kinds of positions, you will be asked the kinds of questions we are asked. let me ask you. why do you think it is important that we succeed in afghanistan? >> i think the first and obvious as to prevent al qaeda save havens. i actually believe the importances wider. i believe the regional stability of afghanistan and pakistan are linked and a lack of stability in that area is going to cause geopolitical problems, even if there were no al qaeda. i think it would still be an important region. i think our credibility in the world -- we have the ability to support the people of afghanistan then move and shake a better future that they want. i think that will make a difference in how we are viewed worldwide. about the linkage between it tell the bad and al qaeda. there have been people in recent

months -- that taliban and allocated. there are people in recent who have said that it is possible to break off that taliban to cooperate with us. he made very strong statements about your skepticism -- you made a very strong statements about your skepticism about our ability to do that, to break the taliban from al qaeda. not so long as they think they are winning, i want to ask you did speak in the open to the tally bad-al qaeda -- taliban-al qaeda a linkage. >> it is somewhat to the taliban, but it is other organizations there. with the taliban, they do have a bank -- link, and i don't think any reason to turn their backs on al qaeda. therefore i don't think there is

a motivation to do that. what is probably more important is that i don't believe that the taliban or a single cohesive organization -- they are more a confederation of small entities. many of which are absolutely motivated by regional financial or almost warlordism. they don't have a large, coherent structure to the level that it sometimes can look on a map or an organizational chart. i think it might be easier to fragment the taliban and separate them from the hard-core al qaeda. >> general, it is my understanding that as of today, we still don't have the kind of integrated civil military joint plan for afghanistan that we have for some time now in iraq. is that your understanding? >> i know that planning is on

going to develop that. the master is a friend of mine, and have committed that if confirmed, -- the ambassador is a friend of mine, and i have committed that if confirmed, we will complete that as soon as possible. >> you will work with them on a joint military-a simple plan for afghanistan? two of the time on which you will complete that? -- do you have a time on which will complete that? as you know, there's a lot of appreciation for the european involvement -- nato involvement in afghanistan, and also a dissatisfaction with how it is working overall. particularly those of us committed to nato are concerned that this significant out-of- peter and offutt by this great military alliance -- out-of- beater in a coffin by this great

military alliance succeed. as you assume this command, what are your thoughts about what we can do to improve nato's involvement here? >> thank you. first, i would add to stan's excellent list of why afghanistan matters the point that you just raised -- and a new engagement, and how the alliance performs there -- the nato engagement, and how the alliance performs there will bleed over into the future of the alliance. it is certainly important and critical. in addition to all the excellent points that stan made, i would add that one as well. as i look at it, and of course, i have not had any conversations that with my military interlocutors in the will of nato, but i was struck by what ranking member ,ccaom

said -- by what ranking member mccain said, ought to ask our allies to do what they're willing to do, and recognize that there are places they are not willing to go. that was the gamut from money to civil-military interaction, along the lines of the plan that general mcchrystal and anthe ambassador to put together. it includes the trust fund we talked about. the odds are high that we will need more security forces, more afghan security forces, at the end of the day. at the end of the day, all security is local. we will need funding for that. that is it a battle zone of contribution for nato. -- that is a potential zone of contribution for nato. i look forward to the interactions with our allies, and working with general mcchrystal to hear what he needs and attempting to facilitate that. >> my time is expiring, so i

want to stay this in a different matter. you had very strong statements in the q&a on the rising ballistic missile threat to europe, particularly that posed by iran. as a consequence, you argue that "the deployment of ballistic missile defenses in europe would make a significant contribution to the protection of the u.s. in europe from a middle east and ballistic missile threat." you also very strongly said that "we need multilayered missile defense capabilities station and operational in the region before a fretfully emerges to ensure, in european allies and partner'' security in this vein." the petric programs are very important, but cannot defeat "the entire range of threats by themselves." i want to thank you for those statements. i cannot agree with you more. i look forward to working with you on those and other matters

related to your committee. >> senator in half. -- senator inhofe. >> that -- they always have a meeting at the same time as this. i have to go back and forth. i cannot think of any more qualified individuals than the three of you. i'm excited about the things to come. you may have covered this in my absence, but i wanted to mention -- in fact, there was a great editorial in "investor's business daily" called "iran grows bold." "that is why that knowing we have decided on a peace and as the best course, mahmoud ahmadinejad, on the everyday of the demonstration of his nuclear bomb, said the freeze of the

iran nuclear program was out of the question about was it goes on and talks about -- was out of the question." it goes on a tax cuts of the individuals -- and talks about the individuals -- head of security forces in moscow as saying that iran is working on a program one or two years away from having a nuclear program. i'm getting mixed signals here, because we are all very familiar with the capabilities that we need to protect western europe and maybe even the united states from the missile coming from iran, and it is necessary to have the radar in the czech republic as wallace -- as well as the poland opportunities. they are ready and willing to do it in the polish parliament, even saying that they are hoping that we don't regret our trust in the united states.

i would like to have won if you respond to what is confusing to me, -- one of the response to what is confusing to me, that we now have russia saying that they don't want to participate in this, or don't want to approve this unless they have certain conditions met on the start treaty. and yet to turn around and say that it is necessary to have this. where you think russia is and how important you think -- let us start with you, admiral stavridis, to have that european side? >> i think i'm the right one to answer the question, given that russia is part of the u.s.- european command area of focus. as you fully appreciate, and chairman alluded to this in his statement -- any of these decisions are a matrix of diplomatic and political activity that goes well beyond the purview of the military commander. my own view at this point,

looking at it from a distance, and before having the opportunity -- >> forget about the politics. it just importance of the european side from a military perspective. >> i agree with the president's comments that as long as the threat exists, persistence is affected. >> it looks like the iranian threat will persist. this is kind of off the wall, and i thought -- i fought and lost the three-year battle three years ago and i thought that that is the best in a bid to an opportunity that we had -- the best integrated training opportunity that we had. we lost it for political reasons, both democrats and republicans, because president bush was in on this decision. the things i said were going to happen, and in terms of roosevelt roads and adversely affecting puerto rico -- i'm

getting people coming back to be saying, "any possibility of reopening it as a sidte?" >> that would fall under the purview of my good friend, the chief of naval operations. >> do you think the quality of turning today is as good? -- the quality of training today is as good? general mcchrystal, you and i have talked about this. i appreciate all of you visiting me in giving you the time that you have. you have been very, very busy. but the nebraska national guard has been in afghanistan on these agricultural programs, and that the oklahoma guard is -- would you give a brief assessment as to what successes or failures that have been? >> my information is second- hand, but all i have gotten is

very positive. in the importance of the agricultural part of -- i know the importance of the agricultural part is key. >> i have heard that from a lot of commanders in the field and others. let me get my three or four programs that are my favorites for yes-or-no answers from the three of you. it would be on training 12 06, 12 07, at 12 away, as it -- 12,008, as it applies to the special forces. i think those three, four programs are among the most significant programs that we have going for us right now. do you agree? >> yes, sir, i agree. >> yes, sir, based on three years its outcome, they are approaching indispensable. >> yes, sir, i concur. >> what i would like -- to have like admiral, for the record, if

you could respond -- i am told that by spending or more money but having the cash flow in that program, we would have a multi- year program that would not be scored and would be immensely more beneficial to us for those partnerships as the other countries. if you could answer that for the record. >> i will, sir. >> i know this is not directly involved with what you would be doing and in this case. i'm concerned they're not getting the resources. when the continent was divided into three different commands, it made much more sense to have after con -- it appears to me that they are not getting the resources. i'm talking about air-and-lived resources and others. do you think they are, and if not, would you try to improve that? >> i will talk to john ward, was a colleague and good friend. i would support the -- i will

talk to general ward, who is a colleague and good friend. >> lastly -- i'm getting it all in here -- the concern i have a for the aging fleet of everything that we're having right now -- the average is 18 years old, the marine corps, over 21 years. all of these things -- i would like to ask each one of you what the effect of operating and maintaining 28- to 40-plus your old equipment has on combat readiness if you have any thoughts about what we can do on the aging aircraft, and the air force base being in my state of

oklahoma, they are doing a great job on the casey 135's. if we are successful in making a determination about what kind of tanker we would have, we would still be using it for another 30 years. let's start with you. it does that keep you up at night, concerned about the aging equipment? >> it is a concern and we need to keep our focus on that. i think -- and i have been on the outside as the services have deliberated on this -- as i look at my position currently as the deputy commander of pacific command, we have the resources we need. it is one of the things we need to continue to focus on and enable us. >> i agree, sir. >> general mcchrystal, i might go a little further. the combat system was one of the first transformations in 50 years we have had on the ground. i know what is very controversial and many of these

decisions are political. i would say we are using some of the outdated stuff. the paladin was world war ii technology. the pen programs would go forward to improve the paladin. it has undergone two or three of these renovations. -- what you think about the military, army's aging equipment? >> much of the equipment is pretty thin, but tough decisions made in the secretary's budget recommendations for this year, particularly moving towards the regular warfare. they had to make tough tradeoffs. there are not i have seen that i did not agree with. >> it is not your purview, but it is still your army. >> secretary gates' is looking very specifically at issue -- at that issue right now. >> senator reed.

>> senator lieberman raise the question of the long term nato commitment to this effort. the nato heads of state agreed to create these training missions and mentoring team spirit is still not filled them. is that going to be a deficit that will continue forward, or are you confident they can fill that and continue for a long time? >> the operational mentoring and leadership teams are in short fall right now. they are 52 fielded. we need 64. the bad news is that looking ahead, we are positioned to have the 71 and need as many as 90- plus. you have identified a crucial area. it is at the top of my priority list. if confirmed -- the top of my priority list, if confirmed, to put an argument to our allies that this is the kind of thing

that we could perform well in. where are the comparative advantages? the small teams cannot tremendous effect -- the small teams could have tremendous effect and the incorporated as a central feature. at the end, security is local. that is what these so-called omelettes would be very good at. top of my list, sir. >> with the exception of the british, who have combat brigades and the country -- combat brigades in the country, what is the ability to generate brigade-sized force is comparable to an american per day? >> -- comparable to an american brigade? >> so, it is limited, and this is why we need to work with allies for the sizing of units they put in the field. the canadians to a terrific work. they have the highest per capita casualty rate, higher than our

own in the united states. the dutch are doing to river corp., the french are doing terrific work, and of course -- the dutch are doing terrific work, the french are doing terrific work, and of course, the british. i will be looking forward for much to general mcchrystal's expertise, and talking to general petraeus, who has excellent experience on the iraq side. between the three of us, we need to find ways to generate combat effect if we cannot have big standing confirmations. >> general " -- general mcchrystal, how you propose to utilize john rodriguez -- how do you propose to general rodriguez? -- propose to utilize general rodriguez? >> what i would like to aspire to is that he be an operational command of the regional commands, the five regional

commands. that would allow me to the to the strategic level and he would do the maneuvering. that requires nato to agree to that. that is not yet done. i don't want to get ahead of reality. that would be my aspiration. >> there is another aspect to the question. shifting away from the geographical base of operations to functional. that is, if nato takes the training mission, if nato takes the logistical missions, the the geography of the fight could be up to those combat units. they are not all exclusively american, but mostly american. >> i have just looked at that. i have not studied it. it seems to make a lot of sense to me. >> there is another aspect here, very, very sensitive, and that is the civilian casualties. like so many of my colleagues, i've been out there recently, and that is an issue that has a great a political act,

manipulated -- great political effect, manipulated by self interest purposes by all sides. how are you going to wrap up the battle, particularly in the south, and minimize collateral civilian casualties? >> i believe the perception of -- caused by civilian casualties is one of the most dangerous things we face in afghanistan, particularly with the afghan people, the pashtun, most likely. that is a way to lose their faith and support, and that would be strategically decisive against the spirit -- against us. my intent, if confirmed, is to review all of our tactical objectives and get all our forces with the goal of not putting ourselves in a position except when we have to protect americ or collision afghan forces' actual survival from

positions where recreate civilian casualties. abizaid as you know, from the chaos of war, -- i want to say that as you know, from the chaos of war, you cannot say always or ever. but it is critical. >> to attack and disrupt the taliban and other elements there, and to minimize casualties, is the use of technology. do you need more? >> i have never had enough, and i cannot envision a day work i will say an operation i am involved in has enough. that said, there is a significant increase in afghanistan, and by the end of this year it will be significantly more. but every time you get more isr, you get more precision.

every time you get more precision, you can reduce civilian casualties and reduce the impact of the city in population. -- reduce the impact on the civilian population. if you go after a single individual and don't affect the whole village, you don't have a negative impact on everyone else. while isr is not a panacea for everything, the more you have got, the smarter you are as a force and the more precise you can be. everything we can do to increase that will be valuable. >> general fraser, you have an area of the world that is very close to us, and one of the lessons we learned worldwide is that government of capacity is such a critical element -- governmental capacity is such a critical element of stability. i wonder if you will undertake an assessment of the government a capacity of the countries in your areas of operation as a leading edge indicator of where

problems but exist? >> thank you for that question. as i have studied what southcom is doing, they already have a robust program to do that. and the issues we deal with in that region, i think, reflect that. it is an interagency approach an international approach. yes, sir, if confirmed, i will continue efforts along that line. >> thank you, gentlemen. >> senator thune is next. >> let me echo what has already been said. you all are extremely, extremely qualified. i cannot think of individuals better equipped to serve in the post for which you are here this morning. i want to thank you for that service and also add my appreciation to your families with a sacrifice that they make every day so that you can continue to serve our country

with such distinction. i also want to associate myself with remarks made by senator lieberman earlier, and also senator inhofe, with regard to the third site in europe and the dangers posed by the iranian threat. at most pervious made strong comments in that regard. -- at most of it is -- admiral stavridis made strong comments in that regard. it is important that we continue to pursue that undertaking. general mcchrystal, the core of the new af-pak strategy is to destroy extremists and safe havens in afghanistan and pakistan. he would apply from that is not necessary to form a coalition government or reconciliation of political elements in afghanistan, as general petraeus

did in iraq. it seems, rather, but the goal requires only that an agreement be reached with the taliban to block allocate operations in afghanistan. my question is is it to acceptable in your opinion to have the taliban once again in charge of afghanistan if they agree to deny al qaeda safe haven in afghanistan? >> sir, i find it very unlikely that the taliban would make a critical agreement to do that i have a difficult time even speculating. that said, i think the president's intend, in my belief, is that we need to create in afghanistan, a state that would not allow the return of safe havens. in my view, it means it will have to be a government that may be a working coalition, may have some former taliban, but based

upon taliban statements, right now i cannot see them being a critical -- being a credible an official part of the government. >> a report on the taliban's advances says that a administration has had to shift its strategy it to a more accelerated approach. i would be interested in knowing what that shift in strategy would do in terms of affecting your job in afghanistan. >> sir, i think is positive. the degree to which pakistan shows the result they have shown -- the result they have shown lately and their willingness to go after what is an internal problem, i think that is positive. if we can in good faith to that, we can continue to build a strategic partnership that is important for the long haul. >> i would like to get one other issue, and i would address this

to general mcchrystal, dealing with the issue of corruption in afghanistan. a lot has been written about it. according to an operator of an economic corporative in kandahar who appeared as a witness before the senate foreign relations committee earlier this year, corruption is so widespread, any interaction results in some sort of shake down. going down roadways requires paying a bribe at each police checkpoint. to pay your electricity bill, the need to go to eight different desks at two different buildings and have to pay bribes for your of the committee bills. i think this is really obstructing our purpose in afghanistan. -- our progress in afghanistan. . .

i think that is what brought the taliban to power in 1994. my question is, if we do not work to clean up the corruption in the afghan government, we may not be able to win this war. what, if confirmed, can you do in terms of taking steps that would implement our new strategy there that would lead to more honest government and and the corruption that is plaguing the government? >> sir, i concur with what you have stated in terms of corruption. i think it has a corrosive effect that undermines the legitimacy of any government, particularly in afghanistan, where it is a real