radio or download the pod cast. >> the marine corps commandant discusses a range of issues, including security in iraq and afghanistan, recruitment and retention efforts, and overall morale. this even less about one hour. -- this event lasts about one hour. . . yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy1

there's a true story that goes back to that day in 1944 i would share with you. i preface it by saying that today, military relations between the services are really probably at an all-time high. that was not always the case. in this particular story this ethree-star operational planner for general eisenhower, made a call to the captain of the battleship u.s.s. texas and he said to him, i understand you're lavending your 60-man marine decatchment -- detachment on the beach tomorrow, is that true? he said, yes, sir, it is. he said, i'm ordering you not to do that. the captain said, i'll do that, may i ask the question rye why? the general said, i understand

how these damn people work, we're going to put 73,000 soldiers ashore on the cant innocent starting tomorrow, but if just one marine goes ashore the next day, the headlines will read, marines storm ashore at normandy. and i'm not going to stand for it. folks, again, i want to talk, as was specified, about where we are in iraq and afghanistan. i want to talk to you about pakistan and about the nature of our force, how we see the future and maybe a little about the q.d.r. but i look forward to your questions. let's start with iraq my number one priority as commandant are the troops at the point of the sphere. we've been in iraq for quite some time. this last february we had a transfer of authority in iraq. we had a major general rick tryon take over. the three-star army commander

was out from baghdad, he said he believe he is is witnessing the last turnover of marines in iraq. we agree with that. there will be a mid summer rotation we do several month rotations, i'll talk with you in a moment about that we think in spring of 2010, general tryon will close the door, turn out the lights and end marine corps presence in iraq. we think we're coming out under a victory pennant, that we've done what the country asked us to do, serve as a second land army, a long way from salt sea in iraq. but we're proud of what our folks working with the army, working with those great sailors who support us have done rotation after rotation in the country of iraq. you know, as was indicated in the introduction we didn't find weapons of mass destruction. but i would offer to you that we did do something that we, and again, every other

serviceman and woman who have served in iraq, have done something there that is perhaps as important, maybe more so, and that is we have crushed the al qaeda in the nation of iraq. it wasn't long after we crossed the kuwaiti border before we started seeing these people and in conjunction with the efforts of the sudanese and all over iraq, shias and kurds, we have turned on them with a vengeance and the movement has been destroyed. there's still rear guard action in, trying to make more presence than really exists but the beauty of it is that other countries have seen that they can and should defeated, the moderates are starting to assume a level of control over the region and we're pleased with the outcome and pleased as well that the loss of life and injury that's been associated with our presence there is being rewarded again by

success. afghanistan is somewhat another story. the casualties the numbers of attack and so forth are on the rise in afghanistan. you have seen the recent actions of the department of defense and president obama's administration in terms of how we intend to deal with that. the marine corps portion of that is some 10,700 marines who have now reported to afghanistan at the end of last month. we'll be operating in the south as a marine expeditionary brigade but as important, maybe moreso, as marine air ground task force. we'll have responsibilities for the province of helmen. there's a particular issue in that province we have to deal with that troubles us greatly. that is 893% of the opium harvested in afghanistan coming

from that province, representing 95% of the opium sold throughout the world. i'll admit to you that the last time we went into the theater, that we went under a misperception. we were concerned the drug control effort there didn't have a holistic approach associated with it. there were eradication team, their efforts were spotty and in some cases arguably political. we thought that was a disaster -- a recipe for difficulty. what we found when we got there was, indeed they get it. it is an afghan-led effort, that the intend is to provide alternative crops and the education associated with how those crops must be managed, that after harvest, there is a need to build the infrastructure, to get those crops to market so the farmers can get their pay. the problem is that the solution set is like this. the problem set is like this. so it's a matter of volume. they understand how to do it,

it's just that there has to be much, much more effort to put against it if we're to take away resources from the taliban. we were told that the estimates vary between $80 million a year and $400 bhl a year in terms of resources going to the taliban and then directly -- and indirectly then to al qaeda. in any event, our marines and additional soldiers being sent in our there to bring a level of security a about so we can have a good and solid and representative national election. we would like to see more ba talls, more afghan army in the south so our people can partner with them. that's our process. the afghan army probably needs to grow some to be able to do that, or more immediately, there needs to be some realignment of the afghan national army so more of their forces are in the south. we're working those things and we have a high level of optimism that between the most

recent directives and general crystal going in, we're going to see these things come to pass. i shouldn't stop talking about afghanistan without giving a tip of the hat to the british. they have been operating primarily in the south, operating out of bases another canned harr and bastion and they have been magnificent in absorbing our forces, the early detachments, if you will, that provide for the follow-on of the main force and even the main force in joining them in locations that already have a level of infra -- infrastructure to allow us to build our own and be much more effective on a much more rapid basis. another issue that we have felt in afghanistan is that we and our army brethren could be wildly successful on the ground, but in the end, we would not have solved the problem. the problem being al qaeda. if in fact there were not parallel efforts and sufficient

progress being made on the other side of the border. i again want to take the opportunity to salute the efforts of the pakistani mill stair, our counterparts, on what we have all recently seen taking place across the border in that country. in a very real way, i believe they achieved operational surprise, which is really difficult in this day and age with constant media coverage and the speed of the internet. but i think they achieved operational surprise because they did what they're doing now from a standing start. there was no threats, there was no buildup of military capability, there were no warning shots provided with the forces they had in the field. they simply started going at the taliban and the al qaeda in the swat and they have continued to sustain that effort over time. they have sustained it with forces off what they call their eastern border and the general would say, i am recognizing that we're accepting risk here.

but this is an existential threat and he's doing something about it. i think they've done masterful things with regard to the information operations effort that must be in place when you take these people on. you see villagers siding with the army now, conducting independent operations or being relied upon the army to assist them in what they're doing. it all is very wholesome. we wish them continued success and salute them for what i think again has been a masterful military maneuver at this pointing based on what we've seen. let me switch gears and talk about the resiliency of the marine corps after seven or eight years at war in two locations. i will fell you on the whole, it is good. we are pleased with what we see. there are stressors, there are strains, of course. you would have to expect that, but we track about a dozen indicators each month to tell us just how the forces -- how the force is doing. in virtually every instance, probably save two or three, those statistics are as good or

better than they were in twune. our young officers are staying with us 91% past their original contract of service. this last year, we closed out our re-enlistment opportunities that the midway point through the fiscal year for both career marines, those second or third-term marines for re-enlistment but also our first term marines. the opportunity is now very restricted for them to be able to stay as we get into the second half of the fiscal year. our recruitment has been little short of just incredible. we were given the authority in late 2006, early 2007 to grow the corps some 27,000 additional marines. when i was here in 2007, we were in the inventory efforts of trying to put that plan together. based on several factors, i believe the quality of our recruiting effort in the field, the support of our families,

some incredible, again, retention results that we're see, but not least the fact that there's a steady strain of great young americans out there who want the opportunity to defend their country in wartime. we have accomplished what was a five-year goal in about two or 2 1/2 years. it's a remarkable effort. our standards have stayed right where they always were. the department of defense standard for high school graduates entering the standard is 90%, our marine corps standard is 95%, we're recruiting about 97% of high school graduates. there's a great young generation we have a right to depend upon that are coming through for us gangbusters. we favor the seven-month deployments. a marine unit is gone for seven months and it's been home, until recently, for about seven months a one to one deployment

to dwell, if you will, before heading back. based on the growth experience and what we think will be reduced numbers required in afghanistan we see that getting fairly dramatically better. hopefully, by the middle of 2010, even to the point where we're able to achieve one to two, seven month december ployed 14rk months home. that's going to be helpful, we think, for families. we think that young marines who maybe haven't had a chance to meet someone are going to be afforded that opportunity. we're going to take some of it back. we're going to have to accomplish some training we have not been accomplishing with our specific focus on counterinsurgency but we think we'll be able to do that and we think the 1-2 is our sustainment factor and those indicators i spoke to you about are going to stay strong or get better when we see those kinds of deployment to dwell. our families, i think, understand that we appreciate

their problems, we are resolved to do something about it, and we're putting our money with our words. i think that sy -- i think the psychological is as important as the tangible, because our families are a big part of the re-enlistment rates and their willingness to stay on and stay with us. we have gotten good reports when we spoke to family, we've always got the opportunity to make it better. the key point is, they understand we believe they're an important part of the equation and we're making some sincere and extended efforts to try to make sure their quality of life is met and that they're taken care of while their marine is deployed. last but not least, i would say that a wuvended waror program has achieved levels that even we didn't expect would be possible. largely through the generosity and support of the american people. we have some volunteer organizations out there that

have gone through tens of millions of dollars at this point, 97 cents on the dollar, going to the wounded warriors and their families in an effort to try to make sure that all their needs are met. our wounded warrior regiment headquartered at quantico has gone about a massive effort not only to satisfy thee the needs of warriors coming out of theater now but to find every one of them and place a call, ask how are you doing? at this point, ladies and gentlemen, that number is almost 9,000 today at this point. they've contacted about 92% of those people. in some cases they've been able to direct visiting nurses on the scene or turn those marines back to other people that might be able to give them assistance, but the fact is, we are accomplishing something that is not just a bumper sticker and that is that marines take care of their own. [applause]

we've got new equipment headed to the theater, the osprey was a frog, it is now officially a prince. we're delighted with the success we're seeing with that airplane. it's had three operational deployments, to iraq. it is currently aboard ship with the 22nd. we had our expectations really, i think it's fair to say exceeded with the aircraft in a harsh environment, in a combat environment in these three deployments. now we have to answer questions for ourselves about shipboard life and the aircraft, what will be the effect of salt sea air. it is still headed into theater, it will go into theater late they are month, it's fair to say, but we're going to have this particular squadron aboard ship. the squad bron -- squadron that follows that will be going to afghanistan. it will be a mag niff vent airplane in afghanistan, it

will be there as long as marines are there, doing the things it's meant to do. that aircraft continues to challenge us, in terms of how do you incorporate use of the aircraft beyond just a helicopter, because it's much, much more than just a helicopter. similarly, we need a different type of m rap in afghanistan. afghanistan is different the rain from iraq. you have to get off the roads there much more than before. there's an effort by the department of defense a very right and helpful effort to come up with an afghanistan version of an m rap. we're not rating for that. we have a vehicle simply called a sebato -- a seven-ton, it's the most popular vehicle in afghanistan with troops that are there. it gets off road prorkvidse good protection, has an elevated system that helps defuse the blast. we're putting the suspension

system off that onto our disturb off the ltbr onto our cat one mraps. it's tested well in initial tests even as we sit here today, it's being further tested before we send it to theater. but we're very optimistic it's going to work, give our marines the offroad mobility and the protection they need in a 38,000 pound vehicle. we're going to get it there faster than waiting for the go the mrap series designated for afghan use and at a fraction of the cost. we're charging ahead on that program with great expectations that our marines will be making great use of the vehicle in the near future. i mentioned we have challenges and we do, as we look about the future of our corps. we have not done a lot of amphibious training by virtue of our focus on iraq and afghanistan. we have to get back to it.

that's what the corps offer this is nation, that opportunity for forcible entry. we're not doing cold weather train, mountain training only by exception, jungle training only if you're assigned by ock gnaw what, we're not doing combined arms training like we used to. we believe in the capacity of a marine ground task force. it's core competency is maneuvering upon its own fires. we used to do 10 of those a year, today we do none. we've got to get back some of that 14 months out there with the opportunity to put those young marines joining nuss record numbers into that type of training to build their conferred and their competence, les we be called to go someplace else for another kind of conflict. lastly, a shot or two on the q.d.r., it is an ongoing process. it is happening even as we speak. the secretary of defense wants to build a balanced kivende of military for the -- a balanced kind of military for the

future, not knowing what the challenges will be out there. we believe we're close to what he's trying to create today in the department. that's not to say we won't be taxed or have to pay our part of of the bar bill when it comes to those types of things. part of the discussion is the amphibious nature of what we do the secretary asked the question openly, do we have too much amphibious capability. we would reverse that slightly and say, how much is too little? today we have a capacity to put two marine expeditionary marines to sea. that's two regiments across a beach. that's not a lot of cacheability if you're going to invade another nation. so we would argue if you start getting below that kind of capability, that in fact the risk could be too great to launch an amphibious operation and the nation could lose its forcible entry capability. we think that's a worthy discussion that needs to be had in the q.d.r.

almost as importantly is on a day-to-day basis, the combatant commanders out there have needs for security cooperation, theater engagement and those types of things. almost union formly they would say that the best means for doing that is an amphibious ship. it brings helicopter platforms to move back and forth, it brings medical capability that can be put ashore if need be. it provides the opportunity for enhancements, if you will work host nation training opportunities if marines are embarked, all those types of things. so what's interesting to us is if you tally up those requirements that the combatant commanders have, work in a navy rotation of ships to be able to do those things and compare the numbers against the requirement for an assault and forcible entry capability, there's an interesting intersection of the numbers and they're about the same. so we have a pretty strong agreement with the chief of naval operations on what the

fleet needs to look like, we'll take those discussions into the q.d.r. and anxiously await reviews. with that, let me close and take any questions you may have. plausplaus >> a mayne once told me that on time for a marine is five minutes early so well done, general. first question from the audience is on iraq. how do you expect the context of the waffer to close under general mcchris fall and what appears to be an expanded special operations influence? >> i think the question pertains to afghanistan but the answer would be the same. i think there's going to be some meeting in the middle, frankly. general mccrystal is an old iraq war yrk he has a lot of

ground time in afghanistan. frakly, i think as the department and as the administration arrived at what our strategy ought to be in afghanistan, there was discussion that it would be what's commonly termed a counterterrorist strategy, that it would rely on great measure on the effects of our special operations forces augmented by host nation capability and by a size force that could support it, but that force much less than what it would take for the other option which is a counterinsurgency strategy. the administration has decided we will execute a counterinsurgency strategy in iraq, every goh the increased number --er go the increased numbers in afghanistan. that has to do with bringing about a level of security, close cooperation and partnership with the afghan national army and police, trying to enhance the

economics, the governance, those types of things that are a national part of the counterinsurgency strategies. i think general mccrystal will have to shift colors to meet the strategy but i think you may see an enhancement of the counterterrorism aspect of what we're doing there because you have an old special operator at the help. >> one of the historic objections to reorienting the u.s. military toward counterinsurgency, particularly in the year that was vietnam war has been doing that -- that doing so would hamper its ability to engage in combat. now that the u.s. is putting serious emphasis on fighting counterinsurgency, how will the marine corps balance the demands put on it. >> it's a great question. whoever asked it, it's exactly our problem. if you simply look at what's happening today in korea, we've got some people that are spending late nights in this city concerned about what are

the potential follow-on activities there, what might the supreme leader do that would constitute something that would cause us somehow to respond. the marine portion of that would, one, be conventional operations and in all probability, amphibious operations of some sort. we're simply not there today. when i step into an audience and ask a group of marines, how many of you have been aboard ship? i'll get 10% or 15% that raise their hand. how many participating in attacks? 10% or 15%. it concerns me greatly that there's a possibility out there, god forbid the probability that we could be asked to do something like that and we're not trained on. we will rely on some of our old hands to get it through, we would eventually accomplish the mission, but i would argue we can do it better when we are trained to it.

that's the sthreefl one to two deployment to dwell, to give us more time -- give the young marines were i'm -- more time with their families and also get back on the training field and get back core competencies that have started to wither over time. >> do you see the latest uptick in violence in iraq as a temporary rise prior to the june withdrawal from the cities or does it represent a resurgence in sectorian -- sectarian strife? >> that glass is half full. for that reason, i do believe in the iraqi security forces. every indication as i visit and from our commanders in the field is that they are better with each passing month. i think that there is a residual presence, of course, in iraq on the part of al qaeda. i think they're trying to get back where they were in some places, get back to the former strength they had between themselves and what we would

call the sunni nationalists, if you will, the people who fought against our presence there. but i think the country is tired of fighting. it's a country that's got a tremendous future bunce they get past the nonsense. i had a professor tell me one time a successful nation needs five things, aeroable land, a fresh water supply, intelligent population, exportable product and a sea part. i would probably add leadership, but i think we described iraq. there are new oil fields on the syrian border larger than anything they have. that they're exploring today. it's going to be a tremendously rich country one day and i think the people of the country understand that. they, like we, want a better quality of life for their children. i think they're going to demand that of their security forces. soing that with the extended presence, if you will we don't know how long it will be, but with the extended presence of

the army advise and assistbury gade combat teams and the continued professionalization of the iraqi army but increasingly the iraqi police that the country will be able to settle its problems and move to these levels of prosperity they haven't seen in decades. >> how many marines are on n anbar now and are they all out of the cities? what level do you see them at by the end of the year? >> last count, number was down to 16,000. we are at this point moving out equipment as the commander will deem appropriate to do so. but we pretty much have an understanding general odierno that we will await the election and even some weeks after that before we start the further reduction of men and the last of our equipment. i think bhi the spring of 2010, as we talked about, i wouldn't put an exact month on it at this point, but i think by the

spring of 2010, we will see marines ending their presence in iraq. we have said all along to the secretary and department of defense, if you want a larger marine presence in afghanistan, there must be a reduction in iraq. we simply can't do both. frankly, 2009 will be a tough year for us. we now have a foot in both camps and those people, the combat support, combat service support marines have always been the groups and the m.o.s.'ses that have been most ridden hard and put away wet in some cases in short periods of time before they're asked to go become. those are the people being stressed by he movement of men and equipment by the requirements to support combat forces in both places. but i see the numbers going down to zero sometime in the spring of 2010. the exception to that probably being 30 marines or less who would work with the fledgling iraqi marine corps who has security responsibilities in