may be a problem here. in fact, jim collins in his little book "how the mighty fall" talks about fannie mae as one of his poster children for how big institutions essentially start to fail and he points out there are five stages of potential failure of an institution. .

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management was listening to the people who said they could make housing goals. they thought they could get high yield and it is aaa. they were not listening to the mortgage side of the business that should have known better. what we see in various stories is the way that dipane may leadership and the freddie mac ñileadershr disregarded the warnings of their risk officers as they plunged into what jim collins calls the undisciplined pursuit of risk. don't worry, be happy. fannie mae and freddie mac were fighting for the and capitalization as late as june of 2008. with respect to the new legislation that was enacted into law.

-- enacted in july. the government stepped in and gave them their salvation and put the two companies into conservatorship. i would like to make two points about the future -- the first point is that for the next five years, and i think everybody agrees on this, we need serious government involvement to shore up the mortgage market that is essentially failed at this point. my recommendation is that they become wholly owned government corporations for the next five years. putting them into conservative persian -- conservatorship, means you have retain private shareholders and the conservatorship means that the government and the board of directors and the management of those entities are working to restore those entities to

financial health and their earlier structure on behalf of shareholders. the same things that occurred at the enemy and freddie mac between their public missions and the predominant rights of shareholders which is in every lawbook the first responsibility of management besides operating below, that tension continues to exist in conservatorship today. this means that we cannot use any mae and freddie mac for a number of things that were being asked about. fannie mae and freddie mac could fund the mortgage is in a prudent manner. you could build a housing trust fund into their business so they would take a certain percentage of their income, put it into a pool, and use that to subsidize a in a controlled way. you do not have this open-ended exposure of a government guarantee. could subsidize low-income

housing. you could provide essential consumer protections for or worse. i do know know what will happen with the little consumer agency but it will be poised between an industry that is trying to kill it and banking committees that have traditionally been fairly receptive to that industry. those consumer protections, if administered by fannie mae and freddie mac as government corporations, could involve changing ways of doing business, the same way in the early '70s the standardized mortgage forms. they could provide more effective borer counseling. they could provide increased foreclosures mitigation circumstances among other consumer protections. finally, a lot has been talked about with fha and it is stumbling, there is no question

that is an accident waiting to happen. any may and freddie mac of automated underwriting systems that we have already paid for as taxpayers. when i take those systems and use them, clone them, adapt them for fha? this is so fha will not blow up. this could happen to have removed shareholders from the equation and given these entities a single track mission which is to support taxpayers of the united states and the housing market while we are in trouble. that is the first stage for about five years. the second stage we have got to decide what we want to do. my only plea is, let's not go back to the model of privately owned organizations with government backing. people talk about co-ops and

alternatives to investor- ownership. we forget that the farm credit system which was a cooperative, blew up in the mid-1980s because a cold as an incentive to lower its profits to benefit its member-users. you have distorted incentives in co-ops. ñiall kinds of institutions have failed, banks, thrifts, wall street, building current, all kinds of institutions have failed. my specialty is government organization and design, i would say that g s e'a have special vulnerability. they are dealt with as unique institutions which means that congress can give them a lower capital standards than competing banks or thrifts. when they are unique institutions, you are essentially giving them high leverage which i would contend

is a very dangerous subsidy. whatever happens, they should have the same capital requirements as anybody else that is doing business with them. if you have lower capital requirements, what happens is, you arbitraged across the mortgage market and you drive literally trillions of dollars of mortgages to replace or leverage is highest and government ownership is weakest. then in may and freddie mac essentially doubled in size every five years. -- fannie mae and freddie mac essentially doubled in size every five years because of that the nominee. only when you make capital standards equivalent across institutions can reduce that dynamic. the second problem with a gst is that they live or die according to their charter providing get congress to tell me that i could get lower capital and higher leverage and my competitors, that is worth more than knowing anything about the marketplace.

if you read the g s e annual report, they talk about political risk. they hire their ceo's to manage political risk, people who are well-wired on capitol hill and will do whatever the administration is currently in power will do. they are not more capable to manage a multi-trillion dollar institution. that is what we saw when they went down, they made systematic bad decisions. they doubled down on their best as everybody else was backing out of the market. these people simply did not know how to manage an institution of this size. everybody talks about government agencies being inefficient. i am afraid that in may and freddie mac turned out to be much more inefficient and much more costly. then a government agency. finally, they hired their ceo's

this. we cannot assume that serious regulation will last into the future. if you watch the progression of statutory changes for fannie mae and freddie mac since they were chartered as gst'e's, you can watch them peeling away one accountability provisions after another. they have longer striker -- stronger capital requirements when they were tortured. -- chartered then when they went down. want to close by quoting the former betty mae ceo -- betty mae ceo. "i would advocate moving the gse's out of no-man's land.

it is difficult to battle financial markets -- balanced financial markets in these proportions. we should examine whether the economy and the markets are better served by fully private or fully public gse's." if we do not pay attention to this and if we do not avoid recreating the gse, that i would like to offer this blind book is a road map for the next time around. thank you. [applause] >> thank you for your remarks.

our luncheon speaker will talk about gse's and the danish mortgage system. you have been talking about the secondary market but there is a third financial mechanism well established called covered bonds. to what extent have you looked at the relative inefficiencies and safeties of covered bond finance is aware of lenders retain the ownership of the mortgage and fund them with covered bonds to try to perpetuate this very inefficient secondary mortgage market system that we have in this country that depends on gse's? >> i have not studied it nearly as much as you have. it is deftly a model to look at. the treasury has taken that position. for the next five years, when i

talk by using a government corporation and deciding whether to renew the charter, our problem is that the covered blond model requires substantial capital. that is something that is missing in the financial system today. after those five years, it is a very promising possibility but i will defer to you because i have not studied the issue and i look forward to our luncheon speaker to becoming informed. no questions? >> i did not want to hog the microphone by asking a second question. the previous speaker offered a simple framework for moving from where we are to what he was recommending. do you have a perspective that is equally elegant?

>> no one can match peters elegance. the first step is to remove shareholders from the equation and put both companies into receivership. then you can use them in receivership as government corporations. the second step is, and i think the concerns are there, will anybody buy the debt for the mortgage-backed securities of this thing if it has this effect of government guarantee, we may have to provide a full forward. we have already accrued but the losses we are going to accrue. that will require a step forward in terms of the budget process. peter is right, that is difficult but i frankly think that it is preferable not to get mired in budget issues if we think that a particular solution is on the ground, the

most effective solution. there are answers to these budget questions in various forms as the world's greatest deliberative body has exercised over time and i think will find some of those answers here. i am a specialist in organizational design. every choice as positives and negatives. that is why this kind of conference is important. you have to weigh them and you have to weigh them in a disciplined way where you scrape away the rhetoric and get down to what is it we are really talking about on the ground. >> do you expect to see the obama administration, with a detailed proposal for handling fannie mae and freddie mac going forward? do you think they will rehashñi

the existing solutions that have been debated and lead congress to take the lead? >> this is a very low debt traded observation. it was my understanding initially that was posed a full review of gse options. my friends told me that is not happening. i suspect there is a reasonable prospect that we will see the status quo carried forward. that ties in with my personal observation that this administration has a huge amount on its plate. in between two wars, health care, climate change, if that ever is on its agenda, there are a whole bunch of things out there. the future of financial services

regulation, generically, i think there is this feeling that we have enough balls in the air and not 2 per one up there yet. -- not to throw another one up there yet. >> given the hundreds of thousands of innocent shareholders who were deceived, manipulated, gouged by management, the seat by ofea as late as april of 2008 when the head of ofea said things were okay -- >> he said they were adequately capitalized. >> there are hundreds of thousands of shareholders. they were assured this was the safest investment after treasury, given that the government has the authority now

to buy 10 shares for one penny, up to an 80% ownership, and given that the taxpayer should have a chance to be paid back, whether to take the first five years of your plan to reconstitute and restore under the present system the penney may and freddie mac so the government gets 80% of the shares cheap, restores it to a healthy state, sells off the shares at whatever price and pays back the taxpayer within five years and lets the shareholders that are left with a small portion of what they had, they have already been punished, at least have a chance to retain what they have and not be wiped out? >> first of all, high leverage, which is what fannie mae and

freddie mac lobbied for, benefit shareholders. they were making 20% return on equity per year, up to 39% for one of the years. shareholders were amply rewarded for the risk theyñrñiçó took whn these things went down. secondly, with the shares trading now between $1.20 dollars per share, i suspect that the original holders are lookout. we have holders who are betting on the future of government policy. by the way, the terms of conservatorship seem to have been violated as these companies are used in a very tentative way for public purposes rather than to support the private owners. my instinct is to get rid of shareholders. they had a good ride and knew these were shares and let's

create government corporations for the next five years that can take some steps to really improve the way mortgage transactions are conducted there was a horrendous amount of damage to consumers. they had over-lending. there were pushing mortgages on people when those people really would not qualify under reasonable stress. i recommend elizabeth warren's book. to see how the dynamic works. i would rather use the gse's as government corporations to establish good rules for how the market should work. i want to encourage those roles in the pattern of transactions we have going forward rather than benefit the whole bunch of holders now.

they have lost most of their value. they are probably betting on a really good lawsuit. >> final questions? thank you. >> how do you think the obama administration is doing in terms of what they are disclosing how they are using gse's and whether they actually know what they need to do with them? >> i don't know the in answer to that. i am always a sucker for conjecture. i have a feeling that they are whipsawed by the say intention of having private owners. the government only has warrants at this point for the shareholders are normally the owners of these companies. how far can we go in using

fannie mae and freddie mac to achieve public purposes in the mortgage market? that is a difficult problem but given the number of things on their plate, my instinct is that they are basically saying that this is a problem that is not blowing up on them. they will set that aside for a while. that is my conjecture to go over to treasury and ask somebody. >> thank you. [applause] >> our final session is with one of the leading consumer advocates in the country from u.s. public interest research group as well as mr. ralph nader. come on up.

ed is a leading consumer advocate. he has worked on a variety of issues including telecommunications reform, banking reform, and other issues. >> john taylor and lease out rice, -- and the lisa rice, you can join me up at the front. this is supposed to be a round table and not a square or a classroom. they thought it might be good to have a couple of housing experts which i am not. they can join the appear. without them having planned to be up here, i am confident they will do a fine job. lisa rice is president of the

national fair housing alliance. john taylor is president and ceo of the national community reinvestment coalition. they are a leading organization of some 500 groups that work on community reinvestment, protection, and other housing issues. two things we have in common, we each have blood on our foreheads from our terms on the consumer advisory council, banging our heads against the wall at the federal reserve board trying to get them to take on more consumer and community work over the years. that is the way i remember it. secondly, all three of our organizations are founding and active members of the coalition

of americans for financial reform. we have many members in this group. our financial security,org is the website. this is for taxpayers, homeowners, and consumers. there are many working against financial reform, the people who caused the system to fail are trying to preserve the system that failed. believe it or not, they are making headway on capitol hill. one reason for that is that they have 1500 lobbyists, according to a study done by bloomberg news. that is not counting the ones that are not registered. that is against 58 consumer

lobbyists. at one time, i may be exaggerating, i am convinced that fannie mae and freddie mac had 1500 lobbyists, themselves. i was at a conference like this 12 years ago and ralph nader and the center put this on. i think it was 1998. chuck lewis was the keynote speaker. he was the founding director of the center -- center for public integrity, a leading investigative reporting organization that studies political power. he told the story that they had studied every leading power broker in washington, every influence-public organization from the chamber of commerce to others. . he said they all hire former members of congress. they all hire former staff members from the hill but fannie

mae and freddie mac for the only ones that were study that hired the spouses and children of the former staff members and the former members of congress. that is, political power base sought to have. nobody would ask questions at the forum. they were afraid to ask questions. ralph nader was at the front of the room and had to hand out index cards to the people could best their questions forward because if you ask a question in public about fannie mae or freddie mac, you were put on a list. you've got phone calls. everybody in your office got phone calls for the money to your organization dried up. congress stopped getting political campaign contributions for it was incredible. you cannot describe how much political power they had grea. we have to figure out a way to decide what to do with what is

left of petty may and freddie mac and that is what this is an important event we are putting together today. they fell because of the nexus between political and corporate power. the supreme court did not come up with a decision today in a very important case on opening the floodgates to corporate money in political campaigns. they might still come out with it tomorrow so state to end on that in terms of danny may and freddie mac and what to do with them, i want to pose the question and opened up to questions or comments to people in the audience, what should president barack obamañixdçóñiñu were writing the new report for him, what is the most important that your organization thinks he should say in that report or what is the most important thing that you have learned today to put into that report? >> i want to back up a little bit. .

i think the various presenters' touched on the same theme throughout the course of their presentations. one of the first things that we need to discuss is what is the purpose of these companies. do we want them to serve a public purpose? if there public purpose is to buttress the mortgage market and make housing more affordable and more accessible, it seems to me that they fm's cannot be a private entity. one of the first things the report needs to do is to back up and look at the whole issue of purpose. what role do we want them to serve? will they be serving a public purpose and is it necessary -- is it's still important for them to have a public purpose? -- to serve a public purpose?

contribution cannot be discounted. this whole business of campaign contributions and lobbying in general from fannie mae and freddie mac -- one of the small good things that happened through this whole mess is with the collapse. the government made it clear that they can no longer law because they now own alabama. -- all in them. o wn them. own them. it is ridiculous to be on capitol hill and the tripping over blue-suited lobbyists were fighting against a meaningful

change to make sure the system does not have the kind of malfeasance and bad practices that got us into this mess. whether you want to blame benny may and freddie mac for being the leaders of this which is observed or whether you want to blame wall street or blame the big banks, they all play a role. we need to make sure we sure the system that does not allow that to system. ñiñithere is an important role r the gse. we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. continued to be a government- sponsored enterprise, they could do more of its original mission and that is to help people into the mortgage market who would otherwise may not be able to be in it. that would be a good thing but there has to be oversights that ensures that happens. it is ironic working for an

organization like the national reinvestment corp. that someone would attach a label to make of being a liberal. that is ok. i am proud of it. what is ironic about that is the amount of times i was invited into congress to hearings and meetings to speak. i was invited by republicans and conservatives because of my views relative to fannie mae and freddie mac and felt they were not doing enough with this government-sponsored benefit they had. i would argue for stronger housing rules and for them to go deeper into minority neighborhoods because of the benefits and privileges that they occupy. i would find myself fighting with democrats over this who thought i was critical of fannie mae and freddie mac. i was not critical for what their core mission was. 10 years ago, the american court system was the envy of the world. now, it is pretty rough.

there is a time when a mortgage system worked well. we have regulatory oversight. unfortunately, we allowed industry both private and government-sponsored, to develop into areas without oversight and safeguards and anybody bringing them into the point where they brought all of us down i think we can correct that without throwing out the baby with the bathwater. >> i am glad to hear you are probably wearing a red letter "l" i am, too. and a report made to look at how mission. did they do a good job? i do not think they did,

particularly in underserved markets. i don't think they did a very good job of fulfilling their mission when it comes to underserved markets. that really needs to be looked at and analyzed. from where i sit and based on the work i have done in the field, working primarily in the states of ohio and michigan, the underserved markets served as an incubator for the subprime market and a home mortgage industry to hone in perfect -- and perfect some of the practices they used and extrapolate to the larger market. i think if they had done a better job of penetrating those underserved markets, some of that could have been staved off. >> i don't disagree. that is our position that they would not -- were not doing

enough. >> to clarify, you're talking about they did not do enough to what, police? >> they did not purchase enough loans from low and moderate- income communities and communities of color that would have enhanced the ability for those populations to get really good quality loans. they lived and dwelled in the realm of middle and upper income levels and kept raising the mortgage limit to the point where they have mortgages over $700,000. that was supported by barney frank and others. we needed a government-sponsored enterprise to help people get $700,000 mortgages? i could be wrong.

>> what we heard a lot of when we would approach the fm's about their lack of penetration in underserved markets was that it was not their fault. if the lenders they do business with are not selling loans in these communities, they cannot purchase them. if the lenders they are doing business with do not sell loans, we need communities utilizing the products that were developed, they cannot purchase loans in those communities. that was their excuse. one of the biggest barriers was that fannie mae and used an automated system and freddie mac used an automated system. their system was a rigid but that also included barriers to fair lending. when we would push for them to do things like consider non- traditional credit, we were

sometimes met with a huge bureaucracy of trying to matriculate through that huge brought bureaucracy to get new products and new under writing guidelines that would warrant more lending in underserved markets. i have to say that when we were able to get their and develop pirate -- pilot programs that could be used in underserved markets, they worked very well. when we finally were able to get the programs and products we needed, they work well. the problem was that the curve of developing those products and bring them to market in a real way was very substantial. >> why did fannie mae and freddie mac seek to increase the size of the loans they could make and why didn't they promote manual underwriting so that you could help more lower income and

people of color get loans? >> profit? >> there was a point that was not raised earlier. fannie mae and freddie mac said that the banks are not bringing them the prime and good product loans in low and moderate income neighborhoods and communities of color. they were seeing with the subprime and how the market had shifted in that direction. i think this is a great part of the un explained aspect of what occurred in this crisis. the banks abandoned these areas. do not assume that home ownership or the ability of someone to pay a mortgage is necessarily a higher risk in a

low income neighborhood that it is in a middle and upper income neighborhood. in fact, one company maintains that income is negatively correlated in the mortgage market. meaning in come in and of itself -- they confide and other income through all sorts of needs that could make a mortgage. not so for upper and middle income. there are other factors in that part of. when the private sector, the mainstream banks, allows the never is to close its branches, what moved and was the subprime and often predatory lenders as the service of choice. also, the basic banking services became pawnshops and credit lenders.

we shifted the financial- services sector to this shadow financial services sector. there is a very shadowy aspect to this sector that preyed upon people, that put people in positions they should not have been in and approve them for loans with terms and conditions that any reasonable person would not have done. >> we can broaden that to underserved markets. look at prince george's county. they are the highest income county in the united states in terms of african-american wealth. over 50% of mortgage loans in prince george's county were subprime mortgages. from my work in the field, i started out as a fair lending advocate. i ran the toledo fair housing and sought more lawsuits than

any other fair housing or civil- rights agency in the country. what we saw over and over again were lenders who were not willing to go into underserved markets, even if we were talking about more affluent african- american or latino markets with their plain vanilla products. i can remember -- used to be able to purchase data in ohio and we could look at the address and it would provide the interest rate and to the finance their bosses for that particular mortgage. i sit down with mainstream lenders and i would say that person has a law and elsewhere, 18%, 25%, go to that person and refinance them. there is your mortgage. they refused to do it.

surprisingly, when they adopted some prime lending divisions, we found that the same letters whose prime entities would not go into these neighborhoods and make prime loans, somehow, they were able to penetrate these communities with subprime loans and with the subprime entities. we also found and we documented this pro a program that we developed with benny made -- it was an anti-predatory remediation program where we took folks who had subprime loans and it would determine their predatory, refunds them into a prime loan and a number one criteria for participation in that program was that at the time you get the subprime loan, you qualify for a prime loan. we had many consumers who qualified for a prime alone and they got a loan with a subprime entity. many of those subprime entities

were subsidiaries of holding companies that also had a prime land there. they were operating in the larger geographic area. what we had seeing, as john has said, prime entities and mainstream lenders not willing to go in with their less-risky products or less-risky underwriting models into underserved neighborhoods to generate and the original mortgages. they would go in with a higher cost product in order to generate mortgages in those areas. >> we have some time to take some questions and comments from the audience. other any questions or comments? >>ñi while we are waiting, i wat to say that we have this forum

on home ownership and lending. the crisis we are in had very little to do with home ownership. most of the loans we are talking about were refinance loans. i have seen statistics that say less than 10% of the mortgages that were made resulted in somebody getting a home. it is really the industry during this las vegas-style gambling with lending as a way of making a lot of profit, not a way of increasing home ownership. a lot of the great ideas from denmark and elsewhere sound great but you are talking about getting people into home ownership. we're talking about a malfeasance. it was an unrelated industry that was allowed to get rid of murder. we have a congress that has the

fortitude to change the system so we return to ethics and a rule of law in our system of regulating financial-services. >> i think it was 1988, we worked to get the national cooperative bank loan act. what is your view of the problems of banks providing low- income development for low- income people? >> i am not familiar with the

model you're talking about. let me say this -- i do not necessarily think we need to come up with new models to service adequately underserved communities. i don't we have to do that. and we have enough robust data. you can take the data from the cdfi sector who focuses on lending to underserved markets and you can really cull bad data and analyze it and help use that data to buttress our mainstream says to. i don't know that we have to keep coming up with new systems or new models or what have you. i think what we need to be doing is focusing on ways to move folks who are currently under represented to or from underserved markets and move them into the mainstream market. i think there are more

protections in the mainstream market. what we have seen in as a result of the financial crisis today -- >> this is an old model of helping underserved people buried the national cooperative bank which was supposed to be a bank to liberate bonds for low- income as well as middle income co-op housing. it has not gotten the attention of your communities. what they say over the years is they are not getting enough demand for their loans. >> they have been a non-factor. when you look in canada, you see the corporate bank there and do see a tremendous amount of activity that working-class people rely on. there are credit unions in the

united states that is a cooperative structure. it has to do with the application of law and regulatory oversight. if you look at low-income communities, the credit unions say they did not vary too much malfeasance lending. they didn't do much lending to begin with. they were created on the basis of serving people with modest means. they are on capitol hill right now pushing to create a line of credit available to the credit union industry. forget the corporate membership model. they are trying to put themselves in the position of having access to the fed window. they want a line of credit that they can use to compete for the with the banks without having an obligation to serve low-income community.

they don't even want to pay corporate taxes. that is an extra benefit that credit unions get. i went off on a tender but i think it is more relevant to the point you're making. >> we have time for about one more question any more questions or comments from the audience? charlie,zñ do we have closing comments from ralph nader? i want to thank my last and a panelist for theirñi participation. the coalition that is working on a variety of reforms, not specifically fannie mae and freddie mac but against the entire financial industry to preserve and reform the financial system is americans for financial reform.

>> all those advocated not to let the fm's use their mortgage- backed securities to meet their mortgage goal. they chose not to listen to us. hud chose not to listen to us. that has to be another component of any assessment of the gse's. when folks working on the ground give -- advocate for different positions with the various regulators, how those various positions are considered by the regulators. >> thank you. [applause] >> i thank the panel which that they brought some of the discussion down to earth.

thank you all for providing your own from a reference. everybody takes their own from records and their experience and their knowledge and we have to be very careful that we do not become sophisticated and abstract in communicating to the public. i have often said that the housing issue, generally, has been depicted in such boring ways that they have not gotten the press they deserve for the basic prerequisite of a decent livelihood. it is not quite as exciting as contaminated food for example. we talked about detention of fannie mae and freddie mac between shareholder value obligations on the one hand and their public mission on the other. i don't think that is the problem. i know think anybody there is worried about the shareholders to begin with.

there is another tension. there's a tension between speculation and investment. the more complex and abstract the secondary mortgage market becomes, the more it looks into derivatives. the more it is onñi regulated - it becomes more of a speculative effort more than an investment effort. in terms of housing on the ground, especially for underserved people. the situation in housing in this country is pretty bad for a lot of people. there are millions of people who cannot afford housing, you still have a homeless problem, you have people who could not afford a home but they should be able to afford to rent and they cannot afford to rent. look at the district of columbia, for example.

we have lacked in this conference the participation of the one person who knows more about how many may and freddie mac underserved low-income committees than anybody in the united states, that person is john brown. he could not be here today and show you his maps and data oibecause of a longstanding fay commitment. i want to recommend his findings for some of you to digest because when we met years ago, he tried to totally deny was undeniable. there is data and maps which demonstrate in a way that was hidden from most reporters, fannie mae and freddie mac were going away from serving low- income areas. as far as the cynicism about

regulation is concerned, regulation has been a farce. we know that it has been especially with ofeo and fannie mae and freddie mac. it does that have to be a part. it is like saying that the police are not being effective against criminals and let's go to neighborhood watches. we know how to make regulation work. we know how to simplify it. we know how to quantify it perry will have to provide it with adequate authority and enforcement. that should be the goal. tom stanton wrote the first book on this warning about fannie mae and freddie mac and capital standards were a big part of his concern. if there is anything easier than enforcing capital standards, i would like to know about it. this idea that people from conservative persuasions c way o

regulate. they don't want us to think about it. there is no reason why we cannot establish these kinds of regulatory patterns. part of this is blaming cra for the subprime mortgage crisis. that is one of the most irresponsible and not unsubstantiated accusations. the community reinvestment act works very well. quantitatively, not as much as some of us wanted but very reliable repayment rates and mortgage payment rates, even citigroup entered into this effort. it was not something that failed at all. it was overwhelmed by a whole layer of reckless endeavors.

as part of that -- as far as the power of fannie mae and freddie mac, politically, let them lobby. they will be back stopped by the government and bailed out for the government now has warrants and owns almost 80% of it. no lobbies. citigroup should not be allowed to lobby. the government has put a lot of taxpayer money into citigroup. you prevent freeloaders and corporate people from lobbying because they are not part of the free enterprise system. they are part of the corporate welfare system. that takes care of multi million dollar lobbyists who are hired on capitol hill by fannie mae and freddie mac from republican

and democratic ranks, outrageous salaries, in order to peddle influence, not meritorious arguments, sheer influence. my final point is, how do we convey what is happening in the huge world of the anime and freddie mac to regular people? how to reconstruct it without making it inaccurate? how do we use simple line was for what is a simple need to which is decent housing? that is what i think we got under way today. i am pleased that cspan came to death. -- came to day. we must never underestimate

people's interest once they are given a chance to understand something that affects them other country in so many intimate and personal voice as housing does for neighborhoods and four other expended livelihood's. we invite all ideas and suggestions from the cspan audience, from the audience here, to send them to onfo @csrl.org. i particularly applaud the people who came here to share their experiences and to reflect the necessities of the american people. thank you very much. [applause] >> we are all invited to lunch. thank you.

[captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [no audio] >> "washington journal" is next with the day's news and your phone calls and the houses in four legislative business at 10:00 eastern. we will talk with two house members on counterintelligence operations and the attempted bombing of a northwest airlines flight.