, why isn't the f.b.i. taking this threat more seriously? that's obviously reflected by the budget that you guys have assigned to counter drone technology. >> i have a limited capability that is embedded within our

emerging threats unit for surveillance issues. that allocation or resource, that research, that operational deployment of our capability is what we have today. i would imagine that this would grow over time. >> what do you think that some of these terrorist cells that might be in the country right now, or maybe even outside of our borders, what do you think that they're looking at when they see a hearing like this and they see no you guys still, after almost a month, don't know what the drones are, what do you think they're thinking? >> so i would be measured in how we speak about our capability. and what our limitations and capacity is. however, i'll say to you, it's not as good as i wish it was.

we'll continue to work to make it better. >> when you're only spending $500,000 a year, it's probably not going to be very good, is it? >> the only thing i would say about that is that this is an enterprise-wide problem. it's not just a technological problem. most of that $11 billion budget for the f.b.i. gets after threats to americans, this being one of them. and the way we apply resources, personnel, operational, all of that to include technology to get after a threat that would threaten american lives, i don't think that $500,000 for the technology part of it adequately captures our commitment to protect americans. >> i want to shift real quick, because you guys have been talking about using electronic warfare to counter some of these drones. what about drones that aren't susceptible to counter warfare, like your fiberoptic drones,

what are you guys doing about those? i'll start with you, mr. jones. >> all options respect on the table right now. we are exploring kinetic options. to complement the electronic. >> you know you can buy those right now, and they're really not that expensive. are you aware of that, mr. jones? >> i'm aware there's a lot of different technologies out there. we have experimented with some that have been very successful. >> thank you. i yield back. >> the gentleman yields. the gentlelady from new york is recognized. >> thank you, chairman. thank you all for being here today. i just want to follow up on what my colleague asked regarding what happened in new york and new jersey. these drones, unmanned aircraft virginia also flown over my district. a number of constituents have seen them over a power plant, in brooklyn, they were coming over the verrazzano bridge. and i will remind everyone, or explain to everyone here that

verrazzano bridge connects staten island, and brooklyn. on the staten island, you have fort wadsworth, a u.s. coast guard sector new york base. and then in the brooklyn side, right on the other side of the verrazzano bridge, you have fort hamilton, which is a u.s. army installation. so it's very concerning to me that we have these objects, we're not sure if they're drones or unmanned aircraft, but they are flying over sensitive infrastructure and facilities. the fact that we don't know what they are or who's behind them or what they're doing is very concerning to me, particularly in a post tiny spy balloon world. the fact that this administration allowed for chinese spy balloon to go across the country, over multiple military installations, is very concerning. we could potentially be having this happen again, it's like astounding to me that this is even happening without any type of intervention. you say it's no known threat,

but is there still a possibility of there being a threat? at the end of the day, that's what my constituents want to know. >> yes. i am cognizant, and we all are in the f.b.i. of what this threat can look like. any way across the spectrum of sophisticated state actors, adversaries that want to hurt us, all the way through counter terrorism matters, cyber, criminal, all the way down to a nuisance drone that could cause harm, that's the wide spectrum that concerns me every day. i was just mention, it concerns me we don't know the answer to your question yet. >> are you working with the pentagon, with f.a.a., with d.h.s., with your partners to try to identify this? because i don't put it all on the f.b.i. i mean, what is homeland security doing?

do you have any idea? >> i wouldn't speak for another department, but i will say that the way we do business is extremely collaborative in the interagency, especially with our state and local partners. >> who's taking the lead here on this particular issue, identify these drones and aircrafts. >> well, we have an investigation open, predicated on the idea that there's unsafe operation in the airspace, a federal violation we have some jurisdiction for. but it would help us know sort of what lane this falls in, when we know the people that are responsible and what this is all about, to your point earlier. and we're actively investigating and would like to answer those questions. i don't have a better answer. >> what if they were carrying chemical weapons? i mean, this could be already, this would be a much worse conversation we could be having right now, because these things have been flying all over new

york, new jersey, over military installations. i don't know, i think, i don't know what's going on there, but these agencies need to figure it out and try to get to the bottom of what's going o. i think it's very concerning. is there a possibility, if hopefully it is not a threat, is it a possibility that would fall under this system assessment and validation of emergency responders program, a program under department of homeland security science and technology, where they are testing various technology for search and rescue, disaster response, and it could be part of a law enforcement assessment. do you think that's a possibility? because my army base doesn't know about it. my nypd doesn't know about it. i guess my question is, why wouldn't the local authorities know if this was part of a testing of security technologies for first responders? >> i don't know that to be the case. i couldn't really comment on that. >> ok, well, just again, i would

love to speak to you offline and maybe share some information with you. but i would really just urge, if you could speak to your colleagues and counterparts in these other departments, because we need to get to the bottom of what's going on here. and if it is something that is not nefarious, is a part of these public safety applications that are being tested, they need to coordinate with local authorities so my guys in the nypd know it's want a threat. >> i would agree. >> thank you. >> the gentlelady yields. this will be the last questioning for the first panel. the chair now recognizes the gentleman from new jersey, mr. smith. >> thank you so very much, mr. chairman, chairmen, both of you for allowing me to sit this on this hearing. i've been in congress 44 years, and i've lost track of the number of times which we seemingly did not adequately assess a threat. i had one of my service members from the marines in the bar ax in lebanon when that terrible, horrible deed was committed by

iran. i actually, after we got hit in anyway roby in 1998 by al qaeda, i chaired all the hearings. we had the chairman of the joint chief of staffs come and testify. they kept saying everyone. no one thought that al qaeda would hit there. maybe in the middle east, but not there. i wrote a bill called the embassy security act, it was signed into law. i added it into an appropriations bill. billing, thick bill, it was all about a lot of good things, and it did mitigate some of the concerns there. but we always seem to miss something, and i'm very concerned that we're missing something here. are missing something here. i've raised the issue, as have my colleagues, new jersey and new york, about these drone sightings. last night, i was on the beach at island state park in ocean county with the sheriff.

he has been working every single night. he has his own tethered drones. one of his officers two nights ago saw 50 drones coming off the ocean right there. we thought maybe they replicated. they didn't, but we thought it was a possibility. we had a commanding officer from the coast guard who said that one of their 47-foot motor lifeboats was followed by between 12 and 30 of these drones as they went through the water. followed, right behind them. what are the rules of engagement? if you are fighting against a narco trafficker or something? they said, we don't know. we don't have any. i reached out to the committee officer at the joint base also in my district and talked to him. i had a good conversation with colonel anthony smith. their air base wing.

i said, i know you have the capability to put out press releases to identify and bring down drones. why can't you deploy them to the ocean? bring one down and find out who's doing it. he said, we don't have the authority. in the parameters of our base. there is a national interest. our jets fly over the ocean all the time. that perimeter -- i did write to secretary lloyd weston asking for that capability. i know they use it all the time. break it out. i'm not saying you have to share it with the sheriffs, it would be nice, but just do it yourself in the interest of the american public. i ask if you would echo that request. the dod has the capability and mably homeland security does as well. we had a zoom meeting with secretary mayorkas.

the governor put it together and i appreciate that. i asked, why can't we track where they go to? seemingly they're going out to see. may be a ship. we don't know. the question really is, can we just get dod to share? in my first term dod and da did a shared agreement for health-care capabilities. it was fantastic. why can't the dod share this with homeland security and the fbi and others to find out who they are? maybe it is china. the china commission, 115 hearings, china, i am on their hit list. xi jinping is a monster. look at what putin is doing. they are all capable of doing horrible things to our people. they are threatening my friend and colleague from new york and new jersey big-time. let's get the dod capability and find out and put to rest the

question of, who is it? we can bring one down tomorrow. >> sir, i share your concern. i share a lot of frustration. i am more than willing to continue working with the department to try to get better. >> if they don't have the authority they can do it on an emergency basis. just send that capability to the ocean, to the beach. because they are coming in every day. figure out which one it is and bring them down. then, retrieve it. my friend congresswoman bella talk us said the thing with the balloon was mind-boggling. over our bases and we didn't see that that was the threat? this is a serious threat. if you could, please get dod to share that capability. maybe homeland has it, maybe you have it somewhere, i know dod has it. thank you.