risk which seems prominent in this recovery and has been mentioned earlier. firms and individuals are facing major uncertainty surrounding federal policies like trade, the environment, health care, financial-services, taxes. considering a commitment to any of capital spending project or a new hiring, it can be difficult to estimate after-tax yields for some new and ever in an environment that is so rich with proposals for higher taxes and regulations. . .

the risk of dim -- during the recovery ahead, we may face an increasing risk of inflation today upward. that has sometimes occurred in past recoveries. while it appears to be minimal, we will have to be careful as the uncover a rueful to keep expectations from drifting around what we will need to be careful of is when and how to withdraw the considerable monetary policy stimulus ninth place.

this time the fed will have to monetary policy instruments to grapple with, not just one. they did other market interest rates in economic outcome. since october 2008, we have had the authority to reserve banks to pay explicit interest on reserves balances to make cold. this is as the ability to change the amount of our liability. we have so much reserves in the

system that interest-rate are driven down. when it comes time to draw down monterey stimulus, the fed will be able to raise interest rates on research and influence the consolation of interest-rate in the economy or to drain reserves which will have its own effects on the constellation of interest-rate in the economy. or we could do both. despite these added challenges, the core objective of monetary policy remains the same. that is price stability. as always, it will require keeping inflation expectations anchorage.

it reflects the views about the future conduct of monetary policy. we will need to carefully choose when and how rapidly to remove monetary policy stimulus. this is the same difficult task we face in every recession. i will be looking at the time at which economic growth is strong enough and well enough to be established. when the economic outlook for the coming year appears to be brighter than the year just ended, our economy does face several significant challenges over the longer term. i will conclude by mentioning two of them. the first challenge that we face over the long run that i want to highlight is the path of a future federal budget deficits that are implied by current and planned fiscal policies. it should be self evident that any government that cannot grow indefinitely at a rate much faster than the economy itself

something has to change. that alternative is the one i will vigorously oppose. while economists can debate the effects of particular changes in spending, at some point the government growth said the ratio of debt to gdp is rising. at some point, it will repeat with private borrowing, lead to higher interest rates, and therefore slower improvement in our country's standards of living. when it is large enough, each effect would be exacerbated if there ambiguities. failure to establish credible plans for bringing our fiscal position back into balance could dampen economic growth.

another challenge that i am particularly aware of is in regulatory reform. in the wake of the crisis we have just been through, it makes eminent sense to reexamine our approach to financial regulation i have argued elsewhere that the most important step to ensuring long run financial stability is to establish clear and credible limits to the federal financial safety net, which has grown considerably as a result of the response to this crisis. i believe the crisis itself was in no small measure the results of us not having clear limits on government support. leverage in excess of writs -- excessive risk-taking were encouraged. those leads have been ratified. if we retain a stand of ambiguity as to when such protection will or not be forthcoming, which institutions

could benefit and which of their liability would benefit, if we do that a suspect our susceptibility to disrupting the financial crisis will continue to grow. with each crisis, it to become ever more apparent. it will require more stringent regulations. regulatory systems are necessarily limited in their capacity to completely offset the incentive of fax of the safety net. it continues the ambiguity of financial safety net think of the up to capacity of growth in the long run in the years ahead. it is a great pleasure to speak with you. thank you very much. i would be very happy to take your questions. [applause]

any questions? >> [inaudible] housing activity was extremely strong by historical standards, especially in the ticket from 95 the through 2005, especially in the years preceding 2005. housing activity has declined to a level far below what we need to replace the housing stock and keep up with the growing demand for housing stock over time. having said that, i think the way he should think about is that it is to expansions worth of housing in one expansion. we have gotten ahead of ourselves in investing in housing. it'll take years before our need

for housing prices to the level where we need to expand construction. that is why i said what i think we should expect and hope for is a level of new home construction going forward, the level of existing homes sales seems to have risen. there are a lot of non foreclosure sales. things have seemed pretty liquid. i think that liquidity was awaiting the appearance of a bottom in housing prices. i think the fact that housing practice -- prices appear to the bottom out has led some people confident that they have a sense of what the market is telling them about the value of the house, finding it easier to price houses. we have a housing market that is functional and not a free fall.

liquidity's come back to the housing market in that sense. i do not think we should hope for an expansion in residential construction to play a major role in the expansion. if we do i think it'll come back to bite us. >> [inaudible] [no>> the rule is, what role do i expect the federal reserve to play. there is a simple answer. there is a difficult answer. -- there is a delicate version the simple version is that in regard to congress's version, the federal reserve has typically acted as an institution ready and willing to

offered good counsel to congress. it is up to congress to decide on matters. within the federal reserve system, we are acutely aware, because we are in the business of economic projections, and the interplay between government budget deficit and the economy. we are aware of how they can be dealt with in the long run. it is a good idea to close the gap with new camper and a review minicam. the delicate version is saithatt has done some lending from a point of view that constitutes fiscal policy in their own way.

when we lend to private institutions, if we do not expand the money supply, it has to sell u.s. government security. we are essentially borrowing -- we are using the money to lend. congress has a right to review that eds fiscal policy -- to view that as a fiscal policy. we take that responsibility very seriously. i think there is this lingering question about the federal reserve's balance sheet. it has implications for fiscal policy and the politics of the central bank lending. for now i will leave it at their. -- there. >> [inaudible]

wha>> would question. -- good question. let me first observed this fall on commercial construction activity and problems in commercial mortgage backed securities. they are typically a late developing part of the cycle. it declines later and recovers much later. that and deadly -- undoubtedly has to do the gestation of a residential verses commercial park it.

-- project. there is still -- they are still not the only game in town. the fed has one program. i think the commercial mortgage- backed -- the commercial real estate problems at community and regional banks is a manageable thing. there were some banks that are heavily concentrated. some turned up poorly. we are seeing bank failures around the country, particularly in markets that are especially troubled in georgia and california and florida. for a banking system as a whole, it will cost the american taxpayer money. for the mortgage-backed

securities, i think it will be manageable. they do have a program called " calf." i do not tell you the acronym. it is a something-acronym. it is like providing a little bit of leverage to private entities but one to raise their own capital to invest in commercial mortgage-backed securities. it is focused on new issues. it is not so much on chasing dishes. my overall take is that it is a manageable problem going forward. let me go to the side. but though the young lady who stood up. >> your projections for the recovery seems to be based largely on prior recovery.

this reflection was -- it was based upon stimulus coming from this government but of how high the factor that into the current projections? >> the question is how have we factored in fiscal stimulus, which appears to be unique in this recovery to our forecasts. it does seem as if the stimulus is adding to growth and it did add to growth in the second half. the amount it eds will be diminishing over the course of a year. i think the economics of the relationships, the way consumers gradually recover confidence, and is a broad measure, that sentiment is the

same qualitatively either way, with the without the stimulus. the magnitude may differ. the recovery growth may differ. it may steer growth toward different sectors. over the brunn condor, maybe the numbers will be different quarter to quarter. there has been a lot of analysis in the system of that thought experiment of what recovery would look like with or about that comparison. i think it was still be pretty clear. the guy who did not stand up. [laughter] >> we hear commentators on bloomberg talking about 10% or 12% of mortgages that are [inaudible] a large percentage of those good of foreclosures.

is that something you are concerned about? >> it depends on whether you are one of those borrowers. there is a huge adjustment process under way in the housing market. people who have mortgages -- it will take a long time for the system to digest those problems. servicers are working overtime. the fed helped sponsor these events were invented servicers come in the room. they try to work something out and get into something they can afford. that is a labor intensive process. it involves collecting data. you have to gauge the borrowers

current income. should they stay on it and not? that is just an intensive process. it is set for the borrowers before the servicers to get the amount of paperwork. servicers are doing a better job than others. it will be months and months. what that means for growth is not necessarily a disaster. if you have this process that works tell where you are taking people in houses and rearranging who is in which houses and what mortgages they have, ultimately,

that does not have to have a large impact on spending per say. people have cut back already because their incomes have gone down or they cut back on their mortgages. it is destructive. it is costly. by itself, that is not going to put the economy in the tank. one more from over here. >> [inaudible] >> i think the question was about the u-curve. you were wondering about whether the timing -- we have all these assets. we have an asset purchase program that we are about to complete in which we but or are

planning to buy one in the quarter trillion dollars worth of mortgage backed securities. there is some more agency debt. the mortgage-backed securities in the treasury are going to mature and roll off. one of the options that we have poured training think reserves is to sell some of the securities. in the mortgage backed space, we have announced this purchase program. you would expect market interest-rate to take into account that we will be vying for a while. after that we will not be buying. i am not expecting a huge increase in mortgage rates on the date that our purchase amends. maybe this would have been.

expectations about our purchase programs have been built in to market rates. beyond that, i think the markets are going to react to decisions remain and announcement of plans we have. i think the experience we have suggests the announcement line a pretty well. things to build into rates pretty rapidly wormy announced our intentions with regard to that. thank you very much. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] >> thank you. as always, very informative. we really appreciate you taking time to come and speak to this group in answer questions. this concludes our program for the year. the first friday economic outlook forum is in annual event. it is what we hope we will

expand every year as it becomes bigger and better. mark your calendars now for first friday 2011, january 7, righty at the marriott. i would like to thank our speakers, the maryland chamber of commerce, and the maryland realtors' association, the politics of business, and all are gets for making the first freddie economic outlook forum a success. bundle up and read carefully. [applause]

>> now the latest on the economic stimulus, the $787 million improve from last february. over 311 million has been committed to states by the federal government to spend on stimulus projects. that is of $4 billion from last week. over $160 billion has been paid out for this project. at c-span.org/stimulus you will find hearings and congressional debates. this is all at c-span.org /stimulus. >> next remarks by secretary of state clinton in the foreign minister of jordan. in a discussion on u.s. counter- terrorism efforts.

after that, a foreign on the recent against an election prope. >> now secretary of state hillary clinton in the foreign minister of jordan calls for a resumption of middle east peace talks. they expressed concern over recent events in jerusalem where settlement activity by the israelis continues. satiric clinton also comments on the flight 253 bombing attempt. this is just over 20 minutes. >> it is a pleasure to welcome him back. they are such an ally to the united states. over the past 10 years, he has carried on the position and

spirit not only of his late father but of the jordanian people. under his leadership, during continues to be a key partner in the pursuit of peace and progress in the region and around the world. today the minister and i discussed a wide range of issues proposal -- issues. i want to begin by saying publicly what i had told the minister. condolences for the loss of lives that was unfortunately both american and the jordanians and i expressed appreciation for jordan's commitment to comment --ñi combt violent extremist at home and abroad. this is a struggle that unites people of faith, people of peace, people of conscience everywhere. terror targeted our series --

cities and citizens and they must be met with unwavering result. i remember visiting the hotels in iman that had been bombed in 2005. walking through the wreckage, visiting the innocent children, men, and women who had been targeted at weddings. i will never forget what i saw there. i will never forget what i have seen. the united states and our partners stand shoulder to shoulder in this fight. we also share a commitment to seeking a comprehensive peace in the middle east based on the two state solution. we are working with the israelis in the palestinian authorities, jordan, and the arab state to take the steps needed to relaunch negotiations as soon as possible and that the preconditions which is in the interest of everyone in the

region. the united states believes that negotiations can lead to an outcome would end the conflict and reconciles the palestinian goal of anñr independent and viable state based on the 1967 line with agreed swaps and the israeli goal of a jewish state would secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet israeli security requirements. both the united states and jordan are concerned about recent activities in jerusalem. but the united states recognizes that jerusalem is a deeply important issue for israelis and palestinians, and jews, muslims, and christians around the world. we believe it is possible to realize the aspirations of both israelis and palestinians for jerusalem and safeguard its

status as a symbol of three great religions for all people. on this and other challenges, the partnership between our countries provide a solid foundation for the pursuit of peace and progress. i look forward to continuing to work closely with the foreign minister with jordan's new government and with his majesty. we broaden and deepen our partnership. >> thank you very much. it is a pleasure and honor. i am extremely happy to be here. -- and to have this opportunity to exchange views with secretary clinton. i said in august that the relationship between jordan in the united states can be best be described as a true partnership.

i think this relationship has withstood the test of time and numerous challenges that we have had. i think relationship get stronger by the day. this last year was a 60th year of the relations between jordan and the united states. this reflects the solid relationship. our partnership is it chirchik one, based on stronger values and shared visions. it shows our firm belief in combating this many challenges. i. thank you, madame secretary.

thank you for referring to the 2005 hotel bombings in jordan. we must not forget that we were and are still a target. we will not waver were be deterred in our determination to combat terror, terrorism, and terrorists. wherever they are. in 2005, we said clearly that we will not wait for the terrorists to come to us. we will try to uproot them before they get to the implementation stage of planning. our presence in afghanistan today is twofold. number one, to combat terrorism and the root causes of terrorism in to help up with the

humanitarian efforts as needed. i would like to say our presence in afghanistan would be increased in the coming days. this is something that is ongoing. we are not only part of a network of countries that are trying to assist afghanistan or trying to combat terrorism. we are also there to defend jordan's national interest in to defend jordanians. i had very good discussions with the secretary with this morning i had a good discussions.

we agreed on the need to be lunch serious negotiations between palestinians and iranians. there would be a clear plan with the benchmarks that lingered conflict to linger on the states. that includes east jerusalem and gaza living side by side. it is vital to achieve a comprehensive [inaudible] upon the terms of reference. we are in agreement that there are serious difficulties. we hope the 2010 will continue a much a leader -- much bigger leadership role. i would like to remind of the

important issues that include refugees to enter some. everything should be subject to negotiations. jerusalem is potentially -- it is so sensitive pitt. actions on the ground in jerusalem can turn into a provocative and antagonizing actions to the followers of the three great religions. it is very important to try and avoid unilateral action in tourism. everyone is in agreement that jerusalem to be discussed in final negotiations. there is a growing sense of

urgency to move forward and to achieve tangible progress that will create an environment ... to address the other regions. we will witness further divisions that extremists will exploit it worldwide. as a told madame secretary, jordan is fully committed to handling our partners in the region and gratitude [unintelligible] we will spare no efforts in ensuring the success of the endeavor.

thank you so much. >> thank you. >> a question on the terror report to the present but yesterday. in that report, it talks of the of the set issue. they talk about the fact that the suspected not have a visa was not correlated with the information his father gave. there was the issue of the misspelling of his name. how serious are these issues? what do you plan to do about them? had you or are you willing to give guarantees to arab countries and palestinians about the obama administration on negotiations in the settlement issue? >> as to the report, i think

that the president made it very clear in his remarks both before and again yesterday that we all are looking hard at what did happen in order to improve our procedures to avoid human errors, mistakes, oversight of any kind. we are fully committed to accepting our responsibilities for the mistakes that were made and we are going to be working hard with the rest of the administration to improve every aspect of our efforts. i think it is very clear from the president's stated resolve that this is the highest priority that only from him but for all of us, the safety and security of the american people,

airline travel will remain at the very top of our minds. we will be working with all of our other partners in said the government to do all that week he minicam. with respect to the middle east, we are absolutely committed and have been from the very first day of the obama administration to working with all our partners to do this negotiation is clearly about issues that most directly affect the israelis and palestinians. it is a great matter not just to the people of the region burgess to the arab nations, but to the entire world. there is a hunger for a resolution. there is a two-stage solution that would reduce the terrorists

and the naysayers that we give the palestinians a legitimate state with their own aspirations and to give the israelis the security they deserve to have. george mitchell will be consulting as he has been very broadly. not only in the regions but in europe and elsewhere. we are in constant close consultation with friends like our partners in jordan, but this is a year of renewed commitment and increased efforts toward what we see as an imperative rule for the region in the world. >> [inaudible] >> good morning to both of the. senator mitchell talked about a two year timeframe. some of you talked about the first nine months.

can you confirm is this the thinking of the administration? the palestinians say they will not and to negotiations give the israeli ambassador is saying they do not believe in time frames. how will you push the gap? >> i think one senator mitchell rightly said is that he wants to move as quickly as possible. there is an urgency. there has to be a negotiation on the a final issues. resolving jerusalem result settlement. i think we need to lift our sights and instead of being looking down at the trees, we need to look at the forests.

where are we headed to get there? we know what a final resolution will have to include. borders. security. jerusalem. refugees. water. we know what the elements of this two-stage solution must include. i think senator mitchell was being very prudent and saying these are very hard issues. they require a lot of back and forth between the parties, guarantees, and assistance from the rest of us who are trying to move this forward. it might take as much as the time he mentioned. obviously, we hope to be moving much more expeditiously. first, we have to get a reading -- but negotiations relaunch. at the end of the day, there are two parties have to make it happen. our goal is to persuade the two parties to get into this very

in-depth negotiations on all of these issues as soon as possible. >> there are [unintelligible] can you shed some light of bell him being -- like about him being a double agent? >> might start by picking up on a very positive statement that the secretary of state has made on the pursuit of peace in the middle east. in the final analysis, time is of the essence. the president of the united states and secretary of state from 2009 expressed a sense of urgency and said peace in the middle east is necessary. time is not on our side. u.s. about time friends. we asked about time frames.

you cannot to setup another open-ended process. some deadlines have to be put on the table. these deadlines have to serve the parties. they help the party put things in the right time frame and the right perspective. with that too much process and not enough peace. what we do not need right now is another open-ended process. they listed them and they are known to everyone. if you talk about the question of borders, and then you result not only jerusalem, but you identify the nature on the grounds of the two state and how it looks. then all other things fit in. that is on the peace process. i hope with the many

difficulties that we sell in 2009, this is a 60 year old conflict, our resolve should not be affected. it will have more difficult this. let 2010 be the year of negotiation. on afghanistan, and added the secretary nor i [unintelligible] -- by our intelligence officers. i do not presume to speak on behalf of the secretary. i am not at liberty to discuss intelligence operations or ongoing shares between like- minded countries. i have said very clearly that in the global war on terrorism jordan is at the forefront.

it is a global network. we are there to protect our national interests. we have had to be extremely effective in our pursuit of those who want to do harm to our country. most recently, we have hotel bombings. that does not count the tens of the times that were foiled. this is the result of our commitment and our ongoing operations, whether with ministry personnel or intelligence work for whatever. we are saving humanity. we are not talking of counterterrorism. we are talking about terrorism

prevention. we are talking of finding the root causes. we are trying to stop them right there. there is a jordanian presence in afghanistan. it has been there for many years. humanitarian presence. logistical presence. and intelligence and operations to protect our own citizens. information is power. sharing of information between like-minded countries is just as effective as combating the teledyne. -- taliban. the bill is a long of an answer. -- i hope that was not too long of an answer. >> thank you.

>> not a discussion and u.s. counter-terrorism efforts and homeland security. from "washington journal" this is just over 40 minutes. . host: juan zarate is the former deputy national security adviser for counter-terrorism during the bush administration. mr. zarate, could you give your analysis of the president's speech yesterday on the flight bombing? guest: peter, first of all, good morning, thank you for having me. i think the president's speech was an important speech, and the report that came out with it, laid out quite clearly what the

u.s. government knew it before december 25, what we have learned since about the potential attack, laid out very clearly and honestly, i think, the failures that occurred. i think the president did a good job, actually, of laying out the facts, and also taking responsibility. you have to give him credit, john brennan, his assistant for homeland security and counter- terrorism, credit, and there seems to be no shirking of responsibility here. but what struck me was that this was more of a failure of the lack of -- of the strategic problem of attacking al qaeda on the homeland with the tactical information was available to the best government. that struck me yesterday, because that was not apparent in the information before but much of the information was more akin to we did not find the small pieces in the vast volumes of n

that. that struck me yesterday, as a former counterterrorism official, but also as a citizen. host: what about the fact that for the last 10 years, almost, since 9/11, we have a new intelligence apparatus in place. is information shared differently? are we succeeding in making sure that people are targeted? guest: i think absolutely. one of the things we need to be careful of is sloppy analogies between what happened here and what happened before 9/11. but the president, as well as john brennan, did a very good job of explaining that yesterday. this was not a 9/11-type failure, where you had intelligence that was stovepiped, capped by different agencies, not allowed to be shared by law, as well as by culture. we actually do have a very good

system, given all the reforms of the past eight years, that actually not only collects vast amounts of information globally, but has it available and is sharing. the problem here is that there was not a prioritization of the nature of these threats, and it was not a connecting of the data that was available. that is what the analysts are supposed to do, frankly, and that is where the failure lies. host: it was in one of the editorials this morning, it could be "the new york times," but in "the new york times" lead editorial, it says, "80 years after 9/11, the government still does not and -- eight years after 9/11, the government still does not have a single terrorism data base." guest: i think there is a reason you did not have the database. there is information about foreign citizens, communications, that cannot be blended with information about suspected american citizens.

host: why not? guest: there are civil rights, civil liberties, constitutional issues, with non-u.s. citizens of versus u.s. citizens. that was not the issue in this particular case, but to suggest one huge database with all the information about potential terrorism suspects -- we have got to be careful, because when you are looking at investigations, you may be looking it innocent individuals, and to put them aside as potential suspects. the other thing i need to mention -- we need to remember that we have short memories and get our country and that there have been incredible successes -- we need to remember -- we have short memories in our country -- that there have been incredible successes. remember the december 2006 plot where al qaeda was planning

out of pakistan through london to bring down 10 airliners over the atlantic. that was a very serious threat, perhaps the biggest threat since 9/11. the intelligence system we put in place, the sharing we had with the brits and the pakistanis, actually support to that well in advance. we tend to forget those in -- that actually thwarted that well in advance. we tend to forget those instances. host: "the washington post" this morning has a large chart that outlines the different lists and all the different communications that are supposed to happen, and it begins with this tide list. could you describe to us what the tide list is? guest: there are gradations of the databases and lists. the tide list -- i would just

call it the tide list -- is the master list of all potential suspect individuals. that number is over 550,000 individuals of potential suspects. host: that is the master list. guest: that is the master general list. but you have to be careful, because not every name in that list means that the individual is a terrorist threat. from there, you have additional screening of those individuals, with information available, where they are able to identify people who prevsent more of a direct threat. that goes to a more refined listed from that, there are lists created for those who pose more of a danger to aviation. the no-fly list, which means you don't let somebody on the plane, because you think they might blow it up or taken hostage or do something nefarious with it,

and the other list is a selectee list, where you take a person inside and you give them extra scrutiny. the problem here was that the suspect in the case, abdulmutallab, was on the big list, and it was not the information to put him on the more refined list that would give him extra scrutiny. that was part of the problem. host: when you come to the no- fly this, there is only about 4000 names there. is that comprehensive? guest: no list is comprehensive or perfect. host: but that is the official no-fly list for the united states. guest: that is. people need to recall that the u.s. government has tried to be strenuous about who goes on that list. those are individuals who are reasonably known to be threats to aviation, who may be operatives, who may decide to use the plane as a weapon. these are not just people who

are potentially suspects who had an extremist conversation monday somewhere around the world. these are actors who are known to us or suspected to us to be very dangerous folks. a real good question here is sure that this be brought in? i would remind people, again, since our memories are short, that when i was in the white house, there was a great deal of pressure from congress and advocacy groups to which will downed the list -- to whittle down the list. there were susan cries about the number of names of the list, mistaken identity -- were cries about the number of names on the list, mistaken identities. host: is the list smaller today than it was when you are in the white house? guest: the master tide this is bigger now. when i left, we were closer to

500. that is now higher. there was always an attempt to refine the list and make sure you did not have wrong names on there, bad names. part of it is the commercial interests. part of it is you do not want to unnecessarily burdened travel for the american public. it is important for u.s. commerce. host: how often did you look at that list? when you are in the white house, your position was similar to john brennan's, except to get the position. guest: he took the position i had, but he is also the homeland security adviser. in theory, somewhat similar. host: would you look at the daily, because supposedly gets fed into a computer every night. guest: i would start and end every day reviewing the threats

that had emerged either over night or during the day. i thought my responsibility was to make sure that we were giving you attention to those threats that appeared based on the information available, information coming through the system. again, i was at a fairly high level. it works slightly differently than somebody on the line. i saw my responsibility as to make sure that we were looking at the priority threats and doing everything to ask the hard questions, not only of our intelligence community and law enforcement community, but our partners abroad. that is how we started and ended every day, and we have instituted this as part of the reforms in 9/11 and accretion of the counter-terrorism center. three times a day, the community, the counter terrorism threat community, did get together, continues to get together, to review literally a matrix of threats that are being laid out against the united states. sometimes those numbers come in

terms of seriousness, in the dozens, sometimes they are a few, but the lists are in the hundreds of threats that are posted to the united states, literally every day. host: does the dni system work, in your viewpoint? guest: one of the things that people need to recall was that the system was built to deal with the failures in the iraq experience. dien n -- dni was not necessarily an expert or model to fix the 9/11 problem. -- experiment or model to fix the 9/11 problem. it is not just counter- terrorism, but it is things related to north korea, iran, the big ticket items that the intelligence community has to be focused on. i think dni is still a work in progress. there had been hiccups' over the last year, some conflicts with the cia as to who is to

represent the u.s. and the intelligence community abroad. but i think in general, the process in place for the counterterrorism community has actually worked quite well. i think folks need to just recall the successes that we had in light of, unfortunately, this failure. host: our guest is juan zarate, former deputy national security adviser in counter-terrorism for the bush administration. cspanwj is our twitter address. margaret, a democrat, you are first up. i have a couple of questions that is slowly layperson has regarded as a computer system to a de -- system. am i to assume -- i had this

question since the christmas bomber incident -- and might to assume the computer systems i have in place in the agencies do not take the information as it is gathered pertaining to one person in coalesce it all? it does and a alarm go off when it hits a certain level of danger? >> that is a very good question. there are multiple databases in the u.s. government that have information about suspect individuals. what you have our systems that actually try to track and manage information and to tie information. an important point is that there is a human factor here that

requires analysts to actually prioritize and pull of permission from the various agencies to actually look at potential threats. there would not be a magic that base -- manage data and booed a bed and data base rehung and did magic of data base. [unintelligible] their actions trying to find a text. operatives that can get past the u.s. homeland, and then look for individuals or pipelines of individuals who may fit that category. that was the failure here. analysts were not taking that strategic problem and then pulling from the data that was available. it was available, and was noble. that is the -- and it was knowable. that is the unfortunate thing about this case.

host: what is it your viewpoint on abdulmutallab's father going to the embassy, a well-known figure, worldwide in many circles, and reporting on his son, and that information not going further? guest: that information provided to our embassy in nigeria in november it was a critical event. the analysts, the people at the embassy and the state department, did not describe enough importance to it, frankly. i think it was his judgment, in essence, as to the importance of it. -- i think there was a misjudgment, in a sense, as to the importance of it. we get hundreds of thousands of locked-in threa -- walk-in threat information all the time did most the time, -- all the time. most the time, it is not any good. that said, this was a little bit different. this was a prominent individual in nigerian society, not going

to his own government officials, but coming to the u.s. embassy, telling officials that his son had gone to yemen. that should have triggered some -- the whole context of that should have triggered more concerned, especially as we learned yesterday, given that we were learning the past few months that al qaeda in and was trying to find out if to send to the u.s. -- find operatives to send to the u.s. host: you are on with juan zarate. caller: this, first of all, is a very interesting conversation. there were two things in the news that were quite chilling recently. first is an interview with osama bin laden several years ago, that he was interested in bleeding america white. unfortunately, concentrating on large wars rather than

intelligence -- wise intelligence gathering. host: could you explain what you mean? caller: i am of the opinion that the entire invasion of iraq was costly in american lives, treasure, and basically misguided. whereas we should have been hunting down bin laden. guest: very good points. in terms of hunting down bin laden, that has not stopped. that is something that is of great importance the prior administration and this administration, is important in terms of the ultimate dismantling of al qaeda. but you're broader point is a good one, that he has talked about his ultimate goal of bleeding america of blood and treasure. he equates the current battle with the united states to the battle against the soviets in the 1980's in afghanistan, he

ascribes to the mujahedin in his efforts the collapse of the soviet empire, and they want to see the collapse of the u.s. we need to be cognizant of that, in terms of how we react, ensuring that we do not overreact. that is one of the challenges for this administration, not giving the terrorists to much of voice in this particular incident. host: when the president spoke yesterday, he talked about reforms for the intelligence community. i want to get your reaction to this. >> these reforms will improve the intelligence community's ability to share, analyze, and act on intelligence swiftly and effectively. in short, they will help our intelligence community to get its job better and protect american lives. but even the best intelligence cannot identify in advance of every individual who would do us harm. we need the security at our airports, ports, and borders,

and with our partnerships with other nations, to protect terror from entering america. guest: i think the president has it right. we have to have a dual system that builds the intelligence picture to identify people who are a threat to us, but he will not be able to identify everybody. you have to have security particles in place that can identify random individuals that have explosives on them. the one thing that is a bit confusing to me about all this is that i think one of the things we have done relatively well over the past eight years is prioritize the threat. you necessarily have to -- the volume of threats is so great that we get, and that the intelligence community, counterterrorism community, deals with. that is precisely what we have tried to do, and i think have been doing over time. for there to be a conclusion that we were not prioritizing properly, not giving enough resources to this problem, really, i think, struck me as a

major default and a major problem, and certainly the president is right to focus on that. but it is odd that we were not focusing more clearly on the threat coming out of yemen. host: next phone call for juan zarate, jackson, new jersey. caller: good morning, mr. zarate. this is a wonderful conversation. guest: good morning. caller: i have a concern about our own connect the dots, and national security. we have a mindset in this current administration that seems more intent on attacking the cia, our navy seals, the fbi, so on and so forth. it seems to me that it is very difficult for these people to do their jobs without being concerned about watching their own back. i think this whole eric holder thing with wanting to try these guys in the united states and bring the cia out to the floor

to lash them a few times, or whatever they are going to do -- they want heads to roll -- i think these people live in a bubble and they want the wrong heads to roll. that is my concern. guest: the caller raises a very good and important point, something i've been concerned about the past few weeks, and that is what all of these actions by the administration are doing to the moral of the intelligence community. i think one of the challenges that president obama has here is that he must demand accountability, he must demand that we do a better job, and given the information that we have, but was revealed yesterday, there were failures year. people need to be called to account and they need to improve. that said, the intelligence community, the cia in particular, feels a bit under siege. we had the incident in afghanistan where seven cia officers were killed literally

on the front lines, and apparently, according to reports, trying to capture ayman al-zawahiri, al qaeda's number 2. these are men and women and institutions that are built to take risks for us, and if the ghost wrote -- if they grow so wary of taking risks, we get out a bunker mentality that could make us less safe. the other thing to mention is that the debate about afghanistan has been incredibly important inappropriate, but one of the negative externalities' of the intense focus on afghanistan, and to a certain extent, the drawdown in iraq, is to not have a global picture of what really is the current threat. we had a margin information about this more direct threat from yemen -- we had emerging information about this more direct threat from yemen. the debate about afghanistan, the intense debate about afghanistan, the centrality of that, which is not in doubt, but

that somehow attracted from, at least the political bird's-eye -- that somehow detracted from at least the political bird's eye view. i think to a certain extent it is a wake-up call for the political establishment and perhaps all of us that we need to be watching the adaptations, we have to watch what is happening in yemen, what is happening in somalia, north africa. these are real problems. it is not just afghanistan. it is sobering, it is unfortunate, but it is the reality we live in. host: next juan call next zarate, -- next call for juan zarate, jacksonville, florida, a democrat. caller: i have a question concerning the way we are put under scrutiny, for lack of a better word, when we go to board our flights here in america. now, so much time is spent on, it seems, getting a group of

names on a list who cannot fly. why isn't there a list done for people who can fly? with our database at today's technology, it takes no time to compile a list of people who are citizens, who are legitimate americans, who have reason to be flying, instead of this list so that it makes it easier -- host: sorry about that. guest: you raised some very good points, actually. this is something that the department of homeland security has been looking at for the past few years. they had a pilot project to make it easier for business travelers to get through security, and that is a preferred travelers program, if you will. i think you are absolutely right. there needs to be a way of making it more convenient. but at the end of today, the list are not going to do it. i name based system is not ultimately secured. you are not going to be able to

put all the good citizens on a list, either. this also points to the fact that the administration has to be careful here. we have to be targeted in a way that we enhance our scrutiny and security, because simply blanketing additional security requirements on airports and american business and folks abroad may not make us that much safer, and actually may have a backlash effect, things that the bush administration had to deal with after 9/11 from friends and allies in pakistan, saudi arabia, algeria. we did not like all the scrutiny, the extra attention that they got as they were traveling into the united states. the administration is going to have to calibrate this well, or else we are going to see some of the very same backlash. host: well, there is a lot of noise in the media whenever something like this happens that we are fighting the last war, the last incident. are we doing that again with these restrictions, watching a

satellite maps on airplanes, pilots putting out landmarks? i mean, really? guest: and the removal of the los -- host: shoes in the bush administration -- guest: that is right. particularly in aviation you have seen this. the hole advent of magnetometers and aviation security started in the 1970's, when terrorists started taking planes over and taking folks hostage, etc. at each interval of innovation by the terrorists, we have had to adapt and put in place new security procedures. richard reid with the two bombings, we take our shoes -- with the shoe bombings, we take our shoes off. now you may be body scan, pat downs, different restrictions on the plane. in terms of that type of preventive security, it tends to

be reactive. one of the challenges is can you get in front of innovation? interestingly, we knew that this particular type of explosive was not only developed and used by this group in al qaeda in yemen but used for an attempted assassination of a counter- terrorism chief in saudi arabia. we actually knew that this type of device was being developed and was being hidden by this group. i think one of the failures was not to actually take that into account as we were thinking about security with respect to the airports. the other thing is that at some point, you cannot be so restrictive in terms of security, that you are going to choke commercial traffic that is so important to our economy and freedom. at some point, you cannot let

the terrorists to dictate how we live. it is a victory for them. so it is a balance. host: next call is from baltimore, independent line. caller: mr. zarate, i caught a speech yesterday at american university on c-span. i went to school for international relations years ago, and it seems like the elephant in the room has always been to me, and if you ask anybody who comes from the regions that are troubled these days, is the unemployment. you go into a taxicab and you asked the man the unemployment rate in eritrea oh, my god, it is a multigenerational unemployment issue. if people don't have opportunities, is this snake oil that we are trying to apply to a wound? you cannot stop terrorism if you

have an endless supply of people who are willing to give whatever modicum -- host: appoint, thank you -- got the point, thank you. guest: absolutely right. you cannot kill or screen your way out of the problem. there is much disenchantment. you look at yemen, for example. not an economy of any real sordid the demographic bulge of young -- not an economy of any real sort. the demographic bulge of young males. a very bleak picture in terms of what young males in a place like yemen can do and aspire to. that said, i think we need to be careful here. at the origins of al qaeda, including the elements here the continue to threaten us, don't necessarily come from the po

or streets of cairo or other parts of the arab muslim world. these are individuals who are largely well educated, privileged in some cases, and we see with abdulmutallab, he came from a privileged family in nigeria, studied engineering in london. we have got to be careful about too many generalizations about poverty or unemployment causing terrorism. i think the dynamic is different. there is an ideology and play here that is a living too much of the world, and that is that the muslim world is under siege, the west is at war with islam, that by the united states, and that there is an obligation, but religiously and politically, to oppose the united states had to fight it with, as they call it, legitimate jihad. we have to realize that there is

an ideology at play that we have to undercut, and much of that, i think, will have to come from the muslim communities themselves. host: as abdulmutallab goes to court today, do you have an opinion on whether national security is threatened by his being in a civil court rather than a military tribunal? inrent danger with havinge terrorists tried in criminal court. we have done it before and we can do it again the real question is the initial paradigm in which she is handled. are we trying to -- in which he is handled. are we try to gather intelligence and prevent further attacks, or are we trying to gather information as a side benefit of actually holding him accountable in the criminal, legal context? you can ultimately to book, but you have to do what first -- you can ultimately do both, but you have to do one first. putting him in the criminal

system for for us the opportunity to get as much as possible -- forfeits the opportunity to get as much as possible. he was in london and was obviously recruited in some way. we are at a moment where, as the administration admitted yesterday, there are additional threats coming from yemen and from this group. we need to know what that looks like. what is the pipeline? who is setting these individuals? how are they were quitting? how many others were there? -- how were they or recruiting? how many others were there? putting them in the criminal system does not give you that flexibility. i don't argue that you do not ultimately try him at some point, either in the military context or the criminal context, but you have to be clear what you are trying to do in the context of the threat. host: west virginia, republican. caller: good morning, gentlemen. i have a question, sir.

with all the technology that this country has, why is it so hard to track down bin laden? i mean, you have a drones, all the intelligence. guest: well, technology is important and critical, but it is not everything. we i dealing, especially when we're talking about the dark corners of the world were al qaeda has found safe havens, whether it is before 9/11 and afghanistan, over the last few years in western pakistan, or more recently in the hinterlands of yemen, we are talking about parts of the world where we don't have much access, where, in many cases, al qaeda has friendly environments, tribal elements, families they have married into that actually i did these individuals -- actually hide these individuals.

and so is more than just being able to put eigha drone in the ear or a listening device somewhere. you have to get intelligence on the ground on where these individuals are t. with some of these parts and the world, we just don't have -- for example, western pakistan -- we just don't have boots on the ground and it is hard to look in every case and every corner. host: your job in the bush administration, deputy national security adviser on counter- terrorism -- how much time was spent on that question? guest: we were focused heavily on that. as i told my wife when i was thinking about what i was doing with the rest of my life as the administration was coming to a close, i said that the two things i want to do -- i wanted to get the three americans held hostage in colombia out, which

we did, thanks to their military, and i also wanted to find a way of getting bin laden, because it would be so important not just symbolically, but because he continues to play the role of galvanizer, organizer of the movement. we have worked around the world to get information about him and try to find him, and not only him, but ayman al-zawahiri. this post with the seven cia officers were killed -- that appears to be what they were trying to do, trying to get closer to ayman al-zawahiri. i think we have got efforts under way. host: do you think bin laden is our ralive, from what you know? guest: i don't think there is any reason to believe he is

dead. there are recent audio tapes that have been authenticated, and we think they are current. i don't think we have had eyes on knowing exactly where he is since tora bora. there was a senate report out in a very good article in "the new republic" about the incident. but no, we think he is alive and there is an active effort to finding him and capturing him. no doubt it will be an important close to a chapter in the war on terror once he is either killed or captured. host: mike in pittsburgh, pennsylvania, a democrat. caller: listen, can you hear me? host: we are listening. caller: he hit the nail right on the head when he said screening people. what is wrong with -- if the

airports will cooperate, what is wrong with having -- lines and lines of people born in this country, showing american citizenship, and another line of people coming in with the visas, and another line of people coming in from another country? host: okay, just add to that, someone you might know at the heritage institute, writes about national security issues, talks about in "the washington times" this morning that the department of homeland security is not necessarily responsible for all aspects of homeland security. if he walks through, in this editorial, the different departments and agencies that are responsible for different parts of the layers of protection that are built to our borders. i just want to add that to the tenement said. -- what the gentleman said. guest: i think that is fine,

although d -- that is right, although the authority has been consolidated and they have that ability. but dhs does not have the to possibilit -- have the capacity to deal with all the counter- terrorism issues and the country. to the caller's point, part of this is being able to use intelligence wisely to figure out who may be suspect and who may not be. i think we need to be careful with profiling and making distinctions, because we certainly have cases where u.s. citizens, of both past and present, not only have been radicalized, but have joined forces with al qaeda. the headley case out of chicago,

where a citizen was helping last party toward the -- helping lashkar-e-taiba. zazi, an afghan-american citizen, apparently trained by al qaeda and sent back to commit some sort of attack in denver, on his way to new york. we need to be careful, because there is a home run problem that we have to contend with that is not necessarily feed into -- homegrown problem we have to contend with that does not necessarily fit into a clear dividing line. host: last call is from maryland. caller: well, good morning. thank you for taking my call. this is my first time calling, so i hope you will be patient with me. i am a sociologist, and i think the american people should notice that we are acting like a nation divided against itself,

with particularly republicans attacking a sitting president who admits -- the republicans are admitting that we are at war -- shouldn't this be considered treasonous? it of violence -- it violates the constitution for a former vice president to say things about a sitting president that gives fodder to our enemies. host: you have been invited to give political comment. guest: i am not a politician by turning, but i will take a crack at this. when we were in the bush administration, there was plenty of debate, and there should have been. an important element of public debate and scrutiny over what we are doing. i don't think all the criticism is a problem. it should be part of our national culture.

that said, i agree with the caller that we should remember who the enemy is. we have a transnational movement that is trying to motivate people around the world, including american citizens, and they continue to attack us, in big ways and small ways. we have to keep our eye on the ball, and that is something that president obama reasserted yesterday. we have to work together to figure out what that means in terms of the long-term interests and how we deal with problems like yemen, not just because of al qaeda, but because of potential instability there. host: how did you get interested in this work? guest: i have been very fortunate and blessed over my career. i was a lawyer by training, got into harvard law, work for the clintons administration for janet reno, i was in the terrorism and violent crime section. i was given an opportunity to

work with some degree prosecutors of our time, pat fitzgerald, folks in new york working on the embassy bombings case. i was put on the uss cole case, working with great prosecutors here. i was a young prosecutor learning at the feet of some great prosecutors who were looking at the problem of al qaeda before 9/11 and trying to address it. the frustration, by the way, in that period -- i was a junior guy, but i was witnessing this firsthand -- was that we knew that al qaeda was at war. they not only declared this and in 1996, but they were taking a progressively greater and greater steps to attack us. the bush administration came in power and i was asked to move over to the treasury department three weeks before 9/1131 9/11 happened, i was part of a leadership team that was going

after a terrorist financing. i did that for four years, and then was asked to go to the national security council. host: juan t today on

a subject that clearly has been getting a lot of attention over the last year, given what we saw in the difficult election season in afghanistan last year but that also has not yet gone away. i think once we got through the difficult process of the elections last year, people were breathing a collective sigh of relief that we moved on and could actually get on with governance and moving toward with strategic objectives in the country, but yet, we have another election seemingly just around the corner, so we have to ask the question, what does that mean for afghanistan's political development? what does it mean for international programs in the country? and how do we ensure that the difficult problems that we faced last year in the presidential council elections aren't repeated as the dwrict council and parliamentary elections go

forward. before i introduce our speakers, let me just give you a little perspective, having lived in afghanistan for the last seven years, working on the rule of law and governance issues. in 2004, i observed the country's first presidential election and then in 2005, i observed the provincial council and parliamentary elections and did the same last august for the presidential and provincial council elections and i cannot overstate the difference in the mood in afghanistan between 2004 and last year. back in 2004, there was a sense of optimism, there was a sense -- there was some energy that you could really feel in the air, that afghanistan was going in the right direction and people were expecting that the promises made after the agreement were going to be met and that the institutions of governance and democracy were being built, that reconstruction efforts would lead to tangible

improvements in people's lives and the 2004 elections were widely deemed to be an overwhelming success with high turnout, over 70%, with violence kept at a very -- kept at very low level, with voting irregularities, while they existed, kept at relatively low levels as well. with the large number of women turning out to vote and people i think thought that afghanistan's democratic development was going in the right direction. if you contrast that with the high levels of fraud, the low voter turnout that had as much to do with voter apathy as it did with fear of coming out on voting day or reprisals thereafter, i think is a reflection of the fact that people are frustrated in afghanistan with the way their democratic development has gone and with the elections coming up this year, we want to try to ensure that the mistakes of 2009 are not repeated. that said, there were some

bright spots last year. one in particular, the electoral complaints commission, two of whose members are here today on the panel, was able to maintain its independence from political interference to such a degree that they were able to pinpoint with some degree of accuracy the amount of fraud, discount the number of ballots and require there be a second-round runoff, thereby taking the initial i.e.c. count to 54.-- 54 point something percent and having president karzai accept that, which i think was a good step for afghanistan. of course the runoff never happened but at least the e.c.c. was able to maintain its independence and show that the rule of law does matter to some degree in afghanistan. so with that, let me briefly introduce our three distinguished speakers and turn it over to them to speak just for a few minutes, probably no more than 10 minutes each if you

can keep it to that, so we can have a frank and vibrant discussion and q&a session after that. to my far left, scott warden who just returned to the institute here. he's a senior rule advisor with usit, who was on a leave of absence to work as one of the three international members of the electoral complaints commission. he was also involved in the elections in 2005 for parliament when he was with the jdmb. you have their buy yows in front of you, i won't go into too much detail on that. isabel root is desk officer for the e.a.d. at the department of political affairs at the united nations and worked in afghanistan back in 2005 as a political advisor and there's quite a lot of afghanistan's elections and has been following the processes very closely. to my left, grant kipen, was champlee of the e.c.c. both in

2005 for the parliamentary and provincial council elections that year and also for last year. i think both scott and grant were at the center of the maelstrom last year. be pointed with your questions and try to get information on what was happening behind the scenes. these guys were at the center of what was going on at an extremely difficult period in afghanistan. with that, why don't we start at the far left with scott and move in this direction and go from there. scott, if you want to start? >> we had a meeting and ruled that -- >> you had a jurga. >> we're going to switch the order. >> ok, take it away. >> thanks very much, john. thank you to usip for hosting this event here this morning.

scott and i had a discussion last night about how we would sort of go forward with this discussion this morning and i think what i would like to do is lead off with a bit of the introduction to the ecc. as many of you know, it's temporary -- of the two electoral bodies in afghanistan, the independent election commission and the electoral complaints commission, the e.c.c. is a temporary body. it's only in existence for the period of the election campaign. it will cease to exist, its mandate ceases to exist up to 30 days after certification of final results. our understanding from a few days ago is that the final certified results for released in sort of late third week of december, our mandate officially ends about the 25th of january. our mandate as described under law, the e.c.c.'s mandate, is to

investigate and adjudicate all challenges and complaints with respect to the electoral process. we have a role both within the nomination period, when candidates come forward with their nomination papers, as well as during the campaign period and after the campaign period. the e.c.c. in 2009 constituted some, i guess, 250 or 260 people. we had headquarters at kabul and offices in all 34 provinces around the country. i'd like to say that one of the things i was enormously proud of and i think the commission as a whole is enormously proud of were the efforts of our staff around the country. of that number, only about 18 or so were internationals. the rest were afghan nationals who, and i don't think there was one individual on staff that had been with the e.c.c. prior in 2005.

so we're working with a totally new group of people. in addition to our official role, which everyone looked on with great interest, one of the other major roles that we had was a professional development one. to bring a group of people that had never been involved in an electoral complaint capacity prior and to get them to understand what the rules and responsibilities were and to have them actually undertake those responsibilities and functions was an enormous undertaking if for these elections. one of the challenges that we had in 2009 was that we were established quite late in the process. our first meeting as a commission, formal meeting as a commission, took place on april 26. we were quickly into the candidate nomination period. at that point in time we did not have a headquarters in place. we did not have any staff identified iaside from a couple of people that had been sent to

us in support of -- in the early going. so we had an enormous task ahead of us, not just in discharging our responsibility, in terms of investigating and adjudicating complaints and challenges but also getting the organization up an functioning. and one of the, i guess, the other major challenge as we saw it was the -- and i don't want to be too difficult on this, but it was -- we had -- we took on a lot of responsibilities that did not really rest with us and the i.c.c. in particular was willing to put the decision on us in one instance on the challenge period in terms of candidates meeting particular criteria set out in the law and the constitution. these were activities that could

very easily have been done by the i.e.c. but for which they felt that we should be the ones that the make those decisions. that kind of relationship continued on through the entire process, which, given the points i made earlier about how late we were established, the fact that we had a new crew learning as we went, placed enormous burden on the organization as we went through. in terms of lessons learned, i know scott will get into this in more detail, i can add as we go along. to me, one of the major lessons learned is, and looking forward is how much we in the international community didn't use the time between the 2005 elections and the 2009 elections to do the kind of groundwork that really needed to take place. if you look at the observer reports from 2005, you'll see a lot of recommendations in those, some of which, one in

particular, voter an civic education that needed to take place, which really didn't occur in the interim period. it was very late, that sort of process was late getting going in 2009. the other thing that struck me was the lack of understanding about the processes as -- as a whole. by many of the take holders. candidates in particular. i remember in some amusement, going to a meeting at the intercon hotel for -- this was a meeting hosted by the election commission, the minister of interior was there, minister of defense, head of m.d.s. and it was about providing security and transportation to presidential candidates during the campaign. and some of you may know about this, there's an assassination clause within the law if there's a death of one of the candidates

for the president rble election, they have to start the process all over again, so there was some interest in making sure all some interest in making sure all candidates remained alive @@å

election day forward. i'm just going to stop there and let scott carry on and then look forward to your questions later on. >> ok. >> picking up from that, one of the benchmarks i think the e.c.c. set for ourselves when we started this was to make progress over the performance of the complaints commission in 2005. and i think we did that in several ways. i think john already mentioned that overall, obviously, e.c.c. decisions were the focus of the election and the public and hopefully we discharged our duty well in terms of upholding the rule of law. i think that through the course of the process we found that there was still great interest in the elections and in complaining about the elections by the voters. we had about 3,000 complaints overall throughout the various

phases of the campaign. with this new and overwhelmingly afghan staff, e.c.c. was able to, i think, thoroughly investigate all of them. and hopefully our decisions represented a model of transparency that can be built on in future elections. another focus of our work was a vetting process. in 2005, there were clauses that prevent members of illegal armed groups from standing for elections. it had mixed success, i think we can say this process was undertaken again in the recent election and we wound up ex-compluding 55 candidates, mostly from the provincial council race, one for vice president and one for president on the basis of their links with armed groups. this was an accepted result and represented a will the of progress in a field where we had hundreds of complaints about

people's bad acts in the past, mostly criminal activity, which was not part of our jurisdiction. still, quite a significant achievement. i think good for the process in after began sta -- afghanistan that we were able to exclude a number of candidates that had not given in their records and not committed to rule of law this went on without much objection. another big success, i think, grant already mentioned is the capacity building element of that, of our 250 staff. this election, despite the focus on the fact that there were international commissioners on the complaint commission, was an a process. to do this on a provincial basis, we had officers in all 34 provinces, they were entirely afghan staffed. i think that represents a good accomplishment to build capacity

at the local level for running elections independly from international assistance. the negative aspect of the elections, of course, was that there was a significant amount of fraud. the presidential election, i think, was pretty well documented in the press. our investigations yielded quite a bit of fraud in all parts of the country in -- on behalf of all candidates, especially for karzai in terms of volume. we had about 1.2 million ballots based on our investigation that led to a second round. let's focus on international -- less focused on internationally buzz the provincial council election but we found across the board there was more passion on the part of complainants and candidates themselves at that level. these are local race, it matters greatly for a candidate's

prestige. there's not so big of a goth mandate the council has. but looking at that race, you see a bit of a preview of what can happen in the parliamentary race. which is lots of candidates, intense contacts a lot of scrutiny in the process. our investigations went on in all the provinces, we investigated hundreds of ballot boxes and wound up invalidating thousands of ballots in that case and we're still waiting, i guess the announcement has come from the i.e.c. as ho to the who won and who lost but their website is down. we're still waiting to see, the public is still waiting to see the outcome. we found significant fraud and i think it revealed that with the presidential race, reveal maryland flaws in the system that need to be taken care of. there's a lot of opportunity for progress. i just want to focus on three areas that i think were

fundamental to the fraud, irregularities that curred in 2009. they need to be focused in the short and long-term of afghan elections. particularly with parliament, some of them can't be resolved if they're going to have the elections in may as the i.e.c. announced. but certainly needs to be addressed if we're going to have progress on the operation of democracy in afghanistan. the first and longest term issue is voter registration and the creation of a voter list. for each of the elections, there's been a registration process, people get a voter card that makes them eligible to vote. a new exercise is conducted in advance of the 2009 election they registered 4.5 million new voters. a lot of those we saw pretty convincing evidence were fraud len. there were a lot of fake cards out there, identities couldn't be verified and when it came down to it in terms of

investigating fraud in the 2009 election we really couldn't rely on the voter list at all to verify if there are 600 votes from a station, were there 6 hurricanes people who showed up and were they all eligible? this is something that doesn't create fraud on its own, but it's a significant tool used in all of our countries and all around the world in developing situations as a gate keeper to the electoral process to keep bad elements out that needs to be fundamentally restructured, i think, if you're going to have reliable elections into the future. but that's a longer-term fix. in the medium-term, you can't deny that one of the biggest reasons for problems in this election was security. it has two aspects. one, keeping people away from the polls to an extent, but also it prevented observers from monitoring the election and

making sure that whatever regularities were undertaken were actually reported. and further more, you had polling stations in places that were insecure with lots of ballots but very few voters. that's something that needs to be addressed in the 2010 elections, which is, are the polling stations in places that can be secure, can be observed and if it's in an area that's dangerous, we want voters to have access to the process but you don't niecely -- necessarily need as many ballots as they provided because of realistic expectations of turnout. the third area i think was a fundamental problem had to do with i.e.c. personnel. you know, it is -- it is candidates, their agents, voters who commit the frauds but the inch e.c. has significant responsibility to the public to

try to take proactive measures, try to mitigate the risk of fraud and when fraud does occur, to take corrective measures. it's really a dualing role between the e.c.c. and i.e.c. to address fraud and the e.c.c. is a reactive component. we an connell -- we can only investigate after the fact. the i.e.c. has broad powers to recount, investigate on their own and to take remedial measures and they failed to do that. that was all put to the e.c.c. and you know, hopefully, we performed our job adequately but certainly it's an overwhelming task and there needs to be a partnership between the two institutions if it's going to work. in terms of leadership at the headquarters level, i think what you need to look to is has learning occurred? and so far we haven't seen any statements from the i.e.c. that say, we recognize there are

fundamental flaws and this is what we're going oto do to direct it. false -- unless that happens you have to look at changes in the management level if you're going to have a significant improvement for next year. but more broadly at the provincial level, fraud occurred in individual polling stations, often in quite remote locations. as a basis -- as a result of our investigation, just into the presidential race we found that i think it was 1,400 polling stations had 100% fraud. our methodology was if we found significant evidence of corruption of the voting process, we would invalidate the station. 1,400 station, individual locations, where you can say there were serious problems. we also did an analysis and found that if you look at polling centers, a high school might be a polling center, with multiple polling stations. 450 polling centers had at least half of their polling stations

with fraud. then we did analysis and found that 23 districts had at least half of their polling stations found fraudulent for the presidential race. this amounts to hundreds if not thousands of individuals who were responsible for the conduct of the elections in. maybe they were intimidated, maybe they were corrupt, but either way, we need to address the large staff issue at the provincial level to see what happened and you have the right people in place. if not, you know, the prospect for a better election in 2010, i think, are dim. so, let me leave it on that note, i think there's a lot of issues that could be addressed in the q&a, but that's an example of the short and long-term approach that needs to be taken in conjunction with what grant said in terms of voter education, candidate education so you can see that this is not an internationally

driven process or an exercise you have to check the box on but rather, this is an organic afghan process to choose leadership. i don't think people are seeing that yet and hopefully they can start to see that in the election -- in the next election to come. >> i will not take too much time, either. i want to leave more time for questions. just as an introduction, i work for the electoral assistance division a small office in new york, which is principally charged with assessing the situation ahead of elections in countries where either the security council or countries have requested we get involved. in the -- at the end of 2007 -- can you hear me? at the end of 2007, i participated in what we call a needs assessment mission to

afghanistan to assess the situation ahead of the presidential and provincial elections. i would have to concur with participants here that we were disappointed to see that very little had been done since the 2005 elections in terms of improving the capacity of the electoral institution, improving infrastructure for the preparation of the elections, nevertheless we made a number of recommendations at the end of our visit that we thought could lead to some improvements in the electoral process. i won't go through all of them, but i think some are still valid for the upcoming elections. i think one lesson that we learned from a number of elections in difficult areas or in countries recovering from conflict or who do not have large experience with electoral

processes is that rather than trying to implement a number of technical fixes which might be difficult to either comprehend or put in place in countries, again that have not had a long electoral experience, what's essential is that the people have the trust of the electoral authorities. trust whichever institution of the government which is involved in electoral process. ideally, you -- it's much ease wrer to organize proper elections in an area where institutions are strong, where you know that the institutions, the e.c.c.'s role is, where the institutions are solid and can bring redress when problems occur. i think one thing that has been a recurring problem with

elections in afghanistan is the elections in afghanistan is the timely@@@@@@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process.

i was indeed in afghanistan for the elections in 2005. i worked on out of country voting for refugees in 2004 for the presidential elections and there was this sense of uplifting that i would agree was not there, regrettably, in the last election. this last process was very difficult. i think everybody recognizes that. it created a number of crises that certainly were not needed at this point in the -- for the country. it swallowed a lot of the energy and it did not allow the country to focus on many other things for almost a year. i'm saying that because i think that there's a lot of questions now about timing, but i think you have to balance how much energy elections, and the electoral process swallows and

you know, what other priorities afghanistan should be looking at at this point. just maybe a word to say that working as an electoral expert, i would say that in many cases, people put too much expectations and weight on elections. elections are not a panacea. thees were the first afghan organized elections. it's difficult -- it's a difficult, technical process but the afghans this time were the ones making the decisions. they weren't in 2004, 2005, some of the members of the independent election commissions were foreign advisors, this was the first time that the i.e.c. was fully afghan. i think they've done, you know, a lot of -- they've learned a lot, i would say, from this process. i think that one sign i would

say that was positive from these elections was the level of political debate, let's say, and in a way, the criticism that accompanied these elections shows that people are interested in learning better and in learning how to improve the process. so let's just hope that, you know, within afghanistan there's sufficient debate now to push forward the reforms that can actually make these elections a prose process that's more accessible to everybody. in terms of the reforms, maybe we can -- i'll see if there's some interesting questions on that later on. i would just say that the status of electoral affairs in afghanistan and the way it reflects also the level of development of institutions in the country, i mean, it's extremely hard to organize

elections when you don't know even what the population is. there hasn't been a census in a listening time. the numbers vary widely. a lot of checks and balances that could normally be put in place cannot be put in plates for the moment in afghanistan because their fundamental and quite far-reaching reforms that haven't taken place. we're still working with the legal -- a legal framework that is outdated. .

the kind of attention that these elections garnered, i think, made it even more complicated. those who argue that not enough had been done, a lot of exceptional things were actually done in afghanistan, particularly the ecc is not a body they you will find in other countries, where some of the members are international. i think that in 2004, there was a sense that this body was needed. it was put in place. and they have done great work. eventually, you know, we hope the country can move towards an electoral process that is more on par with what we see in other countries. but in the meantime, i think that afghanistan has been quite open the putting in place some

quite exceptional structures and measures. to make the process more -- for the future elections, to win back the trust, there are a number of things that can be done. i think the next elections will be difficult. >> thanks very much to each of you. i think we have this room until 12:00? that is quite a lot of time for q&a. maybe we can and early if some of you would like to have a chance to speak to some of the speakers individually. that will still give us quite a lot of time for discussion right now. i would like to use the moderator's prerogative to ask the first question, and i will turn it over to the audience. i would like to focus on

something you said, is about, in your topic. feel free any of you to answer this. it goes to the title of today's panel discussion, can afghanistan afford another a election? nobody was focused really on anything else except getting through the election. there is a sense of governing inertia from the afghan side of things, and the sense that international policy was being implemented in afghanistan, and the development of a new strategy on how to approach afghanistan. we're about to go through another round of national elections as early as this spring, perhaps later this year, can afghanistan and the world really afford to spend a

number of months going through a similar process, particularly if the difficulties and challenges that we faced last year are not properly addressed? another way to look at whether they can afford another election is from the financial point of view. how can they find elections this year? the election cycles in afghanistan, we can expect to see a national election either for this year's councils, something like 15 or 16 in the next 20 years. that will have notifications -- i like to put that to our panel. feel free respond. and we can open that up to the audience. >> i mean, obviously, the taurus of the day of the elections is a

choice that the afghan government has to make. the day is actually mentioned in the constitution, which is not something that is usual, and has been a big constraint, creating a number of problems. my concern, n.d., is that the electoral process -- indeed, is that the alleged moral process will take more time. the constitution says that every election will take place in the spring. all of them were held in the late summer or fall. this is obviously not something that, you know, we have a strong opinion on. it is something that president

karzai has announced, a rather ambitious agenda for himself and his country. when there is an alleged oral process, not very much else -- when there is an electoral process, the afghan government is going to have a way that. having elections in may will probably be very technically challenging. that is the decision they ahve to ma -- have to make. they have the right to postpone the election for security reasons. if this is the right they choose to exercise, we could have a number of reforms that could be put in place. the government is going to have to weigh the costs in terms of

the focus of the country and how much reform can be done. >> maybe just to add to that, i think one of the problems that you mentioned earlier is the process of decision making. whether the elections are in may, september, they are delayed one year, when you make a decision, you can get about governance in the interim without as much disruption. unfortunately, what tends to happen, you get this offer and counteroffer going back and forth. you can't actually realize the benefit of the delay because they're always discussing it. there needs to be an honest kind of consensus developed by the international community that will be funding in large part,

and the election commission itself. are we really prepared? the answer will be no. if you make a decision now that says authoritatively, yes, it will help to do constructive work in the interim. the larger question to you raised, john, it was legitimacy. that is certainly a lot around the presidential elections we just had. we will be interested to see what the parliament itself voices be opinion on. they're the ones up for reelection. if an election goes forward, essentially the same mechanism as 2009, will the constituents say yes, i see you as my representative. or will they be marginalized?

if that is the case, and only afghan people can decide that, then there is an interest in advocating for delay and also looking seriously at some of the legal reforms that they have the power to enact. >> i concur with both scott and isabelle. it is a decision that rests with afghan institutions. certainly with the national community. that decision making process -- we are the primary funders. at the end of the day, it is the afghan institutions that are responsible for the progress -- process. we need to focus on that. at the end of the day, it is the afghans themselves. the more that we can do, the

better off everyone is going to be. to pick up on scott pose the issue of legitimacy, -- scott's issue of legitimacy, trying to describe as free and fair, at think we need to get into a certain sort of paradigm or metric in terms of elections in countries like afghanistan. it is seen as being incredible and inclusive for the population. you know, john made the point earlier that not just security issues have an impact on the elections, but people voting with their feet. that is not a phenomenon that is strictly limited to afghanistan. this should not be seen as unusual. looking forward, what we need to

do,w#d@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speak clearly and injuries yourself before we ask a question. maybe we should take two or three questions at a time and turn them over. i see one question here. these three up in the front. is there a microphone? >> this is being recorded, so it would be good if you please use the microphone. >> i am with the afghan tv

service, the voice of america. i would like to follow up on the issue of reform. how much does reform depend on the iec or the president's willingness to act upon the recommendations that were made very clear during this last cycle? >> i am from the middle east institute. perhaps we can go beyond the mechanics and process that we have focused on. is this a parliament that is electing what ever it is, to look at the character representation, the effectiveness of the results, the effectiveness of the parliament. there seemed to be basic, larger

flaws that are not going to be addressed at all. obviously, one of them is the nontransferable boat -- vote. it caused so much confusion and complexity, certainly. the second is the absence of competing political parties. it has a great deal of effect on the way that people vote. the kinds of consequences that you have involving popularity in particular. and the third is the absence of the census. it would enable us to see the kind of parliament on a district basis. that existed in the elections that took place in 1965-69. it gave a focus on representation in large,

provincial elections. >> john edwards. good morning, everyone. i salute the outstanding work that you will get out there. probably everybody here. it was an enormous contribution. i have a prelude to the question that is for all three of you. you will hold the afghans in very high respect. ultimately, it has to be there process. if i could make a very modest appeal with respect to the representative from the u.n., show them the respect today. it is a rare opportunity to talk to folks that really know, to show respect by being very

candid. to call a difficult, it is far worse. when they go very wrong, there -- and they have advocated were the [unintelligible] their lives are at risk. we have elections coming up in may, so we should show respect for people that are there by being candid. in that respect, do you believe, all three of you, that the difficulties -- the fiascos -- scott came out and said that this really was massive fraud. with the extensive damage to the credibility, there is some kind of investigation warranted.

and afghans themselves -- from the model, it is crucial to have. the other question, particularly for isabelle, where was the u.n.? not your entity, but the experts that were so involved in the process. where were they during the preparation, and as the fraud was perpetrated. --? again, icily grant and scott for your outstanding work. -- i salute grant and scott for a standing work. >> a lot to think about. i will let you fight amongst yourselves about who gets to answer.

>> i love the opportunity to reflect. john, your point about oing -- going forward, etc. one that came out was from ndi. it was a road map for, their suggestion establishing something like a commission in kenya. and i think an initiative like that is a very worthwhile undertaking. i think it offers everybody what they're looking for, an opportunity to reflect an honest and open, transparent manner. to look at what are some of the activities that could take place that are positive?

others are already on this wavelength. i think my personal opinion would be that we can reflect very seriously. this would not be an international effort. this would be a joint afghan international effort. i would you in that direction buried i completely agree with the points that you made. -- i would point you in that direction. i completely agree with the points that you made. the whole political party issue was near and dear. i think a lot of people were surprised. i am certainly looking forward to, in afghanistan, you're going

to need political parties. they do not support that, and it is a detriment to party development. this is something -- and development of political parties is not want to take place overnight. -- is not going to take place overnight. they don't have the same connotation in afghanistan as they do here. i think we would see a parliament that, perhaps, would be ablet o -- able to coalesce around issues much more easily and quicker than is

the case at this opint in -- point in time. the question about the iec, it gets back to the last question. it would be fair to say, and i like to make this very clear we all -- clear. we all have -- it does not serve anybody the start pointing fingers, particularly at individuals or institutions. we all could have done a better job collectively. those that take up the mantle will be talking to them about that. what has happened first --

improvements can and should be made, and we have to move forward. it is easier said than done. as a they have ignored that in order to be able to move forward. >> i agree -- you also asked how much of this is the political will in terms of reform. a lot of it rests in both of your hands. it would have to be the president of the decision. there needs to be constructive

reform. the 300,000 plus staff -- it makes a big decision to fix it. the political will or institutional will have a lot to do with this. i agree with grant. forward looking, with afghan and international -- what happens so we can get to a political resolution of these in

afghanistan? adding that as an achievement that we should recognize, an amicable agreement among the candidates that had the right to run off. this is what the government of afghanistan should be about. that is ultimately the bottom line. so looking at the future, how can this be more legitimate? i think that would be a good idea. you also ask, where was the un in this process? there were warning signs in the form of the voter registration process that i mentioned. the numbers were coming back suspiciously in a number of areas, particularly conservative provinces that had very high female registration. that could have been looked at more closely.

i don't fault anyone. there were warning signs, and i think looking forward, we must look at the patterns of fraud that we were able to uncover and look at it more broadly. practices or provinces are problematic. i think there is room to do that. and finally, i think brant said it well in terms of the importance of political parties , what rule will abdulla play? he got a significant percentage of the vote. and will he use this to try to build a party?

there are numerous attempts by different factions of opposition. that is a key part of any function of a political system. they did a very good job at the personal amount -- he got a lot of support that is unexpected. that would be one way to start building the party, so it is a good thing to watch. it is also an area where you can say, -- [unintelligible] there's definitely room to work on that. to start with these questions, from my perspective of having been in new york, i spent some time in afghanistan.

@@@@@@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impartiality in doubt, it makes it hard for us to do our job properly.

what we are officially advocating throughout the process is to follow the process. i can't emphasize enough how exceptional institutions are. it gave a lot of power to some individuals to address the fraud that would of been very hard to prevent. that ties into something that a lot of people -- there is some confusion about how much of an international process these elections are. even in 2005 when i was covering the eastern region, i saw the elections as very much an ongoing process. when you're covering a whole province, in my area, there were many problems.

afghans were running the elections. they are certainly running the elections now. i don't think that the personnel on the ground could have impacted that so much. there is certainly advice that could have been given. overall, there was not a process in place. i think the process worked. the results that had to be an old were annulled. -- annulled were annulled. we could've gone to a second round with these decisions. there is a decision to take matters into our own hands, but i do not think that is right. the afghan institutions did

their work. i think the process worked. now to tie into how it could be done better, i think the question of the census, to me, it's interesting. there was a process that was supposed to put -- be put in place originally. all of these things would help tremendously in making the process more -- to make it a better process. the security question is key. i take it is very hard to conduct exercises that require a lot of time. and also a lot of money. somebody has raised the issue, can the country afford an election financially?

when a special committee requests more safeguards, do you safe -- the safeguards come at a high cost. they are really key to making the process more credible. it is more important that the people have trust in the institutions that deliver the reductions rather than trying to implement the voter registration system with by a metric features and iris recognition. this will not solve the problems of people did not trust the process. there are a number of key reforms -- i think the legal reforms are long overdue. for instance, the authority under which the president appoints actually comes from a transitional article of the constitution.

there were some efforts on the part of the parliament -- and i think this is something that should happen. this is, as grant said, and responsibility for everybody. i would not say it is not just the eic or karzai, scott underlined -- i think they have earned a voice in the debate. they can also pushing a number of issues. it has to be a collective effort. there is another role to play there, too, with the sovereignty of the country. the problem with the reforms -- it would be a long time. the senses and the civil voter registry, a change in legislation would probably take

a year or a year-and-a-half. it is hard to say exactly, but there are constraints that could be put in place in a shorter time frame. again, is going to depend a lot on the time of the election. >> i would like to make one quick edition. what we saw -- one quick addition. we saw in 2009 was of a democratic culture -- and the challenge of a democratic culture coming out of a civil war after many decades. in our own countries, often, when we go to vote whether it is municipally, or statewide, they

are either on a volunteer -- [unintelligible] these are people that you see a election after election after election. after water to a election cycles in afghanistan, can we really expect to have that level of understanding of that sense of civic duty and responsibility. it is going to take time. and also it won't be the same to the same degree in 10 or 15 years that it might be now, but

certainly, afghans that we spoke to as part of the election process -- they don't want to see institutions that respond to their needs. in many respects, those needs are the very same that we have. the want a secure, peaceful environment. they want economic opportunities for themselves and for their families, for their community. i think we are all working towards the same goal here. perhaps expectations are just a bit too high early on. that transition is going to happen. i come away not pessimistic of although was a difficult process. i am optimistic about the long- term, you know, opportunities

for afghanistan and the people of afghanistan. they're going to get there. they just need our continued support. >> just quickly, marvin, under question of a census. there was an opportunity lost. the levels of a security make conducting an accurate sense is very difficult today. back in 2002 or 2003, they were cast with running a census. it no longer exists. they did not get the funding or the impetus to conduct that. afghanistan poses population is branching from 24 million people, a wide range. we don't know if any level of precision how many districts in the country, let alone how many people are living in the districts.

it is something that gets highlighted this year when they will be district elections. let me turn a over to one question here, and we will go to the side. can you please come to the microphone and introduce yourself? >> thanks. my question returns to the title of the panel. i think that i am hearing, and i just want to make sure to give you the opportunity to confirm that this is correct, that rather than making it a priority to improve the election process and capacity, maybe there should

be something of a the emphasis on elections as a priority. perhaps the greater emphasis on other sources of afghan government such as governance in the sense of functioning security and economic development, i think brant distinguished between it credible elections, free and fair elections. the sense i am getting from a number of the comments just now is that perhaps afghans have lower expectations then the international did, and it was something -- maybe there was international scapegoating of the election process for the frustrations with afghanistan policy.

am i miss hearing that? ->> it is world wide node that the elections were fraught -- full of fraud. of course, the security -- my question is, what are the possibilities of having parliamentary elections coming soon? >> i am michael with the rand corp. will be -- will they be held in

addition to the administrative elections? because there was a kind of false impression after the 2005 election that went very well. perhaps, it was a lot messier than people wanted to a knowledge at the time. and perhaps greater attention to how these elections went. within the parliament and also the provincial council. it might have made people -- i could focus a little bit more -- i was wondering if you could speak to the 2005 experience. i have a question about legitimacy. i am under the impression that

-- [unintelligible] it was the international community that was fretting over the -- over what the elections were due to the legitimacy of the afghan state. i feel like there is insufficient evidence for afghan -- there are studies that have been done -- [unintelligible] they have concluded that it depends on who you ask. one of the other things that they point to is that it is kind of low anyway. perhaps these elections did not do as much damage. we're electing a government, what is this going to be for everybody?

and you can share your thoughts on the effect of the legitimacy of the afghan state. of the afghan state. @@@@@@@ @ @ @ that doesn't have to do with elections, but with the afghan institutions.

i think it needs to be a comprehensive approach. were the grants used, it is participation. and maybe that is really the benchmark that should be observed and improved upon. low voter turnout, i the based on 2005 elections, i do not know how well it was reported, the working in afghanistan, the composition of the afghan [unintelligible] they have a lot of unsavory characters. now i don't think that they have to do with expectations of what an election should produce. it is not understanding of whether you get an unsavory

character or not. the really look to powerbrokers or international institutions to solve the problem for you. that is unrealistic. at the same time, not some much the process of 2005, but the results in terms of parliament census. and what kind of leaders you have -- that is the risk going forward. from this process in 2009, adding the publicity over the fraud and the investigation into it was very positive. there might have been fraught or actors and the provincial -- fraud or actors in the provincial council. i just address several questions

at once, but legitimacy -- they are much more outcome driven. do they understand how the process works? they see their votes or their attitude leading to an elected body. i will leave it at that. it kind of touches on a number of issues at once. and then, there are questions about council elections. i am not sure what their schedule is with that. i think it will be difficult to hold them in may. they need to do more preparatory work. >> anybody else care to respond?

>> what i would say is that, alexian's as i mentioned before, -- elections as i mentioned before, there also a reflection -- and they are also a reflection. i have no opinion on win the elections should take place. it is a decision for the government. there are a number of things that have the change in afghanistan. the government has recognized that. the people are expecting changes. but those will really make a difference. i think security is at the heart of a lot of issues. a lot of other things will be possible. i would not say that we should

work on improving the electoral process. whatever can be done should be done. we will not have -- not only is there experience with electro processes, which is that the only time can resolve, there are other factors that are still there. again, there has to be a balance on these other things, a realization that the electoral process will also be dependent on those other factors. if there are parts of the country that are not safe, the elections are supposed to give everybody a voice. how do you reconcile that? it ties into the question on the

lack of security. how will that affect the elections. there are always things that can be done. relearning the trust of the people in terms of being more transparent, saying what the transitions are, people understand what the process is going to be so that they have time to react. that can obviously affects decisions. and with the parliamentary race, you will have hundreds of thousands of agents throughout the country checking the process. it would be hard to imagine a place where you have just one real competitor. if you have two or three agents in one area, it is the best

check that the process can have on the district and logo elections. president karzai mentioned his intention to hold them. indeed, i think that there are a number of things that need to be put in place beyond the district boundaries. if we have a better understanding of the size of the population, it is something that should also be done, the mandate as to why they should be adopted way ahead of time so that the provincial elections -- their mandate was adopted after the nomination. i think you need some preparations on the question -- preparations. on the question of the 2005

elections, located where the parliamentary candidates were there for a number of weeks, there was a lot of interest, a lot of debate about the 2005 elections. like most politicians, they are quite competitive and eager to win. i don't think the u.n. had any of illusion that these elections are going to be easy. certainly, the elections in 2005 raised a number of problems. again, remember, these were the first afghan elections. they are still testing what will

work for them. every election has had some fundamental changes in terms of where accounting is done the itc was part -- iec was put in place in 2005. there's been a lot of changes. not only are we talking about a country that has not have -- does not have a lot of experience, the rules keep on changing. i don't think you can expect any election to be smoothed for a while in afghanistan what do afghans think about it? that is crucial. the results of the election must be accepted by the afghans, much more than whether they are

accepted by a international community. i wish there were more studies were the afghans would like to see -- what they thought about these elections. >> a quick comment with respect to jeremy's question. i echo the scott's comments. wantonly to keep in mind is to be able to demonstrate progress from one election to the next. however the metric you wanted to use, people have to see progress that we're moving in the right direction. in terms of the, you know, parliamentary elections, how might we improve? i think is important that we

make this point, a very honest reflection on the process. in august of 2009 it used to go back to it -- and not just of 2009. it needs to go back to 2004 and 2005. it needs to go back to when they were written. we need to take a serious, honest view of what went on, and how the resources collectively can best be apportioned to address the issues that need to be addressed. we will talk about district or -- we will not talk about district or municipal elections. one of the things that comes to my mind, to be frank, in 2004,

2005, [unintelligible] it may not have been to the same extent, but it was certainly reported on. in 2005, the issues were very [unintelligible] there was no transitional justice undertaking up to that point in time where people felt those individuals that were running, people's minds believed that these individuals that committed crimes should somehow be prevented from participating in this democratic process. that tainted people's views of the process. many of the complaints we

receive in 2005 did not do with the electoral issues or offensive -- offenses. they are violations of criminal activity. obviously, we had no jurisdiction. we had a very narrow mandate. we had to dismiss these. scott knows because he was there in 2005. there were very heart wrenching accounts of human rights violations and criminal activities over the past years. that play a big issue. the other thing, too, to get it to the illegitimacy issue, -- to

the legitimacy issue, and delegitimize are of these elections, somehow with dealing with the complaints that we received or initiated on our own, somehow we will write all the wrongs -- right all the wrongs. that is dangerous to put an organization in that position. and i think there and is probably, to me, one of the greatest feeling -- failings. we did work in this area, and not just education, but working with candidates, more intensive basis. we work with political parties and the emerging political parties.

and also working very studied very seriously, but looking at the public servants, public officials in the country, there was some effort this time, there was some training undertaken to work with inspector generals and you look at other countries and you look at other countries, specifically the ukraine that go into public service and training and their roles and responsibilities. and i think that's an area that really needs to be worked up in future elections. we saw and received many, many complaints about the role of the state in the process. and while the president did issue a decree calling for the i meanñiçó par she alty of publ officials, and i think that was a good step, i think we need to back up those words, that

decree with concrete training programs and action plans so that people understand that are in positions of authority and responsibility, that they have a very specific role within the electoral process. specific role in the electoral process. it is to support the process, not a particular candidate. a lot of the resources were improperly used. >> in just a quick observation to the last question raised by our colleague from rand. i think you made a good point. did the elections have not so much negative impact on legitimacy? why that is something i would probably agree with. the illegitimacy of the government in afghanistan was before the selection process to place. and that the election served to certainly highlight that.

it was the way the country had been governed over the previous year's that led to the large levels of illegitimacy that we saw. the large levels of fraud at much more of a significant impact. when i was here in may, there were very few people that were questioning the direction -- the strategy that he unveiled in march. a few months later, the levels of debate has shifted dramatically. you had people in congress say how could you back an election like this? it is fraudulent. they're not covering big country properly. we need a credible partner in afghanistan. the election certainly had an

impact on western opinion in western policy. but the afghan people already viewed their government with large skepticism. with that, why don't we take some from the back of the room. we in the back? can you come up to the microphone? right there. and right here. >> i am with [unintelligible] i wrote the political rights monitoring appointment. during that period, drafting the report, we saw taht the m - -th at the -- that the media was not very engaged or active. what about the impact or lack of impact of the media particularly in understanding engaging? and not some much in kabul, but

regionally. >> i am also with undp, the washington office. i am wondering if you can clarify, particularly isabelle, whether you think that the division of labor works effectively going forward, and looking back, in each case there might be less of each entity that would improve the next one. thanks. . .

>> i wrote an article about the lack of advocacy. i found out that most un security representatives did not really report a lot about how they work to include women in political processes. i wonder if you know some good examples from your own work or from the un in afghanistan that sets a good example for the afghan people. and if you have some examples of how you and your colleagues are working to support the implementation of the resolution. thank you very much.

>> does anyone care to tackle this question mark? >> i was in pakistan in 2007 and 2008 for the elections and in afghanistan in the 2005 election. one thing i found impressive was the development of the media between those two election cycles. my sense from talking to colleagues was that it was a very vibrant coverage, the proliferation of television and radio stations, and it was a very lively coverage of the election campaign.

one anecdote i could bring to the table is, just before i left i had lunch with an editor of one of the daily newspapers in afghanistan. he was telling me a little story about how they had coverage of the iranian elections the previous year. they were getting about 40,000 hits a day on their website. during the 2009 election, and after the order was issued and the decision came there would need to be a second round, they had created a special site on their website for the afghanistan elections. suddenly there was tremendous traffic, 45,000 hits a day from iran about what was going on in

afghanistan. many of the comments were about what had taken place and how afghanistan was now going into a second round. the comments being made, afghanistan -- our own country would suppress this kind of opposition activity. the government was very forceful in iran, but in afghanistan you were able -- the democratic process went through the way it should. he said it was terrific for him, a tremendous boost to listen to the observations of others, a next-door neighbor about what went on. he felt very good about the process. i think the media in afghanistan, from my

perspective, i think it contributed to a lot of awareness about what was going on and had a positive impact. i will let isabel deal with the question on the role of the un institutions. in terms of gender specific activities, i know that there was a gender unit within the organization that looks specifically at this. bcc did not really see complaints are challenges breaking out on a gender basis. one of the problem because we were late in setting up, we did not have the opportunity to focus more on recruiting women

to the organization, which we should have. we were up against time constraints, advertising, etc. unfortunately, we did not have a commissioner -- of female commissioner on the ecc in 2005. one of the recommendations going forward from 2009 will be to look at this and ensure that women are more inclusive in the organization, not just at the headquarters level but around the country. i think we have one office that had to women commissioners and at male colleague, but by and large, we were underrepresented

with women in the organization, which was unfortunate. given the circumstances, we cannot really do much about it. >> on the question of the division of labor between the different un agencies, there are many models throughout the world about how the un organizes itself in terms of supporting the election. the afghan model is slightly unusual in the sense that there is a security council mandate that does not have a military component. i am not sure if this is a consequence of it. traditionally when we have a mission, that is usually the one delivering and electoral assistance.

untp is our partner in over 40 countries now in terms of delivering it electoral assistance and has tremendous experience in doing so. the un has adopted an integration model which helps all the agencies work together towards a common goal. we are reflecting on how we could have worked better. we have to be quite open with the problems that internal strife created. we are quite aware of that. i do not see a fundamental problem with the way the division of labor was in afghanistan in terms of electoral support.

untp is well equipped to deliver the assistance. the un is still reeling from the attacks we experienced at the end of last year. there is a lot of reflection being done and how we can best support the country while ensuring that our personnel does not suffer or incur unreasonable risks. in terms of the involvement of women in the election, i cannot emphasize enough the admiration i have for afghan women and women politicians, women voters. as a political adviser in the eastern region, i was in contact with many of the female candidates.

i spoke to female candidates who had undergone a tax. -- had undergone attacks. one candidate was shot in the leg. these women went back to their campaign with an energy and courage that you can only admire. as much as possible has to be done to support them. we should anticipate the same problems that we have had for the next elections. there will probably be a need to encourage more female candidates. there will be public challenges in the recruiting that appropriate amount of staff. there i think it's extremely important, again to, emphasize the youthfulness of having a female staff. i mean, a lot of people ask me, you know, is it difficult for a

woman to work in afghanistan? i said actually it gives me access to more than what some of my male international advisors can do. i can go talk to a man and woman equally. i could go and talk to a woman who had not left their houses since they were born. my male colleagues could never have done that. so in that sense, i think that, you know, it's very important to prioritize that early on. as grant said, the i.t. has a gender unit. but it was put in place quite late and did not necessarily have the resources but in my personal experience i found the best way toñi encourage female participation is through peer support, so from other women or

woman support. >> i'll touch briefly on the woman's issue, i think those happen to be two of the success stories and bright spots of the election.ñi what grant said, media has developed significantly from 2005 to 2009. we all gave a series of talks in the different regions. good questions came out, and they seem really enthusiastic about that. the area for improvement is content. a lot of rumor is reported. i guess that is to be expected to some degree, but the access and coverage is used their and being better informed about the process would be a way to improve going forward.

i second heard comments about the courage and strength of women who do choose to enter politics. one anecdote about the determination of women to participate. i was talking to the human rights commission. they were saying it women were having difficulty campaigning because of the strictures on women. if their husbands to allow them to leave the house, still communities will be upset if women are out campaigning or posting campaign posters with their photo on them so people can identify them on the ballot. many women candidates or print out business cards with their photo on it and their platform on the back, a few bullet points. this could be handed out more discreetly so they would not

suffer harsh reactions because their posters were up like the male candidates. i thought that was encouraging, and that can continue. >> i should have known better than to think we might end the debate earlier. we will have one more round of questions. we will try to wrap up in the next 10 minutes. >> my knowledge of afghanistan is rather limited, but i do want to raise a question. we are reaping what we so did to some extent.

this is an issue of want to bring to other pose conflict countries. we are in a hurry to build up a constitution. we overloaded with processes that the country cannot deliver on. with afghanistan, in retrospect, would it be better served to have multi electoral processes? look at india. as late as 1980, you need to grow into your expectations and aspirations. this is something i just want to throw into the field. >> i would like to get your opinion about the dynamics among the people in terms of the ethnicity, religion, and differences and divisions.

if you look back at the presidential elections of 2005, it was divided. this time around we had similar candidates. i would like to ask your opinion in terms of contrast between the elections this past year and 2005. is there any indication that ethnic relations are the differences among people have improved in the past five or six years?

>> can you comment or give an assessment of the political management of the process? sitting where you were sitting, some of the political science that might have made your job easier or harder. what went wrong, and what should we expect coming in may? >> if you can keep your answers relatively brief, that would be helpful. >> i think the first point is a good one, putting on too much, too fast. in the transitional period,

there was so much that need to be done. i think it is recognized by many of the players that expectations of the heart of the international community were perhaps a bit high, and that carried over to expectations by afghan, that we would have fully functioning institution on all these different levels at once. when that did not happen, there is a bit of let down, and that lays out in the electoral world in terms of lower voter turnout and other things as well. management of expectations and being more realistic about what can be achieved in a particular time frame. people are bearing in mind that that needs to be communicated as well as the new administration takes office. a great question about that ethnic interaction. i did not study it that much in 2005.

it was certainly the elephant in the room as we went through the debate about fraud and going to a runoff. there were dark rumors that some are unhappy and preparing to protest if things do not go their way with their candidate. i do not know how realistic those are. in the end, there was not in a major incident. i did not feel there was any real flash point that was about to go off or that was narrowly averted. my anecdotal impression is that there were ethnic candidates but there were not really ethnic divisions that came out in public debate.

in terms of political management from washington or other international players, it was certainly relatively minimal if anything at all in terms atecc's operation. we got support from the international community in terms of our process and our decisions. throughout, we were processed based, and following our procedures and applying equal criteria to all complaints was our number one goal. i think the acceptance about -- are finding it's hopefully reflect that people did recognize we are acting according to the law and according to procedures. in that sense, the support we got, saying these are the decisions and the afghan

government should and ultimately did abide by them. as people saw in the final days leading up to karzai's announcement that they would have a second round, it was shown to be quite limited. from the complaints, i think the rules for well respected in terms of the international community have an interest in the process. >> on the question of the overload of processes in afghanistan, what i would say is that obviously a process was started. you can question whether that was the way to go. it is hard to go back on things

that have now been experienced a few times. from my limited experience in afghanistan, i think that as in most countries in the world, citizens like the idea of one- man, one-vote. it is a fairly simple concept to grasp. it is quite appealing. i think the problem is that often, first elections raise a lot of expectations that cannot be fulfilled. to be frank, in afghanistan on a provincial level, most of the power is still held by governors who are not elected. the level of change that the citizens have experienced after elections was obviously disappointing. i think there is a reflection or

some conclusions that people have reached on that. it raises questions that are broader than the elections. on the dynamics within afghanistan, i find it interesting. i come from belgium, which is ethnically divided, particularly in terms of politics. in afghanistan, it is fair to say that voting is still done largely along ethnic lines. there is always a frustration on the part of the ethnicities that are lesser in numbers, because you have a sense that your chances of winning the top posts is limited. that is where a lot of work has to be done in terms of power sharing so that every group deals included -- feels included

and it feels their rights respected. although there were fieldfears, particularly when there were only two candidates left in the race, that some ethnic violence could develop. i have not seen anything overly worrying, but i think there is something to say about the responsibility of the government now to make sure that every ethnic group finds its place. >> in terms of the question on the constitution, we should not forget that we had international and afghan agreement on the bond process. that had very specific activities, time lines within it. there was a lot of discussion afterwards that maybe that was just -- that process was too

aggressive, but it was a process that we stop to and worked through -- stuck to it and worked through. the good, the bat, and the ugly. we all deal with constitutions and parts of them that we do not necessarily agree with. you have to move forward. i do agree that it heightened expectations by all parties in terms of how progress was going to carry on after that was fully implemented. in terms of the issue of the question on ethnicity, you know i would go back to the earlier question about political parties, and i think this is where political parties are really necessary in a place like afghanistan to get beyond the self identification of merely belonging to one ethnic group over another, and

balancing or having an individual or a couple of individuals speaking on your behalf, as is the case in this current system, and look at more what people's needs are on a countrywide or geographic basis as opposed to splitting it, along ethnic lines. so that's where political party ins afghanistan is really required. in terms of the role of the u.s. government, at least from our perspective, i -- you know i'd like to say that the u.s. government was extremely responsive to the needs of the eñicc as were other internation doneers. they were very engaged in what we were doing, and you know made it very clear that they

totally backed the work of the e.c.c., and specifically, you know, we had challenges in terms of -- i mentioned earlier, in terms of establishing our organization across the country. . the un at times was not the most responsive organization from a procurements perspective. those times where we had lax in getting things out, we turn to usaid and their partner to provide us with some support. we were provided with that in an extremely timely basis. both in terms of personnel as well as in terms of resources to help us get offices up and functioning. we had a very good relationship, not just with the u.s.

government but with all international donors. both collectively working through the un, but also on an individual basis with our organization. >> unfortunately, we have gone a couple of minutes over, so we will have to conclude the discussion there. thanks to all three of you for what was a very interesting discussion on a subject that is not going away anytime soon. with the elections coming up later this year, this will be on the news and on people's minds for the upcoming weeks and months. thank you all for coming out to our first public event on afghanistan this year, the first of many. the next begins in about 90 minutes on the state of public health and afghanistan. you are welcome to come back for that. please sign up outside with your e-mail address so we can keep you informed

>> located south of the capital city of kabul, david ax was embedded with the u.s. army in the district in october-november. he followedst troops as they work to extend services to the farmers of the area and connect them with the afghan government. >> rocky barack is a district

or sub division of a province. i think there's i don't know 100,000 people in the district. it's a farming community, so 80%-90% of the folks there either grow wheat or corn or raise animals, gets to, sheep, cows. traditionally baracky brock grows most of the food people in kabul eat. it's about a two-hour drive. the troops there, in fact represent reinforcement, because a year ago there were 100 americans in the province. now there are 1,000. when there were 100 they couldn't do anything. they sat in one little base and looked around. that's all they could do. no local development work or training up the afghans now they have enough troops to do some work tan colonel there

from the division decided he was going to identify the population centers in low gar that are most amenable to working with the coalition, taking advantage of that favorable attitude and get in there and do some developmental work and seal the attitude. so he put most of his troops there in the most friendly population center, and the idea, he wants to do good work there so word spreads to some of the less friendly communities that hey, look, get along with the coalition and you get stuff. they call it "extreme makeover" afghanistan edition. >> so which villagers are the ones that need the power? >> emu. >> well, part of the extreme makeover is proving everyday

way of life, those that live here, we have been able to do it because we've established a little bit of a security bubble. this is a location where we've had a very good response from the local population in receiving us and the a.m.a. and a & p the army and police force within afghanistan as well as just a general good nature depens the government of afghanistan so within the security bubble we are providing basic services, small, like a micro grant of money through the surf which is the commanders emergency relief program and take that little bit of money and ask the small community what they need the most and it could be as simple as painting a building or getting a group of villagers generated which is small and straightaway effective. and baracky barack, this

fertile area of agriculture is perfect for this. >> and because you're in the process of expanding your security bubble and reaching spot communities where you don't have a large presence, what's your vehicle for doing that? >> it is military patrolling. it is envy and in an envee, what it is is we show the villagers of the villagers we've been to is giving us a warm welcome and the other villnlers which are being harshly -- partially influenced by us and the enemy. so that creates a fence-sitter situation, and we want these guys to pick a side. either pick the government of afghanistan or you pick the taliban. >> pretty much everybody in low

gar province is a farmer. or if they are not farming themselves, they work for a farmer or haul stuff for a farmer or work on farming tools. one way or another everybody in low gar province is associated with agriculture. it's one of the bread basket provinces of afghanistan so if you're going to reach out to them, you've got speak their language, speak farmer. so what the u.s. army has done in baracky barack is turned the company-sized army outpost into this odding a gri cultural commune in army fatigues and the local captain there even hosts these meetings and the associations are trying to get the province of farmers talking to eachor so they can cooperate on things like shipping their goods up to kabul for sale. the troops at baracky barack

spend most of their time talking and filling out forms. >> your buddies want to come talk to us. >> the idea is just to find out what afghans in low gar and baraki barack really need and so much in afghanistan -- so there's a whole lot of school building going on or road building going on in areas that don't necessarily want them. maybe they are home schooling their kids or might be they can

manage the education on their own, so one key that seems simple but it's not always done is just ask. what do you need and what can we give you that you can't give yourself? and they give them that, and it turns now low gar province it's farm implements. it's advice on growing winter crops. it's help with green houses. it's all agricultural stuff. >> we're conducting agricultural veterinary surveys which is outside of our security bubble in hopes of

enticing some of the farmers to -- and if they do, that is the chance to show them these are services ourselves in conjunction with the a.m.a. and the afghan government can provide them. >> so what are the surveys for? >> agricultural veterinary services specifically we're asking them what type of crops do they have? do they vaccinate their animals, just get a better understanding of i guess what type ofing a cultural services they would benefit from and what type of services they have currently. >> hey, we're going to split up into two sections. >> good question. and questioning these guys. >> ok. >> um, does he have any other land that is his own acreage

that he farms and is in charge of? >> yes. [speaking in a foreign language] >> does he also have any animals that he cares for and -- >> yes. >> can he tell me like how many donkeys? chicken? sheep? >> [speaking in a foreign language] >> any donkeys or chicken or just sheep? [speaking in a foreign language] >> ok.

if possible i'd like to ask you some questions for a survey we're doing for the baraki barak center and i'd like to take you back to the truck to conduct the survey and maybe tomorrow or the next day you can come to the center and we're going to be running agricultural and veterinary services by the end of the month and i'd like to invite him and any of hiss other friends who are farmers in the area to come. >> [speaking in a foreign language] >> yes. >> bring them back to the truck, and -- >> does he rent any of the tools he uses for farming? does he rentñr any?

>> [speaking in a foreign language] >> what's that? do you know what rent means? , like, does he borrow it from somebody else? >> while i was in baraki bawk the afghan government opened a new district center, the idea in baraki barak is to sort of concentrate the afghan police, the afghan army, the u.s.-led coalition and also the district local government all in the same compound just so they can talk to each other and for

security's sake so it's easy for afghans to know where to go when they have a problem or when they warrant to seek out the services local government services should be providing, so the local governor arranged a big ceremony and invite ad bunch of foreign and afghan dignitaries to fly down to baraki barak to inaugurate this thing and there was a bunch of speeches and a big feast and the u.s. army and czech soldiers provided security and it went off without a hitch. demonstrations like that is important because there's a weak tradition there for that and the more pomp and ceremony you have, the more you draw to this. afghans don't take local government for deprarnted. they don't think about it at all. it's a non-entity. the attention needs to be drawn to the fact that hey, you do

have a local government, you've got a district self-governor. very important for those in baraki barak. the whole idea here is to create security, to prime local afghans for a better relationship with their government and then to kick that government into gear and have it do things. and frankly, it needs a building in order to do that kind of stuff. the district sub governor, mohammad udene, an appointed official is sort of the mayor of the baraki barak district, and he's supposed to be the go-to guy for local government issues. now local government in afghanistan doesn't always work very well. this is a country that has a lot of governess issues, and it's not just corruption.

it's the upper-levels of government in kabul so the they try to get him acting like a real mayor, finding out what his people need and connecting the people with the resources. the resources are mostly coming from the united states army and officials but you can put an afghan face on it by putting him out front and he is partnered with the state department who sends out roughly a dozen guys, most of them foreign service officers, and they are just experts in government. and in baraki barak, the head of the district 14 a guy named ron barkley. he chases down the sub governor, ludean, and side-by-side they hang out with the army, the two of them have sort of been inseparable and where the two of them do the army goes with them and so the

sub governor is there putting an afghan face on it and ron is there to sort of baby sit ludean and encourage him to act like the mayor instead of the strong man of baraki barak. >> the village owner? then he is going to collect the names of the people that build these powers. and they need to take that list of names to the sub governor when they pick up their generator tomorrow. >> it's time that we basically start from the bottom up, the village level and work up toward governance. we've been doing the top down from the central government down to the province. that's working, but it's slow and there's a lot of hindrances at the pro vince shall level to be able to get the money down to the district level so this is new, the state department partners with company commanders, troop level commanders at the drirkt and we

work hand in what happened those guys. they give us the opportunity to be here and then we shake hands with the sub governors and the local village leaders and then go from there on the government side. >> they try to help local government figure out how to govern, i guess. >> that's exactly right. they have great concepts. but it's so limited right now. so i think what we're trying to do is say yeah what you're doing is good but let's expand from the village up to the district. let's take the district up to the province because that's where we're going to make our money and where people will see it's evident that the government of afghanistan is doing something correctly. that there's something happening in their village and district and it's being done by the government of afghanistan. >> so what does your typical day look like? >> it varies. anything from -- i try to get out with these guys every other day with missions they have because they are in villages and that's the fun part of it.

you're not sitting at a computer every day. you're pretty much out every day, our district gov comes in. he lives in kabul but comes in on mondays around stays through friday, so we have a limited amount of time, and he loves the eefpks so we go have a meal with him every evening@and at that time when you're sitting around shareing a meal is when you're really able to make end roads as far as understanding what they are trying to accomplish and helping us understand what they are trying to accomplish to build a better afghan together. >> so what are the down parts of your job? >> it's slow. because you realize, one if we just try to go out and do a project on our own, we're limited. we can go out and throw a moss kit and something in a quick impact. but there's not a lot of -- it doesn't multiply. it just stays in one little area.

and what we're trying to do is take that little circle with the sub governor and his staff and expand out into the villages that are around. i mean, there's tons of villages in the baraki barak district, and you can't do that without the key leader engagements and the sub governor and what he knows, because what i've seen this week is we've gone from throwing a project out to -- we get it done. but it's limited. to where this week i've been able to see each mosque we sit in there's elders that come in. they may not agree with everything that's being said there but they are nodding and realizing the government is involved in their lives and they go home and are head of household representing another 20-25 people and the word gets out and that's how it needs to operate.

>> corruption is a huge problem in afghanistan. everybody's corrupt.ñr not everyone agrees on the definition of corrupt. for example, the sub governor of the baraki barak district, pretty good guy by local standards, working with americans to try to grow local institutions and get out and talk to constituents and if you ask him to react to the idea of corruption, he'll rail and complain and use colorful met force involving fruit and nuts, there are no good almonds and like most people do see it, corruption is the biggest problem but he's also getting a cut of well, a local company that provides depravel and he helped arrange the contract and got like $20,000 under the table. so you ask him about that and

he says that's not corruption, that's just the way we do opinions and besides i need that money. so everyone's corrupt, they are just not agreeing on what that means. >> here's for the mosque. >> i'm a -- >> your father needs to work with hagi hakeem so he works with him and they nominate the project at the district center. ok? >> the u.s. army in low gar logar province go out and meet up with local clan leaders and

with the imams and moulayes at the mosques. you again, like with the farmers, you have to speak the language of the local people. and faith is very fortunate afghans. especially in the countryside. and so you have got to meet them on those terms, so the u.s. army in baraki barak is giving out what they call process k kits, these packages of paint and loud speakers and carpets, things that afghans could use to refurbish their mosques. so what happens is the army will say hey, we've got these mosque kits to offer. and we'll give you a kit if you agree to certain things. point out who are the local taliban and agree to give us a a call if you see the local taliban and once there's an accord reach, once you've got

the local leaders agreing to certain terms, the army will give them the kit. actually they ask them to ask the afghans to come to the army joit post and pick up the kits themselves, to just get afghans thinking in terms of reaching out to their own government. so yes. they pick up their mosque kit, take it back, the army waits a few days or weeks and then see if the kit's been installed. one thing i found on some of my patrols out to the mosques was that many afghans, their communities are scared to install their mosque kits because they belief that will mark them as collaborating with the coalition, so they sit on the kits and make a lot of excuses when the army rolls in and says hey, we'd like to see your refurbished mosque. >> we're visitting a mosque in the village. we gave him a mosque

refurbishment kit earlier this month and now we're checking to see how his improvements are going. >> great linux. >> how are you today? >> good. >> just here today to check on the refurbish kits so we can see what kind of improvements you've been able to accomplish. >> you gave it to the people? >> yes. they want to keep it. >> which is the person that you gave it to? >> and is he available to speak with us today?

ok. and did he say anything to him on when he plans on making improvements to the mosque? [speaking in a foreign language] >> ok. so he's going to speak to the elders and the people when they decide to start? [speaking in a foreign language] >> well, let him know that as soon as they do start working on the mosque and seeing improvements that's when he gets to come to baraki barak and receive a monthly payment and with that a money he can continue to improve it and use it for other things.

>> what are we doing? a visit? >> yes. >> tell him we're going spot district for a minute. >> separately, we went inside one mosque and sat down and there was talk of an i.e.d. exploding outside the mosque. the imam blamed that on the taliban. what that actually means it's hard to say when local afghans say taliban, they might actually be describing the taliban, but it could also be just a local criminal network or the other network or actually an al qaeda cell. the afghans call everybody taliban whether they are actually taliban or not. >> it does me no good to fix this door or have these windows fixed if the bomb blows up, if you're looking through the window that's broken at the

place where they put the bomb, you should understand that when you see them putting the bomb, you should tell somebody. >> at this mosque, the army decide that they weren't going to help this mosque until the elders at that mosque turned in the local pad guys, which is sort of the whole point of providing these mosque kits. it's a carrot. you entice the afghans with this gift but there's a condition. the condition is you've got to be on our side, and you can see the elders sort of mulling over that decision. i mean, it's not a small thing to go turn in a taliban team. these are scary guys. >> i'm sure they have a valid point. their mosque was damaged by the i.e.d. but it's a trade.