law&order" stuff. the other issue is in both of these cases, he was out on bail. he has not been acquitted. as was the other person. cases still stand. it is a lack of evidence, particularly the evidence between india and pakistan on the mumbai event. the initial hard position has moved to a cooperative position with india. and a lot of the exchange of information. this will go forward as more evidence comes in and they can proceed. evidence comes in. everybody is learning a big lesson. we have had laws in the past which turned out to be draconian

and so on. india has of lot of very harsh laws. we haven't gone into those. if this weakness persists, you might have to have special offenses. >> i'm going to move around the audience. if i don't take you in the order in which you raised your hand, i hope you will excuse me. this will allow us to spread it a little bit. >> thank you very much. i am alex glicksman with asia consulting. the united states had a problem in how it was prosecuting the war in afghanistan, switch from one general officer to another. fortunately for the united states we also have not only a change in generals but an alternative capability in which we fought.

we have special operations capability which is fairly extensive. my question in terms of pakistan's prosecution of the work, is the current pakistan the army capable of switching tactics from its conventionalare army capable of switching tactics from its conventional focus to the servicing focus and does it have the capacity to change? >> there has been a lot of talk about the army's training and capability and orientation towards india and not being able to switch forces to the western border, difficulties and so on. i would like to tell you the chief of army staff, backed by his operational staff, can move forces anywhere in pakistan. he doesn't have to ask the government, he doesn't have to do anything. it has to do with his perception

of where the threat is at the moment and the force he needs to combat that threat and if any other instrument is taken care of before he takes away forces. that is a pretty established practice in this capacity to move rapidly when required. boston has been using aviation forces in that area. it has a very sizable capability in terms of special forces which were originally -- in the 1950s. in various environments, they are being used in the

operations, so there was a gap which we learned the hard way, has been taken care of. we have training support. many of us have trained in schools here. i don't think there is of problem of capacity. in fact, i don't think there is a problem of capacity in pakistan. it is capable of tackling everything if it puts its mind to it and orchestrates the capacity that it has in the mumbai district. >> the microphone over year. >> i am arlen altman. we were both comprehensive and refreshing clarity. my question relates to outside

support of assistance. as you well know, pakistan requires billions of dollars in aid and economic assistance that is likely to flow from the outside world. there is also a school in pakistan with his rubbery -- readily developing here that argues that perhaps better that the u.s. aid be limited, pakistan has to do this on its own, the more involved engagement from the united states the negative. and other schools as we have to do more. how do you come out on that debate between providing pakistan the tools that it really needs or allowing pakistan to do it on its own? >> we have had this discussion with the united states for a long time. what i am saying is there is a

strong lobby for support for pakistan and the other lobby of not supporting pakistan or limiting support for pakistan. from what it says in the 9/11 commission, there has been a drive to build capacity, what was seen as the key to the problem in pakistan. in afghanistan, the u.s. and nato and everybody is tackling the most difficult situation, which is southern afghanistan. part of the problem. the taliban, possibly after the surge or elections missed out exploiting areas where there is a softness or a weakness. this is taking place, what pakistan is doing in the tribal areas is extremely important at this point in time. at this point, holding back

capacity or any other kind of support, would become counterproductive. pakistan is capable of sitting across the table and discussing what is about money where it should be, and what monitoring should protect this, the u. s asking for specific requirements on the benefit of special programs that need to be put in place. there's a lot of working around huge concerns. the basic data that pakistan's capacity should be built up should not be in doubt. the process of going through -- i hope it goes through a beginning. there is no end to the demands, pakistan is seeing that it has

suffered far more than it can, it needs much more. the u.s. has also been very supportive in international institutions like the world bank and the donor conferences. a lot of things are in the pipeline. i hope they come through. >> thank you, excellent panel. my question was more -- >> please identify yourself. >> i am from the transnational crisis project. my question has to do with something you touched on earlier about areas of pakistan that can be dealt with politically. stern reports suggest the research we have done on the crisis project shows there are

infiltrators from the taliban better shaving their beards off and going into pakistan, how much that is research requires more truth. it is it viable to suggest that only a political solution can address the problem, particularly based on -- quite volatile for some years, and poses a larger threat? >> yes. could be happening. in fact, they don't have to shave their beards. there are plenty of beards in pakistan. they may be doing that. they would use every vulnerability, every opportunity offered. they have instituted process of checks in those areas, registration, there were some double registrations being taken

care of. it will prevent, to the extent possible, this happening, i don't discount the possibility of people sneaking in, they are our own people. that is -- you can't tell just by looking at somebody that he is a taliban. that is another problem. sometimes -- we came very close to resolving this issue, political, parliamentary committee, 29 points need to be addressed to resolve it politically. it got sidelined in these arrangements, took place after that. this indicated the government

and the elections and so on. i didn't say -- is a pretty good solution, a pretty good solution in part because using the military in your own area is not a good idea. in fact, the best urgency operation -- the best counterinsurgency operation starts when you anticipate that there is going to be an insurgency in a city, and not get in the middle of a full-blown insurgency when it is already in your face. that is the situation, if we can take care of it politically it will be great. >> we have a question here and one in the back. >> thank you. thank you very much for this broad picture, if i could bring

you back to the general presentation. you talked optimistically about the fact that you have legitimate government actions according to the rule of law, there is public opinion and popular support. the question is, this is complicated and long drawn affair. going back to something asked in the capabilities of the pakistan the military to conduct effectively counterinsurgency operations, you expressed optimism saying capabilities exist, were created a while ago. a year ago people in washington, the pakistan army --

counterinsurgency is too complicated. they don't know how to handle it. it turned out to be quite different. the question remains as to the staying power that has given the enormous cost, the population that you mentioned. all of those things, long-term, i assume, based on what you said, you are confident that staying power will go forward for as long as it takes to defeat various areas of insurgency. it is difficult to predict, on the political will to go on, given the political, the cost involved. the last point is the drone

attacks, in the u.s. extremely politically contentious until not long ago. these things still go on, we don't hear much about them as a political, contentious point. is there a degree of coordination? are these things plodded together? you predict there will be more of these? how are they received regardless of the military impact in these drone attacks? >> a first one, can we go one and maintain this initiative. i am glad that you said that the previous fears and concerns have gone.

it is not only fighting, it is fighting and deliverance of results. as i said, and you said, it is a long haul. we have to sustain political results. we have to sustain public opinion. media's support. all those things. it is going to be difficult. then, from pakistan's point of view, they are up against two options. give end and that this thing to take its course, or combat and finish it. nobody wants a long, drawn-out struggle. struggle. struggle, all the things you mentioned. i will try to conclude as soon as possible.

there are other factors. once they have all come, the strength of the taliban, pushed them out, it is more a question of articulating commands and positioning troops in those areas for maximum effectiveness. there is basic infrastructure in the form of logistic basis, it is not as if you are out of everything. they should be able to stay, not looking at the course, for years and years, a massive problem. a transitional period, and a similar administration coming in for and effective governance, i don't know what the thinking is on the government side but i am not privy to that. i think there should be talk of the future, the federally administered tribal areas, the

provincially administered tribal areas, the frontier regions, the frontier circulation, the structure which the british created. it has been overtaken for events, somebody needs to think about an alternative to that which i hope will be done because it is the only way you will extricate out of this or it is going to be a problem. the other question on the drone attacks, the u.s. is very sensitive to criticism, very sensitive that public opinion is against pakistan and there's hostility to pakistan, hostility to the u.s. and so on. there is public opinion of all kinds in pakistan, there have been things happening against the drone attacks, but there

hasn't been any real upheaval against the u.s.. nobody has jumped around on the streets war done things which you could say is a public outpouring of anger against the u.s.. that hasn't happened. there is a basic understanding of the problem that we face at the moment, the trip that we face, the orientation to us, sometimes the orientation on the ground, in terms of responses, takes place quickly, mindsets take a little longer to change. that may be the case in our relationship with india and our relationship with the u.s.. the realization that what needs to be done has to be done one way or the other.

>> general, i am paul hughes from the u.s. institute of peace. it was a wonderful overview of the strategic situation in pakistan. as you have indicated, the truth has been seen through the history of counterinsurgencys, these tend to fundamentally reshape societies. in the case of pakistan, the there will be a need to 3jeter national priorities to the things you have mentioned, improve governance, will flock, economic situation than what not. ..

everywhere else, too. but your question -- south asia is a region, perhaps the only

one, one of the very few when material production, a delivery system improvement, is an ongoing process. pakistan starting from its earlier nuclear-free zone has lately pushed for a strategic restraint regime. it did so earlier, it will do so again. this to bring about the recession of this production and further testing and so on. india thinks that china and so on -- it becomes a tried- elective process.

even that is being discussed. there is work going on on changing the situation from such an active, ongoing thing to a more restrained thing. as far as pakistan is concerned, the nuclear issue was in response to the 1974 nuclear tests by india. our hand was forced. we tested. we tested. let me put it like that. pakistan is working on a strategy with india, and admittedly right now because of the mumbai, there's enormous momentum for resumption of dialogue.

and some point in time in terms of restraint and so on. as far as fmct, and other thing concerned, i think it legitimately this starts getting negotiated and as pakistan would have no objection. already very strongly conforming. maybe they connect them to the grid later. [laughter] >> do you have a question there? >> sir, thank you for your time. i am with the department of defense but my comments are my own. you actually printed one of my questions when you spoke about the future of the fatah and the conversation that needed to be had regarding that. i want to go back to questions that were aed by this gentleman earlier about the southern punjab and karachi, and really would you be willing to theorize what a political situation since there is an emphasis on the legal situation, in these areas would actually

look like wax and so now we look at the newspaper and there's talk about a new province in the southern punjab. is that what we are leaning toward or using other solutions to these problems? >> i haven't seen the daunting, but that has been on the table and people have talked about increasing the number of provinces for a long time. it hasn't really gone anywhere as far as a political institution is concerned. but i was hopeful, optimistic on the political thing because we have an elected government now and we have a government in baluchistan, which is a governor, minister, all the ministers of the luke. also we've had a similar arrangement in the past, but this time it looks more gerbil, more sustainable. and you also have a good fix on the grievances as the other side has in terms of job

opportunities in terms of education and facility, in terms of royalties for the gas which is being pumped from the province, infrastructure development. all those are on the table. and as that question was held, that you have to do a major reappropriation of. i think it's the biggest wakeup call a country can get going through a prolonged insurgency situation, which if left unchecked can resume some kind of class struggle situation or a major social upheaval in the country. so that's why i said it's very important for the political institution to start thinking long term about how they are going to ward off this threat in the future and take care of many of the weaknesses and problems which exist, which may give rise to those situations.

and karachi is a big city. something could happen there. baluchistan. other areas in which just need to be looked at, and political institution is the best prepared to do that. if the local government system is not working you have to improvement to deliver. if there were problems between the government system and the political perpetual government you have to take care of that problem, not live with that. maybe you could live with a lot of things in the past, sort of been them, do it later and so on. but now you are in a situation where you cannot bend the things that you cannot put off things, and you have got to start tackling them. >> general, i work for the institute for the saudi for. my question relates, sir, you

have documented evidence that there are militants, use the situation to either fund raise or build sympathies. and i you have the current situation of 2 million people are is the relief effort or is the army, are they aware of that and what is being done, is there a mechanism in place to control military organizations or even other problematic organizations doing the relief work? >> i heard that. i have had this question before and i know this is a concern. after the earthquake, we now need to go there and see what has been the result, who has done the rehabilitation. who is helping the people out, because the emergency which came in and all these organizations rushed to set up centers was actually a basic humanitarian effort.

and in those organizations to establish themselves as other than militant organizations. capable of humanitarian work, capable of many of them have done that and many have done good work because of the accessibility they had in those areas, the funds they had at their disposal and so on. but the bulk was taken by the civil military combination, u.s. helicopters, and those heavy, heavy lift helicopters which operate in those areas almost around-the-clock. so marginal efforts we are making, but within their capabilities. now with the idp's, again, i don't know if they are active or not. but as i said, i think the lieutenant general is handling the% of what needs to be done there. and enormous tonnage of food is then provided by the military and we have called asking a

simple to take over, and they are doing their best. but that's where we are. so i think it's a marginal issue. we should not get hung up on these things. >> we have a question here. >> thank you, general. i'm an intern here at the atlantic council. my focus is china. i'm just wondering if you could just comment on the status of pakistan and chinese relations. it is there a difference between a military relationship with china and civilian government, any thoughts. >> we have had a long relationship with china. there has been a military relationship in the sense that we have procured equipment from china in the past. we have joined production of fighter aircraft and main battle tank with chinese collaboration.