a result of the opposition's policy. >> mr. speaker, is the prime minister aware that some of the finest residential training for severely disabled people has been put in jeopardy by the decision this week of a learning and skills council not to fund the expansion of the national college of my constituency? would he agree to meet a delegation of some of the disabled students and some of the principles of the college and myself to discuss the unique situation of this college and discuss to see if there is a solution to this problem? >> i have to say that we have set aside 2.3 billion for investment in further education colleges over this spending review. we put an additional $300 million into that -- in the budget. i will -- i will ask -- this comes under expenditure on colleges and it needs money that would have to be provided by the

government. and i'm saying to the right honorable gentleman that i will get the college minister to meet with him about this but we have put 300 million pounds extra >> each week the house of commons is in session, we air prime minister's question. live on c-span2 and then again sunday nights on c-span. c-span.org, you can find a video archive of past prime ministers questions and links to the house of commons and prime ministers websites. >> tomorrow on "washington journal," david drucker looks at the congressional week ahead. helle dale discusses u.s.-russia relations and president obama's trip to russia.

henry waxman talks about his book about how congress really works. "washington journal," live at 7:00 eastern on c-span. >> president obama departs tonight for a weeklong overseas trip with stops in russia, italy, and donna. here is a look at some of the trips highlights. on monday and tuesday he will be in moscow and will meet with president medvedev and former president miguel carbajal. the president will be in italy from wednesday until friday for the g8 summit, which will clued meetings with the presidents of italy and china and the pope. ghana be the last of on his trip. check our web site, c-span.org for the latest on the president's trip and updates on c-span coverage of the president's stops. >> now, the former german of the

pakistan the joint chiefs of staff talks about -- former chairman talks about the country's military. this last about an hour and 20 minutes. >> good morning, ladies and gentlemen. on behalf of the president of the council, i would like to welcome all of you to are very special ambassadorial discussion today on the challenge of militancy for the pakistan army. we are delighted that we have here the former chief of army

staff as well as the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the palestine arnie -- palestine army. more interestingly, former ambassador of pakistan to the united states, a man who straddles the world of diplomacy and military with ease. he has now joined the rank of think tankers because he has his own research institute called spearhead in pakistan. just a few words about the general. he is a graduate of the pakistan military academy, but also a graduate of the command and staff college of pakistan, as well as the command and general staff college of fort leavenworth. general staff college at fort leavenworth. he has held many key posts in the pakistan military, apart

from his operational commands, at all levels, he was director general of military operations, and involved with a lot of very key issues dealing with india, during his tenure. then, he headed a corps and was then promoted, brought to army headquarters as the chief of general staff, and then, took over from general abdul wahid as the chief of army staff. to his credit, he is the only army chief in pakistan's history who actually resigned on a matter of principle, after having put forward his views on a number of issues, which did not sit well with the prime minister of the time, mr. navaz sharif and rather than doing what other army chiefs have done in the past, which was to effect a coup, he decided that it was

in the interests of the army, and pakistan, that he would resign. and there by, general musharaff was elected by prime minister sharif and the rest, as you know, is history. today, because of general karamat's special experience and because of his knowledge of u.s.-pakistan relations, as well as the fact that he has been based in pakistan and has been observing at close quarters, exactly what is going on within the policity of pakistan as well as the pakistan militancy, as it faces a huge insurgency inside its borders we are very fortunate to have him talk to us, about the kinds of changes that he sees within the polity as will as within the pakistan army, so, i would like to

welcome general karamat. >> thank you, for that very generous introduction. i'm very glad to be here. i'd like to start by thanking the generals for inviting me. and looking forward to our interaction today. i really don't have a script, so i'm just going to make a few opening remarks, speak for a few minutes. and, then, we can take this discussion wherever you want it to go. because there are so many things you may be interested in. about pakistan or the region in general. i mean, within -- with an audience like this, which is so well-informed on our region, and

international affairs, in general, i don't have to go into the details of what has brought us to where we are. so, what i will do, is just flag some events, just to give perspective, and to highlight the evolutionary process which has brought us to the situation we are in today. you know, of course, about the kashmir problem, with india. pakistan and india, it has been there for 60 years. and really, it is -- its impact is in the protracted nature of the situation that has gone on. and the various phases this has passed through, conflict, war, freedom struggle inside kashmir, support from outside kashmir of that freedom struggle, organizations coming up,

specifically, to support that struggle, then, pressures to seal borders, and -- end outside help and so on and i mention this, because all of this has an impact on what has come about now, because of the kashmir problem. and the fact that it hayes not been resolved today. on our other border, is afghanistan, which, again, has been through a pro transacted period of up -- protracted period of ups and downs and we need to understand, afghanistan, when it was a soviet satellite, its close relationship with india and, two or three intelligence agencies working together, there, the problems with pakistan at that time. then, the soviet invasion, of afghanistan, and what that set in motion, and how it attracted

a jihadi or an islamic fighter element into the region, into the area, and that whole process right up to the withdrawal of the soviet union, and, then, the civil war after that, the taliban mujahedeen in that area, al qaeda taking it over and turning it from a domestic to a regional and an international situation and it is relevant because that is what led up to 9/11, and the post-9/11 action, which, again, over the period of time has gone through various phases and has had different types of impact on the situation, leaving us with -- where we are today. then there were other events like the revolution in iran and i mention that only because the situation is still playing out in iran. there is the nuclear fear, also, there. but i mentioned the revolution in the context of its sort of --

the religious surge that it started, in the area, and which continued for a long time, and which at one period, in our history, was given a push through a process of islamization that pakistan was put through. i mention it only in that context. now, all of these events led to policies which, basically, either sought to secure pakistan, against a perceived threat, or led to policies which were really to take advantage of any opportunities that will be offered by the situation. and at that time, of course, there was an obsession with security. there was a securitycentric situation in the pakistan policymaking circles so that is

how we ended up with various kinds of policies, at various times in this whole evolving scenario. this whole process, of course, had a -- an effect on pakistan's domestic situation, it had an effect on the regional situation, on the extra-regional situation around us in the middle east. and, of course, it had enormous international implications, particularly after 9/11, when this u.s. came into afghanistan, and then into iraq. and i won't say any more about this, unless you want to discuss it later. but, this is the sort of development or evolutionary trend that has brought us to where we are today. and, now, i'd like to just

discuss that part, where we are today and what is happening. what started off as a counterterrorism venture against terrorism by pakistan after 9/11 is now basically an insurgency situation that pakistan is faced with, and it has to be seen from that point of view, that pakistan is actively responding to a full-blown insurgency, within its own borders, on the western border, with afghanistan. the thing that we have to, i think, remember, is that how this insurgency came about, we can discuss that, if you want to. but, the more important thing is that this process that i talk to, has brought on the ground in pakistan militant organizations,

some of them oriented towards the border with india, particularly kashmir, because that is where they have been operating in the past, until pakistan as a -- has a policy -- as a policy, brought that to an endnd and at various times ran into welfare activities, charity and worked on earthquake situations and so on but they are there. they are there. on the western side, again, it started with afghan, taliban seeking sanctuaries on the pakistan side, because, that is the only area, southern afghanistan situation could have expanded and there is no other place, ethnically, culturally, historically, geographically, it is the eastward expansion which would take place after the u.s.

started thrusting south and tanks -- attacking the taliban and that%@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ >> the retaliation led to the tribal of fatah areas where the sanctuaries where. that led to the insurgent movement within pakistan which is loosely operating on what it calls the [unintelligible] taliban pakistan. there is a leader there and 26 groupings of small and big organizations that informally or formally come under his influence and banner. the danger here is in the

present environment, that this insurgency along the western border has established linkages with the earlier organizations, deeper in the country, and we have seen that ever since we have been making a response to this insurgency, in the west, there have been suicide bombings, attacks, gun fights, taking place, in our urban areas. so, they have developed a retaliatory capability, linkage of sorts, which is dangerous for pakistan. and, i think, i might also mention, that from the taliban point of view, a great success would be if they could distract the army to its rear, by internally destabilizing the

situation or creating a situation on the india-pakistan border, or between india and pakistan. and, it is in that context that we should see the nonstate actors' role, especially in incidents like mumbai, which can take things back and create a situation which they can then exploit. so, this linkage then is a dangerous situation, for pakistan, and in recent months it has played out, with attacks in urban areas, on the sri lankan team, on the police academy, on an intelligence headquarters in lahore and so on and i will not go into the details, but we have seen the retaliation taking place, and it is an ongoing thing. now, as far as our response to the insurgency is concerned,

this came about after a lot of back-tracking and forward movement and so on. and, i think the swath of operations which went in, was the 15th military operation that pakistan undertook. and, the earlier 14 had all ended in some kind of peace agreement or agreement to end hostilities and every time there was a peace agreement, all 14 of them, on the government side it was pushed as a -- on the pakistan side it was pushed as a great event, an end to the problem, and, beginning of a new era, in the area in the south. unfortunately, on the other side, on the taliban side, the insurgent side, it wasn't seen -- these agreements were not seen quite in that light.

and, they used each opportunity to expand, spread terror, wyden their sphere of control, and, generally, consolidate themselves. and so when the peace agreement in swat was being negotiated, i think -- i don't speak for the government or the military, but, i think the idea was that for once we should see whether they stick to this agreement, do what they are saying and then we can take it from there. and, it didn't take long for them to throw off any cloak and come out with their intentions. which were very clear. refuse to lay down their arms which was part of the agreement. they declared that he rest of pakistan infidels. and denounced the constitution of pakistan. they started committing unspeakable atrocities which --

the videos are difficult to stomach, and generally created a situation where there was no option but to go in. fortunately, this time, because of the exposure that they got and what they came out with themselves, there was a change in public opinion, there was a change in the media. the political resolution came out, very strongly. so, the military operations which went into swat, and which is ongoing in other areas, had full backing of the media, the political institution across the board, the public opinion firmly behind it, and, except for an -- one or two odd people on the fringe, everybody is pushing for an end to this situation. i think the political and military aim of the operation is to side line the taliban as a

force which can ever challenge the writ of the government. and swat was chosen, because that is where the agreement was violated. and, that is where the expansion had taken place, also because it had started to threaten some vital park is it any communications in nigeria and it is not -- not just in swat, in fact, swat was the last in the -- the division... the division, those were the areas which were tackled first to create a situation of strangulation, and, then, finally, swat had to be cleared, physically, resulting in a large number of displaced persons who we hope will go back eventually. after this sort of northern extremity of the tribal areas has been tackled, the other

area, which was creating a threat, and which, again, was not a central area from the insurgent point of view, again on the periphery, this was a southern extremity of the federally administered tribal areas, where the taliban had created a really important thing by bombings and attacks in the areas of towns like karat and... particularly because there were a number of attacks there and that is the second phrase which the army went through and this time, they got the support of one of the major tribes in the area and was successful in the -- establishing themselves in the southern ex-extremity of fatah. that left the central area and the main area, waziristan, south and north waziristan which over the years has become a

stronghold of major -- a major enter for training activities of all sorts of taliban, of rigging vehicles and suicide bombers and so on. and, weapons and vehicles, takes place there and has commercial importance for the taliban, as their headquarters of the ddt, the umbrella organization i mention and this is the area which is now being tackled, and, here, again, the military has the support of the wa zero -- wazir which is a major tribe in the area and the one tribe which is isolated is themassoud tribe and it is a difficult area, that historically, has never been under anybody's control, but, this is a situation which the military has to go through, because, there is no option. and, i think, doing it -- they are duke it well and so, this is the sort of strategic

plan, the military had, and has, and the way it is operating. there is infrastructure there in the form of controlments, bases, airfields and dis used airfields from the british days and other facilities have been activated so it is not as if they are sitting on mountaintops and operating from there. they have got bases and lines of communication. they have -- there have been traverses, because it has been a learning process for the military and they have suffered casualties and swat alone, i think over 600 were killed. and, pakistani public, for the first time, is seeing in their homes, on television, daily funerals and conferenffins comik in their own area, in a fight, of basically, their own people but since they have chosen the insurgent part it is being

accepted, that the sacrifice will have to be made and as far as i could see, there has been no wavering of resolve in either the media, public opinion, political support for the military operation and so on. the other fallout has been the internally displaced people, who have come out of swat, sometimes you get exaggerated figures, but, the actual figure is also quite large, 2 million-plus, definitely. and almost 70 to 80% of the -- looking after of those people is being done by the military. and, enormous quantities of the military's resources and rations are being diverted, about 60, 70 tons a day, to their displaced people in that area. but, still, it is a problem, and it is a problem which will have to be resolved by sending them back. and very briefly, on the post situation, in the area, if we do

achieve the political and military objective, that the army is being -- has been given or has set for itself, then, i don't foresee a complete transformation of the area, into a peaceful one and there will be sporadic attacks and event taking place, but, i think those can be taken in our stride. the more important thing is that the military may have to stay for a considerable period of, as a trans -- transitional sort of administrative force in that area and it will have to articulate itself accordingly, because the old methodology of clearing and -- an area and getting out a punitive strike and handing over to the frontier corps and coming back is not going to work any more, because the situation has gone far beyond the capabilities of the frontier corps to handle and so the frontier corps will be part

of the military eventual articulation, which comes about for a more -- an area to secure and hold that area, until rehabilitation has taken place, and the area has been fully secured. and, a civil administration has come in with capacity to take care of the situation. which means police forces, and judicial element, health care and all of that. which, actually, has been missing in the past, always very weak and actually led to the insurgent -- it was one of the factors for the insurgent situation. now, with this kind of point at which we are, the other areas where we might have -- or do have similar situations, one is baluchistan. and, there is a lot of talk of baluchistan being a sort of a logistic area for afghan, taliban and so on.

and, action has been taken in that area, to -- from our point of view, the more troublesome aspect of the situation, is the sort of nascent, calling themselves the liberation movement in the baluchistan area. which may be getting external support and existing on that, the leaders are definitely outside baluchistan, who are operating. but, so far, it is low-key, and i think in my opinion, it is a matter which needs to be handled politically, and we have a political government there, federal, provincial, and the provincial government is entirely baluchistany themselves and should bring it satisfaction particularly to an end and some of the grievances with those people need to be addressed and have been festering for a long

time and southern punjab which i mentioned in the context of kashmir and the past activities there, has come up, on the... that area, as a sort of a stronghold of these militant organizations, who were formally operating in kashmir, or supporting the freedom struggle in various ways in kashmir. for the time being, it is quiet. and, again, with the political government, and with enough capacity, it can be tackled, and, there are -- it's not necessarily a military operation, that would clear that. but, there are other ways of doing it, which we could discuss, but i think, it is the -- a political solution, that they have to find to that problem.

there is a large pashtun population there who can control their labor on the dock. they controlled the transport, the mass transit, and there is the other ethnic group which is the government'. there is political capacity to handle the situation and it has been demonstrated a number of times that they are capable of handing it. to be fair to them, i think a lot of work has been done in karachi by the mqm and the person responsible has put in a lot of effort to recruit the situation. -- to improve the situation. the only other point i would like to touch is that while fighting this insurgency and while hoping for a political end to the other problems in pakistan, political stability

becomes extremely important. . he is elected. the government is elected. put together a good coalition, the sandwiches functioning. it is straightforward, leading to the restoration, since that has happened, it is another positive development and is in the process of performing itself. the leasing which perhaps needs attention now in terms of

political stability is the discussion between the opposition and ruling party on division of power between the president and parliament, issues which are wonderful. they are going towards discussion and at some point really old political consensus and stability in the country. the economic situation has been critical, it has improved marginally, not just because of a worldwide economic decision, but because i don't think that has -- it had an impact. it is more to do with the power sector in pakistan, and business activity, inflation, that is something else the government is trying to tackle, and to be fair to them, soon after elections,

they did inherit a massive sector of problems to develop capacity. the drawback is, when all this is happening, fighting insurgencies and political stability, governance is suffering. it is badly needed. as we move to another relationship, we get more and more of the military institute's strength behind the democratically elected government, we should see the government to improve. comedienne and public opinion have talked about so far, they're very supportive, very positive, i hope it stays that way, but whichever way you look at it, the insurgency is going to stretch out for some time.

the military, remaining involved, india, pakistan relations, so far, not moving forward. we are in for the long haul as far as stability and the environment is concerned. but we are well on the way, there is enormous support from the united states, not only the united states, but i think, even though it is a crisis situation, you create an opportunity for pakistan because the whole world is ready to have pakistan if it can get its own act together and come up with proposals and structures of how it is going to use that. i will stop. >> thank you. >> i can see if we can get some

questions going in. >> thank you. >> i want to make a request, when you're recognize, if you wouldn't mind waiting for the microphone and identifying yourself before asking your question. let's start here. >> the familiarity with the role chaplains play in the united states army and military, how would you compare them with spiritual support that is given to those in the pakistan army and military? are there any restrictions or controls on how spiritual and religious matters are dealt with in pakistan's army and military? >> yes, i am familiar with the excellent work with chaplains in terms of guidance and support. the pakistan military, we have

italians, a religious leader who leads, advises them, they go to him with their problems. a lot of things they are going to tell that person, maybe they don't talk about that to their commanding officers, so it has been an extremely useful institution and is a very useful institution in the military. the only other thing i will say is we have a strong, regimented system. the religious leader for generation. his father, grandfather and great-grandfather, it is true of many others. enormous respect, the troops

have confidence and are grateful. helping people. it has been an established institution for years and years. >> general karamat, you have a wonderful delivery, thank you so much for your painstakingly crafted, general overview which is so reassuring. unfortunately, many of us don't feel so reassured. you remind me of general jones, our national security adviser, a very good delivery. if i might ask a question about something that i think troubles of lot of us, at least i should say myself. the degree to which the courts are basically letting extremists

go free. the most recent examples of this have to do with the mosque. after what appears from an awful lot of internationally available information, a rather clear connection between him personally and the organization and the events in mumbai last year. in terms of dealing with extremism, can you talk to us about how the courts, how the legal system, how the law themselves may need to be adjusted and what would be the way forward with that, and if that is not possible, why? i should have introduced myself.

>> i know. >> you know me. united states institute of peace, rhonda jones. >> i am very flattered you are sitting through this second talk of mine. you are right, it has been a problem. let me put it this way. there is a problem with the whole prosecution system in pakistan and the way prosecution can put a case before the judge to get a conviction. that is a weakness that has been taken care of, but there are a lot of other capacity to be built up, a lot of law and order stuff which they show in that film. that has to come in before prosecution can build up a case in which the judge can take a judgment. that is one aspect of not only

this case but many other cases. in both of these cases, sophie mohamad has been out on bail, he has not been acquitted, as has the other person. the cases still stand. the evidence which is going around in indiana and pakistan on the mumbai event. in pakistan, from the initial position, has moved to a very corporate position that has brought off the exchange of information. i think these cases will go forward as more evidence comes in. everybody is learning a big lesson. we have had laws in the past which turned out to be draconian and so on. india has of lot of very harsh

laws. we haven't gone into those. if this weakness persists, you might have to have special offenses. >> i'm going to move around the audience. if i don't take you in the order in which you raised your hand, i hope you will excuse me. this will allow us to spread it a little bit. >> thank you very much. i am alex glicksman with asia consulting. the united states had a problem in how it was prosecuting the war in afghanistan, switch from one general officer to another. fortunately for the united states we also have not only a change in generals but an alternative capability in which we fought. we have special operations capability which is fairly extensive. my question in terms of

pakistan's prosecution of the work, is the current pakistan the army capable of switching tactics from its conventionalare army capable of switching tactics from its conventional focus to the servicing focus and does it have the capacity to change? >> there has been a lot of talk about the army's training and capability and orientation towards india and not being able to switch forces to the western border, difficulties and so on. i would like to tell you the chief of army staff, backed by his operational staff, can move forces anywhere in pakistan. he doesn't have to ask the government, he doesn't have to do anything. it has to do with his perception of where the threat is at the

moment and the force he needs to combat that threat and if any other instrument is taken care of before he takes away forces. that is a pretty established practice in this capacity to move rapidly when required. boston has been using aviation forces in that area. it has a very sizable capability in terms of special forces which were originally -- in the 1950s. in various environments, they are being used in the operations, so there was a gap which we learned the hard way,

has been taken care of. we have training support. many of us have trained in schools here. i don't think there is of problem of capacity. in fact, i don't >> i think it is capable of tackling everything if it puts its mind to it and orchestrates the capacity that it has to combat these threats. >> i am going to ask this person over here, please. >> general, thank you for your comments that were comprehensive and had refreshing clarity to them. my question really relates to outside support and assistance. as you well know, pakistan requires many billions of

dollars more in aid and economic assistance that is likely to flow from the outside world. there is a school, as you know in pakistan and developing here that perhaps u.s.a. should be very limited, pakistan needs to do this on its own, and the more involvement by the united states is negative. there is another school here that says we have to do more. how do you come out on that debate between providing pakistan the tools that it really needs for allowing pakistan to do it on its own? >> we have had this discussion with the united states for a long time. i think there's a strong lobber here, a stronger lobby here for support to pakistan than the other lobby of not supporting pakistan or limiting support to

pakistan. and right from what it says in the 9/11 commission onward, there has been there drive to build capacity in pakistan because it was seen and is being seen as the key to the problem in afghanistan. problem in pakistan. in afghanistan, the u.s. and nato and everybody is tackling the most difficult situation, which is southern afghanistan. part of the problem. the taliban, possibly after the surge or elections missed out exploiting areas where there is a softness or a weakness. this is taking place, what pakistan is doing in the tribal areas is extremely important at this point in time. at this point, holding back capacity or any other kind of

support, would become counterproductive. pakistan is capable of sitting across the table and discussing what is about money where it should be, and what monitoring should protect this, the u. s asking for specific requirements on the benefit of special programs that need to be put in place. there's a lot of working around huge concerns. the basic data that pakistan's capacity should be built up should not be in doubt. the process of going through -- i hope it goes through a beginning. there is no end to the demands, pakistan is seeing that it has suffered far more than it can,

it needs much more. the u.s. has also been very supportive in international institutions like the world bank and the donor conferences. a lot of things are in the pipeline. i hope they come through. >> thank you, excellent panel. my question was more -- >> please identify yourself. >> i am from the transnational crisis project. my question has to do with something you touched on earlier about areas of pakistan that can be dealt with politically. stern reports suggest the research we have done on the crisis project shows there are infiltrators from the taliban better shaving their beards off

and going into pakistan, how much that is research requires more truth. it is it viable to suggest that only a political solution can address the problem, particularly based on -- quite volatile for some years, and poses a larger threat? >> yes. could be happening. in fact, they don't have to shave their beards. there are plenty of beards in pakistan. they may be doing that. they would use every vulnerability, every opportunity offered. they have instituted process of checks in those areas, registration, there were some double registrations being taken care of. it will prevent, to the extent

possible, this happening, i don't discount the possibility of people sneaking in, they are our own people. that is -- you can't tell just by looking at somebody that he is a taliban. that is another problem. sometimes -- we came very close to resolving this issue, political, parliamentary committee, 29 points need to be addressed to resolve it politically. it got sidelined in these arrangements, took place after that. this indicated the government and the elections and so on. i didn't say -- is a pretty good solution, a pretty good solution in part because using the

military in your own area is not a good idea. in fact, the best urgency operation -- the best counterinsurgency operation starts when you anticipate that there is going to be an insurgency in a city, and not get in the middle of a full-blown insurgency when it is already in your face. that is the situation, if we can take care of it politically it will be great. >> we have a question here and one in the back. >> thank you. thank you very much for this broad picture, if i could bring you back to the general

presentation. you talked optimistically about the fact that you have legitimate government actions according to the rule of law, there is public opinion and popular support. the question is, this is complicated and long drawn affair. going back to something asked in the capabilities of the pakistan the military to conduct effectively counterinsurgency operations, you expressed optimism saying capabilities exist, were created a while ago. a year ago people in washington, the pakistan army -- counterinsurgency is too complicated. they don't know how to handle

it. it turned out to be quite different. the question remains as to the staying power that has given the enormous cost, the population that y mentioned. all of those things, long-term, i assume, based on what you said, you are confident that staying power will go forward for as long as it takes to defeat various areas of insurgency. it is difficult to predict, on the political will to go on, given the political, the cost involved. the last point is the drone attacks, in the u.s. extremely

politically contentious until not long ago. these things still go on, we don't hear much about them as a political, contentious point. is there a degree of coordination? are these things plodded together? you predict there will be more of these? how are they received regardless of the military impact in these drone attacks? >> those are good questions. to sustain these initiative -- i am glad you said the previous years and concerns, not only

fighting, delivering in terms of results. to sustain public opinion, medians support, it is going to be difficult. from pakistan's point of view, against two options, let this thing take its course, finish it. nobody wants a long, drawn-out struggle, all the things you mentioned. i will try to conclude as soon as possible. there are other factors. once they have all come, the

strength of the taliban, pushed them out, it is more a question of articulating commands and positioning troops in those areas for maximum effectiveness. there is basic infrastructure in the form of logistic basis, it is not as if you are out of everything. they should be able to stay, not looking at the course, for years and years, a massive problem. a transitional period, and a similar administration coming in for and effective governance, i don't know what the thinking is on the government side but i am not privy to that. i think there should be talk of the future, the federally administered tribal areas, the provincially administered tribal areas, the frontier regions, the

frontier circulation, the structure which the british created. it has been overtaken for events, somebody needs to think about an alternative to that which i hope will be done because it is the only way you will extricate out of this or it is going to be a problem. the other question on the drone attacks, the u.s. is very sensitive to criticism, very sensitive that public opinion is against pakistan and there's hostility to pakistan, hostility to the u.s. and so on. there is public opinion of all kinds in pakistan, there have been things happening against the drone attacks, but there hasn't been any real upheaval against the u.s..

nobody has jumped around on the streets war done things which you could say is a public outpouring of anger against the u.s.. that hasn't happened. there is a basic understanding of the problem that we face at the moment, the trip that we face, the orientation to us, sometimes the orientation on the ground, in terms of responses, takes place quickly, mindsets take a little longer to change. that may be the case in our relationship with india and our relationship with the u.s.. the realization that what needs to be done has to be done one way or the other.

>> general, i am paul hughes from the u.s. institute of peace. it was a wonderful overview of the strategic situation in pakistan. as you have indicated, the truth has been seen through the history these tend to fundamentally reshape societies. in the case of pakistan, there will be a need to requigeure national priorities, to the things you have mentioned, governs, rule of law and other things. if pakistan has a robust nuclear arsenal and program. reports are suggesting that there are two new nuclear reactors built by chinese

crackors that have no lengthsal grid connected to them, which suggests nuclear proliferation. do you think pakistan will reassess its role in the nuclear world and will continue to pursue new weapons, or is it satisfied with what it has now? will it take new steps to perhaps join the test ban treatsy family? your thoughts, please? >> i am here with this global zero growth. we are working to eliminate all nuclear weapons by 2030, global zero. i have been supporting that strongly, and everybody else in pakistan i guess should be supporting that, and everywhere else, too. south asia is a region, perhaps the only one, or one of the

very few where material production delivery system improvement is an ongoing process. pakistan on its part starting from its earlier proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone which are nobody even looked at has a lately pushed for a strategic restraint regime, and did so earlier. and has done so again on a bilateral basis with india to bring about a cessation of production and further testing and so on. india thinks, china and so on, so it becomes a trilateral process. even the trilateral process is being discussed on a track also i think. so there is work going on to

ending this situation from such an active ongoing thing to a more restrained thing. but as far as pakistan is concerned, it's add it into the nuclear field was in responders to the earlier 1974 test by india, and then pakistan didn't want to test 1998. our hand was forced. we tested. let me put it like that. pakistan is working on a strategy with india, and admittedly right now because of the mumbai, there's enormous momentum for resumption of dialogue. and some point in time in terms of restraint and so on.

as far as fmct, and other thing concerned, i think it legitimately this starts getting negotiated and as pakistan would have no objection. already very strongly conforming. maybe they connect them to the grid later. [laughter] >> do you have a question there? >> sir, thank you for your time. i am with the department of defense but my comments are my own. you actually printed one of my questions when you spoke about the future of the fatah and the conversation that needed to be had regarding that. i want to go back to questions that were asked by this gentleman earlier about the southern punjab and karachi, and really would you be willing to theorize what a political situation since there is an emphasis on the legal situation, in these areas would actually look like wax and so now we look at the newspaper and there's

talk about a new province in the southern punjab. is that what we are leaning toward or using other solutions to these problems? >> i haven't seen the daunting, but that has been on the table and people have talked about increasing the number of provinces for a long time. it hasn't really gone anywhere as far as a political institution is concerned. but i was hopeful, optimistic on the political thing because we have an elected government now and we have a government in baluchistan, which is a governor, minister, all the ministers of the luke. also we've had a similar arrangement in the past, but this time it looks more gerbil, more sustainable. and you also have a good fix on the grievances as the other side has in terms of job opportunities in terms of education and facility, in terms

of royalties for the gas which is being pumped from the province, infrastructure development. all those are on the table. and as that question was held, that you have to do a major reappropriation of. i think it's the biggest wakeup call a country can get going through a prolonged insurgency situation, which if left unchecked can resume some kind of class struggle situation or a major social upheaval in the country. so that's why i said it's very important for the political institution to start thinking long term about how they are going to ward off this threat in the future and take care of many of the weaknesses and problems which exist, which may give rise to those situations. and karachi is a big city. something could happen there.

baluchistan. other areas in which just need to be looked at, and political institution is the best prepared to do that. if the local government system is not working you have to improvement to deliver. if there were problems between the government system and the political perpetual government you have to take care of that problem, not live with that. maybe you could live with a lot of things in the past, sort of been them, do it later and so on. but now you are in a situation where you cannot bend the things that you cannot put off things, and you have got to start tackling them. >> general, i work for the institute for the saudi for. my question relates, sir, you have documented evidence that there are militants, use the

situation to either fund raise or build sympathies. and i you have the current situation of 2 million people are is the relief effort or is the army, are they aware of that and what is being done, is there a mechanism in place to control military organizations or even other problematic organizations doing the relief work? >> i heard that. i have had this question before and i know this is a concern. after the earthquake, we now need to go there and see what has been the result, who has done the rehabilitation. who is helping the people out, because the emergency which came in and all these organizations rushed to set up centers was actually a basic humanitarian effort. and in those organizations to

establish themselves as other than militant organizations. capable of humanitarian work, capable of many of them have done that and many have done good work because of the accessibility they had in those areas, the funds they had at their disposal and so on. but the bulk was taken by the civil military combination, u.s. helicopters, and those heavy, heavy lift helicopters which operate in those areas almost around-the-clock. so marginal efforts we are making, but within their capabilities. now with the idp's, again, i don't know if they are active or not. but as i said, i think the lieutenant general is handling the% of what needs to be done there. and enormous tonnage of food is then provided by the military and we have called asking a simple to take over, and they are doing their best.

but that's where we are. so i think it's a marginal issue. we should not get hung up on these things. >> we have a question here. >> thank you, general. i'm an intern here at the atlantic council. my focus is china. i'm just wondering if you could just comment on the status of pakistan and chinese relations. it is there a difference between a military relationship with china and civilian government, any thoughts. thank you. >> we've had a long relationship with china. it's been a military relationship in the sense that we have procured equipment from china in the past, and we have joint production of vital aircraft and main battle tank underway with chinese collaboration, in pakistan. we were i think on the civilian

side, china has been offered incentives and encouraged to comment on the economic side in pakistan. right now, they have come in not strongly but they have come in in the telecommunications sector. they have big telecommunications outfit working there. and they have come in on the development which has been joint massive project. there is some infrastructure project. and there is some mining and other projects. so the civil government and the military, both, have been pushing for greater collaboration with china. and the effort on the civil side has been to bring china more and more into the economic field. we haven't really had a problem with china, and minor issues lately, eti m. operating somewhere in the areas was taken

very seriously and settled with bilaterally between china and pakistan. in fact, i saw later subject, it's coming to capacity on the counterterrorism front in pakistan. so it's a good relationship that we have with china. >> if i may, ask a question, general. you talk about the fact that pakistan has the capacity, you said the government and the military has the capacity to deal with insurgency. brother obviously gaps in the equipment. and could you talk a bit about what pakistan needs and what is the prospect of getting the tools are that it needed from the united states? and if not from the united states, from some other sources. what are the possibilities? >> yes. the operations have been very

hard on aviation, particularly helicopters. we did not and do not have a large fleet of helicopters which can operate in those areas. and we have had to diverged aviation of other areas that we needed like operations of high-altitude and so on. also, with some of the helicopters, i won't mention the name or make, we have problem of the operation, certain time, conditions in that particular area. so the wrist, that's one feel we need support from the u.s. and i think there's agreement between the u.s. and pakistan that the mic of a team has performed particularly well and we should perhaps be in the market for that.

helicopter. we haven't already. we are operating them. the other are minor items like night vision capabilities, which are not enough. there is not enough to go around and troops have been exposed from that point of view. there is communication equipment, of course, on the other side because of the drug money available. the weapons they are using is the highest as a rocket nettled rené. and on our side of course we had the full great a weapons available, jets, f-16, whatever you want is available. but there are little gaps which need to be filled up and we are in constant communications with the united states to fill in those gaps. and there are democratic procedures you have to fight

through, and in the procurement difficulties and so on. everybody is working through that. and some requirements have been met. some perhaps still need to be met. >> thank you. a question in front. >> thank you for the presentation. i'm here from the rand corporation. my question, sir, you essentially have been a very competent at snapshot of pakistan, which it getting some insight of the economic situation and the military affairs and everything. one thing which constantly comes in the news and i just want to get your feedback, was about the water issues between india and pakistan, and in general south asia. if you can comment on that. >> it's a big issue, and it's an issue which is going to come up more and more. we've tried very hard to harness water resources within the country.

there have been political difficulties in doing that because prov@@@@@@@ @ @ @ @ @ one particular dam which has gone through feasibility, it seems it is best thing to do is not being approved across the board politically. so there is a problem, which if not tackled now -- it should have been tackled yesterday -- but if not tackled now can create a problem for the country. the other is the water problem with india. there is a treaty, world bank backed, which exists, which we have invoked from time to time whenever there has been, in our perception a violation by india. the methodology has worked well

in the sense that the world bank gets someone to inspect the site and tells everybody you are rights or wrong and to take corrective action. thing was i think this year or last year when they had, india had the dam project in kashmir. our objection was it was too much and needs to be reduced. i think the world bank agreed in the design has been modified to accommodate that. but that's one issue which has been result. or are going to be other issues with india. that's why i said that every time running to the world bank and going through this whole process of experts coming in examining, there needs to be bilateral dialogue with india and pakistan, which has been a difficult process, not only a bilateral dialogue, the composite dialogue that we had, but maybe a bad channel dialogue

also have sometimes helped very much in resolving these issues coming to terms. so you're right, it's going to be an issue in the future. >> we have experienced from across the border in india that counterinsurgency operations could last a long time. particularly when they are internal to a quiet country and you have 10 to 15 years sometimes, ap up to 25 years. is there a possibility that india and pakistani armies could begin talking to each other to learn from each other's experience? >> we are a long way from that yet. i think it's going to take a very long time, and the resolution of issues before we start in that kind of conversation. but you're right, india has insurgency problems in its northeast which have been there for years. at a particularly bad right now

in two or three states. and that's living with those problems and constantly fighting the situation there with resources, military, police and so on. that's why i said that the political and the military and the operations here should not be too into the taliban or finish it. that would be very ambitious. nobody has been able to do that and insurgent situations for a very long time. we still have to see what happens later, what happens. already you have long blast coming up. what happens in the settlement where it goes from there, reverts to civil war or what because there is an alienated population in afghanistan. and the thrust is lower than southern afghanistan so you have to see what the impact is.

but he is right that these things take a long time to resolve, even after the military operations are over and you have examples of malaya insurgency going for 15 years. and others which have gone for 10 or 12 years. but we already in the 60 year, so finish it. >> any other questions from the group? there's a follow-up. >> i should have asked three. i can ask at least two. can you just pinpoint or list us like three main cbs, like constant building measures from india and pakistan which we can take up to improve the relationship, the mistrusts which we have, you just mentioned, we can learn from each other militarily or economically is between the governments, what we can do.

only three major cbm's. >> i think one good one would be to demilitarize in the kashmir area. they are the two areas where the military's are actually deployed and in a state of readiness for actual conflict on the line of control and the light of contract. not only will that ease the situation there, bring in a factor of longer response times and getting to a conflict situation. i think that's one that should happen. the second one, again, could be a restraint regime which started building trust and reassurance between the two and perhaps the spirit of creating no diplomatic zones closer to the border.

other things like that, which could be worked out and perhaps extending into the nuclear field, other fields. and the third, i think, a good thing would be sort of political interaction between the two countries. it has not been there to the extent that it should be there. when you have visiting and so on, proper political interaction between the two countries, we could learn from india. they have more experience of coalition politics. we are just entering that phase. and it will build up trust. >> i think that would be a good, hopeful point at which for me to >> as i promised you at the beginning of today's gathering, with a guest like him, who easily moves between military, political, economic and social

commentary, and now of course as part of the think tank community, i didn't think we expected anything less than what we got today. so on behalf of the atlantic council, i would like to thank all of you for coming and especially thank general karamat for an exciting and stimulating discussion today. thank you. >> thank you. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

>> tomorrow, a look at moscow summit between president obama and the russian president medvedev, including nuclear defense and darmment. that is tomorrow starting at 1:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. tomorrow, a review of the supreme court's term from lawyers who argued some of the more high profile cases, including the firefighters reverse discrimination case. legal times hosts it live on c-span. at 3:30 eastern. >> and now a review of the supreme court's term hosted by the washington legal foundation. speakers include former attorney general dick thornberg and waltzer delinger. that lasts about an hour and a half. >> good morning and welcome to the legal foundation's annual

supreme court briefing. i am chief counsel of the legal studies digs. we are coming to you line. we want to welcome all of you who have joined us on line and in person as well. the foundation has been around for 32 years. we are a public interest law and policy center which started as a litigating group and has been branched out into being an organization that public she is in seven formats, communities to the public and press, and puts on programs such as these and web seminars as well. we filed 24 briefs in this tern, lost seven, won five and drew on seven of them. we have three that are still waiting to be determined in the next term. we are pleased to have with us today as our moderator, as we almost always do for this

program, it is honorable dick thornberg, who is legal policy advisory board chairman. >> thank you. good morning to you all. welcome once again to our annual gab fest on the supreme court term. as the washington legal foundation, we will obviously be focusing on cases affecting the free end price system, but there are -- enterprise system, but there are others of note, and some observations will be forecoming on the nomination of judge sotomayor to the court which is pending. peter dunn, the mythical bartender philosopher who created mr. dooly once observed that the supreme court follows the election returns. we know that is not literally true of course, but we did have an election last year, and it will certainly affect the

court. most notably, president obama is the appointing authority for vacancies over the next four years, and we can imagine a quite different scenario for appointments if john mccain would have been the president. but then again perhaps justice souter might not have resigned, and but, but, but, but, there are a lot of things there. in any event, the court yesterday completed its october 2008 term, and we recruited the usual all-star lineup to share their views on its activity. to assess some 5-4 decisions, to read some tea leaves and make sense out of this year's varied crop of decisions. i will introduce. participants in the order in which they will speck and then turn them loose. to my left, tom goldstein.

he is responsible for the popular and widely regarded s codus plug. to my left. walter melinger. he frequently appears before the court in his capacity as a private lawyer now. and finally on my far right, dan. spent five years as assistant to the solos tor general, was a former clerk to a judge of the fourth circuit. we will invite each of our speakers to share 20 minutes or so of their comments on court decisions. >> so with that introduction,

wile turn to our first speaker. tom? >> thank you so much. it is always a tremendous pleasure when i get invited to come and talk at the washington legal foundation, particularly in the term wrap-up. it is impossible really to overstate the significance of the foundation and its role at the court institution eel as a body commited -- institutionally as a body committed. more than a dozen merits cases, support for a large number of sur petitions, and almost unparalleled. the chamber of commerce has a heavy level of participation, but the legal foundation is focused on one legal principal that runs through a lot of the supreme court's docket. knowing the many folks who are

watching the program on the web and through c-span, it is tremendous to get to talk to you in this forum. i have three things to talk about. the first is the term by the numbers, the sort of statistical analysis of the term and what it tells us. the second is what i think directionally is going on. what we see about what the supreme court is up to and what i call a injures prudence of not originalism or tech tour lism. and then i want to talk about a couple of cases about what otherwise might seem like dull points of procedure, maybe what the anti-trust law means, which is particularly important. but the kind of more dull-sounding stuff like when it is you have put enough