decision can be made. but what we know is those kinds of deliberations are very inconsistent across the country, and that is why, again, there is a movement now to change it, to try to make it more standardized, consistent, have awards be more consistent and hopefully we could then stabilize malpractice premiums, particularly as a said before, if we can couple it with patient safety efforts. host: bill, you are the last word. caller: i am a disabled veteran from the korean war and i get my medical care in west virginia -- the best muckle care i have had in my life. two reasons. no written records, the are computerized. an awful lot of nurse practitioners and nurses

everywhere during the routine work. i think they just make a better division of labor there than anyplace else i have ever been. i think both of those things are very important. host: professor? guest: hi, bill. banks for your call. i'm glad you brought that up. i think the va system did a bad rap in this country. we only hear about things that happened at walter reed and we hear about our servicemen, home with ptsd and problems and our resources are limited and all of that. but you are exactly right. the va has been a model when it comes to patients' safety efforts. they were one of the first to advocate an early disclosure and compensation model, and they have had great success with that. they have an electronic medical record that has been held up as a standard, a model for the rest of the country. and i couldn't agree with you

more about the use of nurse practitioners and physician's assistants and nurses. we desperately need those people. we are sitting on a physician shortage into the future, particularly primary care physicians, and we will need -- i don't know if this health care bill is going to go through, but if it does and we have more people who are able to have health insurance, we are going to need a lot more health professionals to care for them. we know that from massachusetts, what is happening in massachusetts right now. so we need to work more in teams, we need to communicate better, and i am really glad you are happy with your health care. host: carolyn engelhard, in the house bill or the current senate bill under debate, is medical malpractice and liability addressed in a significant way in your view? guest: no, it's not. it is almost budget neutral. there are no funds of that i can tell or at least very little. on the house side, the language

says to provide awards and incentives for states to enter into demonstrations with these alternative malpractice models that i mentioned before like the disclosure programs. on the senate side, it is weaker. it says that congress should recommend a demonstration program that states can enter into, looking at these alternative models. it is not a big piece of the ongoing legislation at all. host: thank you for joining us. "health care half-truths'." carolyn engelhard, co-author. now going on to their hart 216 hearing room. there is a hearing going on, the commission on wartime contract in iraq and afghanistan. former congressman christopher shays is one of the cochairs of

this group. they are hearing from people from the defense department, department of state, talking about wartime contract in iraq and afghanistan. it began there could be a civilian police experience. these are individuals and the police and they are uniformly drawn from civil policing personnel from the united states and civil policing is one of the critical functions that is being mentored to build up the afghan police. moreover, their presence and the way they conduct themselves provides up corporate professional model, an ethical models of how a police officer should conduct himself in performing civil police think operations. as the ministry -- i believe the

government contractors that we have worked with discuss various issues related to the development of those ministers over last several years. they're exceptionally well qualified. these are major challenges of course in terms of building up these ministries. it is for them to have the capability to manage themselves and to manage the army and police respectively. that is without giving any specific company names. they are capable of mobilizing the special expertise, these unique skill sets to perform a critical mission such as that. i was about to add that there is a limitation, i understand, in

terms of the embedding of police trainers and it is due to the security requirements of limitations in the wake of their contracts are written or the way they performed their duties. it may well be cool not always be fair with the rest of the police mentoring team. for example, not their in the performance of any aspect of their duties. they may not be able to go that extra mile. nonetheless, i believed to still have been performing important mission. >> if you were king, how would you build this trading force today? unlimited resources. how would you build?

>> i hesitate to jump into the breach on that question, commissioner, because it suggests and on the ground operational experience that i am not sure we can bring to the table. i have no doubt this commander could respond much more precisely to that. i will say this. we have been looking at a training mission for a least three years that i can remember. let me go back five years in terms of my own experience. it was very clear in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2018 that this was the other war and in fighting the of the war, the mentoring

mission did not get the first pick of resources. they were underresource. it was evident that they did not have sufficient personnel to deal with the scope and complexity of the challenges in that context. they had access to contractor resources. nato did not step up to the plates either. i believe they will make at the margin is significant difference with the commitments under the new nato training command. i am sure they will be well used from the most single level down through out at our training in the mission. but it is probably true that it

is not well understood generally how difficult and help vital that mission is, even though it was underscored in the president's recent quality statement with respect to afghanistan that we must develop a capability to operate independently and secured the country. it is little known how many casualties the mentors have taken, including contract mentors in the country. and therefore it is probably has been underestimated the quality and extent of resources required to accomplish that mission. going forward, even though i am fully well aware that there command -- they are cognizant of the degree of challenge they face as it expands, and we're

not sure of the full extent of the expansion yet. but already you can see it over the horizon. they areñr already -- but there are already bottlenecks needed to contend with in growing the army to 134,000. >> thinking, mr. chairman. i do want to pick up on this note the for the last several years the training program has focused on the national police and has been under resource. i'm looking in particular at finding you made on page 125 of your september 30 report about just how far back we are and how long it will take. i want to ask you why.

he took one of the major programs, the focus district development program, and you said he that to date, of the 365 districts in afghanistan, and unix. about this program, it takes them one by one and goes through all the districts, only 56 -- camions 56 are done. they had entered or completed that focused district development process. what you found was that this until late 2012. i think you're talking it will be completed even if we were not expanding the force. is that right? or would that far behind? is it because we have been

under resource backs will really take that long even to process if we were not growing the police force? >> thank you, commissioner. i think it is the case that it has been significantly under resource in terms of their developments. there was an army, so to speak, in afghanistan to build upon. in fact, the army is probably the most respected institution in the country. the police have largely been created from whole cloth. it doesn't have the background, the doctrine and the performance standards imbedded institutionalize, if you will. the emphasis was on growing the army initially and not the police.

dod took over the responsibility in 2005 and at that time it was recognized it would take a much more comprehensive and resource- intensive effort to get the police up to speed and that they were critical in the surgeons in fight at the front lines with the population, as it were. the program which has been producing superb results is intended to provide very high- quality intensive training or retraining as the case may. for police at the district level. i believe the have also been getting some in that regard. and also, the border police

have a focus development program. we made our projection in the report based on their resources that were known to be available pursuant to be available in afghanistan at that time. we were there in march of this year before it was issued -- the report was issued in september. i cannot say it has not progressed. with respect to being able to ramp up of the program. to the best of my knowledge, the rest up and a determination of the actual size in the next phase of expansion. i think there somewhere around 96,000 or 98,000 right now. will they go to 160,000? i do not know. i believe there will -- they're

planning for a number in that range. i will be surprised if in the planning aspects it has not already been taken into consideration what sort of resources will be required per i refer back to the nato training mission which i do believe will have an impact on our capabilities to grow the police and grow the more rapidly. >> i was interested that you noted the goal of the program, and i might say the training program in general is to produce a very high quality force. i would like to ask you both to recap what are the huge problems in the way of producing quality graduates of either the basic training or the ftd program? what are the problems in the

way? and what kind of pressures on the training program achieving a high goal might produce? >> well, if i may take your question backwards. i do believe there is a risk in over expediting the buildup of either the army or the police. issue is not just quantity but quality, which is why the ftd program was created. to go back and raise the level of quality and professionalism of the police and hopefully to work to sustain the standard.

>> so there is a risk if you go too far too quickly you'll compromise the building quality and professionalism in an effort to get more police on the beat, so the speaker. you spoke about challenges. police are taking three times the killed in action right as the afghan army. . is a high-risk profession, so the speaker. salaries have recently been increased to a belief basic $250 a month, which is much more attractive than it was. nonetheless, if you're killed in the performance of your duty, you'll not be able to support your family. there are trade-offs their and unless and until they're better capable of defending themselves in a tactical sense, and

equipped a properly, they will remain as vulnerable as they recently have been. in addition, commissioner shays mention the high rate of illiteracy. to train people who cannot read or write to even in their own language is a real challenge. >> my understanding is not only is the literacy a huge problem with the basic police at the bottom of the hierarchy, but isn't the case that even the officer, the police officer, although it is nominally required. able to read and write, even their sometimes illiterate. >> i cannot speak to any specific knowledge about the percentage of literacy among police officers.

certainly there is a standard in the arm it including for the nco corp regarding literacy. i will tell you that there are at least two programs, one for the army, one for the police, to develop literacy, that is considered to be a national priority. i spoke to the minister of interior last spring and he said the school's one of his primary objectives, to get the police literacy levels up because it recognized that to produce a more professional and responsible police capability, they had to be able to read and write. >> you took the two points. let me ask you -- let's take one proxy try equality of the training and that is the wave of

the program of instruction, which currently is 80 week week. i teach at the university of baltimore law school and i would not let the quality upper teaching to go down. how would you view it in to pressure to get too high numbers was placed on the beat. get them on the beat regardless of quality. program of instruction with shortened to some of the number. >> thank you. i think one of the considerations and it is a debate that is ongoing for some years is, what are the responsibilities of the police? if you define them to beat

civil policing and the need to conduct themselves appropriately, defend themselves at a minimum if not the population in some respects against taliban extremists and al qaeda, the half to have trading that includes creating the technical capability similar to what basic army recruits we see. so i think that is a pretty densely packed program as it is. cutting it i think would be probably -- this is just my gut feeling -- may be ill advised. maybe compromising a capability that is core to their being able to perform effectively, perform their roles both in terms of law

enforcement and maintaining civil order and also in the counterinsurgency sense. correct my time has expired. thank you. >> thank you. >> mr. dixon has the floor. >> good morning. i want to begin by thanking you for your distinguished service and in your current responsibilities. i want to come to this subject for a little different stamp. in terms of contract accountability. we recognize the military and the joint contract. of command in afghanistan and iraq have a tough job. the commanders have to strike a balance between achieving results, and measuring performance, but at the same time ensuring accountability. and following the rules.

this involves simultaneously managing programs in the field under the difficult conditions that you describe. at the same time, guarding against fraud, waste, and abuse. i want to go back to the september 30 report the you noted earlier in terms of what you noted, was dod noted as oversight for the contract but has been reflected in the failure to ensure the contractors were basically in meeting standards. the concern i have is that we just returned from afghanistan. we saw there was the president announced the increase of 30,000 troops within the next year. we saw the nato training missions stand up as a three- store command. we saw the isap still ended up.

there is a tremendous amount of change and growth. the framework that you described in your september 30 report dealt with conditions prior to september 30. the question is, is the current framework adequate from program management stamp. to sustain the kind of increases and changes we're talking about? >> thank you. it's a tough question. when we were last on the ground and in our follow-up work during this year, it was clear to us that there were already bottlenecks that were developing, if i can call them that, in terms of expansion of the security forces, the training men in the mission.

there were public manageable but it already suggested that additional contract oversight management personnel work required. as i pointed out, a member of the organizations in vault -- a number of organizations involved and others have attempted to get ahead of the curve. but for one thing, i do not think we know where the curve is going. the gulf post is going -- the goal posts are going to move. they're doing additional planning to prepare for that. there was testimony the year before the pickup -- there was testimony here before the congress yesterday. speakers spoke back to the preparations that were being made to increase the size for

anticipated future contract oversight responsibilities. conceptually, i believe that the challenge is out there and recognize. the full extent of it and the complexity of it is difficult to grasp. it is going to take a lot of vigilance and consistent attention. i did not think it will be possible to declare victory precipitously in this respect. >> you mentioned the challenges were the dangers involved in over expediting in terms of trying to do too much too soon. and yet the time lines and the program plans that we see are ambitious. so i want to get your view on the ability of commanders to

strike the right balance on an urgent basis to stand up and face to ever increasing demands and then to reach back for the increases for dcma and the other agencies that are needed in the field to provide the contract oversight. it does not seem to square that in the time lines projected that we can match it with the framework for management and accountability. >> well, there's unquestionably a dynamic fare between meeting the needs of the war fight and the war zone, making the right operational decisions on day-to- day decision may take a longer view on insuring and appropriate accountability and controls are

maintained, whether they are construction programs or equipment or maintenance, personal services across the board. we have spoken earlier this hearing about the challenges this expeditionary force has proposed to the oversight system of the department of defense and that it was understrength initially and outgunned, if you will, in terms of meeting. that afghanistan was a secondary priority to iraq. there is a need to dig out of a whole. there has been a lot of thought and attention. as to what kind of efficiencies could conceivably be gained by reviewing the current contract. oversight requirements and procedures that the military

commands and their civilian counterparts have to meet in afghanistan, i would defer to the commission on what might be done as results of any comprehensive review there. i mean certainly, our priority is to make sure that fraud, waste, and abuse are prevented and that program performance meets dod's needs. but having said that, we understand the other is a constant struggle over limited resources in an extremely complex and high-pressure environment. that needs to be taken under consideration. >> a final question. you made reference to a defense department task force associate with overseeing the transfer of

the program for basic police training. i assume that includes the contract managing the transition as well. do you have any visibility on the current status of the program? is achieving its current objectives? -- is its achieving its current objectives it? " the short answer is no. i will say that have been in contact with our audit team on the inspector general saw on this joint audit effort and we're fully well aware, having been in contact with them that the oversight is taking place and is ongoing and has not hit the wall in terms of the transition of the contract. what made -- what may be going

on behind the scenes in this reporting process i cannot speak to because it is only report at this juncture. it will soon be issued and it all be transparent in a prime- time >> thank you very much. that concludes my question. >> you have had an interesting career and you're in a great position to be able to provide helpful information. you started out with the military and then went into the foreign service and now you're under the peril of the military again. we thank you for your service. i would like to take advantage of your knowledge in addition to your responsibilities. there is the general theory that you need 20 security per thousand population. if we talked -- we thought at

one time afghanistan was about 34 million per is about 29 million. we need about 580,000. there is a general concept we have been iraq that we have in afghanistan. and while it is a policy issue and we're not going to get into the policy part of it. it does raise some interesting points. we do not appear to be training enough security for us to be able to step down. my point in asking the question, it seems that we will continually have to be ramping up how many we actually train. so i want to first look backwards. we and the brits -- which

basically invaded afghanistan because of their failure stopped the harboring of al qaeda. that was in october, 2001. we have been there a long time. why has it taken us so long to train the pitiful number we have trained? and why have we not done a better job in turning them? >> it sounds like one of those career-ending questions. >> i did not want to be a career-endurer. that is funny. that is an interesting way to approach the answer. i do not want to bear the burden of ending your career. but i do want is a candid

dialogue. what are some of the things that have made -- you said what is difficult. we have not put enough resources. we rely too much on contracts. i mean, the question deserves an honest answer. i think we will respect your honesty. >> rights. i will attempt -- this is my own personal view. as i mentioned previously, it has come to my observation and many others over the last five years but have been engaged in providing some oversight with respect to afghanistan that we were significantly under resource. i cannot over emphasize that. we were discovering the incredible complexity and difficulty and challenging inherent in trying to create an army and police force.

absolutely. you are going up against certain historic and cultural challenges, too. i do not want to make to find a point of this. but this is a very top-down bureaucratic model of governance, whether it is the army, the police, or the civil service. the soviets helped to enforce that. to get them to accept and understand the concept of a delegation to as we understand it a responsibility being taken at lower levels in the chain of command, it impacts every decision making, logistics, the entire capability of the organizational culture to perform in what we would

consider an effective and responsive way to meet the security challenges. >> i am not quite sure i get why a top-down is a negative. >> let me give you an example. their supply chain. at the end of the day, the whole purpose is to get bullets, food, and medicine to the front line troops. but there is a history of leaders, if you will, influential people being measured in their importance in terms of how much stock they have a crude, how much material to have under their control. relinquishing that and allocating and passing that down the supply chain -- >> might inference of what you're saying took a lot of delegation. people are not willing to

delegate, unwilling to go up some authority and power. that affected the mission of training. >> i think it iaffects the mission. the leadership is still the older generation. >> you triggered something. parenthetically, our hope in afghanistan is what we're able to do. the elders want to hold on to the past and the young can see the advantage of learning to read, see the advantage of a better life if they could see it differently. harder to train police or harder to train our military? >not their military. which is more difficult? >> i think the military culture is better established, more professional, and more ethical

on balance. also more literate and has been considered a more attractive profession if you're going to a security -- >> because othe cost of trainine military -- should we have military training -- who should train the contractors? mr. a benefit or is there a combination? is there a negative in having contractors trained in their military? >> well, i believe that, and this is my own view. i've never thought this through to this extent. but now you posed the question. there is an inherent responsibility for our military to manage all aspects of the training and mentoring mission.

therefore, i believe that our military personnel have to be there and need to be running am responsible for the operation. but a fusion of our military professionals and contractors who have specialized skills and provide unique resources that they bring to the fight including increasing nato personnel is probably a model that we're going to want to use because it gives us a mix of capabilities. >> how about with police? it seems to me that we have to be even more reliant on contractors for training the police given there is a difference even with national police. there is a difference between a police responsibility versus military responsibilities.

>> i am not sure -- >> is it intuitive, is it this logical or not logical that you need people with expertise that are closer to police training. therefore you will have to rely may be on mp's, but possibly rely on contractors more to train the afghan police then you would have to train the military? >> yes, i understand. i'm not sure it is either or because the police responsibilities in afghanistan has become increasingly apparent to not only include civil policing capabilities, law enforcement capabilities, but because the brunt of the insurgent attacks that they have

been having to contend with. there are the most vulnerable aspect of the security forces and at the interfaced with the population. they have to have a tactical capability to defend themselves and defend the population. so you're going to need an army training model, if you will, to develop that tactical capability. at the same time, you need a civilian police experience -- >> so you need the combination. tell me, if you could come at an example of where someone not being the direct makes the job more difficult to train. >> well, you know, there are relative degrees of illiteracy. >> let me be blunt.

what we use 30% literacy, it is closer to 20%. then i am told the 20%, you may be are talking fifth or sixth grade capability, not ninth, 10th, 12th-grade capabilities. we're talking about a few folks with real literacy but capabilities. what is the challenge? >> i think the challenge is that in any normal training model that i am familiar with, you rely heavily on written materials, presentations, on a blackboard, or on a slide presentation. the police in particular have exceptionally high degrees of illiteracy in their own languages whether it is p ashtu or others.

their ability to communicate even in their own language with illiterate afghans is significantly limited and that places a special challenge. they are not going to be able to go back to their barracks and look at the training books. >> i get that. one more question. are we going to be able to reach the numbers that we're hoping to given the capabilities we have now? do you think that we will reach the numbers? what you believe the numbers to be again in terms of police? by when? military by when? and you think we can reach those numbers of those dates? >> the only decision that i know that has been made is with

respect to increasing the army to 134,000 by august 2010 i am not aware of any decision to increase the size of the police. i believe our military command has requested certain numbers. i've heard 160,000 for the police and as high as 240,000 for the army. >> by when? >> i do not recall for those projections. i am not trying to avoid your question. it depends in part on how quickly you want to produce these forces and what level of quality. and what your resource -- and what resources your willing to commit to accomplish those objectives. >> that begs the question. can you describe to me the level that you think, a minimum level

that needs to be obtained? and you think we can reach that number? let's take the military, 134,000. >> i can only speak to a general perception that i have detected amongst both our senior military personnel, including nato, but also among the senior ministry of defense and joint staff's officers in the afghan army that they need to be made significantly robust to be able to take the lead in a fight and especially in the most threatened parts of the country. they're not capable of doing that now. >> would you council this commission to be skeptical to do

that? >> at the current level of resources? i would say it is highly unlikely they will be highly unlikely to be able to accomplish that mission. >> mr. tiefer. >> ambassador. what we're hearing this morning is that, and i want to make -- i am looking at the incumbent contract of dyncorp and their recommendation. they have their own reasons to make their own recommendations. we're not endorsing their position. the do have recommendations as the current contractor. one of them is focused on quality of police being trained and not simply on quantity produced. what we're hearing and

correcting from wrong, there is a risk in over expediting the expansion of the force, a risk to quality. we might be compromising the core capability. we might be sacrificing quality and professionalism. i will ask you this but will also ask you at the same and dyncorp's position is we're sacrificing competition over quality. but also there is a simple bricks and mortar issue recovered in your report. the have a recommendation, the current contractor, to increase the capacity of the central and regional training centers and expand the number of afghan instructors and u.s. mentors and advisors. did you study this question and find the was a substantial

impediment in the capacity of the places, the buildings, the facilities in which we do the training? >> thank you. i think our observation was the training centers at the time we were there were operating at full capacity, so to speak. this begs the question if you were two significant increase the basic police training program, what infrastructure growth will be required to reach what level of expansion of the police and in what timeframe. those were serious issues the understood they were trying to grapple with. as far as sacrifice and all -- in quality, it is our

understanding that the transference of responsibility for this basic police training contract has in part to do with an effort agreed to by both the state department and defense that there needed to be the unity of command and unity of effort in terms of police training to provide sufficient flexibility in implementing the training program and tailoring to the variable needs in the war. so hopefully those deficiencies will be gained with appropriate oversight of the contract. i am not sure it is necessary at all to sacrifice quality. indeed, i think the effort at least from our understanding of

dod's vendors. is to increase quality and their capabilities. >> who will still be monitoring this program? >> we are planning on going back in 2010 afghanistan. >> that is 12 months. i would just request that you stay in touch with us on this issue. we're all working out of the same playbook. we want this to succeed. we're looking to find ways where we can help them, those at have to a minister of the program to do it as well as possible. this is the ball game. you're nodding your head. >> we look forward to that corporation. >> great. thank you so much for your

testimony. we will get to the second panel. our second panel is richard formica. david johnson, assistant secretary of state. and michael strain, a program executive officer, department of defense. would you come to the dais and i will swear to you in. is there anyone to respond to a question or are we all set? if you would raise your right

hand and speak up. do you asphalt -- do solemnly swear the testimony you will give it is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? our witnesses have responded in the affirmative. it is my understanding, mr. strain, you did not have a written statement, which is disappointing. you had one prepared but it has not been submitted. you'll be giving a statement, correct? >> it was my intention to give a statement. >> good. we will start with you, general, and then we would just go down the line. >> thank you. >> is your microphone on? there were go. >> how about now, sir? >> they're go. " it's great to have all three of you here. >> good morning, german shays

and -- good morning chairman shays. i was in command from 2018 until just recently in 2009. thank you for the opportunity to appear before your commission. i think you for the work you're doing to assess the alignment of wartime contract with mission objectives tourist important time. we appreciate your visit to afghanistan. i am aware you make a second trip there recently. soldiers worked tirelessly and faithfully to fulfill their mission and to be good stewards. we appreciate you came out to see that for yourself. i have provided the commission with a written statement for the record. i would like to address five points. first, it is a complex command.

is a challenging environment. it is not iraq. i am not suggesting iraq was easy. second, the task is to build sustainable capabilities with the afghan forces. when i left command, the army was at 96,000 soldiers and program to grow to 134,000 of the end of october, 2010. it has its shares of problems. it is on track to achieve its goals. we have proposed to grow to 240,000 by the end of 2013. it was about 94,000 personnel and authorized to grow to 96,

6,800. we are committed to growth and a proposed to grow the national police to 160,000 by the end of 2013. our approach was to explore the momentum of the development of the ama while we had a significant focus. excuse me. third, we are aware of the importance of good stewardship to support this mission. good stewardship is critical to the mission's success and it is of strategic importance. over the past several years, the mission to train security forces has been supported with funding by the united states congress. the high demand has outstripped

the supply of properly trained forces, which creates a demand to fill gaps in training and training support. the command requires the support of contractors in the development of the afghan ministries of defense and interior. contractors often spent existing capabilities. to bring unique skills and provide continuity to the mission. fifth, over the last few years, as the size of the security forces continues to grow, the number and size of contracts increase. this dynamic situation created a challenging oversight in varmint which required continuous efforts to improve management of contracts funded by afghan security forces funds. we have steadily improved our stewardship and oversight of contracts.

measures and controls we have implemented improved capability. their visits and findings and observations made by this commission are delineated in a written statement. in summary, with knowledge more work needs to be done to enhance the management efforts. through accountability and confidence the improvements that will implemented will lead to more effective development and ultimately operational success in this critically important mission. it was my honor and privilege to have served the many braved and dedicated men and women in the command effort and i am privileged to have this rare opportunity to work so closely with the brave men and women of

the afghan security force. we're grateful to the american people and the united states congress. i think you for your efforts to make us a better command. >> thank you, general. >> thank you. thank you to the rest of the commission for the opportunity you're giving to me today to testify on the use of contractors to mentor and trained afghan police. i initiated our program in 2003. we current support a list mission funded through the o50 account. inl has been working with dod to deploy officers to afghanistan to train and mentor them. inl has complemented with this

contract with dod. the united states this parking to help the afghan government developed a professional police force capable of providing public security and enforcing the rule of law. the development of this is challenging. the police training programs we initiated in 2003 are aimed at addressing these issues. building on the estoppels police training program and in light of needing more forces, the defense department was given authority by an agreement over all u.s. efforts to organize, train, and equip the afghan security forces. in 2007, congress responded by funding exclusively through

appropriations to the department of defense. dod determines overall program requirements based on policy guidance. . we have deployed in support approximately 800 civilian advisers to train and buys -- to train and advice. right now, hundreds of former civilian police officers from the united states are embedded with our military helping local

police improve their skills. to streamline their training, the contractual responsibilities are scheduled to transfer as early as march 31st of next year. after this transition, ambassador -- the ambassador will continue oversight and direction. inl and dod are assessing of advance trading class's and mentoring for specific programs or they might continue to play a role. the transfer of a contract responsibility is an effort to eliminate a management layer so we may speed up executions. the department of state will continue to play a role in oversight and overall direction through the ambassador. we're working closely with the dod to achieve a sufficient transition and working toward a

transition plan. we also take into account a de- mobilization effort as well as transitioning all assets and inventory used in the training programs to the following contractors to be chosen by the department of defense. the plan also outlines how to de-mobilize trainers and integrate new ones hired by the new contractors currently run by dyncorp for inl. some of the trainers might well be employed by the next contractors but we cannot predict how many that will be. the globalization and life support at each of the 10 sites including termination of their subcontractors are laid out in the state plans. finally, it addresses the need to address securityxd at the

following sites to the new contractors. this will lead it to amass a transition plan that will develop with d.o.t. and its contractors what's the identify and award the following contract. we're committed to supporting a smooth transition process. we will not allow them to terminate any aspect of the contract until a following contractor is in place and prepared to assume responsibility. we have a fairly staffed office in kabu andl washington to support this transition. inl and faugh dod have weekly coordinating conference calls. our personnel works together on a daily basis in kabul. the coverage of approach to oversight has provided a sound infrastructure for managing our police programs as well as others. as in afghanistan, we is contractors worldwide to implement justice sector programs.

but as we often need to mobilize or hot de-mobilize quick the, contractors lettuce meet those guidelines. further, they enable us to rapidly hire large numbers of former police officers and -- with the recent experience which allows them to return to jobs in the united states when their jobs are completed. three experienced in programl rise in washington provide program oversight. -- free experience programmers in inl proved oversight. office is based in kabul and washington are supported by a team of oversight staff. we currently have 7 in lake country representatives, five of them are filled with two more writing in january. additionally, there are working to add four more to be recruited to the process which would bring

the complement to 11. it is located in washington to minimize the number of staff. 28 u.s.-based staff support these presents is by reducing invoices. mr. chairman, they give for providing me the opportunity to discuss these issues with you. i look forward to addressing your questions. >> thank you, ambassador. >> good morning. i think for the opportunity to be here. -- i thank you for the opportunity to be here. we're currently in his selection process for incoming contractors to support in conjunction with the afghan national police. in addition to that, we are also in the middle of the gao anddod

is working -- and dod is working on a response to that. i cannot respond to anything with regards to that. as such, i am happy to answer any questions you have consistent with what i have outlined above and look forward to our discussion this morning. >> mr. chairman, i would like to say it would have been advisable for you to have a written statement that would allow you to talk about other elements. i realize this is not your decision but i want to go on record saying it is unfortunate that you were not able to come with a statement. the statement is in writing there for you do not get in trouble because it is approved and we could have covered a number of areas 3 make our job more difficult by not having a statement -- a number of areas. you make our job more difficult. you have not done the commission

a favor. we appreciate the times he had that with the commission and had been cooperative. i does want to let you know our disappointment of the and not having a statement. this makes our job more difficult. with that, we will start with -- excuse me. before you go, i want to clarify something. we hear so many different numbers. i want to be clear as to what i am hearing you say. with the military, the goal is to have 134,000 by the end of october 2010 and then to have another 106,000 by the end of 2013. that is the goal stated. >> if i could just be clearer in wording created the program is 4

1/3 to 34,000 by the end of 2010. -- the program is for adoption 134,000. that has been approved. there's a proposal to grow the afghan national army. that has not been decided on that specific number. >> all right. the goal is by the end of this year to have the afghan national police to be an 96,800. it has been proposed that we reach a total number of wonder and 60,000 by the year 2013 but it has not yet been proved. -- a total number of 160,000. >> general, first of all, thank you for your servers particularly in this last year on an assignment that i now had to be extremely challenging and

may be frustrating at times. congratulations on your upcoming promotions. you will be moving too beautiful hot still, alabama. we have danced around -- he will be moving it to be a full huntsville, alabama. i would like to take this to the next debt. counterinsurgencies is very leader, jerk -- leader-centric. there are many who believe we should do more to improve the officer and an c.e.o. court -- and nco corps as opposed to bring them to fast. what does this have to do with training? obviously, we create a need for

additional mentors and so forth. i would like your ideas on the rationale behind the decisions, if those are final, in creating additional ones that as opposed to increasing those in existence. >> thank you for your question. as you allude to the challenges is seceded with a growing and developing afghan national security forces, it includes the challenges with developing leaders. we have focused on developing leaders, officers, and noncommissioned officers as part of our program. when minnie the recommendation to read the afghan national army to 134,000 by october of 2010 we took into account four areas that are concerning.

the development of the leaders, the ability to provide equipment, the ability to build the appropriate infrastructure, and the appropriate number of mentors. to get to that number by october 2010 is no doubt a challenge to achieve. we think it is achievable. the approach that we took working with the minister of defence, who also has asserted it was achievable, but the approach that we took was first to grow in strength without additional structure. in that growth to 134,000 7500 were soldiers without additional structure to reinforce the readiness much like the 22,000 recently approved by congress to

improve readiness and soldiers without structure. that requires the were leaders, fewer demands on equipment, and no additional challenges to the infrastructure. the second thing we did to get to that number was to build small units in the existing forces. in the 44 battalions that are resident in the south and east and each of those will get an additional company. that company gives you more strength, improves the readiness and capability of existing units, puts a reduced demand on a leader development, equipment, and infrastructure and on mentors because you are putting a company in a battalion that already has existing members. in the subsequent part of the gross, we will growth the the

times required to create two additional brigades. we think doing that in the third phase of the growth to 134,000, gives us the ability to ramp up. to have those two grades -- two brigades having the right numbers in the battle space. the decision was made to build an infantry centered force at this point up to 134,000 and in so doing you reduce the requirement for equipment. you reduce the training burden because you are not going to do the more complex trading associated with the combat support skills and artillery engineering. we are going to delay that and it will simplify the development. >> thank you.

there has been discussion, and i do not know how far it has gone, about creating seven entities, afghan public protection programs, local militias, etc., in the western part of the country. how far have those progress? how are they going to be trained if we're going to have a training requirements with them or do we just issue them an ak- 47 and say your mission is to protect your village? >> at the risk of sounding offensive, i am a little dated. some of those initiatives were pretty well being developed as i was leaving. i cannot speak to where we are today. i would prefer not to and rather than be taken for the record and be provided by the staff

because -- i would only say during the time that i was there, there was no effort to create local militias. there were efforts to use experimental growth with the afghan public protection force in one province that was being developed over the course of the late spring and summer. it had different levels of success in different districts. that was being re-evaluated by them as i was leaving. >> is it your sense that there would be a training component by either us or allies with whatever is put together? >> it depends on the mission they would have. there are some responsibilities to either train or mentor them in the execution of their assignment or duty, whenever it

may be. >> one last question. how would you characterize the level of coordination between you and inl in the transfer of responsibility for basic training? >> we are working very working veryinl -- very closely with inl as we did. we are working to build and sustain that relationship. we have met regularly metinl -- we have met regularly with inl staff. i would characterize it as good and getting better. >> thank you. >> thank you, chairman. i appreciate the members of the panel who represent the highest level who have been managing this program. the problems we face in this program are not of your own

making. you bring great skills to coping with them. general formica, you have commented, and i quote, the afghan national army is i would say five or six years for a long in development and the police. you are not alone in saying this, but why? why are the afghan police five or six years behind the afghan army? >> i would just say simply that the first part of my response, resources, attention, and the focus the we had dedicated to the army preceded the resources and dedication that we provided to the national police. it was for that reason that we made the judgment to carry on the decision made by my predecessors.

to characterize our approach was it to sustain an now accelerate the positive momentum we had with the army and add significant focus to the police. in might diminish require more focus. i would submit that some of the challenges were really focused on developing an institutional base, and institutional training base, for the afghan national army. that takes a long time and decisions made by my credit -- my predecessors three or four removed. we have not made the same kind of focus on building the infrastructure with the national police. >> in general, let me ask a similar question in another way. -- general, let me ask a question. we put this chart at.

this is the quarterly report that found that out of the 559 units in the national police, 437 thought as -- got the lowest ranking as far as their capacity inñi accomplishing operational missions. only 24 that the highest rating that they were capable of operating independently. -- only 24 got the rating. why is it that after all of these years of the seeming to train, there is a vast bulk of the units in the national police who are getting a low rating? >> i think that was back to the conversation you were having with the ambassador. -- i think that goes back to the conversation on trading the national police. the development program was created by my predecessor to

create the training forum for the afghan national police, one district at a time. in any one cycle we would train between 5-10 districts depending on the resources available to us. it was a result of that focus on development efforts that we then alignedñi these mentor teams to districts. we were then able to make some requisite judgments as to their capability milestones using the systems we had in place at the time. but this really reflects, as to your question, the number of districts who had not been through that training. if i could just add on, i know you did not ask this question, but to carry on the conversation you were having, if the decision were to grow the number of the national police, the number of districts does not change. it does not add to the problem

of the focused district development read that has its own challenges. i think it is more like 64 today with 20 in trading as we speak. they would come in trained and joy in their districts. >> ambassador, among to ask you are aware of something we knew had taken place at a subordinate level in inl. has there been a discussion, not a decision, not a recommendation,ñr but was therea discussion as possibly shortening the program for the national police currently at 8 6 to six weeks?

>> i understand there have been frequent discussions on how the program might be reshaped and improved. one of the things under consideration at one point was whether it could be shortened in order to increase the number of individuals going through. my recollection is that after consideration of that issue, some of the things would have to be removed in order to compress what was essential. the eight week program has stayed in place. that is relatively abbreviated compared to other training programs around the world. >> he supervised in iraq a training program. -- you supervised. in iraq, the training program there is 12 weeks. the afghan program which deals with a lower level of literacy in their recruits is only eight weeks.

the i read program has a higher literacy of records. >> that is correct. -- the i wrap program has a higher literacy of records. >> in addition to capacity and skill, they are moving individuals to the program and getting them deployed as rapidly as possible. >> by the way, and i do not mean to test you on a closed book exam on the spot, my students at the university of baltimore law school but have sympathy for you if i did that. the civilian police or civpol program in the different countries you are talking about those two police training, yes? >> that is correct. >> besides dying court -- besides dyncorp, are there

other contractors in the civpol that do that major trading? reaching tarining? >> there are others who hold an umbrella contract. we allow those 3 to bid on individual tasks under the various contractçó opportunitie. >> what are those three? >> this is a closed book test. civilian police internationl and pacific architectures and engineers rejected think is a subdivision of lockheed martin -- and engineers, i think it is a subdivision of lockheed

martin. >> i'm trying to figure out what your people do. the contract that is going to be given out is done by the space and missile -- the handling of the contract for the next contractor to do the training for the afghan national police is going to be done by the space and missile defense command in huntsville. what do they do there? >> the space and missile defense command actually conducts the contract work and self. the senior contracts and officers there -- >> substantively, what kind of contracts to they may leave you there? they do not do navy contracts. what do they do? >> be on the contract i currently have with them, i do not have a good familiarity with the contract on going with

the command. >> you, yourself, you are called centpol, the "t" is for technology. do you -- what do you mainly due? you have like 150 task orders. what are they about substantively? >> they are used in conjunction to support counter narcotics and counter narco-terrorism around the world. we support the office of the secretary of narcotics and leveled threats. we support some of the military services. we provide support to local law- enforcement agencies, domestic as well as for and. in terms of acquisition supportr

as well as technology development. >> i think everyone knows that in hunts will they do rockets. -- in council -- in hawsehole -- hopper aviation and technology is the heart of it. it would not make sense when you are working with them of the 164 task orders. >> aviation is a part of what we do, yes, but it is not the majority of it nor is the technologies and development a majority. we have done a variety of activities in support of training as well as technology development as we referred to previously. we have done straight procurements of equipment. >> let me ask about the training. i am not talking about the limited number. there are a limited number of your task orders that are debate

-- in debate. i am not partial to dyncorp. apart from the limited number in the day or in the discussion, -- in debate, mostly your training programs do not have to do with things like cops on the beat. it is trading that has to do with training in dealing with narcotics. >> we have currently 17 test orders related to training and where from afghan border police training which we are currently conducting at four sites in afghanistan. >> i have gone way over my time. >> thank you. >> i have questions for all

three of our panel this morning. i think it is noteworthy we have eight and wrote comprised of view because in the and all this have to work together in order to achieve our security objectives. i would like to start with the general formica. general, we have been meeting -- meaning for some time to talk through the war fire to ensure that, first of all, we thank you for your service and again congratulations on your promotion. we think the servicemen and ñiwomen on their service to our country under extraordinary circumstances. the one question that we need to ask about the war frieder is how contractors at historic levels -- war fighters were

contractors exceed the number of military personnel on the ground right now, how does that affect your planning and operations as a member of the military? how doesñi it make your job easr or harder to haveok contractors and the vault -- involved? >> is your microphone on? >> thank you for your question and thank you for your kind comments. the development of the afghan national security forces, as you suggest in your comment and ñiquestion, in fact requires a civilians, we use international civilian police in our expertise in our headquarters, and contractors. we require the blend of those, as i said in my statement,

contractors really augment our capacity and the bring in a unique skill. we would identify the kinds, the ways that we would approach military trainers and we take into account those drinks to the contractors bring. for instance, a contract traders are particularly good with training support, development, programs, and structure. having the right contractors in the right place enable us to take advantage of their strengths and reduce the burden on the military's we can use them in places where they would be most effective. there are obviously some considerations with contractors from integrating them into the battlefield, and ensuring, as theçó ambassador referred to in his testimony, having the right level of inventing embedding so

that a team has the right mix of military soldiers who can train for military and policing and to have the honor and professional that the contractor brings. one of the things we had to deal with was getting them embedded the right places and at the right level and ensuring they were. that was sending we were wrestling with even in iraq. -- that was something we were wrestling with. >> the fact that we are using contractors so extensively, does that change the way you interface with the allies or the afghans? in our recent trip to afghanistan, i bring this up because the afghans basically, to them, contractors or the military, we are all americans. there were not making the distinction that if we were helping them it seemed to be a team effort.

>> the distinction for the trainee, the kuala -- the quality of the training that they're provided whether they are getting that from a military professional or a law enforcement and factional who happened to be there as a contractor, they were interested in quality of training and the environment in which they needed to learn it. >> thank you, general. ambassador johnson, you mentioned a significant transition plan that will be enacted upon the awarding of the following contract. there seems to be some suggestion in your comments that, in fact, some things cannot be done until that decision is made. i am curious as to whether or not there be a full transition plan in place now or, if not, what factors that need to develop to award the contract in order to complete your plan? >> i think the plan is largely

in place but in order to have a plan where one partner is handing a task to another, you have to have the other partner and work out the details with them. the aztec the general mentioned in response to a previous question, all the things that have been done to repair, the inventories, the joint work between us and his team in order to lay out every single thing we can devise a head of time. we are doing everything possible. it is not as though we are waiting for the partners to be identified. there has to be some closing efforts that take place when the other partner has been identified and how things will go over, but tasks they will be undertaking, and what sort of requirements they might have of us -- we might not be aware of. >> is there anything that stands out as a major issue that needs to be addressed more so than others? >> with the things are referred to is who among the individuals that are employed by the

current contractors might be required or desired by the future contractor. that will be decisions they have to make. how that integrates will require the identification of the following contractor and individuals that are going to execute those contracts. >> thank you, mr. ambassador. when the time comes and you aware of the following contract, i would like to talk about how you plan to manage it to ensure accountability, oversight, control, and basically insecure that the transition is handled with all those things in mind. under what i understand are without a doubt extraordinarily difficult situations in the country. >> first, understand that we have been working with them hand in hand with the development on these task forces to make sure we have the full understanding of all the requirements as well as how that will impact our ability to manage the oversight. as such, i recently established

an office in kabul. that office will be wrapped up significantly to provide oversight necessary. -- that officer of ramped up. this will be at four levels. we will be providing personnel, and then training teams -- embed training teams. second, i will have a series of in place personnel who will be focused strictly on the execution of the contract. i will have individuals at each of the campsites. i will also have a third level roving personnel and subject matter experts who will be going around from campsite to campsite to ensure, again, that there is the proper manage -- management and oversight. we will have those back in kabul as well as here.

on my own, i will probably put some 25 people or more who do nothing more than contract management. >> in general formica, -- general formica, i would go over the numbers again. i want to be as clear as i can be. by november to the house and nine, we have about 96,000 army. by october 2010, we think we will have 134,000 and that has been projected and approved. it is proposed that by the end of 2013, the police now have 96,800. it is proposed 160,0 propose00

by the end of the year as well? >> yes. -- it is proposed to have 160,00 by the end of the year? >> what is the goal of police by october 2010? is there a goal? >> there is not at this point because we do not have approval. i do not having never in my head. if we get approved to go to 160,000 then there would be a brand to get you to that number. -- a ramp to get you to that number. >> it to go from 96,000 to 134,000, that is a ramp. if you kept that in existence, what would your number's been by the end of 2013? -- numbers be by the end of

2013. >> 96,000 in november 2009. 134,000 by 2013 is a ramp. if we continue to use whatever we are going to use additionally from november 2009 to 2010, does the ramp it is up to that number or will we need to add more resources? >> the ramp to grow the army will need to be increased to achieve the number we propose. >> i will spend one half hour on this if i have to. we presently have 96,000 in november. you will get by october 134,000. that is an increase of 38,000.

you have to ramp up, correct? if you use that same line, what would get us by the end of 2013? >> i think my answer is that in order to get to 240,000 by 2013 we would need to increase the rate of growth. >> you are saying we would need to add more people to get to that number from 113. but you would knowledge that if we kept the same progression -- he would acknowledge that you would be higher than that number by the end of 2013. >> if we kept the same progression, we would be ahead --

>> by the end of 213? you just do not know what that number is? -- end of 2013. we are -- we are a commission on contracting. in today's military, we know that in order to succeed we need contractors to build things, contractors to move things, contractors to train coming contractors to guard so our military does not have to do that. we know that and value it. what we are wrestling with is our capability. the implications of getting to a higher number, speaking as a former member of congress and i will be delicate with this, we do know we need more than 134,000 said there has to be a

higher goal. the question we're looking at is, what kind of contractors are you going to need to get to the higher gold that is going to be approved both for the army and police? going back to the number of 20 security for 1,000 populace. we would need around 560,000 in order to have the full number they need. let me ask you -- i would like to ask all of you this question. it is generic. what are the pros and cons of allowing a contractor to protest in the time of war? in times of peace, there is one

implication. what are the implications of allowing this? walk me through the process of a property process of a process not talking about -- but just walk me through what is publicly known about a protest. a protest is made. how long do they have? what is the process? how does that delay the ultimate efforts to get to the numbers we want? >> to be honest with you, my understanding and knowledge of the protests are somewhat limited. the contracting office at the space and missile defense command actually receives the information from the fao. -- gao. i deal with the delays that it will inherently cause. >> let me talk about that.

what does the protest do in terms of the numbers you have told us? >> i am not sure you understand -- i'm not sure i'm understand about the numbers. >> let me put it this way then. let me get into this in a different way. we will get to the answer. we are moving the responsibility of training the afghan police from state to d.o.t.. -- d.o.t.. -- dod. contra responsibility for police training is an effort to eliminate a large management layer so that resources funding and other management issues for this large-scale training mission are more efficient treated the transfer is not intended to alter the type of training provided. the department of state will

continue to play role in the afghan law enforcement training for program, policy, oversight, and overall direction for the cleese programs from our ambassador. that is the statement. do you concur? >> as far as i understand the situation, yes. my dealing with this is strictly relating to the work we are doing with them and how they interact with inl. i am not privy to that. >> you are taking over the responsibility of training the police, correct? >> as they has -- as they have laid it out to us, yes sir. >> is your responsibility to train the police. is that correct? -- it is your responsibility. >> yes. >> how often have you met with state? >> the first time was -- that i personally met with them was

october of this year. we went over to their office and maintains the contract and began that process of working with them. i had my two program managers who have been working full-time on this have been working with the department representatives with respect to the transition on a contractual level. >> how often have in that? >> sir, i do not have the answer to your question at this time. they have been engaging in regular conversations. i do not know the extent to which they have met or the frequency to which they have met. >> how is the program more -- how does the program work when it becomes the responsibility of the ambassador? in other words, there is a point to which dod will no longer be responsible for training police because it will come under the jurisdiction of the ambassador, again, correct? >> as far as i know, yes.

>> do you respond to the ambassador? >> we certainly hope we will get to a point in afghanistan where the need to have a combined effort between the military and police -- we will have achieved such security on the ground and we would anticipate that. try to put a dot on the calendar for that is impossible. >> candidly in what is causing this question is when we were in afghanistan, we did not get a warm, fuzzy feeling that there was a good relationship between state and defense in this transfer. quite frankly, we got the feeling that they did not see the logic to it. it did not give us a sense that there was good coordination. there is the issue now of that we have given the existing contractor two more months at what the $34 million per month?

is that the right amount? >> i do not have the figure in front of me. i would be glad to get that for you. >> what we got from the department of defense was they did not need this contract to continue for two months. there was not a feeling like you all were in agreement. would you say that you see eye to eye on this? or are there is agreement that need to be worked out? >> with respect to the extension that was added on in march, it might work with them in developing requirements to make sure we have a solid require that base on which we can develop a sound proposal and put the people in place to do the work. it was me that started to push

the extension. i ask for it because i wanted to ensure there was enough time to do this correctly and make sure we had sufficient transition time, the proximate 90 days of transition, for the incoming and outgoing said that we would be able to address the issues, if any arose. we knew the complexity and we wanted to make sure we addressed the issue so at the end of the day of the afghan students are not impacted by the transition. >> i'm good to come back in my next round of questions to talk about the impact during wartime of protests. i would like one of you to be able to tell me this. if you cannot, it is pretty shocking you would not be able to. i would think you all would be thinking of the impact. your the one that has to run this program. i would like to think you could tell me the impact. i would like to think you have

asked those questions so you would know. mr. greene. >> thank you. ambassador johnson, please describe as best you can with the continuing role of the inl will be in training specialized police to include footprint and funding? >> i think at this point this is a speculative discussion. we have engaged with our colleagues as to how this program will be handed over and whether or what aspect they would prefer for us to retain or expand our presence in. we have had some back and forth. at some points earlier in the

discussion, the desire by us in is that they would handle everything totally. if we had our continuing engagement, they looked at a couple of things where there are continuing to review. they had access to take over the family centers. we are making provision to do so. as i mentioned, there might be some higher and training specifically related to gender issues -- higher end training. those are not finalized. we are open to that. as i have conveyed, we want to be a responsive partner to our military colleagues. that is the spirit to which we have extended this effort. >> as the footprint and funding been resolved? -- has it been resolved? >> the entire scope of the effort has been resolved.

the funding would continue to come from the department of defense and we would not come at this point, alter the way the funding is managed. >> what is your best guess as to when these issues that are unresolved become resolved? >> quite early in the new year if we stay on track for the award of the new contract. >> thank you. i do not know if this is directed towards -- in regards to this combat vehicle for police training, was anything consideration given to the dodig's criticism to their ability to lead manage and administercentpol idiq contracts?

>> the report you are referring to from december, the audit occurred in august 2008 treated during that time, they look thatcntpo. -- they also looked at cntpo. it revolves around the lack of personnel. that has been addressed. my own organization has 2 increased has 250% in size. the contract and support has increased by all 300%. >> could you give the numbers? >> i have gone from 11 to 30. the contract support has gone from 3 to 13. a significant increase, which was designed and done

specifically at the identification of a discrepancy that was identified, and that is how we have adjusted. >> in general, you may not know this since you have gener -- general, do know what number of the surge of the forces will be involved directly in training and mentoring? i am not talking about as an ancillary duty while they're connecting combat operations. how many of them will be devoted to training? >> thank you for your question, commissioner. i do not know the exact number. it may have well changed from the time that i left. i would just say that the approach that general mcchrystal is taking is more than ancillary

training while but they're conducting operations. it really is a mission statement for the units involved in partnering and mentoring. i would suggest that most of those forces that are going over there, especially the belgrade -- brigade combat team, will have a role in training security forces in the thatwe are operating. >> but not necessary -- but not necessarily in that same matter? >> condi 48 and -- how the 248 and [unintelligible] will continue to provide teams. they have been given a mission to do embedded partnering and it

will partner with army and police in a way that we have not done in the past. >> i just saw something recently that referenced the field artillery battalion. it referenced the artillery battalion of the 101st who will be directly involved in training. >> this is something very new. the regional commanders are going to use this and they are all providing mentoring. that part -- that team is going to partner with not only the national army units but also the police districts in that space as well.

>> when they need to understand better that i think it is driven by the desire of the commanders, but what is the difference between the 48 and 482 and those combat teams? we need to understand that better and i don't expect to resolve that today. one last question for all of you. in the commissioner's opening statement, the referenced significant increase of the contractors related to the surge. have any of you see -- and when we were formed, one of the basic questions was we had too many contractors. comparing this to all sorts of wars in the past, whether we do or not is not what we are here

to solve today. have you seen any attempts to reduce the number of contractors? >> yes. >> i would be happy to take a stab at that answer. we absolutely value the role of the contractor 3 >> we do, too. -- of the contra. >> we do, too. >> to enhance our capacity and to bring the enforcement skills, we absolutely value their role. we struck line by line and the number of mentor trainers that were required in each ministry and the number of traders required out in the battlefield. -- the number trainers. as we increase the number of

units that are doing it are now partnered with police. there is a requirement to increase the number of please contractors so we could provide at the platoon level or whenever the commander chose to organize these mentor teams. we had to increase the number of mentors to accommodate that. at the same time, we were charged in the ministries in how we could eliminate any duplications that occurred in evolve over time. as we took advantage of the increased number of coalitions provided, please mentors, we actually did reduce the number of police mentors, contract mentors, and there was some reduction as a brazil of the role of the -- has a result of the role they provide.

>> thank you. mr. green was given 11 minutes. we are going to do 10 minutes. here we go. . .

>> you only found out in july, and it was only formally approved at the end of august? >> the first time i found out about this transition was on june 24, 2009, followed by my first conversation on june 30. >> if it had stayed at the state department, i have the impression if it were on the contract vehicle they had, there would be at least two other major competitors, cpi and [unintelligible] one has this been given to you? why not open competition?

to the extent you can explain those in general terms, not the legal answer. >> to answer your first question, i received the direction to work on this from the secretary of defense office. that is who i respond to. they asked that i work to make this a reality. as it relates to your question on competition, that goes back to the acquisition strategy. >> let's get that. ambassador johnson, i am trying to find the highest level of the two departments that made the decision to shift the training program to the defense department. if the answer is you are the

highest official, i mean no disrespect. this was a high level decision. this is not decided at the ground level. >> i should know the answer to that but i don't. i may be the highest level official, but the senior levels of the department were made aware of the discussion going on. as i have tried to make clear, we are working as a supporting partner to our colleagues, so this is not something we push back against. we seek to find out whether we can continue to play a helpful role and where we can respond to their desires for a better way of accomplishing this. >> were you aware of the participation of higher levels in the defense department? >> i was not.

>> would there have been a decision document making its way that would explain the justifications for the decisions? >> the documents i recall were in the form of memoranda and cables coming from the embassy that were making known to us the desires of our military colleagues and responding to them from kabul. >> i may have questions on that subject and for the entire panel. we are admonish to note this. in the attempt to meet the current target of 160,000 that

comes to you, there will be decisions on the program of instruction. would you expect there would be modifications in that program of instruction? >> thank you. from a personal perspective, i would expect there to be modifications. based on my own history in the military, i cannot envision we would continue without going over and lessons learned. one of the requirements provided to us as we began the development was the flexibility of the contractor to execute changes into the poi. >> so they have left room for

lengthening or shortening the program in the requirements it gave you for the program? >> as far as lengthening, all i ask is that we have flexibility with change. >> they could change it to the same thing. that is true. are you familiar with the issue that -- of what would happen if the program instruction would be shortened, considering everyone has said in order to meet the fact there is a high level of casualties they have to receive more weapons training than they have in the past, which eats up some of the eight weeks. what would have to happen if it was shortened it? -- if it will shortened?

>> that is a question for them because i just provide them the ability to execute whatever requirement they come out with. i am aware that a high level of the various discussions, but i don't engage in conversations or the decision process. >> i will go to them in a second. embassador johnson, i will ask a question about blackwater because it is one of the five competitors. i realize you are in inl, so i might be asking the wrong person. will stay be passing over to dod information about the past performance of blackwater on the

major contract it has performed for the state department, which would be the personal security contract? >> i will ask if i could take that because i want to give you an accurate answer rather than anything speculating. inl has never had a contractual relationship with whitewater. the way that our colleagues -- relationship with the black water. i should consult with them on this rather than speculating about what that would be. >> that is very inappropriate you would not handle it. i do not note the significance that blackwater currently runs the border police training program, so it is not just drifting through the competition. it is a significant competitor.

general formica, you were fingered as the person to ask on this. you have said the goal is 160,000 afghan national police. suppose trying to reach that goal affected the quality of the police? one of the ways to attempt this would be to shorten the program of instruction while dividing time to weapons -- while devoting time to weapons. what you think about the target of 160,000 in that bind? >> i would say that that was our proposal. that has not been accepted by the dod and by afghanistan, so it is not yet a goal.

we have reviewed the program of instruction for all of the training we do on a regular basis. there is no doubt the current training for police was eight weeks. we have looked at whether it six weeks was achievable. it was done in a committee -- a civilian police professional. they are looking at the program of instruction to see if we could not reduce the amount of training but compressed into six weeks the amount of training required to turn and a police of the same quality. one of that is will were training days, -- one of that is warmer training days.

-- one of that is longer training days. there was some compression in the time required to train. we also referred to the balance between counterinsurgency training. in the eight week poi, it is about 45% of the kind of training that will best prepare a policeman for higher end activity for police enforcement training. the rest was more in administration of general train. >> thank you, and i am done. >> thank you, sir.

general formica, i realize you left command on november 21. this is framed in the context of the day you left. did they have the appropriate resources necessary to handle taking on the management of the afghan national police training through the use of contractors? it you have what you needed to do that job? -- did you have what you need it? >> we had the responsibility from the day that i took command. we were never afforded the resources that were required to provide police mentors when the decision was made before that, so once they adequately resource the afghan security

force, the answer is no current i think general mcchrystal transition to the line of operation [unintelligible] it was transferred and the training teams that go with it to the [unintelligible] that responsibility given to the regional commanders so that he was going to take full advantage of the capability but those combat teams brought not only to the concept of combat operations, but their ability to role model and train the afghan national police. in that regard, things were getting better. i would submit 30,000 additional shoulders only improves that. -- 30,000 additional soldiers.

>> had a properly lined up resources necessary to manage the contract peace? >> as i indicated, we have not matured that capability as contracts group. that was something we identified, it was clear the observation and we appreciate their recommendations and help. it was something noted in the report. we've reorganized them to create a contract management cell and changed our document to increase that capacity. we took some soldiers out and

realigned them against that task. when i left they had not been filled because we only recently changed the document, and that takes time. >> thank you. >> we talked about the transition plan and mr. strain was the head of this requirement for the handoff from state to dod. sometimes we get numb to numbers because we talk about $16 billion spent on training afghan national security forces from the beginning of hostilities. even in that window, if we were to go to the rate of $34 million a month, that is $100 million worth of activity that needs to be coordinated between state and

defense. how effectively they stand up brings into question the potential of waste as we transition with the handoff, will the plans you talked about ensure that the resources are effectively managed and we don't have waste? >> the activities executing the plan will be accomplishing just that. while 90 days is the right numeral, we have sought to make that as effective as we can buy front loading things we can already start to do. in order to make this as smooth as me can and have neither of burlap or overlap. -- neither underlap or overlap.

so we don't drop the baton. >> there is the potential to have duplication of effort, multiple payments and an inefficiency aspect that could creep in if you don't manage this the way you are describing. i want to talk about the question of any obstacles other than the legal process currently underway. you stated it very ambitious goal of awarding a contract in a matter of a few weeks. take that out of the equation and get back to some point where you are able to proceed.

are you sure you have all the obstacles out of the way that would enable you to award a task order to meeth -- to meet the deadlines? >> i would not suggest i have taken every obstacle into account. i suggest we have multiple people who have been looking at and trying to identify where the risk points or. while the initial risks was risk of the time frame we were looking at with respect to making this occur, one of the factors was increasing the timeframe of the contract so we would have more time to conduct a more thorough turnover and ensuring we have understood all

requirements and in short contractors who will be awarding that task -- ensure contractors can accomplish this. >> one of the things we have observed in our visits is how tough is to do things in afghanistan. you mentioned having a presence of 25 personnel that will oversee the management of that contract to inshore accountability and that the contractor delivers. will they have adequate facilities, a place to live, the ability to travel to do their jobs in the timeframe you are contemplating? >> yes, sir. i commented on respect to

establishing a full-time presence in kabul. we have access to our own vehicles and a wide amount of capabilities to get out. that was done purposely because of the oversight i have in that region. we established a capability that allows us to move independently and do the oversight required. the types of support they will provide in terms of building for personnel. the transportation involved to ensure we can move personnel back and forth. establishing a rotation so they don't become too embedded in a camp, so there are fresh eyes and an ability for lessons

learned. we spent a lot of time to make sure we can operate in the environment. >> thank you very much. >> there is an irony in this hearing. we are on thin ice not for significant reasons. the life and death issues we should be talking about are ignored while we tread so carefully on the contract issue and the fact there is a protest. i will tell you what my observation is. you have come to our office and made us feel this transfer can happen like that. you had made us feel it will be an easy process. we hear comments from dod and

state and see body language could not see if we were communicating via e-mail that says this has been an awkward transfer. it does not give me a warm feeling to think you have only had one contact with state and you are in charge of the program. as a matter of public record we know the existing contractor has done a good job. that is not alleged one way or the other. in transferring this in order to move quickly, five contractors can do it and the existing one cannot. what we can address this

understanding during a time of war, does this process makes sense? do we risked the lives of our troops because we have a process that doesn't work properly? in a special report we may say this is crazy. a protest season -- the protest needs to be looked at differently. you cannot tell me your knowledge of the protest because it impacts what you do. if it takes longer it will impact you. if it is a 100-day process. it could be waived. i would like to thank you would know the other parts to it. i would like to think he would make a recommendation. the ball game is whether we can train enough afghans in their

army so that we can leave. ben the irony is, if we can leave it goes back to state. i it would love to hear the logic of giving it to dod. what is also troubling is that we know right well -- we know right now we will have 140,000 if we can train them on time. we are transferring a contract over. we are at 94,000 and at the end of the year will be at 96,000. i would like to know more, like a request of 160,000 has been

acted on. we are sending our troops in but we don't know if we will train more afghan police. all of this is troubling. when we were in afghanistan it was emphasized how corrupt every part of the system is. one part i think we would want to make sure is not correct was that the soldiers and police get paid. that impacts our contractors. we had an incredible conversation speaking to people who have been there five years and we are learning some of these people are not getting paid. i would like to think that we

could have covered more territory with this panel. i think it would have been helpful to understand the protest process. are you willing to give me any concept of what you think about the protest and whether it should be different during war, and if we have the regulations to make it different, whether we should utilize it. >> i have a couple of comments if we have time. from my perspective, as the former commander that felt responsibility for developing the national army. we would want to be able to continue existing contracts or

transition from one to another. the imperative is to do that without interruption of the quality of that training. how that process supports that are the two objectives. i don't know if that answers your question, but we would not want to seek an interruption in the conduct of training. i would like to make a point. we spent a lot of time talking about transmission of the contract. the observation i made -- this is one facet of the approach to improve the strategy to develop the afghan national police. the first element was to create a police training command,

something that the minister of interior has some level of responsibility for. we are there to provide him resources to do that. just like the national army, it is commanded by a two-star general. that has been established and is effective. we don't have anything like that in the afghan police. their training is done by the minister of interior. to create a training command, it has that responsibility for the conduct of training -- >> what is the second one? >> to establish a training group inside the needle training mission to take advantage of the trainers that will come who are responsible for training

training command, which includes trainers at the regional site. the third was to transition the responsibility for managing the contract to the organization that was responsible for developing the police so that we would eliminate going to the department of state associated with that contract. you've had one organization responsible for training the afghan police and is responsible for oversight of the contract so that you have a unity of command. >> do you want to jump in on this as it relates to the issue of being able to do a protest? >> i am not familiar of the protest process, so why will

approach this from the point of view of the citizen. -- so i will approach this. apropos of everything from the truman commissioned to it today, we need a process so that if there are things that need to be dealt with through a protest, that there is a way to do that. >> i will let each of you make a closing comment. one of the things that was revealing to me -- to hear contractors -- this is why we will interact with contractors and will not tolerate someone attempting to suggest that we

are interfering with the process, but we will learn. what we learn from contractors was for the folks running it -- every one of them said we are professionals. if we work for someone else, the irony is 80% of folks doing training under different contracts maybe the same people. that is one of the ironies to this. it was impressive to see the amount of dedication to a cause that superseded a company. there was a sense that we are doing something important and would like to continue to do it

even if it meant they might be under a different management. it spoke well to the intentions of these folks. i would invite you to respond to any question we did not ask that we should have were any comment based on questions asked. >> i would like to thank you for allowing me to be here to have this discussion. the comment he made with respect to making it sound easy, if it came across like that i apologize. i understand the many land mines that exist with this process. we have put a lot of effort into this and will continue to do so.

u s a previous question with respect to the challenge process. from my perspective, environment -- in a war time environment this is critical to what we do on a day to day basis. there are a lot of rules and regulations, but our focus is on serving the needs of the folks in afghanistan. elsewhere in the world where we have work to do we will continue to move forward with what we are doing. some of the issues we will have to overcome is the length of time it takes to address the

issues and how that will impact our ability to conduct a transition, what that might mean in terms of our ability to move quickly with the changeover. those are questions that we cannot answer until we pursue down this road. i will be happy to talk to you about that in the future. thank you for the opportunity to be here. we look forward to continuing this process and spending time in afghanistan supporting this effort. >> we also would concur. thank you. >> i also appreciate the opportunity to participate in this discussion with you. i hope i have been responsive to your questions. with regard to what is said about your engagement with

individuals who are working on the ground, i also have that respect that you outlined. i have engaged in a not successful effort to have this who have given the ultimate sacrifice to be part of the peace officers memorial here. i think they deserve that recognition. with respect to the question you asked about whether we should employ contractors, he moves us who are working on that issue. -- it behooves us. whether it is the department of state for justice who are providing this assistance because of the flexibility that they have and the reach we need into law enforcement, we will

need to rely on these mechanisms to provide the support as far into the future as i can say. >> thank you, ambassador. general? >> i will that to my colleagues my thanks to be able to appear before this commission and thank you for the work that you do in helping us to better align the role of contractors with this work. i share your notion and have a passion that nothing is more important than the development of the afghan national security forces so that they can provide for the stability of the afghan people. we want to enable them to do so. i think you appreciate from your

it visits the complex environment. it is something the development of this forces that will continue to require the efforts of our military and partners, and contractors if the decisions are made to increase the size of the security forces. the transition of the responsibilities was not about changing contractors, it was about unity of command. and have responsibility for developing the afghan police and providing the advisory group would be the same organization that would manage the contract. you talked about pay. we are concerned about several challenges with the security

forces. hay is one of them. -- pay is one of them. we have tried to increase the ability of soldiers to get paid directly through electronic funds transfer. they get their money to their bank account directly. that is in increasing numbers. when i left it was around 70% four army soldiers and 80% for police. that does not eliminate corruption and challenges with being able to take their pay, but it produces it. we thank you for your service and we look forward to working with new, so thank you very much.

we will get to our final panel. fred, and nick, program manager of the afghan national security sector. you can stay standing. is there anyone else who may respond to questions? if so, have them stand up. we may need to ask a question

and if you turn to someone else we would like them to stand. do you swear the testimony you will give before this commission will be the truth? thank you very much. before i start , let me ask for your cooperation. we don't want anyone to game the system. this is not an opportunity for you to make some protest. we realize there is a contract that has to be settled. we had a debate on whether we should invite the of -- whether we should invite you to the panel. you are the most important to answer questions of, what are the challenges of deciding whether to seek work with the

government? what kind of people do you look for? what are the difficulties in training afghans verses are iraqis? the differences between those [unintelligible] fill us in on the generic stuff that will help us understand what it is like in your shoes. and what it is like four other contractors. if we can proceed i think we can learn a lot and we will not have created a circumstance that we regret. am i pronouncing your name properly? you have the floor. >> thank you. on behalf of our employees,

thank-you for the opportunity to participate today. since 2003, we have partnered with the government to build the professionalism of the afghan national police. working closely with the state and afghan minister of interior and the police, our training programs have received high marks for performance. as the program manager, i am proud of the bravery and competency of our team. the team continues to make progress in challenging times and move forward and never quit when it was hard. unfortunately the work is also dangerous.

37 courageous employees, including six and afghanistan have paid the ultimate sacrifice. the police training program faces many challenges. low literacy rates, drug use, issues of corruption, low pay and high casualties. this is difficult work, but it is essential. you know the importance of building an afghan security force in terms of meeting goals and afghanistan. the taliban understands as well. they see the police as a serious threat to taliban control abilities. it is reflected in the vicious and successful attacks on the police. four times the number of afghan police have last their lives as much as soldiers. -- have lost their lives.

as i said earlier, we have faced many lessons over the six years. we have learned and incorporated them into our training curriculum. drawing on my experience as program manager, i am included eight recommendations and would like to highlight five. -- i have included eight recommendations. the numbers train is an ineffective metric for determining capability of the afghan national police. increased the capacity of the regional training centers and expand afghan instructors and advisers. afghanistan needs more police recruits and to provide it danced law-enforcement training to police officers.

we have transition the training of the training centers to the afghan police instructor. we need to develop field training officers to replace mentors in the field. transfer of responsibility should be based on meeting certain metrics. increase the number of police mentored teams and the lengthening period they oversee. this increases law-enforcement skills while reducing the possibility of corrupt activity. as our ceo has discussed with the commission, this should be strengthened to support the wounded and families of deceased. contractors are a reality of

modern warfare. those injured on the job deserve better than they get. we recognize this void and established an employee assistance program. it assists the family of this killed in action. i am pleased to have with me to someone who heads up this effort. he was an adviser in iraq. we would like to see it this would be an effective model. i would like to extend my thanks to the courageous men and women who work in hostile locations. increasingly we only hear bad news when it comes to overseas contractors. you would be hard-pressed to find a more dedicated and qualified work force than the one we have supporting the program today. they serve every day for eight

safe tomorrow. -- they serve every day for a safe tomorrow. they do it because they make a difference and it is a meaningful contribution to peace and stability. i look forward to addressing any questions you may have. >> that was very hopeful. thank you. >> i am mr. nickerson. it is a pleasure to be with you here and building capacity within the

afghan national security forces. over the course of my time i have seen capabilities within the afghan national security sat there and have knowledge of what we bring to their training effort. i would like to begin with two observations about the contract and lessons learned from my years on the ground. >> [inaudible] >> consistent with our contract, we assist with two basic functions. systems development and mentoring of senior ministers. within the ministry of defense, we assist with the implementation of 23 systems.

we assisted 16 systems with regard to mentoring at the national level, we will be the primary mentor or be a backup. we provide training teams for the afghan national army within the five regional divisions. along with these teams, we provide supporting implementation of functioning systems such as inspector general, hospital mentors and trainers. we are involved with the development of the training system within the afghan national army. mentor in programs such as the development of the trainee -- [unintelligible]

i second point is we have learned the value of continuity. they have long jetty -- they have longevity. we understand the value of being integrated because it allows us to better understand the commanders intent, which allows for us to anticipate new requirements and ensure implementation. this allows for effective oversight. we have learned the importance of sensitivity and treating afghans with dignity. cultural awareness shapes our instruction in the expectation. respect for the afghan shapes the tenor of how we mentor. we are proud of our ongoing support in afghanistan and

contributions to training and systems development of the afghan forces. i appreciate the invitation to participate in this hearing and look forward to questions. >> thank you. >> distinguished members of the commission, i am the executive boyce president for xe services. i was an army acquisition officer she previously -- acquisition officer previously. i appreciate the opportunity to be here today on behalf of the team. joseph joined the company last march. the new leadership team is committed to making sure its

work performed for the government is performed with the highest standards of honesty and reliability at all levels. xe has a commitment to conduct business operations in full compliance with regulations of the country in which we do business. transparency must underline our relationships with customers and communities in which we do business. our company's involvement in training afghanistan forces make us qualified to assist the commission. we have more than 2000 professionals worldwide. xe provides mentors should to officers of the border police.

the afghan narcotics units also. these are afghan organizations tasked with combating terrorism in afghanistan. we train these units to interrupt narcotics. the training course lasts six weeks and includes special weapons and maintenance. the basic course lasts six weeks and focuses on rifles skills. xe has applied the lessons to improve these programs. the trainee must respect afghan culture. the relationship between individual instructor and trainee is critical. this relationship must be built on trust and strong sense of

mutual goals. building this relationship requires maintaining a consistent presence of instructors during that time. the training schedule must coincide with the afghan work week and haul the these which do not match ours. -- workweek and holidays that don't match ours. we emphasize the importance of leading by example, including participation along afghan supporters. we have learned that afghans do not like to be outperformed by their colleagues. this has been a motivational tool. these instructors have spent three years in afghanistan. the average age of instructors

is just over 40. that is the equivalent of a field grade officer in the tiller -- field grade officer in the military. i would like to thank you for providing us the opportunity to discuss our successful efforts in training. we are proud our company's expertise can assist our nations mission in afghanistan. i will be happy to answer any questions. >> you have the floor. >> you mentioned in your opening statement several ways to improve the training process. if you have to prioritize the top three, what would they be?

>> thank you. as i looked at my experience over the past 18 months, for a successful law enforcement program the first thing i would do is embed more law enforcement experts at the grass-roots level. we provide a basic training and that is all we are providing. when they go back into the district's what they need are the field training officers. they need someone to continue to provide training for them to improve on the skills they may forget, that is with them 24/7. the other piece that is important is you provide and start to get after this issue we

have heard today of corruption. what you have is a conscience, in looking over a police officer that they have someone to keep them moving forward. i think we need to continue to focus on quality. we talked a lot about short in programs of instructions. the quality that we provide we should not walk away from. the third piece to prioritize this is their needs to be a focus from the grass roots level that goes to the province and back to the moi. the complete chain of command and mentor scheck is very important. -- andmentor -- and mentorship

is very important. >> i welcome your thoughts in a different training environment. what are the top three things that you feel trainers could do to improve the process? >> thank you for the question. it was mentioned on culture. the reason why we list this as number one is it gets at the notion of how we adjust our training. we look at the performance of training. we first show how the task is done through repetition so we see the afghans have that scaled-down, and then we observe. so we get them to

[unintelligible] the second is touched on, our responsibility to bring the right trainer in. that goes to the heart of working with them, we understand what the requirement is they want us to do. then we find that person with that skill set. that is our responsibility. that gets into the standards. the last is the respect for the culture. we have our personnel understand what the training is and the culture so that a factor that in, and observed national holidays that they have. >> thank you. border police, whath