but it is something that an increasing number of americans are obviously very worried about. and it's something that our partners, our investors around the world are worried about. so it's got to be done. got to be done. >> finally was there something that he said today that struck you? something that made news? >> i hadn't heard him talk about who should be on this commission before from congress. so that was new to me. >> i was interested in the way he was describing the tactics, the timing of when the commission ideas most likely to be adopted, in other words early next year, that's when they'll be considering a long-term extension of the debt. and that means that obama administration will have a much greater say in what's going to be done because he'll be talking about the state-of-the-union address and the budget release that come up in january and february. so they'll be very much engaged and involved. >> john mckin none of the "wall street journal," thanks for being with us.

andy sullivan of reuters. gentlemen thanks for being with us on "newsmakers" on this sunday. have a good day [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> up next a hearing on contractors in iraq. after that senate banking committee votes on a new term for federal resaid of chair ben better nan key. after that a house hearing on u.s. counterterrorism efforts. >> his mark on history includes "manifest destiny" and in his new biography of james k. polk, a country of vast delife and times of our 11th president. tonight on c-span's q and a.

>> now friday's hearing on contract oversight for security forces training in afghanistan was held by the federal commission on wartime contracting. members recently returned from a trip to afghanistan where a training local security forces has been made a top priority by the obama administration. >> good morning. i'd like to call the commission on wartime contracting in iraq and afghanistan to order. our hearing. >> this opening statement is made on behalf of my cochairman michael tebow who is not here because of a family emergency,

my fellow commissioners and myself. the other commissioners at the dais are -- also participating is robert dixon the executive director who heads our staff of 50 and deserves your sympathy for having eight commercials who are his bosses. our hearing could not be more timely. afghanistan to overthrow the taliban regime, that it sheltered al-qaeda terrorists, the united states has about 70,000 troops in the country. our president has decided after consulting with military leaders to send another 30,000 americans there. it is hoped our allies will send collectively an additional 10,000 troops. we want to know with respect and gratitude that the men and women of america's and forces have paid a heavy price for their service in both iraq and

afghanistan. as of december 17th, fatality count since the start of u.s. combat operations in southwest asia stands at 5,287 with 931 of the deaths occurring in afghanistan. meanwhile, more than 40 other countries operating under united nations authority, the united kingdom, canada, germany, france, poland, australia and others, have over 30,000 troops in afghanistan and have suffered casualties as 2010, therefor example there will be more than 140,000 u.s. and allied military personnel inñr afghanistan. as of september 2009, there were 104 contractor employees working for the department of defense in afghanistan. the congressional research service estimated just this week that the troops surge in afghanistan could raise the number of d.o.d. contractors

working there to between 130,000 and 160,000. we would note that those numbers, striking as they are, do not include the thousands of department of state and u.s. a.i.d. contractors in afghanistan. considerably speaking, then, the total war fighter and contractor work force in that country will likely exceed 300,000 by the end of 2010. the u.n. sanction military presence in afghanistan is large and growing. but we must note the challenge there is also large and becoming more acute. afghanistan is nearly the size of texas, but unlike texas it's mostly mountainous and subject to brutal extremes of weather. the afghan population is estimated at 29 million. they are mostly rural, mostly poor, mostly ill literate. these conditions and a mounting

insurgency pose great challenges to military operations as well as to the governmental, nongovernmental and contractor organizations that provide security, reconstruction, logistical and humanitarian assistance. it is safe to say none of the countries assisting afghanistan in its struggle against hard line insurgents and terrorists wants to have a long-term military presence there. certainly the united states does not. that is why building well-trained, well-led and law-abiding national security forces in afghanistan is a vital mission. that mission is daunting. afghanistan's military was severely degraded during the soviet occupation and the civil war that led to the taliban regime. today the beleaguered afghan national army numbers about 105,000, about half the size of iraq's army, even though the two country's populations are nearly equal. the afghan national police and

border police have their own problems. the said in an august report the afghan national police are riddled with corruption and short of equipment and no one could argue with that. in september, the "washington post" published a confidential commanders summary from general stanley mcchrystal, the top u.s. and nato commander in afghanistan, that depicted broader problems. the general wrote of the weakness of state institutions, ma lined actions of power brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials as well as errors by the international forces. despite all these challenges, the united states and other countries with a presence in afghanistan are working to promote a stable and democratic afghanistan while preventing al-qaeda or other terrorists from resuming operations from

havens in that country. from that perspective, training the afghan national security forces is the ball game. regardless of the issue under debate, the end game must be creating self-sufficient afghan army, national police, and border police forces that are free from corruption and are able to provide adequate security. from fiscal year 2002 through 2010, the u.s. department of defense will have spent nearly 30 billion on training, equipping and supporting the afghan national security forces. as a point of reference, this effort is exceeded only by the theater-wide log cap logistics support program. this commission does not want a program of this size with its various contracts to get mired in the same wealth of problems that the commission has documented in law cap. meanwhile the u.s. state department's bureau for

international narcotics and law enforcement has obligated more than $1 billion for counter narcotics and basic police training. unfortunately, as the general accountability office reported last month, afghanistan's security operation has deteriorated significantly since 2005, affecting all aspects of u.s. and ail lied reconstruction operations. incredible in insurgent activity combined with weaknesses in afghan national secures forces has caused delay or abandonment of some reconstruction projects, disrupted already tenuous supply lines, undermined any narcotics programs and hindered training of afghan government forces. all of these facts show the growing importance and the growing challenge of training effective afghan armies and police personnel. the department of defense is committing the fourth brigade of the 82nd airborne division, a

company of military police, and the 48th brigade combat team to the training efforts and will be taking over the national police-training mission from the department of state. but there aren't enough military trainers to do the training. contractors like cmpra and dime corps play a significant training role in afghanistan. and as we noted earlier, contractors' roles is likely to grow as the buildup of afghan and army and police ranks continues. considering all these facts, we need to ask how well are the training contracts being drafted and awarded? how effective is contract management and oversight? how good are the results particularly for key metrics like recruisement and retention? what mix of military and contract trainers is optimal? and from a broader perspective, how appropriate is it to have

armed force training administered by contractors however much military experience and instructional skill they may have? these questions converge in large part on the come bind security transition command afghanistan commonly caused cstika. they work with the afghan government and international force and organization to promote security and stability in afghanistan. this includes managing a $404 million contract to train and support afghan national security forces. to understand the critical role of cstika in theater this commission has met with both its former commander, major general richard formica and new commander, lieutenant general william caldwell, who also command the new nato training mission afghanistan. we are grateful for the cooperation provided by these

fortunately the july 30th, 2009 report to contract by the special inspector general for afghan reconstruction says cstika does not have the capability to ensure that u.s. funds are managed effectively and spent wisely. this report in which cstika con kurd noted that the representative in the country for the contract had limited experience and had been unable to make c.o. visits to check performance. more resources have since been applied to this problem. but significant questions remain to discuss in this hearing. not only for cstika and d.o.d. but also for the department of state and for the holders of federal contracts. we are fortunate to have the assistance of three panels of expert witnesses to help us assess the challenges of training afghan security forces. our first panel has a single witness, ambassador kenneth

morefield, assistant inspector general, special plans and operations department of defense. the second panel has three witnesses, major general richard for my ca -- -- formica, cstika afghanistan, david t. johnson, -- law enforcement and michael strain, program executive officer counter narco terrorism technology program officer department of defense. our third panel offering a contractor perspective also has three witnesses. don righter, vice-president of police civilian programs dime corps international. fred writes, executive company z company formerly known as blackwater, and nick nickerson, program manager afghan national security sector development and field development program

division of l-3 communications. although the contractor panel is last on our schedule, contractors are not last in our thoughts. as a member of congress i have travelled to iraq many times and returned 10 days ago with other commissioners from afghanistan. we are aware of the challenges in the u.s. contracting process and have previously highlighted instances of ways to fraud and abuse by some contractors. but we have also observed that contractors supporting american military and reconstruction efforts in both iraq and afghanistan gets high marks from our troops in the field, and that contractor employees include large number of experienced, hard-working and patriot americans -- patriotic americans. their work is vital. we have met contractors who have been in theater five years or more providing continuity and institutional memory that is

difficult to sustain in a six-month or one-year deployment by u.s. military or civilian employees. we are aware that many contractor employees have died in support of missions -- in the mission in afghanistan. it is troubling that no one can provide specific, reliable numbers to document the deaths and injuries they have suffered, as if somehow their deaths and injuries don't matter as much. let me say for the record that this commission deeply respects the work and honors the sacrifice of government contractors and appreciation hearing their views of the situation on the ground. today's distinguished witnesses have been asked to summarize their testimony in five to seven minutes. we will allow it in some cases to go over in order to ensure adequate time for questions and answers. we also ask that witnesses submit responses within 15 business days to any questions

for the record and any additional information they may offer to provide. the full text of their written statements record -- entered into the hearing record and posted on the commission's web site. on behalf of my fellow commissioners, we thank all of today's witnesses for participating in what we view as a very important hearing. after the swearing in we will begin by hearing from ambassador morefield. and let me just state for the record, we've encountered somewhat of a perfect storm with some of our members when we rescheduled this hearing not able to come. and particularly for my cochairman who this morning was planning to come except for a family emergency. so with that, if you would, ambassador morefield, would you stand? and i understand that two others may respond to questions. so if they would stand, raising your right hand do you solemnly

swear or affirm that testimony you will give before this commission will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? >> note for the record that our primary witnesses responded in the affirmative. and if the other two are called to testify we'll make sure their names are given for the record. so ambassador morefield, i understand your statement may take about seven minutes if it runs over a little bit i'll just let you know. but i think you'll be able to give it in the fashion you want. >> thank you, chairman shays, distinguished members of the commission. good morning. thank you for this invitation and the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the department of defense office of inspector general. i would like to share this morning our experiences and views at your request regarding the challenges and risks

associated with contingent contracting in support of the ficly in the development of the afghan national security forces. as commissioner shays pointed out, contractor assistance has provided the u.s. military an indispensable resource? inn building afghanistan's security forces. contract personnel have played many roles augmenting the u.s. combined security transition command, afghanistan or cstika. for example contractor support of management systems development and senior leader development has been key development of the ministries of defense and interior who respectively are responsible for the afghan national army and afghan national police. in addition, u.s. contractors are embedded in the afghan army at the corps level and below and

provide mentoring training teams that rove across the entire afghan army command. they manage in addition police basic training centers, serve with policemen torg teams assigned to the provinces and district headquarters, and there they develop civil policing skills and provide a positive role model for their afghan counterparts. contracted companies are also essential in constructing training and basing facilities across the country. in addition to contributing specialized skills, many contract personnel have been in afghanistan far longer than their military or civilian counterparts. their continued presence has provided a significant degree of continuity and stability in support of the training and mentoring mission. but the mission, to develop an effective ansf, faces uniquely complex problems because of

afghanistan's remarkably difficult -- uniquely difficult, i should say, operating environment. ill literacy is in excess of 70%, extensive poverty and related endemic corruption are a pervasive reality. outside of the national and regional capitals of kabul, kandahar, irat -- and gardez, there is still relatively little infrastructure to support widely dispersed army and police operations. buildings if they exist at all are often little more than mud huts. the transportation system is marginal. and severe weather conditions make building or even accessing remote mountain bases virtually impossible during the winter. wind roads can be built to supply military and police bases and outposts. much of the construction material including cement has to be brought in from outside the country.

any piece of land suitable for construction for a new army or police facility or base first has to be demined. and then conflicting claims of ownership among sometimes numerous competing individuals and families can delay projects for over a year. increasingly more over, improvised explosive device attacks by taliban insurgents on the main roads have disrupted construction convoys. taliban extortion, kidnapping and murder of construction personnel have discouraged contractors from operating in many areas formerly considered secure. since realistically there are few afghan companies with the infrastructure construction experience to meet contractual timing and performance requirements, the u.s. army corps of engineers has had to rely primarily on u.s. and third country contractors for

construction support. even then projects are often delayed or stopped altogether, especially in areas. -- earlier this year our deputy inspector general gave testimony stating that size and skill of the d.o.d. acquisition work force in southwest asia had not kept pace with the growth of its contract oversight responsibilities. expeditionary military operations have placed extraordinary demands on the d.o.d. contracting system. which was, you may know, significantly reduced in the 1990's. the result was a royal small number of d.o.d. contracting personnel, had been assigned responsibilities for an unreasonable large number of contracts. a report the office of the inspector general issued this september validated that concern with respect to afghanistan,

particularly with respect to the train and mentor mission. it found that lack of sufficient well-trained and experienced contract oversight support for cstika and the u.s. army corps of engineers had resulted in an ongoing failure to ensure the contractors selected had the expertise to meet performance standards. moreover, rapid turnover of contracting officers and contracting officers' representatives after three to six-month tours, had prevented oversight, continuity and hindered effectiveness. d.o.d. contract oversight is progressing, however. in response to concerns expressed in this office of the inspector general board the defense contract management agency reports that it has realigned its resources in theater, significantly increasing personnel assigned to afghanistan. the afghan engineering district

of the u.s. u.s. army corps of engineers also has increased staff to provide additional quality assurance oversight for its growing construction project responsibilities. additionally the joint contracting command, iraq, afghanistan, has had its own personnel surge to adequately support contracting in afghanistan including for the buildup of the ansf. if i could now please turn to the issue of the pending transfer responsibility from the department of state to d.o.d. for the police basic training program contract in afghanistan. since 2005, the state department has managed basic police training through its contract with dime corps international the funding for which d.o.d. provided. earlier this year the senate appropriations committee requested a contract audit of the administration and expenditure of d.o.d.-appropriated funding.

the joint d.o.d.-state department team conducting this audit anticipates concluding its final report by the first of 2010. however, the state department has already agreed to transfer responsibility to d.o.d. for the police training contract once it expires. we understand that this decision was based on a mutual recognition that creating a single, unified chain of command responsibility for police training would enhance more flexible program implementation. to facilitate transferring contract responsibility, the audit team recommended establishing a joint transfer oversight working group formed in august of this year which is currently addressing the currency transition issues. among them government property distribution, training center management, logistics support and future contracting.

in closing, let me please note that providing oversight support for d.o.d.'s mission in afghanistan, including to build the capability of the country's security forces, is a top priority of our inspector general. we are currently deploying additional o.i.g. and personnel to the region and to afghanistan specifically to reinforce on the ground oversight capabilities, including for contingent contracting in support of training and mentoring of the afghan national security forces. thank you. and i would welcome your questions. >> and we're going to do 10 minutes or less. >> thank you, ambassador. i think everyone in this room and in our country recognizes the value and the necessity of using contractors in iraq and

afghanistan for a variety of functions. not the least of which is training. which will undoubtedly increase as we expand both the afghan national army and the national police. i would like your thoughts on the influence of tour lengths of our military in pushing us more and more toward reliance on contractors in the area of training. >> thank you, commissioner green. the issue of tour lengths by our service personnel in afghanistan was addressed in our september report on the progress being made in the train and equip

mission in afghanistan. it was our view then and our recommendation in the report that tour lengths be extended to a minimum of one year for all military services. in addition, i noted in my remarks that contracting representatives had been serving only three to six-month tours which created less than stability in their carrying out their oversight responsibilities. so we have been on record and are on record for maintaining that longer tour lengths and consistent tour lengths amongst the military services has significant value in such a complex operating environment where particularly if you're in a training mentoring mode just getting to know your counterparts is a very challenging process. and developing a relationship is

everything. that takes time, it takes an investment upfront, and the results are seen down the road. so we have received some favorable response to this from the military services. i believe the air force has already indicated that they at the request of cstika and sincom will increase their tours to one year. i can't speak yet for the navy and marine corps. on the contracting personnel oversight side i have no information as to commitments to extend tours. but we are mindful that these are civil servants, not military personnel primarily forming these functions. and they cannot be ordered to serve longer tours. but we understand that incentives are being built into

their assignments to make it more attractive to serve longer and that there is a trend towards volunteering to serve longer than three to six months. >> thank you. do you see the incentive that is have been developed so far and adopted so far have had any impact on civilian tour lengths? ..

>> what are the benefits and limitations of using contractors in a training role, aside from tour length? we've already heard from commissioner shay that we are run into many contractors that have a number of years in country, and obviously, that is a benefit, that continuity is a benefit, but what are some of the limitations and benefits in your mind of using contractors in this role? >> thank you. in terms of benefits, i would note that, for example, in the police trainingç commission, ty

bring uniquely necessary skill sets to the table. obviously, our military personnel are not generally, although some may have been the reserves of the guard, have civilian police experience, but these are individuals that are uniformly drawn from civil policing personnel from the united states, and civil policing is a -- one of the critical functions that is being trained and mentored to build up the afghan national police, and moreover,rer this their very presence there in the way they conduct themselves provides¿ appropriate professional model, if you will, an eth cal model of how a police officer should conduct himself performing civil policing operations. as a member of the defense interior, i believe that the

government contractors that we have worked with discuss very issues related to the development of those ministries over the last three years are exrep shonnally well qualified in terms of system development. these are plaje jor challenges, of course, in terms of building up the ministries is for them to have the capability to manageok themselves and to manage the army and police respectively, and without getting any specific company names and clearly they are capable of mobilizing this special expertise, unique skills to perform a critical mission such as that i was about to

touch on that there is a limitation in terms of the imbedding of police trainers, and it due to security requirements or limitations in the way they time stature written and the way they perform their duties. therefore, it may well be they will not always be there with the policemen toring team, for example and not there in the performance of every aspect of their duty, so they may not be able to go that extra mile. nonetheless, i believe they still have been performingç a very important issue.ç >> thank you. last question, if you were king, how would you build this training force today? >> if you had unlimited resources, how would you build it?

>> i hesitate to jump into the breach on that question, commissioner, because it is my on the ground experience that i'm not sure i can bring to the table and i have no doubt thatçó thexdç former commander could respond much more precisely to that, but i willç say this, we have been looking at the training mission for at least five years that i can remember, and in terms of my own experience, and it was very clear in 2005, 2006, 20067, 2008, that this was the other war, and in fighting the other war, the train equip mission did

not get the first pick of resources. they were underresourceed. it is very evident that they did not have sufficient personnel tç deal withç the scope and complexity of their challenges. in that con text, they hadç access to contractor resources, but nato had not really stepped up to the plate either. i believeç they'ret( going to e a, at the margin, a significant difference with the commitment under the new nato trainingmyok command,ç and i'm sure that thy will be well used from the most senior levels, you know, down 4%-mentoring mission.ng and but it is probably true that it

is not well understood generally how vital that mission is, even though it was underscored in the president's policy statement strategy with respect to afghanistan that we must develop mentoring so they can run the countryç independentlyç. it has probably been underestimated, you know, the quality and extent of resources required to accomplish that mission, and going forward, even though i am fully wellç aware that they are krog nigh zandt of the degree of challenges they faceç as the missionfáç expand

we're not fullyç sureç of the extent of that expansionok yet, but already you can seeç it ovr the horizon, and they're already bottlenecks thatxd they're havig to contend with. 134,000. >> thinking, mr. chairman. i do want to pick up on this note the for the last several years the training program has focused on the national police and has been under resource. i'm looking in particular at finding you made on page 125 of your september 30 report about just how far back we are and how long it will take. i want to ask you why.

he took one of the major programs, the focus district development program, and you said he that to date, of the 365 districts in afghanistan, and unix. about this program, it takes them one by one and goes through all the districts, only 56 -- camions 56 are done. they had entered or completed that focused district development process. what you found was that this until late 2012. i think you're talking it will be completed even if we were not expanding the force. is that right? or would that far behind? is it because we have been

under resource backs will really take that long even to process if we were not growing the police force? >> thank you, commissioner. i think it is the case that it has been significantly under resource in terms of their developments. there was an army, so to speak, in afghanistan to build upon. in fact, the army is probably the most respected institution in the country. the police have largely been created from whole cloth. it doesn't have the background, the doctrine and the performance standards imbedded institutionalize, if you will. the emphasis was on growing the army initially and not the police.

dod took over the responsibility in 2005 and at that time it was recognized it would take a much more comprehensive and resource- intensive effort to get the police up to speed and that they were critical in the surgeons in fight at the front lines with the population, as it were. the program which has been producing superb results is intended to provide very high- quality intensive training or retraining as the case may. for police at the district level. i believe the have also been getting some in that regard. and also, the border police

have a focus development program. we made our projection in the report based on their resources that were known to be available pursuant to be available in afghanistan at that time. we were there in march of this year before it was issued -- the report was issued in september. i cannot say it has not progressed. with respect to being able to ramp up of the program. to the best of my knowledge, the rest up and a determination of the actual size in the next phase of expansion. i think there somewhere around 96,000 or 98,000 right now. will they go to 160,000? i do not know. i believe there will -- they're

planning for a number in that range. i will be surprised if in the planning aspects it has not already been taken into consideration what sort of resources will be required per i refer back to the nato training mission which i do believe will have an impact on our capabilities to grow the police and grow the more rapidly. >> i was interested that you noted the goal of the program, and i might say the training program in general is to produce a very high quality force. i would like to ask you both to recap what are the huge problems in the way of producing quality graduates of either the basic training or the ftd program? what are the problems in the

way? and what kind of pressures on the training program achieving a high goal might produce? >> well, if i may take your question backwards. i do believe there is a risk in over expediting the buildup of either the army or the police. issue is not just quantity but quality, which is why the ftd program was created. to go back and raise the level of quality and professionalism of the police and hopefully to work to sustain the standard.

>> so there is a risk if you go too far too quickly you'll compromise the building quality and professionalism in an effort to get more police on the beat, so the speaker. you spoke about challenges. police are taking three times the killed in action right as the afghan army. . is a high-risk profession, so the speaker. salaries have recently been increased to a belief basic $250 a month, which is much more attractive than it was. nonetheless,@@ even in their own

language is a real challenge. >> my understanding is not only is the literacy a huge problem with the basic police at the bottom of the hierarchy, but isn't the case that even the officer, the police officer, although it is nominally required. able to read and write, even their sometimes illiterate. >> i cannot speak to any specific knowledge about the percentage of literacy among police officers.

certainly there is a standard in the arm it including for the nco corp regarding literacy. i will tell you that there are at least two programs, one for the army, one for the police, to develop literacy, that is considered to be a national priority. i spoke to the minister of interior last spring and he said the school's one of his primary objectives, to get the police literacy levels up because it recognized that to produce a more professional and responsible police capability, they had to be able to read and write. >> you took the two points. let me ask you -- let's take one proxy try equality of the training and that is the wave of

the program of instruction, which currently is 80 week week. i teach at the university of baltimore law school and i would not let the quality upper teaching to go down. how would you view it in to pressure to get too high numbers was placed on the beat. get them on the beat regardless of quality. program of instruction with shortened to some of the number. >> thank you. i think one of the considerations and it is a debate that is ongoing for some years is, what are the responsibilities of the police? if you define them to beat

civil policing and the need to conduct themselves appropriately, defend themselves at a minimum if not the population in some respects against taliban extremists and al qaeda, the half to have trading that includes creating the technical capability similar to what basic army recruits we see. so i think that is a pretty densely packed program as it is. cutting it i think would be probably -- this is just my gut feeling -- may be ill advised. maybe compromising a capability that is core to their being able to perform effectively, perform their roles both in terms of law

enforcement and maintaining civil order and also in the counterinsurgency sense. correct my time has expired. thank you. >> thank you. >> mr. dixon has the floor. >> good morning. i want to begin by thanking you for your distinguished service and in your current responsibilities. i want to come to this subject for a little different stamp. in terms of contract accountability. we recognize the military and the joint contract. of command in afghanistan and iraq have a tough job. the commanders have to strike a balance between achieving results, and measuring performance, but at the same time ensuring accountability. and following the rules.

this involves simultaneously managing programs in the field under the difficult conditions that you describe. at the same time, guarding against fraud, waste, and abuse. i want to go back to the september 30 report the you noted earlier in terms of what you noted, was dod noted as oversight for the contract but has been reflected in the failure to ensure the contractors were basically in meeting standards. the concern i have is that we just returned from afghanistan. we saw there was the president announced the increase of 30,000 troops within the next year. we saw the nato training missions stand up as a three- store command. we saw the isap still ended up.

there is a tremendous amount of change and growth. the framework that you described in your september 30 report dealt with conditions prior to september 30. the question is, is the current framework adequate from program management stamp. to sustain the kind of increases and changes we're talking about? >> thank you. it's a tough question. when we were last on the ground and in our follow-up work during this year, it was clear to us that there were already bottlenecks that were developing, if i can call them that, in terms of expansion of the security forces, the training men in the mission.

there were public manageable but it already suggested that additional contract oversight management personnel work required. as i pointed out, a member of the organizations in vault -- a number of organizations involved and others have attempted to get ahead of the curve. but for one thing, i do not think we know where the curve is going. the gulf post is going -- the goal posts are going to move. they're doing additional planning to prepare for that. there was testimony the year before the pickup -- there was testimony here before the congress yesterday. speakers spoke back to the preparations that were being made to increase the size for

anticipated future contract oversight responsibilities. conceptually, i believe that the challenge is out there and recognize. the full extent of it and the complexity of it is difficult to grasp. it is going to take a lot of vigilance and consistent attention. i did not think it will be possible to declare victory precipitously in this respect. >> you mentioned the challenges were the dangers involved in over expediting in terms of trying to do too much too soon. and yet the time lines and the program plans that we see are ambitious. so i want to get your view on the ability of commanders to

strike the right balance on an urgent basis to stand up and face to ever increasing demands and then to reach back for the increases for dcma and the other agencies that are needed in the field to provide the contract oversight. it does not seem to square that in the time lines projected that we can match it with the framework for management and accountability. >> well, there's unquestionably a dynamic fare between meeting the needs of the war fight and the war zone, making the right operational decisions on day-to- day decision may take a longer view on insuring and appropriate accountability and controls are

maintained, whether they are construction programs or equipment or maintenance, personal services across the board. we have spoken earlier this hearing about the challenges this expeditionary force has proposed to the oversight system of the department of defense and that it was understrength initially and outgunned, if you will, in terms of meeting. that afghanistan was a secondary priority to iraq. there is a need to dig out of a whole. there has been a lot of thought and attention. as to what kind of efficiencies could conceivably be gained by reviewing the current contract. oversight requirements and procedures that the military

commands and their civilian counterparts have to meet in afghanistan, i would defer to the commission on what might be done as results of any comprehensive review there. i mean certainly, our priority is to make sure that fraud, waste, and abuse are prevented and that program performance meets dod's needs. but having said that, we understand the other is a constant struggle over limited resources in an extremely complex and high-pressure environment. that needs to be taken under consideration. >> a final question. you made reference to a defense department task force associate with overseeing the transfer of

the program for basic police training. i assume that includes the contract managing the transition as well. do you have any visibility on the current status of the program? is achieving its current objectives? -- is its achieving its current objectives it? " the short answer is no. i will say that have been in contact with our audit team on the inspector general saw on this joint audit effort and we're fully well aware, having been in contact with them that the oversight is taking place and is ongoing and has not hit the wall in terms of the transition of the contract. what made -- what may be going

on behind the scenes in this reporting process i cannot speak to because it is only report at this juncture. it will soon be issued and it all be transparent in a prime- time >> thank you very much. that concludes my question. >> you have had an interesting career and you're in a great position to be able to provide helpful information. you started out with the military and then went into the foreign service and now you're under the peril of the military again. we thank you for your service. i would like to take advantage of your knowledge in addition to your responsibilities. there is the general theory that you need 20 security per thousand population. if we talked -- we thought at

one time afghanistan was about 34 million per is about 29 million. we need about 580,000. there is a general concept we have been iraq that we have in afghanistan. and while it is a policy issue and we're not going to get into the policy part of it. it does raise some interesting points. we do not appear to be training enough security for us to be able to step down. my point in asking the question, it seems that we will continually have to be ramping up how many we actually train. so i want to first look backwards. we and the brits -- which

basically invaded afghanistan because of their failure stopped the harboring of al qaeda. that was in october, 2001. we have been there a long time. why has it taken us so long to train the pitiful number we have trained? and why have we not done a better job in turning them? >> it sounds like one of those career-ending questions. >> i did not want to be a career-endurer. that is funny. that is an interesting way to approach the answer. i do not want to bear the burden of ending your career.

but i do want is a candid dialogue. what are some of the things that have made -- you said what is difficult. we have not put enough resources. we rely too much on contracts. i mean, the question deserves an honest answer. i think we will respect your honesty. >> rights. i will attempt -- this is my own personal view. as i mentioned previously, it has come to my observation and many others over the last five years but have been engaged in providing some oversight with respect to afghanistan that we were significantly under resource. i cannot over emphasize that. we were discovering the incredible complexity and difficulty and challenging inherent in trying to create an army and police force.

absolutely. you are going up against certain historic and cultural challenges, too. i do not want to make to find a point of this. but this is a very top-down bureaucratic model of governance, whether it is the army, the police, or the civil service. the soviets helped to enforce that. to get them to accept and understand the concept of a delegation to as we understand it a responsibility being taken at lower levels in the chain of command, it impacts every decision making, logistics, the entire capability of the organizational culture to perform in what we would

consider an effective and responsive way to meet the security challenges. >> i am not quite sure i get why a top-down is a negative. >> let me give you an example. their supply chain. at the end of the day, the whole purpose is to get bullets, food, and medicine to the front line troops. but there is a history of leaders, if you will, influential people being measured in their importance in terms of how much stock they have a crude, how much material to have under their control. relinquishing that and allocating and passing that down the supply chain -- >> might inference of what you're saying took a lot of delegation. people are not willing to

delegate, unwilling to go up some authority and power. that affected the mission of training. >> i think it iaffects the mission. the leadership is still the older generation. >> you triggered something. parenthetically, our hope in afghanistan is what we're able to do. the elders want to hold on to the past and the young can see the advantage of learning to read, see the advantage of a better life if they could see it differently. harder to train police or harder to train our military? >not their military. which is more difficult? >> i think the military culture is better established, more professional, and more ethical

on balance. also more literate and has been considered a more attractive profession if you're going to a security -- >> because othe cost of trainine military -- should we have military training -- who should train the contractors? mr. a benefit or is there a combination? is there a negative in having contractors trained in their military? >> well, i believe that, and this is my own view. i've never thought this through to this extent. but now you posed the question. there is an inherent responsibility for our military to manage all aspects of the training and mentoring mission.

therefore, i believe that our military personnel have to be there and need to be running am responsible for the operation. but a fusion of our military professionals and contractors who have specialized skills and provide unique resources that they bring to the fight including increasing nato personnel is probably a model that we're going to want to use because it gives us a mix of capabilities. >> how about with police? it seems to me that we have to be even more reliant on contractors for training the police given there is a difference even with national police. there is a difference between a police responsibility versus military responsibilities.

>> i am not sure -- >> is it intuitive, is it this logical or not logical that you need people with expertise that are closer to police training. therefore you will have to rely may be on mp's, but possibly rely on contractors more to train the afghan police then you would have to train the military? >> yes, i understand. i'm not sure it is either or because the police responsibilities in afghanistan has become increasingly apparent to not only include civil policing capabilities, law enforcement capabilities, but because the brunt of the insurgent attacks that they have

been having to contend with. there are the most vulnerable aspect of the security forces and at the interfaced with the population. they have to have a tactical capability to defend themselves and defend the population. so you're going to need an army training model, if you will, to develop that tactical capability. at the same time, you need a civilian police experience -- >> so you need the combination. tell me, if you could come at an example of where someone not being the direct makes the job more difficult to train. >> well, you know, there are relative degrees of illiteracy. >> let me be blunt.

what we use 30% literacy, it is closer to 20%. then i am told the 20%, you may be are talking fifth or sixth grade capability, not ninth, 10th, 12th-grade capabilities. we're talking about a few folks with real literacy but capabilities. what is the challenge? >> i think the challenge is that in any normal training model that i am familiar with, you rely heavily on written materials, presentations, on a blackboard, or on a slide presentation. the police in particular have exceptionally high degrees of illiteracy in their own languages whether it is p

ashtu or others. their ability to communicate even in their own language with illiterate afghans is significantly limited and that places a special challenge. they are not going to be able to go back to their barracks and look at the training books. >> i get that. one more question. are we going to be able to reach the numbers that we're hoping to given the capabilities we have now? do you think that we will reach the numbers? what you believe the numbers to be again in terms of police? by when? military by when? and you think we can reach those numbers of those dates? >> the only decision that i know that has been made is with

respect to increasing the army to 134,000 by august 2010 i am not aware of any decision to increase the size of the police. i believe our military command has requested certain numbers. i've heard 160,000 for the police and as high as 240,000 for the army. >> by when? >> i do not recall for those projections. i am not trying to avoid your question. it depends in part on how quickly you want to produce these forces and what level of quality. and what your resource -- and what resources your willing to commit to accomplish those objectives. >> that begs the question. can you describe to me the level that you think, a minimum level

that needs to be obtained? and you think we can reach that number? let's take the military, 134,000. >> i can only speak to a general perception that i have detected amongst both our senior military personnel, including nato, but also among the senior ministry of defense and joint staff's officers in the afghan army that they need to be made significantly robust to be able to take the lead in a fight and especially in the most threatened parts of the country. they're not capable of doing that now. >> would you council this commission to be skeptical to do

that? >> at the current level of resources? i would say it is highly unlikely they will be highly unlikely to be able to accomplish that mission. >> mr. tiefer. >> ambassador. what we're hearing this morning is that, and i want to make -- i am looking at the incumbent contract of dyncorp and their recommendation. they have their own reasons to make their own recommendations. we're not endorsing their position. the do have recommendations as the current contractor. one of them is focused on quality of police being trained and not simply on quantity produced. what we're hearing and

correcting from wrong, there is a risk in over expediting the expansion of the force, a risk to quality. we might be comproml@l@l@ll l nn

impediment in the capacity of the places, the buildings, the facilities in which we do the training? >> thank you. i think our observation was the training centers at the time we were there were operating at full capacity, so to speak. this begs the question if you were two significant increase the basic police training program, what infrastructure growth will be required to reach what level of expansion of the police and in what timeframe. those were serious issues the understood they were trying to grapple with. as far as sacrifice and all -- in quality, it is our

understanding that the transference of responsibility for this basic police training contract has in part to do with an effort agreed to by both the state department and defense that there needed to be the unity of command and unity of effort in terms of police training to provide sufficient flexibility in implementing the training program and tailoring to the variable needs in the war. so hopefully those deficiencies will be gained with appropriate oversight of the contract. i am not sure it is necessary at all to sacrifice quality. indeed, i think the effort at least from our understanding of

dod's vendors. is to increase quality and their capabilities. >> who will still be monitoring this program? >> we are planning on going back in 2010 afghanistan. >> that is 12 months. i would just request that you stay in touch with us on this issue. we're all working out of the same playbook. we want this to succeed. we're looking to find ways where we can help them, those at have to a minister of the program to do it as well as possible. this is the ball game. you're nodding your head. >> we look forward to that corporation. >> great. thank you so much for your

testimony. we will get to the second panel. our second panel is richard formica. david johnson, assistant secretary of state. and michael strain, a program executive officer, department of defense. would you come to the dais and i will swear to you in. is there anyone to respond to a question or are we all set? if you would raise your right

hand and speak up. do you asphalt -- do solemnly swear the testimony you will give it is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? our witnesses have responded in the affirmative. it is my understanding, mr. strain, you did not have a written statement, which is disappointing. you had one prepared but it has not been submitted. you'll be giving a statement, correct? >> it was my intention to give a statement. >> good. we will start with you, general, and then we would just go down the line. >> thank you. >> is your microphone on? there were go. >> how about now, sir? >> they're go. " it's great to have all three of you here. >> good morning, german shays

and -- good morning chairman shays. i was in command from 2018 until just recently in 2009. thank you for the opportunity to appear before your commission. i think you for the work you're doing to assess the alignment of wartime contract with mission objectives tourist important time. we appreciate your visit to afghanistan. i am aware you make a second trip there recently. soldiers worked tirelessly and faithfully to fulfill their mission and to be good stewards. we appreciate you came out to see that for yourself. i have provided the commission with a written statement for the record. i would like to address five points. first, it is a complex command.

is a challenging environment. it is not iraq. i am not suggesting iraq was easy. second, the task is to build sustainable capabilities with the afghan forces. when i left command, the army was at 96,000 soldiers and program to grow to 134,000 of the end of october, 2010. it has its shares of problems. it is on track to achieve its goals. we have proposed to grow to 240,000 by the end of 2013. it was about 94,000 personnel and authorized to grow to 96,

6,800. we are committed to growth and a proposed to grow the national police to 160,000 by the end of 2013. our approach was to explore the momentum of the development of the ama while we had a significant focus. excuse me. third, we are aware of the importance of good stewardship to support this mission. good stewardship is critical to the mission's success and it is of strategic importance. over the past several years, the mission to train security forces has been supported with funding by the united states congress. the high demand has outstripped

the supply of properly trained forces, which creates a demand to fill gaps in training and training support. the command requires the support of contractors in the development of the afghan ministries of defense and interior. contractors often spent existing capabilities. to bring unique skills and provide continuity to the mission. fifth, over the last few years, as the size of the security forces continues to grow, the number and size of contracts increase. this dynamic situation created a challenging oversight in varmint which required continuous efforts to improve management of contracts funded by afghan security forces funds. we have steadily improved our stewardship and oversight of contracts.

measures and controls we have implemented improved capability. their visits and findings and observations made by this commission are delineated in a written statement. in summary, with knowledge more work needs to be done to enhance the management efforts. through accountability and confidence the improvements that will implemented will lead to more effective development and ultimately operational success in this critically important mission. it was my honor and privilege to have served the many braved and dedicated men and women in the command effort and i am privileged to have this rare opportunity to work so closely with the brave men and women of

the afghan security force. we're grateful to the american people and the united states congress. i think you for your efforts to make us a better command. >> thank you, general. >> thank you. thank you to the rest of the commission for the opportunity you're giving to me today to testify on the use of contractors to mentor and trained afghan police. i initiated our program in 2003. we current support a list mission funded through the o50 account. inl has been working with dod to deploy officers to afghanistan to train and mentor them. inl has complemented with this

contract with dod. the united states this parking to help the afghan government developed a professional police force capable of providing public security and enforcing the rule of law. the development of this is challenging. the police training programs we initiated in 2003 are aimed at addressing these issues. building on the estoppels police training program and in light of needing more forces, the defense department was given authority by an agreement over all u.s. efforts to organize, train, and equip the afghan security forces. in 2007, congress responded by funding exclusively through

appropriations to the department of defense. dod determines overall program requirements based on policy guidance. . for the instruction of a.h.d. and to buildw3 institutional capacity and peopleok skills. defense and state have worked together to address theç challenge of afghanistan establish its own professional police force. weñr have dough ployed and supported approximately 800ç u. police supervisors as wellç as theçw3ç afghan minister ofç . right now,ç hundreds of former miffs in the unitedç states, wh our militaryçç units, andç ll

police can prove their skills. to streamline the management training, its contractual responsibility is scheduled to transfer as early asç march 31f the next year. after this transition, ambassador eikenberry will continue to provide overall police program policy, oversight and direction. inl and d.o.d. are currently assessing training mentoring for gender-specific programs where inl may continue to play a role. the transfer of contract responsibility for police training is an effort to eliminate a management layer so thatç we may speed program execution. the department of state will continue to play a role in afghan law enforcement training with policy oversight and overall direction through ambassador eikenberry. we are working closely with d.o.d. to achieve an efficient transition and working toward a comprehensive transition plan. the state's plan also takes into

account a demobilization effort that we have required of our contractors, asç well as transitioning all assets an inventory used in the police training program for the following contractors to be be chosen by the department of defense. . subcontractors are laid out in the state plans. finally, it addresses the need to address securityxd at the

following sites to the new contractors. this will lead it to amass a transition plan that will develop with d.o.t. and its contractors what's the identify and award the following contract. we're committed to supporting a smooth transition process. we will not allow them to terminate any aspect of the contract until a following contractor is in place and prepared to assume responsibility. we have a fairly staffed office in kabu andl washington to support this transition. inl and faugh dod have weekly coordinating conference calls. our personnel works together on a daily basis in kabul. the coverage of approach to oversight has provided a sound infrastructure for managing our police programs as well as others. as in afghanistan, we is contractors worldwide to implement justice sector programs.

but as we often need to mobilize or hot de-mobilize quick the, contractors lettuce meet those guidelines. further, they enable us to rapidly hire large numbers of former police officers and -- with the recent experience which allows them to return to jobs in the united states when their jobs are completed. three experienced in programl rise in washington provide program oversight. -- free experience programmers in inl proved oversight. office is based in kabul and washington are supported by a team of oversight staff. we currently have 7 in lake country representatives, five of them are filled with two more writing in january. additionally, there are working to add four more to be recruited to the process which would bring

the complement to 11. it is located in washington to minimize the number of staff. 28 u.s.-based staff support these presents is by reducing invoices. mr. chairman, they give for providing me the opportunity to discuss these issues with you. i look forward to addressing your questions. >> thank you, ambassador. >> good morning. i think for the opportunity to be here. -- i thank you for the opportunity to be here. we're currently in his selection process for incoming contractors to support in conjunction with the afghan national police. in addition to that, we are also

in the middle of the gao anddod is working -- and dod is working on a response to that. i cannot respond to anything with regards to that. as such, i am happy to answer any questions you have consistent with what i have outlined above and look forward to our discussion this morning. >> mr. chairman, i would like to say it would have been advisable for you to have a written statement that would allow you to talk about other elements. i realize this is not your decision but i want to go on record saying it is unfortunate that you were not able to come with a statement. the statement is in writing there for you do not get in trouble because it is approved and we could have covered a number of areas 3 make our job more difficult by not having a statement -- a number of areas. you make our job more difficult. you have not done the commission

a favor. we appreciate the times he had that with the commission and had been cooperative. i does want to let you know our disappointment of the and not having a statement. this makes our job more difficult. with that, we will start with -- excuse me. before you go, i want to clarify something. we hear so many different numbers. i want to be clear as to what i am hearing you say. with the military, the goal is to have 134,000 by the end of october 2010 and then to have another 106,000 by the end of 2013. that is the goal stated. >> if i could just be clearer in wording created the program is 4

1/3 to 34,000 by the end of 2010. -- the program is for adoption 134,000. that has been approved. there's a proposal to grow the afghan national army. that has not been decided on that specific number. >> all right. the goal is by the end of this year to have the afghan national police to be an 96,800. it has been proposed that we reach a total number of wonder and 60,000 by the year 2013 but it has not yet been proved. -- a total number of 160,000. >> general, first of >> that's correct. >> but that has not been approved. >> correct.

>> general, thank you for a service i know must have been challenging and frustrating at times and congratulations on your upcoming promotion and your move to beautiful huntsville, alabama. >> thank you. >> we've danced around this issue of quality/quantity, particularly as it applied to the basic police training, but i'd like to take it the next step. counterinsurgency is very leader-centric. there are many who believe that we should do more to improve the officer and n.c.o. corps of the a.n.a. in particular, as opposed to growing them too fast. what does this ha have to do with training? obviously we create additional

-- it creates the need for additional mentors and so forth. i'd like your ideas on the rationale behind the decisions, if those decisions are final, in creating additional kandacs, as opposed to increasing the size of those in existence. >> thank you for your question. as you allude to, the challenges associated with growing and developing afghan national security forces include the challenges with developing leaders and we have focused on developing leaders, officers, and noncommissioned officers as part of our development program. when we made the recommendation to grow the after began national army to 13 -- the afghan national army to 134,000 by october of 2010, we took

into account four areas that are of concern in growing the force. the development of leaders, the ability to provide equipment, the ability to build the appropriate infrastructure and the appropriate number of mentors. to get to 134,000 by ocket of 2010 is a, no doubt, a challenge to achieve. but we think it's achieveable. and the approach that we took, working with the minister of defense, who also asserted it's achieveable, but the approach we took was first, grow strength without additional structure. so in that growth to 134,000, 7,500 were soldiers without additional structure, to reinforce the readiness of the

adigal units, much like the 22,000 approved by the congress for the united states army toim prove readiness, soldiers without structure. that requires fewer leaders, fewer demands on equipment and no additional challenge to infrastructure. the second thing we did to get to 134,000 was to build small units in the existing kandacs. in the the 34 battalions -- battalions resident in the south and the east, each of those gets an additional company, and that fourth company, again, gives you more end strength, improves the readiness and capability of the existing unit, puts a reduced demand on leader development, equipment, and infrastructure and on mentors because you're putting a company in a kandac ha has -- that has existing

mentors. it was in that that we would grow the kandacs required to create two additional brigades. we think by doing that, it gave us the ability to ramp up the manning that would be required to grow those units. frankly, the -- to add those two brigades was an operational requirement to have the right number of brigades in the battle space. the other thing that was key to this, the decision was made to build an infantry-centric force up to this point, up to the 134,000 and in so doing, you reduced the requirement for equipment, you reduced the training burden, because you were not going to do the more complex training associated with some of the combat support skills and or tillry engineering, etc., we were going to delay that and that

simplified leader development. >> thank you. there's been discussion, and i don't know how far it's gone, about creating some entities, afghan public protection program, the community defense initiative, local militias, etc., the latter particularly in the werp part of the country. how far have those progressed and how are they going to be trained, if we are going to have a training requirement with them? or do we just issue them an ak-47 and say, this is, you know, your mission is to protect your village? >> at the risk of sounding defensive, i'm a little dated and some of those initiatives were pretty well being developed as i was leaving. i can't speak to where we are today, and would prefer not to. i'd rather that be taken for

the record and be provided by the staff. i'm just not current on it. i would only say, during the time i was there, there was no effort to create local militia, but there were efforts to quse the -- an experimental approach with the afghan public protection force in one province. that was being developed other the course of the late spring and summer. it had different levels of success in different districts and that was being re-evaluated by isaf and u.s. forces in afghanistan as i was leaving. >> is it your sense that there would be a training component by us or allies whatever is put together? >> it would depend on the responsibility they'd have.

there would be responsibility to tranche them or mentor them in their duties, whatever that would be. >> one last question. how would you characterize the level of coordination between sstka and i.n.l. in retherefore of response snblet >> i would say we were working very closely with i.n.l., as we did throughout the course of the time i was there, we continued to work hard to build and sustain that relationship. brigadier general mcdonald who is responsible for police development, met regularly with i.n.l. we had i.n.l. regulation on our staff. there was a complete inventory done on our property. i would characterize it as good and getting better. >> i appreciate the members of the panel who represent the highest levels who have been

managing this program. the problems we face in this program are not of your own making, you bring great skills to coping with them. general foremica, you've commented -- general formica, you've commented that the afghan nan -- afghan national army is five or six years further alone in development than the police. you're not alone in sing this, but why? why are the afghan police five or six years behind the afghan army? >> i'd just say shrimp the first part of my response is the resources and attention and focus that we had dedicated to the army preceded the resources and dedication of attention we provided to the afghan national police. it was for that reason that we made the judgment to carry on the decision made by my

predecessors, but to characterize our approach was to sustain and now accelerate the positive momentum we had with the army, but add significant focus to the police. in my judgment, it required more focus and in order to try to catch up. i would submit that some of the challenges associated with the development, we really focused on developing an institutional base, an institutional training base for the afghan national army. that takes a long time. decisions that were made by my predecessors, three or four removed, just now coming into fruition. we have -- we had not made the same kind of focus on building the infrastructure in the afghan national police. in another way. -- general, let me ask a question. we put this chart at.

this is the quarterly report that found that out of the 559 units in the national police, 437 thought as -- got the lowest ranking as far as their capacity inñi accomplishing operational missions. only 24 that the highest rating that they were capable of operating independently. -- only 24 got the rating. why is it that after all of these years of the seeming to train, there is a vast bulk of the units in the national police who are getting a low rating? >> i think that was back to the conversation you were having with the ambassador. -- i think that goes back to the conversation on trading the national police. the development program was created by my predecessor to

create the training forum for the afghan national police, one district at a time. in any one cycle we would train between 5-10 districts depending on the resources available to us. it was a result of that focus on development efforts that we then alignedñi these mentor teams to districts. we were then able to make some requisite judgments as to their capability milestones using the systems we had in place at the time. but this really reflects, as to your question, the number of districts who had not been through that training. if i could just add on, i know you did not ask this question, but to carry on the conversation you were having, if the decision were to grow the number of the national police, the number of districts does not change. it does not add to the problem

of the focused district development read that has its own challenges. i think it is more like 64 today with 20 in trading as we speak. they would come in trained and joy in their districts. >> ambassador, among to ask you are aware of something we knew had taken place at a subordinate level in inl. has there been a discussion, not a decision, not a recommendation,ñr but was therea discussion as possibly shortening the program for the national police currently at 8 6 to six weeks?

>> i understand there have been frequent discussions on how the program might be reshaped and improved. one of the things under consideration at one point was whether it could be shortened in order to increase the number of individuals going through. my recollection is that after consideration of that issue, some of the things would have to be removed in order to compress what was essential. the eight week program has stayed in place. that is relatively abbreviated compared to other training programs around the world. >> he supervised in iraq a training program. -- you supervised. in iraq, the training program there is 12 weeks. the afghan program which deals with a lower level of literacy in their recruits is only eight

weeks. the i read program has a higher literacy of records. >> that is correct. -- the i wrap program has a higher literacy of records. >> in addition to capacity and skill, they are moving individuals to the program and getting them deployed as rapidly as possible. >> by the way, and i do not mean to test you on a closed book exam on the spot, my students at the university of baltimore law school but have sympathy for you if i did that. the civilian police or civpol program in the different countries you are talking about those two police training, yes? >> that is correct. >> besides dying court -- besides dyncorp, are there

other contractors in the civpol that do that major trading? reaching tarining? >> there are others who hold an umbrella contract. we allow those 3 to bid on individual tasks under the various contractçó opportunitie. >> what are those three? >> this is a closed book test. civilian police internationl and pacific architectures and engineers rejected think is a subdivision of lockheed martin -- and engineers, i think it is a subdivision of lockheed

martin. >> i'm trying to figure out what your people do. the contract that is going to be given out is done by the space and missile -- the handling of the contract for the next contractor to do the training for the afghan national police is going to be done by the space and missile defense command in huntsville. what do they do there? >> the space and missile defense command actually conducts the contract work and self. the senior contracts and officers there -- >> substantively, what kind of contracts to they may leave you there? they do not do navy contracts. what do they do? >> be on the contract i currently have with them, i do not have a good familiarity with the contract on going with

the command. >> you, yourself, you are called centpol, the "t" is for technology. do you -- what do you mainly due? you have like 150 task orders. what are they about substantively? >> they are used in conjunction to support counter narcotics and counter narco-terrorism around the world. we support the office of the secretary of narcotics and leveled threats. we support some of the military services. we provide support to local law- enforcement agencies, domestic as well as for and. in terms of acquisition supportr

as well as technology development. >> i think everyone knows that in hunts will they do rockets. -- in council -- in hawsehole -- hopper aviation and technology is the heart of it. it would not make sense when you are working with them of the 164 task orders. >> aviation is a part of what we do, yes, but it is not the majority of it nor is the technologies and development a majority. we have done a variety of activities in support of training as well as technology development as we referred to previously. we have done straight procurements of equipment. >> let me ask about the training. i am not talking about the limited number. there are a limited number of your task orders that are debate

-- in debate. i am not partial to dyncorp. apart from the limited number in the day or in the discussion, -- in debate, mostly your training programs do not have to do with things like cops on the beat. it is trading that has to do with training in dealing with >> sir, right now, we currently have 74,000 centers that are related to training, ranging from the afghan border police training, which we're currently conducting in afghanistan, down to the task force, down to training we have done in colombia. >> i've gone way over my time. >> thank you, mr. dixon. >> i have questions for all three of our panel this

morning. i think it's note worthy that we have a panel comprised of military, foreign service, and civil service, to be followed by a panel of contractors, because in the end, all of us have to work together in order to achieve our national security objectives. i'd like to start, though, with general foremica. -- for mica. we've been meaning to talk to the war fighter in this kind of setting, to thank you for your service to our country, and congratulations on your promotion, and to thank the men and women of sstka for their service to our country in extraordinarily challenging circumstances. one question we need to ask ability war fighter is how contractors at historic levels, in a theater where contractors

exceed the number of military personnel on the ground, how did that affect your planning and operations as a member of the military and how did it make make your job easier or heard to have contractors involved in it? >> thank you for your question, sir and thank you for your kind comments. the development of the afghan national security forces, as you suggest in your comment and then in your question in fact requires this blend of military , police, civilian, and we use international civilian police in our -- providing us with expertise in our headquarters and contract trainers. we require a blend of those, as i said in my statement, the contractors really augment our

capacity and they bring unique skills. and so, when we would identify the kinds of -- the ways we would apportion military trainers we would take into account those strengths that the contractors would bring. for instance, contract trainers are particularly good with training support and development and programs of instruction. lesson plans. so having the right contractors in the right place enables us to take advantage of their strength and reduce the burden on the military so we could use them in places where they'd be most effective. there are obviously some considerations with contractors integrating them in the battlefield and ensuring that as ambassador morefield referred to in his testimony, having the right level of

embedding, so that a policemen tore team, for instance, would have the right mix of military soldiers that can frame those tasks that are common to both military and policing, and to have that police professional, the law enforcement professionals, that the contractor brings. one of the things we had to deal with was getting them embedded in the right place and at the right level and ensuring that they were -- that was one of the challenges we were wrestling with even as i left. >> general, from your interspective -- perspective, the afghans themselveses or allies that are there, does the fact that we're using contractors so extensively change the way you interface with the allies or the afghans? in our recent trip to afghanistan, i bring this up, because the afghans to them, the contractors or the military, we were all americans. so they weren't making the distinction so much if we were helping them, it seemed to beñi team effort. >> i think the distinction for

the trainee is the call of training they're provided and whether they were getting that from a military professional or a law enforcement professional who happened to be there as a contractor, i think what they were interested in was the quality of the training and the ability to deliver that training in the environment in which they needed to learn it. >> thank you, chairman. ambassador johnson, you mentioned a significant transition plan that will be enacted upon the award of the follow-on contract and there seemed to be some suggestion in your comments that in fact some things can't be done until that decision is made and i'm just curious about whether or not -- why wouldn't there be a full transition plan in place now or if not, what factors need to develop with the award of the contract in order to complete your planning? >> i think the plan is largely

in place but in order to have a plan where one partner is handing a task to another, you have to have the other partner and work out the details with them but the aspects the general mentioned in response to a previous question, all the things that have been done to prepare the inventories and things of that nature, the joint work between us and his team in order to lay out every single thing we can devise ahead of time so we're doing everything possible and it's not as though we're waiting for the other partner to be identifyinged, but i think there's got to be -- to be identified, but i think there's got to be some closing efforts, as far as what tasks they're undertaking and what requirements they might have of us we're not aware of. >> is there anything that stands out as a major obstacle or issue that needs to be addressed more so than others? >> one thing is just who among individuals employed by the current contractor might be

required or desired by the future contractor, that will be decisions they have to make and how that's integrated, i think, really will require the identification of a follow-up contractor and the individuals that are going to execute that contract. >> thank you, mr. ambassador. mr. strain, when the time comes and you award yourle follow-on contract, i'd like to talk about how you plan to manage it to ensure accountability, oversight, controlering and basically ensure the transition is handled with those things in mind in what i understand are without a doubt extraordinaryly difficult circumstances. >> first, understand that we have been working with them hand in hand with the development on these task forces to make sure we have the full understanding of all the requirements as well as how that will impact our ability to manage the oversight.

as such, i recently established an office in kabul. that office will be wrapped up significantly to provide oversight necessary. -- that officer of ramped up. this will be at four levels. we will be providing personnel, and then training teams -- embed training teams. second, i will have a series of in place personnel who will be focused strictly on the execution of the contract. i will have individuals at each of the campsites. i will also have a third level roving personnel and subject matter experts who will be going around from campsite to campsite to ensure, again, that there is the proper manage -- management and oversight. we will have those back in kabul as well as here.

on my own, i will probably put some 25 people or more who do nothing more than contract management. >> in general formica, -- general formica, i would go over the numbers again. i want to be as clear as i can be. by november to the house and nine, we have about 96,000 army. by october 2010, we think we will have 134,000 and that has been projected and approved. it is proposed that by the end of 2013, the police now have 96,800. it is proposed 160,0 propose00

by the end of the year as well? >> yes. -- it is proposed to have 160,00 by the end of the year? >> what is the goal of police by october 2010? is there a goal? >> there is not at this point because we do not have approval. i do not having never in my head. if we get approved to go to 160,000 then there would be a brand to get you to that number. -- a ramp to get you to that number. >> it to go from 96,000 to 134,000, that is a ramp. if you kept that in existence, what would your number's been by the end of 2013? -- numbers be by the end of

2013. >> 96,000 in november 2009. 134,000 by 2013 is a ramp. if we continue to use whatever we are going to use additionally from november 2009 to 2010, does the ramp it is up to that number or will we need to add more resources? >> the ramp to grow the army will need to be increased to achieve the number we propose. >> i will spend one half hour on this if i have to. we presently have 96,000 in november. you will get by october 134,000. that is an increase of 38,000.

you have to ramp up, correct? if you use that same line, what would get us by the end of 2013? >> i think my answer is that in order to get to 240,000 by 2013 we would need to increase the rate of growth. >> you are saying we would need to add more people to get to that number from 113. but you would knowledge that if we kept the same progression -- he would acknowledge that you would be higher than that number by the end of 2013. >> if we kept the same progression, we would be ahead --

>> by the end of 213? you just do not know what that number is? -- end of 2013. we are -- we are a commission on contracting. in today's military, we know that in order to succeed we need contractors to build things, contractors to move things, contractors to train coming contractors to guard so our military does not have to do that. we know that and value it. what we are wrestling with is our capability. the implications of getting to a higher number, speaking as a former member of congress and i will be delicate with this, we do know we need more than 134,000 said there has to be a

higher goal. the question we're looking at is, what kind of contractors are you going to need to get to the higher gold that is going to be approved both for the army and police? going back to the number of 20 security for 1,000 populace. we would need around 560,000 in order to have the full number they need. let me ask you -- i would like to ask all of you this question. it is generic. what are the pros and cons of allowing a contractor to protest in the time of war? in times of peace, there is one

implication. what are the implications of allowing this? walk me through the process of a property process of a process not talking about -- but just walk me through what is publicly known about a protest. a protest is made. how long do they have? what is the process? how does that delay the ultimate efforts to get to the numbers we want? >> to be honest with you, my understanding and knowledge of the protests are somewhat limited. the contracting office at the space and missile defense command actually receives the information from the fao. -- gao. i deal with the delays that it will inherently cause. >> let me talk about that.

what does the protest do in terms of the numbers you have told us? >> i am not sure you understand -- i'm not sure i'm understand about the >> i'm sorry, sir, i'm not sure i understand what you mean by that. >> let me put it a different way, we'll get to the answer. we are moving the responsibility of training the afghan police from state to d.o.d. ambassador johnson has stated in a statement, the transfer of contract responsibility for police training is an effort to eliminate a large management layer so that resourcing, funding, and other management issues are more efficient. but the transfer is not intended to alter the type of training provide the department of state will continue to play a role in afghan law

enforcement training through program, policy, oversight and overall direction for the police programs for ambassador elingburg. do you concur with that state snment >> as far as i understand the situation, yes. my dealing with this is really strictly related to the work we are doing with cstc-a and how they interact, i'm not privy to -- >> you're taking other rethe response obblet training the police, reektcrekt? >> as cstc-a has laid it out, yes. >> the responsibility to train the police is your responsibility, correct? >> yes, sir. >> and in training the police, it was done by state. how often have you met with state? >> the first time we met with state was in -- that i personally met with the state

department was in october of this year. we went to their office that maintains the contract and began the process of working with them. i had my two program managers which have been working full-time on this, have been working with the state department representative with respect to the transition on a contractual level. >> how often have they met? >> sir, i don't have the answer to that question at this time. they have been engaging in regular conversations, i don't know the extent to which they have meat or the frequency of which they have met. >> how does the program work when it comes to response thovelt ambassador again? in other words, there's a point to which d.o.d. will no longer be responsible for training police because it will come under the jurisdiction of the ambassador again, correct? >> sir, as far as i know, yes, sir, based on the testimony.

>> can you respond to that, ambassador? >> we hope to get to a point in the security situation in afghanistan where the need to have a combined effort between the military and police will be -- we will have achieved such security on the ground and you would anticipate, but trying to put a dot on the calendar for that is impossible. >> but i mean -- candidly what's causing this question is, when we were in afghanistan this last time we did not not debt a -- get a warm, fuzzy feeling that there was a good relationship between state and deform o.d. in this transfer. we got the feeling that state's nose was a bit out of joint they didn't see the logic to it, they didn't give us the sense that there was very good coordination. you know, there's the issue now that we have given the existing contractor two more months at, what, $34 million per month?

is that the right amount, mr. ambassador? >> i don't have that figure in front of me, i'll whether glad to get it. >> i think that's the correct number, pretty close. >> so their view what we got from d.o.d. was, they didn't need this contract to continue for two months. the view we got from state was, you know, that you need it. there wasn't a feeling like you all were in agreement. would you say, mr. strain, that you all see eye to eye on this, or are there disagreements that still need to be worked out? >> with respect to the extension that was added on to the extent there, we might work with cstc-a to ensure we had a solid requirement base for the proposal. it was me who started pushing

the extension. i asked for it because i wasn't sure there was enough time to do this thing correctly and make sure that we had sufficient transition time looking for approximately 90 days of transition between the incoming and outgoing so we would be able to address the issues that arose. we knew the complexity of this. we wanted to make sure we had addressed the issue so that at the end of the day, the after began students were not impacted by the transition. >> i'm going to come back in my next round of questioning to talk about the impact during wartime of protests. i would like one of you to be able to tell me this and if you can't, it's pretty shocking, i would be thinking that you all would be thinking about impact. mr. strain, you have to run this program. i would like to think you could tell me the impact, how long it should take. i would like to think you'd

asked those questions, so you would know. mr. green. >> thank you. ambassador johnson, please describe as best you can what the continuing role of i.n.l. will be in training specialized police to include footprint and funding. to the degree it has been resolved. >> i think at this point this is a speculative discussion. we have engaged with our colleagues as to how this program will be handed over and whether or what aspect they would prefer for us to retain or expand our presence in. we have had some back and forth. at some points earlier in the

discussion, the desire by us in is that they would handle everything totally. if we had our continuing engagement, they looked at a couple of things where there are continuing to review. they had access to take over the family centers. we are making provision to do so. as i mentioned, there might be some higher and training specifically related to gender issues -- higher end training. those are not finalized. we are open to that. as i have conveyed, we want to be a responsive partner to our military colleagues. that is the spirit to which we have extended this effort. >> as the footprint and funding been resolved? -- has it been resolved? >> the entire scope of the effort has been resolved.

the funding would continue to come from the department of defense and we would not come at this point, alter the way the funding is managed. >> what is your best guess as to when these issues that are unresolved become resolved? >> quite early in the new year if we stay on track for the award of the new contract. >> thank you. i do not know if this is directed towards -- in regards to this combat vehicle for police training, was anything consideration given to the dodig's criticism to their ability to lead manage and administercentpol idiq contracts?

>> the report you are referring to from december, the audit occurred in august 2008 treated during that time, they look thatcntpo. -- they also looked at cntpo. it revolves around the lack of personnel. that has been addressed. my own organization has 2 increased has 250% in size. the contract and support has increased by all 300%. >> could you give the numbers? >> i have gone from 11 to 30. the contract support has gone from 3 to 13. a significant increase, which was designed and done

specifically at the identification of a discrepancy that was identified, and that is how we have adjusted. >> in general, you may not know this since you have gener -- general, do know what number of the surge of the forces will be involved directly in training and mentoring? i am not talking about as an ancillary duty while they're connecting combat operations. how many of them will be devoted to training? >> thank you for your question, commissioner. i do not know the exact number. it may have well changed from the time that i left. i would just say that the approach that general mcchrystal is taking is more than ancillary

training while but they're conducting operations. it really is a mission statement for the units involved in partnering and mentoring. i would suggest that most of those forces that are going over there, especially the belgrade -- brigade combat team, will have a role in training security forces in the thatwe are operating. >> but not necessary -- but not necessarily in that same matter? >> condi 48 and -- how the 248 and [unintelligible] will continue to provide teams. they have been given a mission to do embedded partnering and it

will partner with army and police in a way that we have not done in the past. >> i just saw something recently that referenced the field artillery battalion. it referenced the artillery battalion of the 101st who will be directly involved in training. >> this is something very new. the regional commanders are going to use this and they are all providing mentoring. that part -- that team is going to partner with not only the national army units but also the police districts in that space as well.

>> when they need to understand better that i think it is driven by the desire of the commanders, but what is the difference between the 48 and 482 and those combat teams? we need to understand that better and i don't expect to resolve that today. one last question for all of you. in the commissioner's opening statement, the referenced significant increase of the contractors related to the surge. have any of you see -- and when we were formed, one of the basic questions was we had too many contractors. comparing this to all sorts of wars in the past, whether we do or not is not what we are here

to solve today. have you seen any attempts to reduce the number of contractors? >> yes. >> i would be happy to take a stab at that answer. we absolutely value the role of the contractor 3 > >> sir, i'd be happy to take that first. i would like to use this question to make a point that we absolutely value the contractors in providing trainers to enhance our capacity and bring those law enforcement skill we value the role of the contractor. we scrub, line by line, the number of mentor trainers required in each of the ministries and the number of trainers required out in the battlefield and the results are mixed. as we increased the number of

units that are doing embedded partnering and would now partner with police, there was a requirement toin crease the number of contractors, police contractors, that we could provide law enforcement professionals down to those units at the platoon level or whatever level the commander chose to organize policemen tore teams. so we had to increase the number of policemen tores to accommodate that. at the same time, we worked hard, especially in the ministries, in how we could eliminate any duplications that occurred as they evolved over time and as we took advantage of the increased number of coalitions provided police -- coalition-provided policemen tores and we did reduce the number of policemen tores, contracted mentors, and there was some reduction as a result of the role of 482 that they were going to provide.

>> thank you very much. >> we're going to do 10 minutes. mr. green was given 11 minutes and we're going to do 10 minutes. so here we go. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. mr. strain, you mentioned, and you'd briefed us previously on the very rapid rate, maybe even we could call it a crash growth program that your office had to go through. you said it expanded 250%, to accommodate the afghan national police training. is it true that in terms of how -- in terms of it being a crash program that you only found out of the transition to this program, the transition of this

program from lionel to defense department in july, it was only formally approved at the end of august? >> thank you, sir. the first time i prernl -- personally found out about this transition was on 24 june, 2009, followed up by my first conversation with cstc-a in july. >> if it were in the contract vehicle they had back at state there would be at least two other sort of major competitors, dyncorp and civilian police international. why has this been given to you? and why not open competition? to the extent you can explain that in general term, i'm not