distribute it among the public. or we take the money and invest in the sector. in fact, it is none of the above. you can see why unemployment is so high. if you look at the growth of the population, women are not having that many kids. you need have about 2.05 to keep the population in tact. it used to be around 2.7. right now, women are having less than that. .

a 30% unemployment is just unbelievable. finally, in the fourth development plan, they hope they will produce 800,000 jobs per year. 700,000 jobs per year means that there is 300,000 per years without jobs. they need 1 million jobs per year. 15-34 -- you can see very high. inflation, some people say that is because oil prices went up. when oil prices went up for saudi arabia, their inflation did not do anything. they are spending money like crazy rather than investing. importing everything. the stock market has done

miserably. engineering and technical services have gone down. food industries, sugar, a construction have gone down. where does that leave us? the economy is in a mess. unemployment is running up 30%. inflation, 20%. they are debating how to invest the money. behind the scene is, who is going to control the purse? that is where the debate is. is it going to be controlled by jobs, projects, or is it going to be controlled more by the ayatollahs? that is why the issue is between the ayatollah and khomeini and ahmadinejad. i love the picture of the general sitting there.

that is why the question of who controls the revolutionary guard is very important. we do not know. but the unity and vulnerability becomes a key issue. it is them fighting over the money they are making. so the outcome will be partially related to who will control the money. thank you. >> thank you very much, fariborz ghadar. our last presentation is by the non reza their research fellow and he will focus his thoughts on the protest and the gulf and a larger region. >> thanks to robin, we know iran

is entering a new phase that is probably more diffuse, opaque, and contracted than the previous weeks. in a way, that makes it harder for all the countries in the region, specifically the arab world to have a good sense of what is happening to iran. how this will play out. it is important to examine that at this point, the implications for middle east security and politics, of the profound changes that have affected iran recently. much will depend on how these various players in the countries, including the great powers will assess the nature of the system that is emerging from the turmoil in iran. from the middle east, and more specifically from the arab

states, that much is certain. revolution has entered its second age, ever since the election of ahmadinejad in 2005. this new age has several trades characteristic -- the growing assertiveness of the once timid supreme leader, the immensely important and economic rise of the revolutionary guards and previously very important key power centers, including clerical once. the coal states had to rebuild ties in the 1990's. and the rejection of popular legitimacy. we have to understand something -- here we see iran -- we look

back to 1979 and we see a very bumpy road. factionalism playing at. controlled chaos, competing power centers. this is not how most gulf leaders see iran. i would argue most arab leaders. kasey continuity. they see linearity. they see the revolution as having a profound motive -- consistency -- that is not well- understood and the west. -- in the west. we want to see the nuances where they see a purpose-driven system that is expansionists and hegemonic. what is the assessment about this new iran? not much has changed in the

formal structure of power. the reality of power is very different. the assessment right now is that we can no longer talk about iran as an islamic republic. it is a route islamic republic dictatorship. many in the arab world will argue this was always the case. the past two or three weeks have just raise the veil on the democratic pretense that the islamic republic has cultivated for the past 30 years. in that sense, the election of ahmadinejad was good news in this sense that it does away with the illusion of a moderate iran. you see the true face of iran. many westerners penned --

pinned their hopes on this. many of my colleagues argued that ahmadinejad won the election. this is the fundamental collection of iranian politics, and we need to make their peace with that. this is a judgment i would dispute. you have to understand the logic -- twisted, but understandable. gulf leaders have been very disappointed by hatami, in the sense that these were a business-minded people with whom they could talk. hatami was soft-spoken. there were good relations. i am not going to overstate debt. in the 1980's, they were very concerned about iran's agenda in

the gulf. saudi arabia and other places. they were building that relationship in the 1990's. they realize something in 2002 -- that iran had pushed ahead with its nuclear program, and that the good face of iran was hiding a more determined security policy. still very aggressive. they were trying to rebuild confidence between the two shores of the gulf. this still has an impact about how the gulf is upset at iran today. in a way, but they were relieved that ahmadinejad 1. a mousavi presidency would have

had an impact -- a positive impact on the u.s.-will let -- a u.s.-iran relationship, and some believe that iran's interests and that washington's interest and in washington's heart is closer to the arab capitals. you can argue and irrational -- an irrational fear, but when you look at the close history, not completely misplaced. as i said earlier, little has changed in the structure of power in iran. those on the rise right now belong to the most radical and uncompromising faction. power right now is seen from the arab world firmly in the hands

of a praetorian guard with dominance see in foreign policy, a driving policy on the nuclear program, iraq, lebanon, palestine, other places. it praetorian guard that upholds fundamentals and values but also in nationalistic outlook that concerns the arab states. also a praetorian guard that had little knowledge of and a few connections to the outside world beyond syria, hezbollah operatives, and the likes of few hugo chavez. there is very little good news and you interlocutors -- and few interlocutors. they are speculating about iran's coming behavior. it will largely depend on the

iranian leadership. after all, the only item they were really worried about was the western-backed revolution -- and it happened. the threat materialized. if i iranian leaders mean what they say when they blame the protests in the streets on the west, then what she might see is the rise of a more confrontational -- then what you might see is the rise of a more confrontational or ran. this is if ahmadinejad mean what he says publicly. that the u.s. and the u.k. are driving that process. if they have the courage to acknowledge that the popular movement was the result of

profound domestic discontent, then iran may become more inward looking and it frees its investments abroad. two extreme scenarios. it will be somewhere in the middle. this is how they are thinking about it. no one is really confident about the next phase. from the arab world, the clarity -- you know what you are dealing with. up until now, there was fate -- there was fuzziness. all of our debates about what fashion can you deal with iran, and what are they willing to compromise on, were unnerving many arab leaders. in the away, they think this is no longer the case. -- in a way, they think this is no longer the case.

right now, you could argue that the u.s. is in a better tactical position than it was before the elections. we can contest that ahmadinejad -- that the defeat of hezbollah in the earlier alexians -- there is a sense -- i have read in the papers here that washington feels better. but that does not change the fundamental question on the nuclear front. centrifuges are still spending. it does not make a lot of sense. time is not on the u.s. side. at most, it is a respite. for bill states, what they see -- for most dates, what they see is going to be complicated by

recent events. the u.s. administration has tried not to be too confrontational. i think it has been pretty successful at that. it will complicate an already very complicated relationship. the overture will likely be postponed. which, again, even less progress on the nuclear file, which is not good news for the arab and goals states. there is also the fear that most of the hard-liners are faced with internal and foreign pressure, converging, that a nuclear option is more desirable right now. this is speculation. i am not saying this is my

opinion, one line of thinking. another very important to mention here -- the arab states are finding some relief in prices in that iran's image has been substantially eroded. suffered from what the arab world has seen on television. the arab world has a very simplistic and romanticized view of iran. evil, or the model to follow. right now, what arabs have seen is that not all i iranians are happy with the choices of their government. they have a controversial foreign policy. they resent the country's ideological isolation that comes at an enormous cost for them. i have seen some slogans that basically were saying no to

lebanaon. i do not know how widespread that is, but it is good to have iran's image tarnished. they suffered from ahmadinejad taking the lead on confrontation with israel. they appeared weak and lackeys of the west. now confrontation from within iran. there is another element here -- there will not see an immediate difference. the interaction was there. most have been confused by what they saw in the end -- by what they saw in the streets of iran. hezbollah upholds iran as a model.

imagine -- the impact of the images after the repression in the streets of tehran. they have had defect in beirut. remember, the lebanese had their own version of this popular uprising. no blood, no massive repression, but still, they are wondering what kind of state they want. is that a viable model? another country to watch closely is syria, which is trying to rebuild ties with the west. if well played, this can be opportunity for syria. there's not much texture to the iran-syria relationship. the two societies are not in love. there is not a lot of cultural exchanges. there is some religious

pilgrimage, but it is not a profound relationship. the regime we will -- the regime will continue to deal with the same people in iran. what is their assessment of the solidity of the regime? the picture is certainly very complex. as i said earlier, the only merit of the decision to basically throw his weight behind ahmadinejad, at least for the arab states, is to clarify the situation. we no longer deal with the political debate. iran is controlled by the most radical, the most confrontational faction. you can dispute that. iranian politics -- you know.

it has always disappointed, in a way. there is a need to understand that the arab world does not -- even when there is the perception that the iranian threat is very acute, they worry as much about the west, the western relationship with iran, as they do about iran's influence within the region. right now they feel better. thank you. >> thank you very much. we have an opportunity for your questions and comments. i would like to ask, since we only have 40 minutes left, that questions be kept precise. if you would indicate the person to whom you are directing it, that would help. also, please wait for the

microphone to ride since the its earhardt -- since this is -- for the microphone to a rise since this is being televised. >> thank you for a really interesting series of presentations. i am job -- i am bob dreyfus. i spoke to a lot of people there, all across the political spectrum, who said before the election that both ahmadinejad and hamine had an interest in rebuilding ties to the u.s.. they wanted to negotiate a deal. it would be easier to make such

a deal if there guy won. i wonder if you could comment -- whoever wants to -- whether those calculations have changed. if you can put yourself in the place of those guys running the country. what their considerations now when figuring out whether to approach the obama home -- the obama administration, maybe not now but when the session opens in the fall, with some sort of offer to talk to the united states? of course, i think we ought to respond. >>, and was there in march and i came away with the feeling that the clerics, the regime had never felt so powerful, that it had so many trump cards in dealing with the united states.

just across the board. it felt almost cocky. we are expecting in there were an overture from the united states -- and the last couple of days obama did make his message -- that any deal, any serious negotiation would have to include a lot more than the u.s. has offered so far. the u.s. would have to come bearing gifts, including a compromise on uranium enrichment. in the aftermath of what has happened, over the past three weeks, the regime is not going to be a self confident about getting a deal or appearing strong. its own image around the world has weekend. -- weakend. i would not be surprised if there is continuing uncertainty in iran.

for ahmadinejad to reach out and say, i am ready to do business. in effect, to legitimize them. that is where i think the administration comes up against a difficult choice. one thing we do not talk about today, believe it or not, is iran's nuclear program. questions about where it stands and what it is doing. ahmadinejad is the first to come out. we are at 7000 centrifuges. if they continue to do that, that keeps the clock running. they have questions about the legitimacy of the system. their calculations may be that it will be easier to strike and it would have been if you had musab be elected -- mousavi

elected, if you had an election that put ahmadinejad back in power. i think this is the worst possible confluence of factors that the obama administration faces. >> i think he is faced with if things calm down, and it does not look like it will, but if they do, he is faced with the now-what moment. both in terms of domestic politics and foreign policy. it is important to understand part of the reason they decided to go for this brazen announcement of this election, 62% -- ahmadinejad. it was this idea that this internal fisher that exists in iran are not working.

we have to clarify the internal situation so we can push for the kind of policies we want to push for. let us not forget that right before this election occurred at the end of last year that they defeated his major economic initiative, which was to effectively withdraw subsidies in terms of goods and get people cash subsidies. those issues are still on the table as the iranian economy has to face major issues. there was a sense that by clarifying the situation, that we won. it is over. revolutionary guards took over, go home, and elections are no longer a serious, do not participate.

they could pursue these policies. it seems not only is obama faced with the worst, but so is mr. iran. the result is ms. it is that dynamic that makes the predictions that are made prior to a election. it is problematic. it is always the expectation it all -- that they but ultimately make the deal. the only reason they did not make a deal with the u.s. is the hard-liners did not want them to become powerful. they want to make sure they will be in power forever.

i think a lot of that has to do with the iranian pathology. secondly, i think what has happened has completely changed. he is faced with a serious question -- not only has the undermined his office by taking sides, he is accused of mismanagement of a serious crisis. he has to find a way to address those questions that have to do with this leadership. it does not have to do with is he a leader or not. it has to do that he has mismanaged this whole situation in very consequential ways. until he can adjust that, i do not think he can raise his head and tried to address outside. iran will become introverted, at

least for the next few lights -- at least for the next few months. >> [inaudible] >> abd of the parliament of 290 personnel, for command performance, 105 members showed up for the party, ahmadinejad's party. that is one domestic indicator. before i get answers. the obama administration has given from what all indicators are