if you are in poverty, you are eligible for medicaid. we are not going to make subsidies for undocumented aliens. a lot of people feel that they are here illegally, and therefore, they should not be subsidized. there are people here illegally that do have private insurance that they pay for. they will continue to buy private insurance. we do not check to see whether you are legal or not if you're buying a product. we will not subsidize anybody. we will not let them go on medicaid. we do allow people, if there is an auto accident or an emergency, to go to a hospital. we allow any human being to go to the hospital to get medical care. that is one of the reasons we have to continue the extra payment to public hospitals. those are the disproportionate

share hospitals. they take a disproportionate share of uninsured people. they should get an extra subsidy not to have to pass on the full cost to people who do have insurance. that is the way people who are illegal get health care. but they have to be genuinely in need of emergency care. not just show up in an emergency room and just have some medical care given to them. there has to be a genuine emergency. but we will not be subsidizing insurance, nor making people eligible for insurance under medicaid if they are here illegally and undocumented. host: congressman henry waxman, the book is "the waxman report: how congress really works." thank you for joining us. guest: i hope you will read this and get a different insight and point of view about congress. i think there are a lot of good stories and hear about how we were able to get legislation through, almost in all cases on

a bipartisan basis, and >> on tomorrow morning's washington journal, turner. also, the former appointing authority to military commissions regarding the trials of detainees. and a mayor in pennsylvania on his testimony before a senate committee on clean energy. a russian professor on the the president's trip to moscow. "washington journal" begins a 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. we will have a hearing on reducing greenhouse gas pollution. they will hear from the agriculture and interior

department, as well as the head of the epa. barbara boxer will chair the meeting beginning at 10:00 a.m. eastern live on c-span. you are watching c-span, created as a public service by the nation ' s cable companies. here is a look at our schedule. up next, president obama and president medvedev at a joint press conference in moscow. that is a look at topics to be discussed with russian leaders this week. later, senator-elect al franken. >> how is c-span funded? >> the u.s. government. >> i do not know. some of it is government raised. >> it is not public funding.

>> i want to say from me. from my tax dollars. >> how is c-span funded? 30 years ago, cable companies created c-span as a public service. no government mandate, no public money. >> president obama and president medvedev signed a preliminary agreement to reduce nuclear stockpiles in the u.s. and russia. other topics were at the war in afghanistan and missile defense.

>> the ceremony of signing a joint documents is about to start. >> the chief of the joint staff of the armed forces of russia and on the u.s. side -- the

chairman of the joint staff of the united states army, and that is the admiral will sign the frame work documented on the cooperation between the armed services. of the united states of america and the adoption of working plans on cooperation between the armed forces of the russian federation.

[applause]

>> the minister of foreign affairs of the russian federation, a senior deputy secretary of the united states, william burns are signing an agreement between the government of the russian federation and the government of the united states of america on the transit of weapons, material, military property, and military personnel through the territory of the russian federation concerning the participation of the united states of america in efforts to have restoration of

the islamic republic of afghanistan. >> also, and notes have been exchanged by the russian, u.s. commission on those missing in action, prisoners of war, and the memorandum has been signed.

>> the president of the russian federation and the president of the united states of america are signing a joint memorandum of understanding regarding the continued production in offensive weapons. during the visit by the u.s.

president, a joint communique between the russian president and the net that states of america regarding issues has been signed in a joint communique between presidents on cooperation in the nuclear area in a joint statement by the depression of the russian federation and the president of the united states of america on afghanistan as well as a presidential plan of action. a decision has been made to sit at the u.s., russian commission on development and cooperation.

>> dear ladies and gentlemen, a distinguished members of the press, colleagues, we have just completed our negotiations, myself and the president of the united states. the first visit by the u.s. president barack obama to russia. it has been a very busy visit. he demonstrated that you were able to touch upon all of the items on our agenda. our agenda was quite large. i would like to say from the

very beginning that what happened was very useful and a very open, a business-like conversation. this has been the kind of summit that this country had high expectations for and the united states of america was expecting. a summit that the futures of both of our countries depends on and the prospects of global development depend on as well. i would like to emphasize some things. the first day of our negotiations and our personal meeting on a personal level and our enhanced meetings with a lot of participants were sincere and open. that is important. we have agreed to continue to communicate in this kind of rain. it is important for our relationship and it has been somewhat difficult for our

relationship. there are a number of issues that have accumulated over the last few years have been impressive. we were able to both have mutual results and a desire, and given the principal positions that we adhere to and continue to adhere to, to make sure that such issues are discussed in a constructive and business-like manner. i would like to emphasize that each of our countries understand its own role in its own way, and appreciate its role in the entire world, especially at a period of time when the level of globalization has breached parameters and scale and scope where decisions that we meet affect many nations

pretty powerful nation such as the net states and the russian federation, they are responsible for everything that is happening on our planet. .

unless our relationship progresses dynamically on the issues of the agenda, cultural, relations, unless our relationship continues to progress dynamically, we will not be able to build a highway into the 21st century. we have spent quite a few hours in a very specific way, talking about various issues. we were also philosophical at times and i am grateful to my colleague for understanding the principles that we are setting forth, and accordingly, we are paying attention to the proposals laid down by our u.s. counterparts.

we have agreed that we are going to continue unabated. we will keep moving and make decisions that are going to take for our relationship to continue to progress. we have discussed very specific matters and i would like to share some of them with you. obviously, we have covered international affairs and relations. we have such a conference issues like the middle east. we have agreed to keep working together, given the plans that we have discussed in anticipation of a number of that market events. we also discussed the possibility of holding in moscow -- a moscow-based conference. we have covered a very important subject. one or core mission of our actions is extremely important. i am referring to afghanistan. in absence of joint efforts in

this area, it is in my view that successes will be achieved in this area. that explains why we have agreed upon a joint statement. also, relations in the research and scientific and humanitarian areas is also important. these things have to be done. with determination, we will be working on these areas. some of the specific results of our negotiations, we have agreed on most important item, the new agreement on the strategic defense weapons, which is the basic fundamental element to our shared security. the work has been quite intense. our teams, our delegations have worked in a very productive way in this area.

they have achieved a reasonable compromise solutions and we'd like to thank everyone that has participated. we have both achieved a joint understanding of how we need to keep going and where we need to keep going in the future, but also we have reached the basic levels at which we will promote operations in these areas. we have agreed on the threshold for both warheads and delivery vehicles on the setting that this is a very strategic issue in the sense that the statement that we just signed with my colleague. it says that our countries can have between 511 hundred delivery vehicles -- 500 and 1100 delivery vehicles. we are hoping to achieve the

final agreement which will be incorporated into the new document come into the new treaty. we have also agreed that the offensive and defensive capabilities of both countries should be viewed upon to gather. we have passed a joint statement on anti-missile defenses, which is also an important document. we were able to come up with a joint document that has been approved. we have discussed nuclear corporation and the most important thing we will continue cooperation in all of the areas. we have signed a statement on the military transit to afghanistan. we have decided to set up a presidential commission on

cooperation, which will coordinate the relationships between various government agencies of the russian federation and the united states of america and all high priority areas, including the area of the economy and the military. as far as military, the respective heads of general chiefs of staff's will be engaging in that soon. all of these documents will be published and we will be able to familiarize ourselves with them. there have also been compositions that have taken place today. my view in all of this is that of a first step and an extremely important step in terms of reinvigorating false scare cooperation between our countries were the beneficiaries will be both of our countries.

in conclusion, i would like to specifically emphasized that my country would like to achieve a level of cooperation with the united states that will be truly worthy of the 21st century, that will insure its national peace and stability. it is something that is in our interest and we are thankful to our u.s. colleagues for the work that we have been able to jointly perform. a great deal of solutions to many global issues depend on joint leadership of the russian federation and the united states of america. thank you for listening. [applause] >> good afternoon. i want to thank president medevac of and the russian people for their hospitality. michelle and our children are pleased to be here in moscow.

we have just concluded a very productive meeting. the president and i agree that the relationship between russia and the united states has suffered from a sense of drift. we resolved to reset u.s.- russia relationship we can cooperate more effectively in areas of common interest. today, after less than six months of collaboration, we have done exactly that by taking concrete steps forward on a range of issues while paving the way for more progress in the future. i think it is notable that we have addressed the top priorities, not second-tier issues. they are fundamental to the security and prosperity of both countries. first, we have taken important steps forward to increase nuclear security and stop the spread of nuclear weapons. this starts with a reduction of our own nuclear arsenals as the

world's two leading nuclear powers, the united states and russia must lead by example. that is what we are doing here today. we have signed a joint understanding for a tree before the start agreement that will reduce our nuclear warheads and delivery systems by up to one- third by our current treaty limitations. this legally binding treaty will be completed this year. we have also agreed on a joint statement on nuclear security cooperation that will help us achieve the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. the progress that we can build upon later this week at the g-8 summit. these are important steps forward. as we keep our commitments, so west -- so must we ensure that others keep theirs. we have discussed north korea and iraq. north korea has abandoned its own commitments and violated

international law, which is why i am pleased that russia joined us in passing a resolution that calls for strong steps to block north korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. iran also poses a serious challenge through its failure to live up to international obligations. this is not just a problem for the united states. it raises the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the middle east which would endanger global security while iran's ballistic missile program can also pose a threat to the broader region. that is why i am pleased we agreed on a joint statement on missile defense and a joint threat assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century, including those posed by iran and north korea. we have taken important steps forward to strengthen our security to greater cooperation. on the need to combat violent extremism, particularly from al- qaeda.

it would have signed an agreement that will allow the transit of lethal military equipment through russia to afghanistan. this is a substantial contribution by russia to our international effort and will save the united states time and resources in giving our troops the support that they need. thanks to the admiral and his russian counterpart, we have agreed to resume military to military cooperation between the united states and russia, providing a framework for improved cooperation and interoperable at the between our armed forces so we can address the threats that we face from terrorism to privacy. we have agreed to restore a joint commission on prisoners of war and missing in action, which will allow our governments to cooperate in our commitment to our missing servicemen and women. third, we've taken important steps forward to broaden our cooperation on a full range of issues.

president medvedev and i are creating a u.s.-russian and bilateral present to a commission to serve as a new foundation for this cooperation. too often, the united states and russia only communicate on a old habits stand in the way of progress. that is why this commission will include working groups on development, the economy, energy, nuclear energy insecurity, arms control, international security, defense, foreign policy, counterterrorism, preventing in handling emergencies, civil society, science and technology, state, health, education, culture. it will be courted by secretary clinton who will travel to russia this fall to carry this effort forward. to give you one example of this cooperation, the new memorandum of understanding on health. we have learned that most recently with the h1n1 virus

that a disease that emerges anywhere can pose a risk to people everywhere. that is why our department of health and human services will cooperate with its russian counterparts to combat infectious, chronic, and non communicable diseases while promoting health. russia has taken the importance that of lifting restrictions on imports of u.s. livestock. the cost of these restrictions is over $1.3 billion and we have now made important progress to restore that commerce. i will pretend that the united states and russia agree on every issue. we have had some frank discussions in other areas where we still disagree. we had a frank discussion on georgia and i reiterated my firm belief that georgia's sovereignty must be respected. even as we work through our disagreements on the borders, we do agree that no one has an

interest in renewed military conflict. we must speak candidly to resolve these differences peacefully and constructively. president medvedev and i are committed to leaving behind the suspicion and the rivalry of the past so we can advance the interests that we hold in common. today, we have made meaningful progress in demonstrating what a more constructive u.s.-russia relationship can look like in the 21st century. tomorrow, i look forward to broadening this effort to include business, civil society, and the dialogue among the american and russian people. i believe that all of us have an interest in forging a future in which the united states and russia partner affectively on the behalf of our security and prosperity. that is the purpose of resetting our relations and once again want to thank president medvedev and his entire team for being such wonderful hosts and working so effectively with ours. thank you.

>> now the joint press conference of the u.s. and russian president is about to begin. two questions from each side are to be asked. please make sure you introduced yourself and indicate whom you are asking the question. >> thank you and good evening to both presidents. i would like to ask you about the issue of trust. having spent time with president medvedev, do you feel like you have full trust in him and have you settled in your mind who really is in charge here in russia, the president or prime minister putin? president medvedev, polling shows that the american people

have some -- i am sorry, that the russian people have some hard feelings about america. i am wondering what you think that president obama can do to try to change this. >> well, first of all, this is now my second lengthy bilateral meeting with president medvedev and we have also had a series of telephone calls and other exchanges. throughout our interactions, i found him to be straightforward, professional, he is clear about the interests of the russian people, but he is also interested in finding out what the interest of the united states are. we have found, i think, an ability to work together extremely effectively. yes, i trust president medvedev

to not only listen and to negotiate constructively but also to follow through on the agreements that have been contained here today. i am very appreciative not only with the manner that he has dealt with me but the manner in which our teams have worked together. it if you think about the strong framework of time that we have met together and the fact that we accomplished all of the goals that we have set in london -- that we had set in london. these are not in substantial agreement. i think it is a good sign of progress in the future. tomorrow, i will be having breakfast with prime minister putin. i am looking forward to that meeting. president medvedev is the president and prime minister putin is the prime minister. they allocate power in

accordance with the form of government in the same way we allocate power in the united states. so, my interest is in dealing directly with my counterpart, the president, but also to reach out to prime minister putin and all other influential sectors in russian society so that i can get a full picture of the needs of the russian people and the concerns of the russian people. my strong impression is that president medvedev and prime minister putin are working very affectively together. our interest is dealing with the russian government as a whole in order to achieve the improved bilateral relationship that i think can be accomplished.

>> first of all, i would like to thank president obama for the words that he has just said regarding the spirit and degree of openness that exists between the two of us. i have once talked about it. i am happy to talk about it again. it the personal relationship is not the most important but in the absence of one, we cannot build normal interstate relationships. it is great when both a personal relationship and the interstate relationships are harmonious. i am hoping that my colleague, president obama, and myself will continue in this similar vein. as far as the russian sentiments regarding americans, that is a normal feeling of friendship. it is a different situation that when the political relationship is cooling off and problems arise between the two

nations, obviously, it impacts the respective people that are watching and following the political process. this is something that is unavoidable. the better the relationship is between the two nations, the better the neutral feelings between the nations towards the other will be. we are cognizant and aware of beautiful. the time when our country's work together and solved very, very complex issues, issues involving the restoration of peace globally. i am referring to the post-world war two era. we also had a complicated periods in our relationship at times that were dramatic. there is the awareness of the great deal that depends on our relationship. depending on how far we are able to move forward, how successful we will be in making our relationship more adequate

in regard to the current situation, and the degree in which to impact of global world, so to speak, that the attitudes of our nations toward one another depends as well given the fact that people have always felt sympathy and like the other people his darkly. -- and like the other people historically. >> 95% of the global nuclear arsenal is accounted for by these two nations. the frame work of the agreement of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been in existence for decades since the 1970's. it will our countries be able to maintain the situation regarding non proliferation under control especially given the fact the situation has deteriorated recently and the nuclear threat has been

proliferating world wide? >> the non-proliferation issue is the most important issue for our nation's because the united states and russia have the bulk of responsibility in this area. the bulk of the nuclear potential and we are not shying away from our responsibilities. unfortunately, it is difficult for me to disagree with you. the situation globally has been changing for the worse, not for the better, and that has to do with the emergence of new nuclear players. many of whom have not applied for membership in the nuclear club. the dream of doing it and doing it openly or preparing for its secretly. this is not making an improvement in the global situation for obvious and clear reasons.

there are regions in the world where the mere presence of nuclear weapons is capable of creating colossal problems. it is on these avenues that we must work as closely as possible with our american partners. these regions are known. there is no point in pointing them out. it is clear to everybody that depending on the situation in the middle east, the korean peninsula, the overall climate and the overall situation on this planet depends on. it is our shared responsibility that this is something we have to do extremely thoroughly. the russian federation is prepared to do that. based on our conversation today, based on negotiations with president obama, the u.s. seems to want to be engaged in the effort as well. >> i think president medvedev said it well.

this is an urgent issue. it is one in which the united states and russia have to take leadership. it is very difficult for us to exert that leadership unless we are showing ourselves willing to deal with our own nuclear way, and that is why this agreement is so important. i am hopeful that we can reduce our nuclear arsenals by as much as one-third and hopefully can move even beyond that in subsequent agreements and treaties. the critical issue that president medvedev identified is the fact that we are seeing a pace of potential proliferation that we have not seen in quite some time. he mentioned two specific areas.

in the middle east, there is deep concern about iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities, not simply because of one country wanting nuclear-weapons, but the fact that if iran obtained nuclear- weapons, it is almost certain that other countries in the region would then decide to pursue their own programs. we would then see a nuclear arms race in perhaps the most volatile part of the world. in the korean peninsula, we have already seen in north korea flout its own commitments in pursuit of nuclear weapons. in all of these cases, as you see more proliferation of nuclear weapons, the possibility is not only of state actors targeting populations with nuclear weapons, but the

possibility that those nuclear weapons could fall in the hands of non-state actors, extremist organizations, poses an extreme threat to both russia and the united states. i am pleased on the progress that we have made so far. i think the fact that we have a joint threat assessment in terms of what ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear- weapons could pose to our country's, that we will be conducting a review on that and making assessments to find ways that the unit states and russia can cooperate more effectively, that is going to be very important. pursuing the cooperation that already exists between russia and the u.s. on loose nuclear materials and making sure those are secure, i think that will be very important. structuring a new, reinvigorated, a tree that applies a set of rules to all countries, allows them to

pursue peace for -- peaceful nuclear energy without having to weapon is that nuclear capacity will be very important. we have actually suggested a global summit that we intend to host next year. i discussed with president medvedev the strong possibility that in a subsequent summit, it could be hosted by russia, where we bring all the countries together around the world to start making progress on this critical issue. >> deep divisions over a proposed missile shield have contributed greatly to the deterioration of u.s.-russia relations in the years and it

does not seem that you gentlemen have finally resolve that issue either. president obama, you have said very clearly that you would not accept a linkage between the missile systems and arms control talks. president medvedev, are either of you gentlemen willing to budge on this issue? will this contribute to a blockage or obstacle to reaching a final start agreement? president obama, i was wondering if you could give a reaction on the chinese crackdown on the northwest of the country on writing that has killed more than 140 people? >> with respect to the china situation, unfortunately, i have been traveling all night so i have not been fully briefed and i don't want to comment until i see all of the information.

i assure you that our team will get a statement to you as soon as i have been able to do that. on missile defense, we have agreed that we are going to continue to discuss this critical issue. that is part of the joint statement that we have signed. i also believe that it is entirely legitimate for our discussions to talk not only about offensive weapons systems but defensive weapons systems. part of what got us through the cold war was a sufficient sense of parody and determined capability that both sides during those very difficult times understood that a first strike, the attempt to use

nuclear weapons in the military conflict against the other, could result in an extremely heavy price. so, any discussion of nuclear strategy kerry has to include defensive and offensive capabilities. -- of nuclear strategy capability has to include defensive and offensive. we must deal with the possibility of a missile coming in from iran, north career, or some other state, and that it is important for the united states and its allies to have the capacity to prevent such a strike.

there is no scenario from our perspective in which this missile defense system would provide any protection against a mighty russian arsenal. in that sense, we have not thought that it is appropriate to link discussions of a missile defense system designed to deal with an entirely different thread unrelated to the kinds of robust abilities that russia possesses. having said that, president medvedev has been very clear that this is a point of deep concern and sensitivity to the russian government. i suspect that when i speak with prime minister putin tomorrow, he will say the same thing. what we would like to do is to

work with russia to advance a system that insures that a stray missile, whether it was one or 10, or a handful of missiles coming from a third source, that we have the capabilities to prevent those from doing damage. i think we can arrive at those kinds of understandings, but it is going to take some hard work because it requires breaking down longstanding suspicions. with respect to this particular configuration that was proposed several years ago, as you know, we are undergoing a thorough review of whether it works or not, what has been proposed. that review should be completed by the end of the summer. as soon as that review is complete, we will provide the russian government our assessment of how we think we

should proceed, and that will be the subjects of extensive negotiations. so, alternately, i think the more progress we make -- ultimately, i think the more progress we make on non- proliferation, being able to track ballistic missiles coming from other sources, to the extent that we are building deeper cooperation on those fronts, i think the more effectively we are going to be able to resolve this issue. i believe that over time, we will end up seeing that the u.s.-russian positions on these issues can be reconciled and that we have a mutual interest in protecting both of our populations from the kinds of dangers that weapons proliferations is posing to date.

>> i will just add a couple of words on this subject. of course, anti-missile defenses and to be more specific and accurate, not the anti- missile defenses itself, but a third position area is a fairly complicated item for our discussion. i would like to call your attention to what president obama has just mentioned and subbing also that i would like to note. our joint understanding refers to the linkage between offensive and defensive weapons. this itself is a step forward. only relatively recently, all we had was just differences on this matter. now, this linkage has been stated and now there is an opportunity to start bringing relationships closer to one another. nobody says that anti-missile

defenses are harmful in itself or create a threat. it is designed to tackle a number of practical objectives. the question is whether or not certain configurations of anti- missile defenses can be synchronized with the interests of other countries. i would like to note that our u.s. counterparts, unlike what has taken place over the last few years, have called a timeout and are now investigating and researching the situation in which they will formulate their final position. at the very least, this is a step forward in terms of approaching and achieving a solution on this complicated matter. what we heard until then is that all of the decisions have been made. they do not concern you and do not create a threat for you. our position is somewhat different. here are very aware of it.

what our position is is that these decisions affect us. this is somewhere where we will probably have to reach an agreement on. we understand that in terms of threats coming from medium- range missiles and ballistic missiles, those threats are not diminishing. they are increasing. we together have to think about what configuration a defense system can accept. this is something that during our meeting with a few participants, i told my colleague about. >> just one more question. >> this is a question for both presidents. a lot has been said about the concern regarding the situation in afghanistan. could you be somewhat more specific on this area? what do both presidents think about the situation there, which what we understand it is quite complicated?

in what way can russian-u.s. corporation in both transit and relation areas be helpful and overcome the situation? >> the subject of cooperation in the area is very important which is why we have spent so much time adjusting this issue during our negotiations and which is why an agreement has just been signed regarding transit. this is it an important area and we will definitely cooperation with our american partners. as far as the current situation, the situation at hand, indeed, it is not a simple situation. in many areas, progress is either to femoral or there is no progress. we do appreciate efforts being made by the united states of

america and other nations towards preventing the terrorist threat which has emanated and continues to emanate from african soil. in this regard, we are prepared to engage in a full-scale cooperation with both our american counterparts, including in the area of transit. we are prepared to provide assistance in all kinds of directions and on all kinds of enemies. i don't know how quickly it will be possible to change the situation. to a large extent, it depends on how quickly the political system in afghanistan evolves and how successful the economic development and the policy will be. but there again, the situation is not easy and we will continue to work with our partners. recently, i had a meeting with the president of afghanistan and pakistan because both of these

problems have to be looked at and solved to get there. if we are able to focus our efforts in the economic area and in terms of giving support to the counter terrorist operations, success will be hours sooner or later. at the end of the day, success african state is and how ready the society is for change. >> as you may be aware, as soon as i came into office, we undertook a thorough review of our afghan strategy to that point. in consultation with not only our nato allies, but all of the forces internationally that have to tear it to the efforts. we concluded that we have not made as much progress that we should have given the direction in which we have been in afghanistan, and that we can

improve it. so, our approach has been to say that we need to have a strong security system in place for the afghan elections to be completed. we have to train afghan nationals for the army and police said they can effectively secure their own country. we have to combine that with more effective diplomatic efforts, and we have to focus on development. for example, the people of afghanistan don't have to grow poppy but have other crops and goods that they can have a living with. i think it is too early to gauge its success so far. i think by the time we have

completed the next election, and either the president or another candid it has taken his seat, we will be able to i think do an additional review and see what other efforts we can take in order to approve -- in order to improve the situation. i can tell you that russia's participation in contributions to this effort could be extraordinarily important. obviously, russia has its own concerns about extremism and terrorism. russia also has deep concerns about the drug trade and its infiltration into russia. russia has extraordinary -- russia has extraordinary capabilities in training police forces, armies, so our hope is that as part of a broader presidential commission structure that we put in place

discuss both the military efforts in afghanistan but also the development efforts and the diplomatic efforts so we can make progress. president medvedev is right, that this is important for afghanistan and also important with respect to pakistan. we are going to have to think regionally in terms of how we approach these problems. there are countries along the border of afghanistan and in central asia that are very important strategically. i just want to thank again the russian government for the agreement for military transit that will save u.s. troops, both time and money. it is i think a gesture that indicates the degree to which, in the future, russian-u.s. cooperation can be extraordinarily important in

solving a whole host of these very important international issues. thank you very much, everybody. >> thank you. see you again. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] >> here is a look at the tomorrow. in the morning, he will meet with prime minister putin for breakfast and visit with former president gorbachev. later, he is expected to speak at the new economic school and meet with business leaders. on wednesday, president obama

travels to italy for the g-8 summit. he is expected to meet with the italian president and the pope. he wraps up his trip on saturday when he flies to africa for a visit to the capital of donna. check our website for the latest on the president's trip, including c-span coverage of the vents along the way. -- of events along the way. more on his trip to moscow coming up next, with a look of issues to be discussed between president obama and leaders. that is followed by remarks from senator elect al franken. >> later, an update from the situation in honduras from the state department briefing.

>> tomorrow morning, grace-marie turner on health care. also, the former appointee for military commissions regarding the trial of the detainees. testimony before the senate committee on clean energy. also, an author and russian professor on the president's trip to moscow. "washington journal" begins at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. at 10:00, climate change and energy legislation. the committee will hear from the secretaries of energy, agriculture, the interior department, and the head of the epa. it begins at 10:00 a.m. eastern, live here on c-span. . .

. this is my second week and i'm very happy to be here. for those of you who don't know

me, i've been in the community working on these issues for about 20 years at organizations such as the union of concerned scientists and other organizes. so again, very happy to be here. and if you're not familiar with the arms control association, a.c.a. is an independent membership organization dedicated to practical solutions to, solutions to the world's most serious global security challenges and we work to strengthen u.s. and global security threats posed by the -- u.s. and global security from threats posed by the most dangerous weapons. if you were like me you were watching the moscow summit and it's sometimes easy to forget that the nuclear arsenals are there, given the lack of attention that's been paid to these in the last few years.

but the moscow summit certainly remind the us that they are indeed there and at the end of the cold war and the bush two administrations lack of attention to these arsenals have left a lot of unfinished businesses. so these weapons have been off the front pages but not off the firing lines and that's what we're here to address today. since the start treaty was signed by president bush the first in 1991, there has been some significant progress on arms reductions but a lot of missed opportunities. so in many ways today's talks between president obama and president medvedev in moscow are really about unfinished business. but more than that, these talks are a bridge between old threats and new. start, as you know, was designed to manage the cold war arms race and today we're more concerned with the spread of

nuclear weapons to other countries and to terrorist grourgess a threat which president obama has called the most immediate and extreme threat to global security, so as i said the start treaty process really bridges the gap from old to new. stretching back, if these negotiations succeed this would be the first verifiable superpower arms reduction agreement completed since 1991, 18 years ago. we're rm -- really making up for lost time. on the other hand, this is the first step in president obama's pledge in prague to seek peace and security without nuclear weapons so this is the start of what we hope to be an ongoing arms reduction process in the years ahead. so this resumed u.s.-russian arms reduction process serves to rebuild the u.s.-russian relationship on arms control proliferation and this in turn

would build international support, we hope, for dealing with iran, north korea and other narms proliferation challenges. this will also strengthen the arms review treaty up for review next may. and since today's global security challenges are of course global in scobe, we need international cooperation to succeed. so the start treaty follow-on process is thus an essential part of dealing with the nuclear threats of yesterday, today, and tomorrow and it's an essential bridge from the past to the future and as president, observe -- as president obama said today in moscow, we must lead by example and that's what we're seeing the u.s. and russia do today. so today we'll follow the status of the start follow-on talks, review the key issues of contention in moscow including missile defense and discuss the importance of further nuclear

reductions we hope are northcoming -- forthcoming. to help us do that we have two of the most prominent experts in the field to help us understand what's going on. first up will be morton hall perrin, a senior survivor at the security institute and a -- he also served in the clinton, nixon, and johnson administrations, working on nuclear policy and arms control. next up will be derek kimball, the executive director of the arms association. he has written extensively on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation for over 15 years, is one of the leading analysts in the field and is widely quoted on start and other issues. so without further ado, morton, the floor is yours. >> thank you very much. it is a great pleasure for me to be here and i want to thank the

arms control association for arranging this event and asking me to participate in it. as you all know, robert mack amera died this morning and it would seem to be remiss without -- robert mcnamara died this morning and it would seem to be remiss without taking into account a critical role that he played in this agreement that he would have been pleased about. when he became secretary of defense in 1961, the official policy of the united states was that nuclear weapons were conventional weapons and would be used in any military conflict. when he left office seven years later, nuclear weapons were considered a weapon of last resort. that is still where we are today in this policy. he played a major role in that switching policy. he played a critical role in the change in nato policy which moved nuclear policy from that we would use nuclear weapons at the start of any conflict to, again, the notion that we would

fight a war with whatever means necessary. he played a critical role in the -- in the decision of the u.s. to start the process that has come to be called a start. that is, to engage the russians in serious negotiations in the agreements to control offensive and defensive weapons. he fought hard against a ballistic -- ballistic missile defense deployments, which he believed would makeç it much me difficult to negotiate such agreements, as we see even today. and he played an essential role in the non-proliferation treaty, persuading president johnson over the strong objections of the state department to begin the process of negotiating a treaty that would prohibit any additional countries from getting nuclear weapons. this treaty, which the two leaders reaffirmed the commitment to today, is, i think, in many ways a tribute to mac amerrobert mcnamara.

it is a tragedy that he will be remembered more for the vietnam war than the positive role he played in this issue. as i said, the agreement announced today for a treaty is an important, positive step forward. it reaffirms where we were eight years ago, that is, that the two sides would have binding -- legally binding, legally verifiable agreements controlling their strategic weapons. we came to a time of eight years in which the american administration rejected that notion, withdrew from the abm treaty and refuse to negotiate anything with the russians but a symbolic tree that had numbers in it that were not legally binding and had expired at the end of the treaty time. we now have a commitment from the two leaders to reestablish a system of legally binding agreements to apply both to

numbers of deployed warheads as well as to delivery systems and to back up with an effective verification process and the effect of accounting rules to determine how many delivery vehicles there are actually could be. this is a very modest step with just -- with members to slightly below than what the bush administration was contemplating. but in my view, it was the right way to complete the process. -- to begin the process. the commission recommended precisely this, that the first step should be a modest one, but that it should include weekly bonding -- binding limits on both delivery vehicles and warheads and it should be verifiable, and that it should then lead -- as one hopes and expects this agreement will -- to future treaties that will

involve much deeper and deepe substantial reductions in forces. i think it is also notable that the two sides found a way to bridge their differences on ballistic missile defense. as i read it, the russians have agreed to go forward with this agreement on offensive forces without a binding agreement on ballistic missile defense. at the same time, the u.s. has committed itself in a more formal way to a process of seeking to find a solution for the ballistic missile defense problem, which is cooperative with the russians and does not seem to pose any threat to them. there are still a lot of details to work out and i think we cannot assume that we will have a treaty by the deadline, which is the end of this year, but certainly, the steps today make it much more likely that we will have that agreement by the end of the year and i would anticipate the senate will

overwhelmingly ratified it. it would pave the way for a much force -- much more substantial reductions that are appropriate, given the current strategic situation. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] >> i'm derrick campbell, director -- executive director of the arms control association. i would like to join mort in recognize the contributions of robert mcnamara, one of the founding members of the arms control association back in the 1970's. his contributions were huge. he will be missed. i'm going to be describing a little bit more about some of the issues that the two presidents need to deal with as they move forward in this negotiation on this start follow-on, as it is called. as mort said, this summit marks

progress, negotiations between the two sides on this follow on agreement just began in april. there have only been four rounds of discussion, so we are in the beginning phases of this. as we have heard today at the press conference in moscow between the two presidents, would they have issued a joint statement outlining the parameters of this new agreement. they have said that the reductions that the new agreement aims to achieveç will create lower limits on the number of strategic delivery systems, that is, the missiles and bombers and a launchers -- and of the launchers below the start limit of 91,600 launchers. it is going to move the limit down to between 500 and 1100 each. i will come back to that. that is quite a range. i will discuss a little bit more what that means. keep in mind, currently the united states has about one

tauzin 100 strategic delivery systems. -- has about 1100 strategic delivery systems. the reductions they're talking about our modest if they're going to be in the upper range, but could be more substantial fare in the lower range, around 500. they also said that a new agreement will achieve limits and the number of deployed at strategic warheads that may be on those missiles and bombers. they said that the new agreement will move the ceiling down from about 2000 -- 2200, which is where we are roughly today with both sides down to about 1500.org 1600. roughly, a one-third reduction -- about 1500 or 1600. roughly about a one-third reduction. the exchange rate is based on the 1991 start treaty, the star system that had been in place for almost two-two deca that should be simple to carry over in this nawgreergets but

there may be some issues that the two sides debate about in the coming months and i'll come back to that. before i go on about some of the key issues they need to resolve let me also just note that overall this should be seen as an interim agreement as mort said this is a stopgap agreement that consolidates the approaches that were pursued under george bush the first in 1991 under start and the at approach pursued wund george w. bush in 2002 in the so-called moscow treaty. the start treaty limited delivery systems. the moscow treaty of 2002 limited deployed warheads. so we see the current presidents seeking to negotiate an arrangement that limits both deployed warheads and strategic delivery systems, which is very

important because if start were to expire without a replacement in december of this year, the two countries's nuclear weapons arsenals would be virs -- virtually unregulated because the 2002 moscow treaty establishes a limit that only goes into place in december of 2012, the same day that it expires. so it is very important for the two sides to conclude this interim agreement erim . world's total nuclear stockpiles. given that it is going to be a modest agreement, if they can

work through the issues, the arms control association thinks that is very important that u.s. and russian leaders not stop with starch. at the end of this negotiation, which will hopefully conclude by the end of the year, that they begin work on a new round of more comprehensive negotiations that include not just the deployed warheads and delivery systems, but also the non deployed warrants -- warheads. both sides retain a sizable numbers of nuclear warheads in storage but give each side the capacity to reconstitute its arsenals. in addition, there are large stockpiles of large tactical bombs which were created in the '50s and '60s to fight a land war in europe between the u.s. and the soviet union, something that is no longer likely at all. these arsenals are clearly weapons of a dead conflict that

should be reduced and regulated by both sides. so, there needs to be a new round of more comprehensive reductions that substantially reduces all of the arsenal, the total arsenal of both sides in the coming year. another thing before i go to some of the details of the negotiation, doing nothing, as some would2suggest, as some anti arsenal ideologues would suggest, is not a realistic option. to allow the agreement to expire in the -- in december would add to the already difficult u.s.- russian relationship that in addition to arms control, involves issues awaiting the possible expansion of nato, forced balances in europe, energy issues as well as missile defense. we need to move forward with this agreement. not just to send a signal to the

world that the u.s. and russia are reducing the number of xmñnuclear weapons, but it is important to restore better u.s.-russian relations. there are several tough issues that they're going to have to resolve. as the joint statement today noted, there is a range of strategic nuclear delivery systems that the negotiators are looking at, between 500 and 1100. the u.s. has a relatively large nuclear delivery system stockpile -- a relatively larger nuclear delivery systems? how then does russia. russia is putting a priority -- delivery system than does russia. russia's putting a priority on its ability to theoretically take its warheads out of reserve and put them on its strategic delivery systems. that can be achieved by reducing the number of overall missiles and bombers. it can also be achieved by finding ways to limit the number

of warheads that may be placed on those of delivery systems. we will have to see how the two sides resolve their differences on this issue. one limiting factor for the u.s. is that the obama administration is in the middle of a nuclear posture review, which has been mandated by congress to be completed by the end of this year. it is going to be difficult for the administration to make any radical changes in this nuclear force structure before that nuclear posture review is completed. i think it's likely that the u.s. side is not going to want to make deep reductions or to commit to the productions and the number of missiles and bombers until that is -- the nuclear posture review is completed. in addition, there are differences that have been known about for some time. the president did not mention this relating to the possible

convention of nuclear delivery systems to conventional payloads. there has been talk in the u.s. for some time that some of the nuclear-armed submarine launched missiles might be armed with conventional payloads which would certainly make them more useful in terms of dealing with 21st century threats than the nuclear payloads. but that is of concern to russia because russia believes that these missiles, which have very -- they are capable of striking very accurately -- could have the potential to knock off their command and control system. there were about these conventionally abouticpm's. one solution would be to count those conventionally armed missiles under the overall limits in this new start agreement. after all, the u.s. is not moving ahead with this approach quite yet and if the united states were to armed with conventional warheads some of the missiles that are now armed

with nuclear warheads, the numbers we're talking about are very low. it would not affect the overall u.s. force. another issue that is going to be a challenge is, which of the start verifications provisions to carry over. the good thing is that both sides have a lot of experience with the monitoring, on-site inspections and information exchange provisions. but they have different views about which one of these is most important. we did not get too many clues today about what the possible areas of disagreement or agreement you were. finally, a couple of thoughts about missile defense and we can get a little more into this on discussion. as you heard today at the press conference, the question was heard about whether the old plan from the george of the bush administration to deploy a handful of interceptions in

poland and the czech republic might interfere with or be a stumbling block for completion of this negotiation on a start follow on. i think it was clear from the exchange that this will not and does not have to be a stumbling block to conclude this agreement. the two presidents issued a joint communique on missile defenseç that makes it clear ty will continue the dialogue that has been taking place on and off over the past several years about a joint early warning system for third country missiles that might threaten both the u.s. and russia. they also are likely to be continuing off and on discussions -- discussions that were on and off utilizing some of russia's regard on the southern frontier, which could be helpful to the u.s. in during over the horizon to see whether there is an iranian missile

coming over verizon. and they're also going to continue to discuss -- over the horizon. and there also would continue this -- to discuss joint issues. russia hasid been saying that there are no long-range missiles that can hurt the3>r u.s. and they have a point. i think is very useful for the united states and russia to threats that might face the united states in europe. the president -- and in europe. the president did not make any commitments about whether he would or would not go ahead with that so-called at third sight for strategic missile defense in eastern europe. he did note that there is a missile defense policy review that is ongoing. he mentioned that it would be done by this summer, which i would assume to mean by the end of september. i would not expect the u.s. to

even then commit to russia and one way or another about what is going to do with that third sight. but what the u.s. and russia can do, and we have to remember that given that system has not even been tested, the u.s. is in a position to move ahead with deployment of the third side. testing will not be completed for several years. the u.s. and russia have time to discuss cooperative approaches. and a joint assessment, and even to find ways to overcome some of their past differences and cooperate in building a joint missile defense architecture, if necessary. so, missile defense should not, need not become an impediment to these ongoing discussions right now, but it will be something that the two sides need to clearly resolve before they move on to the next round of more comprehensive, deeper reductions

on all types of nuclear warheads, which we hope that they will move toward by the end of -- by the beginning of next year. we will stop there and take your questions. >> morton and carol, thank you very much for doing an excellent job and looking at the issues that have come before us. i would love to take your questions. i would love to enter with any media and the room and if not, just general questions. anyone who has questions out there. yes, right here. >> [inaudible] >> there is a microphone coming around. >> you both mentioned this was a modest agreement. do we need an nuclear posture review to be done before we

ratify this in the senate? and if not, does this mean that we might have more time for the nuclear posture review so that -- for the follow-on agreement after this we can really get down to deeper cuts? >> the nuclear posture review is a congressionally mandated executive branch review of the u.s. nuclear policy. my understanding is that the administration's explanation of where we are is that the nuclear posture review reached some interim conclusions of which enabled them to begin negotiations with the russians and reach these numbers. so, these numbers have been approved, as i understand it, in the nuclear posture review of an interim set of conclusions. since they are very modest reductions, they did not require any fundamental rethinking of our nuclear posture. i think the timing is actually good. i do not think we need to slow down the process.

the intent is for the nuclear posture review to be completed by the end of the year. one of the things that is explicitly designed to do is to provide guidance of the next round of negotiations with russia about further reductions in strategic forces. i think is important that we begin those talks as soon as this treaty is completed. çit but i also think that politically in the united states, it is important that those talks -- not begin until the nuclear posture review is completed. you will hear criticism from senators that even this agreement should have waited until the nuclear posture review is completed. and i think the administration's answer is that it did weight, but that they were able to conclude an interim, a quick round of the posture review which reached the conclusion that these very modest additional reductions were consistent with any notion of what of their weapons might be used. but i think it is essential that

before the next round of associations that the nuclear posture review be completed, the president had approved it, and that it be publicly describe to the congress and the american public so that people can see that the follow-on agreement is consistent of what we have decided -- is consistent, but we have decided >> yes? in the back? >> i'm coming around. hello. i'm sorry, i missed your, morton's talk but i assume that you about -- did not raise this issue that i'm going to raise. you wrote a book called nuclear fallacy back in the 1980's in which you said that there is no military function for tactical nuclear weapons, we don't need them, we don't have to negotiate them, we could just

weave a wand and get rid of them. apparently george bush did exactly that. in this posture review book i don't find any persuasive argument for any of our nuclear weapons, including the strategic ones. i know that we worship nuclear weapons and we can't just abolish them but it seems like we could at least raise the question of do they actually serve a function? it seems to me that all the nungses -- functions i have heard for our strategic nuclear arsenals are totally insane. they don't make anymore sense than our arguments for tactical ones do. >> well, the united states and russia have a different relationship than they did during the cold war. the nuclear posture review, which was subject to a lot of

question, is important because it provides the president with an opportunity to review this question. with an opportunity to review this question. the current requirements -- and more, you can correct me here -- are that nuclear weapons not only serve as a deterrent for other countries, but they're also there in the event of an overwhelming conventional attack on the u.s. or its allies. they are there to counter the possibility of chemical or biological threats and to dissuade other countries from building up their arsenals. in my view, and the view of a growing number of other people, the only defensible position today for u.s. nuclear weapons is to deter the use of naqoura weapons by other countries. if the u.s. and other countries reduce their -- of the u.s. and russia and other countries to reduce their arsenals, we can

move towards a discussion about much lower levels of perching zero nuclear weapons in the years ahead. the essential part of this is that the u.s. and russia and other countries need to adjust their view of what new corlette -- nuclear weapons are for. these weapons were created to fight a land war in europe, the tactical weapons. for the u.s. and russia, that is no longer a valid mission and for the -- is important for the u.s. to press russia to begin negotiations on first accounting for those warheads, and for verifiably reducing those warheads. that is going to be difficult and is something for the next round of negotiations, i think. you have got to remember that the u.s. has several hundred battlefield tactical warheads, but russia is believed to have

as many as about 8000. not all those are readily available for use, but is still a very large number. they pose a different kind of risk today, which is -- it is a low probability but high consequent risk that they could be lost or sold to a third party or terrorist organization. we need toç get to a point at which we are negotiating or reducing those stockpiles, and that begins with a fundamental reassessment of why these weapons exist, which has changed. but president obama gave a very important direction and guidance to the nuclear posture review. he said the purpose of it would be to reduce the nation's reliance on nuclear weapons. if an means anything, has to mean what he just said. that is, eliminating the ambiguity that you maintain a clear weapons possibly to deter chemical attacks or biological attacks or to deal with

conventional attacks. and to say affirmatively -- and i hope the nuclear posture review will lead the president to state clearly and affirmatively that the u.s. maintains nuclear-weapons to deter their use by others, period. i think that is inherent in the president's statement that he looks forward to a world without nuclear weapons and believes that america's the security needs can be dealt with in a world without nuclear weapons. it must mean that we believe we can deal with all of the threats, conventional, biological, chemical, without resorting to nuclear weapons and that the nuclear weapons resist for only that purpose. i think it is -- the new weapons exist for the purpose. i think is essential that we say that. unfortunately, even if we do, it is not clear that the russians will follow suit. they are tempted with the same policy that i was writing about

that the americans had been tempted with before, which is, the fallacy that the weapons can somehow make up for a conventional inferiority. the russians' view themselves as conventionally inferior or around their borders and they are flirting with the notion that this tactical nuclear arsenal can somehow make up for it. i think it cannot. everywhere it has been fought since hiroshima and nagasaki has been settled on the basis of conventional and nuclear power. those nuclear devices are simply not usable weapons. let me say work -- a word about the tactical nukes. i think this has been harder than suggested. in my own view, we probably can do one more round, and should do one more round with the russians after this one before we get to

the problem of tactical weapons and non-deployed weapons. i say that because i think the problem with dealing with those weapons is extraordinarily difficult. we do not know how many tactical nuclear weapons the russians have and we do not have a clue as to how to verify an agreement to limit or exclude all tactical nuclear weapons in the american and russian arsenals. but moreover, we do not know how to do with non-deployed weapons. there are two substantial problems with not deployed weapons. one is, verifying how many each side house and monitoring the agreement to limit them to whatever number you want to. and the of the question is, what is a non deployed within as compared to a weapon earmarked for destruction -- for destruction? both countries have large nuclear-weapons that they have taken out of their arsenals that they have earmarked for destruction. this is only a slight exaggeration to say that what

distinguishes a non-deployed weapon from a weapon earmarked for destruction is the label put on it. so then when we tried to destroy a weapon, which is a label from non-deployable weapon to weapon waiting for destruction and we do a little good, but not much. it is very hard to know how to verify whether those could be redeployed. these are extraordinarily difficult problems and unless you simply decide that it does not matter, which i think we are nowhere near ready to do, is going to be very difficult to reach agreement on those weapons. that is why i think it may be worth considering one more round with the russians, more than the numbers talked about here, which i think we can safely do before we deal with the question on the non-deployed weapons and the tactical nuclear weapons, which we clearly have to do as we move

onto variable numbers and ultimately to the elimination of nuclear weapons. >> yes, ma'am? >> i'm from george mason university. the purpose of naqoura funds is to deter other states from giving nuclear-weapons and you are relying on a jury thatç haa lot of flaws. deterrence sometimes breaks down. i think it was george kennan who said that deterrent to such a great idea that it has become contagious. and lieutenant robert green said deterrence is making a war less likely by making it more likely. if our purpose is a theory that is what, then -- flawed, then what about alternative strategies? it works best when it is accompanied by drastic attention

reduction, so we may want to switch to a policy of mutually shared survival. can you comment? >> well, i think those are useful thought. as i said before, the u.s. and russia and leaders -- military leaders in each of our country's need to reassess the role in light of changed circumstances. we can argue about whether deterrence worked or was flawed. i happen to think that it was more flawed than worked in the cold war years. looking ahead, nuclear weapons do not have the value that they once were thought to have. we need to recognize that today, nuclear weapons are more of a liability than an asset in most situations around the world. the u.s. and russia need to move past the old dynamics and work

together to deal with the 20% 3 threats. -- 21st century threats. we saw -- president obama's remarks that he plans to eliminate by the end of this year and that is going to be working on countries that have nuclear material, nuclear facilities that pose a threat, a proliferation threat trying to find a way to consolidate the different initiatives that have been launched since the end of the cold war, to secure those materials. that is an equally important initiative that he has launched an that russia needs to fully support. i am looking forward to more details about that. we have not heard much about it, but it is important. >> i think we need over the

longer term to move to a different basis of dealing with the russians on these issues. we are still locked in in this whole discussion. and the moscow summit was based on the notion that we are potential adversaries that might threaten each other with nuclear weapons, and i think that is not the right fringe bork. -- the right framework. i think we need to try to gauge the russians, and i think the president was doing that -- to engage the russians, and i think the president was doing that. the ballistic missile defense talks about what countries might threaten to use those weapons. but i think that is going to be a long process, and one that is going to require both countries to get past old habits and old prejudices and old ways of thinking. we need to move parallel on these two tracks. one is taking arms control as it is and moving down as low as pecan and seeking to use that to string -- low as we can and

seeking to use that to strengthen the non- proliferation. and at the same time, strengthen the russians, and the chinese, in a fundamentally different kind of discussion about what mutual security really is and how would cooperate in dealing with common threats to our societies. -- and how we deal with common threats to our societies. >> as you have both noted, the announcement includes a range of numbers for vehicles and warheads. i wonder what you it is a paid about the factors going into whether the two sides and on the higher range -- higher end of the range rather than the lower. >> the question was about how the two sides are going to address the question of selling on the ceiling for the total

number of strategic delivery vehicles, which is the jargon that she used to describe the missiles and bombers that carry the warheads. clearly, the starting point here is that the u.s. has a larger number of submarine land-based missilesç and heavy bombers to carry the warheads. officially, the united states has roughly 1200 strategic delivery systems. in reality, about 100 of those are phantom systems. they really are not -- the missiles are not deployed. but according to the current accounting rules, they exist. we're really closer to 1100. russia has a smaller, mainly land-based missile -- missile force of around 800. officially, probably not all of those are in good working order. the starting platform of these negotiations is a considerable

difference in the way these forces are going about this. in part, because of the way these negotiations are taking place in the midst of the nuclear posture review, the u.s. is going to find it difficult t significantly reduce the number of systems in this round of negotiations. russia, which as i said before, is concerned about the theoretical possibility the united states is capable of redeploying from a larger number of is reserve warheads, again wants to chop the missile and bomber force down substantially. and they're facing budgetary and problem -- programmatic problems. they are racing to try to replace some of the older cold war systems with a newer missiles. they said they cannot keep pace. independent estimates are that with or without a new arms limit -- limitation treaty, russia

probably could not field more than@@ . i think that's probably something they can do in the next round. i think one of the creative ways in which they might settle this is that the united states might simple lay degree to field some of its submarines, its trident submarines with a smaller number of mice ills -- missiles loaded on them. currently these can carry as many as 18 strategic missiles. if they were under this treaty only allowed to carry 12 that could be easily verified and that could substantial by

reduce the total number of u.s. deployed warheads as well as the official number of delivery systems. russia would have to agree to that. that's not an require reversible approach to the problem but that's one way in which the two sides could split their difference. not be surprised to see that in the end they have to have a ceiling that is a range. i don't think that would be the ideal approach, but they may in the end have a range that the trudi specifies -- that the treaty specify its one country has an upper range and the other has a lower one. this could be an interim coalition should that sets up a much more substantial and comprehensive reduction in the next two to three years. >> i agree with that. i think you have to understand this number in two contexts puree.

the administration does not want to be in a position of agreeing to a number which it cannot say was certified by the nuclear posture review. so, it would take the two numbers separately. if you look at the war had number, the current agreement of the moscow treaty is 2200 to 1500 deployed warheads, but it is not legally binding and expires as soon as it goes into affect. we are now going to have a real number, and i think that the political imperative was to get down below the 2200 #, but to have a bit of a range so that the u.s. can say that it's number was still justified by the nuclear posture review. my hope and expectation is that by the time this treaty is being ratified by the senate, a posture review will be completed and the administration will be able to say that they can go to 15 under because it is

justified by the nuclear posture review. on delivery systems, the issue turns in part on how you define delivery systems, that is, what accounting rules are under start. my guess is that what the administration has said to the russians -- if you want to get agreement on the floor number, you're going to have to change accounting rules so that what counts as a delivery systemçó enables us to get closer to the 500 number. if you do not want to change many of the accounting rules, -- although, he would probably have to change a few of them -- then you will be at the higher number. the negotiation will be the trade-off between those two, with accounting rules are, and therefore, how low the number goes. but there will still be a range. again, my guess is that the lower number will be where the russians expect to be. the higher number will be what we can justify based on the interim nuclear posture review with the notion that when we complete the review we can announce that we will actually

go to a lower number. and >> yes, sir, in the back. >> do think russia and the u.s. view the nuclear power of pakistani descent -- in a similar way and does this agreement affect their cooperation in afghanistan and their approaches and responses to terrorism? >> that is a good question. i think pakistan present a different kind of problem today. pakistan is one of the three countries that has never signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and a data arsenal of about 60 to 80 nuclear bombs. pakistan represents a proliferation threat in two senses. as we know, from the 8 uconn

story, -- h ucona.q. kahn storyt pakistan has been of the powerful -- proliferation with other groups. and with the war going on, there is the tir reddick possibility that their nuclear art -- the theoretical possibility that their nuclear arsenal could fall to the wrong hands. i would guess that both governments recognize the on the ground risks in pakistan. i think they may prioritize them a little differently. since the u.s. is so committed to pushing up the insurgency in afghanistan and pakistan, i think what the agreement today that was announced about u.s. military transit rights to bring in military equipment and supplies over and through

russian territory to supply u.s. forces in afghanistan is a sign that the obama reset button approach of emphasizing the positive rather than the negative in the u.s.-russian relationship is producing some modest results. i think this is assigned that there is better feeling between the two. to the extent that russia, i think for the first time i believe, is allowing u.s. military transit rights over its territory is something hard to imagine 15-20 years ago. but i want to make a couple comments. first, about a statement that the russian president made in the press conference was quite extraordinary. as i heard him, he basically said, we share a common interest in dealing with the terrorist threat from afghanistan and we are pleased to cooperate with the americans. and yes, we will have transit rights, he said, but we are also willing to talk about other ways to cooperate in dealing with the

terrorist threat. and of course, the russians are as concerned about muslim extremists terrorism as the u.s. is. on pakistan, i think there is a common interest and a need for a common approach, but one that needs to include the chinese as well as the british and french. and it is in the context of the text van and the ban on the for the production of nuclear weapon. -- weapons. we have a common interest with the russians and the chinese and british and french, which i think was not engaged in this summit because i think they're just was not enough time to do it. to talk about, first of all, american non-proliferation, but then the cooperation between iran states and russia and china to put pressure on india and pakistan to adhere to the treaty and to commit themselves to a moratorium on fishing and more

-- material production. that is something i would expect them to -- to begin to cooperate on. we also need russian cooperation to get this test ban ratified in the u.s. because there is an allegation that somehow the russians have a different definitionñr of what is banned y the nuclear test ban treaty. i do not believe that. i believe we do have a common interest. but i think russian cooperation in making that clear to the senate and to the american people will be critical to getting the treaty ratified in the senate and then enable the two countries with china to work together to try to persuade pakistan and india and altman the, the other countries that are net -- and ultimately, the other countries that are needed to get that agreement into place. >> today's announcement about the results of this summit and the obama-medvedev talks, as

president obama said in april in prague, u.s. leadership on nuclear disarmament, u.s.- russian leadership, is critical to the global non-collaboration -- non-proliferation system. that argument has been supported in washington by saying that the u.s. peter does not have an effect on iran and north korea. that is a misreading on what the president is saying. and the importance of this kind of action on by the u.s. and russia on the global non- proliferation effort. in may of 2010, the u.s. and russia and other countries are going to be convening for once every five years conference to a value of having a clear non- proliferation treaty of 1968 is fairing. -- on how the nuclear non- preparation treaty of 1968 is fairing. the u.s. and russian need to get the non-nuclear weapon states to work with them to improve

safeguards, to clamp down on those countries that do not comply with their safeguards, like iran and north korea, to find ways to work together to limit the spread of technologies that could be used to make bomb material. the only way they're going to be able to build that support is by fulfilling their disarmament obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and moving ahead, once again, on verifiable reductions in their bloated arsenals is the first and best way to do that. that is another way of saying that without this agreement we are going to have an extremely difficult time at the review conference trying to deal with other types of nuclear threats. this question about pakistan brings this to my mind, and that is another important reason why this agreement needs to be completed by the end of this year by both governments. >> last question for steve

gagnon. -- from stephen young. >> you talked about the peace start is the range of delivery vehicles. what is behind that? there are only 136 missiles [unintelligible] yet we are saying that we need 1100 and the russians less than that, 500. there's a big question about that. i cannot figure out or was going on there. -- figure out what is going on there. >> i get a headache every time someone starts to explain it to me.

but under the current start treaty, we now have about 5000 deployed -- the start treaty did not limit actually deployed weapons. it limited warheads deployed by accounting rules that link them to deployed delivery systems. and under those rules we have something like 5000. we're going to much lower numbers than those and i think we do not get credit for that here because of the way they have this -- they have structured the description. but i think the u.s. government is saying that even though the warheads are actually deployed that under the old stars, -- start counting rules, lots of things count. and therefore, the number is closer to the top limit here than it is to the 500 number, but that if we can change the accounting rules so that they more accurately reflect what is now actually deployed, then we can go to the lower numbers.

my hope that is all out -- my hope is that it is all that is. the u.s. can say, we know we do not need more than 1100 and the russians can say, we do not want to go below 500 and they agree on, if not aç number, then a smaller range of the accounting rules. and if the russians are willing to be relaxed about only counting things that are actually deployed or deployable, then we will be able to get to a significantly lower number. >> stephen, thank you for the correction on the trident missile numbers. but as more it said, this is in part confusing because we are in a phase when the u.s. and russia are trying to integrate of a very different approaches to strategic arms limitations. we're going to have to, all of

us, a very attentive -- careful attention -- paid very careful attention to the reference points in this discussion. i would agree with mort, what matters here is the number of operational in deployed warheads. we have got to pay close attention to what the final accounting rules are, but we have to also pay close attention to the fact that there is a huge number of non deployed warheads as well as tactical numbers. today in a joint statement, and the 1500 range. there are many more weapons that the u.s. and russia need to deal with and that is one of the reasons why we believe that they should not stop with this start follow-on agreement. they need to move to a more comprehensive and transparent >> thank you very much. we are out of time.

before we thank you and we thank our speakers, just two notes. one is the arms control association web site has lots more information on all this stuff, armscontrol.org. please check it out. . and number two, we will be back here for a press briefing on july 21, 10:00 a.m., to talk specifically about technology threats and implications for the start treaty process -- july 21, 10:00 a.m., right here. with that, thank you for joining us and please thank our speakers. [applause] [applause]

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> here is a look at the president's schedule tomorrow. in the morning, he will meet with prime minister putin for breakfast. then, he meets with former president corbin jones. he meets also with political and

business leaders -- president gorbachev. he also stopped at the vatican in rome. he is supposed to meet with the president napolitano and the pope. the president will fly to africa for a visit in ghana. go to our website for the latest on the president's trip including more on our coverage along the way. >> how is c-span funded? >> private enterprise. >> i do not know. >> i think some of it is government raised. >> it is not public funding. >> i want to say from me, my tax dollars. >> how is c-span funded? 30 years ago, america's cable companies created c-span as a private business initiatives. no government mandate, no

government money. >> senate new member al franken is said to be sworn in. his uploaded norm coleman conceded last week, following a unanimous supreme court decision in the state declaring al franken the winner. this is about five minutes. >> i am very happy to welcome to our capital senator-elect al franken. he ran a very hard-fought race, and that is an understatement. i was talking to al a few moments ago, and i told him about my hectic race where it was six weeks before the results were in, and his took eight months. he is going to work hard and be

an outstanding senator. but do not take my word for it necessarily, even though i think it is absolutely true. i serve in the house with former congressman weber. there is always someone who laid things out the way that he saw them, and he said this morning that when people find out that he is a smart guy is serious about issues and a hard worker, they will be pleasantly surprised, and they will be. much has been made of the expectations of al franken joining the senate. here are my expectations. of course, he is going to work hard for the people of minnesota. they have gone far too long without full representation. i expect him to but deliver on the change this country is demanding, -- i expect him to

help deliver on the change this country is demanding and to give access for quality health care and to make our country energy independent. i am confident that center- elect -- senator-elect franken will help, but we need more to address the problems. these challenges we face are not democratic challenges or republican challenges or non- partisan challenges. they are america's challenges, and they are too great to be sought by partisanship. moving america forward will still require the cooperation -- too great to be solved by partisanship. the american people want us to work together. democrats are not looking at senator franken's election to

rto ram things through. this is why we will offer senate republicans a seat at any negotiating table. it is up to them if they will continue to sit down and be the party of no or sit down and work for the common good of the people. it is up to them. i would hope that the party of no is coming to an end. al? >> thank you. thank you, mr. leader. i want to thank the leader for all of your support during and after the campaign, and i look forward to working under your leadership. a lot has been made of this and number60. the number i am focused on is

the number two -- this number 60. minnesotans are very practical people. they want to make sure that the work we do make sense -- minnesotans are very practical people. what we do need to a strong return on investment. minnesotans what a rational health-care system that provides health care for all americans, that is accessible and affordable, that gets the costs down. minnesotans what an economy that works for working families, and that means jobs. that means a decent day's wage for an honest day's work, and it means protecting retirement. americans want a new energy policy that creates jobs, that

addresses climate change, and that is going to wean us from our dependence on foreign oil. and minnesotans want their kids to have an education that prepares them for 21st-century economy. i am going to work day and night to make sure that our kids have a great future and that america's best days lay ahead. i am ready to get to work. thank you. >> we're going to have questions asked and answered tomorrow after the luncheon. al and i will take no questions now. >> thank you, everybody.

>> on tomorrow morning's "washington journal," the president of than institute, grace-marie turner. also, an author and a russian professor on the president's trip to moscow. "washington journal" begins at 7:00 a.m. eastern here on c- span, and at 10:00, we will have that senate environment hearing on clean energy and reducing greenhouse gas pollution. the committee will hear from the secretaries of energy, agriculture, and the interior department, as well as from the epa. senator barbara boxer will chair the meeting beginning at 10:00 a.m. eastern live here on c- span. >> how is c-span funded? >> the u.s. government.

>> private benefactors. >> i do not know. >> i think some of it is government raised. >> it is not public funding. >> donations? >> i want to say from me, from my tax dollars. >> how is c-span funded? 30 years ago, america's cable companies created it as a public service, no government mandate, no government money. >> the o.a.s. suspended honduras on wednesday about one week after their president was removed by the military. the state department spokesperson talks about the situation in honduras and other topics for about 35 minutes.

>> welcome. i hope you all had a relatively relaxing three-day weekend. i cannot say that my was entirely unbrokenly relaxed, but i want to make some updates on the secretary's schedule. i would just read some remarks at the top. the secretary is in the office today. she's stopped buying a meeting with the chinese deputy foreign minister -- by a meeting with the chinese deputy foreign minister. she is also going over for a small group meeting this afternoon. and then, a few words on the dramatic development over the weekend, the o.a.s.

as you know, and the u.s. joined other member states in unanimously decided to suspend the right of honduras to participate in the o.a.s. our goal remains the restoration of democratic order in honduras, and we call on all political and social actors in honduras to find a peaceful solution to this crisis. we regret the necessity of this measure and look forward to the day when circumstances will allow the measure to be lifted and honduras' participation resumed. it is important to note that under provisions of the inter- american democratic charter, this suspension does not mean the end of oa.s.a.s. diplomatic relations.

and there is still full respect of human rights and freedoms. in this regard, we deplore the use of force against demonstrators in recent days. we once again call upon the de facto regime and all actors in honduras to refrain from all acts of violence and seek a peaceful, constitutional, and lasting solution to the serious situation in that country through dialogue. similarly, we call on all o.a.s. states individually and collectively to act in a way that enhances the honduran people by ensuring continued outreach to their civil society, maintaining the effective flow of humanitarian assistance, and rejecting the incitement and use of violence to affect political change. and with that, i will take your questions. >> ian, when you say you seek the restoration of democratic

order, have you guys figure out exactly what that means? i think in the immediate instance, it means the return of the democratically elected president, to return zelaya. >> why do you not just say that, that you call for his return? >> well, we do call for his return. >> ok, and that you guys made a decision yet on the determination -- that a coup has transpired and whether u.s. aid would have to be cut off? >> as i said on thursday, we decided that no aid -- the determination under this law -- that none of this kind of aid is now flowing to the de facto regime. we are still in the ongoing

process of determining whether the law applies, but we're not inclined to make a statutory decision while diplomatic efforts are ongoing. >> there are people on the hill who feel strongly that despite concerns or despite uncertainty about whether or not this was a military coup or not, their view is that it is. i mean, he was arrested in his residence, detained, put on a plane by the military. even if the transfer of authority may even have been conducted by the congress -- >> right. >> and i suspect you are going to have some explaining to do if you do not make a determination one or another on this. >> yes. >> while diplomatic efforts are underway, it could be days, weeks, or months, are you going to put this situation in, which is legally mandated, in abeyance until all diplomatic efforts

have been exhausted? >> a couple of points. most of our activities are excluded under this particular section of the law, and that is the humanitarian aid and aid to support democracy-building programs. what we have decided to not continue our funding of are those programs that could be construed as having -- directly aiding the government or what we're calling the de facto regime of honduras, and is a complicated process -- and it is a complicated process, but we recognize that we may make this

determination to terminate, and that is why any program that can be construed as aiding the government's -- 18 the government, none of this is following through the pipeline now -- aiding the government. >> it only excludes a that is democracy related -- that only exclude a did that is democracy related. could you double check that -- that all excludes aid that is democracy lated. could you double check that? >> yes, and we will try to get it. >> it is stopped, i would hope so. >> that is an assumption. >> my question, but i have another one on your contact with the the facto government. with the ambassador, and d.c. a delegation coming here? >> first of all, -- and do you

see a delegation coming year? >> first of all, -- coming here? >> first of all, if the delegation is from this de facto regime, the state department would not meet with them. if this is a regime that we do not recognize, but we do not have any information about a delegation coming here. we heard that there may be a delegation going to san salvador, where the president is now out there, but that is just the reports that we have heard. president zelaya, as i understand id, -- it, and you should probably check. you should probably check with his office in san salvador, yes, but you know what happened yesterday. he tried to travel to honduras. the flight was denied clearance to land.

the plane first went to nicaragua and then to el salvador. president zelaya met briefly with our chargee in san salvador to discuss plans. we see him coming back to the u.s. tomorrow, and, of course, we are very focused on the need for a dialogue to restore him back and restore the democratic order. >> does the administration have any plans to meet him at a senior level? >> we have not made any set plans, but i am sure we will meet with him at a senior level, but there are no definite plans yet. i am not prepared to give you

any definite information on that yet. >> talking with him in recent days? >> no, i know that tom shannon and another man met with him whenever that was, early sunday morning. also on honduras? we will go year and then come back. yes, go ahead. >> -- we will go here and then come back. >> for mr. zelaya, he is backing honduras. we were told that he went back to submit his resignation. now, there are those that are saying that he is coming back to the u.s. as an ambassador of the

de facto government. do you have any information? >> no, i do not. although i would venture to say that somebody is representing a regime that we do not recognize would have a hard time getting credentialed. m r>> mr. flores, still be ambassador to the white house? >> i am not sure. whatever the reverse of the credentialing process is. a letter informing the white house and the state department that he was no longer acting as ambassador, i do not know. i do not know if that has been done or not. >> do you know right now who is

behind this coup or whatever? >> i do not have any information about any kind of an external factors in honduras. but we're very focused on our common goal, which is the restoration of the democratic order. yes? >> any information about that? >> yes, i think we covered that. on thursday or even wednesday. we know that the southern command and minimize contact with the honduran military -- had minimize contact. -- had minimize to -- minimized contact. i think we have done is what is necessary for american personnel there.

i think it is are being reviewed on a case by case basis. >> that base is under direct control of the honduran government. >> that is correct. yes, i have to refer you to my colleagues in the state department on that, but as far as i know, the situation is calm. yes? >> was there any talk of allowing zelaya's plane to land at the u.s. base there? >> that would not be our decision anyway. as he points out, that base is controlled by the honduran authorities, so it is not up to us to allow landing rights or anything. also on honduras? no? new subjects? yes? -- news subject?

-- new subject? yes, i think we, my colleague over the weekend gave a reaction. we saw reports of these shorter- range missiles being launched. these launches are provocative. but they are nothing new. we continue to call on north korea to refrain from these kind of provocative actions that do not to achieve it at all to regional security, and our focus, of course, is on the

implementation of our two u.n. security council resolutions, 1718 and the other, that require them to suspend all mosul-related activity. >> is there going to be a security council meeting today? is it about the u.s. navy ship turning back? anything there? >> i understand from my colleague that there is going to be a meeting this afternoon, i think at 4:00, and i think it will discuss the mosul launches over the weekend -- missile launches over the weekend. i will refer you to the u.n. or others for further details. i believe there will be more available. yes? >> on china, there was a major

riot in at the xinjiang region yesterday, i think, and as many as 140 may have been killed. do you have any comment on the situation there? >> yes, we see the official chinese media are reporting a death toll of 140 as a result of the violent riots in one city there, in the shenzhen region. we are afraid this figure could increase, and we deeply regret the loss of life, and we understand there have been a number of arrests. we do not have any confirmation about what actually sparked the unrest, and we can speculate, but i do not want to speculate on what may have caused the violence, and, of course, we call on all sides.

>> they want freedom, and now, they are counting on the u.s. to get involved. >> as the president has said, we will always stand with those calling for restoration of personal freedoms. i mentioned that the chinese deputy foreign minister -- i am sure that this will raise some of the concerns that we have about the violence in the last

few days. >> did it come up? >> i understand that it did come up? -- i understand that it did, . i do not have full read out, but if i can get you one, i will. >> is he still here? >> i know he is meeting with the ambassador. >> that would be about north korea? >> that would be about north korea. >> the uighur leader here in the u.s. orchestrating it? >> i have not seen that report. >> by the chinese, like in tibet, but somebody has to stand

with them. >> well, i do think we stand with them. the fundamental human rights, like freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and i think we were very forthright about speaking out about it. i think that there are concerns in general that are well-known. not only in china but in other parts of the world. we will speak out when we see human rights being violated. yes? >> human rights being violated right now by the chinese authorities? >> we do not have -- what we have are press reports, and we see this terrible loss of life, as well. >> 140 people dead. you do not think there is any

problem there? >> no, i do think there is a problem there. go ahead. >> questions about guantanamo, is that issues still in play? >> is the issue still -- >> yes. pulling out? any update? >> i do not have an update, but i will see if i can get you an update. >> human rights in asia. as you know, the second trial of the former malaysian deputy prime minister is scheduled to begin on wednesday. i wonder if you have any comment. >> yes, we just saw this. this just popped up today. we have the writers -- reuters story, and we hope that they

do this in a way that builds confidence in the rule of law in malaysia. we do not have more details youtube.com and beyond that. >> as this unfolds this week, i would be interested to know if the u.s. -- since i do not know that it came up when the malaysian foreign minister was here, if there has been any representations made to the malaysian government, that the department regards this as politically motivated, i believe. if you have raised this with them lately, with the malaysian authorities, and sort of make your views known about it. if you can check that. >> yes, we can do that. yes? >> do you have anything on that other meeting? >> yes, that just happened today.

i do not have a very full read out, but i will give you what i have. -- read out. yes, they did meet today in london and discuss a wide range of issues. we are indeed continuing discussions with all parties, and our goal is to create a context for negotiations. we are pressing all parties to honor the road map. we know what that means. that means for the israelis to stop all settlements, and for the palestinians, it means an end to the incitement against israel and demonstrating ability of providing security. we believe the aerospace should take steps towards normalization with israel muggy we do believe there should be steps taken towards normalization with israel -- we do believe there should be steps taken towards

normalization. to a point where we can start negotiations. >> a permanent adoption? >> we mean exactly what it says in the road map. that should be a stop to all settlement activity, including national. >> right, but it is important that the israelis would like to have a 3- or six-month freeze. have you taken a position on that? can you tell me about president obama in that area? >> i do not have any information on that. we're not going to say we are not going to go see details -- not going to negotiate any details. from this podium. >> again, you are negotiating with the israelis, but it is not you and the israelis that need

to negotiate here. it is the israelis and the palestinians. >> and we need them to meet with the arabs, too. >> you got sidetracked? >> just because mitchell met with barak does not mean that we are not working the other avenues, as well. >> a schedule at all? >> i am not aware of one. >> a schedule? >> i am not aware that there will be any follow-ups. >> iran interfering. all of those things. >> well, you know, this administration's approach to the middle east peace process is a comprehensive, regional approach, and yet, we would accept all players, all partners, in the region to

contribute towards that. i am sorry? iran has, of course, not played a very constructive role with its export of terrorism and the kind of rhetoric that we have seen. we would like to see it do more to contribute towards the middle east peace. >> up to israel to determine if it is going to strike targets in iran, with israel let the united states know before they would do that? >> you would have to ask israel about, and that is not to said they're going to make a strike. >> up to israel to make such a determination? >> well, first of all, let me step back a minute. our goal is to prevent iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. when i say "our," i do not just

mean the u.s. it is the international community, so our approach right now is to be very engaged with our international partners to get iran to fulfill its obligations and responsibilities and to fully cooperate with the iaea and the details in the united nations security council resolution. having said that, israel is a sovereign country. we are not going to dictate its actions. we are also committed to israel, and we share israel's deep concerns about iran's nuclear programs. but for questions about what they have to -- what they plan to do to respond to this, i have to refer you to the israeli government.

>> is really is a -- israel is a sovereign country, and we are not going to dictate what their actions are, your words might be interpreted as a green -- as agreeing. >> i certainly would not want to give a green light to any kind of military action, but our policy is that israel is a sovereign country, and we are not going to dictate its actions. >> why do you have to say it? >> because it is what it is. yes? >> just a quick logistical question. the schedule on the foreign ministers' meeting?

>> right now, i am aware of a meeting that he had with the deputy secretary steinberg, assistant secretary campbell, and as i said, the secretary also dropped by about one. he also has a meeting with -- if there are other meetings in this building, we will let you know. >> actually, from the u.s. side, you brought up this other situation. >> i am not aware of that right now. yes? >> a different topic. with president calderon in mexico, they suffered a huge blow. many of the reforms that directly affect the u.s., what

is your view on this subject? are you worried with the narco trafficking? >> yes, well, i just know that we are being cooperative with our efforts with president calderon to our shared prosperity, to expand the benefits of democracy and human rights. we worked with him with the o.a.s. in honduras, but we're also concerned about the drug- related violence that threatens the mexican people, but in the specific instance that you referred to, if i can get you more information, i will be happy to. yes? >> the vice president's statement. does this statement indicates that the administration --

indicates -- indicate -- >> i would not read into it anymore than what you say -- any more than what you see. we respect israel's sovereignty, and we share israel's concern about iran's nuclear program, but our focus now is getting iran through this multilateral process to adhere to its obligations and responsibilities to the international community. that is where things are at right now. yes, in the back? >> president obama suggested today the idea of nuclear talks or a summit to being posted in the united states. is that a new idea? where has that been on the table for a while -- being hosted in

the united states? >> i know that they signed a kind of a free-market -- a kind of a framework to reduce vehicle weapons down to a much lower level -- reduce nuclear weapons down to a much lower level, but i am not aware of the summit here in the u.s., no. yes, is this -- the non- proliferation treaty? well, i just have to get you more information. dave? >> do you have anything that assistant secretary carson had in the last couple of days with president mugabe? something about the assistant secretary? >> i have seen those media

reports. i have tremendous respect for assistant secretary carson. he is our most experienced diplomat in african affairs. he is one of the most talented people we have, and i do not see why anybody would use those kinds of characterization's. >> referring to him as an idiot? -- those kind of characterizations. >> i do not. >> he also said that he hoped that carson was not speaking for obama, annie said it was a great shame him being an african- american, referring to him. what does that mean, particular that his partner in power was here last week.

>> well, i guess i would just limit myself to saying that we, of course, are concerned about mugabe. >> forget about what mugabe had to say to the meeting -- media. what about the meeting? >> all i see is the media reports. >> you do not know if carson is even in libya for this summit? >> oh, no, he was there. >> ok, so what was that? >> let me get you more information. >> on north korea/malaysia, ambassador goldberg's had a brief q&a with reporters, and it is not clear to me whether there had been reports over the course of the weekend that may be

perhaps several malaysian entities are getting singled out or targeted. is that the case? was that the purpose of this meeting, of this visit, to share information for malaysian entities that are suspected of doing business with north korea in contravention? >> yes, i have seen his q&a, as well. he is on his way back today. i think it is to see if we can talk to the man himself to get a more thorough readout. the trip to beijing. ok, thanks.

>> on tomorrow morning "washington journal," grace- marie turner on health care. also, issues regarding the trial of detainees. and the mayor of an area in pennsylvania on his testimony on clean energy. also, an author and russian professor on the president's trip to moscow. "washington journal" begins at 7:00 a.m. eastern here on c- span, and at 10:00, we will have that senate environment committee hearing on clean energy reducing greenhouse gas pollution. the committee will hear from the secretaries of energy, agriculture, and the interior department, as well as the head of the epa. california senator barbara boxer will head the meeting, beginning at 10:00 a.m. eastern live here on c-span. >> how is c-span funded? >> the u.s. government.

>> private subsidy. >> i do not know. >> i think some of it is government raised. >> it is not public funding. >> i want to say from me, from my tax dollars. >> how is c-span funded? 30 years ago, america's cable companies created c-span as a public service, a private business initiative, no government mandate, no government money. >> here is the discussion between presidents and their domestic policy advisers. you'll hear from advisers from the carter, clinton, fourth, and george w. bush administration. this was at the university of virginia -- ford, and george w. bush administrations. this is about 90 minutes.

welcome. i am a senior fellow at the center. you may want to, if you're watching this on c-span or on the website, go to the relevant web sites and find have to watch the other sessions, all of which have been excellent. this session is focused in particular on the lessons of those who have worked in the white house on domestic policy in a number of recent administrations have a merger from that experience, lessons from successes, and lessons from failures. the big topic, and we have got an all-star cast of former white house officials to help us export, beginning with storage eisenstaedt's from the carter administration, but also another illustration -- with

eisenstaedt. he was during the carter years and chief policy adviser. during the clinton years, he was, among other things, a u.s. ambassador to the european union, more recently working on holocaust issues and the author of the much praised book on that subject, "imperfect justice." william ballston, bill ballston, from the clinton and administration, holds a chair in the brookings institution studies program, and he is also a professor at the university of maryland. during the clinton years, he served as a deputy assistant with policy, where to not only on the al gore 2000 presentation, but also on the 1988 presidential campaign. he is the author of eight books,

most recently "public matters." from the nixon administration, arguably one the domestic staff began, but crowe, who recently joined the center -- bud. as a senior fellow on the leadership, ethics, and integrity. famously with his work on john ehrlichman staff at the beginning of the first term of nixon, later moving explicitly would john ehrlichman into the domestic council staff. also, on the basis of that unhappy experience. has spent 30 years thinking in teaching on issues of ethics and integrity, which is part of what he is doing with the center for

the study of the presidency and congress right now. roger porter has been a part of three administrations focusing on domestic policy. he is currently an ibm professor at the kennedy school at harvard, and out of those three presidencies, he was on the president's economic advisory boards, the riggins administration, where he served in the office of policy development, and the first bush administration, where he served as assistant to the president for economic and domestic policy. now, to lead our discussion of these individuals and as the 90 minutes progresses of others at the table, two scholars, two great colleagues of every political scientist who has studied the american presidency. paul holds the chair of u.s. politics at the university of british columbia, which moved

him away from the university of illinois. paul has done many things, and part of what he has done is the recognition of the enduring contribution award from the public policy section of the american political association as well as other rewards. boris natomas is a lips d. prof. of political science -- bruce is a lips to professor -- lipsky professor. there is a book on the presidency and congress as a policy-making institution. a lot of people, but a lot of good people. i am still nannette jim, because i was assured before this symposium that i was going to be tallest person -- i am still mad

at jim. i am going to introduce him anyway, and it is a pleasure to do so. a lot of people know jim for the board he is doing as a contributor on the fox news channel before the war key is doing. he is here because he served as deputy assistant for policy and more recently as a senior adviser to the mike huckabee for president campaign. all along, he has been a columnist for "newsday," and he is with the new america foundation, and he is, again, outrageously tall. thank you all for being here. paul, take it away.

>> we have talked about policy transitions and about getting out the message. this is really a chance to sit back and think about what overall is regrettable -- overall is really critical, and what we like you to do is think about what are the really significant successes and failures and domestic policy of the presidency is that you are associated with -- presidencies that you are associated with, and what did staff have to do. is it about the operations of the staff or the president's directions of the staff or particular personnel or lack of performance. what did staff have to do? we would hope to hear some of the examples ended you to spell

them out of a bit. your conclusions especially about what lessons you would draw, and we will go in something like chronological order. there is some confusion about chronological order, because rogers served in more than one presidency. >> thank you, paul. i would to start with a topic that i did not have much to do with, and maybe that is why we are such a great success. the environment was hardly an issue in the 1968 campaign. i do not think that either candidate humphrey or nixon talked about it. coming into office in january 1969, most of these issues started becoming important, and i am not sure that the president was terribly interested in it, but he gave a lot of responsibility to staff to

develop some initiatives. during that first year, john ehrlichman went from being counted as president to a system to be present for those affairs, and i went with him as the transition. john whitaker on the white house staff became the point person on environmental policy, and that first year of 1969 was looking at what was going on in the congress on the environment. they passed a national environmental policy act in 1968, so while there was no congressional support for this, i do not think we were not immune to what was going on in the congress. senator jackson, gaylord nelson, and others were really championed this idea of similar legislation. 1969 was a learning year about what was really at stake, and then coming towards the end of 1969, 1970, 1971, i think one of

the major explosives occurred. there was the reorganization plan number two from 1970 which set up the environmental protection agency. a gentleman in the department of justice, william, he was asked to head that agency. another came over to run the council on in burma to quality. john whitaker had the assignment on the white house staff. and john ehrlichman, i think, was very successful -- on environmental quality. there was the role of staff in this. i would say that the environmental program move forward because there were exceptionally talented people on the staff, in the council for environmental quality, and the environmental protection agency who were committed and who were very effective. now, what was the result of their working together? that reorganization plan set up

the environment protection agency. rather, they were not voted down. they had 60 days to vote down an initiative. clean water, clean air, in danger of species -- in danger of species -- endangered species, the major pillars of the movement were established at that time. there were public figures, dennis started earth day in 1970, and i remember wondering if it really was my job on the white house staff to assemble on the banks of the potomac river to start pulling out logs and a lot of junk from the river. we have to be part of this major national movement, so there was a lot of support within the white house staffer what we are doing -- were doing, and i think that four-year period was

healthy -- so there was a lot of support within the white house staff for what we were doing. i attribute a lot of it to the four gentlemen i mentioned, ehrlichman, whitaker, and others. we also had tremendous support on the hill. the board and had been primarily a democratic issue. -- the burden had primarily been a democratic issue, but i think we are did for the four-year. . there might be another term that is stronger, but i do not want to go there -- but i think we borrowed it for the four-year period. the president, i am not sure he was ever terribly comfortable with what we were doing on environmental policy, but he signed on it. when you look back, you can think and maybe we overdid it on the environmental side. when you look today, global

warming becoming the critical issue, i think when we're trying to address in domestic policy to look back and say, now, where did this interest start, as a success, we did not have any failures -- no. the fairest thing is for you to talk about a failure. we did a lot of reorganization plans which, as i said, were adopted. i think our major failure was tried to organize everything. we had a proposal that we sent to the hill in 1971 where we were going to consolidate seven departments and agencies into four. i think they were community development, natural resources, environmental resources, and other affairs, and that probably would have alienated every special interest group, every major congressional committee, the staff, and the bureaucracy. i think there were noll