identifying institutions that are too big to fail. we think that there should be a sliding scale of capital required from important institutions that take into account risk asset size, complexity, and we believe in the living will concept. every person should have a plan that if they do get into difficulties how they can respond. it should be filed and approved with the regulator. and if your plan is not filed or approved, then you have to downsize. .

we have the same directional suggestion he talks about, which is to make sure the pain is spread. i would like to clarify a couple of things. i think there's a lot of confusion. we are talking about protecting

creditors in full. the shareholders get wiped out. in some cases, management did not get wiped out. we recommend some people who are responsible for failure to lose their jobs, but the key thing is to make sure unsecured creditors take some hit in some form, said the bankruptcy process is one approach. you can follow the same cut in the administrative process, but they would be paying. i would elaborate what bob said. there is a huge debate about whether we should preemptively breakup institutions. should we arbitrarily set of some size and say above it will break you up? i can tell you there are no antitrust principles to make that decision there a.

is nothing to tell you the magic threshold above which your too big to fail. we debated that extensively. we came down where bob said, which is we would not across the board eliminate all big institutions because there are benefits to size of a global market, but what we do say is all large institutions ought to file this plan with the regulators, and the regulators would have the ability if they are on have been with the plan and see it would not go forth in a way that would protect the financial system, they would have the authority to chop the institution of or order it to be chopped up only in that circumstance. we are against above the board's size limits, but otherwise i would stand where bond left his

remarks. >> i want to thank you all very much for what you have said in the testimony and your response you've given to these questions, and the complexity of this situation is seeing the context. we're dealing with the very difficult and dangerous set of circumstances. one of the things such strikes me is the huge financial institutions now issued 2/3 of our credit card and hold roughly 40% of all bank deposits. that strikes me as an absolutely fascinating set of circumstances, and why we allow that to happen was a very big

mistake, and we allowed it to have been intentionally. there was a great interest on the part of some people to make as much money as possible and engage in this operation in ways that can be most beneficial to them, and if it had some benefits to others, but might not be so bad, but that has not been precisely the case. because of the size of these institutions that is one main reason why the economic clash came about. one thing that strikes me is this whole idea of too big to fail. if we have a situation where something is too big to fail, we are turning everything over to them. they are going to do everything they want, and the consequences will flow on everyone else, so

nothing should be too big to fail. the regulation of setting forth something that is not foreign to be too vague is also very important. i think there ought to be some analysis of some acceptance of the ada to bring to exist. we should not allow these institutions to actually come into play here engage in the circumstances they have engaged been -- particularly in the way there has been this combined operation of commercial and investment base and now that played a significant role in the impact of the economy that began to fall in the end of 2007, so what do you think we should be doing? what should we be engaged in? a number of legislations have

been engaging, but they are moving slowly in the right direction. i think there is more that needs to be done. we saw what happened in the 1930's when there was basic legislation the fed the combination of what we were seeing, all of that is much clearer to us, and we need to stop that from happening in the future. we have gradually weakened that process, and we gradually eliminated it a decade ago. now have to go back now to something much more positive. maybe you could talk about that. what could be done now that is not going to bring about the financial collapse of so many of us have in mind that is likely to occur if we continue to allow this set of circumstances to

exist and continue to override the entire financial cervezas we have to deal with. what should we be doing? what do you think famines and >> let me talk about the area i know the best -- what do you think about that? >> let me talk about the area i know best. not only are they too big to fail, but they are to connected to fail. the failure of one will bring down another potentially horrendous least severely harm them. one thing we can do is bring over the counter derivatives training out of the preserves end onto exchanges and clearing houses where we will not have the enormous exposures building up in these banks that will bring down the banks. in a clearing house situation

where derivatives are exchange's trading, the clearing house rather than an over-the-counter derivatives deal, becomes the counterparty to each and every trade. it marks that trade to market twice today -- twice a day, and at the end of each day it calls for margins to be put up while the traders the market has moved against, so we never get enormous exposure is like aig has. a thing for a free of regulation of derivatives by bringing everything we possibly can end on to regulated exchanges would certainly help. i do think there are additional problems because these

institutions not only remain too big to fail, but i think they are too big to manage and too big to supervise. >> the gentleman's time has expired. >> the wonder if we can continue on touch for a moment. when you talk about the appropriate regulation of derivatives requiring a margin to come up. is five not the case today requiring -- is that not the case today requiring a call on a daily basis? >> that is not the case with any of the over 600 trillion dollars in over-the-counter derivatives. it is only the case on the regulated futures and options exchanges.

>> how difficult would it be to create the system. we have an enormous financial regulatory system already in place, yet we're being asked to create another new superstructure. is there not the capability today to do just what you're describing? >> yes, i think we have a wonderful for retired on a future and options exchanges, bringing as much of the standardized trading as possible will say care of the problem for a lot of the market, because a great deal of the market is standardized contracts. issing see only legitimate economically justifiable over the counter trade -- issing the

only legitimate economically justifiable over the counter trade -- i think the only legitimate, economically justifiable, over the counter trade are risks. i think it is legitimate to continue that market, but there has to be capital requirements imposed. there has to be margin, collateral, marked to market requirement in order to make that market safe, but you should realize we have no experience in successfully or effectively regulating an over-the-counter derivatives market. our only experience with regulating derivatives has been on exchange, and that has been effected since 1935. >> let me answer a question i posed two years ago when we got

in with the futures speculation, and that is what are the tools the ctfc needs to enact the cut of reality you are describing? do they possess those tools today? is there something legislatively they need in order to make what you describe reality. >> in 2000, congress forbid any federal regulator to oversee the over-the-counter derivatives market adult, so that has to be overturned kerrigan you have to note and give the authorities to them as the most important body

to oversee those markets, and you need to require the standardized contracts go on when to exchanges and clearing houses. >> he said years ago but they did possess those capabilities, but only in the chance of an emergency. only in the summer of 2008 with foreign airlines declaring a trophy and the price of oil going up $16 an hour per barrel, i suggested it was an emergency, but you're saying even in an emergency, those hours no longer exist. >> they have not existed since 2000 with respect to the over- the-counter market. there are powers that have not been exercised until recent days in the last 10 years by done cf pc respect to exchange trading

and regulated clearing that allow actions to be taken to reduce speculation, and it is my view that they really fell down on the job by failing its mandate to ensure against excessive speculation on the market. i think last summer or the summer before that there were tremendous bubbles and i and cultural products and energy products, and it was because excessive speculation was being tolerated by the regulator and the exchanges when it should not have been. >> what are some potential pitfalls to creating a regulatory environment you are

envisioning? >> i think it exists -- at least it certainly did when i was the chair in the late 1990's -- there were requirements that everyone declare ahead of time whether there were speculating or hedging. speculator have special requirements a speculator that was abusing the system could be ordered to close out positions entirely or pay extra margins or any number of regulatory tools in the next cftc -- in the

cftc's tool box. >> is there enough to be able to provide the same oversight, or will it require creating a new financial regulatory system? >> i think it is very important that as much of the over-the- counter trading as possible goes on to exchange so they are transparent. i also think if there're any continuing speculative trade in the over-the-counter market, that position limit should be imposed through a regulatory regime like proposed in the pending legislation. >> this is an incredibly busy congress, and i have just been called to bring a bill of mine

that will bring transparency to the billions of dollars in-house tarp funds, but i would like to ask you to respond in writing your ideas on too big to fail, and alternatives -- there were very important. we have passed out of bill to committee which allows government to basically dismantled too big to fail, and i would like to ask how would this impact the global economy if this allowed large to be the norm. i think it is important, and go live to study it further. i would like to say that you and -- i think you enjoy the nobel prize for -- deserve the nobel

prize for speaking out. if we listen to you we would not have this crisis eric and i have a series of questions i like to get on the record. i think they are important as we move forward on financial comprehensive forgive richard regulatory reform. i recognize mr. cummings. >> thank you very much. a moment ago you said something to the effect of fethat not onle larger institution falling into the too big to fail category, but they are too big to control or something like that. aig, a lot of times, the left hand did not have a clear as to what the right hand was doing,

and it was just too rigid just incredible to me, but listening to your testimony, i think you feel the tet -- bauhaus bill does not go far enough. is that right -- the house bill does not go far enough. is that right? >> in terms of the house bill, i st. femme end user extension for -- i think the end user expansion is on wise. i think all standardized contracts should be required to be traded on exchange. >> mr. karr, the conduct of the credit rating agencies during the financial crisis is extremely disturbing, and perhaps most disheartening is the destruction that has been done to the assets of plans across the country.

. they were threatened by the fact the pension board were required , will often found to be rated by these agencies. the proposals of congress has done a great job of addressing many of these conflicts and have exposed issues. in your opinion, have the proposals gone far enough? >> thank you for the question. the coalition does not have a specific position on any of the proposals, but we do believe something like a public utility might be in a very useful structure. we have documented quite extensively about the way in which the ratings agencies were stamping investment-grade on products but were obviously junk bonds for years, so must -- most

of our work has been around documenting the abuses but not necessarily moving around to the appropriate legal resolutions. >> do you have an opinion on that? >> the issue of credit rating agencies is incredibly complex 3 and no one disagrees they were at the heart of the crisis, and what they were doing that contributed to the crisis is there were raiding instruments on the basis of limited histories and extrapolating they would have aaa ratings. we know that was a mistake. some of our mistakes were made bond insurers. the question is what to do. we debated this extensively. i cannot tell you there's a silver bullet to fixing the

ratings agency. what we recommend is that we replace the letter grades they now give with the suggestion the ratings agencies tell us what we really want to know, which is what is the estimated probability of the fault of this bond and then have an agency track these predictions so the public knows how good they are and the u.s. government can have a choice. if it sees an agency consistently overestimated the likelihood that a vaughn is going to survive, or it is underestimating the default probabilities, the government could either decertify the agency or impose penalties cannot but there ought to be

some price to pay for consistently going out to the public with false readings. i am not sure we extensively debated this, but i am not wildly enthusiastic about it. you have to remember all of our bank regulators had major failures, so i do not have a lot of confidence that another government agency or utility commission is going to do any better in predicting the future events that our bank regulators did. >> 19 with the testimony in the government reform of the rating agencies, there is something very difficult to legislate. a lot of the things that were done, i know they may have been

dealing with limited information, but we have testimony that shows there were folks who were not being honest, and maybe that is where you were having such problems. >> the core of the problem is that there is an inherent conflict. the way the market is developed, people can -- the only way they can stay in business is by charging the people who issue the bonds, and that is a blatant conflict. given the state of the market, i am not sure we know how to fix it, except for fixing ways to penalize these guys when they blow it. >> thank you, mr. chairman. a lot of good questions and a lot more to be asked. i want to ask the panel in no

particular order your thoughts on credits the fault. it seems like the fact that banks sold these swaps to reach other contributed to the affects of the financial crisis. it seemed in effect banks were able to make a higher credit rating during this process for regan one question is -- in this process. one question is did it allow them to substitute higher credit ratings and swat that for a lower credit rating, and as the trading of credit defaults wants among faiths have the unintended consequence of lowering or reducing the cab on the day system -- on the banking

system as a whole? , to follow on credit defaults as a legitimate product. >> let me start since credit defaults swaps are a type of over-the-counter derivative, and they certainly play a very important role in the latest financial crisis. they were used by banks and investment breaks and other institutions to ensure mortgage securitization and other securities stations that perhaps otherwise would not have gotten a higher rating, but beyond that, they were used by many institutions, including investment banks, to speculate in the stability of other institutions, the stability of the mortgage market, the

stability of the credit markets, and because of this highly speculative, highly leveraged trading that is essentially gambling on credits, on a credit-worthiness of products, when there was a downturn, there was an enormous crash. the most obvious and the tva and aig that lost hundreds of millions of dollars -- the most obvious being aig that lost hundreds of millions of dollars >> in fact we reduce the capital. >> i think the capital requirements we were using for the banking system were demonstrably inadequate in light of what happened.

>> i can address that issue. before i do, i would say, i would not ban credit defaults swaps. if subject to the appropriate regulation, they are the functional equivalent of insurance, and there is no reason we should ban insurance, but your question raises the issue, were they used to effectively lowered requirements? the answer is yes, because the committee outsourced the requirements of any facts to the rating industries so that if you got a triple a on the security or other instrument, you got a lower charge. i saw this risk-weighting system was nouts i think this in the

essence and led to too little capital, so going forward, five would get away from it. >> aiken -- i think there is a legitimate role for them. clearly, when the market goes sour, that is when the assets have the lowest market value. it seems nearly impossible to set aside adequate reserves. the price would almost no longer be of use in the market. the alternative is to be the

insurer for all of that area i do not think that is where congress wants to go. any thoughts? >> i thought the gem of what you said is if the appropriate capital requirement makes the product too expensive, maybe we should not have the product for reagan that is how i would follow your logic, so if we have this type of products common we have to make sure they are reviewed and the supervisors and regulators understanding. >> i appreciate you being here today it. it is very helpful. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate you being here. i missed most of the opening statements, but i do not think you have covered this so far. i am not on the financial

services committee, but the concept of having a living will is an institution that intrigues me. i do not understand how that would work. they would file a document that i assume in order to have meaning will have to have sufficient details, but that they would rapidly get out of date. if it had lots of details, i assume these would-be public documents, or would they be private documents? i assume there would be issues with them needing to come back and say we have sold these assets already, and institutions

really do not have an obligation to watch out for the u.s. economy. they have an obligation to watch out for institutions, so they are not going to file a document. i assume their duty is to the people who own the business. would you amplify what this document would look like? i do not understand how it would have any real balance. >> sure, i think what we found is that i believe the two ingredients in short supply were capital and risk management skills and that we end our report from taskforce talk about a series of things that can be done to address these issues,

and key among them is this idea of an engagement with your regulator where you have to have a tough conversation about if you hit a turbulent time of stress, how would you deal with it, and i think that is the idea. if you cannot describe that, and if you cannot make the regulator comfortable, then the regulators as you're not the person to be managing an institution of this complexity and risk level, and i have not used this analogy of before, but i think there were analogies to the recent -- i think an analogy to the recent stress test would be that kind of engagement.

>> how is it pronounced? we have had five different pronunciations. i do not understand the kind of detail we would have to have. what are you going to do when things go wrong? >> i think the idea of a stress test is looking at your liquidity characteristics, understanding assets, and having a plan that if you had to move quickly, how would you respond? >> it is not just stress, but how are you going to dismember yourself in the event you have to be liquidated or sold off? which creditors at which order? do you know how many subsidiaries city group has?

2500. deutsche bank has roughly the same number. my suspicion is i am not sure if the general counsel knows all of the subsidiaries. to be specific, if you are forced to write a plan to assess how are you going to unwind this mess, and you do not understand it yourself, then the agency is going to have the authority to consolidate your complexity -- >> let's take for example 2500. are you saying if i am a little bank sitting someplace, it is all going to be private, and word will get around and you're the first to go? i do not understand how this

operates. parks fees living wills are disclosed only to the regulator. -- >> these living wills are disclosed only to the regulator. >> it will be kept for those regulators and shareholders. >> i think most of them are wholly-owned subsidiaries. it is not clear who is responsible. thereafter be a way to say who is resolved before these entities. i am not claiming this is fine to be the magic answer, but at a minimum, but not rigid with the wind down plans to do is to think. first, there is a first draft of the resolution when the institution and the inventor of secord. the second is, by having to stare into the of this, the

sheer act of doing that is a mind-expanding exercise, and i will tell you it is the annual exam, and the directors who are on both basically go to the general counsel and say, you have 2500 companies, and you do not know all their names? what if this thing goes under? then you go back and say, rationalizes for me and tell us who is going to take the loss. that is a very constructive conversation to have. >> thank you. >> thank you very much. i want to mention the over-the- counter derivatives market and the role they play in the economic crisis. one of the most interesting aspects of the energy derivatives market and the way

in which that was carried out without any oversight. there is no oversight, no examination, and this is one reason we have seen the price of energy go up so dramatically. what do you think should be the proper steps to deal with this situation of over-the-counter derivatives markets? the name of them is very interesting. >> the you want to talk about that? >> i feel like i walked into the wrong hearing. we certainly have views on too big to fail and the derivatives market, but we do not have any formal positions on that. we are trying to figure out the

consumer side of life i would be happy to respond to that. i fink first of all it is true but on exchange futures and options and over-the-counter trade in energy has been used for a speculator to manipulate energy markets in the last few years and that it is critically important to the economic well- being of this country to get that under control. i would bring all standardized contracts on to regulated exchanges where there are a lot of regulatory tools to the myth speculation when it is excessive. i would also require that over- the-counter trades be reported

on. i would not allow any of the counter speculative trades, but if you are going to allow that, there should be position limits that can be imposed by regulators on both over-the- counter and exchange positions. >> i am going outside the bounds, so i am just giving my own personal views. i certainly agree what we ought to do is have a recording of all these on trade registries. were the collateral will be held by third parties, this is something the commission was very strong about. if you go right to agee, it was not held in a third party

account. when it comes to living things to clearinghouses and exchanges, yes, we are for that, but we would use capital requirements common and -- requirements, so what we're saying if you haven't a physician not in an exchange, you have a much higher charge, so we have strong incentives for the geniuses on wall street to develop standardized instruments to go to clearinghouses. we would not mandate it, but we would use the capital and end up in the same direction you talk about. the reason it is so important is because we eliminate this bilateral situation where aig is refundable to its counterparty and you've concentrate the interconnections of the clearinghouse, which then needs

to be regulated. you love to make sure the clearing house has adequate liquidity or you have a systemic problems, see you cannot make it go away, but you can make it more visible and controllable if you concentrate thrift. >> do you have anything more to say about that? >> he described the perspective we have in our committee. >> do you think that is enough? don't you think there is additional legislation? >> absolutely. i think the tools they have now with respect to exchange-traded oil futures are necessary for the entire market, and i think as much as possible, oil derivatives should be on a regulated exchange for their

tools to limit the extent of speculation for reagan unfortunately, the summer before last, they failed to do the, even with respect to the exchanges, although they have power to do it. they could have required speculator is to reduce their positions. they could have required them to eliminate their physicians for rigger they could have required them to pay extra margin as suggested, and i think to the extent they are allowed in effect of the active trading over-the-counter, that should be the power -- there should be full oversight, full reporting, and powers to impose limits. i think reporting should allow the cfpc to put together the

positions it has even in the physical market so they can assess whether that is too vague and they can reduce it or eliminate it, and if there is emergency, they can tell bugs regulators to reduce their position. >> to you have time to stay for a few more minutes? >> yes. >> i want to give each of you a chance to predict the future for us. as you look ahead and follow this debate going on in congress and with the american people with all the players involved in this discussion about what kind of regulatory network we need, when we finally have the president put it on

paper and signed into law a major changes, what is your greatest fear we will leave out? what do you think the most likely mistake we will make is? >> i will talk about the over- the-counter derivatives, which is what i know the best. the biggest concern i have is the sum of the bills currently have extensions that can easily be traded on exchange, but they are permitted to stay over the counter. i do not think there is any justification for that. i think that creates falafel that can cripple this effort -- creates a loophole that can cripple this effort. i would eliminate the end user

expansion. i would eliminate the foreign currency extension some of the bills have had on standardized contracts. i would eliminate the provision that suggests contracts can be traded over-the-counter if one party is not an eligible member of a clearing house. essentially, that is particularly frivolous to me because our clearing houses have traditionally had members acting as intermediaries for entities that are not members, so that is not a relevant physician. i am afraid there could be room for an over-the-counter market. >> we have five principles they

have recommended, and we think all five should be in there. if any of them are not, we would think congress is making a mistake here is my personal view about what i would counsel the congress and even the president of the united states. do not oversell this bill. do not use the word never again. the fact is that capital systems are susceptible to crisis. there is a new book out buckner professor of maryland the documents over hundreds of years and many countries the frequency of crises, and i am old enough to remember the banking crisis of 1991. that is how i cut my teeth in

academia. i have seen this before. this will happen again. the best we can hope for is that this bill will reduce the frequency and severity of future crises, and that is the best we can do, because there will always be new markets that will get out of control, and if we have a systemic risk monitor, we will attenuate those bubbles, but we will never put them out, so let's not over-promise. >> i believe the false positives in the banking industry as well as the economy may lead policy- makers not to the bold systemic redesign that is needed. if you lift the current intervention, a lot has been

said about we have been pulled from vanessa edge of the of this, but let's fourth of what we really did. we've made too big to fail vaguer, landing -- and landing among those institutions is going down. the fund is depleted. if you will look of the reality of unemployment, it is growing. poverty is growing. the fact of the matter is wall the economy is technically out of recession, america is in deep depression, so i guess my bottom line is we have not come out of the woods yet, and we need to stay focused on the fact of the financial system is not working for the american public. it is not well-supervised, and the fact we are away from the of this does not mean we cannot

make a u-turn if we do not make the changes that are essential. >> this is your personal opinion? >> my personal opinion is tied up, but five will go past that. what i am going to refer to is the methodology. we took a dozen or 15 of us that have very different views, and we focused on the five key issues. systemic risk, too big to fail, consumer protection, and strengthening the marketplace for reagan we found ways we can compromise, and i think there is a tooling tension between wanting to encourage the way in which our economy can be so resilience, but also wanting to have regulations, and getting the attention right in having long meetings to discuss this is the right way, and it is the

tension between those forces but i think is the right thing, and getting it wrong would be to have too much left or too much right on that point but trying to basically not be to the logical but trying to understand. >> thank you for your testimony, and never again will i use the term never again. >> i want to ask one question one we know that up until 1929 there were problems with the economy that would occur every 10, 15 years or so, but they were never deeply serious. they were routine, but over time there was this organization of the banking industry, and the growing manipulation of investment circumstances, things

of that nature -- all of that crop of big collapse, and then in 1933, we had an act that seemed to be very effective. it stabilized the economy for a long time. we did not have another collapse until 2007, and the experience is very tenuous and could be damaging over time, so the appeal of that act really bothered me. i thought it was a big mistake of the time, and it seems to have been. what do you think about death? do you think we should be bringing back that regulation? the think there should be the selectivity of oversight with regard to investment and consumer banking and the manipulation of regulation that

occurred so abundantly that causes economic condition we are experiencing now? >> i did not know if it will make you feel any better, but i do not read history this way. i think the bulk of economic historians read the depression as critical legislation fax save the country were deposit insurance, the rules we adopted, but actually this act was incidental. one interesting historical fact is that the co-sponsor went to the floor of congress two years later and said, i want to repeal the act. was too late. let's roll the clock forward today. you have been in congress long

enough to know it is hard to reverse. >> my opinion is it was showing itself to be effected. you disagree with me. >> this is not just my view. i think if you took a random sample of most economic historians, they would say the same thing. i would call the that even if we commercial banking, it would not make a difference if we cannot fix this other stuff. if we let the institutions that got in trouble, it was not because of this. merrill lynch, goldman sachs, morgan stanley, these big institutions were not basically a financial conglomerate. they were investment banks, and they underwrote a lot of this stuff and help get us into trouble likewise, if you look if

the big banks, the only true financial conglomerate was sitting group, but the rest of the big banks were not really commercial investment stakes, so i do not view this bill which eliminated the other -- which have largely been removed -- now i do not view that as of precipitating cause. it is a separate issue. did it allow some institutions to become larger? if you look of the names of just rattled off, they're pretty vague, so i would conclude by looking at the recommendation which says let selectively look at an institution and say if its

plan is not satisfactory, then selectively we could force the divorce you are talking about, but i would not mandate it by law, and they're not that many regulated financial institutions anyhow. that is one of the ironies. we thought there would be financial conglomerates, and it turns out there were not many. >> do you have a comment? >> let me mention that i do think it is a worthwhile exercise to look again at the activities we permit large financial institutions that have insured deposits to engage in. it was not let our banks like j.p. morgan to act as over-the- counter derivatives dealers, but it was the banking regulators

today, and that added an enormous amount of risk to those institutions. i think you could look get proprietary trading by large financial institutions that have insured deposits and ask yourself is that the kind of activity we want to be going on in an institution that the tax payer is insuring, so i think there are issues. i agree with bob that it was not only this in the 1930 costs. it was the area there should be regulation of securities and securities exchanges, that there should be regulation of futures exchange -- future exchanges and deposit insurance and several other things that all together

have given us a long time of relative stability before this current crash, and a lot of fat has been dismantled, -- a lot of that has been dismantled either through the modernization act of 2007 for the failure of regulators to actually exercise their powers and enforce the laws they have been entrusted with. >> anyone else? >> i would also agree with much of what bob said and really remind the committee that while the back and plays an important role, the point of the mortgage meltdown happened in a more serious place, which was the interaction between the brokers

and lenders and consumers, and had the products not been designed not to be sustainable, we would not have had much of the process here. our current laws could have eliminated much if not full of unfair and deceptive lending practices that roughhousing markets down. >> the original question was about the business model of large financial institutions, and my own instinct is while further study is always occur idea, in today's marketplace, the distinction is blurred to such a degree that you can make it whatever you want, and trying to design business models to put the people in one lane would not be successful. .

we are very privileged to have him here today. i would like to announce the ambassador. [applause]

>> good morning, ladies and gentlemen. thank you, panelists and for the kind introduction. it is great being back here. i am grateful for the center on politics and foreign relations at johns hopkins university for providing me this opportunity in this important week of discussion about the afghan government on the new strategy being adopted by president obama. we generally welcome president obama's new strategy and new commitment in resources, especially military resources for afghanistan. we are especially grateful for the additional resources to build our institutions and afghanistan, as well as

resources to enhance the capacity of the afghan government to deliver sources -- to deliver services. we welcome the renewed attention to the agricultural sector and we are grateful for general mcchrystal's approach for making the protection of the afghan people the most important pillar of the strategy. we agree with president obama that we must reverse the momentum of the taliban. we should deny them access to major metropolitan centers and populated areas and work with pakistan to destroy all safe havens, including those operating against afghanistan, nato and u.s. forces. the surge is needed to provide

time and space for afghanistan to build its own security forces. we in afghanistan are committed to do our part to see that the new strategy succeeds, and for su -- for us to take the responsibility. i admire president obama for standing tall and emphasizing that this country was built on the values of freedom and human rights. and the u.s. will stand up for those struggling to achieve such values. allow me also to convey my gratitude to all those soldiers a -- soldiers and afghan forces

fighting and dying. they are true heroes. there is a lot of debate about the necessity to be in afghanistan, but those fighting in afghanistan, and i have met many of them, they are true heroes. they are fighting to make the world a safer place for our children. i also welcome the deployment of additional troops and am grateful for support their families are providing for preserving safety and stability in the region. i would like to give you my position on some of the key issues of the new strategy. i will try to answer some questions being raised repeatedly.

the most important item is that we fully support president obama's planned to transition the responsibility of taking over the security matters in afghanistan on a gradual basis. the responsible drawdown of the combat troops may start in 18 months. we are ready to begin to take the responsibility ourselves. there are many regional factors that will impact the u.s. presence and the drawdown of the forces. we are ready to take the full responsibility of the security in afghanistan. president karzai indicated we will take this in a province by province basis. today we are in charge of the security of kabul province, this

is where almost one fourth of the population is living. we are practically in charge of the security in many other provinces in northern and central afghanistan, where some nato troops are operating. we are planning on taking the lead on the military operations within three years. in five years we should be able to take the responsibility of the security throughout the country. we think the best exit strategy for the u.s. is success. to succeed is the best strategy for us and the united states. we will be seeking a long-term political friendship with the u.s. we understand a u.s. military presence will have its limitations.

we understand fighting for afghanistan is our responsibility as the afghan people. we are ready to take this responsibility. for a smooth transfer, we are asking for the establishment of a joint security consultation group with u.s. and nato. some of the initial consultation has already started. the afghan national army is already fighting a long u.s. forces. there is hardly any operation anywhere that has been conducted without the presence of the afghan security forces. they are not strong enough, there is an average of three police officers dying for the safety per day. that will increase when we acquired better capabilities.

there is no shortage of resources or skills . we will get additional resources to accommodate this strengthening of security forces. to give you an example, if we look at the current number of trainers needed, it is surprising how short the number is. we need almost 2375 police teams. only 1050 have been deployed. the same thing with the operation teams, only 55% are filled. with additional troops some vacancies will be filled. we appreciate nato countries and

willingness -- we appreciate nato countries willingness to participate. i think instead of pushing too hard for additional troops for those countries, we should try to seek synergies between different degrees of capability that our partners are bringing to the table. ask them to do what they can do the best. they can help with sending trainers or equipment, particularly the heavy artillery, helicopters, transport airlift for our forces are in demand. many afghans like myself who speak german and french.

euro c being changed. to give an example, the constitution requires a member of the cabinet register their property, but then the penal code does not provide a penalty if they do not do so. these laws are being changed. in the past we appointed once a prominent attorney general and hoped he would deal with this issue, but since he was just one person, he failed. corruption is a symptom of that government, not the cause of a bad government. one should note that what we are facing in afghanistan is not

just bad government, it is absence of government and weak government. in many parts of afghanistan the government is not present. the institutions are week to begin with, so we welcome president obama's plan for the surge.35% say unemployment, and% say corruption. the order is very important. it is very important to improve government but equally important to improve security and provide jobs. as far as the support for the afghan government, the same survey indicates 71% support the performance of the afghan government.

despite all the shortfall in the limitations on our resources, 91% of afghans support the performance of the afghan national army. another issue being raised about the concern of where this money is going to, we are ready to be fully accountable for the international funding that is being channelled through the afghan government. 20% of the funding is channeled through the afghan government. it is usually through the afghan trust fund. and we are asking our partners to change some of the traditional ways they are spending their money. to strengthen the institution of the afghan government we would

like to see the budget being allocated to afghanistan increased to 40% by next year. there has been talk about direct support for qualified institutions and officials as part of the new strategy. this is very much welcomed. i would encourage institutions to perform better. we have always been in favor of benchmarks and deadlines that pushes institutions to perform better, but the focus should be on developing capacity, not replacing capacity. to bypass the government for ignoring the constitution is not a sustainable when of development. -- to bypass the government or ignore the constitution is not a

sustainable way of development. they are offering partnership. let's stay focused on what the mission is. your mission is to destroy, distract, and feet al qaeda. and, prevent the return of taliban and help the afghan people. your presence is welcome and demanded. a lot will be reversed. let's be clear, what the mission is. same question has been asked. what are we in afghanistan? -- why are we in afghanistan? frankly, sometimes i am surprised how quickly people will go back to the mindset of september tamp10.

you are in afghanistan because you were attacked, because of 911. this is truly america's war, to distract and destroy al qaeda. this is nato's battle for regional stability and europe's security. it is our struggle to stay alive in a difficult part of the world. your presence in africa speafghn has prevented attacks. but you're in mounds of afghanistan to provide security -- but you are in afghanistan to provide security. the benefit is neutral. it is to the best mutual nnational interest to fight

a bharal enemy in afghanistan. -- to fight a brittle enemy in afghanistan. one cannot separate this from stability or lack of stability in pakistan, in mission test nuclear capabilities. it has become an epicenter lately. other neighbors of afghanistan have nuclear ambitions. your presence is beneficial for both of us. i know that being in afghanistan is dangerous. so many precious lives of americans have been lost and they are irreplaceable. but not being in afghanistan is equally dangerous. like the government of pakistan to expand their operation in targeting some of

the leadership of the taliban who are there working to kill forces in afghanistan. overall, success is within our reach. parable is very modest. what has been accomplished -- our goal is very modest. we have to develop health care services due to your support and assistance. 7 million children are going back to school. 40% or girls. a major accomplishment. -- 40% or girls. -- 40% are girls. 78% think democracy is the best type of government. there has been discussion back and forth. are we imposing democracy on afghanistan? no, we are not.

and the way to do this is to get advice to the afghan people. if democracy means having not having a terrorist going to bed at home or having an opportunity to send their daughters to school with their spouses t, ths is what every human being deserves. time is crucial. we're grateful for the decision been made and for speedy implementation. we look for the support of the congress to fund this. we are familiar with the economic crisis. we hope that the necessary funding will be in place for this mission to store. we can jointly accomplished this mission. there is more reason to think we will not be able to defeat a

brutal enemy like the taliban. thank you very much. " the ambassador has agreed to take some question. i will ask the first one. we have a lot of questions. i will go back to the question i asked a few members of the bush administration. president bush said will bring osama bin laden to justice. that was 2001. why cannot the strongest army in the nine states, may know, and the afghan army find an individual supposedly finding in a cave somewhere? will we ever find osama bin laden and bring him to justice? >> if he was in afghanistan by now, we would have certainly found him. our armies are in 41 countries.

if he were in afghanistan, he board have been found. i do not think he is in a cave. he needs dialysis and connectivity with the rest of the network of al qaeda. he is most probably in a major metropolitan center and hiding or living in an varmint them living in a cave. he is not in afghanistan. there is nothing that will prevent any one of bust to find him if he is in afghanistan. >> its c and pakistan? >> that is a very good guess. -- is he in pakistan? >> thank you very much. i thought that was interesting. there is a reasonable argument that success depends much more on many more packages than just

the 30,000 troops. it depends on building governance and on pakistan. all of those may be more important than the 30,000 troops. i would like to ask you about the buildup of the army. the u.s. has spent $40 billion so far. half of that has gone to security, about $19 billion to develop security forces in afghanistan. because of that, why haven't you done better with all of that money? what prospect can you give success within the next 18 months? senator levin said the ratio is four nato to everyone afghan army in helmand. i think the u.s. has set less

than a third was able to fight on its own of the afghan army. the u.s. has given enormous amounts of money. why haven't you done better? but prospects you have for success? crust i am not sure about the $19 billion. i cannot tell you it is exactly $19 billion. that money has not been given to the defense of afghanistan. the money has been spent directly by our partners. the reason we are not fair, first, the approach was not proper. we wanted to have an army of at least 200,000. everyone said, this is too much. you cannot have this kind of army. how are you going to pay for it? so they put a ceiling on it.

for a country bigger than iraq, and more complicated than iraq. in this condition, the 35,000 was extremely unreasonable. the training that took place was basic. soldiers were fighting with recycled ak-47's. up till recently, the army was fighting with old ak-47's. there was no nato equipment. just recently they switched to nato guns. the national army does not have airlift capabilities. same thing with the police force. the concept of the league nation was created. germany is on that and is doing that. that is fine.

you don't have to worry about it. the resources were limited. the approach was not appropriate. trading afghan forces with batons and pistols while the taliban is coming with rocket launchers. the job of the police officer is not to issue a parking citation for a car bomb. his job is to stay alive at first. the approach was not proper. the resources were limited. the ceilings were on realistic. 35,000 was raised recently. there is no shortage of manpower. pay them adequately. thousands will and list. -- thousands will enlist. they were recruiting police

officers. it was increased. it was not enough. a cooked in afghanistan makes $3. a driver makes $500. how do you expect people will show up if you're paying that little? it is an expense you have to pay. u.s. soldiers cost $1 million a year. if the cost of not doing that is a lot more, it means having more of your troops, british, american, and other troops being in afghanistan, it is politically not sustainable. we're there to do this. >> mr. ambassador, the 30,000 additional troops will deploy at the fastest pace possible. they can target the insurgency

and the key population centers in afghanistan. how or the troops getting into afghanistan? is it realistic to think the infrastructure is there to support the troops? on agriculture. this is an area that has received little attention. we're putting more attention on that ourself. other areas that could create jobs and wealth in afghanistan are mining, seeking more investment in mining will create large-scale jobs and also provide for the sustainability of the economy of afghanistan in. the council will try to put a strategic focus on creating jobs and creating a sustainable economy in afghanistan. >> stanley?

>> my question concerns iran. after 911, all the reports were that iran very helpful. in the last few months, i have been reading scattered accounts coupled iranian weapons showing up. i of seen those accounts disputed. my question is, how credible of these reports? how'd you view the policy of iran toward afghanistan in general? >> thank you very much. the policy is complicated. on one hand, they do not want to seek the return of taliban. they understand long-term historical linguistic and religious ties. they are playing a constructive role as far as building a roads, help with education, and

assisting the afghan government. because of the tension that exists, they are keeping destructive options active. if there is a complication of relation between iran and washington, we would be paying a price. they are playing both constructive and a destructive role in afghanistan. we would like to be more constructive. we would be better off if iran continued to be constructive. we have been asked very clearly, our friends, and to leave their differences out of afghanistan. it would serve the best interests. the role they are playing is to fall. you are right with the increased tension. -- the role is to wofold.

they remind us that other options in afghanistan. >> thank you. >> give your name. >> i am the correspondent from spain. you look at the map of afghanistan. it is very different from the soviet union. the war is pretty much focused in specific areas. it is said that they are very influential. is there a security problem in afghanistan, or is there is security problem with the past two montshtuns? >> pthe pastuns being used and recruited.

they're all not terrorists. they are the prime victims of that. most of the killing, most of the fighting takes place in those areas of afghanistan and pakistan. there have been grievances in the past on the part of the pashtuns. there are more vulnerable to terrorism. that includes elle lack of delivery of services on both parts of the border -- that includes a lack of delivery and services on both parts of the border. there's not an ethnic nature to it. how can a man because of some ethnic problem, instead of trying to improve his life and participate in building his community will where a suicide belt and go into a mosque full of other pashtuns on a friday

and go and kill himself? how can we explain that, that young men will go into a mosque or market in an hour full of women, mostly christian women, and explode himself backs which have to find out why they had been recruited. ethnicity does not play a role there. it is a lack of services and other historic grievances. >> thank you. i am from gannett. the president talked about an 18-month limit. you said three to five years. is he being realistic? first, he said it will begin in three months. it was a responsible drawdown.

if you put it all in context, we will see the drawdown will not be actually at the day. conditions should be re- evaluated. the main objective is really to defeat the enemy. if we accomplish that sooner than 18 months, we should do it. but i think overall, considering the current security threats, the 18-month time frame is realistic. if other things do not change in the region, will be fully ready to take responsibility from those u.s. troops that will be leaving afghanistan. >> question from back there. >> yes, hi.

terrance smith. there is a lot of rhetoric and the u.s. side about not making the same mistakes that were made when the u.s. was involved in the late 1980's. robert gates said yesterday. what extent is the u.s. actually in vault are committed to non-military advancements in afghanistan? you mentioned girls going back to school. not something we're doing other than security gains. >> a lot of focus has been made of the military part of the new strategy, the number of the troupe, drawdown, update. this is a comprehensive approach on insuring long-term partnership between afghanistan and the united states. you mentioned creating jobs and hope and opportunity as the most sustainable way of fighting in

stabilizing afghanistan. we have been seeking a long-term partnership with the united states. this is the best hope the afghan people have. this is a lot more today, a willingness to focus on the area of enhancing this kind of relationship. the number of exchanges is increasing. students more -- more students coming year. more people-to-people exchanges. it enhances mutual understanding. these are under way. i hope that the economic crisis and the difficulties in this country will allow the united states to further deliver on promises that are being made on the new strategy. we're asking also of the support of the u.s. congress overall,

not just to focus on the military expansion. >> i have one more question. we defeated the taliban fairly quickly after 9/11. why didn't they state defeated? >> we did not defeat the taliban. we pushed them aside. we pushed them into the countryside into pakistan. and then we did not stay focused on afghanistan. there were other big wars and crises. had we stayed focused on afghanistan and start building the security institutions on time, there would not have been a need for additional u.s. troops at this time. of course, the issue of the centuries of the taliban on the other side of the border remain unchallenged. they are still able to receive

political, ideological, and financial support from bases on the other side of the border. >> i have one more question. we have heard an awful lot about what went wrong over the last few years. violence has increased since 2005 every year. u.s. military says the taliban is increasing their control. you talked about efforts began in 2004. president karzai talked-about the willingness to enter into talks. >> the reason is that the efforts of the afghan government since 2004 were not taken seriously by the rest of the world.

the second reason is that there was -- the consolation of the taliban has three components to it. first, it is not -- first, you were dealing with the ideological leadership of the taliban about 10%. they are not affiliated with al qaeda. it goes a long way. it started against the resistance against the soviets. the 10% has to be eliminated in a military matter. >> the president said he was willing to talk. one would assumed he was in the 10%. >> it is one of those 10%, but there is a symbolic significance. if you start talking, that may change a lot.

it has to be dealt with in a military matter. the remaining percentage are malicioutias who have been antagonized because of lack of proper governance and paramilitary operations and what is going on in the south. that 10% is the group that should be focused on in terms of engagement. the engagement is the geopolitical and financial to bring them over to us. the remaining 60% are unemployed that have been promised paradise or $300 fighting. becker is neither a military or political. we have to give jobs and a sense of assurance that if you go back

to afghanistan, you'll not be killed or sent to jail. we have coordination with our friends. we have individual commanders of nato or u.s. agencies or military has contacted them and has created some confusion. so therefore, it is much better to put a clearer structure and to try to do it in a very coordinated way. >> mr. ambassador, i listened to an author's be classified about the importance of education for women and how this will change the outcome of what will happen in afghanistan. this book is now becoming mandatory for members of the military. americans need to learn to listen, respect, and build a

relationship. >> he has absolutely right. every human being. it is mutual. to listen, to respect, and to understand is very respectful. when you hear slogans lighke afghans space for the reconstruction, it is not the right approach kirk is to be done by afghan hands. and here you see the importance of respect and understanding. those hands are still weak. that is the way to build. we roll winning the hearts and mind. -- we are winning the hearts and mind. we're trying to win your heart and mind. no. building trust and confidence.

treating the others as your partner. all of that, come to an understanding come up trusting and engaging. thank you very much.

i asked the gentleman of the press to be as inconspicuous as possible and not interfere with the witnesses today. hearing will come to order. i want to first say that no demonstration will be tolerated. anyone disturbing by signs or any other disturbance will be removed forthwith. so today i welcome -- the armed services committee. our second hearing on afghanistan. the results of strategic review. witnesses today general stanley mcchrystal, commander international security assistant force in the united states force of afghanistan and the honorable

carl ikenberry. we welcome you, we thank you for being with us as we have been long anticipating your testimony today. two months ago i wrote a lengthy letter to the president some six pages. that he listen to his commanders in the field. and let me begin by commending the president by demonstrating his commitment to achieving success in afghanistan by adding 30,000 american troops to the war. in that letter and in private considerations i urged the president to listen to our military leaders and give them what they needed, and he did just that. i've noted that the war in iraq caused the previous administration to lose focus on afghanistan shortly after deposing the taliban regime, enforcing al qaeda out of afghanistan the preoccupation with iraq caused the war in afghanistan to be underresourced

with essentially no strategy. unsurprisingly, the taliban and their al qaeda allies were able to come back and once again threaten the stability of afghanistan and the region and ultimately our country. the president in his speech last week conveyed his commitment to addressing the threat. posed by al qaeda and their taliban allies in january of 2009, there are about 33,000 united states troops in afghanistan, now in about seven months, there'll be three times that. yesterday in my office, ikenberry informed me will soon also have tripled the number of civilian experts assigned to the mission, and we welcome that. many in the press have compared the increase and forces in afghanistan to the surge in iraq. i don't think such comparisons are wise are fair. as a percentage of the forces on the ground, increase ordered by

president obama is much larger than the increase in iraq. and the fight in afghanistan will be different in many ways. many articles citing general petraeus yesterday suggested he does not believe that progress in afghanistan will not come as quickly as it did in iraq. in the article he suggested that we must be measured in our expectations. to me this article highlights the need for a commitment to accomplishing this mission. not just from the president, but from the congress and the american people. i hope that this hearing can help build that sense of support and that sense of commitment. general mcchrystal and you, ambassador ikenberry, sat in my office and told me you think we can successfully complete the mission in afghanistan. i believe that you're right. that the president's new strategy coupled with increase in troops and civilian experts in the sense of urgency provided

by the july 2011 target for transition presents our best chance for success. and remember, this committee will have questions about how it can be accomplished. what does success in afghanistan look like? what do we believe must be accomplished in the next 18 months? what risk are we accepting in the next 18 months? how will we convince the pakistanis their interests lie with us? how will we measure progress over time? and how will we help the afghan people build a legitimate government that can end the insurgency? while i do have questions about implementation, i do not have any doubt that we must succeed in afghanistan, that the president is ranked to order the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops on top of the troops already approved. and that the new strategy

provides a good path for success. i hope our witnesses today can help us fill in the details of how the difficult but achievable goals can be accomplished. ultimately we are working to protect the american people and to end the threat from al qaeda. now i turn to my good friend mccann, the ranking member, the gentleman from california for comments he may have. let me buck one administrative note before our witnesses begin their statements. members are reminded there is a classified briefing with admiral lafever, the military officer in pakistan and 3:01 today given the importance of pakistan, i hope members will schedule themselves to attend there. and with that, let's begin.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. general mcchrystal, ambassador ikenberry, welcome, and thank you for being here this morning. this committee, this congress, and the american people have been awaiting your testimony. before i go into the substance of my remarks, i want to state at the outset that all of us support your mission in afghanistan and the men and women serving under your command. for over three months, washington has been mired in a substantial war debate. pundits and academics alike have been weighing in on whether the conflict in afghanistan is in our national interest and if this is a fight we can win. in the absence of a clear authoritative voice during the months of the white house review, the course of the debate has followed a flood of leaks from the always popular but never accountable anonymous source. to put it mildly, this was not helpful. during this time, the public

support for the war waned. and i worry our mission suffered too. with the president's speech last week and your testimony here today, i believe we've finally turned a corner in this war. we must now move from the assessment stage to the execution stage of this strategy. instead of asking if we can achieve success, we must now give the time, space, and resources that you need to succeed. rather than questioning if the united states has a will to win, you, general mcchrystal, ambassador ikenberry, and the thousands of u.s. military and civilians in afghanistan will demonstrate the will of this mission to defeat al qaeda, route the taliban, and bring stability to afghanistan. it's time we conclude this chapter on the war debate in washington and write the next chapter on national consensus and mission success.

you, gentlemen, will have the pen. you shall be the authors of success. today you will write the first page of this next chapter. after these hearings, washington must step aside and let kabul once again become ground zero in this conflict. general mcchrystal and ambassador ikenberry, the task before you is enormous. i know i speak for the entire committee when i say you are the best people to take on this challenge. this country is blessed to have leaders like you in its service. in september, your written word when we received your assessment, we read your written word when we received your assessment. today we need to hear you speak about the unwritten words between the lines of the assessment. this is your opportunity to speak to the citizens of this country and interested parties

across the world. i think when they hear from you they'll be convinced of the soundness of our strategy and optimistic about the chances for our success. fortunately much of your assessment seems to have been internalized in washington and by members of this committee. on tuesday night, the president agreed to provide you with additional troops to execute a counterinsurgency strategy. the commander in chief responded to the urgency of the situation when he committed to deploy those forces as fast as possible. last week, secretary gates testified that our aim is to reverse the taliban's momentum, which is precisely what your assessment described as essential to preventing mission failure in afghanistan. yet, the president's speech and subsequent testimony last week left me concerned that the administration did not adopt

some of the fundamentals of your assessment. nowhere in your assessment did i see discussion of a date certain to begin withdrawal. in fact, you wrote that the long-term fight will require patience and commitment. i believed your concern was at the afghan people are waiting on the sidelines to see how committed we are. did we demonstrate that commitment last week? on thursday, secretary gates testified that he was persuaded by you and general petraeus that beginning a period of transition on a date certain will, in fact, incentivize the afghans. moreover, i cannot find need to -- before last week's speech, i assumed like many that the afghan national security forces were doing everything they could to get into the fight. while corruption in the realm of governance and development

undermined our security efforts, i believe that the afghan ministries of defense and interior were part of the solution and not part of the problem. in fact, the variable holding back the growth of the afghan national security forces were things outside the control of kabul. namely funds to pay for a larger force, and more capacity on the part of nato to train the afghans. so where did this new narrative of putting pressure on the afghans come from? what i did not hear last week was a commitment to follow the recommendation of your assessment and build an afghan national security force of 400,000. instead, admiral mullen spoke of taking it year by year. again, i don't recall your assessment recommending incrementalism. i'm interested to hear how your headquarters will interpret last week's guidance from washington. finally, there's the critical question of resources.

first, are 30,000 additional forces enough to win decisively? as you wrote in the assessment, resources will not win this war, but underresourcing could lose it. given the many leagues you requested at a minimum 40,000 additional forces. please explain why the president is not underresourcing his own strategy. will you have to cut the scope of the mission because you did not receive 60,000 to 80,000 more forces? and next year, you determine that additional -- if next year you determine that additional forces are required, do you have the flexibility to ask for more? while we've heard about top line numbers, we've not heard discussion about the composition of these forces. how many combat brigades will deploy? how many will be trainers?

will each combat brigade receive all its enablers. will the cap of the 30,000 forces make you choose between adding combat forces or enablers? general, ambassador, this is your opportunity to answer the critics and bolster the supporters. no one is more qualified to do this than you. again, thank you for being here. good luck, god speed in your mission. i yield back. >> thank you, gentlemen. now we open the floor and general mcchrystal, please. >> mr. chairman, congressman mckin, distinguished members of this committee. thank you for the chance to appear before you today. i welcome this opportunity to testify on our way ahead in afghanistan. and i'm pleased to do so with

ambassador carl ikenberry, an old friend. let me begin by saluting the bravery of the men and women of the international security force in afghanistan. they're anchored by over 68,000 courageous americans, our close partners in the nato alliance, and a 43 nation coalition. we honor the sacrifices of the fallen, the veterans, and their families. we also recognize the toll paid every day by our counter parts in the afghanistan security forces and afghan civilians who ultimately suffer the most from this insurgency. it is for them and for all of us that we seek a stable afghanistan, a defunct al qaeda, and a secure future in that vital region of the world. i first deployed to afghanistan in 2002 and have commanded forces there every year since. despite that experience, there is much in afghanistan that i have yet to fully understand. for all of us, afghanistan is a

challenge that's best aproufed with a balance of determination and humility. while u.s. forces have been at war in afghanistan for eight years, the afghans have been at it for more than 30. they are frustrated with international efforts that failed to meet their expectations, confronting us with a crisis of confidence among afghans who view the international effort as insufficient, and their government is corrupt, or at the very least, inconsequential. the afghan taliban is a prominent threat to the government of afghanistan as they aspire to once again become the government of afghanistan. the insurgent groups have more limited geographical region objectives, but they are no less lethal. all three groups are supported to some degree by external elements in iran and pakistan, have ties with al qaeda, and

coexist within narcotics and criminal networks both fuelling and feeding off instability and vg taliban's current momentum and create time and space to develop

afghan security and governance capacity. the president's decision rapidly resources our strategy recognizing that the next 18 months will likely be decisive and ultimately enable success. i fully support the president's decision. the president also reiterated how this decision supports our national interests. rolling back the teleban is a prerequisite to ult ultimate defeat of al qaeda. the mission is not only important it is also achievable. we can and will accomplish this mission. let me briefly explain why i believe so. my confidence arrives first from the afghans resolve since it is their actions that ultimately matter most in ending this conflict. with their interests and by extension of our own secured. second, we do not confront a popular insurgency. the taliban have no widespread constituency, have a history of

failure in power and lack in appealing vision. third, where our strategy is say plied we've begun to show we can help the afghans establish more security and more credible governance. finally, afghans do not regard us as occupiers. they do not wish for us to remain forever, yet they see our support as a necessary bridge to future security and stability. i've been back in afghanistan for six months now. i believe that with the president's decision and ongoing reforms i outlined in our initial assessment our efforts are now empowered with the greater sense of clarity, capability, commitment and confidence. let me start with clarity. the president's recently completed review of our strategy to include its deep and pointed questioning of all assumptions and recommendations has produced greater clarity of our mission and objectives. we also have greater clarity on the way forward. additional forces will begin to

deploy shortly, and by this time next year new security gains illuminated by specific indicators and clear to us that the insurgency has lost the momentum. and bip the summer of 2011, it will be clear to the afghan people that the insurgency will not win giving them the chance to side with their government. from that point forward, while we plan to have fewer combat forces in harm's way -- >> will the gentleman suspend. the lady with the sign will remove herself immediately. >> sergeant and arms, please make sure she leaves through the door. general, please resume. >> thank you, mr. chairman. from that point forward while we plan to have fewer forces in harm's way we will remain partnered with the afghan security forces in a supporting

role to consolidate and solidify their gains. results may come more quickly and we may demonstrate quickly towards measurable objectives, the silver fact, there are no silver bullets. ultimate success the cumulative effect across mutt 358 lines of operation. increasing our capability has been about much more than just troop increases. for the past six months we have been implementing organizational and operational changes that are already reflecting improvements in our effectiveness. but the additional forces announced by president obama are significant. forces to increase our capacity to train the afghan national security forces and forces to partner with afghan army and police in expanding security zones in key areas will provide us the ability to reverse insurgent momentum and deny the taliban the access to the population they require to survive. the additional capability we are building translates into credibility in the minds of

afghans who demand proof not only that we want to protect them, but that we can. in a world perception where the battle field is the mind of an afghan elder, it's hope of an afghan mother, the aspirations of an afghan child, this can be decisive. our commitment is watched intently and constantly judged by our allies and by our enemies. the commitment of 30,000 additional u.s. forces along with additional coalition forces and growing afghan national security force numbers will be a significant step towards expanding security in critical areas and in demonstrating resolve. the commitment of all coalition nations will be buttressed as clear understanding of how we will mitigate risks. i'll briefly mention three. the first is the afghan government's credibility deficit, which must be recognized by all to include afghan officials as critical area of focus and change. equally important is our ability to accelerate development of the

afghan security forces. measures such as increased pay and initiatives, literacy training, leader development and expanded partnering are necessary to position the afghan national security force to assume responsibility for long-term security. third, the hazard posed by extremists that operate on both sides the border with pakistan with freedom of movement across that border must be mitigated by enhanced crossborder coordination and enhanced pakistani engagement. looking ahead i'm confident we have both the right strategy and the right resources. every trip around afghanistan reinforces by confidence in the coalition and afghan forces we stand alongside in this effort. but i also find confidence in those we are trying to help. that confidence is found where an afghan farmer chooses to harvest wheat rather than poppy. or where a young adult casts his or her vote or joins the police.

or where a group of villagers resolving to reject the local insurgency. we face many challenges in afghanistan, but you are efforts sustained by one reality. neither the afghan people nor the international community want afghanistan to remain a sanctuary for terror and violence, and if we are to be confident of our mission and prospects we must be accurate in the our assessment of progress. we owe ourselves, our leaders and the american people transparency and candor, because the price to be paid is high and the stakes are even higher. in closing, my team and i would like to thank you and your colleagues for your support to the american men and women currently serving in afghanistan, and to tell you a bit about them. we risk letting numbers like 30 k roll off our tongues without remembers those are fathers, mother, sons and daughters serving far from home, self fls

their sacrifices for each of us. the other day i asked a young but combat experienced sergeant where he was on 9/11. his answer, getting my braces removed, remind me it's been more than eight years since 9/11, and many of our service members and families have experienced and sacrificed much. but as i see them in action at remote bases, on patrol, partnering with afghan forces, recovering in combat hospitalses, they don't talk about all they've given up. they talk about all they are accomplishing and their determination in this endeavor. this is not a force of rookies or dilettantes. the brigade commander in post is completing his fourth combat tour in afghanistan, and his experience and skirtese is reflective of the force that represents you. all have felt fear and loneliness. most have lost comrades. none have lost heart. in their eyes i see maturity

beyond their years, in their actions i see a compliment to succeed and a commitment to each other. i'm confident that i share your pride in what these great american, doing for our country in afghanistan and it will be my privilege to accept your questions on their behalf. thank you, mr. chairman. >> general, thank you. after the next witness testifies, i'll ask that the members of the press, the photographers, move from the immediate front to the sides. it would be of great help to us. ambassador eikenberry, we thank you for being with us. you're now recognized. thank you. >> chairman skelton, ranking member and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to present my views on afghanistan today. and i'd ask that my full statement be submitted for the record. >> without objection. make sure you get real close to the microphone there. >> how's that? >> much better. thank you. >> okay. last week in the speech at west

point, president obama presented the administration's strategy for afghanistan and for pakistan. his decision came after an intensive deliberative and far-reaching review. i'm honored to have been part of that. i believe the course that the president outlined does offer the best path to stabilize afghanistan and ensure al qaeda cannot regain a foothold to plan new attacks against us. i can say without equivocation that i fully support this approach. i consider myself privileged to serve as the united states ambassador and to represent an amazing team of diplomats, development specialists and civilian experts who formed the most capable and dedicated united states embassy anywhere in the world. and i'm extraordinarily proud of them. i'm also honored to testify alongside general stan

mcchrystal, my professional colleague and friend of many years. i want to say from the outset that general mcchrystal and i are united in a joint effort where civilian and military personnel work together every day. side by side with our afghan partners and our allies. and we could not accomplish our objectives without this kind of cooperation. as you know, mr. chairman, the united states is at a critical juncture in our involvement in afghanistan. on december 1st, the president ordered 30,000 additional troops to deploy to afghanistan on an accelerated timetable with the goal of rating the insurgencies momentum, haynesing the security forces and establishing security in key parts of afghanistan. on the civilian side, we aim to increase employment and provide essential services in areas of greatest insecurity, and to improve critical ministries in

the economy at the national level. these steps together will, i believe, help us to remove insurgents from the battlefield and build support for the afghan government. as the president said, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance, and after a difficult election, the afghan government does show signs of recognizing the need to deliver better governance and security. we await urgent concrete steps in a number of areas. i'd like to briefly discuss the three main pillars of our efforts in afghanistan. security, governance and development. general mcchrystal has already addressed our plans for improving security and building the afghan national security forces. suns assuming my post i've made a special point of getting out of kabul and see conditions firsthand and fully concur with general mcchrystal the answersment that the situation

remains serious. sending additional u.s. and nato ispp forces is critical. this will expand our role and toe the afghans it take on a larger role in prying for their own security. president obama said the transition to afghan responsibility will begin in the summer of 2011 when we expect afghan security forces to begin assuming lead responsibility for defending their country. moving on from security. the second pillar of our comprehensive strategy focuses on governance. at the national and sub-national levels. our overarching going, improve governance so afghans can see the benefit of supporty a lift government and the insurgency loses its support.

as general mcchrystal pointsous, one of our major impediments faced, the afghan government's lack of credibility with its own people. to strengthen its legitimacy our approach at the national level is improving key ministries, increasinged number of civilian technical advisers and providing more development assistance directly through these ministries' budgets. by focusing on ministries that deliver essential services and security, we can accelerate the building of the afghan government to one that is sufficiently visible, effective and accountable. at the provincial and district levels we're working jointly with our military through our provincial reconstruction teams, our district development working groups and our district support teams which help build afghan capacity, particularly in the areas of greatest insecurity, in southern and in eastern afghanistan.

underpinning all of these efforts is the need to combat corruption and promote the rule of law. with our assistance, the afghan government is steadily building law enforcement institutions to fight corruption, organized crime and drug trafficking. in its inaugural address, president karzai stated husband intention to make merit based appointments in his new cabinet and implement and anti-corruption strategy. we're very encouraged by these statements. the cultivation of poppy and trafficking of opium continues to have a debilitating effect on afghan society. our strategy is multipronged involving demand reduction, efforts by law enforcement agencies and the military to detain traffickers and interdict drug shipments and support for illicit agriculture development. the narcotics problem will, of course, never have solution, though, without economic development. this leads to the third pillar of our effort clshs is

development. in recent months, we've adjusted our approach to focus on building key aspects, or key elements of afghanistan's private sector economy. increasing our emphasis on agriculture, enhancing government revenue collection and improving the coordination of assistants with the united states' government and the international community. these steps were taken to produce improvements in the lives of ordinary afghans, and to contribute to more effective government and lesson support for the insurgency. rebuilding the farm sector in particular is essential for the afghan government to reduce the pool of unemploy the men who form the recruiting base for extremisist groups. we estimate some 80% of the afghan population derives their income directly or indirectly from agriculture. mr. chairman, i want to emphasize that we're concentrating on what is essential and obtainable.

the president's strategy is based upon a pragmatic assessment of the security interests the united states of america, and our belief that a sustainable representative government and a sustainable economy in afghanistan are essential to our success. we need a viable afghan government so our forces can draw down and the investment of u.s. taxpayer dollars can be reduced. in closing, i'd like to mention two important risks that we face in carrying out this strategy in which i share with general mcchrystal. the first is, in spite of everything we do, afghanistan may struggle to take over the essential task of governance and security on a timely basis. the second is our partnership with pakistan. the effort we're undertaking in afghanistan is likely to fall short of our strategic goals unless there is more progress at eliminating sanctuaries used by the afghan taliban and their associates inside of pakistan.

the main elements of the president's plan are executed, and if our afghan partners and allies do their part, i'm confident we can achieve our strategic octaves. i say this with conviction, because for the first time during my three tours in afghanistan, all of the elements of our national power are being employed with full support of the president and increasingly with our allies. achieving our goals inside of afghanistan will not be easy, but i'm optimistic that we can succeed with the support of congress. our mission was underresourced for years. but it's now one of our government's highest priorities with substantial development funds and hundreds of more civilian personnel. we will soon have increased our civilian presence in kabul threefold and in the field sixfold just over the past year. we will, of course, need more. the united states foreign assistance is also a

comparatively small but essential fraction of the total amount spent in afghanistan over the last eight years. addition resources will be necessary, and we look forward to sharing more details on our anticipated needs with congress in the coming days and weeks. mr. chairman, afghanistan is a daunting challenge. success is not guaranteed, but it is possible. with additional troops and the other resources provided by the president and with the help of the united states congress, we will work tirelessly to ensure that al qaeda never again finds refuge inside of afghanistan and threatens our country and our homeland. thank you, mr. chairman. i look forward to your questions. >> mr. ambassador, thank you so much for being with us. if there are any photographers in the immediate front the witnesses, please, move to the side. i believe some already have, if not all.

thank you for that. general mcchrystal. tell us what your mission is. >> mr. chairman, i believe that our mission is to do two things. first, al qaeda is a threat to the united states and to our allies worldwide. our ability to prevent lk ann curry reestablishing safe havens inside afghanistan is key. as most people know, many of the 9/11 hijackers were in fact trained on afghan soil in al qaeda-run training camps, and it's critical we prevent their ability to return to spaces inside afghanistan and repeat that kind of activity. wider than that, our mission is to help the government of afghanistan have the ability to defend itself, to conduct its own nation building. top provide it time and space

for it to labor or effectively fend off ex-esterile threats to its sovereignty. >> general, do you agree with the president's decision to strategize and increase the number of troops? >> i agree with the president's decision, and i believe that it provides me the resources that we need to execute strategy to accomplish the mission that's outlined for us. >> general, will you be successful in your mission? >> i believe we will absolutely be successful. >> what do you need from us, general? the armed services committee. >> i believe the resources have been provided by the president's decision. i believe what we need from the armed services committee and from the american people is continued commitment and support

for our forces in this mission. >> ambassador eikenberry, november 12, "washington post" discussed two leaked cables sent by you. let me read. "the u.s. ambassador to kabul sent two classified cables to washington in the past week expressing deep concerns about sending more u.s. troops to afghanistan until president hamid karzai's government demonstrates that it is willing to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that has fueled the taliban's rise" senior officials said. would you explain those "leaked" telegrams? >> thank you, chairman. if i could make three points. first, throughout the very vigorous review of our strategy

that went on for a three-month period of time -- >> a little closer to the microphone, please. >> how that? >> very good. >> okay. thank you. let me make three points. first of all, in the process of the strategy review that went on for three months, all the participants in this very vigorous review process were encouraged to state their assessments and their recommendations, all of the participants did that in a variety of ways. through video teleconferences, through direct conversations, through written communications. my second point is, i'd like to clarify that at no point during this review process, mr. chairman, was i ever opposed to additional troops being sent to afghanistan. as i said during my opening statement, i fully agree with general mcchrystal's review of the strategic assessment he had done and i shared his views about the severity of the situation, which was dire in certain places of the country.

completely shared his view about the need for the accelerated growth of the afghan national security forces. that requires additional u.s. troops, nato troops, to accomplish that. so it was not a question of additional troops. it was the question, as we all had about the number of troops. what would be the timelines for those troops? what would be the context that those troops would operate? and then the third point i wanted to make is as a result of this very extensive review, the mission was refined. the ways forward were clarified, and the resources now had been committed to allow us to achieve the refined mission. with that, at this point in time, as i said in my opening statement, mr. chairman, i am unequivocally in support of this mission, and i am exactly aligned with general mcchrystal here to my right in moving

forward now to vigorously implement the assigned mission. >> i thank the ambassador. the gentleman from california, my good friend, ranking member mr. mckeon. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general mcchrystal, the washington rumor mill has been thriving over the last three months, as the last question we just had there. you know, i have heard that your request of the president was anywhere from 10,000 to 80,000 additional troops. we have not been given your request. all we've had to go on is what we've heard. with each option i know that you requested -- you tied it to a risk factor. now, when i was in afghanistan in august, and we met, i mentioned that i know had you

been given certain direction from the secretary and from others, and i asked you directly if that was going to influence the request that you made of the commander in chief. you told me, no. you said, you have a moral obligation to ask for what you needed to be successful in the mission. as i mentioned, congress has not had the opportunity to review your troop requests. we did -- we were able to read the original assessment that you sent, but i have the highest level of confidence that you adhered to your word and asked for what you thought you needed given your best military judgment to be successful. general, can you tell this committee and the american people what were the different force options you requested and the degree of risk that was tied

to those requests? >> congressman, that is still a classified document. so i'm unable to go into detail, but i can certainly go into the process, and i'd like to do that. when we completed the initial assessment, we went into a resource analysis which we called it, which is the classified document, and in that is outlined for you during your visit we identified different force packages with associated risk based upon our assessments of that, and then i said that we would also make a recommendation, technically not a request at that point, bought very direct recommendation of my chain of command and what the appropriate force level was. and i did that. through this process, then, when that went into the president's assessment and decision-making process, what i was very pleased about is, beginning with my initial assessment i was not only encouraged to be candid and

straight forward, i was demanded to be canid and straightforward. as we went forward with the resource analysis and that became part of what was considered in the president's assessment, throughout that process, which was exchange of different documents and then a series of security dcs, in every case i was able to make my recommendations or my analysis and they would come back for more detailed rashen nall to explain that. i thought was a very healthy change as ambassador eikenberry laid out, getting everything on the table, getting everybody very clear on where we were, and what i think came out of that was, as we focused on the mission, the understanding of the mission, i believe that the president's decision reflects resourcing, resources that do, that are congruent with what i recommended we needed. so i'm very comfortable with the

outcome resourcewise of what was made in the process. >> general, would you be willing to, in a classified session with the committee, give us what you asked for? >> absolutely, sir. >> and let me now frame the question in a little different way, in public. did you ask for 30,000 troops in 2010? >> i asked for four sets to be deployed as quickly as they could be deployed, and as the flow worked out, that was going to be about that, in 2010, but i didn't ask it that way. >> thank you, general. did you recommend that the troops begin withdrawal by july

2011? >> i did not recommend anything to do with -- i made no recommendations at all, no. >> in your judgment, does the deployment of 30,000 troops to the eastern and southern parts of the country and the 18-month timeline provide the least risk and most opportunity for success compared to the other options you gave to the commander in chief? >> i believe that nothing in this is without risk, as you've said with least risk. i think it's appropriate rick. what i'd like to do is give the wider context of this. as we look at our partnership with afghanistan from now through the strategic partnership that the president and the secretary of defense have discussed, in the long term, what in fact we have done is provided the afghans the assurens that we are going to be

strategic partners with them. that likely will not involve impart forces but different things over time, but it's a very important part of the long-term commitment to them, and if you are in the insurgency thashs is also a very difficult fact to deal with, because essentially makes the insurgent long-term approach not viable. if you come to near-term, the president has just announced 30,000 additional u.s. forces, and we expect to get some range of additional coalition forces. so starting very quickly, beginning this month, actually, with deployment, we will have a significant increased force on the ground that's going to allow us to turn the momentum, both actual momentum on the ground and momentum in the eyes of the afghan people over about the next 18 months. i believe the next 18 months are the critical period in this war, because i believe they are critical in the minds of the afghan people and in the minds of the insurgency. so i believe the researchers

we've been provided along with the strategy which we already started implemented and the resolve reflected by this support of the american people and our own co-lgs allies i believe for this 18 months we'll make tremendous progress against this while with simultaneously grow afghanistan's capacity to provide for its own security. that, then, bridges to the long term. so i'm very comfortable where we are now as we go out towards the strategic partnership and i don't--i think inappropriately they will try to use it in information operations and describe it as something that it is not in terms of a lack of commitment on the part of that, the u.s. and the coalition, because we've committed to a long-term partnership, but i think we can deal with that. and on the positive, it is a bit of a forcing function by being very clear to all the players involved that we are going to be

looking hard at things, it provide as forcing function and impetus for moving forward for the afghans and others to continue to make progress towards their own capacity. >> thank you. finally, general i know we moved additional forces in earlier this year. i believe they began arriving april, may, june, and we've began an offensive july 1st. you've had time now to assess that. that's almost what we're projecting for next year. we'll have forces arriving, some this month, and some early next year, and then we're looking to another review next december. so based on how you assess the effort this year and then the increased effort next year, will you feel good about being able to assess for another review next december of how we're doing to date?

>> i will, and, of course, we will do constant assessments as we do to see where we are, but i actually think we'll be, the progress already being made by the forces approved in march, and by the other steps we've taken and how we operate are cumulative with the additional forces that will start flowing in, and we're actually going to start earlier this year than those that were approved in march, and we're going to try to flow these official forces and employ them as quickly as we can. so i actually think by december we will have had more time to mature our thinking and show real progress, and i'm confident that we will. >> and finally, general, do you feel that you will have the flexibility a year from now, december of 2010, to ask for additional forces if your assessment at that point points to those additional forces needed for success? >> i believe i'll have the

responsibility to give my best military advice, whichever the direction the situation is going. i do not anticipate the requirement to ask for additional forces, but i would always provide my candid, best military advice. >> thank you very much, general. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. general, how good are the american troops under your command? >> they're even better than we think they are. they are, they are amazing. i've been in 33 years. carl and i served together most of that, and when i impair it to when i came in in the '70s it is completely different. we are fighting an extended war with a very professional force augmented by citizen soldier whose do an extraordinary job. i was up at walter reed yesterday, as many of you do, seeing our wounded, and as i met

soldiers and sailors who had been wounded, their sense of commitment to get back into their units, back with their forces, was extraordinary and their sense of focus on the mission. then when i go down on thanksgiving. i flew around to as many combat outposts as i could and i went to, i don't know how many, but it was a lot, and on one of them it was a young second lieutenant platoon leader along with an afghan national police element, and the organization was out there in the middle of nowhere and did not have hot chow, because their generator wasn't working, and so they were there and there wasn't a complaint at all, but one of the young sergeants came up to me and talked about partnering with the afghan police, because you know they are the much maligned afghan national police and he said, sir, you got to understand, this is working great. this is extraordinary. the progress we're making. we should have started this months ago, that unit's on yoir 11th month of a 12-month deployment. so when i see that, every time i

get out, i'm extraordinarily convinced how good they are and how well they're doing and at what we've asked them to do. >> you mentioned the citizen soldiers. all of us have national guard troops that have been deployed. how good are the national guard troops? >> well, they're extraordinary, but one of the things i'd say, sometimes someone will fall in and say, just as good as active duty or active army troops, regular troops. that's not the case. in many cases they bring skills from around the country, bring things that active components skills and maturity components don't have subpoena they're not exactly the same, but together they are much better. so, and we are losing, we are paying a price with our citizen soldiers in casualties and in lost time away from home, just like we are with our entire force. so -- i just -- i cannot say enough about their performance.

>> ambassador, the question is put to you. >> could i say one thing? >> how good are our troops? >> chairman, our troops are -- >> get closer, please. >> our troops are every bit as good as general mcchrystal said they are. i wish -- i wish when we were lieutenants together that they were as good as they are now, but if i could say one word about the civilians in the, that are in afghanistan as well. chairman, with your permission, our civilian force we've got in afghanistan representing the full inner agency of our government, the federal bureau of investigation, the drug enforcement administration, the department of agriculture, usad, treasury, i go go on, they are also, we'd say a world-class force. i could give you one example. on the 13th of october, at a u.s. army unit a striker brigade operating down in spenbolduk.

a combat hilt by ieds. whenever i learn we have swilling in harm's way i'll give them a call that night to see how they're doing. in this particular case there was a mr. jim green from the department of agriculture, 55 years old from oklahoma and a mr. travis gardner, usaid, 38 years old from nebraska. in the same convoy out there doing their job as agriculture specialists with the u.s. army. i talked to them both on the phone that night, asked how they were doing. they said doing fine. they were just out there doing their job with the u.s. army. we should be enormously proud of the u.s. swilling serving alongside our soldier, sailors, airman and marines. >> thank you very much. i'm informed that the witnesses have a hard stop at 12:30. with that we are into the five-minute rule. mr. reyes? >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman, and general and ambassador, thank you for being here with us this morning.

the president commented in his speech at west point that we are being assisted by 43 countries. as we go around the world trying to convince other countries to join in the fight, because truly this fight against al qaeda, somehow we have to convince the rest of the world that it's in everyone's best interests to assist. there are two issues that are brought up. the first one is that some, somehow the belief is we're going to leave there, and leave prematurely. secondly, that something has to be done about the corruption with the karzai government. in particular, these -- these two issues are very important to

the traditionally muslim countries where i think we need to focus to get their assistance into this very critical region of the world. can you comment, first of all, on how we can convince others to join in this effort? secondly, on the issue of corruption and the things we can do to change that. both of you, please. >> great. congressman, i thought i'd start on how we can convince others to stay focused on this. we do have 43 nations. in fact, that's about to go up fairly soon as well, and that's extraordinarily important to the effort for a couple of reasons. one, they all bring capacity, but it's also very important, because we are a coalition there we have additional credibility with the afghan people. they know a coalition will never be occupiers. so there's no way to paint us as

the soviet union. so that's very important. i think it's important to all of our coalition partners to stress our long-term strategic commitment with afghanistan. many of our coalition partners are there because they believe it's important. others are there because they believe that either the nato alliance or the relationship of the u.s. is another factor and i think that's very important. but stressing the consistencesy of our commitment, i think is the most key point. >> and general, you don't think that the deadline, 18-month deadline, affects the commitment in others, other nations? >> i believe if we put the perception of that, because, in fact, i don't -- i don't view july 2011 as a deadline. i stview that as a point at whi time the president directed we will reduce combat forces but we will decide the pace and scope of that based upon conditions at that time.

so i don't believe that is a deadline at all. i think it's just a natural part of the evolution of what we're doing. >> congressman, if i could address your question about corruption. general mcchrystal and i both in our opening statements emphasized the importance of efforts to help strengthen the legitimacy of the government of afghanistan. we are working right now in many areas. let me highlight three. first of all, combined efforts, partnered efforts, with the government of afghanistan to improve their law enforcement capabilities. we have many programs. one, for instance, the development of a major crimes task force, the equivalent of an afghan fbi led bike our training efforts and the allies. secondly, we're working to help improve the transparency and accountability of key afghan ministries through certifications programs. more of our money, of our development money, going directly into afghan ministries that are certified and in a

transparent way. this requires partnership as well. right now about 80% of the developmental dollars being put in by the international community into afghanistan are outside of the afghan budget. so they need help in this area as well. and then third, we're working hard, again, with the combined international effort to help improve the civil service of afghanistan. these are long-term efforts. there's not going to be any kind of a silver bullet, but i'm optimistic we can make progress, by afghan leadership encouragingly karzai in his inauguration address he did talk about efforts to go after corruption but this is something we have to make progress on ove+ the next 12-24 months. we're going to need more afghan leadership and commitment but we haveñi to do this with the partnership of afghanistan. >> thank you. >> thank you. i read an article this morning, i think frfs the "washington

post" that was talking about an afghan with one eye and -- to his chest. he aligned himself with the national government and our presence there and acknowledged that if the taliban came back to power they were going to cut his head off. if this is a general perception of after gans isn't it going to be kind of difficult to get them to align themselves with the federal government and with us? let's imagine for a moment that i'm one of the bad guys. i'm evil but i'm not an idiot. long-range plans and above all i'm very patient. the president has signaled that we're going to begin a drawdown in july of '11, and if conditions on the ground are okay, that drawdown is going to continue a pace. i'm going to make sure conditions on the ground are

okay, because i'm a very patient guy and two years or so is not very long to wait. i'm just going to cool it for those two years or so and then these guys are going to be gone and i can have at it. isn't it going to be frightfully difficult to recruit afghans that if they know we're not success and success is not ensured, we're not successful, they're going to have their head cut off or something like that? and why isn't it true that the bad guys who have far more patience than we have. that part of the world sees the future very differently than we do. i let it go now to china to talk about energy. they began their discussion of energy by talking about post-oil. that's a long way off, sir. why won't they just wait us out? why isn't this a really non-productive approach to the solution of that problem? >> two great points that i'd like to bring out on this. first is that you're right about the insurgency and their use of

coercion. they will and do threaten people and it's very powerful, because the threat of being harmed stops you from making decisions you might otherwise make. so it's important that we be able to protect the afghan people. we can try to win their hearts and minds in the neartime, but you must be able to protect them from coercion. the second point, however, is that the insurgency has an essential weakness in this, and the challenge that does allow them to simply wait. first, they're not popular. they are not a national liberation front that people inside are just waiting for their success. they succeed on largely on their coercion. but if they go to ground or if they go to areas and simply wait, what happens is, during that period as we protect the afghan people along with our afghan partners and build up a way of life and convince the afghan feel they have a stake in this better way of life, then the society becomes more durable.

it becomes more difficult to coerce by the people have something to protect and something which they don't want to lose. additionally at this same time the afghan government, particularly afghan national security forces, are building their own capacity up, and so as the people are starting to buy into a new life and their government has increased capability to defend them, suddenly the insurgents who may have waited patiently are faced with a much less vulnerable targets or much less vulnerable afghan populace. so they really can't afford to wait, and this is -- this is the key to us trying to establish security and a future in the minds of the afghan people as we go forward. [ no audio ] >> i'm sorry. do you see that changing? i read about one afghan who was

really happy in '01 when we got the taliban out of there, but he now would welcome them back, because at least they are predictable. at least they administer justice. at least they're not corrupt. what kind of confidence do you have that the afghan government can, in fact, become a central government? they have never had a central government in 300 years. it's been tribal rule. why do you think that's going to change? >> i think it will change. they have had a central government, at least in my view, but it's never been a central government that has the same kind of control over local levels that we might in different models. >> it's been a pretend central government. hasn't it been, sir? >> a legitimate central government but, again it does not run things quite the way, in most nations, that we're familiar with. but i believe that this is the hard part. probably the most difficult task we have, to create credibility governance at the local level that reaches to the national level.

>> doug snyder? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen, for being leer. ambassador eikenberry, i got my colleague aiken here. about a year and a half ago we did a report for the armed services committee and actually stumbled ton this looking at prts, and benefits and medical care. i think i'll do this as question for the record. what we found 18 months ago, quite a bit of discrepancy in civilian incentives, support for family, wounded, i mean, literally having a military person in a civilian u.s. government person killed in action and yet they were treated differently, and i would encourage you as a question for the record to report back. are you safred as we augustment the number of civilians going into harm's way that they will be treated fairly and their families get the kind of support and they will get the kind of support we would expect? >> that's a very important question, representative, and we get you an answer back for the record.

>> thank you. general mcchrystal, i don't want to be too careful reading here but the reading comment of your statement was given to us, it says final statement, and then, but you did make one change here on page 3, talking about the summer of 2011. your written statement says from that point forward as we begin to reduce combat level wes will remain partnered with the forces in a supporting role. you changed that, while we have pure courses in harm's way i am soup that's an acknowledge if you reduce forces there's nothing that says you couldn't pull out support troops or -- i don't want to do, be too careful reading that that. is that an acknowledgement, you said reduce combat levels? >> that's more a case of last-minute editing i probably didn't catch. the bottom line is we will start to reduce troops in some capacity. and i expect it would start with combat forces but -- >> that's fair. i don't want to pay too much

attention on that. in neither of your written statements nor your oral statements did i hear a lot of discussion about possible incentives for getting people who are currently connected with the taliban to come over to a different side, and i don't need detail on this. i assume that is part of the discussions and in the mix? correct? >> it is. that must be a government of afghanistan run and managed program. we have stood up a particular cell to support them in that. we have resources available to do that. we think it's critical to offer fighters, maybe not the most senior leaders of the taliban but fighters the ability to lead the battlefield. >> and you have everything from congress you need to pursue those different objectives? >> we do. >> general mcchrystal, i had some communication i think the day after the president's speech, and you mentioned information how people would respond overseas to the discussion about the middle of

2011, which is a fire discussion. a fair discussion. and this major military is currently trading captains for deployment overseas. mutt me in the position of being a village elder a brother killed by the taliban and you're the young captain just assigned to afghanistan. what are you going to tell me about what does that mid-2011 mean if i and my family and clan and my jeer graphic area that i control aligned myself with the international forces? what are you going to tell me about what that date means? >> i start with the fact that we have committed to a strategic partnership. that's what i tried to explain. we are going to stay partnered with the government of afghanistan and the people of afghanistan for their future, whatever that has to look like. then i welcome back and say in the near term we are going to do a significant effort to grow your afghan national security forces so afghanistan can be secured by afghans, and we are going to use additional

coalition forces to provide time and space, breathing space to do that. i will then come back to him and say, this is a sha shared responsibility. flg fg belongs to afghans. afghanistan must be built and secured by afghans and i would say that they have got to make the decision to do the kinds of things that help that process along. it is difficult. it does put people in hard decisions. i go back to our revolution where our leadership put an awful lot on the line, and an awful lot of people in afghanistan are in the position of doing the same thing. >> thank you. finally, general mcchrystal, there has been some acknowledgement, i think, through the years that the women in the military, your women troops, perform very, very well and this is a different kind of war than some of the legislative restrictions we've had on the assignment of women. do you see any reason that the congress shouldn't consider as time goes by giving more flexibility to the military for

the assignment of women so you don't feel like you have your hands tied when assigning units or posting women? is there anything out there you see that would restrict that? >> sir, to be honest i haven't given a lot of thought. i will tell you on the battlefield i don't give it a lot of thought now, because our female forces perform amazingly well and i just haven't run into many situations where at least at my level, where i've found that to be a consideration. >> good. thank you. thank you, sir. >> thank you. mr. thorn bare? >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, i want to express appreciation for your service, especially over the last eight years. the success you've had and in a variety of jobs and the way you've achieved that success gives me, and i think others, with some insight into your role a much greater confidence that our strategy will be assessed and implemented praply to make the mission in afghanistan a

success. let me start, we've heard a lot in the last week about how the mission has been narrowed, and i would appreciate some specifics from you about what was in your mission at the end of august that is no longer your mission in december? >> i think that the best, the way i look tat is, the mission has been effectively and appropriately refined. as we went into the process from the president -- as we took the information that was in the president's strategy decision in march and then in subsequent documents and we informed ourselves with those and our initial assessment and then our campaign design, we designed a campaign that would focus on those areas we thought that needed to be secured. not every part of afghanistan is either under threat or needs to be secured at the same level. we focused on those to determine

what level of force we would need both afghan security forces and coalition forces, to be able to do that. as we went in and made our recommendations through the chain of command on that, in fact, that turned out to be a great point around which we discussed to refine everybody's understanding of the mission. in fact, we had the word defeat, which we had received in the initial guidance, but that gave us a great opportunity to discuss that in tremendous amount of detail, because in military terms, defeat actually means rendering a enemy incapable of accomplishing its mission. does not mean that you eradicate that enemy down to the last individual. it could be similar to politics where you defeat the other party in an election but you don't wipe them out. but -- but -- so as we look at the strategy, this really helps

govern how many forces you need and where you need to go. so it turned out to be a very, very helpful process as we did this, as we were forced to explain just how much terrain, how much of the population we had to protect, the lines of communication that were important for that and then the forces we thought were appropriate for that. that was the essential refining that i think was very valuable. >> okay. and in your assessment at the end of august, you talk a lot about the need to fully implement a counterinsurgency strategy, different culture, different organizations. great differences beyond the number of troops, and i really very heard very much about that in the last week. were the recommendations you made about different strategy, organizational changes and other things fully agreed to by the white house? >> to my knowledge, they were. in fact, they've also been extraordinarily supportive with

across nato, with our nato isep forces. you're asking our forces to do different things. to operate a counterinsurgency, but starting when i arrived in june we've been pushing in that direction. we haven't been stopped in any of those areas. we reorganize our command, stoo so we have done these things. culturely we continue to work inside our force. most of our forces do very well but there is a mind-set to do counterinsurgency that takes a lot of learning over time so it will probably be unfinished business forever. >> in your august assessment you say failure to gain the initiative and reverse the

insurgent momentum in the near term, risk and outcome for defeating the insurgency is no longer possible. defeating the insurgency is no longer possible. if that was flew august does that mean we have nine months to turn this thing around? >> i think it's important that we turn it around quickly. i might say a little bit longer now, but we eyesed the last six months at full throttle. so we didn't waste a minute of the last six months. agency as we start to deploy those approved what i tell my command, by next summer i expect there to be significant progress that is evident to us inside our force, by next december when i report back to you in detail, i expect that we'll be able to lay real progress out that will be clear to everyone, and by the following summer of july 2011, i think the progress will be unequivocally clear to the afghan people, and when it's unequivocally three to them that

will be a critical, decisive point. >> thank the gentleman. the general lady from california. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you both gentlemen for being before us today. general mcchrystal, on march 27th this year president obama announced a new strategy for afghanistan which included a deployment of 20,000 additional troops. the president stressed there were four goals to that strategy. number one, to disrupt terrorist networks in afghanistan networks in afghanistan and pakistan. two, promote capable, accountable and effective afghan government. i would assume that means not corrupt. number three, dsm self-reliant afghan security forces that could lead the counterinsurgency. and four, involve the international community to actively assist in addressing those objectives. so it's been eight months later and we're hearing the same objectives for this new strategy being presented to us. only this time it's going to cost us an additional 30,000

troops. so general, let me read this question, because it's a little detailed. president obama said that the withdrawal of u.s. forces from afghanistan will begin in july of 2011. and that promise, of course, has been reinforced, but rather ambiguously by the secretary of defense, secretary of state, and national security advisers. i watched them all on sunday's shows. all of those individuals cautioned that the completion of the withdrawal will be conditioned on concrete progress towards our strategic objectives on the ground in afghanistan. and that promise to begin the withdrawal at a certain date and the stipulation that the pace of withdrawal will be conditional, strike many of us as fundamentally inconsistent. for two reasons. if conditions on the ground are paramount, it's not really possible to predict a date, when withdrawal will make sense. and two, conditions on the ground are dependent on a wide array of variables, many of

which are beyond our control, including the strength of the enemy force and readiness of the afghan forces to assume responsibility. so if you could answer yes or no, please, if u.s. troop withdrawal is truly dependent on the conditions on the ground, as administration officialsing have stated, would you oppose a reduction of u.s. forces beginning in july 2011 if such reductions would jeopardize the mission or the security of the force? >> i can't really answer that yes or no, congresswoman. but i can give you a wider answer. >> was that a yes or no, general? >> i cannot answer that yes or no. what i will do is tell you that while i will always give my best military advice, i think trying to speculate to that particular condition would be inappropriate for me at this particular time. >> okay. let's set aside the projected withdrawal of july 2011. if security conditions on the ground continue to deteriorate after the troop augmentation is

completed next year, is it possible that you will request additional troops or put another way, if your professional military judgment leads you to the conclusion that additional troops are needed to successfully accomplish the mission, will you ask the president for additional forces? >> i will always provide my best military advice as candidly as possible. and when i think it's appropriate. >> was that a yes or a no? >> that's it, i will always provide my best military advice, congresswoman. if the conditions warrant my assessment to make advice in that way, of course. >> okay. and for the ambassador. ambassador, i -- i've been very reluctant to endorse president obama's request for 30,000 new troops. i noted that in vietnam, one of the biggest problems weapon had were governments that were corrupt, and not well lined with what the people needed in vietnam.

so my question to you is, have you seen anything in the last 18 months that would tell us that the karzai government is doing something about corruption? have you seen him, i don't know, arrest his brother, put people in jail, bring people to trial, stand up a court system that's actually going to take care of some of this corruption, ask him for the numbers to swiss bank accounts? what have you seen in the karzai government. he's been in for five years, he's just gotten another five years and we know it's been completely and totally corrupt. >> congresswoman, as i had said during my opening statement, and have said in the previous -- >> please get closer. >> as i said in my answer in a previous question, what you're asking right now, the need to improve the accountability of the afghan government, it is central to our success.

but against that, we have to be clear over the last seven years, starting from a very, very extraordinarily low baseline, there has been progress in afghanistan. if you look in the government of afghanistan in the central ministries right now, there's some success there. the ministry of public health, the ministry of education, the ministry of the interior. your question about the need to improve in efforts against corruption, there are points of excellence right now in the afghan government. we've got progress that's been made in the counternarcotics sector with very effective justice task force that's been established. i mentioned the major crime task force, the afghan fbi. this is going to be a very uphill fight that the government of afghanistan has to wage. i will make the point, that president karzai in his inauguration speech, he did take this on. but actions are going to be required, congresswoman.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. i was just requested, i'll put it in a request for question for the record. but i would like a positive and definitive answer to that, not just what -- >> before i call mr. jones, in previous conflicts, commanders have had limitations placed on them by civilian leaders. in korea, for example, the president placed a limit of events of the american forces in the 38th parallel. in vietnam, there were similarly politically determined limits. do you have any such limits in your efforts? >> i am not aware of any limits. i certainly don't have any that i feel right now. >> thank you very much. mr. jones? >> mr. chairman, thank you very much. i want to thank you gentlemen for being here today for your leadership to our nation. and i represent the district where the camp lejeune marine base is located and i'm very

proud of all our men and women in uniform, marines, too. i want to ask a question. several of my colleagues, mr. sanchez and mr. partlet, and in your comments you talked about the karzai government. and knowing that there have been numerous articles written about the brother being a drug dealer and on the payroll. what i want to know from a professional like yourself, how difficult is it to say to the afghan people, trust your government? i mean, if they see us as propping up this corrupt government, try to help me understand just how difficult that is, or if it's not difficult to say, trust your government? >> congressman, it's an extraordinary challenge. what's clear, that the afghan people right now, that they have

much greater expectations of their government. their ability to deliver basic services, the ability of their government to be accountable, the ability of their government to provide predictable justice to them. and that's perhaps more acute in the areas of eastern and southern afghanistan right now where insecurity exists. and that's part of the cause for the reasons of insecurity. so it's absolutely central that the government of afghanistan addresses this. but it is an extraordinary challenge. we're talking about a country that had three decades of conflict. a country because of that three decades of conflict that has literacy rates of 25%, we're talking about the complete collapse of institutions. but i will tell you, i've served in afghanistan since 2002, and there has been progress that's been made. we don't want to overlook substantial progress that's been made. but what's going to be essential now over the next two years,

that president karzai's administration in partnership with us, with the support of the international community, that they start to take stronger measures to become a more accountable government. and that they do address seriously the problems of corruption that plague the society. >> mr. ambassador, thank you for that answer. you are a successful professional, and that's what gives the american people much concern is that it's going to take a long time for this country to ever have a central government, or to be a nation. we have a recession, a deep recession in this country, and this is a debate that i hope we will have on the floor of the house soon about the policy as it relates to afghanistan. general mcchrystal, what do you anticipate once the 30,000 americans are on the ground in afghanistan, as far as the

insurgency? do you anticipate this will fuel the insurgency, embold them to come back out and really challenge to show their strength? i mean, i imagine that's probably a given, but i'd like to hear your comment on that. >> i believe they will try to do that. but i think that they're going to be challenged to do that. when they mass now in any significant numbers, they are defeated fairly quickly with significant losses. so what i think they will do, and what we see them talking about doing, is trying to maintain pressure, show a brave front against this, and continue to show the momentum that they believe that they have. i think, however, that they will end up using an increasing number of asymmetric tactics, suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices and coercion of the population at night and things other than large-scale operations. >> general, let me ask you this,

and this will be my last question. time's running out. if the -- if you needed to pursue the enemy, like during vietnam they had a sanctuary, laos, do you have the green light to go across the border in hot pursuit? >> sir, we have the ability to protect our forces with fire across the border, artillery and airfire. and we do that in coordination with our pakistani partners. so we can pursue them to target them and do that fairly routinely. but again, we coordinate that and have a series of procedures in process, or in place that allow us to do that. >> mr. chairman, i would like to ask that in the future, from time to time, if possible, that we would have classified briefings with men like mr. mccrystal -- general mcchrystal, excuse me, and the ambassador. >> we, of course, have done that in the past. we will do our best in the

future. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you so much. mr. andrews? >> thank you, mr. chairman. good morning, general, good morning, ambassador. thank you for your service. general, ambassador, do you agree with the statement that there is not a robust al qaeda presence in afghanistan today? >> in terms of numbers, there is not a robust al qaeda presence. in terms of the ability linkages to people like the hikani network through surrogates, in fact they do have significant linkage in influence. >> in your written testimony on page two, general, you say that our core goal of defeating al qaeda and preventing their return to afghanistan. return from where? >> there are many locations. their primary location in that area is pakistan. >> i thought you'd say that. and what's the plan with respect then to al qaeda sanctuaries in

pakistan? let me just play a devil's advocate question right now. it's there is a robust al qaeda presence both qualitatively and quantitatively in pakistan. so we're sending 30,000 more troops to afghanistan. what are we doing to be aggressive in wiping out the al qaeda sanctuaries in pakistan? >> sir, my current position, i don't have direct responsibility for operations inside pakistan although i maintain -- a close liaison, based upon my background. the most effective tactic against terrorism is governancei it is very difficult for terrorist groups to operate in. i believeñi it is the critical long-term way to help reduce al

qaeda. next to another location. >> mr. ambassador, what evidence is it that the pakistanis are executing their partnership by aggressively going after al qaeda in the tribal areas? administered tribal areas? >> congressman, that's not my domain as the u.s. ambassador to afghanistan. we do have a very close collaborative relationship with our united states embassy in pakist pakistan. the issues of security we're talking about here today are inextricably linked, afghanistan and pakistan. but it wouldn't be for me to -- >> i appreciate that. and i think that secretary gates and secretary lou were pretty good on this. but some unsolicited advice here.

the american people are not going to support the deployment of 30,000 people on a bank shot. on an indirect strategy to try to deal with a very direct problem. and i understand that the prevention of a re-emergence of a sanctuary in afghanistan has real value. but it's pretty clear to me that one of the central focal points of this mission is to help the pakistani government survive, and to help it gain its footing and credibility. i do think we need to articulate that. i think it's a very legitimate rationale. i think it is in our national interest to do so. but i think if we omit that from our discussion, we're omitting an awfully important point here. just one follow-up to mr. jones' question. general, you said that your orders permitted you to fire across the border, as i understand it. would the force protection rules

of engagement permit you to pursue across the border if in your judgment force protection required that? >> i'd like to take that for the record so i could consult the specific rules of engagement. >> i understand. if you were writing those rules of engagement, what would your recommendation be? >> i would never take away from american forces, particularly their ability to protect themselves. however, i would be very cautious in how i framed it, and how i executed it, because the sovereignty of pakistan is as sacred as the sovereignty of any other -- >> i appreciate that. i know the question is even provocative. and i don't mean to be. my hope is that the taliban are degraded to the point that they're not a virulent force within pakistan. that government can stabl lies, execute the position of the fatah and get both size of the border dealt with. i want to emphasize, this is a

bi-national problem. the taliban would see it as their own sovereign nation in that area. thank you. i yield back. >> thank the gentleman. i also thank the gentleman for raising the issue of pakistan. a reminder that there is a classified briefing at 3:00 this afternoon. hpc-301, le fever, top military officer in pakistan will be giving that briefing. mr. aiken, gentleman from missouri. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and general, i immediately agreed with your comments about the quality of the forces in afghanistan. my son is over there at camp leatherneck. so wanted immediate support there. i would say that what i'd like you to do, if you could do this fairly concisely, would be, what would you say your three biggest challenges are? i'm looking more for titles than a long paragraph on each one. >> sir, i think the number one is going to be the growth of the afghan national security forces, both in size and quality.

i think the second is going to be partnering with ambassador eikenberry and the government of afghanistan's team for governance. because where we create security, it is not durable without governance. and then i think the last, of course, is probably just getting at the psychological aspects of the afghan people as they are coerced by the insurgency. it plays into everything else, but convincing them is a critical task at hand. >> thank you for making that concise. your first point was the security forces, and that was going to be a question i wanted to ask more about. and that is, what would you say is the condition of the security forces in afghanistan? we're on a committee with chairman snyder here and we looked at the same thing in iraq. and you have to oh sort of build up and build. what is the status of the forces in general, if you can do it fairly quickly? >> yes, sir. together the afghan national security forces are just about 190,000 people assigned, or on

the rolls right now. the afghan national army is significantly ahead in terms of professionalization, capacity in the afghan national police. because we started earlier. we started in 2002. at the battalion and company level, they fight pretty well. organizationally, there's much development to do. the afghan national police have much further to go. the percentage of policemen who have actually received formal training is fairly low. we are increasing our partnership and our focus on them. but we are starting in a much lower level. the last point is, the police, of course, have a tremendous challenge because they operate so dispersed, it's harder to have leadership and influence over that. but they also die in larger numbers than any other force on the battlefield, fighting. so while we can be very critical, i think we also need to balance the fact that they are dying for their country pretty courageously. >> the additional troops allows

you to protect them better and partner with them better? >> that is exactly the heart of the strategy, create more security. >> thank you very much, general. ambassador, a couple of questions. thinking back a little bit from lessons from afghanistan, do they have a constitution in afghanistan -- i mean, from iraq -- do they have a constitution in afghanistan now? >> sir, they do. they've had -- >> could you pull your mike up a little higher, please? >> i'm a slow learner here. they have had a constitution since 2004. >> and did we make the same mistake in that one, to put sharia law into the constitution or not? >> the sharia law is not the dominant judicial system. >> that sounds like a double-talk to me. if it's in the constitution -- >> respect for islamic law is in the constitution.

congressman, it is locally interpreted. >> locally understood? okay. corruption is something that a lot of people have been hitting on that theme. is there any -- is corruption inevitable, as long as we've got the massive poppy crops that are -- i have to say that carefully -- over in afghanistan? >> there's no question that the high level of poppy production and opium trade contributes to corruption. >> is it possible for us to deal with the corruption problem as long as there is that major dependence on that supply of income? >> it will be difficult, but there is progress that is being nad against narco trafficking. congressman, last year there was about a 20% reduction that occurred countrywide in poppy production, and last year the number of poppy-free provinces

of afghanistan went from 18 to 20. there could be reverses from that promising development last year. but there is a comprehensive effort that's being waged by the government of afghanistan, sun port by our civilian side, especially in law enforcement and and the agricultural programs and the military. >> thank you. the last thing is, have you been paying attention to governance from the bottom up? sometimes i think we started too much from the top down. >> congressman, that is a very serious problem. and i would agree with you, i'd characterize our first several years in afghanistan just focusing at the national level. our new strategy does call for emphasis at the sub-national level in very direct support and close coordination with our military and their efforts out in the field. >> thank the gentleman. the gentle lady from california.

i appreciate, general, your mentioning the men and women who are serving in, i think particularly and their families, i continue to think we're still a military at war, not a nation pat war. and quite frankly, i'm not sure that we're trying to address that problem. we talk about the credibility of the afghan government to their own people. and we mentioned many times about the corruption. and i want to just focus on our role for a second. mr. ambassador, are we supporting leaders who in fact are fueling the insurgency in  many ways? we have a great deal of resources to the ministries. you mentioned certifying the ministries. but i want to know whether the congress has a role in trying to condition some of that support

further, and the extent to which we could be playing a more significant role? >> well, as you know, congresswoman, you do play one very significant role in that you have the responsibility for the special investigation, for afghanistan reconstruction, the group called segar, which is a very robust auditing and investigation arm that reports directly to the united states congress. indeed, in afghanistan today, in our united states embassy mission, we have over 30 from segar that are assigned. and they're very working in close partnership with us to rigorously audit and investigate the spending of our money. so yes, you are playing a very vital role. and as we move forward in afghanistan, we have many very progressive, good afghan ministers right now that like to condition developmental aid in ways that help them to work with

their own parliament, with very stringent standards being set -- >> i think i'm looking for ways that this really translates to the afghan people, though. the extent to which they see that we're actually doing something about that, and that some of these leaders are not really acting in their best interests. how are we communicating that to them? and it's critical that they get to see that change. >> again, i think that president karzai, as he laid out in his inauguration speech, he has a program for reform. he's emphasizing accountability. and i'm cautiously optimistic at this point about our ability over the next year, over the next two years to increasingly work in partnership with the afghan government to achieve the goals and objectives that you've articulated. >> thank you. i know this is progressive and it doesn't happen on a dime, but i also believe that there may be a time at which we see that the metrics of the work that segar

is doing would indicate to us that things are not progressing in the way that they should. i look to you, and i look to the general as well, to be able to say that, you know, we see some real problems here, and if this continues on a trajectory like it has been, we can't get to where we want to go. i mean, it is a bridge too far. >> the challenges are daunting for government accountability right now. we're working with the afghans in partnership, but it is going to be, as general mcchrystal said, it's perhaps our most difficult task, given what our starting point was back in 2001. >> general, as you work with the troops, and certainly to develop the afghan police in a different way than we've been working on for the last number of years, we know that we're very dependent on tribal leaders to encourage

their men to join with the forces, and yet we also know that the attrition rates are very high. there are multiple, multiple problems in doing that. so what are going to be your indicators, and in fact, you're moving in a progressive way, where would you like to be in three months, in six months? because this has got to happen soon. >> it will happen at different rates in different areas. but if we pick an area like the hellmen river valley where we're very focused, what we'd like to do is increase the number, or percentage of trainees that have had training at all. then once we put them through that training, we partner with them. so we have elements that are with them literally all the time, 24/7. that gives us two things. one, it gives us an ability to help build their professionalism, but it also gives us a constant window into thaur level of professionalism. and it is somewhat a deterrent

as well as corruption and misbehavior because they're partnered with us. what i want to get to is the afghan villagers, the people in the local area assign credibility in their mind to the afghan police. that's the most important metric. more so than their ability to go after crime. they will provide security, but it's, do the people view them as no, this is not happening, then what? >> well, we just keep working through that. at the end of the day, the afghan national police must be viewed with credibility by the local people. it will never be perfect but we have to get to that. >> thank you. >> very quickly, general, given mission the president assigned you, are you convinced that the forces provided you are adequate? >> mr. chairman, i am convinced. >> thank you.

>> thank you mr. chairman. thank you for your patience in answering our questions. i'm going to bring into my questions the three attributes you suggested we have. ranking member earlier that you thought it was your responsibility to provide your best military advice, and i assume that means to us as well, to the armed services committee. here's the core of what every member of this committee needs to know, and the american people need to know. in your experience, in your best military advice, should we send 30,000 additional troops to afghanistan, or a number greater than 30,000? not what you requested, not what were in documents, not what the president ordered, in your best military advice? >> in my best military advice, this is the right decision. the coalition forces that i expect will be helpful as well, but i believe this is the right -- >> you believe 30,000 would be the right number? >> of u.s. forces, yes, sir. >> how many total troops?

more than 30,000? >> i think we're going to end up with about 37,000, although it's absolutely unclear at this -- or a little bit unclear at this point. >> on thursday of last week, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff sat where you sat, and he indicated that you had received everything that you requested. according to military doctrine, normally that formal request for troops, as i understand it, would go from you, to the combatant commander and then to the president. is that a fair representation? >> that's correct. >> was the chairman correct that you received everything you requested? >> that is correct. >> during the period of time that you have served in afghanistan, from 2002 on, has there ever been a time under that chain of command, with that request going through like that, that you have not received what you have requested? >> i have never been in a position where i requested

before. so it would be misleading for me. the force that i had was completely resourced. >> so you had never made a request that you hadn't got. so if i said during the entire time you've been in afghanistan, you've received everything you've requested, that would technically be correct? >> that would be correct. >> earlier today the chairman asked you a question, he said will you be successful in your mission, and you answered yes, you would. from 2002 on, for every command that you had in afghanistan, if i had ever asked you if you would be successful in your mission, was there ever a time that you would have publicly said no, you would not have been successful in that mission? >> no, there's not. but i was in a fairly narrow part of the world. >> i understand. you would never have said, no, we're not going to be successful? >> no, i would not. >> the final question i would like to ask you, you believe that the afghanistan war is a war of necessity, do you not? >> i do, sir.

>> if it is a war of necessity, then i would like to follow up on a point that was raised a little bit earlier. if it's a war of necessity, i would think by definition we would have to win it, is that a fair assessment? >> i believe it's important that we be successful, yes, sir. >> if it is crucial that we have to win it, because it's a war of necessity, how can we say that in 18 months, if we need more troops, we are not going to require more troops, we are going to automatically begin to draw down our numbers, if in fact we need more troops to win this war of necessity? >> let me give you a context on this. first, i don't believe that we are going to need more forces in 18 months. but i would provide my best military advice on the conditions at any point, either at the 18 months or not, no matter how painful it might be. >> and general, i have complete confidence in your integrity. i know you would do that. my point is not with you. my point is as a nation, how can

we say, if this is a war of necessity, that we will guarantee we are going to begin withdrawing troops in 18 months if we have to win it, and if in 17 months we determine that we've got to have more troops to win this war? >> sir, i believe that the key point here is really the long-term stra te tick partnership with afghanistan, which the president has outlined. i think that underpins everything. >> general, just one last shot at this. for my determination part of the three attributes that you asked us to have, wouldn't it be fair to say that as a nation, if we've determined that this is a war of necessity, and if in 17 months or 13 months or whenever that period of time comes, we determine as a nation that we've got to have more troops to win this war, that we've got to put more troops in there to win this war of necessity? >> sir, what i can guarantee is, i will give my best military advice. i would think that the nation has to make decisions then based upon a much wider context.

>> thank you, general. >> thank the gentleman. the gentleman from georgia, mr. marshall. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for your service. i think we've got a great team there. and for all the service of all those you lead. i'm going to continue my lobbying, campaign, provincial reconstruction teams, change the name to provincial development centers, something like that. have an afghan face on this as quickly as possible. we should have done that already. shame on us for not having figured this out five or six or seven years ago. have an afghan pdc university. it's interesting, when i talked with you, general mcchrystal, you agree, and ambassador, if the two of you could just get together and make this happen, i think it would be helpful to the entire cause. i don't envy your balancing act with sophisticated characters, the ones that this -- the 2011 date might have a force function with. presumably they'll be our count

operation, to cushioned on the unsophisticated characters saying, you need to jump on our side of the fence here, at least get off the fence and help us out in the next year and a half. clearly the taliban are going to be emphasizing 2011, july 2011. and we've talked enough about that. but you've got quite a challenge here when you think about the different characters that you're trying to persuade with regard to two different objectives. in vietnam, as far as i can determine, about the only really successful thing that we had going for us was the village pacification program. just about everything else we tried didn't work very well. then we screwed that up by moving the folks who were very effective at guarding their own villages, having help from special forces teams, we tried to move them into more conventional forces and move them to different parts in the country and then they just didn't want to fight there. we've really struggled with the afghan national army.

it's really very visible. it's pretty easy for the taliban to avoid them just like it's easy for the taliban to avoid us. what we really need people are -- we need the one-eyed bearded guy that roscoe bartlett was referring to, you know, looking out for us and our interests in the rural areas. and it seems to me that the people who would come to him and say, look, you better not be helping the americans, because when they leave, we're going to cut your head off, he would like to be in a position to say, oh, really? well, here's the way it's going to work. before they leave, i am going to cut your head off. so i won't have to worry about you showing up after they leave. and that's the kind of almost vigilante justice that occurs in rural areas of afghanistan, and has for centuries. now, general mcchrystal, the central aspect of your new campaign is to empower local defense groups, and its local

communities, in strengthening those local communities. yet you've got this national concept at the same time. so there's a clash here. as far as the local folks are concerned, a lot of them are going to want to treat the enemy exactly as i just described. you help the taliban, i am going to kill you. no questions asked. i'm just going to do that. there's not going to be a trial. if it is, it's the law west of the pecos. we'll give you a trial and then we're going to hang you. how do we, how does america fit in there, when you have the national government and local folks, and local folks not interested in abiding by our concepts in going about doing this? >> i'll start on that. what we have got to get to is afghan responsibility for their security. and by a responsibility, it's got many facets to it. they absolutely have a tradition of local security, denying their area to outsiders of any kind. and i think that we need to reinforce that, and we need to support that where we can. we need to balance that with

great caution against a tradition that's much newer, but much hated in afghanistan of warlords and militias. on the one hand you have a local security tradition, on the other hand, for about the last 20 years, groups have come up under warlords that have been predatory and are much hated by the people, and took part in the civil war. so we've got to make sure that we don't either let reality or perception of those two work against each other. so as i say, with caution, as we go forward. and we are working programs, congressman, to try to build at local levels and we're having some success there with our afghan partners, government and local elements. the other parts of shared responsibility that are wider than just security forces that might carry weapons, it's also elders not allowing the young men to join the taliban. it's also people turning in information on improvised explosive device locations, or

just telling taliban, you can do ieds, but you can't do them in our neighborhood. as that grows out, that's the kind of confidence the locals would like to do that, but they lack the confidence right now. it's like a neighborhood that's been intimidated. so we've got to do a balancing, very credible national force, and there must be an afghan national army and police with a strong neighborhood fabric that is part local security and part just governance, neighborhood watch, and trust for each other. >> thank the gentleman. the gentleman from florida, mr. miller. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general mcchrystal, welcome, sir. in your opening statement, you made a comment about defeating al qaeda, and then in the same line you said you must disrupt and degrade the taliban's capacity. could you explain for us the

difference between defeating al qaeda and degrading the taliban? >> certainly. i believe that it's u.s. policy, and i believe it's an important objective that the taliban be defeated. and that means over time, wherever they are around the world, they must be prevented from being a threat against either the united states or our allies. i think that will take many years and it won't be just an american effort, it will be all of our partners. but where they are, i believe al qaeda both as an organization and as an ideology needs to be defeated. and that will require a lot of muslim nation partners as well. in terms of taliban, what i think we need to do there, sir, is -- and we had an extensive discussion about the term defeat. i think what we're doing is preventing -- taliban, i'm sorry, preventing the taliban from being an a threat to the

people. to lower the capacity within their own means, that afghanistan can hold them from being a major threat to either their way of life or their government. and i think over time, that will cause the taliban to go away, to become irrelevant and cease to exist. >> we do intend to defeat the taliban. >> the military term, in fact, without parsing that too tightly, we intend to prevent them from doing what they want to do. >> thank you, sir. and also following up, you described in your assessment, initial assessment, in that you would write a second assessment. do you intend to provide congress a copy of that second assessment? >> i have not been tasked to write a written assessment in that same form, but i understand from my secretary i will provide an assessment next december.

so my -- i don't know the form yet of that -- format of that, but it will be clearly a complete assessment. >> ambassador eikenberry, do you think we've got enough civilians working now? i mean, it seems like an awful small number when you're talking about 100,000 troops, and we've got less than 1,000 civilians out there right now. and there were press reports earlier that said state department employees were in fact refusing to -- i know we can't compels -- but that they were refusing to deploy to afghanistan. it's happening awful slow. we've been hearing this now for eight years, that we need to, you know, to bring people in, to augment, if you will, the troops with civilians. >> well, congressman, as you know, we're not trying to match military numbers right now.

it's not about how about, it's what effects do they get. on the other hand, though, when we talk about the growth of the forces in afghanistan, it's been extraordinary. the military organizes with units like companies and