thank you very much, carlos, for those comments. let uva make a comment, and then we will -- >> i want to add two things. . >> i think i have more than 100 emails of family, friends, colleagues and there is an interchange of them permission, of texas, of photos, or some trivial happy birthday or happy

mother's day. there are more interesting content, but it has helped unite families inside and abroad. that is something we'll take for granted. -- we all take for granted. the other thing is youtube. in the last year, alone, i can think of about four or five important postings on the internet of things happening in cuba. there were drinking street guys and there was hundred in cuba and it went worldwide.

recently, just a couple of weeks ago, students decided to participate and complain about the quality of their food. it was a lengthy complaint of how can you go to school with the food they were given to rid -- were given. someone is out there filming and putting it on youtube in some way. i think that also shows the use. in this strong complaint, you can see other people taking pictures with phones. there was more than one person taking photographs or film of

these. these are two other elements. even television, for example the concert of juarez was televised live in miami where there are so many cubans. it made a lot of people outside of the island share a moment of music and peace and reconciliation. the blotters, the youtube -- of the blotters -- bloggers , long way. thank you. >> thank you. it just a comment before we open

it up to questions. the united states is trying to take this changing technological landscape into account. it is still not clear if we have the right mix. on the one hand, president obama authorized in number of changes in policy as it relates to telecommunications, including allowing telecom providers to enter into agreements that link cuba and the united states. there were roaming service agreements as well as licensing people that are subject to u.s. jurisdiction to pay for telecommunication, satellite radio. then when you're working with you and providers, it is the cuban government that is providing it. there is a desire to increase those official types of

linkages the u.s. has work to try to facilitate an independent civil society. i thinkñi that those two goals e going to be increasingly difficult to carry out simultaneously. i come back to ted's paraphrasing. this is in the process of trying to facilitate downloading development, downloading democracy or downloading destabilization. those are the questions that are very much on the minds of many of the cubans on the island as they try to understand and react to the role of the united states. with that comment, we would like to open it up to questions from the audience. please identify yourself. >> my question is to the

gentleman from the committee to protect journalism. you spoke of the regulatory framework, yet the penal code does not mention anything regarding on-line activities. do you see a move in the short to medium term of the cuban government to modify the penal code to include sanctions and to criminalize online activities such as the one that the blogge rs doing? >> that is a good question. i am not sure about that. i do not think they need that people could to criminalize the activity. they have a handful of

restrictive laws in place already. ted was mentioning that a month ago, if you bloggers were on their way to a peaceful march in havana there were forced into a car by plainclothes security agents and they were beaten. this can give you an idea of how far the cuban government can go in terms of going after dissidents and gain a lot of exposure internationally. if as i said before, we have not seen, yet, the widespread

crackdown on dissidents and independent journalist that was seen before, with his brother. but taking into account what happened before, when the movement of independent journalists flourished in the mid-1990s, and they got a lot of recognition by publishing their stories mainly on web sites in the u.s. and europe, this does not preclude the fact that a major crackdown may have been in the future. >> the other thing is there is this catchall phrase. in a certain sense, that is so broadly defined that even if

broad -- if online activities are not forbidden, they could be depending on what one rights. -- what one is to write. >> i have a question related to sell phones. as we have heard, cell phone videos have been important. this is not just in cuba, but through latin america. this will events over the next 5-10 years. do these bloggers -- how is their access to cell phones? how does the government restricted? handing out cell phones and keeping cellphone will be easier than keeping an internet connection over time. >> let me refer you to a blog.

he has a number opposed the deal with a lot of these kinds of technological questions and issues and addresses some of the advisers that helps provide this kind of connectivity. the answer to your question is yes, but with lots of caveat. axis makes the heart grow fonder. i think that a lot of young cubans are missing this technology and it does not make them ignore it, it makes them more knowledgeable and more inventive. i have a problem with my blackberry and i do not know what to do. i do not know how to fix it. this like they can make a car run for 50 years, they can really bring up all kinds of technological things. especially the young onesxd. like davy crockett and that

killed in a bear when he was only 3, she built her computer from scratch during the worst part of this time. they have cell phones and they have twitter account . ñrshe was treating the whole, -- tweeting the whole time. the cops are aware of it and a teller to turn off theres -- her cellphone. they do not know what you can be doing if you are punching, you know. all lot of them have twitter accounts. they cannot use them like we do. as far as i know, she has a constant stream of on her blond.

but she does not actually send a tweet. when someone gets a text message, they have to put it on. someone dedicates it to english. this number if they have around the world of solidarity -- this relationship they have around the world of solidarity, that would be how i would address that. >> i would say the cost is still an issue. some dissidents were telling me that cellphone use is still costly for the average cuban. when the government opened the consumer sales of cell phones,

there were charging to register for a plan $160. they were telling me thatñr for- that the government charged you for incoming calls. when you call them, they're looking to the caller id and they may call you right away where send you a e-mail because the cost is still an issue. i think that is still limiting, the use of electronic devices in cuba. >> this is a fascinating discussion one of the things that signaled the imminent downfall -- discussion. one of the things that signaled imminent downfall was that the government lost its will to crack down. i was wondering if the cuban

government is doing this? these agents that put these people in the car told them to serve -- turn off their cell phone. why did they not just take it away? why don't they arrest the blotters -- these bloggers and put them in jail? these may be signs of that the regime is beginning to lose its will to crack down in the way that used to. >> i do not think so. i think that it has the will that it always has to keep the political control that it once. there might be members -- the political control that it o wants.

role has a different approach. he is trying to preserve the system but make changes that will allow the system a little more space and more oxygen, mainly in the economic sphere. the only reason these people have not been thrown into jail is because they did the government to the punch. the government was not aware of these blocks until they had already become famous. by december 2007, when the big wall street journal cover article came out, the government -- i occasionally talk to diplomats in new york. they say that when she won the time magazine thing, they had to figure out who the woman was. you're supposed to be a cuban diplomat and he had to find -- read time magazine to find out who she was. i think that they were caught off guard by it.

been known is a protective shield, and the fact that she was able to become known so quickly, and i agree, the prizes she won for symbolic, given to protect her. i think they are equally given to do for recognition. the government will have to pay a big price if they decide to do that. she is also a much more sympathetic figure and i think that people can relate to her in a different way than an independent journalist. she writes these witty day in the life typo blog posts. that would be my understanding of why they are not in jail. >> i mostly agree with what ted said.

i think that the will is there. but i think that one of the issues is that most cubans do not read these blogs. they do not have contracts says. so, the work of this independent logger, the impact of the work is internationally. çóso, the cuban government salt what happened before with the independent press. and they are not so worried up to now because cubans do not have access to thisñi blog -- to these blogs. at the same time, and i am going to ask him to develop this idea.

the key of the communist party is an old generation. they are not internet technology savvy. there is a generational disconnect and i will let him develop this idea. so, this is another consideration. at the same time, these bloggers are different from the dissident movement. they are not so politically motivated. their comments are not çóconfrontational. they do not criticize the government harshly, but they

examine issues that cubans face daily. ñrthey are critical, but not confrontational. this may be another aspect of the issue. as i said before, taking into çi((áu what happened with the independent press, they were finally -- the government decided in 2003 that it was enough and they launched a massive crackdown. i do not think that this can be precluded. we may see the future that some ofxd these bloggers be sent to jail. >> briefly, on the generational disconnect, if there is only one

big political lesson that we can take away is that the old guard is still on top. role castro is running the country -- rocco -- raul castro was running the country. you have the dismissal of young people and so there is clearly a massive generational gap between the cuban leadership in this new generation. and that being said, i think that the cuban government has learned things relatively quickly. it just one example, fidel castro is still frequently quoted by the international press by making statements on various issues, both domestic and international. of the statements are made through his columns. when you see that fidel castro

said that -- this or that, that is what makes it so easily accessible. the cuban government has come to this game until late, but they are a player in the game. >> tomorrow morning, on washington journal, a discussion on president obama's plans to send 30,000 troops to afghanistan. following that, a look at what caused the auto industry's problems. also, a discussion on the human rights agenda. later, a look at how to prepare your 2009 federal tax forms with a certified public accountant. washington journal is live on c- span. >> freelance video journalist

david ax was imbedded with the u.s. air force in seven -- southern afghanistan >> no, this is the crash 1. it will come along beside. >> should come here to get in? the last thing that they have to do, they have to make sure that when they leave the aircraft, they get all the weapons and ammunition out of the aircraft after the people are out.

we do not want to leave anything for the enemy. >> did you want to be in here? >> no, i want to watch it from here. >> like the captain said, you want to come in from behind the aircraft because of the gun only has 45 degree motion. >> to come up beside as close t10 as you can.

now, you four will start the process. slow, slow, slow. >> the afghan military is still pretty small. even a years into this war. they'll probably fought him -- there are probably slightly more police. >> it is a couple of hundred th. you're trying to support your army. but helicopters to bring

supplies and will not always be able to rely on u.s. and nato helicopters. so, the u.s. air force has an advisory group that is teamed with helicopter pilots and expert maintainers and administrative officers to try and grow -- to try and grow a helicopter force. there are two wings, one in the north and one in the south. they're trying to grow and air force from the ground up. it is a matter of getting helicopters and buying them with u.s. money. you try to recruit some old afghan pilots that were trained by the russians and bring them back in and give them some refresher training and then try to get them working by a u.s. model of air power for your

serving the ground troops. they have a process for calling in and making a request to deliver some water at all that may seem simple in theory, but making it work day after day is complicated. so, the americans working hand- in-hand to show them how we do things in the u.s. air force. you can do it like us and you could supply your own troops. what that looks like a practical terms is that there is an afghan infantry battalion that means water. the americans helped with the request and fly with them. every step along the way, taking off, landing, offloading, reloading things, americans the device and the interpreter is the afghan pilots. ñiñrthey feed little tidbits of

advice to the afghans and they hope the afghans will pick up on that and do it on their own.

[speaking arabic] [speaking arabic] of the first was you're heading control. it got much better towards the end of the flight, but towards the beginning, i think the problem was that you had your [unintelligible] little too far to the left. you kept coming back into a left turn. always remember to always turn it to the center position. always remember to use our paddles.

-- when you are taking out power, you sure petals --he said that you remembered to. more than what you're giving. i think it requires a little more than what you were giving. >> [speaking arabic] >> i am captain tyler rennel we are at kengor airbase. -- ken the her -- kandahar air base. we did some maneuvering as well and that to test fire the weapons. but -- and got to test fire the

weapons. we also did some high level flight, so we got to practice climbing and descending as well as climbing and descending terms. we came in here and got to work on some rodeos as well as some approaches into the wind. we will pick up some cargo and do the whole thing back in reverse and do some mentoring and some fine and have a good time for everybody involved. >> -- some flying and have a good time for everybody involved. the lesson is being conservative am thinking outside of the training that they had. right now, they have all been trained in the russian style in the sense that this is the way that you will do this. you will always do it this way. we're trying to get them to think about maybe trying a different type of approach or a different type of formation, but if you're going to do something different, realize that you need to be safe when you're doing

that. >> tell me about the language barrier. how does that affect the pilot mentoring? what's it slows it down it makes

it -- but itq -- >> it slows it down. ñrgetting information across ina timely manner when you were in flight is a huge challenge. i have tried to learn a little bit of their language in order to take away some of that stress and confusion, the when you were trying to do with a more complicated process, technical terms, flying terms, there really is no substitute for talking the same language. because the afghans have now learned enough english, we have to rely on interpreters. even during flight, after the flight and during briefings. it makes things take about three times as long to get things across then you have to break it down into the basic level of

terms just so that the interpreter knows where you are saying so he can try to explain it. you do not know if they understood exactly what you said because you have to trust that the interpreter said it right thing. it brings a whole new dynamic to the training and advising process. it is difficult to gauge how effective you are immediately. it just takes time after time of doing similar things to figure out whether the grasped what you said. >> we have 15 u.s. mentor's here. they are experts in each of their fields. -- we have 15 u.s. mentors here. they are experts in each of their fields.

what we are dealing with is maintainers who are 40 or older, these folks have been working helicopters for a great portion of their life. some have had maybe five-six years that they have not worked on helicopters, so we have to get a quick assessment of the skill level. since we are just building up the team, but is one of our biggest challenges, is getting a team of people that can perform the required level of maintenance that needs to be accomplished. we have another agreement that provides specialists when we are short -- and other means that provides specialists we are short -- we have another wing that provides a specialist when we are short.

by culture, they rely on what they have learned through their training and not referring to a book because they feel like that is weakness. they have to remember what it is that they have learned. there are some cultural issues that we are trying to overcome. it is a significant challenge, but we are working with them over the past month. we will test their skill and concurrently deliver flight operations. it is something that will allow them to sustain operations when we leave. >> your organization seems to exist in a complex bureaucracy where you have the afghan military and all of them but not always talking clearly to each other. is it a challenge dealing with

-- being stuck in the middle of these organizations? >> a good example of that is about a month ago when we had coordination with many different nations to move into the new hangar that we are operating out of. we had to deal with the tech mentors. we were trying to move into the hangar with the slovakia and guards and combined with that, we had the afghans to deal with. for all the support agencies, there are a lot of different agencies that we have to deal with. since we are a new wing, there are challenges with battles of wills.

this new organization has some of the afghans that don't want to come here. there are issues with this being a new wing. many of them want to live or their family is located. we have some challenges dealing with them in that regard. actually getting people to come here and work is a challenge at times. the way that they deal with their daily operations sometimes may take them to work three days to -- the planning process in the states, we would do a 3 day process in about four or five hours and determined very quickly what parts we need, what skill levels to we need and how can we most expeditiously with -- repair this aircraft.

it takes them a lot longer. there is a lot of patience that we have to show and the frustration that comes about, i usually get with my team. mentoringñr this sum from barbaa have to expect that the afghans are going to be able to perform as we do. the small things that we do back home, sometimes we overlook what allowsçó usñr to do things as ñieffectively as we do. to have the training ability to push the skills that we need in the quantity is required toñi be able to generateñiçó sorties' ae rate that we did. they do not have those foundations in place as part of their culture. that is one of the things that we have to be patient. çóçówe have to continue to focun small, incremental improvements. it is a sustained effort over

time and it will get it. xdxd-- and they will get. >> there is an attitude among security forces. it they have the ability to see a couple of days in the future. there is a huge lack of foresight and planning. it is a cultural thing. when life is as hard as it is, you do not look too far into the future. getting the afghan security forces to plan for enough in advance to get aircraft moving around and delivering stuff and recruiting aviators, this is -- this requires planning. it is very hard to do. >> freelance video journalist david axe was embedded in

afghanistan. to watch this program again or what other programs produced with this material, you can go to our web site, c-span.org. in the search box in the upper right-hand corner type "axe." >> all this month, the senate continues work on the health care bill. here is how you can follow the debate. watched the senate, live, gavel- to-gavel on c-span2. listen to highlights on c-span radio and review the debate at our health care hub. and now, for iphone users, follow the health care debate with the new iphone app. you can listen to c-span, c- span2 and c-span radio.

>> now, a hearing on contract oversight for security forces training in afghanistan. this is being held by the federal commission on wartime contract and. members recently returned from a trip to afghanistan where training of local security forces has been a top priority. this is 4 hours 15 minutes. >> good morning, i would like to call the commission to order. i am the co-chairman of the commission on wartime contract and in iraq and afghanistan. thank you for attending this hearing on contractor training of afghan national security forces

the other commissioners are to t. also participating is the executive director who heads our staff of 58. he deserves your sympathy. hour hearing could not be more timely. eight years after entering afghanistan to overthrow the taliban regime, the united states has about 70,000 troops in the country. our president has decided to send another 30,000 americans. it is hoped that our allies will ñisend an additional 10,000 troops. we want to note, with respect and gratitude, that the men and

women have paid a heavy price with their service. the fatality count stands at 5287 with 931 of the deaths occurring in afghanistan. more than 40 other countries have over 30,000 troops in afghanistan and has suffered casualties as well. there will be more than 140,000 allied military personnel in afghanistan. as of september 2009, there were 104 contract employees working for the department of defense.

it was estimated this week that the troops surge in afghanistan could raise the number of contractors working there to 130,100 60,000. we would note that those numbers, striking as they are, do not agree with contractors in afghanistan. conservatively speaking, the total contractor work force in that country will likely exceed 300,000 by the end of 2010. the military presence in afghanistan is large and growing. we must note that the challenge is also a large and becoming more acute. afghanistan is nearly the size of texas, but is mostly mountainous and subject to approval extremes of weather. the afghan population is estimated at 29 million they are

mostly poor and mostly illiterate. this poses great challenges. they provide security, or reconstruction, logistical and humanitarian assistance. it is safe to say that none of the countries assisting afghanistan in its struggle, was to have a long-term military presence. certainly the united states does not. that is while -- one building well-trained and law-abiding national security forces in afghanistan is a vital mission. that mission is daunting. afghanistan's military was severely degraded during the soviet occupation and the civil war that led to the taliban reg.

it was said in the august report that it was riddled with corruption and short of equipment and no one can argue with that. in september, the washington post published a confidential commander summary from general stanley mcchrystal that depicted broader problems. the general wrote that maligned actions of power brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials as well as errors by international forces, despite all of those challenges, the united states and other countries are working to promote a stable and

democratic afghanistan while preventing al qaeda and other terrorist from resuming operations in that country. from that perspective, training the afghan national security forces is the ball game. of the issr debate, the endgame must be issr creating self-sufficient afghan -- a self-sufficient afghan army that are free from corruption and able to provide security. from april 2002 to 2010, the -- as a point of reference, this effort is exceeded only by the theater why'd logistics support program. this commission does not want a program of this size with its various contracts to get mired in the same problems that the

commission has documented. meanwhile, the u.s. state department's bureau on law enforcement has obligated more than $1 million in trading. unfortunately, as the general accountability office reported last month, afghanistan's security situation has deteriorated significantly since 2005, affecting all aspects of operations. weaknesses afghan national security forces has caused a delay or abandonment of some reconstruction projects. it disrupted already tenuous supply lines and undermined anti-narcotics programs and hindered training of afghan forces. all of these factors show the growing importance and challenge of training ineffective afghan

army and police personnel. the department of defense is committing the fourth brigade of the 82nd airborne division, a company of military police, and others to do training effort. but, there are not enough military trainers to do the training. contractors like dime corps play a significant role -- like duncorp, blessed --dyncorp 8 particular role. how well or the contracts being drafted and awarded? how effective is contract management and oversight? how good are the resultsñi for key metrics like recruitment and retention? what mix of military and

contract trainers is optimal? from a broader perspective, how appropriate is that to have armed forces training administered by contractors, however much military experience and instructional skills they may have? these questions converged on combined command in afghanistan. they work with the afghan government and international forces and organizations to promote security in afghanistan. this includes managing a $404 million contract to train and support afghan national security forces. to understand the critical role, this commission has met with both its former commander and its new commander.

we are grateful for the cooperation provided by these fine officers. unfortunately, the july 30 report to congress by the special inspector general for afghan reconstruction said that it does not have the capability to ensure that u.s. funds are managed effectively in spent wisely. it was concurred that technical representatives have limited experience and had been unable to make field visits to check performance. war resources have been applied to this problem, but significant questions remain. but only for the department of defense, but for the department of defense. we are fortunate to have the assistance of three panels of expert witnesses to help us assess the challenges of

training afghan security forces. our first panel as a single witness, ambassador more field -- moorefield. the second panel has three witnesses. david johnstonñr and michael strain, the program executive officer our third panel offers a contractor perspective and also has three witnesses.

although the contractor panel is last on a scheduled list, contractors are not last in our thoughts. we are aware of challenges in the u.s. contracting process and have previously highlighted instances of waste, fraud and abuse by subcontractors. but, we have also observed that contractors supporting american military and reconstruction efforts in iraq and afghanistan gets high marks from our troops in the field. contractor employees include a large number of experienced, hard-working and patriot -- patriotic americans. their work is vital.

we have met contractors that have been in a year for five years or more and this is difficult to sustain in a 6 month or one your deployment cos bt. many have died in the mission in afghanistan it is troubling that no one can provide specific, reliable numbers to document the deaths and injuries suffered as if somehow their deaths and injuries do not matter as much. let me say that this commission deeply respects the work and honor the sacrifice of government contractors and appreciates hearing their views of the situation on the ground.

>> we also ask that they offer any additional information. the full text of their written statements will be entered into the hearing record and posted on the commission's website on behalf of my fellow commissioners, we thank all of today's witnesses for participating in what we view is a very important hearing. we will begin by hearing from ambassador more field -- moorefield. my co-chairman was planning to come but had a family emergency. with that, if you would, ambassador, would you stand? i understand that two others may

respond to questions so if they would stand, raise your right hand and saw only swear or affirm that your testimony that you will give the bill -- will be the truth, the truth and -- the whole truth and nothing but the truth. >>ambassador, i understand that your statement made take about seven minutes. i think you'll be able to give it in the fashion that you want. >> thank you chairman chays. thank you for this opportunity to appear before you on behalf of the department of defense. i would like to share our experience in these regarding

the challenges and risks associated with contingency contract in in support of the training and mentoring missions in the development of the afghan national security forces. as a the commissioner pointed out, it has provided an indispensable resource in building security forces. contract personnel have played many roles. contractor support of senior leader development has been key to the institutional development of the ministries of defense and interior. there are responsible for the afghan national police. in addition, u.s. contractors

are embedded in the afghan farmer at the core level and below and provide mentoring training teams across the entire afghan army command. they manage police basic training centers, serve with police mentoring teams can develop civil policing skills to provide a positive role model for the afghan counterparts. they are essential in the training facilities across the country. many contract personnel have been in afghanistan far longer than their military or civilian counterparts. they have provided a degree of continuity and stability. but the mission to develop an

effective system faces a unique, complex problem because of afghanistan's remarkably difficult operating environment. illiteracy is an excess of 70% pryde -- 70%. outside of the capitals, there is still relatively little effort structure to support widely dispersed army and police operations. . .

@@@@@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

those are not finalized. those are not finalized. we are open to that. as i have conveyed, we want to be a responsive partner to our military colleagues. that is the spirit to which we have extended this effort. >> as the footprint and funding been resolved? -- has it been resolved? >> the entire scope of the effort has been resolved.

the funding would continue to come from the department of defense and we would not come at @@@@@@@@@ >> i think we are quite early in the new year. if we stay on track for the award of the new contract. >> i don't know if this is more directed to which of you but in agreeing to this vehicle, this contract vehicle for basic police training, was any consideration given to the d.o.d. i.g.'s criticism of space and missile and defense commands' ability to manage and administer contracts?

>> sir, i will answer that question. the i.g. report date 25 september of 2009, the actual audit occurred in august of 2008. during that time period it not only looked at smdc but it was the beginning of the contractual use of that contract. it revolves around the lack of personnel. that has been addressed. mywnwn organization has 2 increased has 250% in size. the contract and support has increased by all 300%. >> could you give the numbers? >> i have gone from 11 to 30. the contract support has gone from 3 to 13. a significant increase, which

was designed and done specifically at the identification of a discrepancy that was identified, and that is how we have adjusted. >> in general, you may not know this since you have gener -- general, do know what number of the surge of the forces will be involved directly in training and mentoring? i am not talking about as an ancillary duty while they're connecting combat operations. how many of them will be devoted to training? >> thank you for your question, commissioner. i do not know the exact number. it may have well changed from the time that i left. i would just say that the approach that general mcchrystal is taking is more than ancillary

training while but they're conducting operations. it really is a mission statement for the units involved in partnering and mentoring. i would suggest that most of those forces that are going over there, especially the belgrade -- brigade combat team, will have a role in training security forces in the thatwe are operating. >> but not necessary -- but not necessarily in that same matter? >> condi 48 and -- how the 248 and [unintelligible] will continue to provide teams. they have been given a mission to do embedded partnering and it

will partner with army and police in a way that we have not done in the past. >> i just saw something recently that referenced the field artillery battalion. it referenced the artillery battalion of the 101st who will be directly involved in training. >> this is something very new. the regional commanders are going to use this and they are all providing mentoring. that part -- that team is going to partner with not only the national army units but also the police districts in that space as well.

>> when they need to understand better that i think it is driven by the desire of the commanders, but what is the difference between the 48 and 482 and those combat teams? we need to understand that better and i don't expect to resolve that today. one last question for all of you. in the commissioner's opening statement, the referenced significant increase of the contractors related to the surge. have any of you see -- and when we were formed, one of the basic questions was we had too many contractors. comparing this to all sorts of wars in the past, whether we do

or not is not what we are here to solve today. have you seen any attempts to reduce the number of contractors? >> yes. >> i would be happy to take a stab at that answer. we absolutely value the role of the contractor 3 >> we do, too. -- of the contra. >> we do, too. >> to enhance our capacity and to bring the enforcement skills, we absolutely value their role. we struck line by line and the number of mentor trainers that were required in each ministry and the number of traders required out in the battlefield. -- the number trainers. as we increase the number of

units that are doing it are now partnered with police. there is a requirement to increase the number of please contractors so we could provide at the platoon level or whenever the commander chose to organize these mentor teams. we had to increase the number of mentors to accommodate that. at the same time, we were charged in the ministries in how we could eliminate any duplications that occurred in evolve over time. as we took advantage of the increased number of coalitions provided, please mentors, we actually did reduce the number of police mentors, contract mentors, and there was some reduction as a brazil of the role of the -- has a result of the role they provide.

>> thank you. mr. green was given 11 minutes. we are going to do 10 minutes. here we go. . .

>> you only found out in july, and it was only formally approved at the end of august? >> the first time i found out about this transition was on june 24, 2009, followed by my first conversation on june 30. >> if it had stayed at the state department, i have the impression if it were on the contract vehicle they had, there would be at least two other major competitors, cpi and [unintelligible] one has this been given to you?

why not open competition? to the extent you can explain those in general terms, not the legal answer. >> to answer your first question, i received the direction to work on this from the secretary of defense office. that is who i respond to. they asked that i work to make this a reality. as it relates to your question on competition, that goes back to the acquisition strategy. >> let's get that. ambassador johnson, i am trying to find the highest level of the two departments that made the decision to shift the training program to the defense department. if the answer is you are the

highest official, i mean no disrespect. this was a high level decision. this is not decided at the ground level. >> i should know the answer to that but i don't. i may be the highest level official, but the senior levels of the department were made aware of the discussion going on. as i have tried to make clear, we are working as a supporting partner to our colleagues, so this is not something we push back against. we seek to find out whether we can continue to play a helpful role and where we can respond to their desires for a better way of accomplishing this. >> were you aware of the participation of higher levels in the defense department?

>> i was not. >> would there have been a decision document making its way that would explain the justifications for the decisions? >> the documents i recall were in the form of memoranda and cables coming from the embassy that were making known to us the desires of our military colleagues and responding to them from kabul. >> i may have questions on that subject and for the entire panel. we are admonish to note this. in the attempt to meet the current target of 160,000 that

comes to you, there will be decisions on the program of instruction. would you expect there would be modifications in that program of instruction? >> thank you. from a personal perspective, i would expect there to be modifications. based on my own history in the military, i cannot envision we would continue without going over and lessons learned. one of the requirements provided to us as we began the development was the flexibility of the contractor to execute changes into the poi.

>> so they have left room for lengthening or shortening the program in the requirements it gave you for the program? >> as far as lengthening, all i ask is that we have flexibility with change. >> they could change it to the same thing. that is true. are you familiar with the issue that -- of what would happen if the program instruction would be shortened, considering everyone has said in order to meet the fact there is a high level of casualties they have to receive more weapons training than they have in the past, which eats up some of the eight weeks. what would have to happen if it was shortened it? -- if it will shortened?

>> that is a question for them because i just provi@@má4,@ @ xg i'm aware of the various discussions that have been ongoing, but i don't engage in the conversations or in the decision process for that. i just execute. >> i will go to them in a second.ç ambassador johnson, i'm going to ask a question about blackwater because it is one of the five prime competitors on thet(ç coodract. i realize you are not in diplomatic security, so your answer may be that you are asking the wrong person. will state beç passing over to d.o.d. information about the past performance of blackwater on the major contract it has

performed for the state department? which would be the personal security contract? >> i'm going to ask if i could take that because i want to give you a completely accurate answer rather than anything i would speculate about. than anything speculating. inl has never had a contractual relationship with whitewater. the way that our colleagues -- relationship with the black water. i should consult with them on this rather than speculating about what that would be. >> that is very inappropriate you would not handle it. i do not note the significance that blackwater currently runs the border police training program, so it is not just drifting through the competition. it is a significant competitor.

general formica, you were fingered as the person to ask on this. you have said the goal is 160,000 afghan national police. suppose trying to reach that goal affected the quality of the police? one of the ways to attempt this would be to shorten the program of instruction while dividing time to weapons -- while devoting time to weapons. what you think about the target of 160,000 in that bind? >> i would say that that was our proposal. that has not been accepted by the dod and by afghanistan, so

it is not yet a goal. we have reviewed the program of instruction for all of the training we do on a regular basis. there is no doubt the current training for police was eight weeks. we have looked at whether it six weeks was achievable. it was done in a committee -- a civilian police professional. they are looking at the program of instruction to see if we could not reduce the amount of training but compressed into six weeks the amount of training required to turn and a police of the same quality. one of that is will were training days, -- one of that is

warmer training days. -- one of that is longer training days. there was some compression in the time required to train. we also referred to the balance between counterinsurgency training. in the eight week poi, it is about 45% of the kind of training that will best prepare a policeman for higher end activity for police enforcement training. the rest was more in administration of general train. >> thank you, and i am done.

>> thank you, sir. general formica, i realize you left command on november 21. this is framed in the context of the day you left. did they have the appropriate resources necessary to handle taking on the management of the afghan national police training through the use of contractors? it you have what you needed to do that job? -- did you have what you need it? >> we had the responsibility from the day that i took command. we were never afforded the resources that were required to provide police mentors when the decision was made before that, so once they adequately resource the afghan security

force, the answer is no current i think general mcchrystal transition to the line of operation [unintelligible] it was transferred and the training teams that go with it to the [unintelligible] that responsibility given to the regional commanders so that he was going to take full advantage of the capability but those combat teams brought not only to the concept of combat operations, but their ability to role model and train the afghan national police. in that regard, things were getting better. i would submit 30,000 additional shoulders only improves that.

-- 30,000 additional soldiers. >> had a properly lined up resources necessary to manage the contract peace? >> as i indicated, we have not matured that capability as contracts group. that was something we identified, it was clear the observation and we appreciate their recommendations and help. it was something noted in the report. we've reorganized them to create a contract management cell and changed our document to increase that capacity. we took some soldiers out and

realigned them against that task. when i left they had not been filled because we only recently changed the document, and that takes time. >> thank you. >> we talked about the transition plan and mr. strain was the head of this requirement for the handoff from state to dod. sometimes we get numb to numbers because we talk about $16 billion spent on training afghan national security forces from the beginning of hostilities. even in that window, if we were to go to the rate of $34 million a month, that is $100 million worth of activity that needs to be coordinated between state and

defense. how effectively they stand up brings into question the potential of waste as we transition with the handoff, will the plans you talked about ensure that the resources are effectively managed and we don't have waste? >> the activities executing the plan will be accomplishing just that. while 90 days is the right numeral, we have sought to make that as effective as we can buy front loading things we can already start to do. in order to make this as smooth as me can and have neither of burlap or overlap.

-- neither underlap or overlap. so we don't drop the baton. >> there is the potential to have duplication of effort, multiple payments and an inefficiency aspect that could creep in if you don't manage this the way you are describing. i want to talk about the question of any obstacles other than the legal process currently underway. you stated it very ambitious goal of awarding a contract in a matter of a few weeks. take that out of the equation and get back to some point where

you are able to proceed. are you sure you have all the obstacles out of the way that would enable you to award a task order to meeth -- to meet the deadlines? >> i would not suggest i have taken every obstacle into account. i suggest we have multiple people who have been looking at and trying to identify where the risk points or. while the initial risks was risk of the time frame we were looking at with respect to making this occur, one of the factors was increasing the timeframe of the contract so we would have more time to conduct a more thorough turnover and

ensuring we have understood all requirements and in short contractors who will be awarding that task -- ensure contractors can accomplish this. >> one of the things we have observed in our visits is how tough is to do things in afghanistan. you mentioned having a presence of 25 personnel that will oversee the management of that contract to inshore accountability and that the contractor delivers. will they have adequate facilities, a place to live, the ability to travel to do their jobs in the timeframe you are contemplating? >> yes, sir.

i commented on respect to establishing a full-time presence in kabul. we have access to our own vehicles and a wide amount of capabilities to get out. that was done purposely because of the oversight i have in that region. we established a capability that allows us to move independently and do the oversight required. the types of support they will provide in terms of building for personnel. the transportation involved to ensure we can move personnel back and forth. establishing a rotation so they don't become too embedded in a camp, so there are fresh eyes

and an ability for lessons learned. we spent a lot of time to make sure we can operate in the environment. >> thank you very much. >> there is an irony in this hearing. we are on thin ice not for significant reasons. the life and death issues we should be talking about are ignored while we tread so carefully on the contract issue and the fact there is a protest. i will tell you what my observation is. you have come to our office and made us feel this tra you have made us feel like it would be an easy process. we go to afghanistan and we here comments fromç bothç d.o.d. a

state and see the body language thatç we couldn't see if we we ÷% said this has been an awkwardçç transfer. it doesn't give me a warm fuzzy state yet you are in charge of the program. you delegated to someone else but that doesn't make me feel very comfortable. we know as a matter of public record the existing contractor has done a good job and has done it for five years. whatever. that is not being alleged one way or another. we know that in transferring it to d.o.d. that in order to move quickly with a task order contract five contractors can do it but the existing one can't and that is the way it is. what we can address as a commission on contracting is

understanding during time ofçö does this process make sense, and do we risk the lives of our troops because we have a process that;h"oesn't workç properly? we may, in a special report or a report done next year, say this isç crazy, the protest system needs to be looked at differently. a protest season -- the protest needs to be looked at differently. you cannot tell me your knowledge of the protest because it impacts what you do. if it takes longer it will impact you. if it is a 100-day process. it could be waived. i would like to thank you would know the other parts to it. i would like to think he would make a recommendation. the ball game is whether we can

train enough afghans in their army so that we can leave. ben the irony is, if we can leave it goes back to state. i it would love to hear the logic of giving it to dod. what is also troubling is that we know right well -- we know right now we will have 140,000 if we can train them on time. we are transferring a contract over. we are at 94,000 and at the end of the year will be at 96,000. i would like to know more, like a request of 160,000 has been

acted on. we are sending our troops in but we don't know if we will train more afghan police. all of this is troubling. when we were in afghanistan it was emphasized how corrupt every part of the system is. one part i think we would want to make sure is not correct was that the soldiers and police get paid. that impacts our contractors. we had an incredible conversation speaking to people who have been there five years and we are learning some of these people are not getting paid.

i would like to think that we could have covered more territory with this panel. i think it would have been helpful to understand the protest process. are you willing to give me any concept of what you think about the protest and whether it should be different during war, and if we have the regulations to make it different, whether we should utilize it. >> i have a couple of comments if we have time. from my perspective, as the former commander that felt responsibility for developing the national army. we would want to be able to continue existing contracts or

transition from one to another. the imperative is to do that without interruption of the quality of that training. how that process supports that are the two objectives. i don't know if that answers your question, but we would not want to seek an interruption in the conduct of training. i would like to make a point. we spent a lot of time talking about transmission of the contract. the observation i made -- this is one facet of the approach to improve the strategy to develop the afghan national police. the first element was to create a police training command,

something that the minister of interior has some level of responsibility for. we are there to provide him resources to do that. just like the national army, it is commanded by a two-star general. that has been established and is effective. we don't have anything like that in the afghan police. their training is done by the minister of interior. to create a training command, it has that responsibility for the conduct of training -- >> what is the second one? >> to establish a training group inside the needle training mission to take advantage of the trainers that will come who

are responsible for training training command, which includes trainers at the regional site. the third was to transition the responsibility for managing the contract to the organization that was responsible for developing the police so that we would eliminate going to the department of state associated with that contract. you've had one organization responsible for training the afghan police and is responsible for oversight of the contract so that you have a unity of command. >> do you want to jump in on this as it relates to the issue of being able to do a protest? >> i am not familiar of the

protest process, so why will approach this from the point of view of the citizen. -- so i will approach this. apropos of everything from the truman commissioned to it today, we need a process so that if there are things that need to be dealt with through a protest, that there is a way to do that. >> i will let each of you make a closing comment. one of the things that was revealing to me -- to hear contractors -- this is why we will interact with contractors and will not tolerate someone attempting to suggest that we

are interfering with the process, but we will learn. what we learn from contractors was for the folks running it -- every one of them said we are professionals. if we work for someone else, the irony is 80% of folks doing training under different contracts maybe the same people. that is one of the ironies to this. it was impressive to see the amount of dedication to a cause that superseded a company. there was a sense that we are doing something important and

would like to continue to do it even if it meant they might be under a different management. it spoke well to the intentions of these folks. i would invite you to respond to any question we did not ask that we should have were any comment based on questions asked. >> i would like to thank you for allowing me to be here to have this discussion. the comment he made with respect to making it sound easy, if it came across like that i apologize. i understand the many land mines that exist with this process. we have put a lot of effort into this and will continue to do so.

u s a previous question with respect to the challenge process. from my perspective, environment -- in a war time environment this is critical to what we do on a day to day basis. there are a lot of rules and regulations, but our focus is on serving the needs of the folks in afghanistan. elsewhere in the world where we have work to do we will continue to move forward with what we are doing. some of the issues we will have to overcome is the length of

time it takes to address the issues and how that will impact our ability to conduct a transition, what that might mean in terms of our ability to move quickly with the changeover. those are questions that we cannot answer until we pursue down this road. i will be happy to talk to you about that in the future. thank you for the opportunity to be here. we look forward to continuing this process and spending time in afghanistan supporting this effort. >> we also would concur. thank you. >> i also appreciate the opportunity to participate in this discussion with you. i hope i have been responsive to your questions. with regard to what is said

about your engagement with individuals who are working on the ground, i also have that respect that you outlined. i have engaged in a not successful effort to have this who have given the ultimate sacrifice to be part of the peace officers memorial here. i think they deserve that recognition. with respect to the question you asked about whether we should employ contractors, he moves us who are working on that issue. -- it behooves us. whether it is the department of state for justice who are providing this assistance because of the flexibility that they have and the reach we need into law enforcement, we will

need to rely on these mechanisms to provide the support as far into the future as i can say. >> thank you, ambassador. general? >> i will that to my colleagues my thanks to be able to appear before this commission and thank you for the work that you do in helping us to better align the role of contractors with this work. i share your notion and have a passion that nothing is more important than the development of the afghan national security forces so that they can provide for the stability of the afghan people. we want to enable them to do so. i think you appreciate from your

it visits the complex environment. it is something the development of this forces that will continue to@@@@ )u@ h@ @ @ @ @' b@ @@@@eorganization that would manage the contract. you talked about pay. we are concerned about several

challenges with the security forces. hay is one of them. -- pay is one of them. we have tried to increase the ability of soldiers to get paid directly through electronic funds transfer. they get their money to their bank account directly. that is in increasing numbers. when i left it was around 70% four army soldiers and 80% for police. that does not eliminate corruption and challenges with being able to take their pay, but it produces it. we thank you for your service and we look forward to working with new, so thank you very

much. we will get to our final panel. fred, and nick, program manager of the afghan national security sector. you can stay standing. is there anyone else who may respond to questions? if so, have them stand up.

>> we don't want anyoneç to game e system. in is not an opportunity for you to say something that would then give you an opportunity to make some kind of protest or swrpb else a protest. we realize there is a contract that has to be settled. we had a debate in our commission on whether we should invite you, the third panel. in some ways you are the most important panel in being able to answer questions like what are the challenges of, you know, deciding whether to even seek

work with the government in contracti contracting? what kind of people do you look for? telling us what are the difficulties in training afghans versus iraqis if you can tell us that. theç differences between those who are literate and those who are not. fill us in on the generic stuff that will help us understand what it is like to be in your shoes. understand what it is like in your shoes. and what it is like four other contractors. if we can proceed i think we can learn a lot and we will not have created a circumstance that we regret. am i pronouncing your name properly? you have the floor. >> thank you. on behalf of our employees,

thank-you for the opportunity to participate today. since 2003, we have partnered with the government to build the professionalism of the afghan national police. working closely with the state and afghan minister of interior and the police, our training programs have received high marks for performance. as the program manager, i am proud of the bravery and competency of our team. the team continues to make progress in challenging times and move forward and never quit when it was hard. unfortunately the work is also dangerous.

37 courageous employees, including six and afghanistan have paid the ultimate sacrifice. the police training program faces many challenges. low literacy rates, drug use, issues of corruption, low pay and high casualties. this is difficult work, but it is essential. you know the importance of building an afghan security force in terms of meeting goals and afghanistan. the taliban understands as well. they see the police as a serious threat to taliban control abilities. it is reflected in the vicious and successful attacks on the police. four times the number of afghan police have last their lives as much as soldiers.

-- have lost their lives. as i said earlier, we have faced many lessons over the six years. we have learned and incorporated them into our training curriculum. drawing on my experience as program manager, i am included eight recommendations and would like to highlight five. -- i have included eight recommendations. the numbers train is an ineffective metric for determining capability of the afghan national police. increased the capacity of the regional training centers and expand afghan instructors and advisers. afghanistan needs more police recruits and to provide it danced law-enforcement training to police officers.

we have transition the training of the training centers to the afghan police instructor. we need to develop field training officers to replace mentors in the field. transfer of responsibility should be based on meeting certain metrics. increase the number of police mentored teams and the lengthening period they oversee. this increases law-enforcement skills while reducing the possibility of corrupt activity. as our ceo has discussed with the commission, this should be strengthened to support the wounded and families of deceased.

contractors are a reality of modern warfare. those injured on the job deserve better than they get. we recognize this void and established an employee assistance program. it assists the family of this killed in action. i am pleased to have with me to someone who heads up this effort. he was an adviser in iraq. we would like to see it this would be an effective model. i would like to extend my thanks to the courageous men and women who work in hostile locations. increasingly we only hear bad news when it comes to overseas contractors. you would be hard-pressed to find a more dedicated and qualified work force than the one we have supporting the program today.

they serve every day for eight safe tomorrow. -- they serve every day for a safe tomorrow. they do it because they make a difference and it is a meaningful contribution to peace and stability. i look forward to addressing any questions you may have. >> that was very hopeful. thank you. >> i am mr. nickerson. it is a pleasure to be with you here

and building capacity within the afghan national security forces. over the course of my time i have seen capabilities within the afghan national security sat there and have knowledge of what we bring to their training effort. i would like to begin with two observations about the contract and lessons learned from my years on the ground. >> [inaudible] >> consistent with our contract, we assist with two basic functions. systems development and mentoring of senior ministers. within the ministry of defense, we assist with the implementation of 23 systems.

we assisted 16 systems with regard to mentoring at the national level, we will be the primary mentor or be a backup. we provide training teams for the afghan national army within the five regional divisions. along with these teams, we provide supporting implementation of functioning systems such as inspector general, hospital mentors and trainers. we are involved with the development of the training system within the afghan national army. mentor in programs such as the development of the trainee -- [unintelligible]

i second point is we have learned the value of continuity. they have long jetty -- they have longevity. we understand the value of being integrated because it allows us to better understand the commanders intent, which allows for us to anticipate new requirements and ensure implementation. this allows for effective oversight. we have learned the importance of sensitivity and treating afghans with dignity. cultural awareness shapes our instruction in the expectation. respect for the afghan shapes the tenor of how we mentor. we are proud of our ongoing

support in afghanistan and contributions to training and systems development of the afghan forces. i appreciate the invitation to participate in this hearing and look forward to questions. >> thank you. >> distinguished members of the commission, i am the executive boyce president for xe services. i was an army acquisition officer she previously -- acquisition officer previously. i appreciate the opportunity to be here today on behalf of the team. joseph joined the company last march. march. the new leadership team is