and we ask why it was necessary to put the security documents on-line for the contract. .

>> after four days of asking, we insisted she provide the documents. we want to introduce that letter to the record. in the end, many things went wrong but many things are going right now. t essayistic in risk mitigation measures -- tsa is taking brisk mitigation measures. to those who re-posted this information on the internet, you should share the blame. in the future, could to please use the whistleblower process that congress has created for you. call the department, called the inspector general, but do not circulate sensitive security documents. we will hold the department to a

camper in i continue to believe that the women of tsa are doing their best to secure the traveling public. this accidental the closure was disappointing and frustrating, i am committed to working with you to improve the transportation security administration services that they provide to the public. >> i thank the gentleman for yielding back. is my privilege to acknowledge and recognized the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from mississippi ford opening statement. >> i appreciate the holding of this hearing. i would also like to take the opportunity to express my condolences to the family as well as the tsa colleagues who are here. it was a dedicated public

server and his efforts in carter secured will never be forgotten. there is no doubt that the events that transpired last week raised several questions about tsa's operational procedures and practices and handling sensitive information. perhaps more importantly, this incident raises concern about the security of our entire transportation system. no actions, legislation, or press statements can on to the disclosure of this information. however, we can learn from the incident and move forward with security measures that inshore sensitive information will not be made available to the public. the event from last week served as a reminder of how critical it is to have accountability at the department of homeland security. i think it was the right decision from secretary of napolitano to request that dhs

inspector general investigate this incident. the investigation is an important first step in learning the details that will be essential in helping tsa improve procedures for handling and posting sensitive material. however, as i have said before, to get tsa to improve its operational performance in all areas end all levels of management, it is the central tsa have a permanent, effective leadership. the president's nominated errol southers and his dedication will strengthen our whole up land security efforts. -- our homeland security efforts. an incident like this will be less likely to happen. nevertheless, today's hearing

provides us encumbers with an opportunity to express our concern about what tsa plans to do. i'm sure we'll have followup briefings and another hearing to review the inspector general's report and to assess the situation going for it. madame chair, there are questions that i have after we have heard from our witness that will more or less enlighten us on this situation. i am concerned about it. i will express those concerns during the question and answer period. i yield back. >> let me also express my appreciation for the astuteness and the detail of which the committee and the staff have taken to securing the homeland.

this committee reflects that and your cooperation and agreement with this subcommittee's intent to hold this hearing is appreciated. i wish to recognize and both of us will speak in tandem, the gentleman from florida. >> i would like writing -- i would like the ranking member be authorized to join us. >> as you ask, i am ordering that mr. bill raucus be allowed to sell this committee and participate with questions 3d unanimous consent for it without objections? so ordered. we acknowledge mr. bill arakis' presence and spikes and for

being here. opening statements may be submitted for the record. our witness today, ms. gail rositis, the acting administrator tsa which has 50,000 people overseeing 450 federalist airport across the nation. she was one of the six original federal executives hand-picked in 2002 to build tsa. that deserves commendation and we thank you for the longevity of service. the witnesses' statements will be inserted into the record, without objection. you are recognized for five minutes. >> good afternoon.

first of all, i want to thank you for recognizing the services of ed kelly and his family. he was truly one of our heroes in tsa. i appreciate you giving me the opportunity today to speak with you about the recent web site posting of an improperly rejected version of it management standard operating procedure on a federal website i regret this occurred and take full responsibility for this mistake. our response was swift, decisive, and comprehensive because our priority first and foremost is the safety of the traveling public. i want to reassure all members of this committee and the traveling public that our aviation system is strong and the passengers will fly safely this holiday season and every day because of the lyric security system we have in place

bridge from cutting edge new technology to retreading our entire work force to the implementation of new security programs, we have in bald and substantially strengthened security in the year and a half since the document was drafted. on sunday, december 6, i became aware that the screening management sop was posted to the opportunities website without the sense of security information properly rejected. the document was an attachment to a screening partnership program contract solicitation. we took immediate action. i convened a teleconference with the senior executives and we notified dhs headquarters on sunday night. also on sunday night, we removed the documents from the government web site within hours and to prompt work by the general services administration. i then directed the office of inspection to immediately begin

a review of what happened and how and that review has been passed on to the dhs inspector general. our security operations office conducted an operational assessment of the potential vulnerabilities that this disclosure may have caused and out of an abundance of caution, we quickly put mitigation measures in place to close any potential gaps. i directed an audit of sensitive information posted internally and an externally to be conducted by the chief information officer. we consulted with federal and law enforcement partners and stakeholders throughout the aviation domain and all have been tremendously supportive. there have been numerous and significant changes in our devolving security program that are not contained in the may, 20008 version of this as a pape.

this talks about who mr. the screen. it does not include the specific procedures used by our transportation officers to screen members of the traveling public. tsa's 12 other standard operating procedures, including the ones that cover everyone remain secure. the strength of our system is in our own people, our technology, r stickle partnerships, and are complex protocols. we take this matter very seriously and look forward to the inspector general's report. our response to their recommendations will also be swift. we will hold individuals accountable as appropriate. at this time, five tsa employees have been placed on administrative leave pending the outcome of the investigation. this has been a critical incident for tsa and we have managed it as such.

we will emerge with stronger internal document control measures for all employees. we will strengthen the electronic process as we use for sharing information and most importantly, we will continue to be called our security programs and what of intelligence and are on testing and training to insure the ongoing security. in closing, i want to assure members of this committee, the traveling public and their partners that our nation's aviation system is strong. we have closed and a potential gaps and we will continue to apply measures that enhance our complex security system. i am happy to answer your questions and can discuss any sensitive material in the closed session to follow. thank you. >> allow me to thank you for your testimony and yield myself

five minutes for questioning. before i do that, let me to acknowledge the presence of mr. hymes, a member of the committee. other members will be recognized in the order which they have arrived. thank you for the initial steps that have been taken. let me ask one pointed question because when we started this unfortunate incident, a lot of hysteria was created in terms of the media reported it. it looked devastating. tell me what level of participation now is the it? how comprehensive is the it's

investigation? >> they are specifically looking at what happened, who was involved, how did it happen, and what measures the recommendations can they make to tsa so this does not happen again. they are looking at papers and doing an extensive forensic on the technology, looking at the electronic transmission of the documents. >> on the sop, did you indicate that members could have individual classified or confidential briefings on the new procedures? >> yes, we have offered and will continue to offer as we go through this process, briefings to any of the members for their staff on the current sop that is in place across the aviation system so that the members can get a full understanding and appreciation of the fact that

many systems improvements have been put in place since that version in 2008 was drafted. >> what is your best assessment about with the lives of americans who may be at jeopardy in terms of the information disseminated. we're talking that a pullback and an investigation of watt. that information has been disseminated and where we would security as it relates to the public? >> the system is very strong. i am confident in saying that for several reasons. first of all, there were six versions or updates to the document that was released that had been very significant changes to the way we conduct a screening procedures. secondly, this was a management standard operating procedure. in other words, it had many checklists of what to do to

start the day at the checkpoint. it did not have a lot of sensitive security information on how to actually do certain procedures at the checkpoint. that being said, i appreciate the gravity andñi significance with which people regarded this. we knew and their immediate reaction was to begin to do a line by line review of that document, compared to measures in place today, and frankly, even with the confidence we had, out of an abundance of caution, we immediately took some additional measures which we do any time we get information that tells us to put an additional set of measures in place in order to be that much more confident in the system. >> is it safe to say that you have changed the review procedures?

is it safe to say that as the public is traveling, that there are new schemes and procedures that no one knows about? let me hold this up. this is an example of the kinds of cards that were displayed. some others dealt with law enforcement officers who need to have a confidentiality and privacy for the question is, should we begin to change all of these id's in order to ensure the safety of those who are in the sixth service of their government? >> let me make sure i am fully responding to your several questions. with respect to the review of the procedures, there were

several but we did. we began our information protection oversight board which is a bore we established several years ago, to look at incidents like this. i ask that even though sop's be treated in their entirety, i asked that we hold and not release them until we could get a complete review of what had been released and what the circumstances were. i also directed the of possible acquisition to look at all of their current and recent postings for solicitations and take down any that have any other relevant ssi or sensitive information in them and to make sure they looked completely at those. we put in a number of mitigation measures that are part of the flexibility is that we have

throughout the system. the federal security directors monday morning were directed to implement some of those other flexible provisions so we would insure the safety of the traveling public. i would like to specifically described the id you show. we take full responsibility and we're not at all pleased that this document was released, those id's in the document are photocopies and i want to assure you and the traveling public and our law enforcement partners, there are other aspects to those identifications and credentials that of security features to them and we have extensive procedures in place to validate the authenticity of persons traveling through that represent themselves as law enforcement officers. in fact, some of those improvements we have made have been at the direct urging of this committee. >> thank you.

i yield five minutes to the ranking member, mr. dent. >> of the president has stated repeatedly that it ministration woodbridge's -- would embrace of the spirit of transparency. are you familiar to with section 114r, which prevents the release of sensitive security information? >> yes, i am. my understanding is that when tsa receives a request like this, we are required to provided to the congress when it is received from the leadership of the committee and we do that when we are properly requested.

>> do you have a date certain when you will be transmitted to the committee and homeland security a copy of the current document? today, next week, and a date certain after the new year? >> what i will pledge to you is that in the aftermath of this, we wanted to exercise the absolute operational security over all of these sop's. my commitment to you is once you're through the traveling season, i will come back and talk with you and the leadership of this committee about how to make all that ever made available to you. in the meantime, we will sit and give briefings to any members or their step that requested on this document, specifically. >> i certainly appreciate that tsa provide a briefing on these two documents.

it was about an hour to relieve -- review the latest version. i want to be clear that i still would like to have a hard copy of the document for a thorough review. why does not tsa want to provide the committee with a hard copy of this document? why is this different? >> the only reason this is different right now is in the immediate aftermath of this incident i was very concerned to maintain the ties control over the current version because it does have a very significant changes to what was released. i want to take the absolute measures to protect that information. that is what a hard copy would not presented but we are very willing to provide the information and actually explain the difference in the versions

from one document to the other. >> i thank you for that answer but i keep hearing that the administration is reviewing our request for an unclassified document. where are you in that review? who would be holding up the documents for being provided to our committee? is it tsa, dhs, or the white house? >> the request is pending in the ultimate decision would be blind or the secretaries to make. under the regulation, we're the two officials to make the decision to release them. >> speaking for the republican side of this committee, i would really request that we get a date certain for the document. we received thousands of pages of sensitive information and it has never been an issue but this

one seems to be. i understand the issue that you and i have talked about with the travel season being upon us but certainly, it would be reasonable to have a date certain earlier in the year. >> i will get back to you, sir. >> after the tsa as the general services administration about the website, they removed it within two hours but it was posted on other web sites. you have a mechanism to keep other individuals from re- posting this information ellipse? >> no, we don't have any authority to ask non-government or of non-dhs entities to take it down. >> what actions are you planning to take on this? >> there is not really any

authoritative action we can take. honestly, persons that have posted it, i would hope that out of their patriotic sense of duty to their fellow countrymen, they would take a damper it honestly, i have no authority to direct them and ordered them to take it down. >> there's nothing in current regulations that provide you with mechanisms to compel? >>no. >> i yield back. >> let me read very clear -- let me be very clear that there is a review by the majority and i appreciate the comments of the ranking member that we want to see the inspector general's work completed before any public distribution of these items, the sop in particular, because there is concern about the impact on national security. i would encourage members to take and the image of a full review of documents but we ask you to urgently move forward as

our ranking member has indicated and we are going to be following this through the holiday season and into the beginning of the year. i am pleased to yield five minutes to the chairman of the full committee, mr. thompson. >> thank you very much. for timeline purposes, can you tell the committee when this particular posting went up on the web and when tsa found out about it? >> yes sir, it went up in march, 2009, it was part of a solicitation for the spp program and a can to my attention and the senior leadership attention on sunday, september 6 in the early evening. >> so this particular item was in the public domain from march until december?

>> yes, sir. >> one of my concerns is that you took swift, decisive, and comprehensive action. that is after you found out? >> correct. >> before that, -- can you explain to the committee protocols for putting items on the web? >> it is through the acquisition process. there are two approaches when we post procurement actions. one is when we have any kind of sensitive information, one is to post it to the secure side of the gsa/bisfed ops site. the other is solicitations get posted to the unsecured side.

this particular solicitation got post under unsecured side and was not properly rejected. -- redacted. we will give potential vendors the opportunity to look a procurement actions. we might have a physical reading room where we invite the vendors in and they can look at that and any ssi material in a physical reading room. >> was this a private contractor who did this? who did this posting? >> that is within the scope of the ig's review right now. i cannot really comment because of the ig's due diligence on determining who did what posting curren. there was a contract company under contract to the ssi office

at the time. >> why would we have a contractor in the ssi office? >> small contracts like that often just provide clerical support, sometimes they provide research support, sometimes they purport -- provide technical support. they're not the ones making the decisions on the technical aspects of the job in terms of -- >> are they of required to have clearances? >> yes, they are. >> did all these employees in question have clearances? >> that i cannot answer specifically but during the scope of the ig review, we will know what clearances' everybody did have and the particular people involved. >> you have already suspended five people. >> yes, sir. >> i would hope that part of your review would look at whether or not these clearances were in effect. >> the five people put on

administrative leave to have clearances, yes, sir. >> to your knowledge, these are not all the people who had access to what we're talking about. emma correct? >> exactly, sir, it is part of the ig review and will find out whether it was concerned to these five or if there are more people who are responsible for this error. >> for the committee's point of information, how did we find out -- how did tsa find out about this posting? >> i found out from a blogger notifying our blog team. they called and sent an e-mail to one of our bloggers and pointed it out. that followed a chain event of me being notified. >> for the particular software

that was used to do the redacting, is that a tsa- approved software? >> ne of their software is approved by our chief information officer. >> did that officer understand that it could be un-rejected on the web? >> that is part of what we will learn in the right to review, which software, which version, and what version was on the various computers that actually touched this document. >> so, we do not know. >> i do not know yet. >> i would take it that you talked to the chief information officer? >> yes, and they're looking at all the versions of the software tsa computers and they are going through that inventory now with the goal being that we will ultimately have the same software on all computers and everybody will be properly trained to that software pa.

>> is there a software presently being used by tsa that cannot be rejected? >> yes, sir, there is. >> have we made that software available to everyone who is doing postings on the web for tsa? >> yes, sir, we have, and we're going back and making sure that everyone who is using this offer is properly trained and nose, again, how to properly use that software. had this software been properly used, it would have worked on this document. we are making sure that everybody that deals with ssi information has this offer. the software that we use today, if that software was used, it would have worked. >> you don't know which software

was used for the >> exactly. >> think you very much. i yield back. >> we now recognize mr. austria. >> thank you. i would like to lend my voice to those who are completely troubled by this incident it is concerning to me that here we sit, eight years after 9/11 in our government, whether it be accidental or carelessness, can make such a mistake as posting unsolicited information on a website. i am very concerned about that. i'm concerned with the fact that tsa posted their standard operating procedures and the federal government, with this incident, may have inadvertently helped those who do not want to have this information, terrorists and others, do their homework for them. i'm very concerned about that. i have a number of questions.

thank you for your testimony today. let me follow on the chairman's questions on reduction, how often does the tsa post redacted standard operating procedures on the internet? what is the purpose of that? >> sir, this was the first fartt we had ever posted a standard offering procedure for a solicitation procedure. it was tons of relief for the procurements of companies to compete for privatizing airports in the state of montana. >> let me follow, a dancer. why -- what -- why would tsa post any information like this?

there were parts that we did not want the general public to say. what would you give everyone the opportunity to learn anything about tsa's security procedures? >> in the course of that particular solicitation, and the vendors will have to prove that they can provide the security procedures at those airports. they needed to know what kind of requirement we would have at checkpoints for them to be able to demonstrate their qualification to be a qualified vendor, to be considered for this contract. beyond that, one of the questions that the ig is asking is, why did we take the steps we took and they're reviewing that decision in terms of what was it posted. >> what is the purpose of posting this? why does tsa post this on the internet? >> the purpose was for a procurement action.

it is not something we post routinely. it was for a specific procurement action that this particular sop was posted. >> a going forward, will tsa continue to use the internet for posting redacted information for security or have you changed the way you are doing business? >> i have immediately directed the office of the acquisition to not post any sop's like this and what we will review is insuring that if we have to ever pose solicitations again, save for technology information, we will verify that that is in as security environment on their website. we are also looking at other measures physically and by the potential vendors in to look at material as opposed to doing any postings at all. >> i appreciate that answer.

can you tell us what tsa's normal process for redacting sensitive documents is? >> the normal process is that within program offices that have ssi information, there is a designated individual who is trained to properly reject the material. -- redact the material. that put out instructions how to properly redact information based upon the information on each individual's computer. we are reviewing that right now in terms of how did this actually happened. now, what are cio is doing is

making sure that the same software for redacting is on all computers. this is so the training is consistent from office to office. >> one last question, i know my time is up -- based on what has happened here, do you believe our aviation security has been compromised or weaken because of this incident? >> no, sir, i do not. >> @ beckham -- thank you, madam chair. >> the gentleman from missouri is recognized, mr. cleaver for five minutes. >> the answer to that question would have been what you just said no matter what, right? >> i believe our system is very strong. >> even if the war, that would

be the answer, right? >> i don't understand. >> you would not have said it from a bus in the tv cameras that our system has been compromised. >> i believe that the system is very strong and it was not compromised as a result of this, sir. >> ok. i understand why you won't answer the question which is why i asked the question. that was somewhat of an answer. i am not sure you can answer my questions in public. >> perhaps when we get into the closed session, i can answer and give you more examples as to why i am confident in our system.

>> generally, whether it is science or theology or anthropology for epidemiology, we all build on what laws. was. it seems to me that any new versions were built on older versions. and i read about that? >> yes, sir. >> if i am correct, there obviously is information that is out there that is in the latest iteration. >> that is true but the bulk of that information is informationssi information. it is routine standard procedures, it is checklists.

>> the ssi material was posted on fob.com on march 3 but it was not discovered by tsa until december 6. >> yes. >> what happened in between time. ? >> it was up on the website and the procurement web through its whole process. a contract was selected for the procurement. and then, the normal routine is once the contract is awarded, gsa keeps the procurement award

posted and advises the public as to who won the contract. >> ok, but unfortunately, it sounds like we've been called to vote. based on what you are saying, i am not sure i want to ask my questions and i know think you will enter these in front of everybody, in the first place. i don't want to ask it because then i will get frustrated because you cannot answer it and, on top of that, i appreciate not answering it. if that sounds clear -- >> if we have the opportunity to go to the closed session perhaps i can give you answers that will not frustrate you. >> you understand? >> yes, i do. >> thank you. >> i think the gentleman. the gentle lady is correct, if we are prepared to go into executive session, we are called for a vote, we will continue for

a period of time. i want to ask the minister on her time circumstances. we want to pose the question to you. what is your time circumstance, please? >> probably, i have to be out of here by about 4:15. >> let me recognize and we will contemplate what our next up is. let me recognize mr. lundgren, 45 minutes. he is not a member of the committee. we are graciously accepting him but we're going to members first. mr. hymeams is recognized. >> a couple of quick questions. i shared my college concern with this disclosure of sensitive information. no organization does not make

mistakes. the measure of an organization is how will you learn from your mistakes. it sounds like you have taken a fairly aggressive approach to that. here is a slightly off-the-wall question. we know that through a couple of different mechanisms, this the information is now in the public domain. are you or anybody looking to see who has subsequently download this? >> i believe that as part of what the ig is looking at. we have in our cio shop as to download it and as it on their website. . dhs and non-government web sites, who has that. >> i was curious about the end users.

when we get classified information on this committee, each page is usually marked with a degree of cast -- a classification, sometimes each paragraph. do you follow similar protocol on a hard copy? would ssi the always indicated as such? >> yes, sir, if properly marked, the ssi document would be marked and the pages would have a header and a porter that said it is ssi information. >> was that in fact appropriately marked as such? >> and no, sir, it was not and that was part of a failure. >> the filly was part of marking and redacting. to have what you're rid of overall compliance is with respect to marking appropriately or documents? >> we do a number of self assessments as part of our ssi

program. we do those routinely. we also had an extensive review by gao at the end of 2007 who gave very good grades to tsa for how we do our program that addresses ssi. >> ideal but the balance of my time. >> i would like to recognize build arakis for 5 minutes per >> i will ask my questions during the executive session. >> let me just -- >> before we go into the executive session, i am struggling a little bit with the underlying premise -- by refusing to give a document to

this committee because of the concern about public disclosure, that is implying that the committee would release the document to the public. that is troubling me. the implication is that this subcommunity -- subcommittee is not taking the security of these documents seriously. that is not the case. i'm glad the inspector general is doing this investigation. that is not particularly relevant to a request for this document. we are a separate and equal branch of government responsible for overseeing tsa's activities. i'm stunned by the refusal to give us this document. i feel like i have been left with no choice. i appreciate the fact that our staff can look at this for a few hours somewhat reluctantly, i

will be introducing a resolution of inquiry demanding that the secretary provide the house of representatives with this document. i think it is only appropriate and i would not -- i would run -- i regret not do it but not having a date certain, i want to make that clear. >> have you finished your remarks? let me ask you if you have a definitive date of the completion of the ig report. >> i do not. i do not know when they will defend to the finish. -- definitively finish. i do not have a specific date. >> to you have a close apartment date? >> all i know is that -- do you have an approximate date.

>> the one to have it done in a couple of weeks. -- they want to have it in a couple of weeks. >> i am very moved by the sincerity of mr. dent's request to offer resolution of inquiry. i am aware that the chairman of the full committee has authority to move forward and it would seem, mr. dent, that you would raise the question with the chairman of the full committee. i think that would be the appropriate next step and not a resolution of inquiry. i might also say that part of our concern has been that in

disclosing the sop, it is possible for leaks. maybe it is ironic that i would use the term lease because obviously we have had a breach. there have been many members of the house and senate that had asked for this document and there is no doubt that this is a high-profile document but our job is to ensure that there are no further leaks or breaches. i would ask the u.s. the chairman of the full committee as the first set but more important, i would importantms rossedes to come back in the next 24 hours and she could be in touch to give us a more definitive time with the ig. i would think the inspector general would be open to the fact that this is urgent. mr. dent has indicated the urgency. my suggestion of a resolution of injured -- inquiry is premature.

it shows the urgency of the matter and we need to respond to that. i would suggest that the first response for mr. dent and his colleagues is a request to the chairman of the full committee, mr. thompson, and then i would want to have the additional information for our subcommittee as to the time that you believe this might occur. >> yes, ma'am, i will do that. >> the ig report. >> i would ask respectfully that should we be given a date certain as to when we receive this document, i would happily withdraw the motion for the resolution of inquiry. i feel the inspector general investigation is irrelevant to our request for that particular document we have receive. many thousands of pages that would secure information and i think the committee has handled it well.

i certainly will make a request to the chairman but hopefully, i would like to keep this resolution out there for consideration and hopefully, in the intervening time, we can get a date certain. if we could get the document, we could withdraw the resolution. >> i think we found some measure of reconciliation. i think there are one or two members who will be here. i will continue the hearing because of the time constraints of ms rossedes. anyone who is interested in going forward on the executive session, they need to hurry back. let me just proceed -- i assume all members have gone forth. i will yield myself for a second round until we convene into the executive session.

do you believe that any actions taken by the individuals that you have put on administrative leave or have disposed of in another manner, and i need to get a correct interpretation, were some of these individuals contract employees? >> at the time in march of 2009, one of the individuals was a contract or. or. he is now a tsa employee and is one of those that is on administrative leave. >> do you believe the actions of these employees were intentional? >> i would have to wait for the ig report but my honest assessment is no. i think this was an accident. i don't know for sure until the ig gives us their report. >> one of the employees was a contractor and you were representing to this committee that that individual is now

employed. are you also representing that that individual went through normal security checks? >> yes, he was hired as say -- if he was tired and as atsa employee, he would of had a background check. >> what have we learned about the actual happening of this incident incurring in march -- occurring in march and this was exposed in the last three weeks. what did we learn from that? as you enter the question, can you comprehend the disappointment that we have in that issue? >> yes, i think there's a number of things we learn from this. our law earnings from this is that we -- our learning from this is that we need tighter controls as to how we handle sensitive information.

in the size of tsa, as large as it is, where this information is shared across the organization, we will have to make sure that we have designated personnel who are properly managing this information and treating it in the matter in which it should pay. we need to make sure our personnel are trained and truly understand that if there is a lesson that the entire tsa organization has learned, it shows that the accident or the mistake of one or eight you can tremendously impact the whole agency and our credibility with the american public. we are taking a very, very seriously. our front-line officers, and our fans, our inspectors, our tso's are very much aware of their responsibility because a document like this has been put out there. there will be a number of lessons that we learn. i also think there are technology solutions that

hopefully will come from the ig report about the right technology to use, the right person to use when rejecting information. >> -- redacting information. >> we will return quickly but my intent is to write legislation, first of all, with a great deal of respect for the reliance of this government on contract employees. , from blackwater employes to a number of others. it is clear that their knees to the standards utilized for the hiring, retaining, and utilizing of contract employees. it will be my legislative initiative to insist that contract employees not be used to handle sensitive security information, period. we are looking to craft

legislation that puts a fire wall around certain technology. as i was listening to the chairman, if this is unique technology that ultimately will prevent redacting from showing up again on a website, then i don't want random individuals having access to that. then you can be exploited. i will introduce legislation in the early part of the year to establish the criteria and we will also have to find a better path way of informing the members of this house and senate and would imagine the white house on issues of breach of security. with that, this hearing remains in recess. we may start back with a brief open session but we will then go into the executive session. thank you. this hearing is now in recess. [gavel]

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