specific examples of services that you provided under a different contractor under log cap, and why the specific contractors might yield better results? >> the way is constructed now is that every task order is theoretically supposed to be bid out and evaluated for those three contractors. the early results are that is a very good thing for the government in terms of price, cost, competition. those are the three organizations. s. that is a long-running contract also. the problem is 90 plus% of the charges are with the old contract which is the supplier and one of our emphasis -- and i will point out to think it was

general odierno identified the same issue which is get on with the competition part of logcap-4. lots of planning and effort and it isn't happening the extent it should. >> thank you. the pace of withdrawal nye wire rack you mentioned some of the challenges that presents us with. what are some of those challenges on the rapid pace of withdrawal? somebody else want to take that? >> sure. i think that there are a number of factors and centcom is planning for this whether they have done enough planning, whether that planning is moving at a pace that's going to accommodate the downsizing and the ramp up we don't know yet. >> but specifically what opportunities are there for abuse or fraud or waste with rapid withdrawal?

>> i think as the troops are withdrawing from iraq as an example, we are probably going to have to rely on contractors to remain there to close down the bases or pass them on to the iraqi east. and one difficulty that was brought to our attention for example just shows lack of planning and for thought on this is they pulled out the air conditioning units in buildings that were going to be passed to the iraqi some and then had to go back and reinstall them again because they just didn't think enough about when they took the equipment out it would still be needed because the iraqi is were going to take over. but all the decisions on reset, which equipment gets sent back here for rehab, which is going to go to the reserve components,

which will be scrapped, which will be turned over to the iraqi, all of those planning decisions are currently being made by centcom. but again, i am not yet comfortable that there are not a lot of holes in the planning process. >> and i might add as an example when we were on one of the bases, the military enlisted person that is going to be involved in some of the support activity pointed over and said it will get all those containers. i haven't opened them, i don't know what is in there and that is the point we accumulate material and now we are going to have to inventory while the military it is dwell time if they are given 90 days they're going to leave and 90 days about the outcome is contractors are going to have to go out and figure out because there could be very sensitive equipment so you can just give it to them and so the important point is as we see it decline in the military there isn't going to be proportional decline in the

contract in fact it might go the other way depending on the activity. 600,000 line items have to be tracked. >> we all know we need contractors. we had one contractor for every six military and the revolutionary war and now it is one for one. the irony is we get out of iraq and we may have more contractors and we have military. and we have what we call white property, that's property in the hands of the contractors but owned by the u.s. government and then we have items on the basis that no one knows who is responsible for. but i would love to just reiterate and review the list that commissioner brandt talked about. we can do need that to the iraqi government, returning to the united states, use it elsewhere in iraq or move it to afghanistan, transfer to other government agencies, sell it and it has no commercial value, scrap it. we are asking people to make those decisions and they may not

know what is needed in another base. so they might decide we should give it away when we are still going to purchase it somewhere else and bring it from the united states to afghanistan when it was in iraq and we could have gotten it from there. >> so it speaks to the need for more coordination. >> and is it worth it to ship it home? it's simple to say we ought to give it to the iraqi is. well maybe that is the right decision. to follow-up on commissioner shays first point, i think that we need to think hard as does the subcommittee. there is an inherent implied concern that we have too many contractors. whether we do or not i'm not prepared to answer that and the joint staff is in fact got a task force looking at what things are procrit to be contract out, and it goes to

governmental and those things. but how did we get to this point? and then what decisions were made by the services, what decisions were made by osd, omb and by the congress that get us on this one to one ratio would ever it might be? i think more important is what are the options? do we increase the force structure within the dod and state so that we have not just the contracting oversight expertise but we have got folks to do some of these jobs being done by contractors. do we change the emphasis within the services to push more things into the system meant force out of the operational force? do we provide just less services

or less quality services or do we just accept the fact this is the way we are going to go to war? and i think those questions we need to focus on in addition to waste, fraud, and abuse. >> that was a large part of the formation of this from reading your own charge in the legislation that is a piece of work that we seriously want to have done. >> mr. don? >> mr. chairman, one last comment. i think we have far to the contractors. when i read we have four -- 240,000 contractors in the arena as in afghanistan and iraq put together and 80% of them are foreign nationals it seems to me that this is just a gravy train of money for these defense contractors, number one, and for all these contractors and i

think almost anybody in this country, almost in the average american would say that it's ridiculous that we are still spending all this money hiring all these foreign nationals and doing, committing all the waste fraud and abuse and allowing it to go on over there and i think it's really sad and it's really shameful. thank you. >> i think the other question we asked were part of that question is what is inherently the governmental responsibility and what is not. what are we doing with some of these people? are they doing a job that should only be entrusted to somebody that is a u.s. citizen or a member of the armed services or in some respect responsible in the chain here, security strikes me as one of those things very much who's protecting whom within these countries and that is the hearings we have had in the past and we are looking

forward to your work on that issue to help of and for what are the many definitions of an apparent government responsibility, what is the one we are going to settle on and how are we going to make that determination? colonel green i agree nobody has discussed the proper number of contractors. and commissioner, you mentioned the ratios, one-to-one went out and then back down and now it is where it is. but the fact of the matter is at some point the argument we have heard when there wasn't anything we could do about it and people were running the military in the white house before our day was a was cheaper to contract. i don't think there's evidence of that at all and it certainly would be helpful to have somebody explore that aspect, how it could be cheaper when we look at these numbers and the degree of difficulty that's been going on. sweet got to get the numbers right and the assignment of who should be doing what and we need the right management and oversight that gets back to the capacity issue you are talking about and that will be critical

if you can help us with that. but in that we have people stationed in over 1,000 bases all over the world, not counting afghanistan, iraq and kuwait in those feeders right now. over 1,000 bases elsewhere that for some reason we sea and incapable of reviewing deciding whether they deserve to be there, should be there, what is their function, are they adding something of value to the national security interests and what are the people they're doing? can't you take some of them and train them? somebody might have technical expertise, somebody might have the ability wetter than sitting at a base for a reason as validated 25, 30 years ago they may not be valid today. we will be looking at separately but i think it is something to note. the other is national guard and reserve to have expertise particularly in security and other areas where maybe a better identification who is in the forces and their deployment would put them in the proper

position and be easier to train police officers and things of that nature for security so somebody in the management structure in the department of defense and state has to be looking at these issues in a much more sophisticated and better way even the civilian corps we are developing and hopefully will be helpful also would isn't going to happen as quickly as we want. let me wrap up my question with a defense acquisition university aspect of it. did anybody think of putting on a disk ehud didn't necessarily have to connect? i was just on the defense universities campus. >> i propose to probably have on the disk but took the individual to take it on line so it got kind of silly if you don't have a set of disks you can't give them a desk. >> that would seem the way to get it done to get people through on that basis. i'm concerned that contractors are now using the kind of technology that the need to use. it seems that is a contractor in

force at issue and for all we are going to hear for contractors coming and telling the are the good guys and all this stuff about your bad management they are partially right. these organizations over it to their own people over their giving their lives and being injured as the chairman said and to the taxpayers of this country to do with the contract says and the technology in there that needs to be put in some contracts these things and follow-through. they owe it to us to speak up when they're building a 30 million-dollar place for people to eat or whatever and repairing another place and should know probably better than anybody that is not funny it may be profitable but it's not a good. they allow the taxpayers of this country cannot just double. so there's enough criticism to go around on that and they certainly have a portion of it and that is why the management oversight if we trust them to do everything on the up and up we wouldn't be so concerned but

when i look at the exit polls you stated and the others in previous reports we have a capacity issue we need the oversight in there and we have to move forward on that basis. we have a lot we want to talk about over the coming period of time and credit you for the work you've done. the situation is one that is important in the report that we look forward to you expanding as you say that you will in your report but with work you are doing i think it will be very helpful to in terms of legislation or probably oversight and all the feed to the fire of the people that are not doing the management what they should be doing and organizing and planning as they should and we need to do to help them if they are on getting the capacity. mr. flake comedy have anything you'd like to add before we let the panel go? thank you for the testimony and for your service and we will work with you if we can be helpful in having your responsibilities fulfil. we will take a five minute break before the second panel starts.

[inaudible conversations] >> the subcommittee will receive testimony from the second panel. mr. allen chvotkin servers on the council for professional service where he is responsible for the association's federal acquisition legislative regulatory policy. prior to this mr. chvotkin was vice president of at&t services and held a number of staff positions in the united states senate including counsel to staff director of the senate small business committee as well last council on armed service. he holds a j.d. from american university school it is the policy of the committee to swear you in before you testified. would you please do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

we would like to 45 minutes to make your opening remarks before questioning, and please do so at this time. >> mr. chairman, congressman flake, members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to appear before the subcommittee today the professional services council is -- more than 330 member company represents small, medium, and large businesses that provide federal agencies with services of all kinds. our members employ hundreds of thousands of americans in all 50 states. we have been actively engaged in policy issues relating to the federal government's contracting in iraq since the first days of shock and all. we testified before the senate on three separate committees over the past four years, twice at hearings chaired by the distinguished vice chairman of the commission, mr. shays, when he was in the house of representatives. he was in the house of representatives. we've submitted comments on legislation and participated in the comprehensive lessons

learned projects conducted by special inspector general for iraq reconstruction and accountability office and in 2005 conducted a formal joint lessons learned review with commanding general of the army. we know the commissioners appointed to conduct this review and had the opportunity to work professionally with many of them during the past and we worked professionally with senior commission staff and each and every individual brings expertise and perspective to these important tasks. we also have the a fraternity to work with the key federal agencies involved in developing the requirements including the oversight activities and special inspector general for iraq reconstruction. we appreciate challenges they faced and commitments they've shown to fulfill the government's mission. we've also been privileged to work with dozens of companies and hundreds of executives from across the membership in the industry that put their companies and employees on the line every day to further the u.s. government missions and objectives regrettably too many members of the military government's civilian employees and contractor employees both u.s. citizens as well as a third

country nationals have given their lives in the support. mr. chairman i can say without fear or contradiction the issues in iraq and afghanistan contract in are among the most complex ever experienced and are in a related and interdependent among numerous and changing government directive missions activities and priorities. while it is possible and certainly easier to be selected on the issues chosen for their review the value of any analysis on the current or past government contractor activities in iraq in particular must take into account several sets of realities. first, iraq contracting isn't one activity at all. it is three different subsets to support the military and military related activities, and the reconstruction of iraq and third, economic development assistance provided in iraq and afghanistan. second, we must look up the time frames for the nation's i effort. the reactions to the fall of the saddam regime presented a different set on the ground

actions from the work undertaken by the coalition provisional authority and different style from the more recent rapidly changing physical security environment and new set of contract and directives and policies some initiated by congress and undertaken by the defense department, state, centcom and joint contract in command for iraq and afghanistan. the final set of realities is what i refer to as situational contracting. to understand the nature of the contract and activities in iraq is essential to understand the differences between emergency contract in during a heightened military action, contingency contracting during heightened physical challenges and longer-term sustainment contracting that could characterize the situation today. it would be a mistake to select any subset of acquisitions written for normal contracting and expect procedural protection when they are applied in the wartime environment. we have known from almost the opposite of the conflict they were too few trained government acquisition professionals assigned to support the rapidly

escalating observations of iraq, the significant growth in the number of contracts and number of contractor employees deployed into theater. we've known for almost the opposite of the conflict many contractors awarded business in the theater of operation will overwhelmed by rapidly changing magnitude of the work and pressures put on the standard business operations while responding to the wartime requirements. it comes as no surprise to many in the private-sector who've been watching and commenting the activities and i hope it isn't a surprise to anyone in government who had responsibility for part of these that the lack of contract and officers deployed into the theater, lack of qualified contracting officer representatives assigned to supervise contractors, the lack of state department diplomatic security bullets or the lack of government program management or technical skills. that had an impact on the government ability to execute, manage, and overseas capabilities. as we read you the elements of the interim report that found their way to the public domain prior to today wilbur struck by the fact these examples cited

did not in fact speak to abuse or fraud, rather to some of the structural challenges that are all too well known. for example the bill of a dining facility had cost to the government despite questions as to the need for the base. it isn't a case of contractor or government fraud or misconduct inefficient and waste but not fraud or misconduct. similarly as the commission continues on highly publicized and often tragic defense and demystified perceptions that at times overwhelmed the facts. finally, the commission has held only two public hearings and in both cases on the government officials were invited to testify. there are however numerous perspectives that must be heard from to ensure balance objective review. ..

we hope the final report would address the root cause and address the reasons and -- to minimize future occurrences. congress should expect no less of the men and women who have already served in iraq and afghanistan and those who will serve there and elsewhere in the future. thank you for the information to provide these views and that would be happy to answer any questions you may have. >> thank you. mr. flake, you are recognized. >> thank you. what, if any areas, do you disagree with the recommendations of the panel? >> mr. flake, thank you. i have had a chance to look at the report quickly last night. the panel's focus on oversight is appropriate, but i think it misses an important part of the front end of the process, making sure there are resources

available to execute the were correctly in the first instance. i support oversight, i think it is an important element of the overall acquisition system. but if we do not have the right people at the beginning the process, we can be sure that the oversight function will find errors and mistakes. we have been strong proponents of increasing the contract and officers, representatives, the amount of program management, bringing the work that iraq and afghanistan have closer to the theater of operations rather than from alexandria or illinois. i think with more resources on the ground in the front end, we will address some of the issues that the commission identified as failures and management deficiencies. >> are there cases where fraud is alleged among contractors but never proven and that is the case, what damage is done to the contractor? >> there many allegations of fraud and certainly allegations of contractor overbilling and

mischarging. many of them did not prove that to be the case but there are of course litigation issues. the justice department does not push through every allegation of fraud. sometimes the cases are there, sometimes the prosecutorial discretion is and there but every one of those damages the reputation of the company and i think calls into question the functioning of the entire acquisition system. if there's no credibility in the system from the requirements generation for the contractor war to the oversight-- oversight to the responsibility if allocations are made that are not sustain simply for the sake of making allegations than that damage is thought only the contractor itself with the entire acquisition system. >> you mentioned the dining hall facility controversies surrounding that. apparently was the same contractor that was doing the reconstruction or i am sorry, the refurbishment and got the

same contract for 30 million to rebuild the facility or to build a new facility. and come the commission pointed to the lack of coordination and that nobody knew the contractor or those overseeing the contract, did not know that any refurbishment had been done. it is their responsibility that falls on the contractor to say hey, we are being asked to build a new facility when we have been doing work on the old one? is there a code of contact-- khan that that the committee abides by? perhaps it is not fraud, but it would seem to be some responsibility that lies in the contractor who had both contracts. >> i'm not familiar with the specifics of the case for garber about it for the first time in the commission's report last night. if it was the same contractor i would be surprised during the course of that work if the contractor did not at least raise to the supervisor or the contracting officer, i am doing

similar work and on the same basis understand it, so what did they did or not i would hope the contractor would take that obligation and an initiative to do that. many times, because of the rotation assignments, because of the resources it is the contractors to have the visibility into the activities of the facility and i hope they would take that initiative. i ten to eska ravan see what i can find out about the contract. i don't have any comments about the specifics. i would be happy to share anything ellen. >> one last question. i know we have votes coming on. i am just certain that in many of these cases where these contracts are not bid out or their sole source contracts that members of your association and community are upset because they would like to bid on these contracts. do you sometimes ask for these, or can you review the material

and what form to you have to go to the agency and say, why wasn't this bid out? i am sure those types of situations come up. what kind of remedy to you have to make sure that the agencies abide by their own rules in terms of contract thing things out? forbidding things of? >> that is a very important question and in fact, we hear a lot, where there is a lack of competition, our members tell us about that because as you said they do welcome the opportunity to compete for work and to compete aggressively. that would much prefer to have sole source work but they understand the importance of competition and the importance of a predictable procurement process. so, when those issues are raised, it is not raised frequently to us that when they are we ask that question. congress last year required the defense department, ish wing's allosource awards over

$100 million to make those justifications publicly available so that process will soon start regulations that had recently been put into place. on the history, we don't have access to a lot of the government's decision-making but we do ask the question frequently, why was in competition appropriate, why wasn't able to be undertaken? certainly there are national security reasons, certainly there are-- that my prohibited but even dating back to the original u.s. involvement in iraq we were strong proponents of phasing in. if there was a need for a sole source award because of an emergency situation or to support the troops that that necessarily need to have a nine year or ten year or even a five year contract. that could have been a better plan for the competition process. some of it is resources, some of it is a changing improvement in particular but we have been strong proponents of competition and that should be the standard that is applied.

>> thank you mr. chairman. >> mr. chvotkin thank you for joining us today and giving your perspective on this. we are going to close the meeting in time to have the members vote. thank you for your time and thank you for your patience in waiting for the first panel. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> there is still time to get your copy of c-span's 2009 congressional directory. with informational house and senate members come to cabinet, supreme court justices, and the nation's governors. plus, district maps and how to contact committees and caucuses. it is $16.95 online at c- span.org/products.

or call 1-877-on-cspan. >> coming next on "washington journal," a look at the day's news. the house of representatives gavels in in three hours at 10:00 eastern. they will work on aid to pakistan and afghanistan. there will launch live house coverage on c-span. watch what -- watch live house coverage on c-span. .