45%. so, economy plays a big role. what happened, oil prices went up and ahmadinejad went around giving money all over. couldn't have given that much money. he probably gave some of the billion that they say he took. maybe another billion in the governme government. in today's billions it not a lot of money, but that is basically what he did. but the misery index is very high and they have to do something about it. the debate within the groups, the into he is debates, are do we take the money and distribute it among the public -- ahmadinejad's position -- or do we take the money and invest in the sectors, rafsanjani's position. but in fact it is none of the above. you can see why unemployment is so high. there is very little -- if you look at where the growth of the population is, women are not

having that many kids in iran any more. they used to. but you need to have about 2.05 to keep the population intact. it used to be around 2.7, 2.8. but now it is less than one. so, the economic conditions are having them have for children. so you see a drop in the angle group between five and nine particularly. and this reflects on where the workforce is. now, i compared yemen, u.s. and iran, and you could see that is where they got to find jobs for people. 30% unemployment is unbelievable. by the way in the fourth development plan they hope they will produce 700,000 jobs a year. that is the optimistic situation. 700,000 jobs a year means that there are 300,000 people still perrier who won't get a job.

they need roughly a million jobs a year to keep the situation intact. you can see here iran is very high. and inflation, some say it is because oil prices went up and inflation was really high. oil prices went up for audit retain, too. -- for saudi arabia, too. their inflation didn't do anything like iran. they are just spending money like crazy like investing. importing everything. the stock market has done miserably. engineering and technical services have gone down. food industry has gone down. sugar industry has gone done. construction has gone down. so, where does that leave us? the economy is in a mess. unemployment is running at 25% to 30%, inflation at 20%.

and they are debating how to invest the money. but behind the scene is who is going to control the purse. and i think that is where the big debate is. is it going to be controlled by ahmadinejad, giving projects to the revolutionary guard, or will it be controlled more in line with the bunyod's and ayatoll ayatollahs. that is why the issue is between rafsanjani and the group of ayatollahs and khamenei and ahmadinejad and i love the pictures of the generals because they are the guys that get the money, not the people -- and that is why the question of who controls the revolutionary guard is very important and we don't know. but the unity and vulnerability become a key issue and it is basically them fighting over the money that they are making.

so, the outcome will be partially related to who will control the money. thank you. >> thank you very much. our last presentation is by the political editor of the national in abu dhabi. he is a nonresident research fellow and he will focus his comments on the impact of the election and protests on the gulf and larger region. >> thank you. thanks to robin, we know that the public conversation in iran is entering a knew phase that probably more defuse, opaque and protracted than we saw in the previous weeks. in a way that makes it harder support the countries to have a good sense of what is happening in iran and how this will play

out over the coming weeks and months. it is pretty important to examine at this point the implications for middle east security and politics of the very profound changes that have affected iran recently. in a way much will depend on how these various players, the various countries, including the great powers, will assess the nature of the system that is emerging from the turmoil in iran. from the middle east and more specifically from the arab gulf states, that much is certain. the islamic revolution has entered its second age ever since the election of ahmadinejad in 2005 and this new age has several main traits, characteristics. the growing assertiveness of supreme leader.

the tremendous importance of the political and economic rise of the revolutionary guard. the alienation of previously very important key power centers including clerical ones with which the gulf states had rebuilt ties in the 1990's. and the rejection of popular legitimacy in favor of raw control in iran. we have to understand something very important about how iran is seen from the other side of the gu gulf. here we see iran as -- we look back to 1979 and see a bumpy road. controlled chaos, competing power centers. this is not how most gulf leaders see iran. and i would argue most arab leaders. they see continuity. they see linearity since 1979.

they see the revolution as having a profound motive, coherent, consistency, that is not well understood in the west. a kind of naivete that we have about the system. we want to see the nuances where they see a purpose -- driven system that is fundamentally expansionist and hegemonic. and so what is the assessment today about this new iran? not much has changed in the formal structure of power, but the reality power is probably very different. so, the assessment right now is that we can no longer talk about iran as an islamic republic. it is a islamic military dictatorship with a narrow power base. and many in the arab world would argue this was always the case

and recent events have just raised the veil on the democratic pretense that the islamic republic has cultivated die accept active deceptively for the past 30 years. so in the sense the re-election of ahmadinejad was good because it does away with the illusion in that you see the true face of iran. and the true face that many gullible, naive we weresterners pinned their hopes on. many arab columnists and my colleagues argue that ahmadinejad won the election fair and square. that this is the fundamental reality of iranian politics and we need to make our peace with that. this is a judgment i would personally dispute.

but you have to understand the logic of that. it is a little twisted but it certainly understandable. gulf leaders have been very disappointed by rafsanjani and other in the sense they were business minded people that could talk. they were good personal relations between some of the leaders. i'm not going to overstate that. but you have to realize that in the 1980's the gulf states had supported iraq in the war and were very concerned about iran's agenda in the gulf. so they were rebuilding that relationship in the 1990's with r rafsanjani and katami. but then they realized something in 2002, that iran had pushed ahead with its nuclear program and the good face of iran, katami, for example, was hiding

a more determined security policy, still very aggressive. that iran was really after a nuclear option at the time that they were trying to rebuild confidence between the two shores of the gulf. and this still has an impact of how the gulf looks at iran to y today. another reason why, i think, many in the arab world are happy that ahmadinejad, or relieved that ahmadinejad won, is that a mousavi presidency would have had an impact on the, probably in their view, a positive impact on the u.s.-iran relationship and this is a thing that some are concerned that iran's interest and washington's interest or heart are closer to iran than the arab capitals.

and you can argue this is an irrational fear but when you look at the history and the close relationship between the u.s. and iran during the shah time, not completely misplaced. so, little a has changed in the formal structure of power in iran. but those on the right right now belong to the most radical and uncompromising factions. power right now is, as seen from the arab world, is firmly in the hands of the praetorian guard dominating security and foreign policy, a driving policy on the nuclear program, iraq, lebanon, palestine, other places. a praetorian ghauard that uphol

values but has little knowledge of and few connections to the outside world beyond syria, hezbollah operatives and the likes of hugo chavez. so, there is very little good news and even fewer interlocki l interlocutors. they are all speculating about iran's coming behavior. and i think it will largely depend on the iranian leadership reading of the protest. after all, the only real threat khamenei was worried about was weste western-backed revolution and it happen happened. so, if iranian leaders mean what

they say when they blame the protests, the conversation in the streets of tehran and other iranian cities, on the west, then what you might see is the rise of a more confrontational and angrier iran using its assets to counter what at the see as a threat. that is if khamenei and ahmadinejad mean what they say publicly that u.k. and the west are driving the process. if they have the currently to acknowledge that the popular movement was the result of a profound domestic discontent, then iran may become more inward looking and in a way freeze its operation and investments abroad. i'm outlining two extreme scenarios. could be somewhere in the middle.

so, no one is confident about the next phase but seen from the arab world you know what you are dealing with. up until now there was a lot of fuzziness and all our debates here about which faction can you deal with in iran and other people who are more willing to reach a compromise on the nuclear situation and stuff weren nerving many gulf and arab leaders chl leaders. in a way they think this is no longer the case. there is mothis another element. right now you could argue that the u.s. is in a better tactical position than it was before the elections. a weakened and confessed ahmadinejad, inward looking iran, defeat of the hezbollah elections earlier this month. there is a sense -- i have read

some papers here that washington feels a little bit better. but that doesn't change the fundamental question on the nuclear front. centrifuges are still spinning. if mousavi was in power, it doesn't make a lot of sense. time is not on the u.s. side. so, this is, is at most a respi. so what they say is u.s. overtures to iran is going to be complicated by recent events. the obama administration has tried not to be too confrontation confrontational and, i think, has been pretty successful at that. but it will complicate an already very complicated relationship. but the overclear will also likely be postponed, which again

with time not on the u.s. side, even less progress on the nuclear side, which is forth very good news for the arab and the gulf states. there is also the fear that iran's hardliners, now that they are cornered and are faced with internal issues and foreign pressure, actually a nuclear option is more possible, even more desirable right now. this is speculation. i'm not saying that my opinion, but this is one line of thinking. but there is another very important dimension here. the arab states are finding some relief in that crisis in the sense that iran's image has been substantially eroded, has suffered a lot from what the arab world has seen on television. the arab world has a very, i

would say, simplistic and romanticized version of iran, they are either evil or the model to follow. right now what arabs have seen on tv screens is not all iranians are happy with the choices of their government. they are not all on board with a very confrontation confrontati poli policy. actually, they resent the country's ideological isolation that comes at an enormous cost for them. i have seen some slogans that were saying not to hezbollah, not to lebanon, we are here for iran. things lick that. i don't know how widespread that was. but at least from the point of view of arab leadership, it is actually good to have iran's image tarnished. they suffered from ahmadinejad taking the lead on confrontation with israel and it made them --

i mean, they appeared weak and essentially looking for not going on board and that conversation comes from within iran. there is also another element here, which is that iran's allies in the region, although they won't see an immediate difference in their interaction with tehran, must have been a little bit confused by what they saw in the streets of tehran. hezbollah, for instance, uphold iran as a model. imagine the impact of the images of repression in the streets of iran have had an effect in beirut. and remember in 2005 lebanon had their own version of this. no blood, no massive repression,

but they are wondering what kind of state do we want. is that a viable model for us? another country to watch very closely is syria, which is trying to rebuild ties with the w west. if well played, this could be a moment of opportunity for syria. but i think there is not much texture to the iran-syria relationship. it is not like the two societies are in love. there is not a lot of cultural exchange. there is some religious pilgrimage but it is not a profound relationship. so the syrian relationship will 10 to deal with the same -- will continue to deal with the same people in tehran. but what is their assessment of the solidity of the regime in tehr tehran? the picture is certainly very

compl complex. as i said earlier, the only merit of these troubles and khamenei's decision to basically throw his weight behind ahmadinejad for the arab states is to clarify the situation. we are no longer dealing with a political elite that debates option and so on. iran today is controlled by the most radical, the most confrontati confrontational faction. you can dispute that judgment and iranian politics are very fluid and i certainly appreciate your observation earlier that pund punditry in iran has always disappointed in a way. but you -- there is a need to understand that even when there is the perception of the iranian threat is very cute, what they worry -- they worry as much

about the west's relationship with iran as they do about iran's influence in the region. and right now they feel in the short term they will feel in a better position. thank you. >> thank you very much, emile. we have an opportunity for your questions and comments. i would like to ask, since we have only a little under 40 minutes left, that questions be kept precise. and if you would indicate the person to whom you are directing it that would help sort things out here. and would you please wait for the microphone to arrive since this is being webcast and televised. and please give us your name and affiliation. who would like to start? the gentleman here. >> thank you for a really interesting series of

presentations. i'm bob dreyfus with the nation magazine. i spent a couple of weeks in iran during the election. i spoke to a lot of people there all across the political spectrum who said, before the election, that both ahmadinejad and khamenei had a strong interest and desire in rebuilding ties to the united stat states. that they want to negotiate a deal with the united states. and these were even from very strongly pro mousavi people who thought it would be easier to do a deal if their guy won. so, i wonder if you could comment, whoever wants to take this is ok, but about whether now those calculations have been changed and put yourselves in the place of these two guys who are now running the country, and what are their considerations

now in figuring out whether to approach the obama administrati administration, maybe not this week, but a month, or two, or when the u.n. session opens in the fall, with some sort of offer to talk to the united states? and how do you think we ought to respond? >> i was there in march, and i came away with the feeling that the clerics of the regime had never felt so powell that rful, had so many trump cards with the united states. they felt almost cocky. and we were expecting, if there were an overture from the united stat states, and my last couple of days obama made his message but they were anticipating any serious negotiations would have to involve a lot more than the united states had offered so

far. it would have to be the united states have to come bearing gifts. and including a compromise on uranium enrichment. in the of the as a matter of fact -- in the after math of what has happened the last they weeks the regime won't be as self-confident about getting a deal, appearing strong. that its own image around the world has weakened. i would not be surprised if, particularly if there is continuing uncertainty in iran, for ahmadinejad at some point to basically reach out and say ok, i'm ready to do business, then force the white house, in effect, to legitimize him if it wants to engage. i think that is where the administration comes up against a very, very difficult choice. because the one thing we don't talk about is iran's controversial nuclear program

and questions about where it stands, what it is doing. and ahmadinejad is the first one to come out and has been the past year to say we are at 5,000, we are at 7,000 sentry fuselages -- centrifuges. and if they continue to do tha,. that keeps the clock running. and i'm sure there are many in israel who are very aware and the uncertainty in iran, the questions about the legitimacy of the system, their calculations in israel may be that it will be easier to strike now than it would have been if you had mousavi elected or what looked like a legitimate election that put ahmadinejad back in power. so, this is the worst possible confluence of factors that the obama administration faces. >> i think that mr. khamenei is

faced with if things come down -- and it doesn't look like it is going to calm down, but if they do he is faced with a "now what" moment in terms of domestic politics and foreign policy. it is very important, it seems to me, it is important to understand part of the reason they decided to go for this brazen announcement of this election, 62%, ahmadinejad even got more than katami. it was this idea that the internal fissures in iran are not working to iran's side so we have to clarify the internal situation so we can push for the kind of policies we want to push for in terms of foreign as well as domestic policy and let us not forget that right before this election occurred at the end of the last iranian year

ahmadinejad was defeated on his major economic policy initiatives which was to effectively withdraw subsidies and in terms of goods and give people cash subsidies. so, those issues are still on the table because the iranian economy has to face major issues. and, obviously, there was a sense that by clarifying the situation and effectively saying we want -- it is over, we have consolidated. revolutionary guards took over, that is it, go home. elections are no longer serious. don't participate any more. they could pursue these policies. so, it seems to me that not only mr. obama is faced with the worst possible circumstance, but so is mr. khamenei, because he went with something to clarify the situation and the result is a mess. and it is that dynamic that makes the predictions that were made prior to election rather

problemat problematic. within the iranian political context it is always the expectation that whoever consolidates power will ultimately make a deal with outsiders. in fact, the argument has always been that the reason reformers were not allowed to make a deal with the united states was because the hardliners did not want the reformers to become powerful. and now that they are going to be powerful, they are going to make a deal to assure that they will stay in power forever. i think a lot of that has to do with iranian pathology and secondly i think what has happened has completed changed the dallas. mr. khamenei is faced with the serious question, not only has he undermined his office by taking sides.

he's now accused of mismanagement of a serious crisis facing iran. and he has to find a way to address the questions that has to do with the fact that he has mismanaged the whole situation in very critical ways. and unless he can figure out how to address that kind of question i don't think he can raise his head and sort of try to address the outside world. iran, i do think, will become rather introverted at least the next few months. >> the gentleman right in the back here.

>> [inaudible] out of a parliament of 290 personnel, for a command performance, 105 members showed up for ahmadinejad's party. that is one aspect of a domestic indicator i would like to get some answers for. but the obama administration has given, from what all indicators a are, until october for the iranians to come up with some hard means by which we can come to some conclusion or at least a direction on the nuclear, october. after that, there will be very seve severe, given your picture of the economic consequences, very seve severe, maybe the fourth major

crackdown in terms of international focus on the economic circumstance there. under those circumstances and the possibility of if that fails and the israelis feel and have stated indicating that 214 was the date they could play with in terms of the nuclear, what kind of feeling or haven't you put the iranian leadership in a pretty tough position? i don't see any means where time is on their side. can you answer that in a general way? thank you. >> well, i see at least three questions there, but robin, do you want to take a crack at one of them? >> in terms of parliament it is important and that shows one of the many cracks that basically let's about a third of the members of parliament showed up

for ahmadinejad's victory party is very telling. in terms of the dead libralinde would caution you to watch putting a deadline on it when the process hasn't started yet. i think president obama has talked about a year that he wants to see something happen, which would mean until january. but again this is a very fluid situation. i think in some ways it is a day-by-day thing. you can't look too much forward now. we are only 2 1/2 weeks after the election and i think there will have to be a lot of settling down before that process even begins. >> would you comment on the prospect that sanctions could have any further effect? we have many more kwif equiv mo could use. >> i don't think the split has just been there. you see it in the assembly of

sports. i don't think anything will happen until they sort the mess out among themselves. that is my perform feeling. with regard to the sanctions, let me first look at the nuclear situation. president obama and cairo sort of seem to say if you want nuclear power for energy you are ok. now, the iranians interpreted that as concentrating iraniurant 2% to 3%. he didn't say, that but that seemed to be the message. i think that is already a done deal, and let me tell you why. iran needed nuclear energy way, way back. in fact, during the shah's area seme semee siemens started a power plant in this location. iran was concerned about

availability to enrich uranium. so the deal was struck that they would hold, i believe, 12% or 13%. was with the ministry of economy at the time. they bought 12% or 13% a french operati operation. when the revolution came the nuclear power generation plant was reneged and the french took over the 12% or 13%. whether they nationalized it or what happened god knows. so the irans are saying we need energy. they are practically self-sufficient in gas. they need to export oil. they need electric generation. so, now the question is, does this nuclear power, is it really for energy? iran is in a completely different situation than korea. korea says i want a nuclear bomb and here it is, boom. the iranians are saying we don't want a nuclear bomb.

furthermore it is against our religion. there is the ayatollah saying that. they may be lying. but that opens up a situation for us to go in there and basically look at it, supervise it, elements. mousavi, it seems he said i'm willing to see a uranium enri enrichment operation in iran among many moult national companies. that means the japanese, russians, et cetera. i think that is about the best we can do because they want to have at least 10 nuclear power plants, invest about one to two billion per plant. they are going to be highly dependent on nuclear energy in the form of electricity and they are not going to rely on somebody from outside giving them enriched uranium. i think that is done and doesn't really matter who becomes -- or who comes to power. the issue of sanctions, i think that the sanctions hurt the iranian public. i think there is no question about that.

but i don't think it has any effect on the iranian regime. i honestly believe it has backfired. we discussed the possibility of putting sanctions on importation of gasoline. they use this as an excuse to ration it and put coupons on and people on it. if we put sanctions on gasoline, the administration and iran will love it, jack up the price, saying it is the americans' fault. with regard to sanctions on other sectors we keep saying it is hurting them. yes, it is hurting them. i wonder if they increased the oil production to seven or eight million barrels a day would we have to pay $147 for a barrel of oil. i don't know. that is a good question. but if you look at it, our sanctions have resulted in europe become dependent on

russian gas. athought they were our allies. it has made turkey pay for gas. turkey charging 15% will be self-sufficient in natural gas consumption. they would be happy. pakistan and india gas pipeline is talk, doesn't really happen. so our sanctions are not only hurting the iranian people her putting our european allies at rick, hurting the da-risk hurti the turks. i don't think the sanctions have been effective but that is a minority position. >> it happens to be one that has very strong evidence behind it. but thank you. >> i don't think anything that has happened in iran has changed the limited options that the obama administration had prior to what has happened.

even before these things happened, you know, there were discussions about military strikes essentially being nonviable. that sanctions effectively harmed the iranian population and strengthened the hardliners. i don't think anything that has happened in iran in the past few weeks has changed that dynamic. the only thing that has changed it seems to me is that because the election was at the center of the controversy it is now possible, despite mr. khamenei's making this a systemic problem, to make an argument that there is a crash, not between reformers and conservatives but a crack between the system and the government. that is considered by many in iran to be illegitimate. ok? so, and it is within the context of that that i think outside governments might start thinking about policies that actually

directly harm individual members of that government, whoever identifies, whoever is identified in terms of ambassadors, the people they send outside. so, people have talked about the possibility of political sanctions against individual members of this government. that is an opening. i'm not -- things are working out so fast that i don't think -- i think it is is time for the obama administration to sit down and assess the situation. but i think that is the only crack that has opened that introduces us to new possibilities of kind of policies that the obama administration can pursue. but the old ones that were on the table will still be as ineffective as they were before all of these things happened. >> let me expand a little bit on what was said about the report from the head of the mousad.

that most fully described in an article in the daily star of yesterday. the daily star is published in beirut. and the head of mu ss the mousa saying the military program of iran would only mature in 2014 which the previous argument was 2009 or 2010. therefore it is is urgent. so, the interpretation by the author of this is that the moussad is coming out and removing a key reason the netanyahu government could use for an early attack and their argument to the obama administration that we can't do palestine first because iran is a more urgent problem. so, this is an interesting comment by the head of the mouss

moussad. an interesting development to keep your eye on. other questions? yes, ma'am, right here. >> thank you. i'm an india editor for women inc. robin or dr. farhi, how much validity to you give to the rumors of the involvement of grand ayatollah sistani who is systematic economy against the theocratic state? either one of you. >> i'm engaging in rumors, too. let's be very clear.

ayatollah sistani has many, many offices. they are all over. and he is obviously a very influential leader not only in iraq but also in iran. and he's now married so ayatollah co-mainy's grandchildren and sistani's grandchildren have now very close relations. and ayatollah sistani, like many other members of the clergy involved, is what is considered to be a traditional cleric, essentially not very happy with

the kind of dynamics. they don't want to be out of the political process. obviously they want their influence. at the same time they cannot be very happy with the dynamics. and there are reports that some people have gone to see him and it is very clear when mr. ahmadinejad went to iraq he didn't meet with heim. so i think he has given his hint in terms of where his preferences lie. and it is within this that he think he falls within the context of all of these activities that are going on within the clear confidential community -- clerical community. robin showed the picture of some of the ayatollahs that have been the more political ayatollahs in iran that have taken a stance. but in the past week in iran, two major grand ayatollahs have

given sermons and hasn't done that for a while. where they came up with the idea that separation of power was a political arrangement that existed in the early days of islam and in a direct rebuke to ayatollah khamenei has said let's follow the law and gave this very interesting sermon about how could you talk about rule of law when the institution that devised the law, implements the law and judges the law is the same institution. so you cannot rely and therefore you mistrust that law. so, it is for the first time that these very non politicpoli people are hesitant to making their point.

that this not going to continue, this is not working out very well. and i assume that ayatollah sistani has always tried to stay away from iranen politi eniranfs that the group that is not very happy with what is going on in iran right now. >> yes, in the back. >> i have two quick questions. first of all, if president ahmadinejad, by pressure or whatever means, if he agrees to talk with the united states as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, then do you think that the administration will still vehemently support their democratic forces in iran? what will be the administration's position in the key issue on which the u.s. administration banks on, which is the nuclear issue, if there is leniency on ahmadinejad's

part to negotiate or talk about it, what happens to the democratic forces at the moment? secondly, the troop pullout from iraq, do you think it has got any implications on the middle east or in iran or middle east in general? thank you. >> i don't think the withdrawal of u.s. troops has any implications on what the united states decides to do about iran. i don't think the american public has an appetite for any kind of additional military intervention in that neighborho neighborhood. in terms of what obama does i don't think they have made a decision yet. i think that is the tough call. how do you create a balance where you seem to be encouraging the democratic voices throughout the region, not just in region, at the same time you have to deal with some of the most -- the last biggest block of autocratic leader in the world.

so it is a calendar not just in -- it is a challenge not just in iran but across the board. it was interesting what he did in egypt deciding to give a speech there but never mentioned mubarak in the speech. and we have to understand that the issue of engagement is because we ever liked whoever was going to be in power. it is because we are trying to avoid the military option. >> yes, in the back. >> al millikin. a.m. media. how do you think israel and their leaders view the election in their memory of the holocaust? >> i don't know about the second part of your question but as pointed out, i would assume the israelis look at the iranian situation and essentially see a weakened state and therefore

they are happy about that dynamic. they also see the possibility of rapprochement between the united states -- serious rapprochement beyond the technical discussion about the nuclear program, more remote. and again, that is seen as a plus for the israelis in the region. beyond that i think the israelis are watching and trying to make sense of the direction of what is going on. but at this point i think it was a welcomed addition to their understanding of what is going on in the middle east. i think their reaction is very similar to the reaction that

emile described. >> emile, let me ask a question to you. if you posit a general reduced legitimacy of the government in iran, what would be your estimate of the impact on the leadership of hezbollah and hauls hamas? are they put off by it? s does it make no difference as long as supplies and money come? >> there's a difference between hamas and hezbollah in the sense that hezbollah is committed ideologically to the islamic revolution. that is a talking point during the elections in lebanon is the secretary general of hezbollah said he was proud of that. so, of course, imagine if the elections it lebanon had

happened after all of this unrest in iran -- and i think that you would have seen, actually, a weakening of hezbollah's allies. in terms of communications, that is a victory for those opposed to iran in the region, not that they had anything to do with it, but in a way what was so embarrassing to them was this notion that the islamic republic and ahmadinejad had more legitimacy and more popular legitimacy than arab governments themselves. and right now a.c.hmeadinejad i shaky ground and they like that. the other thing, hezbollah and hamas are not going to suffer in the sense that the support, whether funnin 'n gfunding, tra weaponry is going to suffer. the revolutionary guard are the

ones that control that so they are not directly affected. in terms of positioning, in terms of talking to their own public in palestine and lebanon, in terms of ideology this is a set back. >> let me just say something, first of all, hamas and hezbollah are completely different entities as far as the iranians are concerned. and i would be very interested to know whether or not the kind of schisms that have developed side of iran and are blatant are being reproduced in hezbollah. because as many of you mow, the father of the hezbollah movement is a major mousavi supporter. the former interior minister. he is mrone of mr. mousavi's ma advisors so he has close links

to hezbollah. so, it would be interesting for somebody to examine whether this has reverberations there. >> i think you will find people minister comm more committed to the islamic revolution there than iran. in the sense, many of the hezbollah still romanticize this idea of the revelation. they don't have to go through it, so that makes it easier. but i think that you have a core. how large that core is i don't think it -- it is 20%, 30% of hezbollah, not the overwhelm in majority but you were mentioning the ayatollahs who were taking a principled stand against ahmadinejad, khamenei and so on. add to your list a major one in

lebanon who had very tense relations with khamenei over the years, doesn't accept it, doesn't want to precede him on t the domestic affairs. so, you had that dimension. the thing is, it won't have any tangible, direct political impact because events in lebanon are driven right now by other factors. but we are entering a new process, a new phase right now. we will see where it goes. >> i see a hand back here but i can't see much more than that. >> thank you. i wanted to come back to the question of what is going on in the u.s. right now we've a divestment bilk pushed by aipac and some are saying it is framed as

divestment from the oil and gas sector in iran and some are saying that passing this bill would be supportive of the green movement and mousavi's efforts. i wanted you to talk about what the political implications of something like this would be, what the economic implications are broadly for the iranian public and what the implications are for the parts that have an interest tin the oil and gas sector. >> i honestly believe that we have already put enough constraints on the oil and gas and any additional one would just reinforce what the chinese are doing and what the russians are doing. the russians -- i don't think we have to worry too much about the russians because they put up a good talk but they don't want to do it so they will pretend they want to. but the chinese are very interested and i think that as

time goes by if we isolate them completely they will completely shift to the east and we will wake up one day and we don't have any liberation, we don't have any capability. but if i may go back to the israel question, i really think the israelis are sitting there and watching like we all are. we don't know what is going to happen. we can speculate, but we can have an optimistic scenario, my optimistic scenario that an assembly of experts will get together and larijani will play a big role and they will have a council of leaders, they will reduce the power of the guardian council, and maybe ahmadinejad will stay and maybe he will not but it will shift gradually toward a real islamic republican and transfer and gradually go in

that direction. if that happens, i think that will be a very move. and i think that the israelis will be happy with it because it will put controls in place to make sure the nuclear generation is really nuclear generation. the question then really becomes why are we supporting hezbollah and hamas. in the election israel was really not an issue in iran. it is not an issue in iran. the pessimistic side, however, is that the revolutionary guards are in a much more powerful position than we think. that khamenei supported ahmadinejad because was afraid of the revolutionary guard. if that is the case we are moving toward a dictatorship and that is what was being insinuated and that is a dictatorship of thugs because the military is completely out. the past 72 hours there's been military maneuvers, the army had one, the navy had one.

the air force had one. i have no idea what that means. but the military is having some maneuvers. but the problem is the revolution that i remember guard is in the -- revolutionary guard is in the best seat but and if we go to a control by thugs that is very frightening. then i don't know what israel will do. so i think at this point israel is waiting because we don't know which direction we are going and i think we are at a cross roads. >> we are both at a cross roads and out of time. let me just underlane the fact that i think -- underla lanline fact that one of the themes of the presentation is how much we don't know and being in that situation policy makers are best advised to tacan collect as muc information and not take action. join me for thanking our speakers and thank you for all

attending. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> these places remind me of modern catholic derails that donors would build wings on hoping they would go to heaven. waurt kirn would like to see changes to the higher education system. >> princeton philosophy lectures should be on the web. these wonderful, concentrated islands of talent and wealth and eru erudition should be opened up to the society. >> the under education of an overachiever on q aa&a tonight

c-span. . and then from the detroit center of health-care issues, health care issues and what they mean toon