tv C-SPAN Weekend CSPAN January 16, 2010 6:00am-7:00am EST
6:00 am
principle and he will. i think the principle is preserved, but the working families and middle class in our family will not feel the negative impact that we feared. we all owe a debt of gratitude to our friends in the labor movement for having this interaction with the white house because, really, all america's working families benefited from the accommodation that has been made. that is very well received by our members. so, that was one of our main issues. but again, affordability. we want to do the best we can to make the bill affordable for the me american people that. is essential to whether this bill is going to work. accountability for insurance companies, whether we are talking about an exchange, medical loss ratio, talking about the reforms that we have in the house bill that we want to see in the final bill as
6:01 am
well. they are talking about the challenge that some of these insurance companies will face if they raise rates in the next couple of years, then they won't be able to participate in the exchange. so, those accountability pieces our members are very supportive of ending the waiver of the antitrust laws for the insurance companies. so, those are some of the issues that have always been part of our agenda for accountability. our agenda, for accountability, taking other forms, public option this are that but they are always about accountability for the health insurance. [inaudible] >> that had nothing to do with
6:02 am
that. we were on this course of action anyway, because what we want to do is to move this legislation because i don't think the american people can wait any longer gillet it is about the assurance that they will have that we have found their common ground and that this legislation will pass though we are on the path we have always been on, from a time standpoint. i don't know, we are going to go back to the white house and talk about some other issues this afternoon and probably have a better idea as to when we can sense something that we will send it again, when we are ready, but very optimistic but we are finding common ground, making progress on the differences but remember, 75% of these bills were very, very similar so it is just some different priorities we had in the house and senate. all of them are good. it isn't as if one is better than another. it is just establishing
6:03 am
priorities which is our job, but we were very pleased to have such a powerful message both from our president barack obama last night on this subject and then today from president clinton. it was really a master class izzy connected health care to jobs and then to the green, dig green jobs, the jobs of the future, and i was pleased in the debate when people were talking about retrofitting i think we came out of the meeting instead of talking about retrofitting we are talking about future fitting so in any event everyone has caught the spirit of where we want to go with this. but central to this health care. ..
6:04 am
[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> president obama poke with reporters yesterday about his conversation with the haitian president. he also talked about the latest relief supplies to reach the earthquake-stricken country. this is five minutes, from the
6:05 am
white house. >> good afternoon, everybody. i wanted to make a brief statement on the latest situation in haiti so that the american people are fully up to date on our efforts there. this morning i spoke with the president of haiti, who has been in regular contact with our ambassador on the ground. i expressed to him my deepest condolences for the people of haiti and our strong support for the relief he efforts that are under way. like so many haitians, he has lost his home and his government is working under extraordinarily difficult conditions. many communications are down and remain -- and many people remain unaccounted for. the scale of devastation is extraordinary as i think all of us are seeing on television and the losses are heartbreak.
6:06 am
i pledged america's continued commitment to the government and the people of haiti in the immediate effort to save lives an deliver relief and long-term effort to rebuild. he and i agreed it is essential that the efforts are well coordinated among the united states and government of haiti with the united nations, which continues to play an essential role and with the many international partners and aid organizations that are now on the ground. meanwhile, american resources continue to arrive in haiti. the search and rescue efforts continue to work, pulling people out of the rubble. our team has saved the lives of american citizens and haitian citizens, often under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. this morning the aircraft carrier u.s.s. carl vinson arrived with helicopters that will be critical in delivering assistance in the days to come. they are preparing to move badly
6:07 am
needed water, food and other life-saving supplies to priority areas in port-au-prince. food, water and medicine continues to arrive with doctors and aid workers. at the airport, help continues to flow in not just from the united states but from brazil, mexico, canada, france, colombia, and the dominican republic, among others. this underscores the point i made to the president this morning. the entire world stands with the government and people of haiti, for in haiti's devastation we all see the common humanity that we share. and as the international community continues to respond i do believe that america has a continued responsibility to act. our nation has a unique capacity to reach out quickly and broadly and to deliver assistance that can save lives. that responsibility obviously is magnified when the devastation that has been suffered is so near us. haitians are our neighbors in
6:08 am
the americas and for americans they are family and friends. it is characteristic of the american people to help others in time of such severe need. that is the spirit that we will need to sustain this effort as it goes forward. there are going to be many difficult days ahead. so, so many people are in need of assistance. the port continues to be closed and the roads are damaged. food is scarce and so so water. it will take time to establish distribution points so we can ensure that resources are delivered safely and effectively and in an orderly fashion. but i want the people of haiti to know that we will do what it takes to save lives and help them get back on their feet. i want to thank our people on the ground, our men and women in uniform who have moved so swiftly, civilians and embassy staff many of whom suffered their own losses and those
6:09 am
members of search and rescue teams from florida, california, virginia, who have left their homes and families behind to help others. so, to all of them, i want you know you demonstrate a courage and decency of the american people and we are extraordinarily proud of you. i want to thank the american people more broadly. in these tough times you have shown extraordinary compassion. already donating millions of dollars. i encourage all of you who want to help to do so through white hou house.g house.gov. i will be meeting with president clinton and president george w. bush at the white house to how to enlist the help of the american people in this recovery and rebuilding effort going forward. i would note that as i ended my call with the president of haiti, he says that he has been extremely touched by the friendship an generosity of the american people. it was an emotional moment. this president, seeing the
6:10 am
devastation around him, passed this message to the american people. he said "from the bottom of my heart and on behalf of the people of haiti, thank you, thank you, thank you." as i told the president, we realize that he needs more help and his country needs more help, much more. and in this difficult hour we will continue to provide it. thank you very much. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> pentagon officials release the findings of their investigation of the fort hood shootings.
6:11 am
next week your chance to talk to the authors of "game change" they take your questions on the 2008 presidential campaign and the impact of the book on washington politics and policy on "washington journal" tuesday morning at 9:00 a.m. did you know one of the top free news apps for your iphone or i-touch is span radio. you can get quick and easy access to three streaming audio channels. span radio, c-span and pap 2. there is a tab with links to all of our podcasts. it all free and available from the app store. the defense department released its internal report on the fort hood shootings yesterday. the co-chairs of that review former army secretary togo west and retired admiral vernon clark spoke about their findings during a 45-minute briefing at the pentagon. >> good afternoon and thank you
6:12 am
for joining us. earlier this morning secretary gates acknowledged the seat of the -- receipt of the independent review report related to the fort hood shooting. he took the opportunity to thank the co-chairs while highlighting some of the key findings as well as how he intends to move forward upon the recommendations. of this report. >> he said it is one that was delivered on time despite a very aggressive schedule. today, this afternoon, it is my privilege to present to you the co-chairs of the independent review. the former secretary of the arm togo west and former chief of naval operations admiral vern be clark, both of whom many of you know but have graciously given some of their time to discussing
6:13 am
with you in more detail theirç findings and recommendations anç to also address some of your questio questions. so, gentlemen, thank you very much for your rapid your dedication and for giving us this opportunity to ask youçç about the report.ç >> 72 days ago a lone gunman opened fire at the soldier readiness center at fort hood, fowlkes. 13 people died, 12 uniform service members and a civilian. 43 were wounded. that will be remembered as a day of tragedy. all who worked with us on this project extend our sympathies to the fall en, to the families of the fallen, to the wounded, to
6:14 am
the families of the wounded, to all that were touched by the tragedy. in the aftermath of that day secretary gates established his independent reviewç relating t fort hood. he asked admiral clark and me to co-chair it. we accepted, we have done so. as he told you this morning, we have provided him our report. it is being releasedç as we k speak, a favored few already have it. secretaryç asked us to do a careful review of personnel policies, of force protection measur measures,ç of emergency respon plans, and of support to those who give medical care to our service members, to our wounded. he also asked us to conduct a
6:15 am
review of the army's application of its policies and practices to the alleged perpetrator. to accomplish this we established five teams. each staff had a full range of experts and we established a board of advisors composed of senior uniform leaders. they had full access to facilities, to personnel, and to the resources of the department. they visited fort hood, as did admiral clark and i day after we were -- the day after we were appointed. their view and the things they found for us and our conclusions are what constitutes the report. and it isç coming to you this morni morning, secretary gates said he would not address specifics with respect to the alleged perpetrator. we are bound by the same
6:16 am
construct. but we refer you to what you perhaps have already seen, and that is the concluding lines in our executive summary as well as the one-page chapter 1 with respect to the alleged perpetrator and -- in which we point out that, as a result of our view it appeared there were several officers who did not apply the army's policies to the perpetrator. we recommended to the secretary that he refer that finding as well as materials associated with it to the secretary of the revi review. my specificçç languageçy] w review as for accountability or such other action as the secretary of the army shall deem appropriate. our report, however, was broader than the alleged perpetrator. in fact, it is 53 findings and associated recommendations
6:17 am
covering the full range of the terms of reference that you heard me speak to a moment ago. that purpose is to strengthen the department's ability to find the indicators, to understand them and to prepare itself for action as we defend the force against this threat. the secretary of defense gave you a fairly detailed overview in his comments this morning. admiral clark is prepared to fill in some additional information. before i pass it to him, let me mention three observations from that day of tragedy. first, no amount of preparation can be too much. leaders at fort hood anticipated a mass casualty event in their emergency response plans and
6:18 am
exercises. that preparation showed at fort ho hood. two minutes and 40 seconds after the initial receipt of the 911 phone call emergency responders were on the scene. and by emergency responders i specifically refer to elements of the fort hood security team. a minute and a half after that, the assailant was incapacitated, taken into custody and remained in custody of security forces throughout the remainder of that day including the transportation to the civilian hospital and provision of care to him during that time. and two minutes and 50 second after that two ambulances and an incident command vehicle from the post hospital arrived to begin to dispense life-giving medical care to those who had been wounded. yet, and lives were saved as a
6:19 am
result. yet, 13 people died and 43 were wound wounded. we will prepare harder, plan more diligentlyers and seek to see around the corners of our future to find the signs of an emerging potential next event. secondly, we need to be attentive to today's hazards. yes, it is the roll of our forces to protect the nation against external threats. but our emerging concern is to protect the force against the internal threats. you heard the secretary of defense say, you will hear admiral clark elaborate, that we need to make sure we understand the forces that cause an individual to radical iize, to commit acts of violence, and
6:20 am
thereby to cause an internal vulnerability, a vulnerability within our forces. third, courage and presence of mind in the face of crisis can carry the tkaday. we saw that, too, at fort hood. courageous acts were a key element in preventing greater lo loss. the question for us is can we reward that courage by exercising the foresight to ascertain the threat, to find the information that identifies the threat, and, having done so, to act preemptively? admiral clark. >> thank you, secretary west. let's start first with force
6:21 am
protection. existingç policies are not on theized -- optimized for countering the internal threat. what that means then is that there is insufficient knowledge and awareness, the kind of knowledge and awareness that is required to identify and address individuals likely to commit violence. further, guidance concerning workplace violence and the potentials for self-radicalization is insufficient. there is not a well-integrated means to gather, evaluate and disseminate the wide range of indicators that could signal an insider threat. complicating the entire force protection area of discussion is the challenge that has been
6:22 am
created by the diverse nature of responsibilities as they have evolved within the department since 9/11. therefore, under secretaries of defense that have responsibilities and we outline the specific things they are responsible for but the end result is that synchronization is difficult. as the secretary said this morning, there is no single official assigned overall responsibili responsibility, and that results in a question about effective policy integration. shifting to information sharing, some policies that govern the exchange of information, both inside the department and externally -- and by that i mean within the interagency arena -- some of these policies are deficient and they do not support detection and mitigation
6:23 am
of internal threats. the time has passed when concerns about specific entities over protecting their information and how it then is allowed to prevent relevant threat information an indicators fromç reaching those who need , that time has passed. the people who need it most in this particular case are the comm'ujuj and leaders at the point of interest. as the secretary of defense indicated there is a requirement to create a more agile and adaptive force, one that can deal with the changing securityç environment, anticipating new threats and bringing a wide and continuously evolving range of tools and techniques and programs into play. finally, under information sharing, hand in glove with an effective information sharing program is the command and
6:24 am
control system that it supports. a robust program and the accompanying command and control structure to convert information into specific decisions and actions requires more active information gathering onxd potential threats and dissemination and analysis of the assessments to every level of command. the secretary tasked us specifically to look at the area of i.d. being employees who could potentially pose a threat. the most summary statement i can provide you is that there is a lack of clarity for comprehensive indicators, which then limit the commanders and rest of the chain of command's ability to recognize these threats. certainly detecting a trusted insider's intention to commit a violent act requires observation
6:25 am
of behavioral cues and anomalies and this is a difficult task. let me shift briefly to a comment on health providers. the secretary asked us to look at this and they are a very important part of the security equation. the tendency is to focus on the care of combatants. healthcare providers are not immune to the stressors that are present inç their workplace, a that is true whether they are at home or deployed. our recommendations suggest that there is a requirement to put the right programs in place to support these critical people. finally, let me talk about emergency response. secretary west, secretary of defense gates this morning, made the observation that the response at fort hood was great.
6:26 am
and i want to alignç myself wi those comments. i was committed to the armed forces for 37 yearsç. on the second day of our service here, secretary west and i, as he said, went to fort hood. we received aç briefing from general cone and the team down there on their of a-action lessons learned and i want to tell you that their report and the actions that they identified were the best that i have ever seen in 37 years of service. lots of good news to report. the people on the base were certainly prepared. dedicat dedicated. secretary west talked about courageous acts, prompt acts. the speed of response was terrif terrific.
6:27 am
having said that, it is our conviction that it can be even bett better. an example of what made it so successful was the effective implementation of a counter to the active shooter reality that was present at fort hood. we can spend some time on that if you would like, but it was executed in a superb fashion and the outcome certainly did prevent further bloodshed. with regard to the response of the entire team there are memorandums of agreement or understanding, anded a fort hood they are called mutual aid agreements. these are agreements that lay out the relationships between people on the base and potentially external providers and so forth. our finding is that there is sufficient policy for the establishment of these kinds of
6:28 am
devic devices. the experience at fort hood suggests that without those devices the outcome would not have been nearly as effective. there were problem areas in some regimes. some of them were dated. but i would say my experience is that you could put them in place this week and a month from now they may be out of date because people change and so forth. but what we are suggesting is that where improvements are possible they should be identifi identified, including exercise requirements and all the çrest. currently all 50 states in the union have complied with the federal requirements for the national incident management system. this was the result of an act afty 9/11. we found that within the department there are no established milestones to define initial and full capability.
6:29 am
our recommendation is that the time line for achieving capability should be examined with an eye toward bringing about a system that will be fully interoperable with all of the states when the process is complete. let me conclude my response about -- my comments -- about emergency response withç anoth statement about command and control. the command and control structure that we referred to earlier is ultimately manifested in the middle of a crisis respon response. again, agility, adaptability and speed of response is the key. at fort hood, commanders had to deal with mis informatiinformat that is true in every crisis that will ever happen in the history of man.
6:30 am
we believe, though, that a better system is required and we also believe and recommend that the department examine more stressing exercise scenarios to ensure that effective crisis response in the future will meet the objectives and standards the department holds for itself. the response of the fort hood community in the aftermath of the tragedy there serves as a reminder of the strength of our nation and resiliency and character of our people. secretary west and i were extremely impressed with the people there at fort hood, military, civilian workers on base, and the people in the civil sector that supported them on that incredible day. i certainly want to align myself with the comments of secretary gates this morning and my partner in this, secretary west,
6:31 am
regarding the families and wounded in this incident. the thrust of our effort has been to do everything that we know how to tdo to put the spotlight on procedures to enable the department to become better and to provide the kind of structure and force required for the future. thank you and we look forward to your questions. >> several officers were mentioned that will be referred to the army for action. can you put a number on that and speak to the vulnerability of the force today in light of the shooting? how vulnerable are other installations to another attack? >> i will take the first part of the question and let the admiral talk the secretary part on vulnerability because the first part is easier. we are bound by the same constraints the secretary of defense is and can't talk about the specifics. let me say this. we have not considered the
6:32 am
question of numbers yet. >> of the numbers of officers that are being referred to -- >> raoeufplt >> can you give an estimate of how many you came across? >> what is the difference between that question and the one i answered? i stepped across the line, i'm stepping back. >> are we talking three, dozens? is it a systemic problem? >> the report says several. >> maybe three? >> several. haste to give the secretary part -- the secondmyçç part. >> with regard to vulnerabilities today, i thought secretary gates addressed it directly. this is not a threat that somebody thinks is massive and is overwhelming the force. but one is too many. his language this morning suggested so much has changed in the last decade. as i look at this and i look at everything that is going on in
6:33 am
the area of security and the issues that "face the nation," i believe that this is another one of thoseç key moments in time where we assess ourselves again. we take advantage of this experience and ensure by having the courage to challenge every assumption that we make about the way we do things and the way we execute things, the assumptions that we have in place building the security apparatus and make sure by challenging thoseç assumptions that we meet the standards that we set for ourselves and those are areas that we suggested to the secretaryç in terms of poly and programs. >>ççççxd at the bottom of ç talk about discrepanciesi] betwn the alleged perpetrator's documented performanceç and official reports and actual performance inkçñrym training, residency and fellowship.
6:34 am
does that mean his documented performance seemed toçñr indic an unblemished record where his actual performance there are problems that never reflected in the official record? >> where areçç you reading th >> bottom of page ççsix, top page seven. >> your question is does that refer to -- >> discrepancies. are they referring to an official record on paper that seems to indicateç añr promisi referçççñr with great econom credentials versus performance issues in the field that were issueflected in the official record? ç >> i'm not -- we are not going to try to interpret thatç language for you in general but the specific answer to that question is this. discrepancy can be discrepancies internal to what is said. it can mean what youç said as well. that is between what is reported andçç whatççç isççç kno.
6:35 am
>> may i ask one quickç -- >> no, into is it. >> there were talks about problems thathyou have identified with the joint terrorism task forces. potentially more military personnel should be on that task force. i know that that was at the limit of your review but if you could talk to us a littleç bit about what you found there and whatç you are recommending to ensure critical information does get to the medical tear? >> one of the things that are in the terms of reference cites several other investigations that are occurring and we were given clear guidance in the terms of reference not to interfere with the criminal investigati investigation. the president had authorizedç ç chartered an investigation into intelligence activities and we didn't go there. what we did have in the process
6:36 am
is the simple awareness ofç wh the commitment, the department's commitment was in terms of personnel resources, and also an understanding in the public domain that there were modifications in the dissemination process thatç we being examined and our recommendation is simple and straightforwa straightforward. the department has a vested interest in the outcome of all of that and thatç waoerbt be working together ensuring what we talked about in the information sharing, ensuring that the pwbest information tha is available is made available to the key people so that we can provide for the security of our people. that straightforward. >> it was said earlier the report says çself-radicalizati. the admiral said more of that is
6:37 am
going on. it talks about extreme practices of faith groups. isn't the immediate problemç islamic radicalization? >> the immediate problem is radio tkalization of -- radicalization of any sort. our concern is with actions and effects, not necessarily with motivationed. the role of motivation is if they are allowed to get carried too far then they become the spark of action. so, suppose it were a fundamentalist christian inspired. our concern is not with the religion. it is with the potential effect on our soldiers' ability to do their job. >> so, no particular religious group, across the board? >> çyes. >> we certainly didn't cite a particular group. what we are citing is the activity that is prejudicial to good ordera%d discipline and making sure -- notice the language. the language talks about
6:38 am
activities that are dangerous to us. and activity that shouldn't beñc authoriz authorized. so, the question of ç self-radicalization, there is muchç to be learned about all these indicators. so, when we talk about the indicators we are suggesting to the department we did phase one. phase one suggests to us that there isn't clarity about these indicators and what needs to happen now in phase two, as the secretary has laid out the phase two process, is digging, drilling down into this issue and coming to grips with the solution to that question. what are these indicators? then the other thing we will say -- and we believe that this is why adapt bt is so important. thisç is not a single point solution.
6:39 am
it is an evolving solution. >> more self-radicalization going on? >> i don't know the universe and we didn't seek to -- our study didn't go into all of -- we were examining policies, procedures, paralysis. so we were not out there digging around in that. admiral mullen has his point of view and i respect it. >> the time line you gave began with the 911 call. do you know how long elapsed from the beginning of the shooting until the 911 call? >> no. we thought about that and we even had a best estimate. the problem was when we try to add in all of theç components never come out with the same number. so i will give you my answer only and i do not tie my colleague to it. roughly weaken seven and eight minutes from the first shot to the hrlast. >> and i align with that. and you can understand why the
6:40 am
difficulty from getting to the initial shot to the 911 call there is nobody sitting there with a stop watch taking that kind of information. but it is very clear. that is why we are so impressed with the response at fort hood. it was fabulous. >> here. and i thought there were hands over here. >> secretary gates also said that he didn't consider the internal threat to be significa significant. but obviously this is a question of changing culture and mindset within the military. i wonder if you think that the fact that this could be more of an aberration is going to make it more difficult to containing the culture over time and how do you strike the balance? because you don't want to go too far and make the military becomç kind of a witch hunt seveatmosp. >> i think he was right in that. here is what is significant.
6:41 am
we are talking about the fact that on all of our posts across the country what we called credentialed members are able to enter using their cards and their uniform, without being stopped for the routine check. you can't do it any other way or we would bring the post to a halt. we are talking about the fact that also our policies, which do permit stop and search, won'tç catch anything that is carried in in a car if there is not a stop and search. that is significant in that we need -- if we can not ensure that we can find that -- and we certainly haven't proposed anything in an of a-action action fort hood has instituted periodic checks of everyone without advance notice.
6:42 am
and that will certainly help. what we are thrown back on is our ability to respond to cues, indicators, and other ways of identifying the individuals on whom we have to be -- with respect to whom we have to be particularly careful to see it those are indicators of potential violence. >> how is -- how are you going to inculcate this new kind of culture in the military? >> we made several recommendations and we have that old all-back and that is for the next set of reviews that follows us to try to focus on. the secretary said -- i hope you heard that and saw it. in his statement this morning he sent a message to the force. he said commanders, step beyond your day-to-day duties. that is part of it. and it is a message for everyone. >> just before this happened
6:43 am
there was an army member health advisory team that recommended, among other things, doubling a number of mental health providers in afghanistan. was there pressure to provide those bodies that might have caused people to overlook major hasan's problems? >> frankly, i think that you would have to ask the army about their specific response. but in looking at programs, policies and procedures we know that there were -- that there are always shortfall areas that a department, a particular service is pursuing. i can't speak to the accuracy of the report that you are speaking to. one would expect that the whole personnel management process is continually doing the kind of assessments that they seek to
6:44 am
meet the current needs. we know that the kind of warfare our people are facing on the front and that is why i alluded to the healthcare providers, these are stressing times for th them. is the force stressed? the force is stressed we we train it. part of the growth and development process is to test it. so, what we are saying in response to the question put forward to us with respect to healthcare providers is they must be provided the same kind of care in responding to the stressors that exist that even the combatants are dealing with. >> thank you for the phrasing of your question. it almost tricked my alert but it didn't. >> in this force security section you call on commanders to have the authority to intervene in the case of activities that show potential
6:45 am
violence and does that mean though that commanders or their delegates will have to be out there looking at what is being preached at certain mosques or radical christian churches and determining what kind of religion, philosophy, statements, constitutes radicalization and how involved do you want the military in that kind of assessment? >> what you heard admiral mullens say today and the day that this was put into being is that there is a part -- and i speak to as a person who did this for 37 years -- there is an inherent belief in the chain of command and the ability of the chain of command to deal with problems. the secretary, as secretary west said, the secretary of defense charged commanders to look
6:46 am
carefully -- understand that this is a challenging threat are arena. and the difference between a force protection system thatç puts upç barriersç to keep everybody outçç and now deali with threats thats3 haveor th potential to beç inside. and whatç those commentsç mea the report there is that the chain of command hasw3 to beçç attuned, watching, çlistening, being in situational awareness is the order of theç day.çç7 >>[çzvççqmççççççi]çñr mosques? >> not in our recommendations nor a hint of it.ç >> you are reallyç referring t my personal assessment of what might be in the annex and the reconvicted annex and we are not going to discuss anything in the restricted annex other than what
6:47 am
has been said. >> but since you didn't get that question answeredç because it v out of bounds do you have one that is in bounds that you want to ask? >> no. >> next. >> what are the duties of -- you talk about information sharing within the department of defense. does a -- how far do you want that to go? do you want chaplains who counsel someone, other mental health providers, if they see some of the indicators you were talking about to go to unit commanders and say i counseled this fellow but i think you need to take a quicker look based on what he said or isç that a privacy violation? >> i can. the admiral's elbow in my ribs saying now is the time to talk about balance. and balance in our report and balance in our recommendations. and it is raised by your question as well. do we want commanders in the
6:48 am
mosque? no. do we want anybody there? no. but we wantç commanders' awareness of what is happening in their units and what has happened to their people. admiral mullen will tell you they are already supposed to do that and we should not be having to say t. and perhaps they are. but our emphasis is on that is where we believe much of the solution lies. we are not saying -- or we are not recommending that our soldiers and commanders be told toç talk about their colleague but the language in our report is be aware when they are in trouble and when they require support. sometimes counselling in a helping hand can help. but other times there are warning signs that need to be paid attention to and passed along. so those inç authority can dece
6:49 am
what is the right approach. none of this works without another one of orç recommendations, which is that there be an effort to collect from experts, our own experts around others, the signs that something is wrong, the signs that are there across the board. so, that commanders and others can have a sense of what they are. then there is the ability to bring those two together. >> before we move to the next question, let me just then talk about other things that we should be speaking about when we are talking about sharing informati information. something happens on base a and how does that information get to base b a few miles away? when we talk about a command and control system that changes outcomes, we are talking about the ability to share realtime or near realtime information in a way that will ensure the right
6:50 am
out com outcomes. and our finding and the secretary defense referred to it this morning is that system doesn't exist. we need the same kind of common operational picture for force protection that we have in the field when we are talking about warfare and the pieces that go with that. we need to enable the commander with the kind of information shared inside the department that will allow them to be preemptive in dealing with threats. >> if you had been major hasan's commanding officer what would you have done based on what you have learned? >> now, do you think maybe you have stepped across there? >> can you answer that within -- >> it makes us refer to what we have learned, right? >> you probably could say that you would have been alarm bid certain things. you could probably say that. >> let me tell you what we did
6:51 am
say. we said that we thought that several officers responsible for applying the army's policies to him did not do so and we think that should be referred to the secretary of army for considerations of accountability. i think that is as far as you want us to go. >> but is there a positive thing you could say of what you would have done had you been in that situati situation, like the wording you would say that you were concerned about this, this and that? >> let me take this in a direction that might be helpful without speaking to this specific case. this morning the question was asked about information moving from base to base and with an individual. one of the things that leaders do and good officers -- and at the heart of the united states military -- we grow and develop peop people. the growth an development process sometimes takes counseling and sometimes takes instructi
6:52 am
instruction. so, part of what we are suggesting here and has to do with sharing information, what we found is that some information is maintained at a local level and some information is maintained at a servicewide level. leaders areç the people who direct the kind of interchange with individuals who improve their performance. we use the term "officership" in our report because weç believe thisç is fundamental to the institution and thatç our recommendation is that the secretary of the army take a look at it. >> here, then here. >> mr. secretary, you said you don't want people necessarily telling on each other but you want them to be concerned. but you want them to be more than concerned. you want that shared within the chain of command, do you not? >> i said that but it may have
6:53 am
dribbled off. yes. >> when can we expect to heqrç who and how many people will be reprimanded for the mistakes made? >> we are not going to give you a time but -- in fact it may have been referred to the army. he has referred it to the secretary of the army. they have the information. >> you have the people in mind already, right? >> the decisionç is within the chain of command. this is a referral for accountabili accountability. accountability has to do with whether there isaç basis to hold those particular people responsible. >> you have reservations -- >> the recommendation we made on this is the recommendation that you have in the report. >> but i haven't had a chance to read it. >> i used the language for you. refer to the secretary of the army for review as to accountability and such other
6:54 am
matters as may be -- >> you didn't recommend numbers? >> we did not. >> you just said you recommend. >> we said consider accountability. accountability raises the question of anything the secretary of the army may consider in terms of action. this one. >> maybe in is a phase two question but do you recommend at all in here on how to break it culture of essentially letting troops slide by with bad recommendations or people kind of not really ponding to what they see as maybe kwrod behavior or anything? is that something you kind of discuss in here? >> no. we have a recommendation to the secretary that he send a strong message the kind only he can send and he september part of it this morning. >> but is there language in
6:55 am
there on suggesting what to do? because this culture is kind of the big, one of the big problems. or is this something that has to be tasked elsewhere? >> you have assessed it correctly. this is a challenge. performance appraisal, when i was a chief of the navy one thing i was digging after was the performance appraisal system. and in off-line discussions we have talked about the calendar of this. this isn't just a department issue. this is an issue in performance appraisal systems everywhere. we did not define a specific "you should do this." we said to the secretary, in order to be able to identify internal threats, as much accurate information as is possible is required to be known by the leaders. and what we find in the process is that some information is
6:56 am
passed and some is not. the report says on page seven,i believe, thatçç some informat wasç potentially missed. potentially co information, i think it said missed or misinterpreted. but the point is that we are suggesting to the secretary the policies and the programs behind the performance appraisal system merit review and the -- an emphasis on accurate information and he passed that emphasis this morning. >> one question then i think wa are done. >> the language is that several officers failed to comply, et cetera, and you are recommended them for possible reprimand. but you didn't recommend names? >> no. >> you are saying several officers, you are not saying who in the report? >> we are not recommending but all of our research and everything that contributed to it is beingç passed to the arm along withç the report.
6:57 am
>>ç there are news accounts saying five could be, eight >> i read those and we are not commenting. >> could you clarify the record. that not asking us toñr comment. >> here is the answer. we are not going to confirm. she hasn't finished the question. >> you don't name the several officers in -- >> we did not name them to the secretary either in this or in any protected annex. we have no doubt that the army will be able to isolate the individuals and take the appropriate action. if we had any doubt about that we would have named. >> there is a technicality here that we don't need to get immersed inç but there are informal investigations and -- informal investigations when it comes to disciplining personnel. we were given the phase one part of this was the informal piece
6:58 am
of çit. but there is a large amount and volume of information that is being turned over to the army. we have the kind of data and records that we were able to examine in this report that is part of the restricted annex that gave us the kind of comfort that we understood the issues in a manner in which we could make the recommendation that we did and we recommended that the secretary pass this to the secretaryç of the armyç for an and he did so according to his words this morning. he said he has already done so. >> remember when he announced our form atiation six weeks ago said this is not a review to point fingers. we followed his instructions. but make no mistake, the army has sufficient information to do what it has toç do. we thank you for your time.ç
6:59 am
173 Views
IN COLLECTIONS
CSPAN Television Archive Television Archive News Search ServiceUploaded by TV Archive on