about how the courts, how the legal @@@@@@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @, can you tell about what would be the ways forward with that? and if that is not possible, then why? ronnie jones, from the united states institute of peace. >> i am very flattered. you are right. there has been a problem. first, there is a problem with the whole prosecution system in pakistan in the way prosecutions have gone before the judge. it involves a lot of other capacities.

re a lot of other capacity to be built up, a lot of law and order stuff which they show in that film. that has to come in before prosecution can build up a case in which the judge can take a judgment. that is one aspect of not only this case but many other cases. in both of these cases, sophie mohamad has been out on bail, he has not been acquitted, as has the other person. the cases still stand. the evidence which is going around in indiana and pakistan on the mumbai event. in pakistan, from the initial position, has moved to a very corporate position that has brought off the exchange of information. i think these cases will go

forward as more evidence comes in. everybody is learning a big lesson. we have had laws in the past which turned out to be draconian and so on. india has of lot of very harsh laws. we haven't gone into those. if this weakness persists, you might have to have special offenses. >> i'm going to move around the audience. if i don't take you in the order in which you raised your hand, i hope you will excuse me. this will allow us to spread it a little bit. >> thank you very much. i am alex glicksman with asia consulting. the united states had a problem in how it was prosecuting the

war in afghanistan, switch from one general officer to another. fortunately for the united states we also have not only a change in generals but an alternative capability in which we fought. we have special operations capability which is fairly extensive. my question in terms of pakistan's prosecution of the work, is the current pakistan the army capable of switching tactics from its conventionalare army capable of switching tactics from its conventional focus to the servicing focus and does it have the capacity to change? >> there has been a lot of talk about the army's training and capability and orientation towards india and not being able to switch forces to the western border, difficulties and so on.

i would like to tell you the chief of army staff, backed by his operational staff, can move forces anywhere in pakistan. he doesn't have to ask the government, he doesn't have to do anything. it has to do with his perception of where the threat is at the moment and the force he needs to combat that threat and if any other instrument is taken care of before he takes away forces. that is a pretty established practice in this capacity to move rapidly when required. boston has been using aviation forces in that area. it has a very sizable capability in terms of special forces which were originally -- in the 1950s.

in various environments, they are being used in the operations, so there was a gap which we learned the hard way, has been taken care of. we have training support. many of us have trained in schools here. i don't think there is of problem of capacity. in fact, i don't think there is a problem of capacity in pakistan. it is capable of tackling everything if it puts its mind to it and orchestrates the capacity that it has in the mumbai district. >> the microphone over year.

>> i am arlen altman. we were both comprehensive and refreshing clarity. my question relates to outside support of assistance. as you well know, pakistan requires billions of dollars in aid and economic assistance that is likely to flow from the outside world. there is also a school in pakistan with his rubbery -- readily developing here that argues that perhaps better that the u.s. aid be limited, pakistan has to do this on its own, the more involved engagement from the united states the negative. and other schools as we have to do more. how do you come out on that debate between providing pakistan the tools that it really needs or allowing pakistan to do it on its own?

>> we have had this discussion with the united states for a long time. what i am saying is there is a strong lobby for support for pakistan and the other lobby of not supporting pakistan or limiting support for pakistan. from what it says in the 9/11 commission, there has been a drive to build capacity, what was seen as the key to the problem in pakistan. in afghanistan, the u.s. and nato and everybody is tackling the most difficult situation, which is southern afghanistan. part of the problem. the taliban, possibly after the surge or elections missed out

exploiting areas where there is a softness or a weakness. this is taking place, what pakistan is doing in the tribal areas is extremely important at this point in time. at this point, holding back capacity or any other kind of support, would become counterproductive. pakistan is capable of sitting across the table and discussing what is about money where it should be, and what monitoring should protect this, the u. s asking for specific requirements on the benefit of special programs that need to be put in place. there's a lot of >> thank you, excellent panel.

my question was more -- >> please identify yourself. >> i am from the transnational crisis project. my question has to do with something you touched on earlier about areas of pakistan that can be dealt with politically. stern reports suggest the research we have done on the crisis project shows there are infiltrators from the taliban better shaving their beards off and going into pakistan, how much that is research requires more truth. it is it viable to suggest that only a political solution can address the problem, particularly based on -- quite volatile for some years, and poses a larger threat? >> yes. could be happening. in fact, they don't have to shave their beards. there are plenty of beards in

pakistan. they may be doing that. they would use every vulnerability, every opportunity offered. they have instituted process of checks in those areas, registration, there were some double registrations being taken care of. it will prevent, to the extent possible, this happening, i don't discount the possibility of people sneaking in, they are our own people. that is -- you can't tell just by looking at somebody that he is a taliban. that is another problem. sometimes -- we came very close

to resolving this issue, political, parliamentary committee, 29 points need to be addressed to resolve it politically. it got sidelined in these arrangements, took place after that. this indicated the government and the elections and so on. i didn't say -- is a pretty good solution, a pretty good solution in part because using the military in your own area is not a good idea. in fact, the best urgency operation -- the best counterinsurgency operation starts when you anticipate that there is going to be an insurgency in a city, and not get in the middle of a full-blown insurgency when it is already in your face.

that is the situation, if we can take care of it politically it will be great. >> we have a question here and one in the back. >> thank you. thank you very much for this broad picture, if i could bring you back to the general presentation. you talked optimistically about the fact that you have legitimate government actions according to the rule of law, there is public opinion and popular support. the question is, this is complicated and long drawn affair. going back to something asked in the capabilities of the pakistan the military to conduct

effectively counterinsurgency operations, you expressed optimism saying capabilities exist, were created a while ago. a year ago people in washington, the pakistan army -- counterinsurgency is too complicated. they don't know how to handle it. it turned out to be quite different. the question remains as to the staying power that has given the enormous cost, the population that you mentioned. all of those things, long-term, i assume, based on what you said, you are confident that

staying power will go forward for as long as it takes to defeat various areas of insurgency. it is difficult to @@@@@ @ @ @ difficult to go on given the cost and human lives involved. the last thing, about the drone attacks by the u.s. which were extremely politically contentious issues. these are still going on, but we don't hear much about it. is there a degree of coordination? are there things plotted together by the u.s. and pakistani forces? how was this evolving? or do you predict there will be more these? how are they politically received, regardless of the military impact and successes of the drawn attacks?

thank you. in these drone attacks? >> those are good questions. to sustain these initiative -- i am glad you said the previous years and concerns, not only fighting, delivering in terms of results. to sustain public opinion, medians support, it is going to be difficult. from pakistan's point of view, against two options, let this

thing take its course, finish it. nobody wants a long, drawn-out struggle, all the things you mentioned. i will try to conclude as soon as possible. there are other factors. once they have all come, the strength of the taliban, pushed them out, it is more a question of articulating commands and positioning troops in those areas for maximum effectiveness. there is basic infrastructure in the form of logistic basis, it is not as if you are out of everything. they should be able to stay, not looking at the course, for years and years, a massive problem.

a transitional period, and a similar administration coming in for and effective governance, i don't know what the thinking is on the government side but i am not privy to that. i think there should be talk of the future, the federally administered tribal areas, the provincially administered tribal areas, the frontier regions, the frontier circulation, the structure which the british created. it has been overtaken for events, somebody needs to think about an alternative to that which i hope will be done because it is the only way you will extricate out of this or it is going to be a problem. the other question on the drone attacks, the u.s. is very

sensitive to criticism, very sensitive that public opinion is against pakistan and there's hostility to pakistan, hostility to the u.s. and so on. there is public opinion of all kinds in pakistan, there have been things happening against the drone attacks, but there hasn't been any real upheaval against the u.s.. nobody has jumped around on the streets war done things which you could say is a public outpouring of anger against the u.s.. that hasn't happened. there is a basic understanding of the problem that we face at the moment, the trip that we face, the orientation to us, sometimes the orientation on the ground, in terms of responses,

takes place quickly, mindsets take a little longer to change. that may be the case in our relationship with india and our relationship with the u.s.. the realization that what needs to be done has to be done one way or the other. >> general, i am paul hughes from the u.s. institute of peace. it was a wonderful overview of the strategic situation in pakistan. as you have indicated, the truth has been seen through the history of counterinsurgencys, these tend to fundamentally reshape societies. in the case of pakistan, the there will be a need to 3jeter

national priorities to the things you have mentioned, improve governance, will flock, economic situation than what not. .. in your personal view, do you think that pakistan will reassess its role through the nuclear world? and whether it will continue to pursue new nuclear weapons or is it satisfied with what it has now? or will it take new steps to join the contents ocomprehensivn treaty? >> we're working to eliminate

all nuclear weapons by 2013. down to zero. i've been supporting that strongly. everybody else in pakistan, i guess, should be supporting that, and everywhere else, too. south asia is a region, perhaps the only one, or one of the very few where missile material production, deliver systems improvement is an ongoing process. pax thpakistan, starting from is nuclear weapon program nobody has even look that has pushed for a strategic restraint regime earlier.

it's done so again on a bilateral basis with india, to bring about a cessation of material production and for testing and so on. india links that to its perception and china and so on. it becomes a trilateral process. even that process is being discussed to generalizing. there is work going on, on taking situation from an active ongoing thing to a more restrained thing. but as far as pakistan is concerned, it's advent into the nuclear field was in response to the earlier 1974 attacks by india. then pakistan ran a test in 1998. it is regarding india.

pakistan is working on a reduction strategy with india. it is on hold right now, admittedly, because of the mumbai situation. there's an enormous need for dialogue. the working on that. as far as other things are concerned, i think, if regionally this starts getting negotiated and pakistan would have no objection, very strongly conforming. i don't know about the two reactors. maybe they're connected to the [unintelligible] [laughter] >> fenty for your time. and with the department of

defense. but my comments are my own. you spoke about the future of the fata and the conversation that needs to be had regarding that. but i want to get to the southern and jab and karachi. would you be willing to terrorizgive you a theory on whe areas would look like, southern and j --southern punjab and karachi? >> i have not seen the thing. but it's been on the table and people have talked about increasing the number of provinces for a long time. it has not gone anywhere as far as political institutions are concerned. but i was hopeful, optimistic on the political thing because we

have an elected government now. we have a government in baluchistan with all the ministers being baluch. we had a similar thing in the past, but this time it seems more durable. and we have a fix on the grievance is the other side has. the job opportunities and educational facilities and in terms of loyalties for the gas being pumped from baluchistan, infrastructure development, all those on the table. as the question was here, that you have to do a major reorientation after this kind of insurgency, i think it's the biggest thing the country can get going through a prolonged insurgency. if left unchecked, it can assume some kind of class struggle situation or a major social

upheaval in the country. so that is why i said it's very important for the political institutions to start thinking long-term about how they're going to ward off this threat in the future and take care of many of the weaknesses and problems which exist, which may give rise to those situations. karachi is a big city. it is something that could happen there. baluchistan, also. other areas need to be looked at. the political institution is best prepared to do that. if local governments are not working, you have to improve them, to deliver. if there's a problem between the local government system and the provincial governments, you have to take care of the problem, not live with it. maybe you could live with a lot of things in the past and sort of this they were going to do it later, but now you are in a

situation where you cannot put off things. you have to start tackling them. >> i work for the institute of the study of war. you had the earthquake. then there was evidence that militants used the situation to fund raise or build sympathy ii. now you have the current idp situation of over 2 million people. is the army aware of that? what is being done? is there a better mechanism needed to control militant organizations involved in stemming on relief work? >> i know this is a concern.

after the earthquake, we now need to go there and see what we did see who has done the rehabilitation, who is helping the people. all these organizations that rushed to set up centers, there was a humanitarian effort. in those organizations there was a sense to establish themselves as other than militant organizations, capable of humanitarian work, many of them have done that and they have done some good works because of accessibility they had in those areas, the funds that were at their disposal. but the bulk of the help, the u.s. military helicopters and heavy lift helicopters which operated in those areas almost around-the-clock were there. those were moderate efforts they

made, but within their limited capabilities. now with the idp's, again, i don't know if they are active or