it is not an example of thinking in cold war terms, but thinking in terms that are really more appropriate for the 21st century, where in my view, we are added. where nuclear weapons will no longer be the weapons of the strong. fe will be the weapons of the week. .

in the hands of the united states and russia. it is the most realistic approach for us to engage or push them first, otherwise no other countries would follow. therefore, i think that this first step that you have taken, this first stage, focusing on the united states and russia, is a sign of a realistic approach. anyway, in this context, i would like to emphasize the next summit in moscow. it will be critically important

for it to be successful in encouraging. >> we are going to leave the remainder of this recorded program and take you live to a discussion on the disputed iranian election and its aftermath. mahmoud ahmadinejad is declaring victory in the race. the opposition candidate, mir hossein mousavi, has called for a second round of voting. the woodrow wilson international center for scholars is hosting this event. >> we hope that our speakers today will give us patterns and clarification in what we should make of this important election. amongst the things that i hope they will address -- is the election as significant as the media in the united states and

europe has made it out to be? as the opposition to the regime been broadly and not based -- broadly enough based that it can continue to work behind the scenes? is compromise possible for desired by leadership? ultimately, if, as the guardian councils validation of the election yesterday seems to indicate, mahmoud ahmadinejad continues in office, what are the implications for the stability of the regime and for foreign policy? we have available to you the biographies of speakers. i will not go into those in any detail. the initial speaker is robin wright, a longtime journalist

with "the los angeles times." nauert a public policy scholar here at the center. one of our most valued experts on the middle east. >> thank you very much. for those of you who were here when we did our pre-election presentation, i ended on this slide, which turned out to be far more pressing and the nine new. so, where are we? the first week was clearly a big political showdown over the disputed election. the second week was about a physical confrontation as the state began to clamp down. most importantly, as the flashpoint move gone through the election to the powers of the supreme leader, now we are in the third week and we have begun the sorting out process

politically and on the streets. i have 10 bottom lines to offer. my first is that a regime that came to power in this way faced its biggest challenge in 30 years in peaceful the sabaeans. it was a stunning development for iran and the entire middle east. their uprising needs to be understood in a global context. in other words, the past 20 days fit into a broader historical pattern. the largest public demonstration since 1979, forcing the regime to face the same ideals that it swept across five continents over the last 25 years, forcing regimes to take into account the supremacy of popular will,

accountability, transparency, and issues of justice. the outside world had focused on how iranians use twitter and facebook. this same technology has also indicated them over many years about what is happening elsewhere in the world. iranians very much want to be a part of the 21st century. some kind of challenge was inevitable, given iran's modern history. political trail blazers, their quest for empowerment has played out in four different phases. the very first of its kind in asia, a powerful coalition of

intelligentsia and clergy forced the dynasty to accept the constitution. in 1953, the democratically elected national fund pushed constitutional democracy, forcing the final shah to rome. in 1979, another coalition of clergy and intellectuals mobilized a dynastic rule. energy unleashed in peaceful demonstrations and angry protests, from the caspian coast to southern shore rock, is the natural -- natural sequel in this stream of events. each of these left indelible imprints that opened up iranian politics, defining what followed.

the student protest failed because it only involved one section of society. when you look at the variety of people that turned out on the street, the coalition is the most powerful since the revolution. it includes people of all ages and class as. feisty women, trail blazers in the wider is solid world. it included strapped businessmen, two former prime ministers, as well as taxi drivers and members of the national soccer team. one of the most interesting things is the role of the clergy in all of this. several have spoken out, adding legitimacy to the challenge.

he who would have been prime minister had he not decided to speak out before the imam died, has issued a virtual fact wtwah urging iranians to reclaim their due in protest. he has said not to follow orders that might lead them to be condemned by god. today he wrote censorship in cutting communication lines cannot hide the truth. another outspoken cleric is the grand ayatollah, who told the guardian council that we must use the objections that the protesters have with the objections. we must let the people speak. abhorrence was expressed for those behind the violence in sympathy for the injured

protesters, particularly the students. he said that what belongs to the people should be given to the people. the wishes of the people should be respected by the state. another grand ayatollah said that the protests were lawful and islamic, and he warned security forces that it is against islam to attack unarmed people. most senior clerics have been noticeably silent in endorsing ahmadinejad before the election for embracing him afterwards. most clerics in the holy city have never backed an islamic republic. i think we are seeing these objections play out in the election. a more powerful coalition has backed ahmadinejad, led by the supreme leader. the regime has unleashed tools

of the state to support their choice, with no holds barred. the paramilitary religious vigilantes' have become more powerful than at any time since their creation after the revolution. in general, iran has not witnessed this mentality since the chaotic days of the early ridge -- revolution. the strategy is to rebuff all allegations of fraud. the council of guardians has given a stamp of approval. second, they are trying to divide and conquer, dividing groups to prevent anyone from taking those videos or pictures of large crowds gathering. 3, picking up people around wasabi and the protesters. interestingly, this was found

by research assistant, the regime is using the same technology as the students, putting up pictures of people in the demonstrations, asking people to identify them. we have several that are marked as identified. the political divide in iran is now a full-scale schism. there are people that once served in the shah's jails together, whose mug shots hang together. it will be very hard to recreate that kind of unity any time in the near future. one thing that we need to remember is that the protest is not a counterrevolution. they are not talking about ending the islamic republic. they are talking about what it should be, how to reform it, refine it, and make officials

more accountable. core issues are not new. this little word up here says republic for republicanism. the main flashpoint in this confrontation goes back to the early days of the revolution between the ideologues and the revolutionaries. ideologues said that it should be a redeemers state, restoring islamic purity in iran and across the 57 nations of the islamic bloc, creating a new islamic body to challenge the east and west. the realists argued that iran should seek legitimacy by creating a capable islamic state, institutionalizing the revolution in a practical framework. they wanted a new political and

social order independent of the outside world, capable of interacting with the outside world. the bottom-line issue is whether to give priority to the revolution or to the state. whether the islamic republic is first and foremost islamic or a republic. that issue played out in the campaign this year with ahmadinejad champ and championing the idea of the original vision, mir hossein mousavi arguing for practical state. in the latest statement, mir hossein mousavi tellingly warned that the large amount of cheating and of vote rigging has killed the idea that islam and republicanism are compatible. we need to be clear, neither the opposition leadership nor the demonstrators are rejecting the

role of islam in the state the rallying cry is still god is great. they simply envision a different role for islam in the state. my final bottom line, where does that leave us? the regime has never been so vulnerable. the idea of a supreme leader, and unassailable political pope, faces a challenge of legitimacy, and there is no revolution in sight. three factors will determine the future. leadership, unity, and momentum. leadership is where the opposition is the most tolerable. there are still unanswered questions. can mir hossein mousavi lead this opposition long term? the answer remains unclear.

he was always the leader of public sentiment, no more so than the president in 1997. in both elections, said the voters latched onto a figure who promised a degree of political, economic, and social openings, who had a prospects for winning. there is probably a window of opportunity for him to act. he has been increasingly less visible over the past week. the third issue is unity, which is where the regime is most vulnerable. many in the government must be worried about long-term cost of a crackdown. the public has yet to get more deeply -- the public has begun to get more deeply involved in

reconciliation and outspoken criticism. i am sorry, i had this fantastic video of this little speech given by a angry member of parliament, so angry and worked out, his turban keeps falling off. it is not something i have seen any place else, this was just in the last few days. i think that it is very striking that it played out in parliament. this is also where the speaker of parliament, himself a former presidential candidate, could emerge as a player. so far he has traveled both sides. the speech given by the supreme leader, he has indicated some concern over what is playing out

in the streets. security services are another area to monitor. it will be interesting to see what plays out amongst the police. this is one of many pictures of a protester trying to help a policeman who has been injured, we have lots of stories of policeman indicating to protesters said they do not want to hurt them, please leave. there is a question around the revolutionary guard. not the commanders, but the rank-and-file. in 1997 and poll was taken to find out how they voted. they found that 84% voted for the reform candidate. we must remember that most of the revolutionary guard is rank

and file, many prefer to do the revolutionary guard because they get offered to 30 and can get a second job. the third issue is momentum and have the opposition movement manages to st. sustain itself. this will be the trickiest part. we have already seen this take a significant blow. the morning cycles, neda agha soltan, the young woman who was shot in the street, she has emerged as a heroic figure to the revolution. but because the tactic of mourning was used originally by revolutionaries held protests against the shah, they have

begun to crack down on the type of engine that could bring that momentum. they have cracked down the tides of morning. my last bottom line is that i think that the genie is out of the bottle and it will be impossible to put back. it can be repressed for now, but i do not think that there is any way that we can go back to what happened at the beginning of june. thank you. >> thank you very much, robin. two announcements that i neglected to make in the start. since we are being webcast and broadcast live on c-span, i would like to ask people to turn off mobile devices phones -- , mobile devices, phones and such. people in the overflow space, we will be taking questions from

you as well. those questions will be conveyed to me and we will work them into the discussion in the second hour. the next presentation comes from an adjunct faculty member and former scholar here at the center, a frequent visitor to our sessions. someone that we welcome back, farideh farhi. >> thank you everyone for being here. i will take up bomb where robin left. essentially, making an argument that most of the sources really do not know where iran is going.

it has to do with the fact that the iranian leaders themselves probably do not know where they are going at this point. i will make an argument that this is a very improvised game and a moment in iranian history. we are probably better off sitting down and watching been trying to analyze the situation on a minute by minute basis. the crisis that has involved iran since its election is without a doubt the most significant event in the 30 year history of the islamic republic, as far as i am concerned. the revolution itself has deeply restructured these events. these are big events, like the iran and iraq war, the

revolution of 1999, turning the office of the leadership into an absolute office that created the expediency challenge because of the conflicts that existed none of these events have been as significant, as far as i am -- as far as i can tell. there have been two basic institutions and fundamental concept -- contradictions. those institutions were elections and leaders. in this situation, both institutions failed amazingly,

this election was the 29 in the 30 year history of the republic. the office has been the ultimate overseeing arena where there are regulations and negotiations, not necessarily completely managed. this competition goes out of control once in a while, but it is ultimately the body that comes in to negotiate. in this crisis, both of these institutions, your respective of fraud or the perception of it -- irrespective of fraud or the perception of it, these numbers

were completely cooked. i am in the camp of these numbers being completely made up, and happy to defend that position. this election was mishandled, fraud or no fraud. in fact, both of these institutions and the up heightening problems further. i am from hawaii, and i stayed awake until midnight to watch it live. my mouth was open, i could not believe that he would go on television and in side the public to go into the streets the way that he did. that is a role that the leadership has not played and

not tried to play. so, the failure of these institutions has caused violence. as far as i am concerned, this is electoral politics by another means. they will continue, as far as i can tell, for a while. the damage that has been done to the legitimacy will either have to be repaired in serious ways or face these institutions facing serious consequences. with the results for the future structure of power, either elections will become totally meaningless in iran for in the way they are conducted will be prepared in serious ways. in short, such cosmetic and amusing efforts by the guardian

council to reopen the pull boxes on national television when no one knows where they have been for the past two weeks, it is a release of the exercise in trying to repair the damage to the system. the fact that they are doing so means that they fully understand that something serious has happened. so, while these events must be seen as an uncertain and ultimately improvised in outcome, no matter the direction of events, one thing is certain, the election was seriously mismanaged. you could say that both sides in this competition underestimated their opponent's power. let me begin with the

reformists. the so-called anti-ahmadinejad front. foremost in their calculation on the expanded rights of the iranian relief and to that standing behind mir hossein mousavi. a certain degree of modification was the name of the game, but massive manipulation seemed unlikely. in that misguided belief, i was also guilty. i did not think that there would be massive manipulation by an iranian politics. i thought, as reformists thought, that this massive manipulation would be dangerous. hence, it would not be tried. and they understood, from the beginning, that the path of opening the presidency would be

difficult, depending on their ability to realize a silent vote -- voting bloc, suggesting up to 40% of the electorate. they entered the race for highly skeptical of mir hossein mousavi's ability, but they did assume, wrongly, that if he did manage to mobilize a block of voters, he could overcome 5 million to 7 million against the conservative ability to organize performers -- supporters. one former reformer -- once the former