style of judging and writing. because there is is constantly changing internal dynamic, the addition of a new ingredient changes the whole. it does not cause other justices necessarily to change their views, but it does open up the possibility of a kind of shifting of majorities, a shifting lot within the court. >> a new judge to happens to be hispanic will bring great diversity to the bench. when a visitor walks into the court room, there is only one african-american justice right now. adding a hispanic justice will increase the diversity there, and adding a second female voice will certainly do that, too. when you think of how america's have male and half female, to have nine justices and only one be female certainly appears

quite lopsided from the reality of visitors lives. even to of the nine will not be representative of america, but it will be more than there are now. . who can give that up pretty strong. with better ginsberg is from brooklyn. samuel alito is from trended

jersey. you wonder if you can have an east coast hang with the addition of joe's -- the justice. >> is in this room where there will gather 48-72 hours after hearing oral argument in the as they began looking at the court. >> this is that this is what their corn to decide. and the start casting votes. the start with the chief justice. typically, it is of to the ninth justice to have his say and then once every justice has been able to speak, they may have some give-and-take among the others. also, they go in order of seniority.

even though it is very serious business, there are no secretaries or law clerks. it is just the nine justices. before the start, they do a couple things. justice o'connor used to say that she just loved the idea of having a human contact before they were about to disagree vigorously. after they meet in conference, carried by messenger fromthe justice wants to make fellow justice about he or she might be prepared to rule, or changes

suggested in language, the justice rights that

will lose one of your five, then you will be much more

agreeable to accepting what that justice would like in the opinion in order to hold the vote. that happens just sell them. you have to negotiate in order to hold together your vote. if you have a seven vote majority, if one of the seven says a do not like that he did not want to abandon, but that is a boat you really don't need. it will probably be less accommodating than if it is a 5-4. >> this is our moment. the guy from reverse is always pushing the most to get through so he can -- a guy from reuters is always pushing to get through. the supreme court public intermission office says here is the material, make of it what you will. we will make sure you have the

material. that is an enormously invaluable function. it is also nice not to have the sense that someone is trying to spin you. >> i like the pageantry, i like to hear the justice announce what is in the opinion. then i raced down the stairs to the court press area where we all have our laptops set up, and i write a first version of that story, so it can get on our internet site. essentially, you would have to take all day and then file a story that would appear in the next day's newspaper. now, readers want to know as soon as possible what the court ruled. >> my sense about the press and the court is that we are in the early stages of a profound shift in which the press attention to the court, the press awareness of the court is going to be so much smaller over time, that maybe the american people will find the court even more of a stranger to them. the newspaper industry's decline is something that is probably

not going to be reversed. one cannot imagine an economic shema since about the press and the court is that we are in the early stages of a profound shift in which the attention to the court, the press awareness of the court, if you want to put it in those terms, is going to be some small over time, that maybe the american people will find the court even more of a stranger to them. the newspaper industry's decline is something that is probably not going to be reversed. one cannot imagine an economic model that will keep that medium viable or restore it to its sense former prominence at any about the press and the court is that we are in the early stages of a profound shift in the --

so, the question arises, foreseeable time in the future, who will be the chronicler of the supreme court? who will tell the american people what their supreme court this. who will be paying attention? i am not sure i know the answer to that. to some degree, the electronic media as it is and as it will develop over time can take up the slack. the pressure in the electronic media for a constant, 24 coverage enhances brevity.

>> has the new media made it more difficult? it has made it more challenging and exciting. if i wrote for the next day's paper, who would care? everyone would know it by the time they woke up the next morning and got their newspaper. what they want to know at 11:00 on the day of the ruling is how the justices ruled, and what they want the next day is something that is more terms of reaction. >> critics have said that the press corps is essentially there on bended knee. we are part of the institution. we treat the justices as if they were untouchable gods, and that sort of thing. that kind of criticism simply misunderstand the role of the press.

even though we tried to be as detached as we can be from the court as the court is from the political winds, it does not hurt, and i think it helps enormously for a reporter who is covering the court to be aware of the answer, to have some sense, not of simply being an apologist for the court, but to be able to experience the awe of the place, the granis and majesty of -- the grand ness and majesty of the place. >> in the future, i think the supreme court might be in pace with the country on the law, maybe even head of the country on the law, as it has been at different times. terms of technology, that will behind the rest of us. >> a lot of people say it is a

very secretive institution. no, it is not. it does most of its work in the open. as they like to say, the work comes in the front door and goes out the front door. >> you are watching c-span to america and the courts. we continue with our encore presentations from c-span's supreme court week. >> mr. roberts, we will hear from you now. >> after punishing mr. helper with two years in prison and a $5,000 fine -- >> do you remember your first oral argument? >> absolutely. i was very nervous when i did my last oral argument as well. if you were appearing before

the supreme court and you are not nervous, you don't really understand what is going on. >> you are certainly in a moment. it is all about fielding questions and using the time strategically so that you respond to the questions. >> 8 physical movements that may be going on, it is really quite remarkable. >> we will talk to attorneys who have argued numerous cases in front of the supreme court. they will take us through the experience of oral argument in the courtroom and show how and where they prepare for this crucial one hour that can potentially sway the justices. we begin in a room just down the hall from the supreme court chamber, where attorneys gather argument. >> they come in and give practical pointers. they try hard to put people at ease to be before going into the

courtroom. you get to meet opposing counsel if you have not met them already. it is friendly. a lot of nervous energy in their. >> it is designed to calm down lawyers who are doing arguments for the first time, to make sure they do not tell jokes or attempt to tell jokes during their oral arguments or not refer to their familiarity with one of the justices. and that indeed they will survive the experience. they ought to see it as a place where they can make their best case and the court will hear decision. >> we wanted to enter the courtroom prepared and ready, and both sides have an equal chance at winning the case. the attorneys are instructed to be there at 9:15 in the morning. irregulars all know to be there.

sometimes you do not know your opponent. it might be new york and california. attorneys to all hang out around the same courthouse. they exchanged greetings and are all glad to see each other. they go over the events that will occur that day and let them know if opinions are coming down. the absences of any justices who might be reduced, answer any questions they might have, and offer them cough drops, aspirin, anything like that that they might need to make them feel more comfortable. the feedback i have gotten over the years, they like it very much. >> the honorable, the chief justice and is hosted justices of the supreme court of the united states. oyez, oyez, oyez. the court is now sitting. god save the united states and this honorable court.

>> when you are sitting in the chair getting ready to argue, your waiting for them to come in from behind the bench through the curtains. they are called in by the marshal. it is a very formal entry, and everyone rises to show respect. then the gavel is pounded and people sit down and the court is called into session. it is always very ceremonial. the building is majestic, and the procedures are high ceremony, very traditional. nothing informal and modern about the way the court conducts its proceedings. very, very traditional, but ii would not change it.

i have never heard and advocates say they would like to see the some way. a lot of reverence for the court. >> it is a very powerful experience. i think everyone feels it, even people who have been before the court many, many times still get a rush when it happens. one of the lawyers on my staff, quite a good lawyer, i went to him when i was new in the office and said, how do you feel when you argue? do you have butterflies? >> he said, i do, but i decide is like playing ball. you are nervous until the first hit. after that, it is fine. >> when your first argument arrives, the uniform reaction among everyone is, i cannot believe i am here. what i remember was enormous

pressure to perform. that is what i feel every time i am there. it was probably most intense the first time, because i understood that if i did not do well, i probably would not get to come back. for many lawyers, is the career, to argue before thei wanted to do it more than once, so it was intimidating,>> i don't know if i would callit creates a certain nervousness on people who appear in the court. i had a voting rights case before the court. skilled or well prepared as an advocate. i got the sense that the court was reaching out to help him, and i wanted to know, why not me? of melodrama i won the case. one of the things i remember -- ultimately, i won the case. one had the full 30 minutes. justices held off on their questions for a while to let

you get in five minutes or so of your argument, and then the questions began to fly. when i argued under chief judge -- under chief justice rehnquist, the rhythm was quite different. he ran it in a military way, were you got 30 minutes. when you got to the end of your time, if you were mid-syllable, he would say thank you, and that was the end of the story. i had to get accustomed to that difference in rhythm. now under chief justice roberts, we are back to a more relaxed sense in the court. i think largely because chief justice roberts was an advocate before the court a number of he is allowed, he identifies with those who are standing up and

arguing cases, that maybe they should be allowed to finish their sentences before they are told to sit down. >> is important for lawyers to be nervous. anxiety helps to improve performance. it is very much like being an athlete, and having some anxiety before the meet begins helps you level. that is what you want to do when you go to the supreme level. i feel that way about other courts, but you want to perform at your best. lot if the justices and advocates are fully prepared. that will help them do your job, it will help your client when the case. unlike many other koreans, you do not really what very far. if you'd like many other courtrooms. your seated right next to the podium. you just stand up and slide over a few inches.

for me is about taking a deep breath and saying mr. chief justice, may it please the court. and then you are off, and have a few sentences that you have chosen to deliver to the court, but you will start getting questions usually within the first minute or two. >> each of the justices has their own unique style about questioning. we have some people who have inothers like to spend out long hypothetical. >> would you explain again why it was irrelevant? was that if the gun was inoperable or not? >> there are nine people up there, and i am with them, and we are talking.

it is a conversation. i have no awareness of the court room, the people in the courtroom, any physical movements that may be going on. willit is really quite remarkable. it is this physical closeness, proximity. there is something about the p a system in the course that is very sensitive. from the justices, if they whispered, one could hear their questions. some lawyers have a real problem. every once in a while they look down at their notes and they forget where the question is coming from. it could be coming from any place. particularly when justice

ginsberg came on, and there were two women. a person would turn and say no, justice ginsburg, and it would have been a question from justice o'connor. when justice o'connor left, there was a party, and they gave out t-shirts that said "i am not center, i am ruth." of the other ones that i am not ruth, i am sandra." >> how do you single this out, and how are we certain there is an injury to your client that she would not have experience for other reasons? >> it is very intense. once you start, you are certainly in the moment, and it is all about justice, fielding questions and using the time strategically so that you respond to the question. you cannot persuade the justice if you don't answer what they

have asked. you also have to remember that you have a limited amount of time, at most you will have 30 minutes. often the argument may be 10 or 15, depending on whether you had to split it with another party. you have to cover a lot of ground and the time you have. while answering the question, getting across police, trying to change the subject you need to, still feel like you have addressed the concerns that have been expressed by the justice. >> there are some questions that are real questions and the justices want to know the answer.

other times they are talking to a fellow justice through you. you are like a ventriloquist's dummy. that will go back and forth and you will be pushed. one thing the justices do is take your argument and move it to the next level and the next level after that, because the court is concerned with resolving not only the case before it but thinking about how their decision will affect similar or related cases down the road. what will be the impact of president? one of the answers that is often given -- you just cannot restrain yourself from saying that is not this case. usually one of the justices will say, we know that. so the argument goes on for a while, and one of the bad signs questions stop. it means you have either not persuaded them or they have figured it out already and there is nothing more you can add. under the best of circumstances, it means you have

been so persuasive they don't need to hear anything further from you. but then you sit down and the respondents's lawyer gets up and he or she has the job of setting out that argument but also trying to poke holes in the argument that was made by the petitioner. >> it is not made for tv, so that answers your giving work usually not wonderful sound bites that the press would love to report and an audience would like to cheer over. it is a much more scholarly see on television. it is designed to persuade them, based on the facts in the record of the case and the language of the statute, to bring those materials to bear in a concise and persuasive way, and to do it in a very small amount of time. you have to be extremely well

prepared if you are going to do well. you have to know your case backwards and forwards, better than anyone in the court room. you have to be able to recall it very quickly and we've been into a narrative that you are giving to the court while responding to other questions. it is very challenging. they are all brilliant. americans should be enormously proud of their court. the supreme court is excellent, all the way across the bench. it is very challenging for advocates to essentially argued at that level and meet their expectations. >> does it stop being a quota because it is somewhere between eight and 12? >> a lot of people have the impression it is just a dog and

pony show, what can somebody tell me in half an hour that will make a difference? the answer is that it is probably quite rare, although not unheard of, that oral argument would change my mind. but it is quite common that i go in with my mind not made up. a lot of these cases are very close, and you go in on a knife's edge. persuasive council can make the difference. >> it would be very rare to be able to talk for 25 minutes. ordinarily you get peppered usually within the first minute or two. it used to be sometimes within the first 20 seconds, but lately they seem to be giving advocates a little more time.

you can get questions from any justice at any time, and your job is to answer the questions. it is not really about coming with a prepared speech. most of the time that i spent preparing for argument is spent preparing for anticipating the questions and preparing answers i think i would like to give to those questions. sometimes that involves thinking of hundreds of questions they might ask, even though they will not ask more than 50 or so in the course of the half hour. it is a lot of questions. they interrupt each other. there was one time when i was arguing -- i was answering the question from one justice and other justice cut in and ask another question. justice rehnquist said, let her finish her answer. in effect it was the chief

umpiring for me. my reaction was as if he had said, she is worth listening to. >> in talking about whether one focuses on a particular justice, i think skilled advocates before the court understand that that ought to be familiar with the views of the justices, based upon what they have done in related cases, and be prepared to recognize questions that actually are the results of the set of positions the justice has taken. it is not a very smart approach as an oral advocate to seem to ignore the other justices and focus physically on another pursue justice, who may well be the pivotal justice. i don't think they like that very much. they are not then scanned.

hin-skinned -- they are not thin-skinned. i was convinced that justice stevens was with me every step of the way. he was asking great questions and looking benignly at me as i argued. i even thought there was a nod somewhere. when the opinion came out, it was 7-2, and he was one of the dissenters. i wrote a law review article about the issue of was addressing in the lawsuit, and essentially said don't take people for granted on this the up issue. justice stevens wrote a dissent that is a roadmap of how legislation and administrative actions ought to be taken to steer clear of some of the problems he saw in the federal statute i was defending. . .

-- i think it is helpful. the more that you know about the court and the president and the way they do their job, it is more of an advantage. i do not think there are very many advocates the show for the first time and have done a wonderful job because they have mastered their case they had anticipated questions without knowing precisely what the justice -- what justice brier

might ask. >> she was not engaged in bonafide services were the governor argued that nancy temple was the central figure in this episode. but how do you know it is not an affirmative defense? >> it is often difficult for the public to understand what is happening because it is very complex and the issues are often about statutory interpretation and so they are unraveling different words in the statute and talking about the enactment and how different areas of the statute intersect. i think that a discussion of that type is difficult for the public to follow. there are other cases that are easier to get their arms around.

i had a case about recruiting 8th grade athletes and first and the protections that would apply in the recruitment process. a lot of that was about the potential for a coach to unduly influence an athlete by making calls to the home. at -- in a case like that, people could listen. a white light will go on when you have five minutes remaining when your time is expired, a red light goes on. when the red light goes on, you were supposed to stop. when justice rehnquist was presided, you are really supposed to stop. but some want to raise an issue that i rose with by opposing counsel.

first of all -- >> does it matter to you if you win a case 5-419-0 or 8-1? >> i think that a win is a wind. -- a win is a win. there are situations where there are issues that one wanted to have nailed down that were not nailed down. one of my colleagues said that you would rather lose 9-0 because it is 5-4, you always think what you could have done to push one justice over to my column. i think that those of the end skirted nine-zero, there's nothing you could have done. it is a hopeless case.

5-4, there was a point that you could have been able to shift one vote. even when i was unhappy with the court's decisions and felt that i was robbed, the supreme court is so impressive to visitors. i think that they get the sense that these are very serious people. they are trying to do the best they can. i would like to take others into the court and have them watch smart people ask probing questions and trying to find helpful answers to the issues that are before them. >> there are not a mysterious body. i do not know why someone would

view them as mysterious. i do not like the idea of everything being televised. i think is great for the justices. they continue to have the same persona of someone who is on television all the time and is quickly recognized. i think it has that advantage i don't think of them as mysterious there is really no court that i know of that does this prove they're not regarded as mysterious. their decisions are all public. the proceedings are public and people can come if they want. they should come to see the court in action and so they can see the building in person. >> i think that the supreme court is viewed as an institution that is worthy of

their respect and trust. we have things like bush the core -- like busch bea gore -- like bush vs. gore. three very difficult times, which have been able to keep justice in focus. we can understand that is of value and can not undermined. i think that the notion is that if we have veered, or left the path, that is the only answer to a meaningful and constructive

future. >> you can watch all of the interviews at supreme court -- at c-span.org/supreme court. >> beginning monday, a rare look at the highest court with 10 supreme court justices about the court, their work and the history of the iconic court building. did your own copy of your original documentary on dvd. it is part of the american icons collection. this is one of the many items

available at c-span.org/store. tomorrow, a discussion on foreign policy. after that, a look at barack obama's achievements with stephen hess and dan thompson -- thompson -- thomasson. >> now look at the 2008 presidential campaign this book about how different from those in the past to do this is about 90 minutes. >> good morning. i and the chair of the panel. we have a series of really interesting papers this morning. i am going to go in the order of

the program. i will first introduce andrew. he is the editor of the paper. the paper they will be presenting is seeking the panel. >> we will try not to spill that. we will call the success. what we're doing in this paper is focusing on innovations and adaptation in presidential nomination campaigns.

the theme of our paper is that change is driven by candidates or party elites. the real purpose of this paper is that we focus on the candidate side and not so much on the party establishment or the party elites. we are basically arguing that it is the out of power party that tends to engage in more innovations as well as the lesser candidates, not necessarily dark horses, but second tier candidates that

engage in innovation and adaptation. when i say that, i am talking about being quicker to latch on to technological change. in this paper, we describe a variety of techniques from barry goldwater taking on direct mail, all the way up through john mccain been quicker to use the internet. if these things are successful, they tend to be mimicked by other candidates. it becomes part of the normal method of campaigning. we focus on presidential candidates because they are very entrepreneurial people. they are ambitious and they are operating under conditions of uncertainty, an environment that changes from election cycle to election cycle.

the out party -- get out of office party needs to do something different in order to break up and overcome what we would consider the natural or expected finished witches that they lose if they do what other normal strategies that are being used generally, they do not always win. that is an important point. we're not looking at who is winning, and we will talk a little about this. in this paper, we talk about economic and cultural changes and then we talk about the

changing coalition for the democratic and republican party is over the last 50 years. we argue that this is done largely in politics and research really does relate to a couple of main themes. one, we are directly responding to what we see as a shortcoming of an argument about party establishments. in that piece, they argue that the party elites engage in along, national battle and in doing so, they try to reach a consensus on which candidate should be nominated. they are looking for candidates that are going to protect party orthodoxy and who can win. that argument is pretty similar

to one made by matthews in 1975, in which there were looking at the pre reform era and somewhat of a similar argument. the lees are successful in some elections and not others by looking at this issue of inflation and adaptation, it will eventually get to who is able to break through and who is not able to break through. when are they more willing to adopt change? >> we're really talking about parties that are out of power trying to lure new groups into the coalition and doing this through entrepreneurial candidates. there are doing this by using new technology, a different strategy, and for us, the interesting question is, why is

the out of -- out of office party like this? we always assume the parties are trying to win elections. if your party has lost the election the previous time, you could rationally argue that if we only have 45% of the boat, by simple arithmetic, we need to end up getting more people to vote for our candidates. why is there room the resistance, at some junctures, and why is there resistance to gary hart or howard dean. there are a lot of different explanations, but would boil them down to four. there is classical organizational fairly and there is a battle between the party elite network verses more or less and outgrew that is trying

to bring new groups to the coalition. we talk a little bit about allen wears work. the party that has been able to keep the coalition together better has tended to win in the general election. we have some disputes where we basically think that he ends up minimizing the issue. there is also legitimate disagreement which could throw away any advantage that we have. they could end up accepting

entrepreneurs at that time. the third explanation looks the disconnect -- there is that clash. he also looks at the nature of the nominations. that is what i will look at for the next couple of minutes. why are some successful and others are not? for some, it is the aspirants themselves and the characteristics they embody and the groups they are trying to lure into their coalition. we have three different types of entrepreneurs with three broad

categories that a lot of definition and a lot of refining. we talk about unsuccessful operagoers, that not only takes the general election,. there are new techniques and strategies to rally groups that are predisposed to the out of power -- out of our party. if you look in terms of supporters, it is interesting. that is a very strong democratic group.

in terms of this support the demands. he obviously begins to emerge. one reason that he fails is because he emerges fairly early in the process. the become aware of them fairly quickly. if you look at the nature of his base, it is one that is a democratic leaning base of support. i then compare that to premature entrepreneurs. goldwater is bringing in new groups to the republican party. we talk about this when we speak

of the work. eisenhower attempted to do this. he is very successful because he is not challenging the elite and chile gets fairly close to the attention. they would not be very easily swayed by this. southern whites are not going to be swayed. the signals are sent out. the related this.

the say this is opposed to goldwater of. they say they will be safe and still vote against still water. he signifies the traditional base. the successful entrepreneur usually benefits by being a doctor. we talk about reagan in 1980. he is trying to bring in new groups to the republican party to cement them in.

what he benefits from is that he has become acclimated. if reagan had been the nominee in 1976, it could be a building 0.41980 campaign. it may have led to do and did. by the time you get to the convention, the republicans are pretty well rallying behind reagan. if you look at this, it will be a little bit more knowledgeable. almost nobody is a major figure in the republican party as opposed to 1964.

since i have run out of time, i think will probably end right there. >> thank you. our next speaker is rick farber. -- former -- robert farmer -- rick formearmer. i thought everybody was going to bring a power point so i did not want to be left out. i made one of the plane and shows those colors at about 1130 last night. if somebody else has a power point, you need to get up and do

your power point. it is an honor to be here. i really appreciate the work that is done here. i welcome all of you to akron ohio. i look forward to being a part of this conference. you guys do a great job. i was invited to talk to a group of students in february of 2008. it was an awards banquet and there were some community people in some universities leaders -- and some university leaders. the cast who was born to be the nominee for president. the question is, who is more to the president of the united states and the answer is bill clinton. fo-- hillary clinton this is wht

this paper is about is that i would have been right. they would have known that i was want to be embarrassed this morning. the point of the paper, what i hope that i can demonstrate in a few short minutes, is that the unintended consequence could -- the consequences of the 1970's and 80's are likely to produce many more primary season like 2008, where the super delegates for the convention will have to choose the winner. that is the argument that i would like to put forward. the party select their presidential nominees.

frequently, there was lots of patronage that was distributed. with the advent of television, all of that came into people's homes and it did not look so good on television and so a number of reforms were put in place. they adopted similar reforms and had those reforms imposed upon them. we will not talk much about the republicans today. i will talk more about them in the paper. most of the reforms occurred in the democratic party and were brought into the republican party. the most famous reform and the most important one did a number

of things. it made it more accessible to voters. it created a proportional delegate system. because it opened up the process, democratic state parties asked what it wanted to hear -- ask what they were going to do here. the advent of all these primaries -- and television created a process. there is a string of delegate selections and there is a whole bunch of candidates at the beginning of that with each week. if you do not do well you drop out. if you're doing ok the new stadium -- did you stay in.

-- did you stay in -- dthen you stay in. . .

.

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] back down to something that was inevitable within the security council. the security council -- let me give you the short version of this, had as always a range of opinions. with the russians in the particular being very clear that they would not allow any resident region to pass that appeared to legitimize in any way what had already happened.

wanted -- this is the russians, wanted a statement of principles to be decided by the security council as to what underlay the situation in iraq with the u.s. and the u.k. as occupying in it, wanted to resist the u.n. taking over responsibility for what russia saw as the neas the u.s. and the u.k. had created. you have the u.s. at one end of the speck truck and russia at the other. it became almost a normal security council negotiations. thinking back to the post 1441 resolution. it went to the french when it comes to 1483.

the security council were more constructive than i was expecting at this stage. i think for one, perhaps two overwhelming reasons. one was they wanted the united nations to come back into the picture. they wanted the unilateralism of what they saw having happened in the invasion to be corrected back to an internationally approved and organized situation for iraq with u.n. playing its proper part in it. and secondly, they wanted to minimize the overall political geo-political damage that had been done by the invasion of iraq and that in my mind was a more constructive approach than might have happened but i had

something to play with in the rest of the security council because of those attitudes. those two sets of responses very much echoing the united kingdom policy at that moment. >> with a country like france, a fellow permanent member with very similar global interests of the united kingdom, we often approached matters of peace and security in the same way. on iraq, we were on different sides of the water sh shed because of the decision to use force which president shirack had been veried a -- chir ad ack had been very -- chirac had been very adamant against. the french were prepared, at least in private and occasional in public to be more construct i than that tone of voice before the conflict started.

it would be helpful to hear a bit about the secretary general's attitude during the medication of 1483. did it in effect end up where he would have liked it to end up or was it short of what -- despite that resentment and distancing where you described earlier, where an organization would like to find itself? >> the secretary general continued to feel his way and anybody with experience of inspector general evans' political thinking and political decision making would have expected him to do that. the secretary general is, in a sense, the servant of the security council and of the member states and cannot act in a situation as tense and as

highly political as this without security council authorization. he needed to know where members of the security council went but he was also capable of encouraging them to go in certain directions. he did not want to be responsible for the administration of iraq. he did not want the united nations to be absent from iraq and therefore he was looking for a role in between those two things that was dignified and proper for the united nations without biting off more than he as secretary general could chew and so he partly negotiated with us over what might be possible in private and partly watched to see what would happen in the security council. i'll give you an illustration. he had appointed a special envoy on april 7 but the draft of the security council resolution began to talk about a special

coordinator, which i wanted turned into a special representative, which was the proper title for a u.n. representative in a particular territory, to show that the u.n. was properly there and in the end, we got that term into the security council resolution and he was very pleased with that, i think. you will see with the wording of 1483, which is tort chewous at times that we got to descriptions of how irk should be run politically and what political objective in our printed paragraph nine, the kind which the secretary general would have been satisfied with. he plays an active role mainly throughout the scenes of this whole negotiations. >> thank you. one thing in 1483 we have

touched on already and that is the limitation to the united kingdom and the united states. the role of occupying power. unlike your joint letter a few weeks earlier. how did that come to be? for example, the australians had a military presence in iraq during and after the invasion. were coalition partners in the joint letter. no longer had the status of an occupying power. how did that actually come about? a deliberate withdrawal or withholding by the two partners or others? or what? >> i can't remember myself having a discussion with the australians or any other coalition partner about their receding from the may 8 letter to this paragraph and

disappearing from responsibility. i think it must have been settled between capitals. it was much more in the medication i was involved with, a matter of the u.s. and the u.k. deciding how they would be described as the powers in charge of iraq at that time. there were people in washington, indeed, people in london, who didn't want any mention of occupation or the occupying powers. and also the image of an occupation which was obviously in the context to middle east going to be compared with the israeli occupation of palestine and was by al-jazeera and the man on the street and the rest

of the world. i remember advising london that it was sensible to have a mention of occupying powers because that made it clear under what body we would be acting and without that clarity, we might be confused ourselves and our fellow security council members might resist agreing to a resolution unless there was a clear mention of what the status was of the people in charge of the territory and london and washington decided that they would be the two that took the responsibility for that status of our presence in iraq. >> without 1483 and without that designation, it would have been questionable, would it, as to how far the coalition could set economic policy or decide on what institutions could be brought into use? >> actually with 1483, we were

still subject to the terms of the geneva conventions. in 1483 goes through a certain amount of detail but it doesn't give the occupying powers all the authority, as it is called in the resolution, complete powers to do anything it likes inside iraq. >> you mentioned operating power of 2009 and 2008. much of it describes encouragement, influence, that sort of thing. just before we leave this point, the preamble to 1483 notes that other states not being occupying powers may nonetheless work with the authority. i imagine the act was quite

heavy to counterbalance the occupying power flavor. >> the other countries contemplating being members of the coalition wanted to know that if they did so it was with reasonable security council authority for their role and not as responsible powers but as participants in the authority. so in effect, not affecting retrospect i responsibility though the letter of may 9 may have been thought to confer some of that. >> yes, i can't remember the degree to which we negotiated the letter of may 8 with all members of the coalition. i think only the a very limited extent. >> i think fairly soon we need to get to baghdad and just before we do, i think we might take a short break in a minute. others may have questions. martin?

>> leaving the u.n. before your mission. would you tell us the mood of that mission and what was discussed and how it impacted your mission? >> i spent the first 10 days or so briefing myself in london for my role in baghdad, which -- where i arrived on i think the 15th of september, and on the second of september, everybody had come back from that including the prime minister and he called a meeting on those who were going to be most responsible for the u.k. involvement in running iraq to

discuss what was going right and wrong and what was needed from the u.k. government to make things go right. and the main concerns, i think that came up with that meeting were first of all security because security was beginning to go wrong from way back and there was the question of how many coalition troops there might be on the ground. were they sufficient? was a larger coalition needed? etc.? i think i recall the prime minister being interested, not in a larger body of external troops being involved in iraq. he saw the difficulties in that in supply and resource terms, particularly on the american side. but rather in getting the police force going, getting a new

police force trained and getting civil order restored in iraq through the rapid creation of a new iraqi police force. so john was also at that meeting with his experience already on the ground in iraq and he and i, i think, tried to warn the prime minister that it would take quite a long time to get a police force of the necessary size going with decent training. from scratch. but he said that was his priority and he wanted us to get on with that and see how quickly we could do it. we -- we thought it might take a year or so to get a decent police force running. he said try and do it by the end of 2003 if you possibly can. john and i looked at each other but decided we had better see

whether we could do anything to help that but we realized it was an extremely ambitious request. the prime minister wanted to talk about the political framework and the political process of getting a new government going in iraq and i think he said that we should aim to hand over to a new iraqi government by the summer of 2004, if at all possible. which wasn't quite where the americans were at that stage and thought might be too soon. we've skipped this meeting and quite a lot happened before then. >> we need to skip back. >> let me answer your question on this meeting because there was one other focus of the prime minister's attention which was the media operation in iraq, which he felt was going badly.

they were not extending ourselves well enough and forcefully enough to the iraqi people. we were not getting our message particularly well out to the rest of the world and he was concerned we hasn't put enough investment into a sophisticated media operation in baghdad and internationally and we were asked to concentrate on that so there was probably quite a lot else that we had discussed. i remember those three areas. security, political process and the media as being the three priorities that we carried away. >> i would like to go back before we break and return to baghdad after the break. the issue of 1483. where the c.p.a. sits in terms of its responsibility to, if any, or accountability to the united nation's security council, right at the end, the secretary general's special representative has to report to

the council and the paragraph 24 encourages the coalition partners, governments, to inform the council at regular intervals. tell us something about c.p.a. doing it in that regard. >> yes, in then co-text of the security council, it is the members of the security council that report to the security council on what they are up to this a matter of peace and security that is the responsibility of the security council or it is for the security council to call a non-member from the security council from another member state to come and report it. that word encourages would have been in the negotiations with the americans to some extent because they would not have accepted the security council instruction and so that verb came out like that.

there is a touch of fiction in this. in that the security council wanted to appear -- wanted it to appear that the united nations was assuming the responsibility for the disposition of political forces in iraq. but they were not assuming responsibility for the administration of iraq. the people in control of what was going to happen in iraq were in everybody's view without any doubt, the americans. so 1483 was actually rather a sats factory resolution from the point of view of the united nations but it made it appear that the special representative of the secretary general was going to be at the apex of a relationship, which in truth on

the ground, he was not. he was, as i saw it, one of an equal triangle of responsibility and the u.n. and the u.k. were subordinate to the united states in terms of the physical presence on the ground of resources and capabilities. >> yeah. i think after the break, we may want to come on to the real, as contrasted with formal lines of reporting and authority. but i think that is probably a good moment to break. if we may, back in 10 minutes or so. thank you. >> i would like to go back april 4 on the baghdad phase but before we do, i have one last question about 1483 which

clearly gives equal formal status to the united kingdom and the united states as opposed to the reality and proportional difference. that was clear both to us and to washington and both capitals wanted that. >> yes, that was the case. it carries with it an assumption of responsibility on the united kingdom for the entirety of iraq on the occupation. and that was understood? >> the period that was understood. >> ok. well, let's revert to april 4. >> thank you very much, indeed. you said that you -- on the fourth of april, in which you indicated that the -- by the united states and hen -- takes plait place on the seventh and

eighth of april. is that a sign of diplomatic activity and influence by the united states? >> not a significant one. what i said on the fourth of april, that was 614, was that the u.s. was too -- for the u.n. environment. it was going to be essential to have the united states in the lead in terms of troops, resources on the ground and everything else and we were in the middle of the conflict at that point but i think my observation was that if the united states tries to run the u.n. input into that, from a position of we're in charge. we would like you to do what we're asking at the u.n., it

wasn't going to work. there would be a reaction. that was what i was warning against. at hills bro, amongst the other things that were being discussed, which i was not party too, was this item on the way in which the coalition would describe involvement of the u.n. and, as i understood the way it went, president bush was being advised by his own team not to give too much away in his description of what part the u.n. would play, because in practice, the u.s. had to be the decision-maker and they didn't want their freedom of decision making to be constrained. the prime minister made the point that the u.n. had capabilities which would be

highly useful to the coalition on the ground and therefore the u.n. needed to be encouraged to provide those services without being put in the position of subordination. or perceived subordination. and we would have liked the u.n. to be described as playing a leading political role with the u.s. and the u.k. in administering iraq as a try umvernt. that was too much for the united states. president bush came out between his own advisors and the prime minister in describing the role that they wanted from the u.n. as being vital. and do you remember how president bush described what a vital role? it is worth reading into the

record because it gives an indication of u.s. thinking. in a press conference afterwards, president bush was asked by a reporter what the word vital meant and he said a vital role as an agent to help people to live freely. that's a vital role and that means food. that means medicine. that means a place where people can give their contributions. that means suggesting people for the interim iraqi administration. that means being a party to the progress being made in iraq. so you can see that president bush is thinking very much of the practical input of the u.n. but under the leadership of the u.s. as the controller of the political scenario. >> but the point i wanted to really get at, did the u.k. -- did president bush shift in his thinking from where he was from

the point he made that statement at hillsboro? >> yes, because from the prime minister's input, we wouldn't have gotten the word vital. rather an american -- the u.n. would be so useful that we must make sure they are encouraged to be useful. >> we are going to move to baghdad but before we do that, you're in a unique position at that time because you have an insight to the thinking at the united nations. you have been negotiating with the ambassador. you have an understanding what the u.k. thinking is but in preparing for your role in baghdad, were there any outstanding issues that you found out before you went? we heard about your meeting with the prime minister in september but were there any issues that

were troubling you before you went that you wanted to get clarity on? >> yes, a whole load of issues but there always are when you take up a new job. and diplomats going to a post are used to going around your own capital in particular and talking to everybody who is involved and seeing what their views are. what's going on? what's happening on the ground? how am i going to be supplied? what am i expected to do? etc. so yes, i did a whole round of double in that stage in london. in new york, i was announced in mid june as the future special envoy for iraq and i left the u.n. at the end of july. i had the opportunity to talk to people at the u.n. about the

u.n.'s input. i talked to sergio at one stage when he came back to report to the security council in late july. at that open security council meeting in late july, members of the iraqi governing council came to new york. i had short conversations with them. also in late july, i went down to washington to talk to ambassador paul bremer, because i would be his partner on the ground and i wanted to redrink myself to him because -- reintroduce myself to him because he hasn't spoken lately. >> sir had not been deputy

administrator. bremer wanted that to continue with me. his preference was that i should not be a deputy administrator, but the representative on the side of the c.p.a., the c.p.a. of u.k. interests. >> were you content with that? >> i said i would discuss it when i went back to london and see what my government wanted me to do and that was part of my discussions in early september so that issue was finally decided in london because i was going to do what my government wanted me to do so long as that was agreeable to the americans. actually, the point i'm making is that bremer did not want me to be his deputy administrator. >> ok. now while -- before you went there, there had been an attack on the united nations and a

tragic death of the special representative. did that in any way give you any cause for concern before you went and what were these views that you thought that particular withdrawal of the united nations staff meant for you before you got there? >> yes, it changed my approach radically. i had begun to imagine what my role would be in circumstances that were clearly very difficult at the start and becoming more difficult because of the loss of control of the security theater. and also from what i had heard about the capacity of the administrative machinery of the c.p.a., i never imagined that i

would be working in that triangle again. the u.s., definitely in practice, the apex, but the u.k. and the u.n. from their separate and independent positions in baghdad, feeding in advice, political comments around suggestions as part of a team that would be working very closely together drawing on the wisdom of sergio from his previous u.n. postings and whatever i could bring to the table having no experience as an administrator. with the removal of sergio personally, that immediately changed the situation because sergio was a powerful instrument in my view, in his own person. i had lost that. i had lost a real partner.

if it was to lead to the withdrawal of the u.n., which was not clear really until i actually arrived, altogether in terms of its presence in baghdad, that was going to change the waiting between the u.s. and the u.k. because i had conceived of the u.n. as being part of that waiting. so the answer is yes, for those reasons. >> thank you. before you got there, following that meeting in september, and you did talk to your colleagues in the u.k., what was your understanding of the objective that was set for you? >> what i was clearly being asked to do was to support the american objective of returning iraq to the iraqis in a secure

and stable state. so i was to represent the u.k. interest in that and i was to do what i could to make sure that, first of all, the political process developed sensibly and smoothly. second, that the u.k. team in the c.p.a. were well organized, well looked after and working to the best of their capability and third that what we were doing in baghdad fitted in to the u.k. presence across iraq, most particularly in the south, but we can come to describing my relationship with the south in a moment but also with those

governorettes, as the u.s. called the provinces, having actors in them, tch may sound -- kurdistan and -- >> at the time we were increasing duration of security issues. the situation was quite complex? >> yes. i didn't know what i was going to find on the ground in practice. >> what did you find when you got there? >> well, what i was told i would find at one point from the foreign office was a dysfunctional administration. an administration which was not up to running iraq, as it should be run at this stage. and the american part of that was also not functioning as we would have wished to which my reply was it's surely an

exaggeration to call the american effort dysfunctional. this is the super power. this is a hugely powerful machine that must be doing things effectively even if it is not doing everything effectively. when i read some of john's reports, his final report at the end of july and when i came to it on the ground to jump forward and answer your question, did indeed find that the coalition's capabilities were not fully up to the business of administering iraq and was not fully in charge of the whole theater in iraq because the military were operating separately from the coalition provisional authority. >> so the military was operating quite separately from the coalition? >> in terms of lines of reporting. >> right.

>> the only place at which the apex of administration of iraq came together between the military pillar and the civilian pillar, which is the c.p.a., was in the pentagon. the deputy secretary of defense and the secretary of defense were the first points at which iraq was being administrated from one desk. >> so when you got there and you found the dysfunctional c.p.a., how did you go about determining what you would do and how you would influence and observe u.k.'s influence on the c.p.a.? >> well, i had addressed this question in london. i addressed this in london before i went and when it was agreed that i would not be deputy administrator but u.k. special representative as bremer wished and i said to ministered in london and i said this to the

prime minister, do not regard me as an administrator in iraq. i'm here to represent u.k. interests in iraq through whatever influence i can bring to bear but the person who responsible to london, to the united kingdom, as the country co- responsible under the resolution is ambassador bremer. is that understood? and the prime minister said that he understood that. i want it to be clear that i could not be responsible for the administration of iraq. >> jerry bremer, i understand it. he was responsible to londonners? >> i don't think so. he didn't act as if he understood that. >> there was nothing in his instructions? no, i think he was being

micromanaged himself by the pentagon and that was almost his sole focus. >> just to pursue that. you said a little while back, bremer did not want you as his deputy within the c.p.a. was that a reflection of the fact that there were two equal coalition partners or he just didn't want somebody in the chain of command that was not american? >> both of those things. he didn't want, for instance, to hand over to a non-american as acting administrator when he left the country do return to washington. he was not, you know 100% that way inclined and zero percent the other. we talked this through and there were pros and cons for either option. but i understood that he wanted

his senior structure to be american, to rely on a temperature deputy who was american, to -- to really on a deputy who was american. and for the u.k. to do it own thing on the side of that but to supply people to the c.p.a. as the coalition partners did but not to our degree in a way which was supportive of and loyal to the american leadership. >> but leaving open our responsibility as occupying -- >> yes, it did leave that open in terms of the administrative capacities, but remember in the american mind it was major british input into the running of iraq. >> you have not said what you personally thought about this. only what bremer thought and london thought. did you think that you should have been the deputy

administrator and been given a more formal role in this? >> no, i decided that in the end on balance it was better not to be deputy administrator because i did not want to be in a position to be instructed to shut up or whatever by ambassador bremer. i wanted an independent voice in the u.k. interests, which left me having to use that voice as a matter of influence and input and personal management of my day rather than through any formal position. >> so that was in the end what you decided. when you went to see bremer in july, was it your idea and was its their idea that you should have a formal part in the structure as a deputy to bremer? was that the starting point? >> not really because i talked this through with john at some

point but in most details with john when i was in london in early september but i checked with him before i had went to see bremer and he had not been deputy administrator and thought that was probably the right thing. there were disadvantages in this both cases. but the u.k. had responsibility and needed to be able to put a veto on the table if it disagreed with the way that the united states was handinging things and you could not do that if you were deputy to an american administrator. >> on the military side there was no difficulty in this senior british officer being a deputy on the -- to the american military command. so this created a disjunction between the civil and military sides of what was going on in iraq? >> i don't think so. i think the military probably had to have a single chain of

command. the political situation was in structural terms more complicated than the military situation and therefore that didn't surprise me that there was a dichotomy there. >> but if you were talking about exercising, being able to exercise some sort of veto and not being a deputy to bremer, in some way that almost put you in position to being an ambassador to iraq or -- or in some way, bremer having an accountability to the british government through you but that never happened? >> no, that's what i tried to establish, that bremer had a direct responsibility to london but in practice, he did not report to london. he relied on me to do that and tell london what was going on. if london disagreed with something that the united states was doing or wanted something to be done that was not happening, london would talk to washington. >> thank you.

>> you can just i have to us, not now, but as we go through the story, the points at which you actually exercised this power of veto. >> can i come back to your earlier comment when you said for bremer the line of responsibility was with the pentagon and the apex. what was the apex this london? where was the command coming from in london? >> the alex in london was the prime minister. the prime minister had appointed me. and the prime minister expected me to work to him but of course in the british system, you worked for the system. in practice, there was a triangle in the british arrangement which was the

foreign policy advisors for foreign policy maker number so. he was in that position. the political director in the foreign office, john was in that position at that time, and myself in baghdad. we would have triangular teleconferences and other means of communication and if the three of us were clear that this was the way to go, it was my job to get that done in baghdad, persuade ambassador bremer, whatever, it was their job to make sure that they were acting with authority in london. i came back to london once a month during my 6 1/2 months in baghdad and when i came back to london, i would talk to ministers, normally to the prime minister amongst other ministers, as well as to officials. so although it sounds like a

multiplied arrangement, it is entirely normal to the british system that officials will work on the daily routine basis with their ranking officials and that it is london's job within the system that officials make sure that they have clearance for instructions they give overseas. >> did you think the lines of communication were effective in terms of what you reported back? >> yes. i mean, there was understanding and clarity about the lines of reporting. that's not to say that there was understanding and clarity about how we got the job done and what resources were needed but the communication and the line of command back to the prime minister was, to my mind, not a problem. >> what you're saying is the line of communications were fine but they were not necessarily responsive to what was needed?

>> yes, to the latter, but that was primary because we were having to follow the americans in almost everything that we did and we could not achieve the filling of gaps where we perceived gaps unless the americans did most of the heavy lifting in that respect. >> before the break, you said that the arrangements -- when they were agreed and of course you had given reasons in response to my colleagues' questions about what i you decided not to be a deputy to bremer but how did it actually work on the ground in terms of the cohesiveness of the c.p.a., how did you work with the british team and actually influencing what the americans were doing? >> by trial and error. there was a considerable british

input into the c.p.a. i'm talking about the civilian side of things. i observed the military but wasn't part of that. we -- if the c.p.a. was roughly 1,200 people, the brits were about between 90 and 100 of those 1,200. most of those british were working within the c.p.a. under the administrator. i was off to one side as the u.k. satellite, if you like, as my own small private office and advisors, and my first responsibility and i said this to ambassador bremer when i first telephoned him on his own appointment, before i -- as soon as i knew that i would be coming, was loilt to him and support -- loyalty to him and support for him in getting our

joint job done in iraq and it was the american approach and it was internal ambassador bremer's approach that the duty of anybody working in baghdad was a loyalty to the united states and practical cal support for what -- practical support for what they were doing. i tried to provide that using whatever materials i had to hand. if if it came to disagreement with bremer or my wishing to suggest that we should think of things in a different way from the way he was thinking, that was a matter of discussion between me and ambassador bremer. >> were there differences of approach and objectives? >> well, he had an approach

which was, i think i would call it a prive driving approach. he had his instructions from his president. he had his seven-step plan, which you know that. >> yes, indeed. >> he thought that the way to implement that plan was to create momentum behind it and he expected me to be a part of that momentum. the second or third day i was in baghdad, secretary colin powell came on a short visit and he, bremer and sat in brim bremer's office to talk about the political process and the seven steps and i was asked for my views by secretary powell and i suggested, as i had done to bremer in washington in july that it would be wise to think of options, political options, what if happen as he predict.

>> in other words, not sticking to the steps >> behind the seven-steps plan but what if iraqis don't go along with that bit or that bit of it? on both occasions in july and on this occasion in september, i was given a very direct message from bremer that i was to stick to the seven steps plan. this is what had been decided. this was the mission to be accomplished and i was to support it so i turned to some other subject with colin powell and decided to see how things played out. >> he was issuing instructions to you and you were not his deputy? >> yes. and i was trying to suggest that there was a political discussion to be had. so in a situation like that, you

take a step back and consider what has happened and decide how you exercise your influence on the next occasion or how you put in your thoughts about the political process and whatever i was concentrating on in the next round of conversation. >> but he was not receptive to your advice? you were there as a very senior person, outranking him in your own diplomatic career and you were there to offer him advice and when you offered him advice, he was telling you that you were to accept the order and that was it, not to raise points of this kind, even in a small conversation with himself and colin powell. >> that was the outward and immediate effect, yes. that he didn't want to hear suggestions about how to complete a satisfactory political process that was different from what the president had decided. >> and did that take into

account the involve identical of the iraqis because he was pressing ahead? >> it didn't take into account two things. one was that and in june, sistani had issued a fatwa, a religious decree against part of seven-steps plan which was having a constitution before there were elections, which was ambassador bremer's clear view of where he wanteding to. so ambassador bremer already knew that there was iraqi resistance to the seven-steps plan and as i understood it at that point, his reaction was to drive harder with the plan that he had. there was also something called the c.p.a. vision for iraq, which was written down, which i thought didn't amount to a clear

enough mission statement actually for the coalition in iraq as we might come to later but which was a vision for iraq and was publicly available to iraqis. that made it clear that some flexibility, adaptation in the coalition's approaches might well be necessary but that was not the message that i got from ambassador bremer in that particular conversation. >> do you think that it was too much emphasis on the sectarian approach looking for the -- iraqi situation in the way the americans were approaching the reconstruction? >> it was more than reconstruction. it was an attempt to establish a new iraqi government. it was highly political and i thought, and the u.k. approach

was behind this all the way, that the iraqis needed to be both consulted and, indeed, groomed and brought to the point where they could start taking decisions for the administration of iraq and that they needed to be quite closely onboard for the political process that we followed. >> what role did you play in ensuring that happened? you obviously operated in a very subtle manner. did you succeed in changing views? >> if you hit a small hiccup as i did on my third day with bremer that he wasn't easily going to accept advice, you think of other ways to operate. one of those ways that i chose was to have my own relationship with members of the iraqi governing council, primarily to persuade them to go along with

the american plan, so my first duty was always loyalty to the american plan. but to explore with them their alternative thoughts if they wanted to bring them and some of them clearly had other ways of approaching these questions and to try and handle those to see if they could be dealt with without deviating from the american plan and to make my own judgments on how far the seven-steps plan was going to work and separately, within the c.p.a. itself, i was constantly talking, as were my close advisers, with the american political team and other parts of the c.p.a. machine as to whether we thought what the administrator wanted was going to work in practice, whether we should put forward separate advice. so you do an increasing multiple of things to get through to a good sense approach to the

administration of iraq, even if the administrator isn't quite there yet. and that's the way you operate. >> so within the constraints, you were finding room to maneuver and develop your own strategies to make sure you didn't exert influence and you were keeping the u.k. informed with all of that? >> yes, i was always pretty frank and open with my reports to london with how i thought things were going, including reporting that conversation with jerry bremer. can i bring another point in here? coming back to best case scenario. it was very clear to me, even before i got to baghdad that, the united states had been working on and continued to work on the best case scenario. that they could administer iraq and turn it back to iraqis who

could administer iraq with the lowest possible input of resources and troops and in the most direct way possible and they didn't ensure against things other than the best case scenario with a higher number of troops or with alternative vertical plans. ambassador bremer was responding to the pentagon in trying to run a best case scenario approach. that's why he didn't want alternative plans. but when i talked to other members of the american team, when i talked informaly to the military, to the intelligence agencies, to other people who were operating, i found a very much more gloomy prognosis of what was going on than i felt or understood that ambassador bremer was reporting back to the pentagon.

>> the intelligence report, which was published in february, describes it as disjointed and ad hoc quality. >> which intelligence report was that? >> this was the intelligence report of the united states. it was published in february. let me just quote what it says here. it says the absence of well-defined doctrine on -- the approach to reconstruction to have a disjointed and ad hoc quality. >> that's -- it is a big question to go into the whole of the c.p.a. capability. >> i'm talking about when you were there. is that how you would describe it? >> yes. i'm happy with that description. the whole american effort between the civilian and the military aspects was

compartmentalized. stove-piped is the word that is often used, including amongst most persons. the military and civilian arms were not working smoothly together. there were differences of view within the military. there were differences of view between the pentagon and the state department. and these have all been played out as we were trying to administer a country. there were also differences of view from time to time between london and washington that had come into the records of the conversations between london and washington. >> can we now move on because you had touched earlier about the relationship between the c.p.a., baghdad and basra. how did that work in practice during your time? >> the southeast in the

arrangements for iraq was regarded both by london and by washington as very much a british concern. to the extent that very little american money was going into the southeast and the basra area, which led to the british deciding that -- quite early on, that they had to bring in british money through british support for the military, to create almost an independent subadministration in that part of iraq. i inherited that situation when i arrived. i went down very early on to see my counterpart in basra. who was deputy administrator to bremer and was in the c.p.a. command. >> we heard from -- >> and so i left