under pines -- america's values. the challenges are considered pro bowl. -- considerable. it is the environment that we have today. there is no simple answer. we must can does -- conduct a list -- conduct a holistic effort. casualty's will likely increase. we will make mistakes. commitment and continued support of this committee, congress and the american people will be vital. with the appropriate resources, time, sacrifice and nation, we can prevail. a key component of people, more than 21,000 additional personnel

will be deployed to afghanistan by october of this year. you might ask if that is enough. i don't know. it may be some time before i do. i do know that a military strategy will not succeed. they are preparing to train and deploy civilian personnel with expertise. they will unite efforts across the area, governance is on going. we will address issues across the region. i will support fully the execution of that plan. . . . . ir elected

government secures their trust through effective governance and economic development at all levels. an's effort with our committed support. in counterinsurgency, how you operate the impact of civilian casualties, collateral damage, cultural insensitivity, and the inherent complexities involved in supporting the insurgents from population often determined -- complexities involved in separating the insurgents from population often determine success or failure.

afghanistan faced with a determined and unconstrained fellow -- foe, precision is essential. if confirmed, i would emphasize that how we conduct operations is vital to success. this is a critical point. it may be the critical point. this is a struggle for the support of the afghan people. our willingness to operate in ways that minimize casualties or damage, even when doing so makes the task board difficult, is essential to our credibility. my experience leading counterterrorism forces in afghanistan, iraq, and other locations, did much to develop my belief in the importance of a holistic counterinsurgency campaign. while part of the contributions of the forces i was honored to command, we were most effective when integrated with partners in

full spectrum counterinsurgency campaigns. i believe that intelligence- driven, position operations will remain critical, but must be supported to efforts that protect the population and set conditions for government and economic advancement. i expect stiff fighting ahead, but the measure of effectiveness will not be in the number killed, but the number of afghans shield it from violence. securing the population is ultimately passed on by afghans. i consider the afghan national army and police our highest priority security task. if confirmed, i would work with our nato and il and afghan partners to support the effort. -- nato and eu and afghan partners to support the efforts. like you, i am keenly aware of the efforts on the part of the coalition, many of, sacrificed greatly and invested heavily to support afghanistan. if we are both confirmed, i will of the honor of working for my friend admiral stavridis, and

might force one could nato partner nations -- might force will include made a part -- but would need a partner nations supporting afghanistan. i look forward to listening to, learning from, and leaving this team -- and a leading this team in our common a challenge. since 9/11, our forces have learned a valuable lessons regarding the treatment of detainees, and made mistakes along the way. when i took command in 2003, i found the treatment of detainees followed existing guidance, but needed improvement. our facilities are limited, our expertise and specialties were insignificant, and we lacked organizational experience at every level. in the months and years that

followed, we invested considerable energy, developed expertise and experience, and appeared continuously. if confirmed, i will stick in force -- strictly enforced the high standards of detainee to be consistent with international and u.s. law. working within the realities of family needs and development, we must develop a core of professionals to process expertise in the theater and the language and culture. these experts can significantly increase the effectiveness of our overall effort. i would like to thank the committee for consistent support. programs like the commanders of reagan's response program offer critical flexibility -- commanders emergency response program offer critical flexibility. equipment like the am wrap -- mrap vehicle save lives.

most important is the magnificent volunteer force, seasoned by year's end growing experience in counterinsurgency operations. they inspire us with the courage and commitment. they are strong, but have given much. thank you for the unveiling support you have provided these tremendous professionals and their families. i was honored to be nominated for this position, and if confirmed, pledge to you and the men and women for whom i will serve the best of which i am capable. with that, i look forward to answering your questions. >> we have an eight-minute round. before we begin with questions, let me ask the standard questions of each of you. we ask these of all of our nominees. have you here to the applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? >> yes, sir. >> have you had taken actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? >> no, sir. >> will you ensure that your

staff complies with deadlines? >> yes, sir. >> will you corporate with providing witnesses in response to congressional request? >> yes, sir. >> do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request of this committee? >> yes, sir. >> do you agree to give your personal use even if they differ from the administration in power? >> yes, sir. >> you agreed to provide documents in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis of any good- bit delay or denial and providing such documents? >> yes, sir. >> i think there is going to be a vote at 11:, and we will try to work right through it. let me ask both admiral stavridis and general mcchrystal about the strength of

the afghan national army to general mcchrystal, he made reference to it. the current goal, the strength of the afghan national army, 134,000. as of april, there were 86,000 troops assigned to the army. president obama has approved the deployment later this year of 4000 soldiers as trainers. they will and then work with the afghan security forces. but i'm a very much concerned, as many of us are, about the size of the army, the lack of a higher end-strength goal. i join with senator lieberman and 13 other senators in a letter to the president to urge him to support now the increase in the end-strength the levels for the afghan army and the police, to hire rangers that were recommended by the afghan defense and interior ministers for the army. that range was between 250,000

and 300,000, which would mean a double the current target. admiral, let me ask you first, because general mcchrystal has commented on it. i then want to ask the general the same question. do you believe that the realities on the ground in afghanistan and necessitate growing the afghan national security forces beyond the currently planned and s strengths? >> mr. chairman, my study of classic counterinsurgency doctrine, looking at everything from tea lawrence to david -- t.e. lawrence to david kilcullen, leads me to believe that we need a larger security forces. >> larger than the current and- strength? >> yes, sir. >> general, do you also believe -- in your judgment, will the afghan army need to get a

significantly higher end-of strength than 134,000? >> yes, that is my belief right now. >> in terms of the pakistan situation -- and here, general, he made reference to this -- would you agree that assistance to pakistan would only be affected if the pakistani government is considered by the people of pakistan as taking the fight to the insurgents because of their own needs as a nation, not because of u.s. pressure? >> yes, sir, i do. >> admiral, do you want to give a quick comment on that? >> yes, sir, i do. >> the general mcchrystal, are you familiar with the national solidarity program in afghanistan? >> yes, sir. >> do you have an opinion of its success?

>> i want to learn more when i get on the ground, but from what i've seen here, it is very successful and very positive. >> relative to the question of detainees, and you make brief reference to it, general, we have a letter that we will make part of the record clarifying an answer which provided -- which you provided for the committee in advance of the hearing today. one line in your letter says that we must at all times and here to our obligation to treat detainees to many, -- adhere to our obligation to treat detainees humanely. military necessity does not permit us to derogate from those imperatives. i will put the entire matter in the record. it is an important clarification of your pre-hearing answer for the record. relative to the events that occurred, i want to clarify

your understanding and awareness and knowledge of what occurred when you with the commander of special operations -- when you were the commander of special operations. how many special unit task forces were there when you were the command? >> sir, there were multiple. we had a task force in afghanistan, which then had supported it task forces, and sometimes it was as few as two, sometimes as many as four. in iraq, similarly, we had a major task force. we then went to two major task forces. each of those had supported a tax forces. -- each of those had supported it t -- had subordinate task forces. i was commander of part of special operations. there were a theater special operations as well.

>> you were not the task force commander? >> i was the joint task force command. >> but in terms of those special unit task force, you are not the commander of those task forces? you are not the commander of one of those task forces? >> those task forces made up my joint task force. >> they made up my task forces. >> did those task forces have a commander? >> yes, sir. >> what was your understanding more awareness of the treatment of detainees when you were the overall commander? the inspector general of the department of defense indicated that a memorandum of the secretary of defense, which was approved on december 2, 2002,

that memorandum, relative to the interrogation of detainees, authorized the use of things like stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the use of dogs. that memorandum of december 2, 2002, went first to afghanistan and was transmitted verbatim to iraq. in terms of the treatment of detainees, when you got there, tell us what you were aware of, what you did relative to that subject. >> yes, mr. chairman. i took over in october of 2003. i would like to start with three things. i do not and never have condoned mistreatment of detainees and never will. when we found cases where we thought there was an allegation of mistreatment, we investigated everyone and we punished cases

that were substantiated. that said, when i took command, i found the detainee facilities really insufficient foreign me. they were physically unprepared. we did not have the right number of interrogators or the right experience in the force. none of us had ever done this with the level of precision we needed to. that were in them when i took command. with each change in guidelines, we did in the review and stayed within those all the time. we also, as i outlined last year -- it also was something that i believe continuously approved -- continually improved. each month we get better at it. the procedures to stop constantly looked at so that -- the procedures just got constantly looked at so that they were approved. the constant improvement was what took us from what i think was acceptable and legal to something that i became much more proud of overtime in terms

of the quality of the operation. >> you mean that they were within the guidelines established by the secretary of defense? >> they were within legally prescribed guidelines, the policy we were given. >> which you understood at that time was legal? and that policy included at that time, under the december 2002 memorandum of the secretary of defense, the aggressive acts that i described -- stress positions, the use of dogs, and nudity. is that correct? >> sir, it did. we did not use all the things outlined there. >> some of them were used? >> some of them were used when i took over. we immediately began to reduce that. >> senator mccain. i just want to make sure -- use it you improved, he met that

even though some of the actions -- he meant that even though some of the actions relative to the detainees were approved by the sector of defense, when you say you approved of them, you reduced the number of techniques which were utilized, even though they had been authorized. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> were you uncomfortable with some of the techniques you saw? >> when i took over, i was. >> and the reduction of the use of those techniques, even though they had been authorized by the secretary, nonetheless was something that you felt was a proper and necessary? -- appropriate and necessary. >> that is correct. >> general mcchrystal, general mckiernan reportedly had a request for the deployment of an

additional 10,000 troops to afghanistan in 2010. do you expect to renew this request, alter it, or rescind it? >> i believe i ought to make an assessment on the ground. >> what is your initial assessment? do we need the additional 10,000? >> sir, i'm just not sure at this point. >> how long do you expect the counterinsurgency effort in afghanistan to last? >> i cannot put a target date on it. counterinsurgency takes time. we need to start making progress within the next 18 to 24 months. >> you to comment in a statement that you believe casualties would go up in the short term. that is an important message that members of powers and the american people understand. roughly how many detainees were in the bar from prison -- bagram

prison today? >> i believe about 600. >> some of them are not from afghanistan, other nationals. >> i do not know the breakdown right now, sir. >> do you expect the other fighters, as we saw in iraq, will be on the battlefield in afghanistan? >> i do, senator. >> and we will be capturing some of those? >> i do, senator. >> a problem of what to do with detainees -- with detainees -- our problem of what to do with detainees from other countries will continue? >> i believe it will. >> the death by friendly fire of corporal pat tillman was a great tragedy, as we all know, and the pain of loss of this american hero was compounded by the misinformation about the circumstances of his death, some of which were included in the recommended citation for the award of the silver star medal that was forwarded by his

commanding officer three you as the commanding general of the joint special operations command and approved by you on april 28, 2004. can you describe what happened in april with respect to the information about the circumstances of corporal tillman's death and why you forwarded the silver start recommendation in the form it was in? >> i appreciate the opportunity. corporal tillman was killed on the 22nd of april, and on the dates falling, -- on the days following, as with any is soldier, a couple of things happen. i arrived back from afghanistan from a meeting in qatar with general abizaid. i was informed that point that they suspected from the fire might have been the cause of death, and they might have initiated what we call a 15-6, an investigation of that. we were ready for the outcome of the initial review before we

went forward with any conclusions. it was a well-intended intent to get some level of truth before we went up. at the same time, we looked at his potential award for valor, and any loss soldier, they immediately look and determine whether a war -- with an award was appropriate. and it is a corporal tillman, a silver star was recommended. -- in the case of corporal tillman, a silver star was recommended. we looked over the geometry of the battlefield and i queried the people to satisfy myself that his actions warranted that, even though there was a potential that the actual circumstance of debt had been friendly fire. i need to stress here that we have a number of famous people in american history killed by friendly fire -- stonewall jackson and the like. i don't separate, or believe that the circumstance of debt it

detracts from his courage, commitment, or contribution. i was comfortable recommending, once i believe that the people in the fight were convinced it awarded a silver star. i also sent a message informing my chain of command that we believed it was fratricide, and we did that when we were told there were going to be fairly high profile memorial services. what happens in retrospect -- i would do this differently if i had a chance again -- in retrospect, they look contradictory, because we said a silver star that was not well written, and although i went through the process, i will tell you that i did not review the citation well enough, or i did not catch that if you read it, you could imply that it was not friendly fire. also, what i sent the message,

the intent entirely was to inform everybody and i can to commence a that nobody would be surprised -- inform everybody in my chain of command so that nobody would be surprised. the intent on awards at that time was to do an award rapidly so that it could be presented to the family at the memorial service for their comfort. what we have learned since is that it is better to take your time and make sure you get everything right with the award, and not rush it. i say that -- the two things that were entirely unintended on my part and in my view, everybody that i saw, -- entirely well-intended on my part and in my view, everybody that i saw, still produced confusion. the outcome produced a perception that i don't believe was at all involved in the forces that were for it. >> and you believe that corporal tillman earned the silver star by his actions before he died?

>> i absolutely do. >> given your experience in afghanistan, deeply the interrogation techniques in the army field manual -- do you believe the interrogation techniques an army field manual are sufficient to get the information you need? >> yes, sir, i do. >> do you believe any additional techniques unnecessary? >> no, sir. >> do you believe counterinsurgency in afghanistan to be depended in some extent on pakistan? are you encouraged by the temporary but at least some success but a pakistani army in -- by the pakistani army in the swat valley and waziristan? >> sir, i am encouraged. if you look back several years, what appealed -- what appeared to the people of pakistan as an american problem of terrorist ever transnational -- that were

transnational -- i believe deeply -- i believe they see it as an internal insurgency. the actions of the last few weeks have been resolute in going after that internal insurgency. >> the situation is not as bad as we had feared, but not as good as we hope? as regards the effectiveness or commitment of the pakistani government and military? >> the situation is very serious, but they are acting on it. >> are you concerned about the overall corruption problem in the country? >> sir, i am. >> there is not a policy for a repetition of the poppy crops? >> it is critical that we develop one. i have not looked at it closely,

but i know that we need one. >> as a result of your experience in iraq, what lessons do you apply to afghanistan? briefly, since i think i am out of time. >> sir, i believe a counterinsurgency campaign, a classic counterinsurgency campaign, well-rehearsed, will be required. >> under different circumstances? >> it is different, but many of the same requirements. >> and a large geographic area? >> sir, it is more limited than it was in sometimes in iraq. it is mostly in the south and east. there are problems in the west and in the north as well. >> and we will experience significant resistance as we move into the south of afghanistan? >> sir, i believe that we will. >> i thank you, mr. chairman.

>> thanks, senator mccain. senator lieberman. >> thanks to the three of you for your extraordinary service to our country, and congratulations on these nominations. i want to focus on afghanistan for most of my questions, and say that in nominating admiral stavridis and general mcchrystal to the positions were going to -- the positions you are going to cut the president has put in place not just a start team but an all-star team. you now, general mcchrystal heading our operations, as you describe in afghanistan, with general rodriguez -- that together with the diplomatic and non-military effort there with ambassador holbrooke, ambassador i can very going into -- the

ambassador going into kabul with a cruel include several state department personnel -- with a crew that will include several state department personnel -- we are concentrating our strengths because it is important to win in afghanistan. general mcchrystal, do you believe this is a winnable war do you believe this is a winnable war in afghanistan? >> i believe it is winnable. i do not think it will be easily winnable. >> i think both of those points that you brought out in response to senator mccain are very important to hear from you, for members of congress and the american people to understand. it is winnable, but it will not be easy. it will probably get worse before it gets better. you are a general and not