allow the taliban to establish a system while the taliban shutdown their training camps and turnover weapons. a 45% plurality said the government did the right thing, while 40% said the government made a mistake. this is another sign of a shift in opinion, because just before the agreement in march, a poll by international american institute found 72% then supported the deal. further, the public has judged that the pakistani taliban broke their agreement. when asked if they thought sending forces violated the agreement, two-thirds said this was a violation. a large majority does not even think the pakistani taliban would submit to the jurisdiction

of the course they were demanding. 71% think they will not accept these courts having the power to try taliban members. this may seem a small point, but it can be important for how militant groups are perceived in the future, because the willingness to accept a role for yourself as often basic to people's perceptions of fairness. there is a big divide between the majority's view of some aspects of sharia. we asked what they thought it aloud, and what they thought the taliban all-out -- allowed. are women allowed to work? 75% said yes. bar girls allowed to go to school -- bar girls allowed to

go to school? 83% said yes. will be taliban allow girls to go to school? 83% said no. do you think they have confidence to govern and deliver public goods, but this does not mean people have faith in the government's competence. people were asked who would do a better job in three areas. what about providing an effective justice? only 14% think the taliban with to a better job. a majority, 56%, thinks the government would, but 26% opted out and said both or neither. preventing corruption in government. just 9% preferred the taliban, but fewer than half preferred the government. 38% said both or neither. helping the poor. 7% said taliban, 44% government, and another 44% said both or neither.

since we see this shift of attitudes about the pakistani taliban, the sea change cover the afghan taliban, and if so, to what degree? nearly all pakistanis say in principle, they should not have bases in pakistan. at the same time, many seem unwilling to face the prospect that the afghan taliban to operate from sanctuary bases on the pakistani side of the border. groups trying to overthrow pakistan are not operating from bases within pakistan. asked if the pakistan government were to identify

bases of taliban groups who are trying to overthrow the afghan government, do you think the government should or should not close these bases, even if it requires closing bases. 75% said the government should close such bases. this appeared to show a considerable growth in support for the military action to secure the western border. our september 2007 poll did find a plurality that favored allowing the army to pursue and captured taliban insurgence -- insurgents who crossed over the border. if the afghan tell them more to succeed in its goal, 3 onion 5 pakistan -- three in five pakistanis see this as a-goal.

24% said this would be a good outcome. others said it would be neither good nor bad. when the united states is brought into the picture, this really gives rise to different attitudes. asked about the current u.s. drone aircraft attacks in northwestern pakistan, at 82% called unjustified. only 13% disagreed. if the u.s. were to -- 75% says this would not be justified in bombing, although this is not supported when carried out by it pakistan's on government. we asked a question that would remind respondence that the international community, not only the u.s., originated the military presence in afghanistan.

the un had authorized a mission. this mission is meant to stabilize afghanistan and help the government defend itself from the taliban. do you approve or disapprove of this mission? 72% disapprove of the nato mission. only 17% approve. do you think the mission should be continued or ended now? 79% said it should be ended now. 13% that it should continue. the recent decision by the obama administration to send 17,000 more troops to afghanistan as widely projected in pakistan. 86% said they disapproved. there are few signs of the washoe over. -- be washed over.

to the degree that the war in afghanistan is brought to pakistan, there is a strong public reaction. let's look now at whether the arrival of obama has brought signs of warmer attitudes to the u.s., and i should say this poll was conducted just before the president's speech in cairo. he did briefly mention u.s. plans for humanitarian aid in pakistan. asked how much confidence they have in president obama to do the right thing in regards to world affairs, 30% expressed some or a lot of confidence. when asked the same thing about president bush, they found even if you were expressing confidence -- 7%, but the same number 61% expressing low confidence.

more express confidence in all, then president bush, but the majority expressing a lack of confidence in the u.s. president is really the same as before. we asked them to consider what president obama's policies that for the country. 32% said the policies of barack obama will be better for pakistan. 36% said it would be worse. 26% said they will be about the same. three in five think obama's policies will stay the way things are or get worse. 69% feel on favorably toward the current u.s. government, and 58% are very unfavorable. only 27% have a positive view. this is roughly similar to responses in 2008 when 56% or

unfavorable and 17% favorable. added it is are a loyal -- attitudes are less lopsided when talking about international law. this has shown signs of moderation. there are two statements. on the right, the u.s. has been an important leader in promoting international laws and sets a good example, or the u.s. tries to promote international laws for other countries, but is hypocritical because it is not all of these rules itself. a comparatively moderate 2/3 to the critical view of the u.s. this is down from 78% in 2008. a significant minority chose a state which praises the u.s., perhaps some thought folsom lane -- fulsomely.

the u.s. is seen as having this respect to muslim countries that a majority think is purposeful. a substantial one in three said this was not intentional. the u.s. is often this respectful to the islamic world of of ignorance and insensitivity. however, a 55% majority thought the u.s. purposefully tries to humiliate the islamic world. this image of u.s. actions seems pretty entrenched. it's broader attitudes have shown improvement, what about attitudes toward the u.s.'s adversary, al-qaeda? there has been a shift in attitudes as far as it pertains to pakistan itself. in 2007, if you look at the bottom bar, their activities

were seen as a critical threat to pakistan. in the current study, at 82% called al-qaeda's activities a critical threat. this doubled. an overwhelming majority thinks al-qaeda should not be allowed to run training camps. 88% said this. most say they are not. 76% thought this is not the case. nevertheless, if the government were to identify al-qaeda treating -- training camps, a 75% said the government should close them down, even if it requires military force. 17% disagree. this shows a shift in attitudes from 18 months ago. for comparison, in our 2007 goal, a 44% plurality then it

favored the pakistani army capturing al-qaeda fighters, while 36% were opposed. even if the u.s. were to identify al-qaeda treating camps -- training camps, four in 10 do not think it would be justified for the u.s. to bomb such camps. similarly, back in 2007, 80% said the pakistan government should not allow american or other foreign troops to capture al-qaeda fighters. so, views have changed a lot, where their own government's actions are concerned. the views have barely changed in

other respects. one way of understanding this is we may be seeing a rise of national feeling directed at both extremist groups within the country that are increasingly seen as harming the integrity of the state, and against outside forces that are also seen as harming the integrity of the state. many of the public see the taliban, the afghan television, the u.s., and al-qaeda, all as harming the state integrity. but the image of the u.s. does not benefit from this shift, this rise in national awareness, overall, i think this change should be welcome to the u.s. ok. >> thank you. christine will take another slice of the study. >> ok.

>> so when you hit a button, and makes them appear. >> ok. that is good for this luddite. let me give you a brief overview of the next presentation. this tries to this aggregate what pakistan look like. the proceeding presentation looked at the country over all. we have aggregation that is urban/world. we did not see a lot of variation between residents of the rural parts of pakistan and those from the urban areas. we have differences. i think it is important to say up front that in pakistan, there is more variation within a province them between provinces. the only way we can really look at the determinants between the variation in the country is the regression model. that is not something we are doing here. another caveat is this sample is

from 1000. it was meant to be nationally represented. we are very cautious because the sample was not drawn to be representative at the provincial level. we will only present those variables that have a substantially demonstrated, but statistically significant presence. if we do not have the specific slide addressing the variables, there was no significant differences, or these the difference we felt confident in sharing with you. -- or at least a difference we felt confident in sharing with you. i have another survey i am doing at princeton and at stanford that uses the same firm, and we are doing 6000 people. some of the differences we point out here, we'll be tracking in the 6000-person survey.

i also think it will be interesting to share anecdotes. before we did the survey, jacob and i went to pakistan to enumerate our training. i think it is important to understand the vernacular is distilled out. one of the important things we found only did the training -- and those of the people going out to interview the participants -- we went through every single question in minute detail, and question them vigorously to make sure they understood the question period will be found in 2007, there were a lot of respondents who did not know and did not want to respond. we were trying to figure out whether they did not know or did not want to respond. to minimize the do not know, which spent a lot of time making sure they understood technology. there are two interesting findings we have from the trading -- training.

when we asked people what is al- qaeda, most of them -- who were all well educated -- many of them had master's degrees -- almost all of them have five or more years of experience doing marketing war. a number of these folks were well educated and they could not tell us what al-qaeda was. we train them to explain to the respondents, who also may not know, that al-qaeda is bin laden's organization. we said, do you know what al- qaeda is? can you tell us? a woman raised her hand. this was very funny. women almost never know what al- qaeda is and never offered an answer. she said, i know, i know. she explained al-qaeda was haunted karzai's -- hamid

karzai's organization. [laughter] we spent a lot of time with them making sure they knew what al- qaeda was. similarly, many cannot give a clear explanation of what the taliban was. you need to be careful of the translation and that folks understand. with those caveats in mind, we will move forward. this is very interesting -- if you look at a map, you have ethnic pockets -- this is 5% of the population. in a statistical sampling, this is a lumpy soup. the soup is not well stirred. you have to take bites all over the suit. we do not really know whether the results we see are and at a far -- are an artifact of the lumpy soon phenomena or if it is

genuinely and a liar. we we tracking this in the 6000- person survey. -- we will be tracking this in the 6000-person survey. we will be talking about the threat perception. and we will be talking about the attitudes toward american policy and leadership and so forth. this is a slide we have already seen. we asked whether respondents see this as a threat or not, and we gave them a variety of threats. this looks at the activities of local taliban and islamic militants. this is what we find. it is really interesting. look at the differences you see between nwfp and punjab. folks are much more concerned

about these organizations. a think there is a fairly straightforward explanation. oddly enough, the afghan taliban -- this is really about ethnic insurgent violence. so maybe the afghan taliban are pretty clever. they're not making a problem. but you see these other three provinces. maybe that explains why this isn't out liar here. we also asked about the activities of military groups -- militant groups in pakistan as a whole. you see interesting differences. with fox in the -- with folks in me nwfp and the punjab as a

whole. when they began suicide campaigns, they really concentrated in the punjab and fata and nwfp. aside from the attack on benazir bhutto in recent years, they have really been scared. going back to the question of the goals, we asked whether the taliban was going to take over all of pakistan, and what would this be? you see real provincial differences with people in the print job, which has been most affected by the activities -- people in the punjabi, which has

been most affected by the activities. many cities do not view this in the same way as the taliban, but people who know know that they outsource violence. again, the two provinces that bore the brunt of the violence are more apprehensive about the outcome of the takeover. we also asked about goals. i will not read the question again. this is the second time you have seen this slide. fascinating provincial differences. even though folks -- they are much more likely to believe this will take over all of pakistan. it is important to understand when the survey was taken. this was fielded after the taliban had moved into mon-

khmer -- khmer, which was a breach. as long as the craziness happens in any nwfp and the punjab, people can deal with this. constitutionally, they do not have the entitlements and the obligations of the citizenry. this is a very different social status. my interpretation is the world view changed in the punjab and nwfp. if you look at the data files on the march, before the subsequent events, people had a very different opinion about the

pakistan taliban and its goals and the likelihood it would succeed in those goals. again, they think the taliban will just stop at the north west frontier province. when we asked about the likelihood of the taliban takeover, there is very striking is variation, and you see a very different provincial got -- provincial grouping. these folks are at ground zero. they are much more at the believed they will actually take over. folks in the print job are more skeptical this will happen. they were the most skeptical.

we also wanted to understand how folks in the different provinces view the government's, as well as the pakistani taliban, with regard to the conflict. you see fox in the nwfp have the sympathy is that lie much more with the government. there is another interpretation. the only way that we can really know is through some sort of correction model. there are long sought -- longstanding issues of disenfranchisement with the government. you see that going on with the national insurgency. and there have been episodic. of ethnic -- there have been episodic times of ethnic

violence. this difference comes from their own disenfranchisement or have they been exposed last to violence? we also asked, folks, as you know, about the government's confidence. you really see a lot of variation here. i personally found the nwfp results to be absolutely baffling. i have no coherent explanation. they bore the brunt of federal and provincial and the military's handling of the situation. people in jobs -- that is where i expected the punjab to be. if you add the allotted some, it

falls between the punjab. i have no coherent explanation as to why that might be. if you all have thoughts, let me know. i have no way of rationalizing that. we also asked folks about their confidence in the army's dealing with the ttp. again, nwfp here was very similar than the -- similar to the previous slide. again, nwfp looks very strange. the point job is definitely confident generally -- the person job -- punjab is generally confident. folks have no confidence in the ways the army has been handling the ttp situation. now we turn to the second basket.

again, if you do not see a slide, it is because we have no significant differences to share with you. the next basket is going to be looking at the ways it falls view u.s. leadership policies and so forth. first, we will revisit views about whether obama will be better or worse for pakistan. falls are more optimistic that this will be a better outcome. this is performing in a way that is, i think, counter intuitive. he was very transparent, much more than bush, about the utility of predator strikes. he said he would continue to do this. with president bush, it was

really a situation of denial until the end of his elected term. the u.s. was in denial about it. you can look at the early press reports where the term was for saying these were american airstrikes, and there was silence. maybe, maybe not. at the end, bush was very clear. obama was more clear. this is a tool that is useful to us. fox in the nwp think things are going to be better. overall, they are uniformly opposed to predator strikes. if you look at the data that only it focuses on fata. you can survey in fata, but it is really it onerous getting a good sample. i would