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>> defense secretary robert gates in chicago talking about the defense budget. then at 7 we will talk with congressman timothy murphy and the labor department chief economist. then live coverage of the u.s. house as they finish work on the annual energy and water spending bill. >> howell is c-span funded? >> taxpayers. >> private donations. >> public support. >> consumer funded. >> the were funded.

>> private contributions. >> 30 years ago america's cable companies created c-span as a public service. a private business initiative. no government mandate, no government money. >> defense secretary robert gates talks about national defense and the obama administration's proposed $680 billion defense budget. in chicago, this is an hour. -- at the economic club of chicago. [applause] >> please take your seats. welcome to this very special meeting.

i believe our guest is the first to address the economic club of chicago. some have called him the ultimate washington insider. the truth is his favorite places near mount rainier. he came to the nation's capital 40 years ago on a whim as a graduate student. he signed up for a cia recording business mostly because it was a free trip. 45 years later dr. robert gates is running the place. the first entry-level person to ever become the agency's director. along the way he has worked with democratic and republican administrations. he has managed to maintain his sanity, his reputation that made a town famous -- in a town made famous by bureaucracy and back fighting. wherhe's done pretty well. its three highest profile positions.

cia director. president of texas a&m university. secretary of defense currently. he's helped remake 3 organisation's that were bound y culture. he's done it by listening to people on the frontline. analysts and agents, teachers and students, corporals and colonels. is funded mostly by focusing on the product. he said the national propensity of bureaucracy is not a decision, but to chew the cud until there's no taste at all left. he has chewed up a number of bureaucrats. he's not afraid to make a decision. his ego is not in line with his title. he's not afraid to put himself or his job on the line. at his confirmation hearing in 2006 he told senators "i did not want this job, doing this to

serve my country." he has retained the reputation. after a reporter recently said he was pretty outspoken parity smiled and said, what are they going to do, fire me? all his experience and skills brought to bear in his current job. it is not only fighting insurgencies and terrorists, but fighting bureaucracy at the pentagon, not to mention the members of congress and company that want to stay at the status quo. the defense budget has doubled in the higher decade, now higher than any other time since the second world war. the u.s. spends more on defense than the entire world combined. defense spending as a major impact on our economy. bob gates is having a major impact on defense spending. the bound to help bring accountability to the budget process. he is working hard to making good on his word. he has kept track of every

soldier killed in battle. he writes a personal note to every family. lately he's been called everything from the anti- rumsfeld to a bureaucrat unbowed. he sees himself as a public servant with a duty to make a difference. there's no higher calling in his eyes. it gives me great pleasure and honor to welcome the secretary of defense dr. robert gates. >> thank you, secretary daily. it is an honor to the economic club of schicago. i appreciate the special

arrangements you have made. i want to thank all the distinguished citizens of this great city laware here today. i am mindful that i am speaking in the hometown of my boss. president obama's and his greetings, as do rahm emanuel and david axelrod and the rest of the chicago group. they are discovering that washington is the true windy city, no doubt. [laughter] [applause] the place where those who travel the high road of humility encounter little heavy traffic. [laughter] the only place in the world you can't prominent person walking down lover's lane holding his own hand. [laughter] the issues that brings me here today is central to the security of all americans, the future of

the u.s. military, how it should be organized, equipped, and funded in the years ahead. to win the war as we are in while being prepared for threats on or beyond the horizon. earlier this year i recommended to president obama and he enthusiastically agreed that we needed to fundamentally reshape the priorities of america's defense establishment and reform the way the pentagon does business. in particular, the weapons we by and how we buy them. above all, to prepare to wage future wars rather than continuing to rearm for previous ones. i am here on relatively short notice to speak publicly about these matters because the congress as we speak is debating the president's defense budget request for the next fiscal year. the budget request that implements many needed reforms

and changes. debating the president knows the defense budget request for the next fiscal year -- debating the president's defense budget request for the next fiscal year, especially things that affect troops, families, and the war effort, have been widely embraced by both parties. however, some of the crucial reforms that deal with major weapons programs -- have met with less than enthusiastic reaction in the congress, among defense contractors, and with in some quarters of the pentagon. so i thought it appropriate to address some of these controversial issues here, in a place that is appropriately not only be adopted home of our commander-in-chief, but also a symbol of america's industrial base and our economic power. first, some context on how we arrived at this stage. president obama's budget proposal is the nation's first

truly 21st century defense budget. it explicitly recognizes that over the last two decades the nature of conflict has fundamentally changed. and that much of america's defense establishment has yet to fully a debt to security realities of post cold war world. and the complex and dangerous new century. during the 1990's the u.s. dollar british the demise of the soviet union under end of history, by making deep cuts in the funding for the u.s. military, including a 40% reduction in the size of the u.s. army. this took place even as a post cold war world grew less stable, less predictable, and more turbulent. the u.s. military, with some advances in areas such as precision weaponry, essentially

simply became a smaller version of the force that held off the soviets in german -- and germany for decades and expelled iraq from kuwait in 1991. there was little appetite for or interest in preparing for what we call a regular warfare. campaigns against insurgents, terrorists, militias, and other non-state groups. this was the bipartisan reality in the congress and the white house. of course after september 11 some things did change. the base defense budget, not counting spending for the wars, increased by 70% over the next eight years. during that time there were important changes in the way u.s. forces were organized, based, and deployed. investments were made in new technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles. however, when all was said and done, the way the pentagon selected, evaluated, developed,

and paid for new weapons systems and equipment did not fundamentally changed. even after september 11. indeed the kinds of equipment, programs, and capability needed to protect our troops and defeat the insurgency in iraq and afghanistan were not the highest priority of much of the defense department. even after several years of war. i learned about this lack of bureaucratic priority for the wars we are in the hard way. during my first few months on the job as the iraq surge was getting underway. the challenges i faced in getting what our troops needed in the field stood in stark contrast to the support provided conventional modernization programs. weapons designed to fight other modern armies, navies, and air forces. programs that had been a pipeline for many years and had acquired a loyal enthusiastic

following in the pentagon, the congress, and in industry. the most pressing needs of today's war fighters on the battlefield, in the hospitals, or at home simply lacked place and power at the table when priorities were being set and long-term budget decisions were being made. so the most important shift in president obama's first defense budgets was to increase and institutionalize funding for programs that directly supports to those fighting america's wars and their families. those initiatives included more helicopter support, airlift, armored vehicles, personnel -- personal protection equipment, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance apparatus for it troops in afghanistan and iraq. we increased funding for programs that provide long-term support for military families

and treatment for the signature of bones of these wars, such as dramatic brain injuries and posttraumatic stress. -- signature wounds. the world of insurgents and ied's is with us for zero long- haul, but we recognize that and other world has emerged. growing numbers of countries and groups are employing the latest and increasingly accessible technologies to put the united states at risk in disruptive and unpredictable ways. other large nations known in pentagon language as near peers are modernizing their militaries that could pose a challenge to the u.s. over time. in some cases their programs take the form of traditional weapons systems such as more advanced fighter aircraft, missiles, and submarines. but these other nations have learned from the experience of

saddam hussein's's military in the first and second goal force. that it is ill-advised, is not suicidal to fight a conventional warhead to head against the united states, fighter to a fighter, ship to ship, tank to tank. they also learned from a bank erupted so the union not to try to outspend us or outmatched our overall capabilities -- a bankrupted soviet union. they have taken advantage of our technology and vulnerability to take advantage of our freedom of movement and to deny our military options and strategic choices. at the same time insurgents and malicious requiring or seeking precision weapons, sophisticated communications, cyber capabilities, and even weapons of mass destruction. the lebanese extremist group

hezbollah currently has more rockets and high munitions, many quite sophisticated and accurate, then all but a handful of countries. in some the security challenges we now face and will in the future have changed. our thinking must likewise change. the old paradigm of looking at potential conflict is either -- as either regular or in a regular war, conventional or unconventional, high-end or low end is no longer relevant. as a result, the defense apartment needs to think about and prepare for war in a profoundly different way than we have been accustomed to throw out the better part of the century. what we need is a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. as a result, we must change the way we think and the way we planned.

fundamentally reform the way we do business and purchase weapons. it simply will not do to base our strategies solely on continuing to design and buy as we have for the last 60 years only the most technologically advanced weapons to keep up with or stay ahead of another superpower adversary. especially one that imploded nearly a generation ago. to get there we have to break the old habit of adding layer upon layer of cost, complexity, and delight to systems that are so expensive and elaborate that only a small number can be built and are then usable only in a narrow range for low probability scenarios. we must also get control of what we call requirements creep, where more and more features and capabilities are added to a given piece of equipment often to the point of absurdity. an example is the new

presidential helicopter. president obama referred to it as a defense procurement run amok. once the analysis and requirements were done, we ended up with helicopters that cost nearly half a billion dollars apiece and enabled the president, among other things, to cook dinner while in flight under nuclear attack. [laughter] we also had to take a hard look at a number of weapons programs that were grotesquely over budgeted. we are having major performance problems, we are reliant on unproven technologies, becoming increasingly detached from real- world scenarios. in september 11 and the war is -- as of september 11 and the wars that followed had never happened. the manufacturing sector's have at some point faced a combination of these challenges in your own businesses. in the defense arena we face an

additional often insurmountable obstacle, bringing rationality to budget acquisition decisions. major weapons programs, regardless of their problems or performance, have a habit of continuing long after they are wanted or needed. recalling ronald reagan's old joke that a government program represents the closest thing we will ever see on this earth to eternal life. [laughter] first there's the congress, which is understandably concerned, especially in these tough economic times, about protecting jobs in certain states and districts. there is the defense and aerospace industry, which has an obvious financial stake in the survival and growth of these programs. then there is the institutional military itself. within the pentagon and as expressed through an influential network of retired generals and admirals, some of

foam are paid consultants to the defense industry and some often quoted as experts in the news media. as a result, many past attempts by my predecessors to end failing or unnecessary programs have gone by the wayside. nonetheless, perhaps in a triumph of hope over experience, i determined and the president agreed that given the urgency of the wars we are in, the daunting global security environment we will inhabit for decades ahead, and our country's economic problems, we simply cannot afford to move ahead with business as usual. to this end, the president's budget request cut, curtailed, or end of the number of conventional modernization programs. satellites, ground vehicles, no club dues, fighters. they were either performing poorly or access to real world

needs. conversely, future oriented programs where the u.s. was relatively underinvested were exhilarated or received more funding. for example, we must sustain and continually improving our specialized strategic deterrence to ensure that ours and our allies security is always protected against nuclear-armed adversaries. in an initiative little-noticed, the president program includes money to begin a whole new generation of ballistic missile submarines and nearly $700 million in additional funds to secure and short america's nuclear deterrence. some of our proposed reforms are meeting real resistance. they are called risky one -- for not meeting certain military requirement, or lacking in study or analysis. those three words, requirement, risk, and analysis, are commonly invoked in defense matters.

if applied directly, they help us make sound decisions. i have found, however, that they more often have become the holy trinity of the status quo, or business as usual. in truth, preparing for conflict in the 21st century means investing in new technology. it means taking into account all the aspects and capabilities we can bring to the fight. it means measuring those capabilities against real threat posed by real-world adversaries with real limitations. not threats conjured up from enemies with unlimited time, and limited resources, and unlimited fax technological acumen. there's air security provides a case study. let me start with the controversy over the f22 jet. we had to consider when we were

preparing for future potential conventional state on state conflict, what is the right mix of the most advanced fighter aircraft and other weapons to deal with the known and projected a threat to u.s. air supremacy? for example, we have unmanned aerial vehicles that can simultaneously perform intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions as well as deliver precision guided bombs and missiles. the president's budget request was -- would purchase 48 of the most advanced aircraft than ever greater range than some of doorman's fighters, in addition to the ability to calling for four hours over the target. we will by many more in the future. we also took into consideration the capabilities of the newest manned combat aircraft programs, the f35 joint strike fighter. it is 10 or 15 years newer than the f22.

care is a much larger suite of weapons and is superior in a number of areas. most important, their ground missions such as destroying sophisticated anti-air defenses. it is a versatile aircraft that cost less than half of the other aircraft. some 500 will be bought over the next five years. more than 2400 over the life of the program. we already have eight foreign partners committed to buying them along with us. thef35 has had development problems. just like every advanced military aircraft ever built, including f22. but the f35 will be the backbone of america tactical aviation fleet for decades ahead, if money is not drained away to spend on other aircraft that are

uniform military leadership considers lower priority for access to our needs. having said that, the f22 is clearly a capability that we need. the silver bullet solution for one or two potential scenarios. specifically, the defeat of a highly advanced enemy fighter fleet. f22 does not make much sense any place else in the spectrum of conflict. nonetheless, supporters of the f22 lately have promoted its used for an ever expanding list of potential missions. these range from protecting homeland from seaborne cruise missiles to as one retired general recommended on television using the f-22 to go after somali pirates cool are in many cases teenagers with -- who are in many cases teenagers carrying an ak-47.

a job that can be done by a few navy seals. these are examples of how far fetched some of the arguments have become for program that has caused $65 billion and still counting to produce 187 aircraft. not to mention the thousands of uniformed air force positions that were sacrificed to help pay for it. in light of all these factors and with the support of the air force leadership, i concluded that 183, the program a record since 2005, plus four more added in the fyio supplemental was a sufficient number of f-22's and recommended as such to the president. the reaction from washington has been predictable. the most substantive criticism is that completing the f-22 program means we are risking the future of u.s. air supremacy.

to assess the risk, it is worth looking at a real world potential threat and assessing the capabilities that other countries have now or are in the pipeline. by 2020 the u.s. is projected to have nearly 2500 manned combat aircraft of all kinds. of those nearly 1100 will be the most advanced fifth generation f-35 and f-22's. china is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. by 2025 the gap will widen. the u.s. will have approximately 1700 of the most advanced fifth generation fighters compared with only a handful of comparable aircraft to the chinese. nonetheless, some portray this scenario as a dire threat to america's national security.

correspondingly, the recent task of a possible mix pnuclear test in north korea that the attention of the country. the risk of national security has been invoked, mendon because the missile defense budget was reduced from last year. in fact, whether the threat is real or growing from rogue states or from short to medium- range missiles that can get our deployed troops or our allies and friends, the budget sustains all increases funding. most of the cuts in this area come from two programs that are designed to shoot down enemy missiles immediately after launch. this was a great idea, but the aspiration was overwhelmed by escalating cost, operational problems, and technological challenges. consider the example of one of those programs, the laser. this was supposed to put high- power lasers on a fleet of

747's. after a decade of research and development we have yet to achieve a laser with enough power to knock down a missile more than a 50 miles from the launch pad. thus requiring big planes to loiter deep in enemy airspace to have a feasible shot at a direct hit. moreover, the 10 or 20 aircraft needed would cost about 1.5 billion each. also tens of millions of dollars annually each. for maintenance. and for operation. the program and operating concept were fatally flawed and it was time to face reality. so we curtailed to the existing program while keeping the prototype aircraft for research and development. many of these decisions, like the one i just described, where more clear-cut than others. but all of them, insofar as they involved hundreds of billions of dollars and security of the american people, were treated

with the utmost seriousness by senior civilian and military leadership of the pentagon. an enormous amount of thought, study, assessment, and analysis underpins the budget recommendations, including national defense strategy that i issued last summer. some have called for yet more analysis before making any decisions in this budget. but when dealing with programs that were clearly out of control, performing poorly, and access to the military's real requirement, we did not need more study, more debate, or more delay. paralysis through analysis, in effect. what was needed was three things. common sense, political will, and tough decisions. qualities often in short supply in washington, d.c. all of these decisions involved considering tradeoffs, balancing risk, and setting priorities.

separating something nice to have from something necessary to have. requirement from appetite. we cannot expect to eliminate risk or danger by simply spending more, especially if we are spending on the wrong things. but more to the point, we all, the military, the congress, and industry have to face some iron fiscal realities. the last defense budget presented by george w. bush for fiscal year 2009 was $550 billion. in that budget the bush administration proposed that my recommendations for fiscal year 2010 budget of $524 billion. the budget does -- just submitted by president obama to congress was 5 under $34 billion. so even after factoring in inflation and some of the war cost removed from supplemental appropriation, president

obama's defence request represents a modest but real increase over the last bush request. i know. i submitted them both. [laughter] in total, as secretary daily indicated by one estimate our budget adds up to about what the rest of the entire world spends on defense. and only in the parallel universe of washington, d.c. would that be considered gutting defense. the fact is that even if the defense budget had been higher, my recommendation to the president, with respect to troubled programs, would have been exactly the same. for all the reasons i have described. there is a more fundamental issue. if the department of defense cannot figure out a way to defend the united states of america on a budget of more than half a trillion dollars a year, then our problems are much bigger than anything that can be cured by purchasing a few more ships or planes.

what is important is to have a budget baseline with a steady, sustainable, and predictable rate of growth that avoids extreme peaks and valleys that are enormously harmful to sound budgeting. from the very first defense budget i submitted for president bush in january 2007, i have warned against doing what america has done multiple times over the last 90 years, by cutting defense spending after every major conflict. the war in iraq is winding down. one day so will the conflict in afghanistan. when that day arrives the nation will again face pressure to cut back on defense spending, as we always have. it is simply the nature of the beast. the higher dollar base budget is now, more unrealistic, the harder it will be to sustain necessary programs we have, and a more drastic and dangerous the drop-off will be later.

so where do we go from here? authorization for more f-22's in both versions of the defense bill working its way through congress. president has indicated he has real redlines in this budget, including the f-22. some might ask why threaten a veto and risk a confrontation over a couple billion dollars for a dozen or so more airplanes? the grim reality is with regard to the defense budget we have entered a zero sum game. every defense dollar devoted -- diverted to fund excess or unneeded capacity, whether for more f-22's or anything else is a dollar that will be unavailable to take care of our people, to win the war as we are in, to deter potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas where america is underinvested and potentially vulnerable. that is a risk i cannot accept

and one that i will not take. with regard to something like the f-22, regardless of whether the number of aircraft is 12 or 200, if we cannot bring ourselves to make this tough but straightforward decision, reflecting the judgment of two very different presidents, two secretaries of defense, two chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and the current air force secretary and chief of staff, where do we draw the line? if not now, then when? if we cannot get this right, then what on earth can we get right? it is time to draw the line on doing defense business as usual. the president has drawn the line and that line is with regard to a veto. it is real. on a personal note i joined the cia more than 40 years ago to help protect my country. just about my entire

professional career in government, i've been known as a hawk on national security. one criticism of me at cia was i overestimated threats to the security of our country. i have not changed. i did not turn from a hawk into a dove on january 20, 2009. i continue to believe the world is and always will be a dangerous and hostile place for my country with many who would do as harm and many who hate what we are and what we stand for. but the reality is the nature of the threats against us has changed. so should the way our military is organized and equipped to meet them. i believe, along with senior uniformed military leadership of this nation, that the defense budget we propose to president obama and that he sent to the congress is the best that we could designed to protect the

united states now and in the future. the best we could do to protect our men and women in uniform, to give them the tools they need to tour our enemies and to win our wars today and tomorrow. please stand by this reform budget and we are prepared to fight for it. -- we stand by this. i arrived in washington 43 years ago this summer. of all people, i am aware of the realities in washington and i know the changes -- things don't change overnight. the influence of politics and parochial interests in defense matters is as old as the republic itself. henry not, but for secretary your war, was charged with building the first american fleet -- henry knox. he eventually ended up with six frigates being built in six different states. the stakes today are very high. with the nation at war and the

security landscapes steadily growing more dangerous and unpredictable, i am deeply concerned about the longterm challenges facing our defense establishment. i'm just as concerned that the political state of play in washington does not reflect the reality that major reforms are needed, or the tough choices and real discipline are necessary. we stand at a crossroads. we simply cannot risk continuing going down the same path. where our spending and program priorities are increasingly divorced from the very real threats of today and the growing ones of tomorrow. these threats demand that all of our nations' leaders rise above the politics and parochialism that have often played considerations of or national defense. from industry to interest groups, from the pentagon to the foggy bottom, from one end of pennsylvania avenue to the

other, the time has come to draw a line and take a stand against the business as usual approach to national defense. we must fulfill our obligation to the american people to ensure that our country remains safe and strong, just as our men and women in uniform are doing their duty to this end, we in washington must do ours. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, mr. secretary, for that very thoughtful -- those very thoughtful remarks. the custom of the club is to

have a question and answer session. we appreciate you are willing to participate. our question committee has come up with some thoughtful ones. the first one is on a personal level. what leadership or personal experiences as director of cia had helped you in your role as secretary of defense? how are the two jobs similar? are there major differences between the two? >> when i get out of this job i want to write a book about the challenges of leading change in large public institutions, because whether it is cia or a huge public university or the department of defense, they all have very important characteristics in common. first, they are all publicly accountable. second, they are all accountable to a legislature. third, they all get their budgets from legislature. fourth, they all have permanent

cadre who will be there before the leader of rise and will be there after the leader is gone. moseley have the opportunity just to outlast them. they all have either retirees or alumni who consider that they still should have significant influence over how the place gets run. [laughter] the reality is what i have learned at all three places is particularly when it comes to leading change, the central strategy for me has been that it is my responsibility to set the goals, to set division, but then to incorporate the professionals in the organization in figuring out how we accomplish that goal. how do we get from here to where we need to be? because the truth is, if they participate in it, if they helped to design a solution, then they will increase its and they will defended once you have left.

i've worked for too many people in the government wh came in and tried to impose change from the top and the change walked out on the day they left. the key is bringing professionals on board, working with them and establishing a productive partnership. then you have the opportunity for a permanent change. i learned that lesson at cia first and continue to apply it until today and in the defense department. >> you are the only secretary to ever stay on with a newly elected president. what were the factors that went into your decision to stay on with this president? what -- how do we strengthen our civil servants to have that sort of strong feeling for the country that you do? >> i spent most of the first six months of last year trying to build a wall very high that made

clear i did not want to stay in the government, i did not want to stay in washington, d.c., and that i wanted nothing more than to go back to washington state. i talked a lot about my old clock that was turned down the days, hours, minutes, seconds to when i could depart at noon on january 20. the reason i did that was that whoever was elected, if i was asked tuesday, i would have to do that. i hoped i would just never get asked. i did get asked the question and i did not hesitate and i immediately said that i would be honored tuesday. i would say this, about president obama, i was deeply

impressed that his vision for the country and his concern for the security of the country led him to ask me to stay. because it seemed to me -- this had never been done before after an election -- it seemed to me to reflect his recognition that at a time when we were at war in two different places and major conflicts in two places and many other conflicts on a lesser scale, that what was important for the nation was continuity. and so, i had no hesitation in saying yes. >> what would be the major differences, stylistically, in leadership, or approaches to defence between president bush and president obama? >> journalists have asked me that question on a number of occasions. i have a stock answer. i have a really good answer to

that question. i will answer it when i get paid to answer it. [laughter] [applause] those 41 years in washington have taught you a lot. what countries situation most were you? and obviously there is pakistan and north korea. any other countries you may want to talk about? >> i think this is option e, all of the above. i think that the situation -- we face a number of challenges. i will tell you the president is the eighth president i have worked for. i do not recall a single time in my entire professional career when i felt the country faced as

complex and in many respects dangerous daytime as we do now. -- dangerous a time as we do now. i grew up during the cold war. we had a singular focus on the soviet union. every problem in the world was seen through the prism of the cold war and the competition with the soviet union. it was a relatively simple structure that we were dealing with. there was always the danger of a nuclear catastrophe with the soviet union. but the truth of the matter is through the 45 years of the cold war with one or two exceptions, that possibility was really quite remote. the problem that we are facing now is we face a multiplicity of threats. while none of them are as potentially cataclysmic as the nuclear exchange of the soviet union, the likelihood of one of them actually happening is

significantly greater, in my view. so we have a number of countries where we have to be concerned and where in the past i like to tell young officers this, in the past a crisis would come up, be dealt with, and go away. nothing ever seems to go away. remember, at the end of the bush administration i had an exchange with secretary rice. we were in this equation room for a meeting on piracy. who thought we would be dealing with piracy? this is 18th-century stuff. [laughter] these things keep coming up. just like piracy, they don't go away. we have to figure out a way to deal with them. all of these countries are a concern, but the one i think is the most difficult -- and it was difficult in the bush administration and it is difficult in this administration, is the problem of iran.

it is iran's determination, apparently, to seek nuclear weapons. the inability of the international community affect their determination to do that. and how you deal with that. and where all the outcomes are negative. if they achieve warren, the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the middle east is very real. -- if they achieve a nuclear weapon, the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the middle east is very real. the consequences of them getting one is unpredictable and likely very bad. the international community, not just the u.s. that faces the problem. if iran could have missiles to deliver nuclear weapons to people in their region it would get there a lot sooner than they would have the capability to deliver one to us. this is one of the messages i have delivered to the russians

over the last few years. is that they are a lot closer than we are. there does not seem to be a good options where one can have any optimism that a good option can be found. >> what are the steps and time lines to closing the prison at guantanamo bay? >> the president, as you know, has signed an executive order that would close guantanamo on january 22, 2010. the line of states and communities that are willing to have the folks at guantanamo come to their area seems to be a very short one. [laughter] like nonexistent.

i expected 5 the hundred 35 separate pieces of legislation in congress saying, not in my district or state -- are expected 535 separate pieces of legislation. we need to find a place. closing guantanamo is complex and difficult, but the reality is we have dozens and dozens of dangerous terrorists in maximum- security prisons in the u.s. and not one has ever escaped. as i said during the bush administration, interestingly enough, guantanamo is probably one of the best prisons in the world today because of all the things that have been done to improve it. nonetheless, it will, i believe, forever be tainted. it is something that can be used against us by our adversaries. therefore, i certainly agree with the president and i agreed with the last president that it needs to be closed. if we are moving down that path.

i think we will get it done. >> what is the future of the don't ask, don't tell policy can be altered successfully pulled and meet the original intent of the policy? >> this is a difficult challenge for us. there's no reason to soft pedal it. but the fact is the president has said he intends to change this policy, but the key is to remember it is not a policy. in it is a lait is a law. before we can do anything, congress has to change the law. after the law is changed, then we will do what the law says and what the president tells us to do. in the meantime, as i have indicated, i have our attorneys at the department of defense looking to see if there is a way in which we can enforce the law.

we must enforce the law. we have all taken an oath to do that in public office. but is there a way to comply with our oath to enforce the law that finds some way in which we can apply it more humanely. one example of that might be, what if we did not take into account third parties trying to harm somebody who may be gay in the service, somebody who may have a vendetta or hatred toward somebody, and therefore out them as a way to wreck their career? is there a way we can not focus on those kinds of reports? to tell you the truth, i am not a lawyer and i don't know the answer to that question. if it were an easy question, i

would probably have gotten an answer back from my general counsel weeks ago. if we are looking at it to see if there's any flexibility so we can enforce the law but do it in a way that at least brings some flexibility to the process until the law is changed. >> what is the department of defense during about the rise in military suicides and posttraumatic stress disorder cases? >> we had a -- every day we lose somebody in the department of defense. it -- each day we lose somebody is a tragic day. we had a particularly tragic day run the middle of june. at that time we have lost 87 of our young men and women killed in iraq and afghanistan. on that day, year to date we had also lost 87 to suicide.

this is a problem that every person in the pentagon is taking very seriously. none more so than the leadership of the army. we have made huge steps in dealing with the posttraumatic stress issue. we have put enormous resources into it, done an enormous amount of educational activity to try to -- virtually every soldier in the army has been exposed to training on how to recognize the symptoms of post-traumatic stress, building the but the principle of looking out to see if your buddy is demonstrating this, educating families so they can recognize the symptoms, creating capabilities for treatment for these people. we've done a lot to try to remove the stigma of recording -- reporting. i think making progress for people seeking help and i think we're making significant progress in those areas. the truth of the matter is i

believe the suicides are a reflection of the stress on the force. and we will do everything in our power to try to have commanders andnco's an nco's and others recognize distress. the solution to this problem is where our soldiers have more time at home, where there's less stress and where we are not putting people through five rotations in stressful situations like iraq and afghanistan. >> there has been news of people penetrating the pentagon computer network. what do you have to say about any new steps to handle that? >> we need to make additional

investments in this. one of the lines i have used since january 20 is there were a number of decisions from the air force tanker program to several others that last fall i pointed to my successor-- punted to my successor, only to find myself on the one-yard line receiving. [laughter] ansari. i got distracted by myself. -- i am sorry. i made some preliminary structural changes last summer and last fall, but i did not want to take the next step of creating a full cyber command. i thought that should be left to my successor. once i ended up with my staying in the job, i decided to proceed. the president had directed a 60-

day cyber study by the white house. we participated in that. i held off on my decision in creating the cyber command until that was over and we could see how it fit with the rest of what the administration was going to do on the cyber. this really consolidate a number of different capabilities within the defense department. it simply puts us in a better organizational position to be able to defend ourselves, to defend the military networks against the intrusions from abroad and to exploit what we learn when people make those kind of attacks on us. if -- it is one of those areas are referred to in my remarks where we need to make additional investments. i would say that the civilian side of the government needs to do likewise. >> mr. secretary, we are extremely proud of you. a number of chicagoans have

moved on to run the country with the president. now we have a question from somebody from the united kingdom. luke. >> mr. secretary, on behalf of the economic clu of such a -- club of chicago, we thank you for your service to our nation and would you have sacrificed to make us better people. thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2008] cost

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