sanctions ankle, does the idea that we are trying to line up the support before negotiations even begin actually undercut the chances that the negotiations might succeed rather than providing some leverage which would help them succeed? >> i said i feel that if we do these things openly, ratchet up plans for the sanctions and so forth, that this would create a more coercive atmosphere in which one party feels that it is compelled to negotiate. that does not mean that we cannot make these plans. one always engages in contingency planning. but doing it openly as has been talked about is counterproductive. this is why i am skeptical about that approach. i suspect that it either

involves a misjudgment of the iranians or perhaps has advocated in the hopes it will contribute to a stalemate and then failure of the negotiations. i'm not convinced that everybody shares the same goals regarding the negotiations as the president has articulated. as far as democracy promotion is concerned or other activities, i think the distinction is precisely that, which means democracy promotion and other activities. the other activities are not able to be discussed. the extent is not public knowledge, but there are indications over the last several years that the promotion of democracy perhaps is not limited to human-rights

advocacy, ngo's, to a on how to vote, how to organize free elections, but they may go farther than that. for example, encouraging ethnic conflict within iran, if not by us then by whom? there are mujahedin still under u.s. protection in iran. they were once labeled as a terrorist group, but no longer. activities of this sort, if there are such things, would have to be examined, if one is interested in serious negotiations. to engage in activities which may unintentionally have the effect of using iranian

nationalism with shiite fundamentalism could happen. that combination is the source of support for the iranian extremism. and ahmadinejad has nurtured his political chances through that. i think, the more the iranians, particularly the urban intelligentsia, the urban middle class, and the younger generation, the more they feel there are more real benefits to be had in a constructive relationship with the west, particularly the u.s., the more likely there is a political change within iran, in the long run. in the long run, that is the way to really achieve something that implies a significant turn towards democracy. there is a form of democracy in iran already, which we tend to disregard.

if you look at these elections today that are ongoing, can anyone tell me with confidence in this room who is going to win? i can't tell you. if you ask me about russian elections in 2012, i will tell you right now who is going to win. [laughter] that is a rather basic difference. we have presidential elections which are complicated, but in a sense their democratic. i wonder how many people know that there's a woman who is the vice-president of iran right now? how many people in this country know that there are more women in iranian universities than men? a lot of professions such as law, medicine, doctors and lawyers heavily performed by women. and the nobel prize was

presented to woman recently. this is not a stereotyped country of medieval iran. it is a very complicated mixture in which nationalism plays a very important role. a sense of imperial tradition plays a very important role. a sense of the country's own worth. the country, more than 80 years or longer, maybe almost 100 years has heavily focused on its own sense of internal change. german universities, german education and all that has had very high standing and a major impact on iran. the country with which most iranians have most frequent contact in education is 30. every time they go to turkey, they must noticed significant

events is between 30 and themselves which is probably attractive to them. this is a much more complicated country in the notion of its ayatollah's and its "president." they are on an extremist bench, but it as its own socio- economic history. >> i wanted to ask you to examine the scenario of an iran that does not come back to the u.s. and agree to any type of negotiation even after they settled down after the elections. what should the u.s. atmosphere -- added to people filigr attit?

what should the response be in this country? and about obama's speech yesterday, there has been a lot of criticism that he was t was to -- that he was he wasa bit t squishy. did he go too far in reaching out? >> if iran chooses not to come to the negotiating table, that would set in motion consequences we don't need to talk about before they make that decision. i am not so naive a person as to think that if they don't come to the table, it should have no effect whatsoever. it will have an effect. but we don't need to try to entice them to come to the table by issuing implicit or

explicit threats. because that would be counterproductive. my sense is that there is a fair amount of interest in iran in negotiating, actually. i think there are some indications from the iranian elite that that is currently the case. even in a totally different level from a symbolic level, i have experienced that for myself. they it view me correctly as a person who wanted the u.s. to do much more than it did to prevent the ayatollah khamenei from assuming power. that was my position. i never had any illusions that he would result in a regime that was liberal, democratic, progressive. nonetheless, i have been asked by the iranians recently to appear on iranian television, to discuss the relationship. they wanted me to discuss it with one of the key advisers to

the supreme leader. i said i would not do it on that basis, because i have no assurance that that will not become a rather hostile debate between the two of us. i see no merit in rehashing the past. so i would rather appear on a television in which journalists would ask me questions and i lay out my point of view. they agreed to that. they taped 27 minutes, i said nothing would be cut and they agreed and they broadcast it on their television. they had sent reporters over here. throughout the interview i refused to go into the business about of them making our diplomats into hostages. i just kept repeating

that i wanted to stick to the current topic of today. they printed the interview in the newspaper. even a different newspaper came to me for an interview. they published it week or so ago. that, to me, is a hint of some desire to engage in dialogue. it certainly was not designed to stimulate more hostility. because i did not play that game and i did not let myself be drawn into that. the newspaper, on its website, produced a telephone conversation with the first foreign minister right after the revolution, and myself. i met a person in algeria when he and the prime minister came to algiers shortly after ayatollah khamenei to power. i went there and met with him on behalf of the president. i told them we are prepared to deal with the islamic republic of iran. and that they could still have a

military relationship with us and so forth, is what i told them. they were positively inclined, but after they went back to tehran a week or so later the extremist elements staged a coup and overthrew him. neither of them was imprisoned. they're still alive. we had a discussion that was recorded and made public. that seems to indicate that there is within this complicated body politick, at least, is stand that deserves -- but a strand that deserves being explored. in obama's speech, he did not talk about islamic terrorism. we had eight years of islamic phobia and sanctions. we had talked about jihadist

terrorists and islamic terrorists and so forth. in a sense, creating publicly a sense of an american perception of the world of islam dominated by these people and, in effect, putting in the same box the moderates and extremists. how would some other people feel in the case of ira activity in northern ireland, if we only spoke about papast terrorism, catholic terrorism, roman catholic papacy and so forth? my guess is that the 60 million americans in this country would find that offensive. it would not be helpful in isolating the ira. that is what he did. it was foolishness, stupidity, mindless. it goes further than that. our previous president, in his

last state of the union message , confidently predicted that the struggle against terrorism would be the defining it ideological challenge of the 21st century. when he delivered that speech it was february 2008. would anyone in 1908 predict that the 20th century would be dominated by the rise of hitlerism and communism? would anyone in 18 08 predict that the rise of nationalism would define the politics of europe? it took enormous intellectual courage on the part of our previous president to act as a historian of the future to make that statement. [laughter] but that was his official visit of the future.

the president of the nine states. it is very optimistic that obama is offering a different view of the future, one that is more rein the spirit of our times. we need reconciliation and not moralistic sanctioning of a class of civilizations. i approve of what he said. as a still supple statement defining his cents -- this was a philosophical statement on his part, not a policy statement. yes? >> national council on u.s. [inaudible]

thank you, national council on u.s.-arab relations. to add to the line of questioning in your response about ethnic divisions, the mehdin and -mujahedin and so foe would you put the clinton administration on perhaps driving a wedge between the government and the populist, on one hand, and the los angeles- based -- where would yobroadcasd you draw the line in your response on the ethnic divisions? >> i will not dodge your question by pleading ignorance, but i really don't know what our

official broadcasts say to the iranians, whether it's news or more political-oriented analysis. i have no idea what the people in los angeles are doing. one simple thing, we cannot do anything but restrict our freedom of expression. i'm not quite sure whether that freedom of expression can be limited when american citizens decide to address issues in the country of origin or country of special interest. there wili don't think our freef speech could be subject of negotiation with a foreign government unless there is absolutely clear evidence that it is not freedom of expression that is involved but advocacy of some sort of violence, in which case there may be legitimate foreign objections. i imagine that someone or broadcasting to the united states from a country from which

we had diplomatic relations urging let's say muslim americans to start engaging in suicide terrorism, that we would have legitimate grounds for going to their government and saying, you guys better get this under control. all right. in the back, all the way? >> the stimson center. i wanted to ask about the role of third parties in helping persuade the iranians that perhaps taking the risk of some new relationship with the u.s. is worth that. while i agree that many in the iranian elite are intrigued by obama, certainly there are power centers in iran that are not persuaded it is in their interest to change their relationship with us. if you were national security adviser, would you be calling of india or turkey or indonesia and saying, can you help us out here? and how can we persuade the iranians this is the right thing to do?

>> without being national security adviser, i have actually done a little bit of that in the contact i currently have, but there are countries that can have a constructive influence on the iranians. if they are amenable to doing so, we should encourage them. i would add china to that list. i think the ones you have mentioned, 30 is involved, no doubt about that. -- 30 turkey is involved, no doubt about that. i don't know how much india is involved? do you know? does anybody know about india being involved? all right. anyway, i agree with you. >> we cannot let you get out of

here without commenting on the peace process. >> which one? >> the other one. if you could comment on the link to the extent that it exists between engagement with iran and arab-israeli diplomacy? >> i think the debate of which comes first is futile. each affects the other. if there is no progress on the israel-palestinian front and the issued thereby becomes more intractable, it's not going to help in our dealings with iran, because it directly hamas and hezbollah and others are involved. if we don't have any serious movement with iran, not necessarily movement with agreement, but movement on a set of negotiations in which some issues might move forward more rapidly than others, that is also going to create a more negative atmosphere in the middle east.

i would say the two have interactive roles. it is an interactive process, both issues. a poisoned atmosphere, both issues are potentially dangerous and damaging. >> to what extent do you think the friction over settlements that is developing in the last few days, especially, will constrain to any extent the obama administration in terms of their post-iranian election engagement activities? >> i don't think it will limit its either way. what it has done, however, is it has elevated one specific issue into a policy issue. because the rest of his speech, there's nothing in it that is precisely binding or is precisely a clear-cut test.

but this issue is cut precisely. he has put to the u.s. on record as saying the settlements are illegal, they are unacceptable, they are damaging, they have to stop. well, that is a fairly categorical statement that there has to be some acceptance on the part of the isralei spirit in one way or another, it will affect what is happening, and in some way it will affect the relationship. so, that is one very specific concrete policy consequence inherent in what was said. yes? >> dr., boston university. there is the argument from the

other gentleman about negotiating with iran in an alternative manner. some argue against this. i would like to know where do you stand and if you do not agree with this bargaining approach, how do you debase it? >> i am not sure that i agree or disagree with the grand approach. it is a grand slogan. if there are negotiations, they will involve a variety of issues. not all of these issues can be discussed at the same time. but there will have to be some set of negotiations going on, presumably in some relationship to each other, through a special task forces or subcommittees and so forth. on that basis we will be able to

judge which issues are moving forward o toward potential resolution and at some time we will be able to decide whether we can resolve some issues quickly and others later. it's not possible to predict that. until we know what the possible agendas are for both sides. our end will be complicated by the fact that not all of the participants on our side have similar views and it will be complicated on the iranian side as well by the likelihood that the iranian government will be divided on these issues. there is ongoing political debate in iran even as the crisis unfolds perhaps. i cannot answer your question yes or no.

yes? >> this will be the last question. >> doctor, a question, you mentioned the north korea-iran formulations. iran, by saying we don't see nuclear-weapons. but the same report you mentioned in 2007 argued with high confidence that iran was seeking and did want nuclear weapons. how do we prevent them from drying out to the negotiations such as they have been doing and they're by pursuing their technical signs, such as the time if and when they do is is that they want nuclear weapons? thank you. >> the report said that they were seeking nuclear-weapons. and that they were not at the present. >> it said they were keeping options open. >> that is different from what you said earlier.

they are keeping their options open. the point of the negotiations is that these options are at some point closed. that is the whole point of the exercise. an arrangement whereby we have confidence that what they are ostensibly claiming is true because the option has been closed. that is the whole objective of the exercise. whether that will succeed or not, we don't know in advance. but i don't see any other way of proceeding. that is a different situation from the situation with the north koreans. they say something very different, therefore, there demonstrations are defined automatically of being in a different context. not saying thwe have to decide e going to bribe them to get them off of it, are we going to pressure them to compel them to get off of it, are we going to intimidate them to get off of it? and who is going to be helpful

in it? that is a very defence situation from what we have been with the iranians. thank you. >> a combination of clarity, candor, audacity, and vision is what we all look for from dr. brzezinski and that is what we got today. in conclusion, i want to thank all of you for joining us today. there are still, i think copies of his recent publications on the subject available outside. in conclusion, i would like to thank those who provided support to the organization of this event. i would like to thank all the members of our middle east board, including dr. brzezinski, who is in attendance today. i would like to that another

doctor who did all the work to make today's event possible, and all of her staff. thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2008] >> next, indiana gov. mcdaniels. then at 7:00 eastern, your calls and comments on "washington journal." the u.s. house gaveled event today at 12:30 p.m. eastern on a

bill to reauthorize and state programs through 2010 that includes u.s. peacekeeping and legislation to increase aid to pakistan. live on c-span. the senate is back in session today at 2:00 p.m. and they will continue work on regulating tobacco products, a vote on that it expected this afternoon. and congress may vote on a conference report for spending bill. the house is expected to vote on the measure first, followed by the senate. senators could also debatable to increase the number of foreign tourists visiting the u.s. the senate will be live on c- span to. with a federally mandated transition to digital television coming next week, we will get a status report on how the fcc has prepared viewers for the change. we will have a panel discussion

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