on the reauthorization of the satellite home viewer act, portions of which are expiring at the end of the year. it is essentially a statute that lets people get out -- lets people in one community cbs satellite content from another, from outside their area. it is an issue that both chambers are looking at, and bills are moving forward. that could point this and extend the statute that we have on the books, but i think both the senate and house commerce committees have indicated that they want to push this forward. . .

team members have been called on to take a hard look at internet companies, how they collect your information, information about you as you surf the web, and things you are presumably interested in. i think that is going to be an interesting discussion going forward as the internet companies bring out their heavyweights, to know that we're doing everything right to preserve privacy and what congress does on that front.

[captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] >> moshe shorts from the congressional research service discusses a new report saying that contractors and afghanistan outnumber u.s. troops. and just and hollander talks about his book, "fallujah and dangerous:america's worst properties and what can be done about them." "washington journal," live at 7:00 a.m. on c-span.

>> this is c-span's "america and the courts." on september 9, world arguments in citizens united versus federal election commission. next, a discussion about the case in future reform. a discussion wednesday at the national press club. washington. >> thank you for your patience, and welcome to this event, sponsored by the american constitution society. as carolyn said in her introduction, the board will here, these unusual arguments one end week from today. the justices themselves team up in important cases when in june they announced it would broaden

to look seriously at corporate expenditures are around the board. central to the real arguments is a 1990 case of austin versus michigan chamber of commerce, which you will be hearing a lot about today from our panel. that is the 6-3 case in which the supreme court, in the boys of thurgood marshall writing for the majority, said if they could restrict corporations from using their general treasury funds, spending them on individual candidates in connection with state elections. dissenting were o'connor, kennedy, and scalia, two of who have continued to play roles of campaign finance. i am sure we will sure but justice kennedy today, and teamwork critical votes -- the more critical vote coming up, john roberts.

i think that the fate of government corporate regulation is evident and the number of briefs that have come in. three times as many have come in for these arguments that are much more important for constitutional free speech. after initial opening remarks, we're going to do some question and answer up here and take questions from you all. so please be ready with any kind of query's that you might have for our group. immediately to my left is a jim, crews general counsel -- who is general counsel for free speech. to his left is larry, associate general counsel for the afl-cio, and next to him is the president and ceo of "democracy 21." turning us leader will be bob

bauer, the general counsel for the democratic national committee. all four of these gentlemen have been crucial players on campaign finance law for decades, literally. we will have each of them start with opening remarks, about seven minutes to play at where they stand on the case, and then we will have some questions and then go to the audience. we will talk a little bit about the history of the provision in the history of the case, which he started in his challenge to be able to sell -- to offer hillary the movie on video on demand. >> thank you. my job is to tell you how we got here from there. many of the things that i will discuss, i have been involved in. i was one of all lawyers challenging mccain find gold and mcconnell versus fcc, represented 26 clients in that.

i was lead counsel for i took a big whack at the electioneering communication corporate provision the supreme court had upheld in mcconnell. that i was counsel for citizens united in the lower court, and in the pleadings that got the case accepted by the united states supreme court. if you want to start from the beginning, start with the first amendment. the first amendment says that congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or the press or the right of the people to peacefully assemble and provision -- petition the government. i am aware that the supreme court just had trouble with the word no, similar to my daughters as they were growing up. and that is that they often meant to them at least for this time. and at least up holding limits,

you certainly viewed the first amendment's provision against laws abridging the freedom of speech. the result of these decisions has been an incredibly complex set of statutes and regulations. if the campaign itself is to under 44 pages in the statutes, there are 568 pages of regulations that the fcc has promulgated. of course, the courts have been active in determining of those laws and what the words mean, and there have been 13 major court decisions, 366 other cases

during the same thing, and 17 cases currently pending. if you needed more information, you can consult the 100728 pages in the register providing explanation and justification of these regulations, were you could look at the 10 policy stations or the 107,771 advisory opinions that the fcc has issued since 1970 for -- 1974. i would submit that this body of complex and difficult regulation is the antithesis of the notion that congress shall make no law. the next principal case beyond this, in striking down advocacy, in campaign spending

by candidates and parties, established two principles. these principles were explained by the u.s. -- to the supreme court by john mccain and russ feingold in their brief offered by the luminaries in the campaign reform movements, including fred wertheimer, a whiz on the panel today. and that is that barkley stood for two propositions. it must be directed at precisely toward spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular photo. the result was the adoption of a series of test but the supreme court, campaign finance laws, to

only campaign financing and possibly protect issue advocacy. certainly, mccain-find gold went way beyond both express' advocacy and many of us would argue the proper limits of the authority congress has on regulating campaign finance. a blackout period was established before federal elections where you go to federal prison if you mentioned the name of a candidate in a broadcast ad. mcconnell upheld this provision, and as he could hear, the proponents of the communications did not try to overturn buckley. they tried to argue under buckley fat the electioneering

communication prohibition was unambiguously related to campaigns for federal office because studies indicated that the ads of rendering these periods where the functional equivalent of express advocacy. mcconnell upheld the corporate prohibition on his pace, and challenged the provision as applied. as we know, a statute can be constitutional on its face but have a certain unconstitutional applications that the court will prevent the government from applying in those particular circumstances. and here is what right to life argued. the corporate prohibition could

not be applied to, even though its application generally was up help. the result of that case was a decision carving back the lectionary communication black out with application to broadcast ads to only those advertisements that had a deal to vote. that is, for the only reasonable operation instead it urged people to vote for or against a particular candidate. the problem faced after that case was that while the movie is a 90 minute documentary that wanted to run on tv, it mentioned the name of a federal candidate during that, they also had 10-second and 30-second ads to do that.

disclosure requirements were not challenged in wisconsin right to life, and a disclaimer can eat up a 22nd advertisement. and as to the movie and the advertisement, there would have to report contributors. those of us represents advocacy groups understand that disclosing your contributors to federal office holders in the wake of nixon's enemies list and clinton having 1000 illegal fbi files, or obama asking you to out your friends and neighbors who are criticizing his health care reform -- understand that revealing the identity of people criticized federal officeholders and candidates are setting themselves up for retribution.

and as a result, disclosing contributors is as chilling as a prohibition. so the challenge -- when we put this case together, our main focus was on a disclaimer and disclosure requirements are rain after wisconsin right to life, and we believe that, consistent with the campaign-related principle, if a particular communication does not meet wisconsin's appeal to vote test and cannot be prohibited, it cannot be regulated at all. of course, we also challenged the prohibition where they said it could be prohibited, because it did not have an appeal to vote, there was no call for action in the ad. we also argued that this has been so complicated and so difficult to apply the appeal to

both tests, the fcc has been so recalcitrant in adoption of its regulations and applying the appeal to vote test, it has now become unworkable and the supreme court's kodak to first principles and overturn the upholding of the law. now, once we got to the supreme court, olson took to representation, and he took a different approach. he basically did not pursue the unambiguously campaign-related argument but did pursuit to the of argument. one is more broadly, he specifically raised the constitutionality of both austin and mcconnell, which were not raised in district court. he also made in our arguments, saying, well, this is a video on demand, and after all, video on demand, somebody has to go pay for it and maybe they ought to

get this exception for that circumstance. furthermore, citizens united is like the corporation that cannot be prohibited from engaging in this kind of activity. this resulted in a stunning revelation that corporations could be prohibited from doing books, which has been the longstanding commission. it could be set in front of everybody, the supreme court saying it is time to take another look at the changes in austin and mcconnell, and that

takes us here. >> we want to make sure we get some of the others quickly for this opening round. the point was made in oral arguments that this could go to book, and we will have to see what the solicitor genuine -- general says next week. coming from opposite side, we will talk a little bit about the provision itself and history. >> thank you. i think the book's argument is a red herring. will get to that later. iowa talk -- i want to focus my opening remarks on a ban on corporate kaine -- campaign

expenditures in the austin decision, although a good deal of remarks also apply to mccain- feingold. what we're dealing with is a federal policy that needs backing for more than a century. all line of cases that have upheld constitutionality of that policy. longstanding core principles mean that we give respectful appearance to past decisions unless there are exceptional circumstances. the doctrine of constitutional avoidance says we do not destroy it -- decide cases on broad grounds when they can do narrow grounds, and the case with the issue of whether upholding the ban on corporate campaign expenditures was never raised

below, therefore, there was no record of what has been very important in campaign finance cases. we have now have the court on their own and else they want to examine the question of whether this constitutional doctrine and longstanding policy is constitutional. whether in 2009 we're going to discover last corporations have a constitutional right to spend their and dance -- immense an aggregate wealth in campaigns, and in doing so, to create a system of potential influence doyle likes of which we have never seen before. the first ban on corporate campaign expenditures goes back to 1891, when kentucky enacted a

ban, four states or five states enacted in 1890. in 1987, congress enacted a ban on corporate contributions, in the year when senators were not known by their states. they were known as the senator from standard oil, the senator from u.s. steel, and that was certainly in the forefront of the minds of congress and president roosevelt when the ban was enacted. 1947, the taft-hartley act, the ban on corporate contributions was expanded to expenditures. at the time, senator taft says all we're doing shear is affirming what we have always understand -- understood the ban to mean, that it covers indirect contributions or expenditures as well as contributions.

that act also extended the ban on corporate contributions and expenditures to labor unions. so we also had a ban on unions using the treasury funds for contributions and expenditures. in the mcconnell decision commager's what the court said. since our decision in buckley, congress's power to prohibit corporations and unions from using treasury funds to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election of candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our law. so the supreme court in 2003 says this power has been upheld and is firmly embedded.

the mcconnell cases followed by the wisconsin right-to-life case that jim was talking about, in which the court narrows the application of restrictions on corporate and labor union expenditures and reaffirms the mcgann, and that was just two years ago. we look a consequence is that we face here. if the ban on expenditures is overturned, let's start out may be with the universe of corporate wealth. in 2005, the irs estimated corp. said total net worth of 23.5 trillion dollars. no one is arguing at 23.5 trillion dollars is going to be ended up spent in campaigns, but that is the universe we are

dealing with here. if you leave that, you provide corporations with the capacity to use untold wealth, to spend directly to campaigns, and in doing so, too clearly creates the opportunity to buy influence with elected officials or to create the appearance of influence buying. and if you just look at the health-care fight going on right now, you can get a sense of this. the economic stakes in government decisions are ignoring -- enormous. if, in the middle of this battle, drug companies, for example, were free to make these kinds of expenditures, and you have a member of congress sitting there, trying to decide what to do on health care and facing five or 10 or $20 million in direct expenditures to defeat

that member of congress, depending on how the member votes, you are facing a clear situation of potential influence buying, and you multiplied out across the board on issues across the board. we will see an electoral system, a government decision making system, the likes of which we have never seen before in terms of the capacity of corporations to dominate that. i would submit that if you look at this policy's history, the history of court decisions, the doctrines of starry constitutional avoidance, the absence of any factual record in this case, if the supreme court chooses this case to overturn alston and declare that corporations are free to unleash

their immense wealth on campaigns in government decisions, you will have a decision that must be defined as radical activism. >> larry goldberg represents the afl-cio, and unions have an interesting position. they were not covered in 1990. but it wanted to address the consequences. >> this case is about independent speech and a relatively small slice. advocacy is explicit in causing for the defeat of the candidates and what is called the functional equivalent, which is certain broadcasts referred to candidates, unions, and corporations, and it can be interpreted as nothing but an exhortation to vote for or

against them. this is not a contributions case, not about the ability of corporations or unions are anybody to actually give money for people to use as they wish. but this case does implicate what kind of first amendment we have. consider some of the government's propositions in the case. there has a lot that has been said about what extreme results thermite be if things -- if anything is -- if either of the two cases is overruled. but cyclical key propositions year. one is -- let's take a look at you proposition's here. one is that it is available for video-on-demand, for people to call it home on their television. and the government says the issue in the case is whether or not it can be constitutionally made a crime to do that sort of thing.

secondly, as alluded to earlier, there was an oral argument that, for example, the union subsidized a writer to write a book, that is the explicit message of voting for or against the candidate, and a rep fuel publisher decided to publish the book and did so, it will be a crime for the union to have subsidized that. finally, and even more broadly, the government's decision in this case is that it is constitutional to criminalize speech merely because an officeholder or candidate are aware of were feel indebted to those seeing what is favorable to them. and it is considered that a speaker is trying to curry favor with or influence officeholders by what they say in public.

speech could be prohibited, independence speech could be rejected in various cases, tried by the government, the sec, and there's a restriction from six years ago not accepted by the court that is now the centerpiece of a government argument. when you think about it, the notion that any speech can be prohibited merely because candidates might hear in react to it in some way has no limiting principle. it is not limited to the elections were legislation, and it is a pretty extreme proposition in itself. and that is why it weighed in at the second stage of focus. so really, one reason we ought to be focusing on this, it has

been all lost, looking at the context of this case and seeing what truly bears examination, is who gets to have a say about candidates and officeholders in america. who gets to use express advocacy and who does not. so very quickly, who can do this? individuals can do this, with their own money, no matter how wealthy they are or regardless of the fact that corporations have sources of wealth. people could spend their billions even though they derive directly from companies they control. media companies have absolute freedom to use their resources to talk about candidates, editorialize about elections, and have things be relayed by candidates as delegations.

and in corporate associations can use advocacy and delight -- the likes. and so-called corporations, nonprofit groups the to do's to corporate money, can say anything bit more in any circumstance. so can bloggers, an individual with the website canst do it, and a federal package. so there is a broader array could can now speak freely on these matters. kucan not? business corporations cannot. regardless of their size, state, expertise, or even if they have control over them. secondly, nonprofit groups cannot do it if they take a penny of corporate money. advocacy organizations, the sierra club, the national rifle

association -- they are prohibited, regardless of whether they have expertise or people want to cure what they have to say. -- hear what they have to say. and people have been swept up and involved in uncomfortable legal situation of corporations in many years. our subject is that even though our subject has never identified the standard, it was never one to justify in the speech, except in french fleet. the austin decision distinguished unions, that was the one that said it was constitutional to prohibit corporations from the express advocacy. they say that distinctions do not apply, and the supreme court seemed to have forgotten that

when they issued a mcconnell decision. but consider this. uniquely among the organizations mentioned, unions have the following characteristics. there are formed by individual workers, often under arrest. -- underdress. membership is voluntary. by law and culture, they vote on other policies, there are boards like non-profit corporations, business corporations. the center's in unions can utilize the democratic process of reorganization, or they can resigned membership, not pay for political activities, and still be entitled bylaw to complete and total and fair representation.

yet the law disfavors unions in the same way that it does corporations. in this case, it is not directly concerned about a union plan. but in our view, it does implicate the rights of unions and all organizations, rebels of how the court comes out or what rationale it uses. i think it is really important looking at this case that we consider what is, and we have some serious rethinking about what the first amendment is and who is a entitled to it, who should be disfavored, and why. i have to think that the principal ones of argument in this case in part directly deal with unions, simply not comporting with what i think a thoughtful analysis would say. >> we have gotten word that bob bauer is on his way, so i will

stall for a minute on those defending the provision and asked jim and larry to address directly the idea of the wealth that could be unleashed in elections in 2010, 2012, if the supreme court does strike down this provision and reverse austin. i think everybody knows that people like senators mccain and find gold talk about the special nature of corporations, that they have this artificial distinction, they're not persons, and individual people should be deciding elections. do you want to address that first? >> the argument they're making now is completely novel. so while they rely on the long history and so forth, their actual arguments completely new. it is that austin was based on the idea, and you're alluding to it, that because of the corporate form, the ability of corporations to amass very well

that their participation in our electoral process who be distorted by their mere participation, that basically is the government and the reformers throwing it in the trash can because it seems so indefensible. now that they're talking about quid pro quo corruption, that is -- look at this money corporations have, they can use it to try and essentially bribed officers. the first thing is, quid pro quo corruption is dealt with by contribution lists. the supreme court had a whole series of cases on contribution limits and they said the way to deal with people who want to curry favor or get quid pro quo favors with officeholders is through a contribution limit. certainly, any corporate spending that would be the result of the decision in this case will still be subject to

corporate limits. the only way i can get around that is to say that, well, it is stored to be the general spending, the independent spending that will be corrupted. here they run against a whole series of cases that specifically rejected their claim. so sure they are, talking about science and history, while the arguments are, number one, one that was never considered by the court as it relates specifically and particularly to corporations, and the second argument is why the supreme court has routinely rejected support for corporate prohibitions. and honestly, if fred and his cohorts actually believed what they were saying, they would tell you they are simply a mouthpiece for the richest people in our country. in the last 10 years and the pew foundation, george soros, and other corporations, through

a concerted effort, have spent $140 million subsidizing the reform movement. in fact, democracy 21 was created on hold bond by grants from the largest corporations, the largest individuals, and the largest foundations in our nation. but they never say that. they never say they are just a mouthpiece, because they are not. i do not believe they are. i believe that they are sincere in their advocacy for the position. it is, of course, true that the wealthiest people benefit by the restrictions on corporations. because after all, george soros has spent his own money, bill gates can spend his own money as an individual that they derive from the corporations. but those of average means have to pool their resources in a corporation or a labor union in

order to participate, and the corporate ban targets them. they cannot go out and spend their own money like george soros or rich people can. they have to pool their resources, they invariably do that in corporations and labour unions, so it is people of average means who are targeted. >> first of all, last i checked, i have never received a contribution since created. corporations are not usually used to describe foundations. secondly, if i'm a mouthpiece for the second richest people in america, they haven't told me so, and nor has he.

i want to make two quick points. i firmly established the that congress' simple in trust affects cass corruption, curbing the occurrence of such influence, and i would submit to you that that is exactly what massive expenditures in campaigns do. i would also point out that, from the time of the boston decision to the time of the mcconnell decision, we have had

clear evidence inserted in the record for the case showing that expenditures were being used to attempt to buy influence of the standard test of the supreme court. secondly, in terms of larry's point about a unifying principle, there is one, and it has been for over a century that as individuals vote and individuals provide the private financing, labor unions participate in this process through their pacts, given for the purpose of being used in corporations.

so the unifying principle curious that for over a century , we have individuals, citizens, people choosing to represent, also financing those cases, and we do not have groups with special characteristics doing so that give them -- in the end, have been gathering money. in the economic marketplace, we're talking by business corporations, and doing so in the context of their economic interests.

>> we're going to let you have some opening remarks for about seven minutes. >> talking abut the indiscriminate nature of some of these rules, he says some foundation supporting his organization are not the corporations we would be concerned with, but the law does take all corporations and treat them the same, whether it is a nonprofit organization controlled by members that is wholly dedicated to a particular member or a huge mega- corporation, whether it is general motors or general electric, with special privileges. the question earlier was, what would happen if both of these cases were overturned, and i

think it is difficult to predict what would happen. corporations and unions now, even though they are disfavored under law, and do have a broad range ability to speak without prohibition on legislative and political manners and talk about candidates, and we have not witnessed the dedication of resources that i think are predicted if some of the last lines of speech categories were eliminated as far as descriptions go. i am not sanguine about corporate power. we deal with it every day in the media. but the notion that unions are subject to these restrictions or have special characteristics that justify faber, a think ignores everything i said about them. the fact is that again, unions,

voluntary groups and the like -- this is freedom of association. we protect associational rights with the first amendment, not just individual rights. >> thank you for a comedy me on this schedule cure. -- schedule here. there was no basis in the case for speaking out, no record to support it. the court would have to go out of their way to decide so momentous a change in campaign finance causes. there are other alternative ways of reaching a decision in this case, whichever way it turns out, without unsettling

these core principles of constitutional law. we are also a point where, over many years, campaign finance laws have been in development. it has been around for a long time. we're seeing some equilibrium which has worked in the last couple of years in favor, and with very great deal about it and other panels have mentioned it, that for a variety of reasons, including developments on the internet and other incentives for fund-raising that may have accelerated in recent years, political act shares have

found ways of reaching small donors where it was difficult to mobilize before, and once they're on list, there also asked to participate in other ways, looking at participants in the political process for this development so long coming to be unsettled by a violent change in constitutional rules in favor of corporate spending rights, certainly a very destabilizing potential, and it is something that this court is not required to do. there is nothing but compels the court to destabilize the

campaign finance regulatory situation or balance, his starkly destroying excess long coming. now we're seeing a maturing under this regulatory scheme. the last point i would make -- and i'm looking at fred's notes -- i want to stress that there's a myth out there, the austin case, which the court has asked to your arguments on, were somehow one-out liner, wondering if kim fame finance doctrine, it should be -- wandering around a campaign finance doctrine -- it simply isn't true.

allston may be a case that was not very clear exposition, but that certainly would not distinguish it from other campaign finance precedent. in that respect, i think it is not an out liar in a disreputable cents. but in many other respects, if you look at what the allston court tried to say, the majority of the deeply doubt and analysis of where the constitutional law has rested for many, many, many years. so while austin may have been a somewhat opening presentation and open to criticism, i did not see a departure from precedent. and the notion that somehow we deserved the circumstances with no record before the court to support it and no requirement that the court address it, it nonetheless deserves to be reconsidered. i think it is an unsustainable

proposition true for those reasons -- an unsustainable proposition. for those reasons, it will visit and revisit issues of constitutional law, and be a fairly extraordinary step for the court to take, and i think that is generally recognized. >> i just want to ask a practical question. he talked about too fast, too soon for any kind of reversal. but it strikes me as a journalist that it is interesting that the dnc has come in and not the rnc, where to make of that. i think, fred at one point, you said that the interests are already spoken for there. do you think, looking at 2010, 2012, you would speculate on how there could be a shift in the character of elections, if this could particularly hurt democratic candidates? >> anybody who has hazard a guess on the impact of law on political behavior has been

wrong. so i am being invited to be wrong publicly, and i will decline that invitation. i will say about the rnc, there is, and this probably has also been mentioned, there is a pending case. the republican national committee is looking to mccain- feingold-of of political parties. to permit political parties to collapse soft money. if you look at the rnc as a whole, it is positioning itself, and i think its position each year is quite clear. >> would you respond to that? >> i would respond not by agreeing. the rnc has adopted a resolution i sponsored, i am a member,

putting them in favor of deregulation, and in particular, got them off their two-year detour where they were supporting the adoption of further restrictions on 527. so there are definitely in favor, as a matter of policy, in favor of the first amendment, and that has to be juxtaposed with the dnc which is in favor of the status quo. >> i just have one more question before i open it up. we're planning to open it up first to reporters, anybody who wants to oust the question of the panelists. but just in the context of the supreme court broadening these cases so dramatically with the june order, we saw in another case of last term, the voting rights act case, were justices at one point seemed to be looking at a very broad ruling and then pulled back in the and, as we all know, for the texas

utility district voting rights case and decided not go further. does anybody feel like there might be a sense, even without hearing oral arguments, that the justices might not go as broadly as they're looking right now? any sense of speculation as to go into this of what they might already be signaling, and given the new makeup of the court, what you might anticipate from people like john roberts and justice samuel sli -- alito? >> they have to set up a situation, i think, where they are giving themselves options as a matter of good sense. and the appellate said in their brief that we do not believe this case is necessary. it is appropriate for them to

reach mcconnell and overrule it, not necessarily to reach austin. there is an interesting subtext of this case having to do with the supreme court as an institution, and how it deals with cases and issues before it, which is interesting and important across the board, with all kinds of cases and issues. but if it does not reach either of the questions that opposed, it is inevitable it will, and that is at least for this panel the more important focus, because it deals with these first amendment issues i described. and there will be a case next time, but if they do not do it at this time we will not have any of these institutional questions working, as well. >> anyone else? rep. we would start with reporters first, and there's a woman with a microphone here.

if you could just read either side with questions. >> hello prepare -- hello. tomorrow, national law journal. ted olson took a different approach from your perch. why didn't you take that approach, and are you pleased with how this developed by? you did not make a frontal attack, and now it is being framed that way. do you think that is wise? >> our approach was based on two considerations. number one was that i believe a president is always implicated and subdirectory considerations if it is to be applied, and the

government is asking that they be applied as a justification for both corporate prohibition on the movie and the requirements of their reports and disclaimers. it seems like every time there's a precedent under challenge, liberals get real antsy about broad rulings, even though in my experience, they love broad rulings if they go in their direction. and i did a law review article in the early-fenty's, when roe versus wade was challenged, and there are good at that time that it is always implicated if you are asking to apply it to. do you expect to sit there and if they believe that austin is wrongly decided, it makes criminals of a wide variety of individuals who simply want to engage in democratic free-speech

that they should apply that precedent, even though they think it is wrong? we have decided because of the niceties that the plaintiffs did not ask for it to be understood and overturned? that is irresponsible, in my judgment. so if the validity is always subject to reconsideration if somebody asks the supreme court to apply it. the second reason was -- is that we believe that the supreme court tossed explicit recognition in this case of the unambiguously campaign related principle, kind of a threshold issue that taps the power of government to only those things are regarded as a campaign speech.

we have campaign disclosure requirements applied, and unless it is like davis, saying that if reports go down, the court will have to look at these specific justifications for the disclosure provisions. so this has obviously been more dramatic, and the supreme court, it seems to me, in asking for arguments, and given all the possible options and niceties been, the reformers are of concern about them, like of which is principles, narrow rulings, and the plaintiff asking for things -- that has all gone by the board down. so they have a full array of options. i've argued in the re-hearing on behalf of eight former commissioners of the fcc, seven of whom are former chairman,

that while it is not necessary to overturn austin or mcconnell, that the court should do so and do so because of the established fact that all of this has become unworkable, and these eight commissioners that were asked to apply, to administer the act, are uniquely situated to explain to the court about how utterly complex and unworkable this team is. >> let me just mention to the audience that ted olson is in the unusual position of being a challenger to this provision. >> i do not tend to look at a crucial principles as niceties. but let me just wuote and justice roberts view of processed