c-span. >> go inside the supreme court to see the public places have those rarely seen spaces. hear from the justices as they provide their in sort botched their insight. -- as they provide their insight. >> how is c-span funded? >> private donations. >> taxpayers. >> public television. what's the donations. >> i don't know where the money comes from. >> federally? >> contributions from donors. >> out is c-span funded, america's cable companies created c-span as a public service, a private business initiative, no government mandate, no government money. . .

>> you have the foreign secretary and the labour -- in the labour government, and a shadow foreign secretary and the conservative party. dollars british of butter is expected to go to the polls next spring, and the most recent polls ofshow that the

conservative party has the lead. >> particularly for the commitment and eggs -- and afghanistan and iraq. that said, the positions of the two parties have not been hugely different. on both sides -- sides of the political divide, what you will see is a much greater degree of caution about taking on major overseas military commitments. that opinion is taking on major commitments for afghanistan and iraq at the same time, it has put enormous strain on the british armed forces. and then coming ahead, is the pressure is -- you see pressures on cuts in public spending.

the public was to seek financing pact under control. the deficit has absolutely blown because of measures taken trying to end the recession >> in terms of foreign policy, are the policies of either party toward the united states different? >> not hugely, and note. -- not a huge lake, no. -- not hugely, no. that said, whichever party comes and, if the american states, looking for british support of major military operations, there would be a

significant degree of more caution. >> william hague is the former leader of the conservative party. not david cameron is leading the conservative party. what is their relationship and what will his role be going forward? bubblers' the relations had been very good. william hague did step back from front-line politics for a while. it was david cameron who encouraged him to come back, and he is one of the party's most talented politicians. he has an appeal to the right of the party, which is not mr. cameron's as strong as face. mr. hague is adamant that he does not want to be leader again in the future.

>> for our viewers who do not know, you write for the press association. what is your organization about? >> it is the predecessor -- the british and national news agency. we provide a full range of stories. they get picked up by far in newspapers as well near >> we appreciate you, gavin cordon, for joining us. thank you for the update. that speech by william hague, the british conservative party's shadow foreign secretary. this was at the institute for strategic studies in london. >> thank you and good afternoon. it's great to be here again at iiss. i think this is the third time in four years that i have spoken on the 21st of july, parliament

cannot go into our recess until i deliver my speech. i thank you for assuring me that i would only be 30 minutes on television and i was still sitting there two hours later. but two hours of arab translation versus the same time in parliament is different. the coming general election will be of extraordinary magnitude, with the proportion of national income running at its highest as the second world war, there is no doubt that the principal legacy of the current government to its successors and the next generation will be that, and that on a scale that will take many years to scale back. -- will be debt, and get on a scale that will take many years to scale back.

we must not forget the focus on mounting external challenges which go beyond the economic sphere but which will be all the more difficult to deal with at a time when resources will necessarily be constrained. any informed assessment of likely trends in world affairs of the next decade, one which are not -- our national future depends, is a sobering one. we have to recognize that the al looked in foreign affairs, it just as much as an economic affairs, will require all the ability, energy, and focus we can bring to it, and it leads unmistakably to a world environment in which it will be more difficult for this country and its traditional allies to achieve their farm policy goals unless we improve the way we go

about them. this country continues to present great assets and advantages. among them are skilled and highly respected diplomatic course, which is a bright it continuity uncertainty over time. an exceptionally strong relationship with united states of america, a major role in the affairs of the european union, with other nations, formalized in the commonwealth, and the enormous influence that comes from being a global trading nation and the home of one of the great languages of humanity. we also have the immense advantage of armed forces that are considered around the world to be among the finest it is possible to possess, although currently under previous strain. the net result of such advantages is that britain still carries far more clout in

the world than its current share of the world's population would suggest. such assets should always give us confidence in the fortified knowledge set the foundations exist for building up british influence in select areas if we chose to do so. at the same time, the advance of international cooperation discussed at international summits and a multilateral approach to foreign policy that provides other nations with a fresh opportunity to respond positively give cause for optimism in international relations. it is not unreasonable to expect for advances in medical fees praise process, for better air and u.s.-russian relations, and for more constructive response from the leadership of iran, all more determined effort by the international community to overcome iranian entrances and some -- and transients

andintran -- intrangincese. whatever the odds and downs of any given year, it will be harder for our country to pursue a chosen policy and to protect its interests and citizens. looking at a decade or two ahead, powerful forces of economics and demography elsewhere in the world will make it harder for us to maintain our influence. conventional assumptions about what britain and its main partners can readily achieve in world affairs will be eroded. and the likelihood of the challenges that it will be vital that we understand and equip

ourselves for now. britain stands to lose a good deal of its ability to shape world affairs unless we decide we will not accept that and are prepared what is needed. but there may be turbulent times away -- head, here is an analysis. their recent report on a national-security ided organization argues that we have to learn to live in a more complex, less predictable environment, facing a broader spread of risk with greater independence and reduce government power. and i agree with that. there're many specific reasons why the world looks like he could be a more dangerous, rather than less dangerous place in the coming decade. four previous generations, such increased danger occurs because of a rise of a single dominant adversary. this is not the case in the first half of the 21st century in which less likely to be characterized instead by growing political and economic and military and stability.

the prevalence of state play your -- failure, bringing enhanced opportunities to develop terrorist networks and organized crime. so serious is this that we may need to speak of the emergence of what am i may be called failed or failing regions, -- what in moumbai might be called failed or failing regions. it will have serious consequences for our already struggling capability to reverse the decline of tumbling states. globalization means that the threat within these regions cannot be easily contained. a second factor growing directly from the first is the increasingly transnational dimension of terrorism. the terrorist may be a citizen of somalia who was educated in yemen, have been trained in

pakistan, and may be living in afghanistan or the streets of britain. this is vastly complicating the task of identifying and stopping those who would attack us and requires unprecedented cooperation with our allies. third, and related to the other two, is the changing character of conflict to a regular work there. it is exemplified by the improvised explosive devices that play -- claimed most of the british lives in after i -- in afghanistan and iraq. it challenges the assumption that victory on the battlefield can be swiftly followed by development in nation building. as one person has put its, given overwhelming u.s. u.s. superiority, it turns out that africa -- afghans do not give up. any smart element -- enemy goes

unconventional and they are likely to continue doing so until we have demonstrated the ability to prevail in in a regular -- in the irregular warfare. this means that despite the economic recession, many developing countries are not only being left behind by are falling further behind. described by one person, 1 billion people stuck in a train that is slowly rolling downhill. policy is not a dissertation are an explanation for terrorism but it does help to make such country havens for threats to our national security, including not only terrorism but illegal trafficking and pandemic threats. alsace and widespread polity are growing today, and they're terribly new -- and aeronaut new in world history.

there are two central challenges in men's in scope which the world as never had to face before. the first of the risk of irreversible climate change. as we a brought home if you listen to the tale of the maldives, now part of which is more than 6 feet above sea land. the war in dartboard -- darfur has been driven by climate change and environmental degradation. unless enough action is taken quickly enough, this phenomenon all lead to starvation or lay waste to an entire region. it is vital in on national interest to move to a genuinely low carbon economy and act with our international partners to reach agreements on the success

to reduce global emissions, keep global temperature rises below two degrees celsius. the sec at the stabilizing force is the threat of nuclear energy. it can provide part of the answer to climate change, but the global spread of nuclear technology and material presents a new age of nuclear and security. it involves a rash of new nuclear weapon states are even the acquisition and nuclear weapons by terrorists, a risk which may grow in parallel to their possession of chemical or biological devices. as in the case of climate change, decisions taken in the next year or two will be crucial in determining whether this colossal risk can be minimized. after that it may be too late for the alarming features of these threats are not only that they are new and not only that

the consequences are unknowable, but they are certainly not reversible once they have happened. this list of worrying factors is exhausting. you only need to think about the risks in energy security to think about further dimensions. this troubling scenario is bad enough in itself. the outlook for london and for other european capitals is further compounded in grimness when the relative economic power of western nations is in decline. economics as as makes a big difference to a foreign-policy influence. -- economic success makes a big difference to farm policy influence. it reinforces but influence of foreign ministers. this is something tony blair was able to enjoy it while gordon brown was destroying that renaissance.

it reduced britain from second to 12th place in the international league of competitors, according to the world economic order the diminishing our economic power, and its effectiveness, and sets in -- and such additional short- term decline is exacerbate -- exasperated because it is so unnecessary. the size of the european economy relative to the rest of the world looks set to shrink dramatically. the european commission's own projections have shown europe's share of the world economy declining from 18% now to 10% by the end of the century, and even the united states is not immune from the effects. this diminished economic plight will have a major impact on the ability of western nations to achieve their farm policy goals. for instance, we're used to the idea of calling for economic

sanctions against nations whose human-rights records we find unacceptable. south africa under apartheid as a celebrated example. and now we have applied them to recalcitrant racine's in burma and iraq. we may come close to the time when we have that put tougher sanctions on iran. yet it is already clear that the power such economic weapons is declining. it follows in this analysis that it will decline much further in the years to come. what is more, much of the economic waste is coming from countries that do not share our idea of democracy and human rights or are opposed to intervention approaches to foreign policy toward china is obvious case. -- interventionist approaches to foreign policy. china is an obvious case.

china gave robust support to the sri lanka and government in its recent conflict, and western governments were unable to pass a resolution in the u.n. council on human-rights. india, another rising power and the world's most populous democracy, is traditionally not inclined to support our western inclination to support human rights and economic pressure and military intervention. nor are many of the growing economic power centers in the world, brazil or in the call. not only has the world not converting around our own democratic norms, but according to a survey, global freedom to his third year of decline in 2008, but nearly powerful democratic nations do not share our view of how to conduct foreign policy. the liberal interventionism has

generated much debate in britain. but the varying degrees, all have subscribed to it. the economic conditions have enjoyed some support as has military intervention in many countries. iraq being a much more controversial case, but heavily supported at the time. we're all agreed that we would try to intervene in another situation. but in the years and decades to come, the rise of other nations will constrain our ability to act in this way. a further constraint will come in the form of tightly controlled military budgets. the extreme pressures on our own defense budget faces a review which an incoming conservative government would certainly undertake. as crucial but such a review is informed by the changing pattern of threats i have described rather than financial considerations along. france is also bitterly engaged in reshaping its armed forces.

but beyond britain and france, there is no sign of other european nations making a serious effort to develop greater military capabilities. indeed, it is our criticism of the youth defense arraignments -- eu defense arrangements, and just calling something european does mean -- does not mean it enhances europe's ability to act. does this background of a decline in our relative economic base and severe constraints on our military capabilities mean that we simply accept a much diminished role in world affairs? the united kingdom has engaged timbale for in major axe of the strategic shrinkage, such as the withdraw from the suez canal. yet the conservative party answer to whether further such shrinkage would be right for british international role is no. true, as a nation we will have

to accustom myself to being -- to more situations that we do not dislike. it is our contention that britain must seek to retain our influence wherever possible and in some places seek to extend it. we must not disconsolate nly ceased to make the effort. the british national interest requires our continued fully active engagement in world affairs, since all the threatening factors i have listed of a threat to the interest of this country. no other nation or group nations are going to increase the protection. the essential alliances we enjoy with the united states and in the european nations depend directly on a continuing doing a great deal on ourselves. what we might call are and why the national interest required british global engagement. britain will be safer if our

values are strongly upheld and widely respected in the world. nor will britain ever be happy as a nation if we partly are largely retired from the sphere of influence on world events. the citizens of britons have always been reckless in trying to improve the wider world and global in our outlook. we've always been at the forefront of international challenges, and the welcoming of refugees. 200 years ago it was the royal navy that helped to drive the slave trade from the high seas, and our parliament led the way in challenging the excesses' of colonial rule. it is not in our character to have a farm policy without a conscience, to be eidolon interested while other star for murder each other in their millions, that is not for ras. that is why david cameron and i have spoken in recent years of our approach to foreign affairs been very liberal conservatism. we believe in freedom, human rights, and democracy in want to see more of these things things

another nation. but conservative because we believe strongly in the continued relevance of the nation state and are skeptical of grand utopias schemes to remake the world. as david cameron put it, my instinct is to work patiently with the grain of human nature. we're cuts is that our international role is no isolated subject. -- were conscience -- we are conscious that our international role is no isolated subject. how we regard ourselves and what it will mean in the next generation to be british. if britain is continued to beat global -- global engaged, it needs to be with a real sense of a possible on how rapidly nations can be built, and how on earth are we going to do it? the answer to that question will constitute our approach to foreign policy.

it must necessarily and bought using our resources more effectively, increasing our knowledge of other countries, and launching an sustaining certain initiatives over many years. in january 2007, in my speech, i set out five keys for farm policy of the next conservative government. 2.5 years on the remain valid as the background i have described but did not time to update them. the first of these themes is learning from past mistakes to improve the decision making a british government itself. i've already mentioned the need for defense review. it is consistent with what i argued that this must be focused not on whether britain should be able to project military force elsewhere in the world but on how it will do so. it is not the purpose of this speech to preempt any way that review. i wish to make clear now, first, that it will be a defense and national security review

covering all aspects of british security and not just the armed forces. second, that it will be guided by the requirements of farm policy and not solely by financial constraints. third, we will not shrink from adapting our future armed forces for this change the world. good decision making also requires all are and commonwealth office to be in its rightful place in the center of decision making. we want to take a close interest not only in day-to-day decisions but in its future as a great institution, able to attract the finest talent, and while it cannot have a monopoly on knowledge of expertise, to be the center of british thinking about and development of relationship of other nations. the decision making of labour downing street has been bad. the iraq war inquiry was a classic example of decisions

made wholly in downing street which the foreign secretary was left to defend, underlining the fact that the foreign office can only exercise its proper influence if there is a close and personal relationship between the prime minister in the foreign secretary. a conservative government will establish our real national security council at the cabinet, chaired by the prime minister or in his absence by the foreign secretary. this will bring together on a regular basis the work of the foreign office, the home office, and ministers responsible for other relevant matters such as others. we intend this to not be a new barack -- but a center of decision making and it will only work if it is treated as such. buttressed by crossed the bodman old team supporting it, and covering the whole range of national security issues. the attempt by the brown government to create a national security apparatus in response to our demand for one has been a pitiful failure.

typically in this vital area of the prevalence of short-term gimmicks over a sustained effort in the current administration. the national security committee announced with much fanfare two years ago met only three times in the 20 months that followed. the prime minister's national security forum has nine -- had no discernible impact at all, and says the joint committee was announced a year ago, its members had not even been appointed. this chronic bell year to institutionalize cross departmental working is in our view us serious impediment to the successful at the met -- execution of farm policy measures. the recent decision of the u.s. administration to institute a quadrennial diplomacy and development review should be examined as a possibility for this country. the second of our crucial thing is our commitment to the transatlantic alliance, which david cameron and i