consumer facing and there is a double check that no one did anything wrong. >> how do we give you -- let me start with you, m@@:zz0@ @ @ @ how do we give you real clout? >> i do not know. >> i will make a suggestion. treasury needs a club to go along with the carrot. some sort of very concrete monetary penalty for violations of the terms of the hamp service our participation agreement. >> can they really force it? do they have a compliance steam that can force it? rigid scheme -- a compliance

scheme that enforce it? >> they would be willing to come into court and force it for treasury. but several times it has been attempted. there is a new class action filed in the last few weeks with that is exactly what borrowers are trying to do. but the courts do not understand why all orders is pressuring -- white borrowers are pressuring the issue for treasury. . and -- >> leverage. >> leverage. >> ms. schwartz, let me ask you, what do you think about the cram down issue? >> i'm not going to say -- >> you're not going to venture an opinion? >> i have empathy for all sides. as you know, i work around the clock and -- >> i didn't say that i really respect and appreciate what you're doing. >> the uncertainty is

>> the uncertainty is concerning for someone with my background and i see a broken market and i worry that keeps it broken for longer. i think our job is a couple of things. why aren't we figuring out a product to help the unemployed that can be 30% or 40% of the problem so that it's in front of the hamp mod. we have kind of program to slow down the required payments and get back into partial payments to get into a hamp mod to get back on their feet when reemployed. let's talk about no borrower goes to foreclosure without review for hamp mods. >> they do. >> i hear you, but i don't know the me tricks, it's hard to respond to all of that. i see the metrics of the people getting work out, some in process and those who didn't go into foreclosure because they're in process of review. i'm sure you're right. let's get into more detail and facts and proper controls into place so that doesn't happen. >> i agree with you.

but i don't think we have the time. >> go in a room and figure that out. >> i mean that respectfully. >> and i just think that we need that -- i don't want to use the word stick. i want that option available to leverage so that the kind of suggestions or recommendations that you make because i know how slow the decision-making process is whether it's here in the u.s. congress or in any agency or bureaucracy and there is interagency review and all of that other stuff that we're going to find ourselves next september looking like it's 2008 rather than 2010. that's my fear. >> mr. chairman, there is a vast gulf between where mortgages cannot be modified at all except for curing a default and maintaining payments and

the proposal that just got defeated which is to allow cramdowns and restructuring to allow some kind of modification that may not involve evaluation of mortgage, fees and cost and interest adjustments and things that are within the hamp model that could be done that are not cramming down the mortgage, if that's not a political option. so those options need to be, i would suggest, should be addressed, should be discussed which is why the suggestion of having a backstop, a judicial backstop to a hamp program that may not be working fast enough. >> who would administer the judicial backstop? >> the bankruptcy. >> could the bankruptcy courts do that? what do you think of that ms. schwartz? >> i don't feel i'm expert enough to have an opinion. >> everybody has an opinion now, come on. .

has not even heard -- where do i go to say they are not doing go to say they are not doing what they say they are going where do like it? this house. there is not anywhere to go. >> that is a concern. >> i totally agree with that. i have some plans for treasury and fannie mae and freddie mac. >> you are as good as it gets. how about helping us in coming

up with a concept or a mechanism to do that back option, and let's not create a new bureaucracy. some sort of additional authority to the trustees are whatever. i am really concerned about this. i am going to turn the gavel back to the real chair of the commercial and administrative law subcommittee, mr. steve cohen of tennessee. >> i thank the distinguished gentleman from massachusetts for that discussion that he led and for the time he spent and for his many good words and years of service to the bay state as well as the united states. i'm sure is he is disappointed as i was in the vote today.

there were several votes that i was disappointed and. sarbanes-oxley was not fully implemented. and the cramdown position, loan modifications were not pass, but we passed a bill. you do not get everything. i appreciate you all being here. if you can bring something to us to consider, it looks like -- although you can put these provisions on other bills. that is the only time you can get good bills into law. the system has the methods to this map that. i thank you for your time today. without objection, members have 5 legislative days to submit additional questions. they will be made part of the record. without record -- without objection, the record will remain open for five additional days for additional material. i thank everyone for their time

and patience. i wish everyone a happy i wish everyone a happy hanukkah, a merry [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] 5 >> next on c-span, and senate hearing looks into body builder uses steroids. the former british ambassador to the yen -- un it talks about the iraq war.

"washington journal" begins at an earlier time. >> tomorrow wrote it will be started half an hour earlier than usual at 6:30 a.m. eastern for with coverage of the final vote on the health care bill. we will have analysis from andrew armstrong. later we will talk to general gary cheek of the army's wounded warrior program for soldiers. it begins at 6:30 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> now senate hearing on body building supplements containing steroids. witnesses included student athlete who experience liver failure after taking a supplement laced with steroids. arlen specter chairs the subcommittee. this is 1.5 hours.

for the committee will now proceed with this hearing. it is on the body building supplement and the possibility of their contain steroids or steroid like substances. the federal laws which govern the subject our complex. if the substance is a drug with in the food and drug act, it is subject to clearance by the fda and failure to comply may result

in criminal penalties. if the item comes with in a controlled substance act, it is one to defy steroids. the legislation provides that substances before 1994, which are body building are not subject to the rules of the food and drug administration. rules of the food and drug administration. but experience has shown that there are many of these body building supplements which are sold over the counter which may contain a steroids or steroid- like substances, which may cause very severe damage to the liver or the kidneys. we find that our society, which

is very much addicted to sports and very much addicted to excel in sports, and athletes are very anxious to build up their bodies to be able to excel, or at least to do better. this is an attitude which goes from the professionals like mark mcgwire, who received disciplinary action as a result of having steroids in his body, to jesse ramirez -- j.c. ramiro because he had steroid like substances in his body. that was the judgment of some. the question arises as to whether there needs to be changed in federal law.

the consequences can be very serious for using steroids, as identified by the food it meant -- by the food and drug administration in serious terms as follows -- anabolic steroids may is cause serious long-term adverse health consequences in men and women. these include shrink ends -- shrinkage of the testes and mellon for metal -- infertility, breast enlargement and males, short stature in children, and adverse effects on blood lipid levels, and increased risk of heart attack and stroke. the consequences of liver failure and kidney disorder have

already been identified. on one of the morning television shows, a young man appeared to say in anticipation of this hearing, there was television coverage, that he had used a steroid-like substance and become very ill. he went to a doctor and was told that it had not secured medical aid by two days, he might well aid by two days, he might well have been it is a big decision which prohibited the national football the -- a leak from taking disciplinary action against the anti-dumping provisions. there in the eighth circuit court of appeals and upheld a district court decision signed by minnesota law. the individual side can defend

themselves under in minnesota statute. if it is an item which most likely can be handled by federal supreme some -- supremacy. federal law will control minnesota law, which will supersede the decision of the court of appeals. these are very important items for dealing with a multi-billion dollar industry estimated to bring in supplements might $24 billion a year. there are substantial property rights involved. there are substantial health

risks involved. there are tough penalties. we may need to take a look at what we are going to do here with the exemption that allows the steroids to be sold allows without these body building steroids to be sold without pre clearance under 1994 legislation. and now i am pleased to yield to my distinguished colleague, senior senator from utah, senator hatch. >> it is nice to be with you, as always. we are very close friends. i appreciate being here at this hearing. it should be of high priority to enforce the laws currently on the books. national football players or a

major league baseball player may walk into a health food store and purchase a product off the shelf that contains steroids. to days, such purchases are illegal, plain and simple. any company that sells such products that is in violation of law, those products should be taken off the shelves immediately. this is an important issue and it is equally important that this hearing clear up the misinformation about what follows are, how they are being enforced, and who is responsible for overseeing bell lost to make anabolic steroids illegal. it is my hope that we can use this hearing is an opportunity to educate american consumers, especially teams and athletes, about the dangers of steroids and to assure them that laws do exist to protect them from these dangerous product. as members of the subcommittee know, we have worked hard to ensure that the government has adequate authority to take

products containing anabolic steroids off the market. many of us had been concerned as we begin to see the use of anabolic steroids increase in professional and amateur athletics. that was the primary reason for the enactment of the 1990 steroid control act, which banned steroid use in the united states. senator biden and night for the co-sponsors of that bill. what was successful in deterring potential steroid abuse, a new products were developed to circumvent the reach of federal law enforcement. and while not technically anabolic steroids, the steroid precursors act in a similarly dangerous manner once inside the human body. we've updated the law and pass the anabolic steroid control act of 2004. mr. chairman, i recall you being supportive of this legislation.

i personally appreciate it. this is not controversial legislation. it passed the senate unanimously, and the house of representatives passed it by a vote of 408-3. the laws that gave the dea the authority to schedule new precursors easily without this difficult process of proving that the product builds muscle mass. it eliminated -- and identified androstendione as a controlled substance, clearing up any confusion. senator harkin of iowa and i have spent considerable time urging the the government to ban andro as it is called.

this places significant controls on its use, including substantial criminal penalties. let me take this opportunity to raise one issue that will be considered within the context of this hearing. when the 2004 law was considered on the floor, senator biden, kennedy, durban, and i had a colloquy about how the 88, all hormone precursor, would be treated under the anabolic steroid control act. as we recognize, it was not the intent of congress to in the use of substances that are not abused. the 2004 law deliberately did not schedule dhea, and therefore legitimate users continued to have access to it if it is

correctly market. but the 2004 law allows the dea, should it find that the product is being abused by athletes, but youngsters, or by teenagers, to schedule it is a controlled substance -- it as a controlled substance. but add that in fact the dea need not find that dhea meets each of the eight factors before it can be scheduled. if the dea can titters that dhea has no dependents liability, the dea may schedule it if the agency concludes after consideration of the facts and relative importance of other factors such as the actual or relative potential for abuse, the history and current pattern of abuse, or the scope, duration, and significance of

abuse, that it should be scheduled. it would be clear so that i asked that the administration provide written understanding of that, and and and and the spreader brought a letter to me stating that each of the eight factors is not a mandatory prerequisite to scheduling. mr. chairman, i ask unanimous consent that that letter be submitted for the record. >> without objection. >> if i could take a few more minutes, because this is a subject important to me and my home state of utah, world leader in the manufacture of dietary supplements. while they help committee has jurisdiction over this bipartisan law that senator harkin and i've read, it is an important case of supplement regulatory structure. dshea insures that consumers

will continue to have access to safe supplements and information about their use. it passed the senate not once but twice by unanimous consent. the law established as a statutory framework for fda said that these vitamins, minerals, herbal process, amino acids, and other dietary supplements are generally recognized as foods. the law grandfathered substances on the market at the time of enactment. the results in being that these products had eight abundant history of long in safe use. products that might be harmful could be removed from the market. as a double safeguard, we gave the fda and the imminent hazard a party so that the agency can immediately remove from the market a product that is -- it suspects to be unsafe, no questions after we also included

a provision to require manufacturers to submit to the fda 75 days prior to marketing said the affirmation about any new ingredients not previously marketed. a key principle of the law is that supplements are not subject to premarket approval, says the cost and time alone required to see a profit through the fda approval process would sound the death knell for this industry. most products cannot be patented, and there's no incentive for a manufacturer to put his products to this onerous process when many other manufacturers could benefit from the research and investments. another key provision authorized good manufacturing practices for supplement so that fda inspectors can make certain the products are being manufactured in compliance with all the safeguards of the law. we required that all ingredients be listed on the label and that any claims must be made truthful and not misleading. the reason i outline these

provisions is to illustrate that we took great pains to design a regulatory framework that will assure supplements are manufactured and marketed with consumer safety at the top priority. we provided the fda with an arsenal of new tools to enforce the law. some they had used, others not. and since that time, the industry has grown. by some estimates, it is a $20 billion industry today, while critics of the industry had viewed this as a negative development, repeatedly stating that the industry is unregulated, that is simply the wrong statement. all of these requirements are to be administered by the regulatory agency in the fda. and while the great majority of products are used safely, there have been progress with some -- problems with some products. somberly to manufacturing, some to labeling, and i do not see this as a failure in the law. supplements are regulated under the law. let me be clear.

we all recognize there are bad actors in the supplement industry. these individuals should be subject to swift punishment by the fda and the federal trade commission for their products should be removed from the product -- from the marketplace immediately. unfortunately, it is no secret that the fda is a woefully underfunded agency. the agency will be the first would make that its oversight of the dietary supplement industry is hampered by a lack of resources. for several years i've worked with senator harkin to rectify that shortcoming five requesting that the appropriations committee provide the fda with more resources so that it can do a better job regulating the industry. senator kohl, senator bennett, and senator cochran had been very helpful in this regard. one other regulatory authorities should be mentioned before conclude. the problem with the drug

ephedra is an illustration. we work together with senators harkin, in sin, and the chairman to pass a law in 2006 which mandated a system of adverse event reports to the fda regarding all series of events which are associated with the use of these products. i also want to mention that that government accountability office issued a report on the regulation of dietary supplements at the end of january. the reported that my opinion -- we in congress will continue to bite gao's regulations on how to improve the regulation of this industry. one of the important points the report raises is the lack of fda resources to enforce laws already on the books. i will continue to work with my

colleagues in congress and the fda to provide more resources to the fda for dietary supplement oversight. and before i conclude, i want to stress an extremely important point -- since enactment of dshea, almost every commissioner is on record stating that the agency has enough enforcement authority to regulate dietary supplements. and the current commissioner, in a recent speech, mentioned that "reports have noted that there has been a steep decline in the fda's enforcement activities." some serious violations have gone unaddressed for far too long produce include violations including product quality, adulteration, and false branding. misleading advertising. furthermore, in providing an example of the fda stepping up

its enforcement activities, dr. ann burke cited enforcement actions against people selling over the county -- over-the- counter body building substances that include steroids. she said, these are unproven and she said, these are unproven and unapproved drugs, not simply put, under current law, the products are not allowed to be marketed. i appreciate the willingness to listen to my statement. this subject is near and dear to my heart. but to welcome our witnesses in ticking time today to join us. i look forward to discussing this issue with them. fa>> will they please rise? >> dtv swear to tell the truth,

the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? >we may be seated. we will proceed to our first witness. >the director of the new drugs compliance in the office of compliance for the center of drug evaluation and research at the food and drug administration. since 2000, he was associated chief counsel at one of the branches of the fda. before that coming he was an assistant district attorney with the philadelphia d.a.'s office. he received a bachelor degree from amherst.

um laude degree. u.s. had excellent training. >> thank you. >> you have the same name as a former assistant district attorney. >> i do, yes. >> is your father? >> know, and we are not related. >> i hired him as an assistant d.a. in 1971. he is now the distinguished united states attorney for the eastern district of pennsylvania. thank you for joining us, mr. levy. there is a five-minute limitation. which is the standard rule in the subcommittee's. >> mr. chairman, and members of the committee, i am michael levy, director of the division of new drugs and labeling

compliance in the office of compliance of the fda's center for drug evaluation and research. >> pull the machine a little closer. >> ok. with me today is a doctor, a director of the division of dietary supplement programs in the fda center for drug evaluation and applied. he will respond to questions about products marketed as dietary supplements and the regulation on the food, drug, and cosmetic act. at this point out one to take the opportunity to thank senator hatch for his longstanding leadership on dietary supplement issues. and specifically, the 2004 anabolic steroid control act and at first event reporting for dietary supplements. >> thank you so much.

>> and thank you to the subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss fda's perspective on the position on products marketed as dietary supplements. fda is very concerned with products containing the synthetic steroid ingredients that are marketed as dietary supplements. bodybuilding pockets marketed as dietary supplements are commonly found to contain these types of steroids. there is no requirement for the manufacturer of a dietary supplement to provide fda with evidence of the product's effectiveness or safety prior to marketing unless the product contains a substance that was marketed as a dietary in agreement before 1994 and that has not been a part of the food supply, which a lot supplies as a new dietary ingredient. in addition to the agency's concern that many of these products have not been critically study demonstrated to be safe, the products are also in sold with misleading labeling and their frequently manufactured without quality controls.

by labeling steroid products as dietary supplements, unscrupulous firms can introduce into the marketplace products that contain grievance that may pose a risk to health. -- ingredients that may pose a risk to help. in july 2009, fda issued a public health advisory warning consumers to stop using any body building products that are represented to contain steroids or steroid-like substances. the public health advisory was issued in response to a clusters of serious adverse event report submitted associated with several products containing synthetic steroids and marketed as dietary supplements. there was serious liver injury, stroke, kidney failure, and pulmonary embolism. although the body building products containing the synthetic steroids were marketed as dietary supplements, they were not dietary supplements. the or unapproved and misbranded

drugs that had not been reviewed by fda for safety and effectiveness. fda it executed a criminal search warrant regarding the illegal manufacture of these products. fda also last week as a kid a criminal search warrant at the premises of bodybuilding.col -- executed a criminal search warrant at the premises of body building.com in the past five years, fda has sent 28 warning levels to firms that were illegally marketing products marketed as dietary supplements but containing steroids. our civil and criminal enforcement offices are reviewing additional data that are marketed for body building and that claim to contain steroids or steroid-like substances. despite these actions, fda enforcement in this area is challenging group because fda generally does not receive

informational these products prior to marketing, we generally cannot identify the products before they enter the marketplace. then fda must undertake a painstaking analytical process that often involves laboratory testing to show that they are by a lot of -- violative. we're also unable to effectively prevent the importation of many violations because of the sheer number of imports. these challenges make it very difficult to stop the sale of these dangerous products. fda will continue its efforts to identify and remove illegal steroid products from the marketplace. fda is committed to doing everything we can to protect the american public, not only for

regulation and enforcement, but through education, our reach, and in collaboration with entities outside fda-approved fda looks forward to working with congress on this important health issue and i would be happy to answer any questions. >> thank you, mr. liddy. our next witness is mr. joseph rannazzisi, deputy assistant to administrator for the drug enforcement agency, the coordinate's major drug investigations. he serves as liaison to the pharmaceutical industry. he has a bachelor's degree in pharmacy from butler university, a lot degree from detroit college and michigan state. are registered pharmacist and a member of the michigan bar. thank you for coming in today, and a floor source for 5 minutes. >> thank you, sir. chairman specter, senator hatch, distinguished members of the panel, on behalf of the 9400

men and women of the drug enforcement administration, i want to thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony concerning body building products, steroids, and enforcement barriers. to understand the abuse, we must guard by discussing testosterone. it is a hormone produced in the body. is this -- it is a schedule iii drug. it is used by many to perfect body appearance, increase physical performance, and gain muscle size and mass. over time, scientists developed and synthesized derivatives that were structurally similar to testosterone and prohormones, such as andro, a steroid that when ingested metabolizes into testosterone. androstendione was sold over the

internet and nutrition stores as a dietary supplement until 2004. not all designer steroids and testosterone boosters on the market today are sold as dietary supplements. in 1990, congress passed the anabolic steroids control act which placed 27 anabolic steroids into schedule iii, pursuant to a 2004 ad. they placed an additional 36 steroids and over-the-counter prohormone dietary supplements into schedule iii, including androstendione and its derivatives. the drug enforcement administration has no authority to enforce provisions of dshea, i can investigate manufactured in the dietary supplement market.

congress refined the definition of the road -- the original 1990 law to allow dea to administratively classify additional steroids as anabolic steroids. using this provision, we identified substances marketed as anabolic products in the dietary supplement market and then conducts a scientific review and analysis of the substance to determine if it is related to testosterone, and if that meets the criteria to be scheduled as a anabolic steroid. -- as saying schedule iii anabolic steroid. this is a lengthy process and there is no method under the current statute to expedite the scheduling process. dea is in the final stages of the scheduling process for

boldione, and other substances. three substances sold and marketed as anabolic steroids in the dietary supplement market. we are aware of 58 supplements that are part of the late kaine one more -- one more of these substances. it was published in 8 -- 2008. we anticipate the final role in the next several months. these products would be the first substances scheduled under the 2004 act. as you can see, the overall time period to perform the scheduling action can take as long as two years to complete. in the time it takes to schedule a news steroid, several others can take its place in the market. they can substitute and altered the structure of test run and then market them as dietary supplements.

often these new formulations have never been clinically tested, and the potential adverse reactions in humans are simply unknown. we've also identified substances that contain anabolic steroids. the company's manufacturing, bottling, and marketing them do not go for a controlled substance regulations. this manufacturers -- this violates various provisions of the controlled substance act. we will continue to identify substances that are similar to tester on -- testosterone and classified them as controlled substances. we will continue to investigate people who are selling them, and pursued the appropriate avenues. wheat that the subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss the issue and welcome any questions you may have. >> thank you very much.

our next witness is mr. travis tygart, ceo of the u.s. anti- dumping agency. prior to joint -- and tight doping agency -- and tieti dop ing agency. he got his law degree from southern methodist. we appreciate your being here, mr. tygart, and a sportier testimony. five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. my name is trevor tygart, and the chief executive officer. on behalf of the millions of participants who demand fair, clean, and say sport that we represent, i appreciate the opportunity to be here to discuss this important issues. this is unrecognized -- we are greatly concerned about the ease

with which products containing steroids can be purchased. we are equally concerned that some athletes have tested positive for banned drugs because the products they were using were either contaminated or intentionally spike by manufacturing. as they made their leap into the american consciousness in 2003, one of the designer steroids found was made all. they come from clandestine laboratories to mainstream marketing. since its discovery, he quickly rose from an unknown substance to the signature ingredients in nutritional products readily available in r it is marketed to an unsuspecting public. 10% are spent annually on performance enhancing product. there hundreds currently

available that contain one or more of the steroids. it is too easy for the junior high or college athletes to walk into a local health food store and see the labels for of legal and on natural. we all believe that because they are readily available that they must be safe and effective. what he did not know is that all the tapes -- all it takes is a credit card to import raw materials from china, the ability to pour water into a eighth label, and -- into a label, and the label maker. they sell millions of dollars a product before the fda has the ability to take action. unfortunately, we do not have to imagine such an act. one is here with us today. scoy his name is kareem hunter.

i had not known him long, but it does not take long to realize he and others like him are so bring examples of how unscrupulous profiteers are trading the help of our children for the pursuit of quick cash. he was fortunate to have some god-given athletic ability and the work card debt earned thanatos assistance to play baseball at a small college. he decided a look for red legal nutritional product to help his workout. he did his due diligence and checked on the prohibited drug laws. he found a product not on that list. according to court papers, it was at protesting -- even invoked the name of congress that because congress had not added it to the controlled substance act, it was 100% legal. he started feeling ill and the pain drove into the emergency room. if he had waited another day, he

might not be alive today. he had suffered acute liver failure. his pursuit of the american dream was compromised by what he reasonably believed to be a safe and legal product. i want to thank him for being here today and let me share historic free today his health is better but he is fourth to be constantly vigilant for the symptoms. he now works with children at and mentoring city, trying to help other kids stay away from drugs and off the treats. -- off the streets. his only mistake was in assuming that things readily available or say. he had no way of knowing that a 15 year-old scheduling scheme has been hijacked by unscrupulous manufacturers. he had no way of knowing that these companies are exploiting the lack of premarket regulation to sell magic pills while using the reputation the

cloak themselves with the appearance of safety and propriety. mr. chairman, we applaud this committee for holding this hearing. now's the time to fix this problem. while the recent fda rates are an important step to protect consumers, but current law severely restricts the fda in its ability to stop, much less slowdown, the designer steroids gold rush. premarket and post market changes are required to give everyone a truly healthy choice. the legitimate dietary supplement companies, truly concerned about the health and safety of our consumers, have nothing to fear by proposals that we will be discussed in my written testimony. we're committed to being part of the solution and we will be announcing an effort, supported by the national football league, major league baseball, the national basketball association, and the united states olympic committee, and many other entities equally

concerned about this topic. we look forward to working with all groups that have a sincere interest in preventing these dangerous products from so easily getting into the hands of our young children. i would finally thank this committee for its time in its interest in this important public health issue, and for inviting me to share our experience about the reality of the market. >> thank you very much, mr. tygart. we now turn to mr. daniel fabricant, ceo of the natural products association, a trade association representing the natural products industry. mr. fabricant has a bachelor's degree in chemistry from the university of north carolina, ph.d. from the university of illinois in chicago. thank you for coming in, mr.

fabricant. your testimony is next. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for the opportunity to be here today. we represent the interests of more than 10,000 manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors. i am also a former college athlete and cited as a sports nutrition expert, so i have a peak -- a deep personal understanding of this issue. we welcome this hearing because we share your concern about illegal steroids -- selling products containing illegal substances is already a crime. we were the first to call for throwing the book that in the opening party. anyone caught selling steroids should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, and the natural products industry has worked for years to pass those laws. this is the best way to stop the criminals. the barriers to enforcement are

simple. money, manpower, and well. we fully support strong rules to ensure what is on the label is what is in the bottle. the criminals who sell steroids illegally do not agree we fought for stronger drug enforcement agency ability, especially the passage of the anabolic steroid control act of 2004. it made it easier for them to schedule a anabolic chemicals. we've worked hard for good manufacturing practice regulations, serious adverse effect reporting, and not a pick -- a notification systems as well as other important provisions of the federal food drug and cosmetic act. we also strongly support the fdc] \ -- ftc enforcement activities. we are not surprised that criminals ignore current legal requirements to notify the government of their intent to sell illegal substances 3 we urge you to get tough on the

criminals. that is why our industry has fought repeatedly for the congress and the administration to provide the drug enforcement agency, the fda, the ftc, and other government agencies the resources they need to enforce their laws. for many years those resources were slashed. but congress has provided a significant infusion of funding which has led to a noticeable increase in activity. like the enforcement activity last week. we welcome this increased government enforcement and support efforts to boost resources further. the criminal soustelle -- who illegally sell steroids do not. there are other investment morses but could be used. -- there are other investment measures -- enforcement measures that could be used. to our knowledge, dea has only proposed listing three additional compounds under the anabolic steroid control act of

2004 in the past five years. it makes it far too easy for criminals to stay one step ahead of the law. i'll also say for anyone to be aware of any product that sounds like an illinois -- illegal steroids. if that is posing like one, the chances are it very well might be. 81 seeking to buy these illegal products is doing such a great risk to themselves. it is our best interest to continue to earn the public's trust and anything we can do to separate the legal, safe, help the supplemental industry from the illegal world it is worthwhile. when any athlete suggests an off-the-shelf dietary supplement was the cause for a banned substance being found in their bodies, our industry asks them to name the supplement, name the manufacturer, and name the store where they bought it. we ask the same questions of donald fehr, who essentially

blamed the entire steroid scandal in major league baseball on legal dietary supplements. mr. chairman, we are glad that you're holding this hearing. we support efforts to stop the sale of illegal steroids. we strongly support some resources for government agencies to enforce the law. we stand ready to work with the committee and other agencies to help identify and remove criminal activity, the root cause of this tragedy. and i look for to your questions. >> thank you, mr. fabricant. our final witness is mr. richard kingham, concentrating on product liability, representing many major pharmaceutical manufacturers. is a graduate of george washington university, law degree from the university of virginia. thank you very much for coming

in, mr. kingham. before george. -- the floor is yours. >> manufacturers of legitimate dietary supplement share the concern that you have for the distribution of body building products that contain anabolic steroids birdie at first that banks are well known and they should not be available for general use. it is important recognize that the vast majority of dietary supplements are in no way implicated by the matters being discussed at this hearing 31 to 150 million americans regularly use legitimate dietary supplements, and those products offer significant health benefits to those who use them. and this is the main focus of my presentation -- there is no need to amend existing legislation to deal with anabolic steroids. that the administration -- the agencies can make use of existing statutory powers.

congress has twice amended the controlled substances act to give dea special power to regulate anabolic steroids the most recent in 2004 greatly expanded the list of substances subject to regulation under the statute to include metabolic research groups -- metabolic precursors. congress also simplified the burden for mistreated scheduling action. person to traffic in illegal steroids are subject to punishment. although many of the products that are currently promoted in stores and on the internet are labeled as dietary supplements, they seldom if ever are in compliance with a dietary supplement provisions of the law. fda has multiple enforcement tools which in fact are set out

and mr. levy's written testimony to this hearing. they can deal with products of that type. these include provisions of the federal food and drug and cosmetic act to drugs and to the dietary supplements. many products are advertised with claims that fall within the new drug provisions of the food and drug act, and are for this reason both ms. branded and in violation of statutory provisions that require pre- market approval of new drugs. other contains new dietary agreements for which require pre-market notifications have not been made to fda under the dietary supplements provision statute. those products are legally deemed adulterated and are liable to a full range of enforcement measures, including seizures, injunctions, and criminal prosecutions. the provisions of the food and drug act governing premarket submissions for new drugs and you dietary ingredients do not require fda prove that the product is unsafe, but only that

the procedures have not been followed. the burden of proof on the government is minimal and experience suggests that courts are willing to interpret the provisions of the act literally to protect the public against unlawful products. for this reason, all warning from fda backed up with a credible threat to take further enforcement action is usually sufficient to achieve compliance. fda has distributed warning letters to those to distribute anabolic steroids and it has the capacity to issue more letters and take more formal actions as appropriate. effectively addresses the problem of designer drugs that are formulated to prevent the -- tour -- to circumvent the scheduling process. they will typically be new, within the new -- the meanings of the provisions, that requires the approval of new drug applications are the submission of new dietary ingredient

notifications. as is also been mentioned, recent reports suggest that there are some products on the market whose labeling does not declare the presence of anabolic steroids that are detected and laboratory test. they might be surreptitiously added to what might otherwise be lawful product. they are clearly illegal under multiple provisions of existing laws. the food and drug act, for example, prohibits the it requires labels disclosure of ingredients. what is on the bottle must be on the label. these provisions can be enforced. i do not believe the amendments

to the law would be inappropriate. existing law is sufficient to assure protection of the public. in pre-market approval would only add to the expense of bringing into the market. body building products constitute less than 10%. there are a tiny fraction of that. it to be a mistake to alter the regulatory framework simply to do with a small number of products that can be controlled. >> we will now proceed with him in it round of questioning.

>> are the existing laws adequate to protect the public? which has steroids or steroid like substances? >> i think, clearly not, from our perspective. >> could you have him step for to let us hear what happened to him? would you mind stepping forward? mr. tygart has described your experience. would you tell us what happened to you in your own word. >> yes. i went to college in missouri and while i was in school, i ended up getting sick. i went home for the summer, and

i found a supplement on line, that i thought would be healthy for me. it would be something that would not hurt me. at the beginning of the year, our coach comes then with the help instructor and gives a list of all the supplements that we cannot take. so the list was in debt. i looked at the list, and i went to gnc and compared things that i could not take. most in satgnc i could not take, because i the the supplement or something in the supplement was banned from incaa. however researching for about three or four weeks. different products that i could take that would be legal that would not be harmful. when i found, the product was called superdraw. i thought it was a diamond in the route, something that would

not hurt me off. >> did you take it? >> yes. >> did harm you? it actually gave me of liver failure. >> liver failure. how long were you in the hospital? >> it was four years ago. to be exact, it was anywhere between four to six weeks i was in the hospital. and it was not in and out, i was in there and could not lead. -- and could not lead. >> did you hear the consequences? >> the doctor let me know that throughout my life, he could come back anytime. as of right now, i am ok. the doctor told me to be aware of what right do, that it could come back anytime. >> mr. levy, you testified that there are problems with misstating labeling, no quality controls, you have issued

warnings and public health advisory. some 28 warning specified and listed a long line of problems from pulmonary embolisms, stroke, liver problems. in the absence of three clarence, is there any aspect of way for the fda to deal with these problems? -- in the absence of preclearance, is there any effective way for the fda to deal with these problems? >> this is a very challenging area to regulate, because it is difficult to find violative products. >> to mr. tygart actually -- accurately describe what it takes to put one of these supplements on the market? >> i do not recall exactly what mr. tygart said. >> he said he could get a

substance -- he testified a few minutes ago. were you listening? >> yes. >> you could put the powder in the bottle, but some liquid and it, print a label, and sell it. that's the accurately describe the process? >> yes, i think that is quite possible. it would not be legal but it is possible. .

>> the process is frustrating because by the time we get something to the point were will be administrative the scheduled, there is two to three substances out there to replace it. >> is it possible to be effective? >> at the present time, i do not believe we are being effective at controlling these drugs. >> you accurately depicted the situation as as senator hatch's said, you do not use the same words as bad actors. how is it realistically possible, given what the food and drug administration has by way of resources to deal with this problem without pre clarence.

>> i think you touched on it. it is a matter of resources. all of us at the table and members of the committee were happy with the recent activity last week. that calls for more enforcement. that is the critical issue here. >> how about it, mr. levy? is it realistic for you to follow these people after the fact? how many of these bad actors do think there are out there? >> i think there are quite a few bad actors out there. is it realistic to follow after every one? no, i do not believe so. what we have chosen to do is to try to be strategic in the way we approach enforcement actions and get the biggest bang for our buck. >> the biggest bang for a few bucks may not be as big bet -- as big of a bank as big bangs go. mr. tygart, what is the impact

on these diet supplements which have steroids, with >> i think it is huge. well my fellow palette -- panelist said it is only 10% of its $28 billion industry. 10% of 150 million consumers as 15 million. it is huge. a lot of those are our kids. they are going to stores to buy these and be the best they can be. >> how effective is the -- are the anti-doping policies in professional leagues? >> the leaks are part of this effort. they have not yet adopted the world anti-doping code, which we think is the gold standard.

>> why not? >> i am not sure. we think they should. but they have decided not to. >> what is stopping the enforcement by the end of of the disciplinary action taken a bang -- against the two athletes? >> it is potentially big. it could get the effectiveness of the programs. >> what were the facts of those cases? >> as i understand them from the minnesota case, there was a parallel case in louisiana, but there were three minnesota vikings using an over-the- counter product advertised as a dietary supplement for weight-

loss requested they have adequate notice they were doing something that could get them into trouble? >> there were told, as all of our athletes are told, these products are dangerous. >> what about romero? >> i think he was adequately warned. and the policies are at that level to notify athletes of the potential risks of positive tests in taking supplements. >> who notifies the athletes? >> the league and hopefully the union. >> what were the facts of the mark mcgwire case? >> i think it came out publicly that he used andro. i do not know he received any sanction of his use for it -- use of it. it was a scheduled three controlled substance. >> he declined to testify before a congressional committee due to self-incrimination, correct? >> that is exactly right.

>> do you think congress has the authority to legislate and overruled the court of appeals opinion in the eighth circuit and enforce those laws? >> i think so. >> i will yield to senator hatch. i will observe the time limits. >> it is an interesting hearing like everything else. law enforcement can only do so much. the laws are certainly clear that these are -- these kinds of products are illegal. we wrote them carefully so they would be. it basically comes down to we will put the funds into be able to do the work it has to be done. i think fda is overburdened as it is, without question. we treated like the wicked stepsister around here. i passed the fda revitalization act in the early 1990's, and yet

we are still not finished. it did not start until around 2000. i blame congress for a lot of these things. we do not give you enough support. let me go to you. i want to thank you for your testimony here today. in your prepared statement, you reference to the antibiotic -- anabolic steroid act of 2004. i was a primary sponsor of that bill. in that bill, with all the recommendations of the dea to refine the definition of what is their right is. -- a steroid is. and allowed the dea to administratively classified additional compounds as scheduled-2 anabolic steroids. i reviewed your previous

testimony from march, 2004, and you expressed the support of the dea for the anabolic steroid control act of 2004. speaking for d.a., you appealed to congress providing a legislative remedy of refining the definition of a steroid. in your testimony, he said this would give us a new tools to move more quickly and effectively classified steroids is controlled substances. as i stated, congress did that five years ago. we gave the dea what you ask for. i noted in your prepared statement that the dea is in final stages of classifying three substances scheduled under the anabolic steroids control act of 2004. most of them stated that the dea is in process of reviewing three other substances. can you tell me why, five years after congress expanded your authority, only three substances have been scheduled?

i am puzzled as to why these three substances have not been finalized yet. why will they be the first three scheduled under the anabolic steroid control act of 2004? is this a lack of resources? >> no, sir. if you go back to the 1990 act. it required as to show promotion of muscle growth, which was impossible for us. we looked at andro for five years and up until the act was passed in 2004, we did not showed -- we could not show that it could promote muscle growth. while it made our job easier, it by all means was still a very difficult process. the problem is that when we schedule a drug, it has to be

based on scientific evidence. it takes six to eight months to do the studies required to schedule a drug. we have to show that the drug is @@@@@ will help us streamline the process, but i cannot tell you is going to be much quicker than it is right now.

>> does dea have a memorandum of understanding with the fda to ensure that the agencies are coordinating their activities relative to steroids? >> do they work together? >> we do work together. in several investigations, the day and fda are working together. we just met -- dea and fda are working together. we just met regarding products and pharmaceutical train. it is not a question of us not working together. it is the scheduling process. we work together fine. >> let us know if you need changes in the law. we are always going to have bad actors. we'll always have criminals. it seems to me there is enough legal authority there to get these bad substances off the

marketplace, but i understand that there's some evil people out there. it does fda tell you when they deny new ingredient notification that it could involve an anabolic steroid? >> if i may, may i talk to one of my scientists? >> yes. >> we do not receive a warning, a scientist to scientists, no. >> do you do with your own chemists? the chemical analysis we do, but the studies, the cellular studies and animal studies all have to be outsourced. >> do you check with fda to make sure they have received the dietary ingredient notice for our compound you are looking at investing in?

>> not in regard to anabolic steroids. >> on page 11 of your testimony, in the first full paragraph, all three samples that you set would be illegal under the the 99 -- the 1994 law. i want to know what we can do to help you. you made it clear you do not have the resources to be able to do what you need to do. i blame us for that. we have tried to get to their resources. we have not been able to be as successful as i would like us to be.

>> i think we are doing what we can. we have had an agency-wide meeting recently as a part of this. i think the ingredients that i mentioned in my testimony, we have taken enforcement action with respect to all of this bird >> let me ask a couple questions. has the federal government specifically the fbi and dea reached out to the industry and worked in a collaborative manner? >> not in any formal manner. not in any understanding or

agreement in that capacity. we do on time -- from time to time. it is on an informal basis. >> what is your response to the concerns raised by the fda and the dea about the difficulties encountered when they tried to pull park -- products off the market? >> let me point out, and i think we agree on this, the products that this hearing is about requires some form of submission to fda before they enter the market, a new drug application or new dietary ingredient application. for multiple other reasons, they're almost always in violation of other provisions of the act. people violate existing requirements for new drug application submissions and new drug ingredients applications, why would we believe it would comply with some new pre-market approval that you would put in a lot? the answer is that the fda has

to use the authority it already has to bring severe, serious form of enforcement actions against violators. >> doesn't have enough authority desk was i believe they do. -- >> i believe they do. the products we are discussing are in clear violation of law. the question is whether the law will be enforced. caesar -- seizure actions are good thing as well. if people flout the law, criminal prosecutions may be inappropriate. >> more than 150 million

americans currently use a body building substances. -- dietary supplements. bodybuilder's account for 10%. you have something less than 15 million they use the supplements. given the facts of life as to what is happening in this field, don't you think it is important that congress should modify the law to have some pre- clearance requirements on these bodybuilding supplements? >> what i meant to say is that the body building supplement is about 10%. that includes vitamins and minerals and other products. it is a tiny fraction of the business.

>> you have 10% of body building products. that is at 15 million people a lot of people are at risk. >> but that includes a market segment to which legitimate dietary supplements that are perfectly safe and probably a profit -- perfectly appropriate -- >> many that are legitimate are not causing damage, but you still have millions of people being exposed to the problem. i agree with you that more has to be done on the regulators.

you mentioned that superdol is not listed on schedule three as a prohibitive anabolic steroid. why not? it is one of the substances we are looking at. >> you took an affidavit that it was an anabolic steroid. when you say that there's something falls on an affidavit, you might find a criminal case here. when you identify superdrol as an anabolic steroid, and you have a case of a young man who has been hurt, is there any

conceivable excuse for your agency not having listed it on schedule three? >> i cannot just was something unscheduled three. it has to go to the scheduling process. it must go through the scheduling process. i do not have the authority to say i want this drug schedule. it is a process. >> you could take an affidavit that it is an anabolic steroid but not put it on a scheduled three? where do like is to change the law to simplify the scheduling process? >> we would, senator b. [laughter] worse than that -- >> we will give mr tygart's testimony under your name if you do not speak up. >> i apologize, sir. >> my time is about up. -- was banned by the fda in

2004, but the ban occurred 10 years after fda issued its first advisory. only after fda had received thousands of reports of adverse effects, including debts. what possible explanation is there for that kind of delay -- including deaths? >> i will turn to our doctor on that. >> you want to consult your lawyer? >> my dietary supplement expert. >> certain products in that search warrant were seized. you can buy that currently on the air -- on amazon.com. it is being sold by other companies.

>> we are about to close this hearing, and you can supplement your answers to the committee in writing. >> when you were talking about 10%, you did not mean 15 million people. you said there might be that many you are taking some sort of dietary supplement and some may be taking bodybuilding supplements as well. >> that's correct. >> that does not mean that all are taking the banned substances. >> though other thing i want to underscore -- and i do not think the fda disagrees that of the products required under current law some kind of submission to fda before they enter the market. people -- these people are breaking the lock and the law needs to be enforced. the problem is enforcement. >> i think iraq the loss well. -- wrote the laws well.

on 20 many occasions, athletes have appeared before cameras and apologized for testing positive for a banned substance. they may not have intended to and just the substance, however, athletes sometimes fail to assume personal responsibility when they make a mistake, especially in cases where they have -- if they had consulted with their legal office or with the committee, they could have avoided it from the onset. that does not excuse bad actors in the sports nutrition industry. athletes need to be held accountable for their own actions. you have indicated that you believe that. in your prepared statement, you stated that the u.s. ada 's mission is to preserve and protect the athletes -- the help athletes. can you explain it the support to at least when they are considering taking a substance?

is there a dedicated hot line at to call to seek advice on supplements? in a recent case, a high-profile athletes failed to call the hot line and he tested positive for a banned substance. had the f. lee called the hotline, -- had the athlete called the hot line, he would not have ingested that banned substance. >> millions of athletes phone our jurisdiction. given the poor regulation, any product to take a multivitamin it to an anabolic type product, you run the risk of testing positive. we have had at least two cases, one with the jessica hardy case, were another athlete was taking a multivitamin and a panel after a case determined that the multivitamin that he took is

what caused his positive test for a steroid. same with the jessica hardy case. >> i believe that case was overturned later on appeal and @@@@ in place and we have not seen any numbers near that.

>> i am talking about dietary supplements that are legal. d.c. any events? >> we have had issues, signals and notices. they have all been acted on very quickly by industry. we have had recalls, a voluntary recalls where the industry acted very responsible. you compare that with other consumer products industries and it exceeds 60,000 for them to take action against a pharmaceutical on the market. for the assertions that they are not regulated, i would advise them to look at just how quickly they responded. >> the system is working? >> very well. >> let me ask you this. of the 58 dietary supplements mentioned in your testimony that

currently contain one or more of the three steroids, many of them are currently on the market? is it not true that the fda has the authority to move any of those products under the laws that we have here? >> i think our scientists have talked about the substances. some are and some are not. we do not know. i have a list of the drugs and names of the drugs on the market or were on the market when we did our checks. i believe that list was shared with the fda. i have the brand names. if you like, i can submit for the record. >> i would like you to. >> thank you very much, gentlemen. i am constrained to conclude the hearing by 4:00. senator hatch, would you like to make a closing comment? >> thank you, mr. chairman. you are always courteous. let me just say this to you.

we have done it are very dead level best to make sure these laws have the strength in them to be able -- to go to the safety and efficacy process of the fda could cost up to $1 billion or more. even as much as 15 years. there is no way anybody in the dietary supplement industry can go through that. by and large, the industry is a highly competent, a good instrument. it is inexcusable that we permit any of these anabolic steroids to be on the market. mr. tygart, i appreciate what

you are trying to do. it is a tough thing, because all of us hate to see a star athlete get chewed up. especially in the olympics. i hate to see in professional sports, too. sometimes it really is not their fault. many times it is. i hope that we all work together. if you can give us better ways of amending -- amending these laws are making them better than they are, i would be happy to consider that. i think there is enough language in the law that we have passed, that i have personally been a sponsor of, for fda and the dea to do their jobs. it will hopefully be helpful to you and and your group as well. we certainly do not want our folks in this country or any other country to be subject to

deleterious substances, which the fda has our right to take out of the market place automatically. it is not like the laws are not there. the question is, i would suggest to all of you -- this is my last sentence. that to really push the congress to give fda the resources it needs to do this job. the law is there. all we have to do is have the resources. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator hatch. the efforts to give the fda more resources have not been successful. i think there are some things that need to be done here, some real questions. i think the drug enforcement administration needs to answer a question which is not been answered today about why superdrol is not placed on its

schedule 3 list after it was identified as being an anabolic steroid. if he needs some revision on your listing, let us know. did not wait for our to come to you. -- do not wait for us to come to you. the business about waiting for us to ban a substance 10 years after the fda issued its first advisory and only after they received thousands of reports of adverse effects, including debts, that is not satisfactory. -- including deaths, that is not satisfactory. when the senator talks about the legitimate part of the industry, i think that most are bested legitimate. if you have 15 million people who are taking the supplements and steroids. although some of that is legitimate.

exposing millions of people to problems. from my view, i think we need to look of some pre-clearance issues. unless we find some way to solve that otherwise. the leagues have a question to answer -- why have you not adopted the anti-doping policy? perhaps the hearing is useful for all the questions which have emerged. thank you, all. we especially thank mr gunther, and wish you all well. that concludes our hearing. thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

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with the removal of sergio, personally, that immediately changed the situation, because sergio was a partial instrument in my view, in his own person. i'd lost that. i'd lost a real partner. if it was to lead to the withdrawal of the u.n., which was not clear, really, until i actually arrived, altogether in terms of its presence in

baghdad, that was going to change the waiting between the u.s. and the u.k., because i conceived the u.n. as being part of that waiting. so the answer is yes for those reasons. >> and before you got there, following the meeting in september in terms of what you did with your colleagues in the u.k., what was the understanding of the objective that was set for you? >> what i was clearly being asked to do was to support the american objective of returning iraq to the iraqis in a secure and stable state. so i was to represent the u.k. interest in that. and i was to do what i could to make sure that first of all,

the political process developed senseably and smoothly. second, that the u.k. team in the c.p.a. were well-organized, well-looked after, and working to the best of their capability. and third that what we were doing in baghdad fitted into the u.k. presence across iraq, most particularly in the south, but we can come to describing my -- in the south but also with those -- as the government called the provinces, which had u.k. personnel as leading political deputy administrators or actors in them, which may sound -- nasiriyah and entering stan. >> and and -- and kyrgyzstan.

>> and the situation was quite complex? >> yes. i didn't know what i was going to find on the ground in practice. >> what did you find on the ground? >> well, what i was told i would find at one point from the foreign office was a disfunctional administration, an administration which was not up to running iraq as it should be run at this stage. and the american part of that was also not functioning as we would have wished. to which my reply was, it's surely an exaggeration to call the american effort disfunctional. this is the superpower, this is a hugely powerful machine that must be doing things effectively if it's not doing everything effectively. so i need to judge that when i

come to it. i read some of john sars' final reports at the end of july, and when i came to it on the ground to jump forward and ants your question, i did indeed find that the coalition's capabilities were not fully up to the business of administering iraq. and was not fully in charge of the whole -- in iraq, because the military were operating separately from the coalition authority. >> so the military was operating quite separately from the coalition? >> in terms of lines of reporting? >> right. >> the only place at which the apex of administration of iraq came together between the military pillar and the civilian pillar, which was the c.p.a., was in the pentagon. the deputy secretary of defense and the secretary of defense

were the first points at which iraq was being administrated from one desk. >> so when you got there, you found a disfunctional c.p.a. how did you go about determining what you would do and how you would influence u.k. -- exert u.k. influence on that? >> well, i was in london before i went. when it was agreed that i would not be deputy administrator by u.k. special representative. and i said to ministers in london, i said this to the prime minister, do not regard me as an administrator in iraq. i am here to represent u.k. interests in iraq through whatever influence i can bring to bear, but the person who is

responsible to london, to the united kingdom as the country coresponsible under the resolution for the administrator of iraq is ambassador bremer, is that understood? and the prime minister said that he understood that. i wanted it to be clear that i could not be accountable for the administration of iraq. >> did you understand did he understand that? >> i don't think so. no. he didn't act as though he understood that. >> there was nothing in his instructions, i understand. >> no. i think he was being micro managed himself by the pentagon and that was almost his seoul focus as far as lines of reporting was concerned. >> you said before that relative not what you as his deputy within the c.p.a. was that a reflection of the

formality or was it just that he just didn't want somebody in the chain of command that was not american? >> both of those things. he didn't want -- to hand over to a northern american when he left to washington. and he was -- he was not, you know, 100% that way inclined and zero inclined the other. we talked this through, and there were pros and cons for either option deputy administrator or separate member of the u.k. but i understood he wanted his senior structure to be american, to rely on a deputy who was american, to report to the pentagon in an american reporting chain, and for the u.k. to do its own thing on the

side of that but to supply people for the c.p.a. as our coalition partners did, but not to the degree in which it was supported by and loyal to the american -- >> did it leave it open? >> yes. terms of the administrative capacities, but remember there was the m. & d southeast which in the american mind was the major british input into the running of iraq. >> you carefully did not say what you personally thought about this or what bremer thought. do you think that you should have been the deputy administrator and have been give an more formal role in this? >> no. i decided in the end it was better not to be deputy administrator, because i did not want to be in a position of

being instructed to shut up by a master -- i want ad voice in the u.k. interest which left me to use it as a matter of influence i had an put and personal management of my day rather than through any formal position. >> so in the that's in the end what you decided. when you weren't to see bremer in july, was it your idea and white hall's idea that actually you should have a formal part under brem center >> not really. because i talked this through with john at some point, perhaps in most detail with john when i was in london in early september. but i checked with him before i went to see bremer. and he had not been deputy administrator and thought that on balance that was probably the right arrangement. though the disadvantage --

there are disadvantages both ways, but the u.k. has a separate responsibility and needed to be able to put a veto down on the table if it disagreed with the way the united states was handling things, and you could not do that if you were deputy to an american administrator. >> with no difficulty in this senior british officer being deputy on the -- to the american commander? >> so this crealted disfunction between military sides of what was going on in iraq? >> i don't think so. i think the military probably have to have a single chain of command. the political situation was in structural terms more complicated than the military situation, and therefore, that didn't surprise me that there was a dichotomy there. >> but if you were talking about being able to exercise some sort of veto and not being

a deputy to bremer, did that mean -- in some way that almost put you in a position of being ambassador to iraq or in some ways bremer having accountability to the british government through you but that certainly never happened. 12k34r no. that's way tried to establish that bremer had a direct responsibility to london. but in practice he did not report to london. he relied on me to do that and to tell london what was going on. if london disgreed with something the united states was doing or wanted something to be done that was not happening, london would talk to washington. >> thank you. >> perhaps we go through the story, you can just identify to us not now but as we go through it the points at which you actually exercised this power of detail. but leave that i think -- would like to get back. >> yes, can i come back to your

early comment when you said bremer -- in the pentagon that was the apex. what was the apex in london? i mean, where was the command coming from london? >> the apex in london was the prime minister. the prime minister had appointed me. and the prime minister expected me to work to him, but of course in the british system, you work to the system. in practice there was a triangle in the british arrangement. -- which was the foreign policy administrator when he was in that position, the political direct john saurs in that position at that time and myself in baghdad.

we would have try angler teleconferences and other means of communication, and if the thee of us were clear that this was the way to go, it was my job to get that done in baghdad and persuade ambassador bremer, whatever, it was their job to make sure they were acting with ministerial authority in london. i came back to london once a month during my 6 1/2 months in baghdad, and when i came back to london, i would talk to ministers, normally to the prime minister amongst other ministers, as well as to officials. so although it sounds like a multiplied arrangement, it's entirely normal to the british system. the officials would work on a daily routine basis with their ranking officials, and it's london's job within the system

that officials make sure that they have ministerial clearance for instructions that they give overseas. >> and do you think the lines of communication were effective in terms of what you reported back? >> yes. i mean, there was understanding and clarity about the lines of reporting. that's not to say that there was understanding and clarity about how we got the job done and what resources we needed. but the communication and the line of command back to the prime minister was to my mind, not a problem. >> your line of communication was fine but not responsive to what was needed and what the situation was on the ground. >> yes to the latter. but that was primarily because we were having to follow the americans in almost everything that we did. and we could not achieve the

feeling of doubts where we perceived doubts unless the americans did most of the heavy lifting in that respect. >> before the break you said the arrangements were theoretical when they were aexceed and of course you've given reasons in response to my colleagues' question as to why you decided not to be a deputy to bremer, but how did that work on the ground in terms of the cohesiveness in other words how did it work with the british teams and how did you go about influencing what the americans were doing? >> by trial and error. there was considerable british input into the c.p.a. i'm talking here about the civilian side of things. i doubt the military was part of that. if the c.p.a. was roughly 1,200 people, the brits were about 99

-100 of those 1,200. most of those british were working within c.p.a. under the administrator. i was off to one side as the u.k. satellite, if you like, with my own small private office and advisors. and my first responsibility, and i said this to ambassador bremer when i first telephoned him on his own appointment, before i -- as soon as i knew that i would be coming. was loyalty to him and support for him in getting our joint job done in iraq. and it was the american approach, certainly ambassador bremer's approach that the duty of anybody working in baghdad, including the separate british representative was a, loyalty

to the united states, and b, practical support for what they were doing. i tried to provide that whenever i could using whatever materials i had to hand. if it came to disagreement, with bremmer or my wishing to suggest that beshould think of things in a different way from the way he was thinking, that was a matter of discussion between me and ambassador bremmer. >> what areas were there where there were disagreements or differences in approach or objective? >> well, he had an approach which was -- i think i would call it a driving approach. he had instructions from his president. he had seven steps a plan which you know about. and he thought that the way to implement that plan was to

create momentum behind it. and he expected me to be part of that momentum. the second or third day i was in baghdad, secretary colin powell came on a short visit, and he, bremmer and i sat in bremmer's office to talk about the political process and the seven steps. and i was asked for my views bicek tear powell. and i suggested, as i had done to bremmer in washington in july that it would be wise to think of options, political options, what if things don't happen as we predict which often does happen in a situation -- >> in other words not sticking to the plan? >> we're behind the seven step plan but what if the iraqis don't go along with that are we thinking of alternative routes

and in september i was give an direct and preemptry message from bremmer that i was to stick to the seven steps plan. that was what had been decided and this was the machine and this would be accomplished. and i was to support it. so i turned to some other subject with colin powell. and decided to see how things played out. but these were -- >> the deputy was issuing instructions to you? >> yes. >> and i was trying to suggest that there was a political discussion to be had. so in a situation like that, you take a step back. you consider what's happened, and you decide how you exercise your influence on the next occasion or how you put in your thoughts about the political process and whatever i was concentrating on in the next round of conversation.

>> but he was not reaccepttive to your advice and you were there outranking him in your own diplomatic career and you were offering advice and when you were offering advice he was telling you that you were to accept the order and that was it not to raise points of this kind even in a small conversation with he and colin powell? >> that would be the outward and immediate effect that he didn't want to hear suggestions about how to complete a satisfyry political process that were different from what the president had decided. >> and did they take into account the involvement of iraqis? because he was going ahead. did he engage effectively with the iraqi people? >> it didn't take two things, one was that and already in june ayatollah sis stani had

issue ad fatwa, a religious decree against part of the seven steps plan, which was having a constitution before there were elections which was ambassador bremmer's clear view of where he wanted to go so ambassador bremmer already knew there was iraqi rance to the seven steps plan and at that point his action was to drive harder with the plan that he had. there was also something called the c.p.a. vision for iraq. which was written down. which i thought didn't amount to a clear enough mission statement actually for the coalition in iraq as we might come to later. but which was a vision for iraq, and was publicly available to iraqis. that may be clear that some flexibility adaptation in the

coalition's approaches might well be necessary, but that was not the message that i got from ambassador bremmer in that particular conversation. >> do you think that there was too much emphasize on the sectarian approach as opposed to looking at the iraqi situation, the way the americans were approaching reconstruction? >> well, it was more tan than the reconstruction. it was the attempt to establish a new iraqi government. so it was highly political. and i thought, and the u.k. approach was behind this all the way. that the iraqis needed to be both consulted and indeed deproomed and groomed and brought to the point where they could start taking decisions

and needed to be quite closely onboard for the political process that we followed. >> and what role did you play in ensuring that happened, because you were obviously operating in that manner and did you succeed in changing views? >> well, if you hit a small hiccup, as i did on my third day with bremmer in that he wasn't going to easily accept political advice, you think of other ways to operate. and one of those ways that i chose was to have my own relationship with members of the iraqi governing council. primarily to persuade them to go along with the american plan. so my first duty was always loyalty to the american plan, but to explore with them their alternative thoughts if they wanted to bring them, and some of them clearly had other ways of approaching these questions, and to try to handle those to

see if they could be dealt with without deviating from the american plan and to make my own judgments on how far the seven steps plan was going to work and separately within the c.p.a. itself i was constantly talking as were my close advisors with the more than political team, with other parts of the c.p.a. machine as to whether we thought what the administrator wanted was going to work in practice, whether we should put forward separate advice. so you do a an increasing multiple of things to get through to a good sense approach to the administration of iraq, even if the administrator isn't quite there yet. and that's the way you operate. >> so within the constraints you're finding room to maneuver to actually work on your own strategies to assert influence

and you were keeping u.k. informed of all of that? >> yes. i was always pretty frank and open in my reports to london how things were going include that conversation with jerry bremmer. can i bring another point in here? coming back to best 46 case scenarios, it was very clear to me, even before i got to baghdad, that the united states had been working on and continued to work on the best-case scenario. that they could administer iraq and turn it back to iraqis who could administer iraq with the lowest possible input of resources and troops, and in the most direct way possible. and they didn't ensure against things over than the best-case scenario, with a higher number of troops or with alternative

political plans. and that's -- bremmer was responding to the pentagon in trying to round and run a best-case scenario approach, and that's why he didn't want alternative plans. but when i talked to other members of the american team, when i talked informally to the military, to the intelligence agencies, to other people who were operating, i found a very much more gloomy prognosis of what was going on than i felt or understood ambassador bremmer was reporting back to the pentagon. >> the report which was published in february describes that at this point the quality of the whole enterprise was a disjointed and ad hoc policy. >> the intelligence report which intelligence report was

that? >> this was the intelligence report of the united states published in february. let me just quote what it says here. >> was this an nic estimate? >> it says here the absence of a well-defined doctrine caused the approach to reconstruction to have a disjointed and ad hoc quality. >> it's a big question to go into the whole c.p.a. quality. >> are you happy with that description? >> yes. the whole american effort between the civilian and military as pecks of compartmentalized, stove piped. stove piped was a word often used including amongst americans. the american and civilian arm were not working smoothly together. there were differences of view

within the military and there were differences of view between the pentagon and the state department. and these were all being played out as we were trying to at minister a country which there were also differences views in london and washington in coming to the records of the conversations between london and washington. >> can we now move on because we touched earlier about the relationship between the c.p.a. in baghdad and -- [inaudible] how did that work in practice during our time? >> the southeast in the arrangements for iraq was regarded both by london and by washington as very much a british concern. and to the extent that very little american money was going into m & d southeast, and the basra area.

which led to the british deciding that quite early on that they had to bring in british money through -- british support for the military, and to create almost an independent sub administration in that part of iraq. i inherited that situation when i arrived. i went down very early on to see my counterpart in basra -- [inaudible] who was deputy administrator to bremmer and was in the c.p.a. command. >> we heard from him -- >> and so i left him most of the time to get on with his own operation, to report independently to london, to look for resources independently from london and to report to bremmer, but we saw each other's telegrams. we talked when necessary when we could help each other and i

supported him with bremmer when he want that had, and i supported him with london less often when he need that had. but on occasion he did need to make an impact on london, because he didn't have enough resources. but on the whole, i think you should take my answer to indicate that we worked fairly separately, and we didn't have daily contact on what was going on from my point of view in basra and his point of view in the rest of iraq. >> in other words, you -- to what happened to c.p. itself? >> no. i was -- any -- i exerted of what was going on in the southeast would have been done through the c.p.a. system as a whole or in response to a particular question from the southeast or from london. >> ok. can i just interrupt, there was reference a minute ago on an intelligence report, what

exactly was it a published report by the inspector general for reconstruction which was published -- it wasn't anywhere in -- testimony. >> my other question is about deboxification. because when we talked to saurs, he said the coalition wasn't step further and was necessary under debathification. but it would be a mistake to think the debathification under the policy was necessary. is that your impression? >> the debathification decree was issued way before i got there. within four days of ambassador bremmer arriving. i met when i arrived net consequences of that. and i wouldn't disagree from what john saurs told you

earlier. that this was on balance and understandable decision. that the sheer politicians in particular were strongly against bringing ex-baathists, particularly senior baathists into the senior administration or got to the council or whatever. and that ambassador bremmer made quite a careful judgment of how far he could go with debathification. what did not happen was defined -- to find people to run the government who were not baathists, and that decree was issued before a clear route had been firmed to filling the posts necessary for the minimal government of iraq. so there was an era not so much in the debathification decree

or even if i could add, the decree disbanding the iraqi army. there was a failure to fill the gaps, which those institutions performed in iraq through any other means, which should have made them think about the wisdom of those two decrees or the timing of them. on debathification when i arrived, ambassador bremmer was handing over the implementation of that decree to the iraqi economy -- to the commee to ray med chalabi who was deeply against the baathists and in my opinion was taken too far for the -- including in the professions in the academic and legal and other professions and in the civil serven't when we needed iraq's middle class to be performing its functions if it were to administer it

properly, and we all tried to persuade both ambassador bremmer and mr. chalabi to allow more baathists back in practice if they were not senior baathists who had taken responsibility for some of the awful things that had happened under saddam hussein and in some effects ambassador bremmer mitigated some of the effects of his decree through the implementation of it. >> now you were sending -- [inaudible] and what sit having an impact opt levels? >> the u.k.'s [inaudible]? >> yes. >> they were performing extremely effectively under very trying circuses. >> i mean, how was the interacting with -- within the c.p.a. when you say it [inaudible] what areas were they concentrating on?

>> on the whole, any other nationality, -- american in the c.p.a. was regarded as completely integrated spot c.p.a. process, so the two younger officers we had in the government in the political section of the process, one of them a very good arabic speaker, and his colleague, julie chapel were both very effective younger members of the government team, and the -- the bath hearth was the deputy administrator for operations under ambassador bremmer, hugely effective, trusted by bremmer, regarded with great crpt by bremmer. there were many other britain's working in the c.p.a. who did their job well and got the respect of the americans for the job that they were doing. if somebody did not fit as one

of two didn't, they were asked to move on, but on the whole that was only a tiny proportion of our 100 or so people operating there. >> ok. you began to touch on the political -- and i'm going to hand over to john to take up the political process. >> thanks. yes. i supposed the focus of your influence on iraqi politics and politicians was the achievement on the 15th of november of 2003 of getting a statement about the transition. could you give us a little bit of a narrative as to how that was accomplished, given the fact earlier that the sistani fatwa had been called up by iraqis and not the occupying powers, and how did you get from the -- of the to the 15th of november?

>> prior to looking at a plan b, the stalemate was that ambassador bremmer did not want elections to take place in iraq without constitutional principals being laid down which would make it clear what those elections were all about. a perfectly reasonable and normal approach. ayatollah sis stani ayatollah sistani did not iraq's constitution to be written by or influenced by non-iraqis. he wanted iraqis to be elected to draw up the constitution, amongst other things. that was a stalemate. and it was some months before ambassador bremmer decided that the seven step plan as he had designed it, and as it had been approved in washington, would not work in the order that he

had drawn it up. so we went through a number of discussions amongst ourselves, with the iraqi government council as to how we could get around ayatollah sistani, which was the way it was expressed in the early stages and tried various approaches. when it was clear that ayatollah sistani would not back down and particularly the religious shiah members of the governing county critical would not do anything but support sistani, we had to find another route around it. and it was a quite well-known meeting in the history of this amongst those who were part of the -- who were participating when i eventually stopped listening to the tewing and crowing between ambassador

bremmer and the iraqi government council and interjerningted that when there was a chickenen and egg problem, one way to get through sit to design a double circuit, two chickens, two eggs. with some humor and disbelief on the american side. to try and explain that if you have ab, ab, then it's a matter of subjective choice as to whether the b comes before the a or not. and indeed that's actually in the end what happened in we designed a process of drawing up some preliminary constitutional principals through the administrative law, leading to a first round of elections after which there would be the writing of a proper constitution by elected officials, leading to a second round of elections under that constitution. and that was the heart of the

15 november agreement. >> was the only means of communication communicating through ayatollah sistani then through the others or were they available to yours? >> there was no way i was going to succeed in getting a private conversation with ayatollah sistani who refused to even see the administrator. the channel of communication was either through the shiah members of the governing council or through the written word, because ambassador bremmer did on rare occasions write to ayatollah sistani and got a message back through his own ack lieds. -- ack lites or through other third parties when ambassador brahui my of the u.n. became

part of the action. he had an advisor, a lebanese advisor who himself went down to see ayatollah sistani and became a conduit. ambassador bremmer also had one other arab advisor who was a conduit to sistani. >> when with brahui my's arrival, the ayatollah would not see him either? >> yes. the ayatollah did see him. it was a very deliberate move of the ayatollah not to deal with the occupying authority. >> yes. thank you. there was not only the need to get around he in the shiah interest but you have many effects of interest within the i.g.c., basic ones, -- and shiah. but how much of your energy had to go into trying to understand

and manage the various relationships within the council itself in order to arrive at the conclusion of the 15th of november? >> well, i understood my primary task in practice was to help make the political process work. without that there was no structure for anything else we did and without that we would not get out of iraq. and so i got to know more members of the governing council. and with the most senior ones, their immediate advisors and deputies, i would have my own separate conversations with them. i would occasionally. i would always attend meetings of the governing council and administrator. i occasionally chaired meetings of the governing council when the administrator was absent, and dealt with the whole political substance of what we were talking about in those ways. i found that i had particular

work to do with the kurdish members of the governing council. partly because the iraq the arab-iraq-kyrgyzstan dichotomy was a vital part of the whole substance partly because of the british relationship with the kurdish nation, but i also did work with the senior members of the governing council to get on the shiah side who wanted another channel of political discussion. than the administrator. which was viewed with some distaste, i think, by some members of the american members of the c.p.a. and by the administrator. but i was there with an independent remitt and i had my government's authority to do that. and they couldn't prevent me from doing that. in fact your function of not

having become a deputy? >> yes. that i couldn't i think if i'd been a deputy i would have still participated. but those conversations helped to ease the members of the governing council around bremmer's -- and was loyal to the overall mission of the administrator. and helped him achieve both the 15 of november agreement and later the transition into administrative law. >> looking back to your time there, what exactly was the most important achievement in making progress under the c.p.a. in your time there? >> yes. the -- because the political process we set through those two organs, the november 15 agreement and the tal. and the t.a.l. have lasted to this day as the basis for the political development of iraq, around which security and the

central situation in iraq had to circulate. i regard that as the success of the c.p.a. under ambassador bremmer, it was his achievement. and i should comment, here, i think that through his year as administrator, ambassador bremmer increasingly came to understand what was necessary to develop the process of returning iraq to its own sovereignty and to its own people. in a way which washington did not always understand, to the degree to which i think bremmer found the more he ppeds, that decisions had to be taken in iraq on the basis of with a would work on the ground, the more distance was created between him and washington. >> a not untypical predicament. i think. thank you.

all right. do you want to take up some points? >> yes. i'm curious about the discretion of your own role. we've talked a bit about it. but it is interesting. the -- you've explained 1483 described the u.k. and the u.s. as joint occupying authority. it was a coalition provision of authority not a united states provisional authority, and describe how within the administration the two countries were pretty well integrated. but there is this question hanging over all of this is -- of leadership. and you talk about loyalty to an american -- this was not a joint british american plan it was an american plan. is that fair? >> yes. i was at the u.n. when the seven step plan was drafted and

agreed, but -- and i'm sure that john saurs john sours had an input into that plan but i couldn't see what laid behind it. you're absolutely right. in theory we were co-responsible for iraq. in practice we were a tencht full less of the practical capacity to do things in iraq. and the practical nomplely -- normally was more influential than the theoretical in the way things happened. and it was described as sort of a role you picked up for yourself. almost sounds like picking up from where you left off in the u.n. except for very different circumstances, that is working closely with the political

leaders that you found around you -- not agree with anything that the u.k. or americans were doing but try to find a me to negotiateuative work through -- did you see this as being a particular application of the skills that you brought to baghdad. >> you tend to use the skills that you've honed over the years rather than trying to look for new ones. that's the stair tori you're familiar with. -- that's the territory you're familiar with. and what we're talking about is working with a superpower that likes to do things its own way and with the top decisions being taken by a closed circuit of americans. and working with reality. those two things. the brits work well with americans as anybody does.

in the international situation. and the americans were extremely generous to us in terms of integrating us into the system in the c.p.a. i was in an office within bremmer's area of the republican part. his office was at one end of the complex, our joipt private office which you might call a third room in old foreign office terms and i was in saddam's deputy office at the other end of the private office so we were in the same complex. we saw a lot of each other's material when we decided to show it to each other but there was a lot of american material that i never saw. and there was i think a good spirit in the c.p.a. of international cooperation but absolutely no question at all that we were working to an

american leadership. that american leadership was vowsiff rouse. the leadership of the military was different than the leadership of the civilian team, the leadership of the whole business from the pentagon in washington was different from the state department and not working well with the state department, which produced the air biss and world specialists that occasionally were or were not part of bremmer's team. i had to get my influence going in that system as best as i could by judging what was happening against what the reality on the ground was going to make happen whether we liked it or not. and where the american decisions did not seem to -- with the events taking place on the ground, i would try to use as pecks of the situation to try to get the americans to adjust that policy because that

backed up the arguments i was making, and i was used to doing that in the security council. and that helped. because the americans are and were capable of taking decisions in the american domestic context that were not necessarily going to produce the results that they really wanted on the ground in a country like iraq, and i was trying to mend the process when i saw that as being likely to happen. >> and you described earlier when asked a question from sir martin that this meeting from the with the prime minister in september where he put a lot of stress on improving the peace foreand how everything we've heard about the iraqi police force would indicate that that was totally unrealistic. whatever you and john sawyers decided to try to do to put together a plan. how was the unreality of some of the expectation ins london

fed back? must be -- because you got to baghdad. the role that the police force played and pair military force, how hated it was and how difficult it would be to build up anything to -- iraqi society effectively? >> it must have been just as difficult for london as it was for me in baghdad. i took the approach that if i disagreed with something that was happening on the ground and was trying to change it, that i would not go weeping to london about it and ask them to get washington to persuade bremmer to do something differently. it was my job to persuade bremmer, or we'd have to go along with the administrator's. >> washington was in the lead. we had a relatively poor input into pentagon decisionmaking

about which you have heard from other witnesses, and therefore, there was a sense of frustration in london that becouldn't always persuade the americans to do what might be our preference, because they were in charge. they were going to do their own thing anyway, and we had to try to make it work on the ground. so there was sense of frustration in both places. some things were going reasonnably well, but the police area was not one of them. and frankly, in 2009, it still isn't one of them. it never came right, and we never got iraqis to create a police force of the strength of saddam. the police training exercise was actually run by an extremely competent british former chief constable, douglas brand, whom the americans hugely respected.

but he had hardly any resources to do it with. he had to invent a training program, which we eventually did with jordan, which produced a far number of lower recruits going through the system in far too short a training time than was -- to create a police force on the ground, so the sense of hurry we had from our two capitals -- depens the production of well-trained, well-behaving policemen or not ground. so there was attention there. >> and into that gap, when it wasn't a police force, the american particularly because of the tribe but also the british forces have to go. did you have any sense of the way that issues of detainees and interrogation and so on were being handled at the time? >> not in detail, because there

were no british in that particular system. the prison system was run by the american military in primarily in american area. i can't speak for the southeast. they must have had some things but i regard it as separate from the question you're asking. i had no input into those arrangements. if ambassador bremmer had an input into them, because they were being run by the u.s. military, and he didn't have direct responsibility for them, i was not brought into those discussions. we did have some concerns that too many detainees were being held without being processed through the courts. this was something which anne klute, for instance, as the prime minister's special envoy for humanitarian and human rights affairs was concerned with.

we would raise those concerns with bremmer and with general sanchez, the american commander on the ground to see if more people could be put through the courts so that innocent people were not held for longer than necessary. we only had a limited amount of success in that area. but we didn't have day-to-day sight of what was going on. >> now in the -- the revelation of abu ghraib came after you had left baghdad, but we heard last week that the military at least were aware that some things had been going on there, and that this was likely to come out. were you made aware of this time bomb of imminent media disaster as well as -- and for very good reason in terms that the practice was not the way we

were supposed to be behaving? >> as it happened, i was not made aware. for two reasons, one, the international committee of the red cross did not accepted me a copy of their report even though the u.k. was not responsible in iraq. secondly, he did not pass a copy of the report over to me, which perhaps partly answers your earlier question about responsibility for these areas. because i understood or was told by my own legal advisor there might be questions about the u.k.'s spobalt for detention facilities in m & d southeast, i got my legal advisor to obtain a copy of his report from his contact in the c.p.a., go through it. actually while i was away on a visit elsewhere, and check what

was relevant for british concerns and make sure those parts were reported back to london and to the ministry of defense, which he did. he did not go through the rest of the report or give me any other occasion that there were any -- other indication that there were any other -- so i missed an opportunity to focus on it. >> and the senior british officers didn't contrary -- this to you either? >> no. they did not. >> so you were not able to give london any warning that this issue was likely to blow up at some time? >> i do not know whether london otherwise got a full copy of the report. i think we sent them the parts of the report that affected british responsibility. you would have to ask other people when they saw the full report. but when abu ghraib, the issue

became widely public, that was a surprise and shock to me. and -- >> and can i ask you a bit more on the civil military relationship. you've given an indication that when you started there was very little prospect of extra american forces being brought in. and we've also heard from the military officers a sense of surprise at the shift in strategy in november, 2004. in the sense that as they thought they were getting on top of things, that all of a sudden the united states had gone off in a different direction. and we've also heard from -- that he felt that they were making progress wit