about the court and the building. "the supreme court, home to the highest court," the first sunday and october. >> how is c-span funded? grants and stuff like that. >> public television. >> i do not know where the money comes from. >> federal aid? >> how is c-span funded? america's cable companies created c-span is that public service, a private business initiative -- no government mandate, no government money. .

>> the main opposition party has a shadow team or shadow cabinet who breach the main government ministers. you haven't foreign secretary and in the shadow foreign secretary in the conservative opposition. it is his job to challenge him, question the foreign secretary, and potentially would hold the position of foreign secretary if he were elected in the next general election. >> most of the recent polls show the conservative party with a 15% lead. what role is foreign policy playing in british politics right now?

>> foreign-policy has been high on the agenda because of their commitment currently in afghanistan, and before that, in iraq. the positions of the two main parties have not been hugely different. on both sides of the political divide, what you are going to see is a much greater degree of caution about taking on major overseas military ahead. you are going to see pressure for cuts in public spending, battles to getting the public by

his back under control. it has absolutely ballooned. >> in terms of foreign policy, is the position of either party as far as what the united states does any difference between the labor government and the conservative party? >> not hugely, no. i think both are committed to nato. both are anxious to cultivate good relations with the united states. that said, i think whichever party comes in, if the united states comes looking for british support for major military operations, there will perhaps be a significant degree more caution.

>> william hague is a former leader of the conservative party. now david cameron leaves the party. what is the relation between the two, and what will be the role of william k. going forward? >> relations -- there have been too conservative leaders between mr. haig and mr. cameron. they determined -- encouraged him to come back and saw him as one of the party's most talented politicians. he has some appeal to the right of the party. mr. hague is adamant that he does want to be leader again in the future. >> for our viewers who did not know, you write for the press association. what is your organization about?

>> the press association is a british national news agency. we supply a full range of stories to the british media, news paster at b.g.e. newspapers and broadcasters. >> we appreciate you for joining us with the press association. thanks for the update. now that speech by william hague, the british conservative e party's shadow foreign secretary. his remarks are from earlier this summer in london. [applause] >> thank you and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. it is a great pleasure to be here again, and thank you again for hosting. the third time in four years i have spoken around the 21st of july here in this room. parliament cannot go into recess until i have delivered my speech each year.

i do indeed remember you assuring me that i would only be required for half an hour on television, and two hours later i was still sitting there answering the questions. two hours up translator arabic make a lot more sense than two hours in the house of commons, so i was pleased to do it. running at its highest since the end of the second world war, there is no doubt that the principal legacy of the current government's to its successes into the next generation will be debt, and get on a scale that will take many years to scale back. yet amid all the attention rightly given to the massive economic challenges facing the next government, we must not neglect the need to focus at the same time on mounting a external challenges which go beyond the

economic sphere, but which will be all the more difficult to deal with a time when resources will necessarily be so constrained. any informed assessment of like the trends in world affairs over the next decade on which our whole national future heavily depends is a sobering one, while optimism, hope, and faith in human nature must always be present in our approach to these issues. we nevertheless have to recognize that the outlook in foreign affairs, does as much as an economic affairs, will require all the ability, energy, and focus we can bring to it, and that the pattern of events we might expect leads unmistakably an uncomfortably to world environment in which will be more difficult for this country and its traditional allies to achieve their foreign policy goals unless we improve the way we go about them. this country continues to possess great assets and

advantages, among them a skilled and highly regarded diplomatic corps, a permanent seat on the united nations security council, a bipartisan approach to certain aspects of foreign policy, which has provided continuity uncertainty over time. an exceptionally strong relationship with the united states of america, a major role in the affairs of the european union, historic links with many nations outside north america and europe, many of which are formalized in the commonwealth, and the enormous but less tangible influence that comes from being a global trading nation and the home of one of the great languages of humanity. we also have the immense advantage of armed forces that are considered around the world to be among the finest it is possible to possess, although currently under grievous strain. the net result of such a dentist is that britain still carries far more clout in the world -- of such advantages. such assets should always give

us confidence in the fortified knowledge that the foundations exist for building of british influence in selected areas if we chose to do so. at the same time, the advent of the kind of international cooperation discussed at recent summits of the g-20 and of the united states administration with the multilateral approach to foreign policy that provides other nations with a fresh opportunity to respond positively. both give some cause for optimism. it is not unreasonable to hope for advances in the middle east peace process, for success in the new approach in afghanistan, for a better era in u.s.-russia relations, and more constructive response to the international community and the leadership of iran or a more determined effort by the international community to overcome iranian in transitions, and while the prospect of any of these folks coming to fruition survives, is the label for america's allies to work hard to bring that about for the good of all.

it would be a mistake to allow our current hopes to obscure the longer term trends. there are likely to make it harder for countries such as britain to pursue a church in policy and to protect its interests and citizens. looking a decade or two ahead, powerful forces of economics and demography elsewhere in the world will make it harder for us to maintain our influence. conventional assumptions about what britain and its main partners can readily achieve in world affairs will be eroded, and the likelihood of this happening is sufficiently great, and the challenge it will present sufficiently daunting that is bible we understand it and equip ourselves for it now. simply put, britain stands to lose a good deal of its ability to shape world affairs unless we decide we will not accept that

and are prepared to do what is needed. though there may be turbulent times ahead, there's a current thread running through most analyses of the next decade. regional support -- recent report on national security argues that we must learn to live in a more complex environment with greater independence and reduced government power. i agree with that. there are many specific reasons why the world looks likely to be a more dangerous rather than less dangerous place in the coming decades. for previous generations, such increased danger usually occurred because of the rise of a single, dominant adversary. this is not the case in the first half of the 24 center, which looks likely to be characterized by a growing political uncertainty. the first factor bringing such insecurity is the prevalence of state failure, the collapse of government in the country

bringing enhanced opportunities to develop terrorist networks, private armies, organized crime, and links between all of them. so serious is this contagion that we may need to speak of the emergence of what may be called failed or failing regions. this applies to the war of africa and could also apply to afghanistan and pakistan unless our efforts there succeed. this new phenomenon will have serious consequences for are already struggling capability to reverse the decline of crumbling states, just as globalization means that the threats within these regions cannot easily be contained. a second factor is the transnational dimension of terrorism. a terrorist today may be a citizen of somalia who was educated and yemen and has been trained in pakistan and may be fighting in afghanistan are attempting to commit a

terrorist act on the streets of britain. this requires unprecedented cooperation with our allies. related to the other two is the changing character of conflict, from conventional to irregular warfare, exemplified by the improvised explosive devices that have claimed most of the british lives lost in afghanistan and iraq, undermining traditional military power and challenging the assumption that victory on the battlefield can be followed by development and nation-building. as put in the accidental guerrilla, given overwhelming u.s. superiority and contrary to the pre 9/11 conventional wisdom, it turns out that adversaries do not give up armed struggle under these conditions. rather, at any smart indigos unconventional, and most are likely to continue doing so until we demonstrate the ability to prevail in your

regular conference such as those where currently engaged in. these three factors are fed by the extent of chronic poverty within the developing world. this means that despite the economic success of many developing actress, roughly 1 billion people are not only being left behind what are falling further behind, despite -- described as 1 billion people stuck in a train that is slowly rolling downhill. failed states and lives bread -- are scarcely knew in human history. on top of the problems, worrying enough in themselves, come to central challenges which are immense in their scope and which the world has ever had to face before. the first of these is the risk

of irreversible climate change. in some cases this brings a threat to the very existence of nations, as is brought home if you listen to the new president of the maldives described the current condition. the study found that the war in darfur has been driven by climate change and environmental degradation. it is easy to see how shortages of water could lead to tension and even conflict between nations. blessing of action is taken quickly enough, this phenomenon looks set to cause wars, disease, starvation, or the laying waste of entire regions. it is vitally in our national interest to move to a genuinely low carbon economy and act with our international partners to reach agreement on a successful -- keep global temperature rises below 02 degrees celsius and

avoid catastrophic climate change. the second destabilizing force is the spread of nuclear science. civil nuclear energy can bring immense benefits to humanity and provide part of the answer to the challenge of climate change. but the global spread of nuclear technology and materials threatens a new age of nuclear in security, involving a rash of nuclear weapon states or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists, a risk which may grow in parallel to the possible possession of chemical or biological devices. as in the case of climate change, decisions taken in the next year or two will be crucial in determining whether this colossal risk can be minimized. after that, it may be too late. the alarming features of these two central threats are not only that their new and not only that their consequences are unknowable, but they are almost early not reversible ones that

have happened. one only has to think of the many risk involved in energy security to add a further dimension. the overall trends are clear and worrying enough. this troubling scenario is that up in itself, but the outlook from london and from other european capitals is further compounded in its grimness when it is understood that the relative economic power of many western nations is in decline. economic success makes a big difference to foreign policy influence and sometimes quickly so. the economic renaissance of britain undoubtedly reinforce the influence of british ministers on world affairs, something which tony blair was happy to enjoy all his chancellor gordon brown was busy running back barry renaissance. one of the damaging effects of gordon brown catastrophic stewardship of britain's finances and additionally reducing britain from second to 12th place in the international

league of competitiveness, according to the world economic forum is the diminishing of our economic power and by extension the effectiveness of our international role. such additional short-term decline is exasperating because it is so unnecessary. on top of that, the huge expansion of economy such as china and india means that in our working lifetimes, the size of the european economy relative to address the world looks set to shrink dramatically. projections have shown europe's share of the world economy declining from 18% to 10% by the middle of the century, and even the united states is not immune from the effect of economic problems. this diminished economic weight will have a major impact on the ability of western nations to achieve their foreign policy goals. we are used to the idea of calling for economic sanctions against nations whose human rights records we find an acceptable.

south africa under apartheid being a celebrated example. now we apply them to recalcitrant and regimes. it is already clear that the power of such economic weapons is declining. it follows from this analysis that it will decline much further in the years to come. what is more, much of the economic weight in the world is passing the countries which either do not fully share our concepts of democracy and human rights or for their own reasons are opposed to interventionist approaches to foreign policy. china now is an obvious case. in recent weeks, the western boycott of financial support for zimbabwe, designed to encourage a democratic transition, has been undermined by china's decision to provide that country with a $1 billion credit line. china gave robust support to the

sri lankan government in the recent conflict, and western countries proved unable to pass a resolution in the u.n. human rights council calling for an investigation into human rights abuses in the conflict there. not only is the world not converging around our own democratic norms, according to the freedom house 2009 survey, global freedom suffered his third year of decline in 2008. newly powerful democratic nations do not necessarily share our view of how to conduct foreign policy. in britain, liberal interventionism has generated much debate. to varying degrees, all of us have subscribed to it. the economic sanctions i have

mentioned have enjoyed consensus political support, as have the military interventions in other countries. iraq is a much more controversial case, but heavily supported at the time. we all agree we would try to intervene if another rwanda were predicted an like to do more in darfur. in the years and decades to come, the rise of other nations will constrain our ability to act in this way. a further constraint will come in the form of tightly controlled military budgets. the extreme pressures on our own defense budget, obviously necessitates a strategic defense review, which an incoming scud conservative government will certainly undertake. it is crucial that such a review is informed by the changing pattern of threats i have described, rather than financial considerations alone. france is also busily engaged in reshaping its armed forces. beyond britain and france, there is no sign of other european nations making a serious effort

to develop greater military capabilities. it is our criticism of eu defense arrangements that they too often involve the duplication of data structures. just calling something european does not mean it has enhanced europe's ability to act. does this background of a decline in our relative economic base and severe constraints on our military capabilities mean that we simply accept a much diminished role in world affairs? the united kingdom has engaged before in major conscious acts of strategic shrinkage such as the withdrawal from east of suez after 1968, but the conservative party's answer as to whether further such shrinkage will be ripe for britain's international role in the decade to come is no. the nation will have to accustom ourselves to there being more situations which we dislike but cannot directly change. it is our contention that

britain must seek to retain her influence wherever possible, and some places seek to extend it. we must not cease to make the effort. foreign policy is about the protection and promotion of our national interest, and even narrowly defined, the british national interest requires our continued, fully active engagement in world affairs, since all the training factors i have listed are in the interest of this country. no other nation or group of nations will increase the protection they afford us, and the essential alliances we enjoy with the u.s. and european nations depend directly on us continue to do a great deal for ourselves. it is brought a sense, what we might call our enlightened national interest requires british global engagement, too. britain will be safer if rebellious are strongly upheld and widely respected in the world -- if our values are

strongly upheld. the citizens of britain have always been restless in trying to improve the waterworld and global in our outlook. we have always been at the forefront of international charity, and the welcoming of refugees. 200 years ago it was a royal navy the help to drive a slave trade from the high seas, and our parliament led the way even then in challenging the excesses' of colonial rule. it is not in our character to have a foreign policy without a conscience, to be idle or uninterested while others star or murder each other is not for us. that is why david cameron and i have spoken in recent years of our approach to foreign affairs being based on liberal conservatism, in that we believe in freedom, human rights, and democracy, and want to see more of these things in other natures the jig in other nations. conservative because we believe strongly and are skeptical gran

utopian schemes to remake the world. as david cameron put it, i in stake is to work patiently with a grain of human nature begin my instinct is to work patiently the grain of human nature. how we react and how britain uses its ability is a crucial part of who we are as a country, how we regard ourselves, and what it will mean in the next generation to be british. if britain is to continue to be globally engaged in meaningful and influential since, realistic sense, however earth are we going to do it? the answer to that question will constitute our approach to foreign policy. it must necessarily involve using our resources more effectively, increasing our knowledge of other countries and

often strengthening relations with them, and lodging and sustaining certain initiatives over many years. in january 2007, i set out five themes for the foreign policy of the next conservative government. 2.5 years on, they remain valid against the background i have described, but it is now time to update them. the first of these themes is learning from past mistakes to improve the decisionmaking of british government itself. i have already mentioned the need for strategic defense review. it is consistent with what i have argued that this must be focused not on whether britain should be able to project military force elsewhere in the world, but on how it will do so. it is not the purpose of this speech to preempt in any way that review. i wish to make clear now, that it will first be a defense and national security review and not just the armed forces. it will be guided by the requirements of foreign policy

and not solely by financial constraints. third, we will not shrink from advancing our future armed forces for this changed world. good decisionmaking also requires the foreign and commonwealth office to be in its rightful place at the center of decision making. it is our intention to take a close interest in its future as a great institution, able to attract the finest talent, and mali cannot have a monopoly of knowledge or expertise, to be at the center of britain's thinking about and development of relationships with other nations. in my view, the decisionmaking of labor's downing street has often prevented the foreign office from taking this role. the reason badly handled announcement that the iraq war inquiry was a classic example of decisions made hurriedly in downing street rather foreign secretary was left to defend, underlining the fact that the

foreign office can only exercise improper influence if there is a close political and personal relationship between the prime minister and the foreign secretary. this will bring together on a regular basis the work of the foreign office, the home office, and ministers responsible for other relevant matters such as energy. we intend this not to be a new bureaucracy but a center of decision making, and we understand that it will only work if it is treated as such, and covering the whole range of national security issues. the attempt by the brown government to create a national security apparatus in response to our demand for one has been a pitiful failure, typical of the prevalence of short-term

gimmicks are sustained efforts in the current administration. the national security committee announced it two years ago, the prime minister's national security form has had no discernible impact at all, and since the joint committee on the national security strategy was announced a year ago, its members had not even been appointed. this chronic failure to institutionalize cross departmental working is a serious impediment to the successful execution of foreign and security policies, and an urgent priority to rectify. the recent decision of the u.s. administration to inches -- institute and development review should be examined as possibility for this country, too. the second of our crucial things is the commitment to the transatlantic alliance, which david cameron and i have long argued should be solid but not slavish in its nature. in our view, a