someone to my surprise, i felt kind of got this point i made earlier about how communications were changing faster than other parts of government. >> but you were able to see assessments if you wanted to see them, the work they produced on a weekly basis? >> if i wanted to, but i did not go around looking for them. when i talked about close consultation with them, they were coming to the prime minister's meetings, and that it would also come to the september, 2002 dossier, but that was intense consultation. >> we will come back to this in more detail. you said on the 12th of september, 2002, you attended a

meeting. you said this was, "a meeting with the prime minister, david paul, myself, the head of the sis, and a senior sis officer." . officer. the last of these explained that there'd been a new source in recent weeks who had given the new information. we were being told is because the intermission was important, but also it was being emphasized that this was information that could not go into the dossier. now, why should the director of communication have been included in such a sensitive meeting with two senior officers of the sis when it did not concern information that was publicly usable? >> probably because the prime

minister wanted me to be in as a speculation of my own may have been as well. i don't know. i happened to be at a lot of the prime minister's meetings. but at that time is of the intelligence agencies i suppose are spending more time than they normally might happen to be there. i was also at a time, as that entry makes clear, involved in the process of the production of the september dossier. >> when i worked in government there used to be something called the need to no principle to protect very highly classified information. if this information that you and your job needed to know? >> no. >> no it wasn't. >> it was nonetheless helpful and where it was at that time was the work that was going on with the dossier that was being published. it was actually quite helpful to know. did i need to know it in terms of my diaper printed dossier?

no. >> wouldn't have been more normal for them to invade this sensitive information to determine if jic to number ten downing street? >> i don't know. >> whether they need to see the prime minister is that it happened already? >> that it may be that richard decided -- richard j. love is very senior figure within the intelligence services, clearly if you wanted access to the prime minister you can have it. >> i-india saw him quite frequently? >> i would say so, quite frequently guess. >> i was the jic not at that meeting? i'm not saying that he was a nothing that he wasn't. i'm simply saying as far as my recollection does i do remember the meeting. i remember that richard j. love was accompanied by this other person who explained why it did appear be quite significant intelligence to the prime

minister, but equally it was to inform him rather than as it were going to be divulged in public. >> you were of any precedent for somebody who had been the prime secretary who is now the director of communications to have the level of access that you had to which this is just one example. in the direct relationship with the intelligence agencies? >> that's not for me. you trust the people in my predecessors in the job. joe hands or anybody else i don't know. >> but you are not aware of any precedent? >> i'm not aware or unaware of any precedent. i'd be very surprised if the people in my job at some point did not meet people from the

intelligence offices. and i go back to the point they made earlier that i felt intelligence services did understand in these really complicated international situations communications in an assessment of communication as an important part of what they were doing as well as what we're doing in downing street. >> but essentially the role that you were playing as direct your of communications and strategy was not really one that existed in that form before. it was new and perhaps for the reasons you party give in. and still do, as one of the two or three closest advisers to the prime minister, were playing a much wider and more sensitive role at the half of government. >> i think that's probably true. i have no experiments on trent experience of another government other than watching the dashed >> you watch it fairly closely as lyrical editor. >> and i watched a very closely and political opposition. but i've no other experience of

how other people have operated. >> your world is very central. anything happened at the center of government he would've basically known about it and probably be involved in. >> i would assume to be involved in discussions about it. anything of that level is likely at some point to have contact with the public domain and that was part of my job, was to make sure that the government's position on any given issue was being put across to the public. >> thank you. that's very helpful. i think this makes it easier for us to now going to some of the specific areas of policy do you would've been having these discussions about. and perhaps i should at this point and on. >> just before she takes that the questioning, do any colleagues want to raise any questions? >> you haven't mentioned the cabinet secretary to any of these.

what was his involvement if any at any of these crucial meetings? >> who was involved in all sorts of meetings and certainly once they got onto -- because what tended to have been biased a group that comprised jack straw, jeff holland, as cbs, john scholar and would see the prime minister pry into a private ministerial group. and also don't forget the cabinet secretaries in and out of downing street the whole time. >> now i want to talk about when you up for a ten as to build up to the dossier. as we've heard from other witnesses about after 9/11 and the axis of evil speech and the prospect that you admitted to effect regime change in iraq,

more largely than never. so christopher mayer told us that he received new instructions from downing street in march 2002 and that when the pm and the president met, they were there to talk about containment of sharpening sections he said. did you agree with the prime minister's views on regime change? >> sorry, what did you say christopher said? >> they said they weren't there to talk about containment or shopping sanctions. >> ipods in several in christopher bears as they didn't didn't actually put trade a proper picture. >> i would like to say that did you agree with the prime minister's views on regime change? >> if you are saying to me, do i agree with christopher's

analysis that the prime minister shifted his position from one of containment to regime containment and disarmament to the united nations to a regime change, then i don't accept the analysis at all. >> i'm talking about the meeting crawford and i'm really asking you again, did you agree with the prime minister's views on regime change? it's your views. >> i agree with the prime minister's views. the prime minister is not dana crawford we now have a policy of regime change. the prime minister is absolutely clear both before crawford, at crawford, and subsequent to crawford that the policy of the british government was to pursue saddam hussein to united nations. i think i was very clear in his public cordons at the time. and the reason why i think it was important to point out that i think christopher mayer's brother overstated themes that, for example, he made a point

about the speech that the prime minister made the next day at the george bush senior presidential lives. and they talked about regime change and so forth. if you read the speech he talks about the three previous occasions on which he had been involved in regime change, the taliban and, sierra leone, and kosovo. so i don't really accept this analysis that at crawford there was this fundamental shift of approach and policy by the prime minister. and we point out to the prime minister in relation to his pursuit of disarmament to saddam hussein, the way he was, yes i did. >> you did support it likes and what were the others inconclusive to john powell? worthy of the same view? >> i think you have to address them, but i think it's unfair to expect me to put their position but i know they were there as well. >> and your, i think the meeting on the seventh of march in 2002

you say that the cabinet was mainly about iraq come and not exactly division but a lot of concern where it is going. what were the concerns? >> march 7th, so that was pre-crawford, gal. i can't remember the discussion in any detail but i do remember there was a sense of people just raising concerns in relation to is this happening? is there some sort of rush to war which there never was. but i think just the periods where the issue of rack was bubbling up in bubbling up and ministers were quite right in raising concerns in which the prime minister would no doubt sort of address. >> can i now actually move to the crawford meeting because you accompany the prime minister to crawford. and can you just tell me what

exactly did tony blair committed the uk to in this meeting with president bush at crawford? >> i was not at the meeting that they had dinner together. >> were you briefed about it? >> that was obviously were considerable discussion to place. that evening, as i recall, myself, jonathan powell, dave manning, i think chris didn't leber have a separate dinner with condoleezza rice, karl rove, and i don't remember the exact -- i do remember and not a lot of discussion and i can remember at the dinner redundantly rise and a lot of it was on the war and does a really pressing issue. i think that to follow the prime minister's discussions as well. in relation to iraq, i went up

to for the president of the prime minister were the following morning. i think there'd been separate discussions that david manning had been asked, which he would've talked to about. and then there was kind of a broader meeting where things were recast. and as far as they were recaps, it was to say that, i mean, the prime minister shared the american analysis on iraq in terms of the threat that saddam hussein posed. also in terms of the continued defiance of the united nations. so she was saying we shed in our system and we share the objectives -- >> and all this were about the extent of the threat? >> the analysis was about the threat that saddam hussein posed both to the stability in the region and security in the region and also to the authority of the united nations. and the prime minister was emphasized that the whole way through. and so what came out of -- i'm

trying to remember exactly what he said in the press conference afterwards. he talked about leaving iraq to develop wmd and fragrant bleach of the united states resolution does not notch and pretty goes on to say the response to iraq of a calm, measured, insensible and out the options available will be considered. at the same press conference, george bush restates it quote, the policy of my government is the removal of saddam. that was since bill clinton signed the policy of the american administration. >> did the prime minister made clear to him that that wasn't the uk policy? the >> yes, yes. the prime minister made them clear throughout this better object to is was disarmament of saddam hussein through the united nations forcing them to comply with this extreme of united nations resolutions.

now, so but i think then followed -- the reason again -- the >> when the president talked about military action, how did time to go to war. it wasn't like that ault. he was saying we got a real problem with saddam hussein, post-september 11th he said we both share the analysis and tony blair and he mentioned this in

the first statement after september 11th, the genuine fear of w.m.d. and fail safe and terrorism coming together in, with absolutely lethal devastating consequences. they shared that analysis. they clearlied shared the analysis that saddam hussein was -- was an awful brutal dictator, bar bruss regime. they shared the fear about his w.m.d. program and george bush was saying rg as he said publicly, our policy is regime change. and tony plair was making clear that the british policy was it pursue disarmament to force them to face up to his obligations and his united states -- united nations resolutions. i wasn't at the meeting but i recall the discussion afterward. as i understand it, what president bush said to the prime ministers, there was a very kind of small team over this,

looking. looking at military options. >> this is -- >> over there as in not many people involved, and it is -- yeah. and that was, that was going on. and -- and indeed, i suspect, because -- because one assumed, because of the -- there was a fairly public debate, you mentioned under the previous witnesses talked about the immediate aftermath of september 11th, quite a lett of poem on the american side of things, back in iraq and saddam hussein then. and the british government from the prime minister down saying hold on a minute. this is about the taliban and afghanistan. so, the -- the point is that when it got to -- e to that discussion, there george bush said to tony blair, we're -- there's planning going on.

before we went to the meeting they talked about what options they play look at now. and i can remember -- my voice at that, that setting out -- his analysis of what -- he believed the american thinksing was to be at the time. that informed the discussion the prime minister had with president bush. >> is it your understanding that when -- president bush talked about -- about the manning going on in states, about military -- military planning going on, that the prime minister give a commitment of the british troops to the planning? >> no. i think that really goes way beyond the nature of the discussion at the time. look. you could ask the prime minister about this. i think this is -- this is --

>> okay. let's move on to -- oy -- on to september, because in the -- in the diary of the meeting of the 23rd of july, 2002, you say that the u.s. had pretty much made up their minds and jack straw said of the four causing a threat with w.m.d., iran and korea and libya and iraq and iraq would be fourth. he does not have nukes, he has w.m.d. capability and the tough question is whether this is just regime change or is it -- issued to w.m.d. and you say the tv was clear that we have to be with the americans. but had the prime minister by that time made us up his mind and com midded himself -- committed himself to president bush in joining. >> i think that -- i think within the -- the -- if you look

at the transatlantic relationship, with the -- what the prime minister said to you that was fundamentally important to his analysis of the british national a strategic interest. yes. without a doubt. and therefore, he would -- actually i was -- i was going back to the 1980 operation, operation desert force, there were similar discussions then about when we should or -- whether we should or should not be with the americans. i think the prime minister at this point, his instinct and leadership said be with the americans. but does that mean your tailor your policy to suit theirs? no. as i said earl here, he shared the analysis and he shared the concern and the objectives, which are disarmament of the saddam hussein. now, so -- >> did he share the means to the end? >> ultimately, when came to the

e -- when it came to the invasion he did but the whole way through, he was trying if you like -- he really believed and still does believe that in these situations, you have to try exhaustively to go down the diplomatic route but when you're dealing with saddam hussein, you have to have the genuine threat of force there alongside it. i think that sums up his -- his approach the whole way through. again, christopher maher read to you the speech made in 1998. and -- and i think it sums up his position then and it summed up his position the whole way through. saddam hussein was a genuine threat. he was -- he was -- in defiance year after year after year of the united nations. >> we know about that. what i'm trying it establish is at what point did tony blair commit to -- to bush about regime change?

>> he committed to -- and again, bare in mind, this is the prime minister, he's not doing this because george bush wants to do it. this was his genuine belief that iraq had to be confronted over its continued defiance of the united nations and over its continued attempts to develop his w.m.d. program in defiance of the u.n. that's his position. and -- and that is a polls that he pursued the whell way through, right to the point of the house of commons vote. and that's when you had -- you heard from mike boys and you had him on the end of the telephone to america, right at that . i the prime minister was hopeful this could be resolved peacefully, right up to that point. the whell way through understanding if it did come to military action, if that became the only feasible route to go down to make this disarmament

happen, then he would, he would -- want to persuade the cabinet and parliament and country to commit forces to that. >> then i move on to the -- the september 2002 -- when you accompanied the prime minister to camp david if a further meeting with president bush. i think you participated in a discussion which was to build international support for -- for actions against iraq. >> yep. >> and what were the rationales discussed for regime change and for taking action against iraq at this meeting? >> well, i think there's -- i think that was one of the key moments in this whell -- the -- this whole history because -- the as i think they thought, the -- the prime minister really was being asked by the president to persuade his vice president that it was the sensible thing to

take this down the united nations route and i thought chris was remarkably cherished about the prime minister's contribution in that. i think the prime minister did make a difference in stating the vice president and president -- you asked what the key point was. >> i said what were the rationales discussed? what were the rationales for regime change? >> the history. i don't think this changed. the -- and why was iraq such an issue at that time. and it is -- it is the history and nature of the regime and threat and the context of the threat per september 11th. and i think it was in the bubblely report this quoted a paper that i haven't seen at the time but they had a state of the calculus of threat and that's a good way of putting the -- how the analysis, the context analysis had changed. so in a sense it was -- it was, they were discussing -- the best

way to take forward and try it work toward this objective and disarmament of saddam hussein and face his obligations. i know you heard from lots of witnesss about this sense of tension within the american system. and -- there's no point in denying they were there and they were real intentions of any government. but what i think the significance of that meeting was that george bush came out of it and said we're going to the united nations and we're in the going to look for pretext and military action. >> i want to come back to the question of rationale. i mean, there was -- there was a discussion of breakdown of sanctions, i understand. and w.m.d. and -- saddam hussein, what? >> and all of those things will be on the agenda. >> things were there. so -- but, and was it not the u.k. and the u.s.a. that gave to different entities, to these

rationales? >> possibly. i mean the -- the, there was a sense that -- that -- on the communications side, i had very, regular contact -- with my office numbers so therefore we were able to get, get a sense of where their public opinion was and our public opinion was. and they didn't feel the same source of pressure that we did. their public opinion was we were keen all the time to emphasize the importance of the u.n. and the american attitude as you all know is somewhat lukewarm to the united nations. to put it mildly. u.n

was the emphasis different. but the prime minister didn't share the idea that saddam hussein had to be confronted. >> what did you think, there was a fundamental agreement on -- on , that saddam hussein had to be dealt with. that was fine but there were differences. they were say regime change. >> i have given you that. regime change and -- and the united nations. >> did you and your colleagues explore with the american counter parts what the differences were and the implications would be downstream? >> yes, in fact that was a important part of the discussion both in the margins and within the discussion. and i can remember when there was the broader discussion, initially, i think, it was the prime minister and the president and the vice president and david manning and condi rice and that was where i think the prime minister dissuaded orb at least

got kind of tacit approval if the president from the vice president to go down that route. in the prodder discussion for example, george bush was -- was if you like picking our brains about this anti-americanism. and -- and what -- what our analysis was as to where it came from and how much it mattered and how real it was. so they were conscious, i think, of -- of different stwrands of public opinion. and -- and i think it is -- to go back to the point of this being three different bits of the g., probably overstates it but you know, the white house and the state department and the pentagon all different places. but i think that the certainly the people that i was dealing with and watching the prime minister's discussion with president bush, they got some of the prodder political and -- and issues attached to this. >> but, still, a picture, there was a lot of common ground and that you did not explore in some depth where the distant events lay and what that would mean in

the longer term. >> this was -- this was an issue that was being played out in the public domain all the time. and so, there was -- there was the difference in emphasis was evident for all to see. and i -- for example later on in the process i can remember when we, we would get on the business of forgetting 1441 and later the pursuit of the -- of the second resolution. and -- that george bush was pretty clear that -- that in terms of the pursuit of the second resolution, it was very much for the u.k. interest. and since -- i think the difference of emphasis was pretty clear. >> okay. >> can i of, the meeting? did you understand that the prime minister and president have been discussing what would happen after the reaction, if -- if they would be -- if there

would be one? >> yes, i saw going through my, my notes before crawford and that meeting that i mentioned was the checkers, with mike boyce and the other military. and at that discussion as well, there was -- there were already talking about aftermath -- >> they being? >> they being us, the british and -- and certainly in the discussions that -- that i saw the prime minister help with president bush, it was always on the -- on the agenda. >> but mentioning it. was there proper planning in terms of what that would involve and entail? >> it -- don't forget, at that time, you were a listening way off -- military action and -- and the genuine genuine attempt, the prime minister is leading on behalf of the british government is to make sure this is resolved peacefully. i don't know when, you -- you have to ask people directly involved, when was it were,

specific detail aftermath planning -- certainly everybody conscious the whole way through this, that there would come a point if it came to military action, there would be a point where you're in postconflict iraq and big questions arose from that and i think they were starting to think about those questions -- i couldn't say when the planning started but people were always conscious. >> my understanding is that the american view was it would be all right on the day? >> certainly, i read david mannings' tipt to the inquiry and i think there was a feeling on when he described at the neoconwing, if you like. there was that sense, that's correct but i think there were others -- who didn't necessarily share that. so i think we had a sense there was an awful lot of manning going on. >> by whom? >> within the american administration. >> the aftermath? >> yeah. >> by thune?

i come back wanting to take action against saddam hussein. why did they focus their case on w.m.d.? hussein, . us i reread tony blair's speeches going way pack. there's a whole panoply put there, why did the issue of w.m.d. become so central? because that was what gave rise to the -- to the fear and the sense of -- of a serious and credible threat to regional stability, and also, as i mentioned, in relation to september 11th, the prime minister was absolutely seized

and i think still is, seized of the swrue that if the world is not vigilant on this issue of w.m.d., it is a matter of time where something terrible happens in relation to them linking them with terrorist groups. that's his mind-set and people can disagree with it or not. but that's where he was coming from. w.m.d. was the regime part of it? of course. and would somebody like tony blair from the day he went into politician, and saddam hussein should be got rid of. yes, he was. what was that the policy he pursued? no. he was trying to -- to, through the u.n. lead the british government in direction of pursuing a policy that would lead ultimately, to saddam hussein. when it came to it, when the diplomatting process clearly -- was -- was not going to resolve the issue. and post1441 and when the -- when the french pulled the plug, then military action became the

only means sonsible. >> and you said earlier there was common ground and of course the -- this is something that blair and bush shared. but we put emphasis on w.m.d. was it because the attorney general believed that the action for regime change and intervention could not form a legal basis for military action? >> no, i don't think so. and again, i know the attorney general will be here as well. so he could -- he can answer about legal, the legal questions. that was not the argument, no. look. people can disagree with it or if the but tony blair held a -- a fundamental view about this. about this being a real threat. and the context for which was completely changed by -- by september 11th. interestingly, when i was preparing for this, i was reminded of on september 10th 2001, we went to a lunch at the

guardian and and reminded me, post-september 11th, at the luncheon, september 10th, tony blair said the really big issue is w.m.d. slash rogue states and terrorist organizations. the next day, he had that view pretty firmly established -- cemented. and from that moment, as he said, i think when he gave evidence to the butler court, it was the context that changed then, the containment which in any event was becoming less successful. and people were feeling -- people's feeling was more difficult to assume. not necessarily having the effects people wanted. the toll rans level if you like, of -- of allowing saddam hussein to carry on define -- defying the united nations resolutions which he was in defiance, that that is what changed and the context changed. that was a real security issue, and his judgment as the prime

minister ultimately, that's why -- he's there and i'm not. and other people aren't. and he's got to make the big judgments based upon what he knows and it was a genuinely held strategic judgment about british security interests. >> i understand that. but the thing is, he -- he private my had a strong conviction about regime change but publicly, there was -- there was a policy to actually focus on the w.m.d. >> no, he had an absolutely fundamental view about disarmament. and look, david mattingly reminded you, even george bush and i can remember condi rice that saddam hussein did comply with the united nations obligations, and if hans blick had been able to say, i've been there and seen the lot and the leftovers, i have been right through the document, we have all of the paper and seen the evidence, he's got rid of lot of it, that would have been regime change and it would be a different sort of regime.

so i don't accept -- you seem to want me to say that blair signed up to saying, regardless of the facts and regardless of w.m.d., we're going to get rid of the guy. it was not like that. thank you. >> you want to ask one or two before we break? >> just wonder if i could fall off on one or two points. >> and -- and you i think talking about the crawford press conference, or quoting from the prime minister's press conference, and crawford -- he said, well, had him say, all of the options available will be considered. can you recall from the meetings that were held on iraq and that was in 2001 and 2002, when meetings the prime minister did hold to consider all of the strategic options with regard to iraq and the likely consequences of each?

>> how many -- how many meetings did the prime minister hold on iraq, dozens sdeans. if you were talking about sitting down as it were for a -- a fundamental review of all policy, i would say that was -- that was happening on an ongoing basis. there were a number of really big meetings with the relevant minister this is and all of the obvious people that you would see in the process. i think he was -- i think he and his colleagues were thinking about the different strategic options all the time. >> but what were those options? >> well, you could -- when he talked about it. when he talked there, and the crawford meeting about all of the options being available, he -- he's making -- and i go back to what i said in my previous answers, about the -- the running together, if you like, of -- diplomatic and military track and strategies aimed at ultimately, in the disarmament of saddam hussein.

and that hopefully can be resolved diplomatically but if they can't, they'll have to be resolved militarily. >> those are tactical options within a strategy but -- but -- you're not in the situation since 1991 containment had prevented iraq, effectively from threatening its anybodies and from -- developing a nuclear weapon. and was that in the an alternative strategic option? was that looked at? >> yes, it was. and evening there were discussions about -- i think again, you have to check the record but i think there was a discussion of that at that crawford meeting as well. and there's -- certainly was a discussion at the first meeting the prime minister had with president bush in -- in shortly after president bush's election. so that, that was, that discussion was happening with other -- with other leaders as well. including with the -- with the french about the extent to which the containment policy was or

was not working. i think there was a sense that it wasn't -- wasn't sustainable if the long-term. guy back to the j.r.c. report and the calculus of threat. i think that had changed, and -- the nature of that argument. and all of these, all of these different options, he would be aware of them and get advised on them and think about them all the time. >> there were times where perhaps even in a slightly formal way with cabinet ministers and others, and experts on the region. the prime minister would have sat down and said here's the problem of iraq and what are the possible ways, the possible strategies if dealing with it and what is the down side of this that and the other. as well as the up side. those discussions did take place? >> they did. >> and the prime minister therefore was fully aware of the risks of going for a policy that might eventually lead to -- to military action. >> yeah, he was and he was -- oy i would say, he's somebody who i

think always will weigh up. and very candidly up sides and down sides of a course of action. none of these decisions were straight forward. none of them were ever black and white, 100%, and obvious every step. you couldn't see another way. there was always a way to handle the issues but ultimately he has to make decisions. >> and now, you said -- talking about regime change, that the prime minister was in the saying it, that -- 0 at crawford we have a policy of regime change but in his speech at the george bush presidential library on the 7th of april immediately after the crawford meeting to which you referred, he said, you canning talking about terrorism and w.m.d. and not just about iraq, if necessary the actions should be military and again, if

necessary and justified, it should involve regime change and he then went on as you said to refer to three conflicts involving regime change and the sierra leone and later on he talked about iraq. he said i know some fear action and the moment for decision on how to act is not yet with us. yeah. that language on regime change which christopher maher certainly regarded as a change of tack. you as a communications expert -- and would you in the -- feel, that that was a clear indication that the prime minister was giving to the american people, he was speaking to the united states and his support for regime change and his readiness to apply to iraq? >> i -- i mean, i can't remember how the american -- the american media and public took that speech. but i don't see that -- as a significant shift. and -- with the, speech that --

that christopher referred to in 1998, we have a cler responsibility and interest in the long-term peace in the world to stop saddam hussein from defining the community. >> slow that down. >> sorry. >> weave clear responsibility in the interest of long-term peace. it is in the record. >> it is in the record. >> the point about -- the point about the speech that george bush presidential library, i don't think he's saying anything there that wasn't evident. >> if you -- if you stand up to the united states of america, you stand up in america, in april 2002, when there's all of this speculation about what is going to be done to iraq -- yes. >> and you say, if necessary, the action should be military and again, if necessary and justified, it should involve regime change. >> yeah. how is the american audience going to interpret that? >> probably the same way it

would interpret the speech in chicago. >> this is a different period. iraq -- iraq is off the agenda with the middle east peace process and the arab-israeli conflict. the prime minister says that. is he signaling to the american people by saying that that he supports regime change. >> what he is signaling and i think what he says, is that -- we're going to try, we're going to absolutely determined to disarm saddam hussein and we're going to force him to confront his obligations in the united nations and these resolutions that he defied year in and year out. and we're going to try to do that diplomatically, if that cannot be done and the only way, the only way, the only way left is -- is through regime change and military action then the british government will support the american government. if they leave that message. >> the british government will support the american government. >> this is the message. that's the message. >> in my view, that was not a significant shift in his position. i accept the context is clearly

different because of the -- where we were in the iraq debate and the fact he's in america and he just seen george bush. i accept all of this. >> whether or not it is a significant shift, is in a line he repeated in the u.k., is it a line he used parliament at that time? >> if you're the prime minister of an issue like this and with -- with modern communications as they are. and anybody following the story would not be unaware on what they said -- >> that's not my question. my question is, did this continue to be his line when he was addressing audiences in the united kingdom including parliament. you're the director of communications. >> i thought that speech and again, if you look at my -- look at my, the -- my diaries, i think i point out that the -- both of that speech was written before we got there. there was a bit of fine tuning. he knew what he was going to say. >> that's in the the question i asked. >> and what i'm saying is the message, the overall approach

was -- was the same throughout. and there were moments at which emphasis might change and there were key points that -- at which there was a greater focus than other pins. this play have been one of them. i think it is entirely consistent with what the prime minister has been saying throughout. >> you told us that you read all of the speeches while preparing for this inquiry. and did you find that le had used that line again after using it at crauf fords when talking in the united kingdom that he used in parliament or other speeches. >> i think he made clear, when he talked about it. he kept saying, conflict is not inevitable, disarmament is. and he was cheer throughout that if the diplomatic route did not lead it disarmament, through saddam hussein facing his obligations and under successive u.n. resolutions then the military option was evident. i really don't think that speech was -- was, i know you asked

jeremy green stock, did you receive specific instructions of a change. he said no, he didn't. and i don't think there was a reason for that. >> i wanted to ask you about that point too, not so much with regard to jeremy green's stock. you said you didn't accept christopher maher analysis that there was a shift in policy, you disagreed on that point. was there not also documentary evidence, some of which indeed leaked into the newspapers that in march of 2002, as part of the preparations for crawford, so david manning went to washington with changed instructions. what sir christopher described as a change in the instructions given to him. and with regard to this -- e very question of regime change. so there was an evolution at that time, wasn't there? or do you disagree with christopher on that? he said i got a chunky set of instructions in march of 2002 and he referred to sir david's visit and he said one of the

main things he was seeking to do, and i if you like borrowed his instructions to do my side of things, and was to say to the americans, quote, look, if you want to do regime change and if -- and if this is going to require military action, you guys are powerful enough to do it on your own. you could do it on your own and you have got the power to do it. and if you were going to do this, and you want your friends and partners to join you, far better than -- then that you should do it inside an alliance preferably taking the u.n. route. would you regard has -- as a change? or an evolution or what? >> i think it is obviously a different part of the -- of the time frame. and i think that is consistent with the overall approach that i been trying to set out and the prime minister's overall approach of saying ultimately there's, a disarmament. we're going to do our level best to get that done through the

diplomatic route without a single shot being fired. if push comes to shuve and the diplomatic route fails, britain would see it as his responsibility to take part in the military action. i think that's consistent. >> i just got two more points and then we're going to take a break because arising from the conversation thus far. on -- on camp david, and more generally you said that we were very keen, all along, to -- toe emphasize the importance of the u.n. and you also said -- that the prime minister fundamentally shared the view that saddam hussein had toby confronted. and that's the fair representation of what you said this morning. >> yes. confronted in as in he faced his obligations. >> did the. believe that saddam hussein had to be confronted even if this was not supported by the united

nations. >> if the united nations through the inspection route had discovered that -- that, the -- the there was weapons, weapons weren't there and he wasn't a threat and what was this all about, then i'm sure that the prime minister would -- >> that wasn't my question. my question was if the united nations didn't support confronting saddam hussein, was the prime minister still as you say fundamentally of the view that he had to be confronted? >> with or with without the united nations support. >> i thought tfing interesting, i thought he made a really telling point at the end of the evidence about, it is almost a philosophical discussion about the united nations, it is not an arbitration body. it is a collection of the nations. what you ended up was a fundamental agreement with the security council and the united nations. if the united nations enmass had said hold on a minute, prime minister blair, this whole iraq thing is overblown, but nobody

was saying that. even the french were saying -- it was a threat. >> you still haven't answered my question. >> and your question depends on there being a single view that is defined as the united nations view. >> there's a single view if the united nations security council adopts a position. >> right. if the british. >> the prime minister. >> you adopt a position that the british and american government didn't agree with. >> if the british government and the american government were not able to get the support of the united nations security council, the prime minister was prepared to go ahead without the united nations. >> ultimately, when it came to military action, he believed that route, that having persuaded george bush to take the issue to the united nations and having made clear that in his view, the united nations had to resolve the issue and in the avoid the issue, and through some extraordinary diplomatic work, not least by jeremy greenstock, resolution 1441 is unanimously agreed but then when it came to the next step.

elementings of the united nations and in particular the french walked away from anything -- that might lead to, lead to the united nations organizing military action. >> we'll come back to that later on. i think you effectively given an answer to my question. my final question is that in these interactions, with with the white house and prum bly the prime minister wrote to president bush from time to time. and did you see this krns? >> yes. >> did he tell bush in writing during 2002 that he would support the president if he took military action? >> i think, i would certainly say the tenor, the prime minister wrote a lett of notes to -- to the president and i would say the tenor was as i said earlier, we share analysis and share concern and we're with you in making sure that saddam hussein is -- is -- has faced up

to his obligations and iraq is kiss armed -- disarmed. if it can't be done diplomatly, it would be done militarily and the british government would be there. >> without conditions? >> there's not a question of without kobe bryant conditions because if you're saying along that route and bear in mind, when -- >> let's not go along the route. >> you asked me a question. if i could answer it. 12 years after the first resolution, six machines after george bush takes it to the united nations and four months after 1441, i think it was measured and i thought -- i think the prime minister was all the way through and trying to get it resolved without a single shot being fired. now in the end, he's the guy at the top that has to make the judgments with the advice he gets about how best to do that. that was his motivation right the way through. >> can you -- >> take a break. >> we need to take a break at

this point. can you save it until after the break. thank you. >> and let's -- let's break now and come back at half past 11. >> welcome back, everyone. >> a couple of points. i like to make an announcement about about timing. we won't finish by lunch-time as i part my foresaw if opening. so we will have an extension after a lunch break of an hour and restarting at :00. and that's just you're information. >> couple of points about the letters between prime minister and president bush that you referred to before the break.

were these letters that would be drafted by others, would they be for example be seen by the foreign secretary and trfted before they were sent? >> he play have discussed -- i think they were pretty private. and -- certainly, would have discussed the -- with david manning. i suppose his thinking play have emerged with meetings with others. as to the drafts, i would doubt it. >> did the prime minister write to himself? >> he did. >> who would have seen them after they were sent. you saw them and who else would have seen them? >> i don't know. that's the short answer to that. certainly -- and jonathan powell and david manning and would have seen them, obviously before they went. -- and -- and as it were. and i couldn't answer that question. >> foreign sect. -- foreign secretary. defense secretary. >> i think it would depend. the -- i don't think you've seen them but i seen part of the --

part of the documentation that -- that you have access to, that they were -- they were and i sometimes felt that -- i felt strategic and i felt it was that they were -- they were -- advisory and strategic terms. they were -- they were -- they were very frank. >> very frank and advisory. >> okay. >> and martin. >> you were speaking before the break about the -- about the importance of the rou and indeee primecy with regard to our -- our relation wts united states. and can you tell us what discussions there were in the prime minister circle after camp david about -- about, what the u.k. would do if the u.n. route failed? >> so -- and we're now in september. and -- and -- from my

perspective, postcamp david, that was when -- when the -- when the real kind of work on the september dossier really stepped up. i was very much engaged in nap i think again, if you look at the -- if you look at the statement, the prime minister made and in the house and on the day of publication, and i think again the message is very clear, this is -- this is about -- this is about, informing the public about why we're concerned. and why that concern has grown and -- and in relation to when the g.i.c. called a step change. and in iraq's attitudes and activitys in 2001 and obviously, the context of september 11th but also making clear that -- he, as -- as a believer in the internationalism and the united nations as a frs for good in the world. and that -- that, there was a very tough message in -- in iraq and -- and -- and saddam hussein

is as well. >> and was it not -- curious, and to answer my question, that -- that the -- there wasn't a discussion of what would happen if britain having pursued the u.n. route as the means for -- >> are you saying the discussion? of course there were. and i think -- i couldn't tell you how many days or how many successive days the prime minister would hold meetings on iraq but it would be -- very large number. and so, i mean these questions were being raised and discussed all of the time. >> what was the -- the consensus or the view or the views as to what -- the u.k. would do if the u.n. route failed? >> i think the -- the position at that time was very much as he said, publicly on a number of occasions, and as he said right up until the point of the invasion, that -- that in his view this was the best route to resolve the ib peacefully.

he said right until the end that could have been done if saddam hussein had responded a different way and took the bigger powers of the united nations had responded in a different way, as it were during the day. and just prior to the -- in march. and -- and after -- i think he had a genuine fear as well, that if the united nations did not resolve this issue -- and was not seen to stand up for what has been called if over such a listening period of time that there was a potential damage to the united nations as well. and i think this -- this play seem -- this play seem counter to -- to what it was, what it was the convnsal wisdom on this. i thought it was interesting, jeremy greenstock made a similar point that actually his -- his, it was a challenge the whole time in what he was saying to the united nations and -- and you have gone off for so long or we the united nations have gone on for so long in wreck --

stating publicly again and again what he has to do. and had doesn't do it and we know he doesn't do it. and occasionally, there's a skirmish and there's a, a diplomatting fall and occasionally, there's a military operation like in 1998 but actually saddam hussein, has effectively gotten away with it the whole way through. >> damage to the united nations doesn't know what britain will do. >> britain does, and again, i think prime minister's credit that it happened the way it did, that despite the divisions, they were pretty profound at the time, but actually in part because he had been so -- aggressively and so pursuing the united nations route.

about the united states and i think there was in his mind that part of the argument here was how is the united nations i'm going to rebuild these relationships in the immediate aftermath of an invasion should that be necessary. >> the subtext or the square bracket is in the united nations route failed the united states would have to take reaction. >> i think once 1441 was agreed and once the french had failed to get to 1441 to say what they wanted to say that i think that was not before. >> that was not discussed. >> now. all, right. thank you. ..

>> why was it seen to be necessary in september 2002? >> it seemed to be necessary because the prime minister had been more and more concerned in part because of the intelligence that he was seeing over a moment in time. i mentioned the step change. and i think post september 11th, he was more concerned. even with senior politics, he

was kind of having to have the argument if you saw what i saw he wouldn't be asking all of the questions. what he saw, the video and the material and a number of other senior ministers were able to see. and i think this partly relates to the discussion that we had earlier about the way that the media and political culture has changed. there was a time. when i was a gymnast in the streets, you know, there's some story going around about intelligence, we never commented about intelligence. people accepted that. that was it. i think there is no longer tenable. what i think -- it's a shame in the way that the controversy that's followed about the darfur

was as intense as it was. an exercise in open eness and much more open government in trying to share with the public information that is really quite sensitive. but when she's trying to share with the public so they can be inform the about all of the factors doing into the decision-making process. >> there was a political context as well. and in your diary for the third of september, you say we went through some of the hard questions on iraq. the hardest was why now. why was it that what we knew now that we didn't before was that it made us believe what we e have to do now. it was about the policy as well, not just revealing the healthy intelligence. >> and it was also, at the time, this is again how add things looked sort of differently in sense of the benefit of hindsight. at the time, i don't know if you remember, but over the summer holiday, over the august period,

i mean up until then things had been relatively calm. i think it was jim baker made a couple of pretty high-profile interventions in the american debate on if you like the state department side of the argument. and the neocons really cracked it up. and cheney and rumsfeld were out making -- and the people were out making some pretty neocon type statements. part of the thinking, when the prime minister came back if his summer break and we went to the state of the government in south africa, and we decided to have a conference. that was when he said we're going to bring forward the process. he made the point i think in the september 3 press conference in

sedgefield. con trick is not ahead of himself. what he did want to do is set out for the public in accessible of way that has possible the reasons why he had become more concerned. >> so this very much depended on the newness of the information, the nature? >> partly, yeah. not entirely, but partly. >> just again another little bit of context was the meeting that you then had a few days later which you've already been discussing. where the question of presentation became a big issue between between -- and you discussed with it dunbar in the white house as well. was there a sense of immediating to influence each other's -- the american debate about the british debate? >> i think as i said earlier, i think the american opinion was in a different position.

but on these big global issues -- >> you mentioned the neocon. >> yeah, i was interested in evidence when he talked about his assessment of opinion as he went around the state. not being terribly supportive of the administration. i didn't have that impression. i must at mitt. i thought that was interesting. i thought we certainly, it was a question of them trying to influence us. but we were aware that our communications had a impact on their positions. even more so, their communications had an impact on us. to be fair to dunbar and karen hughes and these people, they were always very up for being told very, very frankly where sometimes their communications didn't help ours at all. we did have a lot of discussions. >> now we'll move to the actual

production. this wasn't the first time the issue had come up? >> no. >> so there'd been two papers prepareed -- [phone rings] >> let me check. [laughter] >> there's been two papers beforehand. there'll be one prepared by the jic in march 2002? >> that's correct. >> or were those separate? yeah, it was passed 21st on march. why was it decided not to use that paper there? >> i think that the paper -- i mean that kind of work, i suppose, is being done all the thyme in terms of them making

assessments. i suppose the axis of evil speech that people might be focused on. >> you were a different paper -- >> okay. >> yeah, there was a four-country one in 2002 which did look a -- >> yeah. >> so -- >> and then -- >> and i'm happy to talk about that. but that was the reasons that you -- carry on and say so. >> as i recall it, there was a paper prepareed within the jic process as it was across the four countries. it decided and just where you put to one side. not for any great reason other than the fact that it wasn't the sort of thing that was going to be put in any way put into public domain at that time. no rime or reason for it to have been done so at that time. >> and then work began on iraq specific.

it could have been one reason past the caution on february 2002. is that by looking at iran, inn -- libia, as well as iraq in 2002. but those other countries were further advanced in greater concern in terms of nuclear weapons and iraq. >> yeah, i and i think that's why when you talk about those questions that you read from my diaries in september in sedgefield, why iraq was a very, very important question as well. i think were tony blair here, the reason he was more concerned about iraq is partly because they had used chemical weapons, partly because of the nature of the regime and the history of the regime is important in this. and also because there was no

assemblance of being able to get any sort of dialogue at all. >> but at the moment, there wasn't a particularly good political reason why to produce something. you've highlighted the significance of those other powers in february. but in march there was a paper on iraq that was confirmed by the jic and passed on to us on the 21st of march which i think covered some of the same. i think we decided not to go ahead with that. why not in march? >> again, this is a -- this is -- i can't claim to remember ever part of the thought process or decision-making process. but i think at the time, it was ramp up an issue that at the time we didn't particularly want ramped up. >> so you were happy to ramp it up in september. and then in april, i'm not sure

if this is before or after crawford, the deliberation of the foreign office was sacked to prepare the paper on the history of inspections. that led in june to a document that was entitled british papers on iraq. do you recall that? >> i don't recall being involved in that process? >> you weren't involved in that. the point is that by september there were two the potential departments or agencies that might produce a doc. >> i think there was a big in the foreigns office where it should be their product.

the prime minister was clear and right about it as well. it was very -- john used the word ownership. if we said that was the main document -- he wanted to be 100% in charge of the prop seases. that's something i think it's fair to say there were people in the foreign office who wanted to have similar ownership. we had to make it very, very clear that that was not going to happen. >> in one of your answers, you said you got the communications better than others. can you expend on that? >> that wasn't the criticism in front of us. what i meant by that is the -- when i talked earlier about

rather silo driven department by department communications really as we have to go to the back. you have the ministers, you have the policy officials and they do all of the really important stuff. and then bring in the communications guy at the end. they will sort of press release. that's kind of it. that was the sort of basic approach. i exaggerate to make the point. but not that much. what i think -- what i was talking about in relation to in particular some of the big international crisis moments. that there is an understanding. the media will follow them, report them, present them to the public. they can actually have an impact upon what they have to be on the ground, militarily and the intelligence as well. >> so you have a agree -- degree of confidence the jic understood the media context. so you wouldn't be taking them

into unknown territory. >> i think what -- i'll step back a little bit from that first of off. forget my view. there's a reason why the prime minister was so@@@@@@@ p'@ @ @ r

>> because john had a draft of the dossier. this is going to be a document that prime minister presents to parliament. this is expectations around it. i need a presentation or support. and that what i gave him. >> something that you said, you said that scott had already done a draft. i didn't think the draft have been done. >> he said i know reached the point where i need -- so we met on the 5th. and as a result of those meeting a process was set out by me in writing around the system which made clear what the dossier in terms of overall structure and contents but exercising that there was john scarlet's work.

anything before was irrelevant. when he came back to me, it was i need their advice. i was chairing nose meetings. because the prime minister was going to be presenting the paper that john was working on to parliament. massive media right around the world. i think it was entirely not as appropriate. but it was absolutely necessary that i should have done that. >> but in most organization chairing meeting authority and accountability. so basically you say, you are the customer of this process, as well as you're going to help with with the presentation? >> i mean in terms of the -- just the point by the way the meeting were downing street not the cabinet office. within the context of that meeting i was the person who was charged by the prime minister to advice him on all of the presentation add sected to do with the dossier.

and his production was going to be enormous. i think on the day the dossier was published, the web site crashed. it was huge. john's role within that, which was clearly understand by everybody. i think also in a way it hopefully was of assistance to john of the jic. in a sense we were so clearly having that relationship because to the rest of government it was sending very, very clear the message that is now the document the prime minister is going to present to parliament. that guy over there, john scarlet, is the man in charge of it. >> but it was sort of anen usual thing. it wasn't a president that chair the meeting with intelligence professionals? >> well, there had been meeting that i had before where intelligence people would have been there. because they had legitimate and appropriate advice to give to me

about presentation on communications issues. >> you said after wards which indicated the main headings to be covered. the important of this being a jic product. and in terms that john has to be happy with it. there were two additional points. you do attention to the fact that media will be focused on what's new? and you express pleasure that the intelligence community was going to take a healthy approach in going through their material. what did you have in mind there? >> what i had in mind there was the fact that -- there were these reporting -- reports in part of the media room in rumblings within the intelligence community. throughout the process, john scarlet, richard dear love and others made it absolutely clear

that the seniors commissions within the agency, that was not the attitude at all. they understand why the prime minister wanted to present this in the way that he wanted to. >> and helpful approach means looking through material that perhaps hadn't seen the light of day before to make an impact if >> he was making sure that all of the -- the material the prime minister might be referring to when he's saying i'm seeing more and more intelligence. which makes me more and more concerned about iraq as a threat. that was concerned in the dossier. >> and then the second you said that the team was being established to review the document in a point of view. which was to make recommendations. how did this team work during the production of the dossier? >> i think the -- that -- when i

said the inquire that there were all sorts of people putting in comments and suggestions. they were perfectly entitled to do that. enough a sense involving all of the people within my own -- number ten operation but also in the foreign office and elsewhere who when it came to the presentation of the dossier which i said several times is going to be a pretty major communication event they were brought into the process as well. they were able to make comments and it was up to in terms of any redrafting, it was up to john scarlet and his team on whether they took it or not. >> but they were sitting in on some of the drafting meetings? >> i don't think i ever went to a drafting meeting as such. and again i wouldn't necessary be aware of all of the different meeting that john scarlet and his team might have been having. but certainly, there was a very,

very significant piece of communications. as you said, it was all we had on the al qaeda document use intelligence. on this scale, there was nothing like this done before. so the by-product in number 10 and those in the foreign office, they had a legitimate interest in understanding the preparation of this. but the whole way through it could not have been made clear to everybody that nothing would override and that john scarlet was the person who as you like on the single pen. >> but people -- i mean -- approaching from a memo to the prime minister from john scarlet of course is june 2003, he said that would he agree to the agencies? of course he represented to the number 10. and number 10 john williams, james were involved. this was -- they were quite

actively engaged in the discussions. >> that was john's way of just making clear to the prime minister that it is going through all of the people. he would probably expect it to take a look. he's going to present it to parliament. >> could we just clarify the role of mr. williams? since that report, documents being released of the draft prepared by him with the press secretary of this. now some people have described this as a first draft of the dossier. but would you say that was fair? >> no. well -- well, as i understand it, and i don't recall ever seeing, doesn't mean i didn't, but i don't recall ever seeing it. and i think that was john. i can't recall whether he's asked about the inquire. but that was john williams in a sense putting what i think he described as a front piece to one the papers that you refer to that's being produced in the jic earlier. once we got to september the 5th

and september the 9th, it was anything that needed to be written before frankly was used by john scarlet as he saw fit. i did not see that. >> okay. once the john scarlet pastured the first draft on the 10th of september and he referred to considerable help from john williams. >> well, can i emphasize for the sake? i'm not criticizing john williams in this. he was totally and legitimately wanting to help in terms of the building the arguments, in terms of making sure all of the presentation aspects were right. there came a point within the process. i remember he phoned me up. he said, look, john, obviously we're very, very close. and jack being very, very helpful. if you worked on school time on this, writing it, then he's

there. and he's in that spirit that that was being offered. not as it were the kind of turf or can i grab this thing away from the jic. >> okay. when the -- when this first draft was distributed, which john scarlet said it's drawn on all of the available intelligence identified so far, the response from some of the people on the presentation side was a bit disappointed. it was an e-mail string around september that started and play it more to make sure the intelligence sourcing and mr. smith comes in wearing it's a bit of a muddle. needs a lot more clarity. and then it comes to phil basset who agreed it should be less

generallistic. and the intelligence light. it feels like this is the least possible intelligence material that the intel people are prepared to let go. describe the fact that we say it's everything that the government knows of this issue, which is clearly isn't. now this read of the presentation team couldn't believe that the intelligence material was so thin. >> well, that may have been honestly their opinions. but i didn't agree with them. i thought paper that john scarlet produced on september 10 was, i -- it surgeonly had -- i thought it was a very, very good piece of work. they are all entitled to make those points.

what overall structure of -- >> it relative to being concerned about makinging -- if this was their -- >> i think that was relevant. it's interesting of course that when the prime minister wrote a note to -- what i think it was one of his monday morning notes that i referred to earlier, and this -- he said on dossier, the expectations might be right. i've updated it. remember the case we need to make is for the refer of the inspection regime not about the largest strike. now if people were expecting a document that said we're all going to be sitting, carrying in our homes because saddam hussein is about to of launch off weapons at peter brooke, that was not what was being said.

it pointed out when the dossier said it was dull, course, nothing much new. we never wanted to be anything other than setting out the -- the people in the case -- it was not the case of war. it was case why the prime minister had become more concerned. now if somebody in the press thought that it wasn't this, and it wasn't that, fine. but i thought it was a very, very solid piece of work. >> it's not just a question of the nature of the threat it's presenting. because as you said, this wasn't necessarily a threat assessment. it was an assessment of the evidence. but it was a sense that -- now if you say -- they were assuming that what they were seeing was the tip of an iceberg in intelligence, but actually it was nothing but water. what they were drawing attention to was the problem that whatever the message, the intelligence on which seems invasive, which has

been shown in the draft was thin. >> well, they are entitled to that view. but i didn't share it. >> on the evening of 11th of september, you met with john scarlet. and after that meeting, a note went around reporting, i guess on your views. it sayss -- it states that number 10 through the chairman wanting the document to be the strongest possible on the bounds of available intelligence. this is more to be done. looking for more material. >> it was a process. like any such publication. where i said that was the point to which john said i need presentational advice and support in this. and that's what i gave. but i think as john scarlet also made clear, many, many times, the at no time did i ever ask

him to beef up any of the judgments that he had. and so forth. so he was -- and i was more i think that the jic wanted this @ @ @ s@ @ @ @ @ @ r@ @ @ @ @ @$ s presented. >> well, i'm not sure about that. think that -- look is it the normal stuff of intelligence

office work to be engaged in that kind of production? no. but they weren't normal times. you were in a situation that in this particular policy as it evolved and develop develop -- it becomes. he's the prime minister, he's conscience of the fact that he's got incredibly difficult and serious decision that he's going to have to make. a serious set of decisions that he's going to have to make as the process evolves. i think he was just in a position of say, well, here i am. i see this intelligence. i am becoming more and more concerned that we are going to have to face up to this. we are going to have to deal with it. we're going to have to stop turning a blind eye to it. we're doing to have to share that with the public. now, once he's made that decision, as the prime minister and ultimately the head of the intelligence service as well,

where i sit, i have to do my part at the job that follows from that. and they have to do it. but at no point did anybody from the prime minister down say to anybody in the intelligence service, you have to tailor to fit this argument or that argument. that never happened. >> the pressure is on. you're trying to make a case. now we've heard from a man that stressed how careful were officials to indicate that intelligence was sporadic and patchy. you want a strong case. but it has to be based on evidence. >> all i can say that document that was presented to parliament by the prime minister -- i think

that -- if that have been the view. so when the prime minister said, for example, in the temples what he believed in terms of assessment. because he believed the intelligence. why shouldn't he? he believed what he was being told. why shouldn't he? i think in a sense, i don't really -- i don't believe that the dossier misrepresented. i think it was cautious. i think it was aware of the unprecedented nature of it. for that -- in part because of that, two great care in the handling of it. and look, let's be absolutely frank. i think they would be having this exchange if it was not the control which cub wently is huge. which was may i say not an

idea. >> well, i'm not talking about the control policy which subsequently ensued. that was the major case that was made at the time for the basis for stepping up policy which was mr. hands himself said. >> he said he set out the case. >> so, it was about making the case. but it had to work with the intelligence that was available. >> yup. >> now just we've-ed the previous inquiries that have looked at this. what happened suggested that the jic might have been quote, subconsciencely influenced to make the dossier somewhat stronger than it if contained the assessment. might that have happened? >> no, not at all. i can see why they might say

that. i can say where i sat seeing john scarlet and his team approach not just that testimony but every testimony they are involved in, i don't accept that, no. >> and the battle of committee was placed on more intelligence that it could prepare. and the dossier gave the impression that was fuller and firmer of intelligence. >> again, all i can say. i can repeat myself that when the prime minister in his -- not just my exchange but also his own absolutely clear that they -- the jic, had to be happy with that document. and in terms of -- let me also say again because people now are not remoting suggesting you. the large part is media. they routinely rewrite the history around this. i think the way the prime minister presented it to parliament actually was on the cautious side of things. he said in terms, intelligence can't give you the whole

picture. intelligence isn't necessarily going to be right. but the intelligence that he saw as it was explained to him and as he had repeated discussions about it, it led to the conclusion as we sit down forward that he did believe it was doubt. it was continued to produce the chemical and biological weapons. and he's been able to extent the ballistics of the whole program. he sees wmd as a -- >> we'll come in a moment of the particular judgment that is were made. but i just wanted to -- just to conclude the section. you've described the process in which the intelligence agencies through the jic are keen to do their best to get evidence into the public domain in a serious way possible. they understand the policy

context. you've told us how john scarlet's is is regularly attending policy meetings. maybe these are not questions for you. but it is -- it is an issue that they are being drawn into. helping make a case. and they want to help. they want to serve the government as much as you do. and therefore it's not necessarily that surprising if lord put in that there wasn't the subconscience desire to push things beyond. >> all i can say is i think that the relationship that john scarlet has with the prime minister and the respect that the prime minister had for john scarlet and his integrity and his commitment and his professionalism, that i think -- you have to ask john scarlet, but i don't accept that he would have felt under that pressure. i think john scarlet has actually felt that intelligence really doesn't bare out the argument that you want to

present in parliament. parliament just didn't accept that. but the reason why we got to this place in the first place, and in this process in the first place was the prime minister had become more and more concerned about the intelligence that he was seeing. >> tell me now to the question of the forward. could you draft this? >> yeah, i think what happened was that -- a meeting of which -- this would often be the case. and the prime minister would give me a verbal draft. he would tell me what he wanted to say within the forward. and i would go away and write something. and then i would show that to people within the system before going back to him. so again i can't remember every step of the process. but that would probably -- i certainly remember as it was the meeting at which he said this is what the board should say. and he was very comfortable with

the lines that you came up with? >> yeah. and almost certainly when identify rewritten them and a draft would have gone around the system and people would aboy comments in a normal way. he would have suched up the final version. >> master john told us he saw the forward something else from the dossier itself. it was a work of the statement signed by the prime minister. and therefore, not something he felt he would change. >> he did change it though -- >> he changed it on the bit to the reference of jic. >> yeah. i think what happened is the forward went to john. and it was copied to all members of the jic. again, any one of them had a concern about any aspect of it. i know for a fact that the prime minister would have taken that on board. so i think john scarlet made a number of small suggestions all

of which were taken on board. and i understand that he says. or understand what he means by that. he's got -- there's a forward by the prime minister. which in a sense was the part of the basis for the prime minister to statement of the parliament as well in a very high-profile, pretty politically charged complex. john said, there is what as it were i've done. i think if john or any of his team would have any concerns of real substance about the forward, nay know they could have raised the prime minister. >> so when we take the sentence, what i believe the assessment has established beyond doubt is it's continued to produce chemical and biological weapons. nobody challenged the beyond a doubt? >> no. >> so the intelligence does not have that certainly attacked to to? >> i think the point you made there was general point. i think that was a perfectly

fair point to make. but this is the prime minister presenting to this parliament. he is no doubt based on the fact that peach believed him clear that -- >> beyond a doubt. so like beyond anybody's doubt. >> yeah, but at that time if you'd have spoken to the -- maybe the french intelligence service or the german intelligence service or even the countries that you want matily did not go with the united states and the uk and the oral a lies in this. they are really saying that saddam hussein did not have wepons of mass destruction. and he was not a threat to him. >> we can argue about some of it. it's very strong phrase. >> and, but again this is why -- >> but it supports the view that the case has been made. that it's irrefutable. >> okay. would it have been that weekend had those two words not be there?

probably not. because if a sense what the document did was it set out a pretty broad range in case. attend had the history. and if you go to the --er i repeat the point that i made earlier. it was noted in the report about the major economy. at the time, it was pretty conservative. it was very cautious. there was nothing explosive about it. the reporter who provoked the controversy later, actually said there's nothing new in this. we have lived for years. so what we can, you know what i can say about that. because i can't remember every part of every discussion about it. but i think that what we're doing, as i say, is making a case as to why the government why the prime minister had become ingrown much, much more concerned about this as a serious, credible, and current threat. >> do you think it was sensible

to incorporate the forward into the document in the way that it did? because it did suggest the jic was endorsing the forward and the process you've -- >> i -- >> because it's moving jic into -- >> look it's the prime minister going on to parliament and standing up a making a statement. which is basically the contents of the forward. he was going to be saying there's not based upon this. he was going to be put into the political and public arena on a global basis. now that -- you can argue as to whether that judgment should never have been taken. but i go back to the point i made earlier about the changing nature of the media landscape and the political landscape and the fact that people no longer just prepared to say the prime minister said his intelligence here. okay. prime minister we'll boil that. that's fine. >> i just want to establish one point that we make. this regarding john scarlet and

indeed other's ability to raise point on the text of a forward. so john told us that he saw the forward as something as a text of the dossier. that's not disputed. he also told us that he was in his of judgment an avertly political statement signed by the prime minister and not something therefore he could change. and desmond bowen and his evidence while in a minute said much the same thing. now, they had the opportunity to intervene, they could. but they didn't because they felt they couldn't. >> i don't -- no -- i don't agree with that. i'm not disagreeing with how -- look. i'm not going to say anything remotely critical about john scarlet in that regard.

i don't believe that had any of the jic in any sense overstated the case to a agree that would make the work that they had@@@@ b anything beyond a doubt. >> look. in order to say there is the prime minister presenting this

document to parliament and him saying what he believes. and also that, you know, i had been in meetings with john scarlet and other intelligence officials. and is that what they were saying? yes, it is. >> just finding on the forward. jonathan powell as you say, does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an eminent threat from saddam. and you replied saying that is why tv sets out the case that i'm making. and the intelligence assessment to threat assessment. >> no, i think jonathan was making, we were never saying that there was a setting out that saddam hussein was about to, you know, do something

terrible to the british mainland. and that wasn't what we were saying. so i don't think the -- >> well, you can get the threat assessment without -- >> yeah, but the forward was really never anything other than the prime minister, yes, putting his stamp on this document and also in the debate that was going to flow from it. and it was the -- it was i suppose the basis for some of the arguments that he then set out in parliament. i don't 71 that it changed the -- as it were two parts of an argument here and made it something different in the forward. >> well, it may be something different in the sense that it drew the policy implications. >> he's the prime minister. that's what he's there for. >> in the first draft, he had stated, the case is make is not that saddam could launch an attack. he could not. which reenforces the point that

you've just made. then the sentence was removed for the final draft. >> again, no idea why specifically. but he made a very, very similar point in parliament. so, look -- you'll be aware of this. things get drafted and redrafted and written and rewritten. there was no sort of significant strategy call policy reason to why it shouldn't be there. >> let me start with a nuclear issue. and what we've already looked at, on the presentation side, it was a concern particularly about the feeling of the material and the issue. not by me. and not by the prime minister more importantly. >> in our evidence from tim for a moment, they confirmed the nuclear issue was manageable and saddam's sanctions were in place. >> yup. >> on the 16th of september draft, it noted that with sanks -- sanctions in place, iraq

would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. without sanctions it would take five years. it went on to say they were proceed to obtain the role. taken from the jic i believe. basically the line that's been taking here -- put it this way, the iraq knew how to cook, but they lacked the ingredient. as long as sanctions were in place, they wouldn't get the ingredient. it would take them five years to get the ingredients themselves. but self-evidently, if somebody just gave them the ingredient, then it would take them far less time. that's basically the sort of position that they are taking. but you've not got the particular problem with that. which was retaining some sort of consistency with the americans. president bush in the speech to the u.n. general assembly on the

12th of september said should iraq require the material which is the basic point about somebody somebody giving you. it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. >> yup. now that obviously begs all of the important questions about the material. so did you see that as a problem of reconciliation between a rather relaxed timetable suggested by the jic and it's incredibly urgent timetable to be mentioned by the president. >> when i saw the -- the latest guardian conspiracy theory yesterday about the issue. and i had knowledge of any discussion about britain and america. as far as what i recall, the dossier and timelines was because one of the drafts i

genuinely did not understand what they were saying. because they appeared to be suggesting that saddam hussein could get a weapon more quickly with sanctions in place than with sanctions removed. what they were not making clear was the question of legality. when the issue was raised, the council qc took me through the issue in some detail and pointed out that the institute of strategic studied had said they thought iraq would get a nuclear weapon in nine months. now if we were in the business, i thought we'd been pressing for that. i'm afraid with the business about us trying to line with the americans, if that was going on in the intelligence level, i have no idea. but in terms of my role in the relations to the dossier, i have nothing to do with that.

>> they share the worries about the paragraph, the one that was 16th of september draft. they were both like a timeline. nuclear bomb in one to two years. which is different what it's been over the 16th. that does start to align with the americans. but it makes much more specific. >> maybe it does. but what i'm saying to you is the point that i'd be making in the timelines of the dossier is not a what they were saying be the american or jic. i understand one the drafts that he could do it more quickly without sanctions that with sanctions. >> that wasn't in the e-mail that is you sent them. there was one on the 18th of september that found the nuclear sanction confusing and nothing much to worry about.

i'm sorry to bombardon this point, but i worry that it is not in great shape. >> it was unclear. that was the point that i was making. >> he had a weapon. but he had membered the section to make it clear, on the section of the 19th of september graft does change. and it now includes this one to two year timeline. so something had changed. for some reason this was not in the initial draft. but now it's saying we asked if iraq obtains this material and other essential components from foreign sources, the timeline could be shortened. and iraq could produce a nuclear weapon between one and two years. that's quite significant. because in the evidence that we had, the focus was on five years

after the lifting of sanctions. now we're taking a very particular scenario. which somebody is giving a lot of help. >> right, all i'm saying is i clearly taught you that what i know and what i did. all i'm saying is in writing, anything that flowed from any intelligence assessment, that was not my role. that was not my position. so if it did change from draft to draft, then that is because john scarlet and his team have chosen, based upon the intelligence assessment, to write it in a different way. i pointed out, i think, the perfectly legitimate point which is that i did not understand it. if you like a layman's point, i did not understand what they were saying. as a result of that, -- >> this is not the only -- >> you may not have been the e-mail. the fact that somebody else, the

e-mail that you read to me -- >> no, no, i'm sorry. it's impossible to get a description on cross conversation. >> sorry. the e-mail i was just quoting was you reporting somebody else's comment to you. >> yes. >> so you thought that was important to -- >> if e-mail is what i think it was -- >> it was somebody in your office. >> i took the stage -- quite a few people in the office have seen this every stage and every draft. i took it to somebody that had not been involved in the process at all. i said i'd like you to read this. you are now a member of the public. i want you to tell me what you think about it. they are making the same point. they couldn't quite understand that point. >> in your published article on the 19th of september, you say the nuclear timeline is just about thwarted. what do you mean by that? >> what i meant by that is

finally after a bit of discussion about it, judy and john scarlet had written it in a way that i understood, and everybody else understood. >> i cannot stress strongly enough from anything that flows from an intelligence assessment, i think that's very, very cleared that the memos that you referred to is my memos and his responses were not a single one of them at any time sought to question, overright, rewrite, let alone the phrase, the intelligence system is any way at any time on any level. >> what we're looking at is a process where the overall impression you get from the intelligence shifts. and we start off with a situation which we've had confirmed to us was the -- >> we just -- >> i'm not talking about john scarlet. it's a situation in which the overall view was that the five years after the ending of

sanctions could produce a nuclear weapon. to one where the prime minister stands up in the commons, doesn't mention the five years. but says there'll be others who say i can get, for example, it could be several years before it requires the nuclear weapon. if you were able to purchase the material, it would only be a year or two. this is now highlighted -- >> i don't think somebody highlighted. although the institute is hugely reported body, they also said it could be nine months. i'm sorry to repeat myself. but i think we are in the part -- in this part having the discussion. i completely accept that there's an argument to be had about whether intelligence material should be used by an elected prime minister in the public decision-making process. i think it's a good think. i think it showed much greater openness. i think it was a genuine attempt

to take the public into the confidence about why he was as concerned as it was. i really do believe that it's because of the policy that we are still talking about this line, that line, that paragraph, and some of the changes that took place in the drafting process. i'm sorry, i'll just repeat myself. when he came to it, i was not being accused of sort of moving this line and moving that line. shifting this line and shifting that paragraph. i was being accused of forcing intelligence officials to do things that they didn't want to do. it was simply untrue. >> i mean on this process, you'll be delighted that i'm not going to turn a 45-minute claim. now -- this has been something of interest. the number of inquiries. it's been established that you didn't make up the play or insert it in the dossier. so that's fine. but important, it's still have been raised about the way it was

expressed and viewed. now one view is that there's something particularly exceptional or surprising -- >> yup. >> you referred that it was something like rocket launchers. a sort of weaponnal delivery system that can be ready for the rapid deployment in the event of conflict. so the key thing that this refers to the copper field systems. the jic assessment of the new intelligence used up the discussions on the 9th of september stated that quote, iraq is disbursed it's special weapons including it's cdp weapons. it could be with military unit and ready for firing within 20 to it 45 minutes. and after the dissemination, it

was suggested that this new intelligence should go into the next draft. :@@@@@@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you or members of your team and were involved in the discussion of how the 45 minutes was going to be introduced in the draft

and whether this distinction was one that was understood by your team? >> well, i think i can one of your earlier witnesses talked about this iconic 45 minutes and again and certainly wasn't made iconic. i noted in the baller report that the butler committee wrote to senior journalists to ask whether the government had been promoting this one in five minutes as a major part of the september dossier and they said no, we have not. it wasn't within these discussions to be found, it wasn't that big a deal, and you may say it was mentioned here and the prime minister mentioned it. that's true, he mention lots of different things, lobs a bit and arguments, lots of the ramparts of the dossier.

i made two points on this. the original intelligence as you say says 2245 minutes. and we had been in this game we would have said can reduce the 25 minutes rather than 45 minutes. i don't think that was taking place and i wasn't aware of that until quite later on in the process and likewise when the prime minister set up in the house of commons and i think in terms of the public what they would see and the dossier i don't know how many actually read it but i don't know more would have seen a the prime minister and standing in parliament and when you said 45 minutes with in the same sentence talked-about against his own population so i don't think we were in fisa saddam hussein has these weapons and if one of the papers went down that line they were depressed by s. >> isaacs of fact, but if you are talking about the importance

of bringing intelligence into the public domain and i am in favor of its, then could have been clearer? >> you can go back with hindsight and rewrite every single thing, but i am simply saying to you that that was not that big a point within the overall presentation of the case the prime minister was putting at the time. >> can i make a couple points on this? first, there was a presentation question i don't want to spend a lot of time on a but if you look at the wave of 45 minutes claim was presented at the start of tapestry in the dossier, it appears some distance away from the point where chemical and biological weapons had been developed for artillery, bombs, sprays and so on. and then just after the peace -- after the peace had an the

missiles reading eastern turkey and cyprus. so just one of the consequences of were the point was located it was encouraged with longer-range weapons and then was the case. the responsibility was that it was certainly -- >> and don't think -- and we are looking at this in such microscopic detail in that way because it became such a controversy. nobody was saying that at the time. >> they would have in the sense of how it was picked up by the press which i will come to in a second. and then we have this question of which again was the discrepancy between the draft text which said that the iraqi military may be able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes it decision to do so and the executive summary says has

military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons some of which are ready in 45 minutes in order to use them. and by the next draft the text is in line with the executive summary. now, you did make a suggestion that that should be. >> i pointed out an inconsistency which was what i was there to do it was expressed directly into an places and i pointed that out and what i didn't say was you should write it this way. >> would you have been surprised if it rains have come into the executive summary? >> it was untimely end. i set out a serious, observations. it was there after after he decided how to resolve those and i think he pointed out, it is mentioned here and express a different made in this other parts of the tape. in as i understand it, again

this from memory, they would have spotted it anyway. >> also would have been an inconsistency with a ford or it was stated the military planning allows for the some -- a wmd to be ready within 45 minutes. >> he expressed differently but is inconsistent. he expressed it differently and again when he stood up and house of commons, but we don't all go around saying the same thing in exactly the same way on every occasion. i really don't think -- this is a point that has been gone over and exhausted not because of the decisionmaking processes in the dossier but the policy that followed a much later. >> and about to finish and will come to that but i wanted to check, were you are aware there were a number of intelligence professionals, dr. brian jones,

who were unaware of the tightening up of language were creating a degree of certainty in the language that was not justified. he wasn't opposed to including the praise but he said that it should be intelligence that suggests. >> i was aware as i said earlier of some reports in the press of some people within the agency suggesting, but as i said in with john scarlett and richard taylor, that did not represent the view of what the agency's number, indeed, their assessment of how most people in agencies felt. >> finally i will conclude, you mentioned already this footnote in the report to which comments on correspondence of letters and regional newspapers and what it says there is another suggested

that the 45 minute story attracted attention because it was eye-catching in a document containing much that was not and a technical nature. so it didn't attract a lot of attention, not just because what happens with today story and it attracted a lot of attention at the time and. >> look, the big message and the big point that came out of that day's events as i recall was the tony blair, prime minister was publishing and intelligence based dossier that explained why he believed iraq was the current serious and credible threats and then lots and lots and lots of detail, virtually every single point was getting some sort of attention. >> we did not see it and did not plan our communications around that particular point. >> i think jonathan powell sent an e-mail on the ninth of september, would be the standard on the day of publication, what we wanted to be?

>> how did i replied? >> i don't know. [laughter] what did you want to do? >> look, i know that we have and maybe i have a reputation as a sort of wording and obsessing about headlines but the truth is i don't and never did. a very large time that i was on dowling street because i reached the point of understanding this guy is back to the point about what strategic communications is. it's not about one headline a and is whether you are communicating all the time, your objectives clearly, your strategics thinking clearly, and whether you are getting your message through to the public so jonathan in inquiring like fats as to whether i applied or what i applied. >> so the evening standard 45 minutes from attack iraqis could have a bomb, 45 minutes from to

reference to cyprus, express saddam hussein can strike in 45 minutes. were you surprised by those headlines? >> and not surprised by anything that most of the british newspapers put out on a daily basis but all i have to say is when we were preparing that to end it it really is why is so unfortunate the delay -- debate developed as it did subsequently when the bbc broadcast as they did. actually i think it was a very important development in government communications and i think there is a real risk arising out of this. and that in future very difficult international crisis situations that develop, the politicians, they don't said the

decisions that maybe they should. i thought i did attend every single word of the dossier. i did and every single part of the process and i think it was a genuine attempt by the prime minister and the government to engage the public properly in trying -- in understanding why the prime minister was developing as it was. >> as a final point, i think from one of the lessons, we are about lessons and the importance is this. that we agree on your final observation in in terms of the government and they've done this sort of thing in the past, that it is and therefore important to understand why this particular product is now looked at so negatively and perhaps the

lessons that ought to be learned and are about taking more care. >> i would like to go back on that. i don't believe it was -- at the time. insofar as you say it was negatively, it is looked at -- lee by the media that just refuses to accept that when the lord hudson investigated it to in the detail he did he came to the only conclusion is that the analysis could get you. since when and they never tell what that report concluded, they simply say that it was a whitewash and this and that. but that's the point. >> that's not the point i'm concerned with here. in. >> not across talked. >> i would like to have the opportunity to respond to this

because it goes to the hearts of it. you say the dossier is regarded negatively and actually a lot of people did not regarded negatively because they understand that the basis of a case the prime minister main is contained within the air. about a generally perceived threats. if you have a media culture that the signs that because a certain inquiry did not find as they kept telling their listeners and readers there were going to do on the points you have been raising and day after day after day they tell people actually they didn't get to the truth, only we can get to the truth, then no wonder they end up thinking what was bad about and then when they deliberately conflate with the paper that will no doubt, on in february, they routinely say that the dossier we have been discussing was lifted off the internet. no wonder the public starts to think what is that about. >> the reason why the document became controversial and that issue arose in the end was

because on the fortunately a lot of the material that was contained within its when tested against what was actually in iraq after the invasion, it turned out not to be there. the big problem -- >> then you have a debate about intelligence and that's what that was about a but my point i think actually therefore makes my point, lord hutton stated in terms even in the intelligence turns out to have been wrong it did not justify the reporting of issue and my point is a the reporting of the issue and the controversy that cost and, indeed, that is what makes it viewed by some in the way you describe and i am sorry, that is my very strongly held opinion. i cannot see any other way. >> i think we're coming from a different direction in that but i will pass it over.

>> thank you. i'm going to declare a lunch break at this point. we have occurred evidence so far on your communications on strategy, some of the key meetings in that #ah)áy@@@ @ @ will open for that purpose at 115. that's downstairs. so with that, we will come back 2 o'clock.

thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> welcome back everyone. taking off from where we took from before the break, supplementary is of the september dossier. first, i'm going to ask one of two points. when you're talking prime minister's press conference in early september of 2002, you said that this holiday time in which neocons in america had set up speculation about the possibility of military action in that the prime minister's purpose in that press conference had been to try to calm down the atmosphere. is that it fair reflection? >> not just to the press, but in the days prior two that with mozambican south africa, it is

fair to say that media travelling in those areas was close to a state of frenzy with the decision made, what was going to happen, only a matter of time. so i think the tone at that press conference and the purpose was really to do two things -- one, as i say to call things, action is being taken, there will be all sorts of questions that have to be answered and he listed some of those at the press conference. and then announced it was passed the ongoing debate and deliberation and then publish the dossier of. >> we have this morning of 45 minute claim in the dossier heating up a new frenzied and very big headline story is. and as you said in on the butler committee he established that this was not as a result of

briefing by you, but never the less frenzied happened. >> there was a frenzied than at the time of population -- publication. >> sirloins freeman refer to a huge headlines on the front page of the evening standard and. >> and headline is not a frenzy. >> well, let's not split hairs over this. a number of newspapers covered in this in a very germanic way. would that be a very fair --? >> when i talk about a frenzy, when newspapers are all chasing the same story, the television and radio talk about a 24/7, that's what a frenzy is. >> well, the 45 minute claim attracted some very big stories in a number of newspapers, i don't have to characterize that one way or another. did you take action then and to dampen down the speculation? did you get on to those papers

to correct the misrepresentation of the story? >> i didn't specifically but so far as anybody else would have all of them up it would have been made clear what they referred to. >> you weren't pro-active you in your office and pointing out to them that they claim that had referred to munitions essentially battlefield weapons was being represented in a quite different and much more alarming way by some newspapers and you just let that ride in didn't take action to strain the story? >> i didn't and so far as i can recall -- >> you were in charge. >> yes, i was and as far as i can recall discussion, bear in mind you have the prime minister with a statement and the dossier, the issue moved on pretty quickly. the 45 minute thing is a was a frenzy, it wasn't, it was one or two newspapers reasonably problematic and then it fell away. it was not that big an issue.

so we go to the evening standard and say you've got this wrong. i didn't. where are the people minded to follow the story up and talk to our press office is about whether they deployed but i'm not aware that even that happened. >> you didn't think it necessary to take action to correct the story? >> now, bear in mind if we correct in every single store in every newspaper that we knew to be wrong, we would be 24/7. >> bad as i think your area of business, not mine. i'm very glad to say. like other colleagues who have already referred to the point, i'm interested in a statement in the prime ministers or write to the dossier -- if i can find the correct quotation -- what i believe the incest -- is that

the saddam hussein has continued to produce biological and chemical weapons that he continues to develop nuclear weapons and that he has been able to extend the range of ballistic missile program. now, the statement, the assessed intelligence has established beyond a doubt, it's a very strong statement. and jic assessments used the words, beyond a doubt, in describing the intelligence about iraq? >> i don't know but i would have to agree read them. as i said to them this morning, that's the prime minister giving his assessment that has been given to him. so if he were two have sat around as he did many many times with the intelligence chiefs and said to them, are you pretty sure about this and this and this, and as john said and gave evidence he believed the

intelligence. >> what i'm trying to establish is what is the basis that u.s. the drafter of this and the prime minister as the person who signed it had foreseen that the intelligence was beyond a doubt. those two words which are some definitive. >> not definitive. >> what was the basis? >> the bases was the intelligence assessment that was presented to the prime minister and the bases was also the nature of discussion at the time with the intelligence chiefs prior to the dossier being published. >> i find that a little puzzling. i mean, isn't that the case that doubts and caveat were expressed in just about every jic assessment on iraq? >> there were an dowd also was expressed in the prime minister's statement that parliament about the complete picture and never be sure everything is right. that is his judgment and when it

comes to which he can have all the advisers you want and all the military dreiser's and the diplomats and all the rest, he has to make judgments, strategic, political, he has to make those judgments and has to present those to the public and that's what he has done their based upon his analysis of what the intelligence chiefs are telling him and his analysis meeting with intelligence over a time. through the time when the jic themselves talked about a staff change in terms of their assessment. >> is that a phrase they use? step change. >> jic in 2001 a. >> server william and his evidence said to us getting as a few of the things that were sent, the picture was limited on chemical weapons in april 2000, the knowledge of wmd and the ballistic missile programs was patchy, march 2000 to the intelligence on iraqi wmd and

ballistic missiles programs is sporadic and patchy. going on now, august 2002, the very near the time we're talking about, there is i quote, a little intelligence on hyrax pc w doctrine that is biological and chemical doctrines, and we know little about iraq -- cdw, iraq prime minister maliki chemical and biological weapons since late 1998. crucially the assessment of the ninth of september 2002, the intelligence remains limited. so in august the jic says there is little intelligence. september it says the intelligence remains limited. on the ninth of september. and about two weeks later this be one tells parliament in a document presented to parliament that the assessed intelligence

has established beyond a doubt. now this is why i'm puzzled -- i can make those statements which together. >> we will have to speak to his statements. i can only tell you from the position i was then, not an intelligent person, as the communications director. the he has engaged in ongoing dialogue with intelligence agencies about the intelligence presented to him and that is -- the way that he decided to put it to the public at that time. i suspect when he comes along -- one ever coming to the inquiry that he will stand by in again. >> so he was certain that they still stand by the words beyond a doubt? >> i do because at the time and that was the judgment that he was led to make. and i would also stand by -- i know that the butler report fell back to the rear things talking about expensive than detailed. i stand by that as well because i think that that document had

it the full authority of the joint intelligence committee hearing it was detailed and wasn't just about intelligence that had come in in the last couple days and some of the caveat or in there. it concerned me make the point that to both you and sir laurence have no doubt that could have been more in terms of public presentation putting of the case why these caveat in there but i think of some of the in terms of what the public would have taken out of it it wouldn't have made that much depends because it wasn't cautious. >> so if the jic assessments when we are able perhaps i don't know if we will be able to publish some concern the me read them, or not to correspond to the phrase beyond a doubt. and if members of the jic and we have already heard somebody who did serve on the jic, were to say that beyond a doubt was not a phrase that was justifiable, would you at that stage is in that parliament had been misled

the by the prime minister saying beyond a doubt? >> no, i wouldn't. >> obey, thank you. can i move on to my final point. again, a broad points arising from what was said this morning there you use the phrase which i have seen used many times to describe the threat to the, the phrase the current serious and credible threat from iraq. but when the prime minister that spoke in the debate in parliament on the 24th of september when parliament was reconvened in the dossier had just been put in the library of the house of commons, he used a different phrase. he said, his meaning saddam hussein, wmd program is active, detailed and growing. what was the basis, the evidence for him to tell parliament that saddam hussein program was growing? >> it was within the dossier,

the story, the narrative he was sending out with in the dossier. >> but it doesn't use the word growing. >> it may not but again and that is the prime minister setting out what he read from intelligence he was presented to. >> but i can't find this concept of a growing at. >> a step change. in the ballistic missile program that is growing. >> we have been through thousands of documents and intelligence reports and the idea of growing doesn't really appear in them. if i can quote from your diary for the 23rd of july, 2002, again, you recall that the foreign secretary jack straw as follows -- jack said that of the four powers posing a potential threat with wmd, iran, korea, libya and iraq, iraq would be the fourth. he does not have a nuclear weapons, he has some evidence of

wmd capability. now, turning than from that statement by foreign secretary to the dossier, the dossier referred to iraq's continuing possession after 1991 of chemical and biological agents. it referred to the saddam hussein, his continuing capability to produce them. referred to his covert attempts to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons. none of that describes his actual program as growing. so was an accurate and to represent a threat from iraq at this time as growing? >> i have said he many times this morning that the reason the prime minister wanted to say the dossier in the way he did was because he had grown more and

more concerned about the threat that saddam hussein based based on intelligence presented to him. ..@@@@@@@@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @@

the point i made earlier as to whether this unique threat would have actually been contained since 1991 -- scaap that is a judgment isn't it. >> am i trying to figure out it's very important to this inquiry with the judgment was based on that it was growing. >> of the judgment -- look, the prime minister is a made the decisions and i will say what i think he would say were he here that the containment policy wasn't working as effectively as it had been, that the september 11th had changed the context in terms of how united states, britain, other countries were going to address this issue and the volume of intelligence that was crossing his desk about this issue was making him more

concerned about it. >> that could be perfectly true without the intelligence saying the threat is growing. the prime minister becoming more and more concerned as he said in the four were increasingly alarmed the phrase he used is one thing. but seeing the threat is growing as he would understand is another. >> but ultimately, the -- you can present as the intelligence people do, as the diplomats do and the advisers to, they could present all the factual analysis including the caveat and the rest of it and ultimately the prime minister has to make judgments about it and that is the judgment he made. >> mr. campbell during the course of the morning you said that the development was important in terms of communications. it was an innovation and you also said these were not normal

times. now when the decision was taken to have this innovative approach to pushing information out in the public, was consideration given, was it a discussion about the constitutional propriety is that you would have to consider because the principal of keeping intelligence rigorously separate from those made decisions is a very much in bed in the way the constitution proprieties operate. now, given your role because your trade is communications and que were advising these powers. but is getting the process for developing this, was that actually discussed, the ball would be the proper way of developing this? because you yourself said it is a pity because this happened, again because this goes at the heart of the public trust. these proprieties exist for the reason. was this actually discussed? did anybody draw this to the attention?

>> was it discussed? yes. where people aware some percentage in nature and therefore did the increase the level of discussion and potential concern? yes. was the judgment and reached including the complete support in the intelligence agencies that this remained a right and proper thing to do? yes. >> who did you discuss that with? >> the prime minister, other ministers, john scarlett and other people. >> was the cabinet secretary involved? innovation? >> what to do something significant was through the whole process. >> did anybody draw to your attention with the conventions are? >> it was unprecedented. >> the convention i'm talking about is keeping intelligence completely separate from decision making and good judgment to put one together with a political forward and the information because -- you blurred the lines.

>> i didn't say you blur the lines between intelligence and decision making and i think you could say intelligence became more involved in public communication and public diplomacy the to have been. that is a development and response to the sort of changing political landscape i talked about earlier. were we aware that that was a significant change, of course we were. were we are where people might have concerns about that of course we were. was it still, nonetheless, despite the unprecedented nature, despite the fact this was the intelligence financed to do something maybe they wouldn't normally be expected to do, will the prime minister and i hope intelligence agency still say the was the right thing to do i think yes. >> given that these were not normal times and this decision to want to go to the war, with africom having listened to earlier do you think he was rigorous enough?

>> absolutely. i'm sorry to repeat myself. i think the process was utterly addressed. i think that the integrity was very, very strong and profound at every level of operation and i really do think having this discussion in large part because the subsequent control which was disclosed by piece of agendas. that's the fact. that's the fact. >> okay. >> let's move on at this point to some others. >> given what you have just said about the quality -- before we actually get to this, i'm interested you obviously thought a good job had been done with the secretary to help the prime

minister. was it in the discussion with john scarlett about the possibility of having more exercises of the sort? >> i think at this time it was seen as you would never do it again but i don't -- i don't have any feeling that the minister wanted to do it again. it may be as the situation developed if it actually the diplomatic process had gone on much longer that perhaps there would have been with no such discussion. >> so, how will you then come supporting the prime minister and the dossier in terms of helping get all the factual background the evidence analysis to support the works and speeches and press conferences and the documentation around?

>> there were periods even during this time when iraq was permanently controversy all and a high-profile issue. there were periods there were other subjects quickly taken over the agenda which would where most of my work would be going a lot of the domestic policy related, some international issues and northern ireland was always there adults in terms of being a difficult and sycophant area. but so i think that the bulk of communications with actually have been the sort of thing you just referred to come speeches, exchanges and parliament, press interviews, the normal stuff of the day-to-day communications. >> the iraq communications group? >> that the fault in a way from the fact that -- my day for

example used to be to see the prime minister first thing. i would then chair a meeting of most of the main government departments the obvious big government departments, the prime minister's office, treasury, home office, for an office and if there was any other issue on to other departments who would come and that would be to go through as you were that day. now, what was becoming clear that a certain point was that iraq was dominated and we decided actually that although that meeting continued that it would also be useful just to have once a week -- the evolves into a once a week but then became more formally -- >> what is the time we are talking about here? early 2002, 2003? >> yeah. i've got it written down somewhere here when it started.

but that became just tried to step out of the day today the whole time and just discuss, talk and think a little bit more strategically, and to be frank i used a lot of it for my own education, educational purposes if you like. we have people coming along and we would set up an islamic media for example. we had experts advising on the way for example some of the messages we would be communicating very productively within the british context. often when you think you are gaining an understanding of what you are trying to do they would have somebody coming away and explain some of those measures jews were being received in an arab and muslim so that was that kind of discussion. on the discussions would be i can remember one to go back to the discussion of camp david we did have quite regular discussions about how we tried

to help the americans address this business of anti-americanism which is fighting the premise said in his speech at some point it may be in a note i can't remember this anti-americanism up until now the americans have been happy to sit as an irritant the united states is related. it's those kind of decisions. >> did the narrative right if you like. >> also what it was we were putting together by terms of the strategy, the elsewhere on the day-to-day basis. >> it was about getting the message is right and making sure you understood when you were doing on the day to day -- >> given that this is an area where -- and it's not my natural area of expertise or the defeat could their expert to the to expertise, it was to sit on my regular basis with his people expertise it was. some of them from the intelligence services, some of

them from foreign offices, some of them every now and then bringing people outside. >> and what was the collision information center? >> that we've got to go back a few years. it started with relation to kosovo and what happened in the communications of kosovo there came a point when president clinton and tony blair fault although the ministry campaign was clearly made to against molosovich, there was a very strict in terms of military balance, communications and public relations if you like, and public opinion that we were losing that particular battle because milosevic had complete control over his own over the media systems of those joining from those countries that were their britain and america and elsewhere. and so, i was asked to go and help me to put together

different communications which we did. and we took elements of that and we've recreated a form of the different communications post september 11th and then adapted that began in iraq and the cic first incarnation was post september 11th, and that was about having all the different nature time zones at the plant could be in islamabad, washington, london, information centers where we were linked up all the time understanding everything that every leader involved in the coalition was doing and saying and so forth and they brought forward for the iraq conflict and the cic was the british element of that based on the event and maybe the foreign office but working is very much part of --

>> part of your team were part of its? >> part of my team, part of the american team we had a system of swapping, we had a senior person from the american side who was there. we had different times, we had a french people, we and spaniards, poles, australians, dutch, people from all across. >> but this was commissioned to do of the dossier? >> it was, yes. >> can you tell how that came about? >> that came out from one of the sis people who were expert and pfizer's. it wasn't always a weekly but fairly regular iraq strategic discussion really. he informed us there was

intelligence that had@@@@@@@ @ . . ready. . . . . . the discussion whether that could be used publicly.

while the decision wasn't made and i think there were further discussions about that and then what can about. we didn't know at that stage how that was when to be done but i commission at a certain point the cic to a paper on iraq and the issue of consumer instruction, and the general messing around of the pictures. historically as well as current. they started to work on that and produce a paper which i think was then discussed. i made a number of -- i changed the title and made a number of textual changes that went around the system -- >> went around the system, does that include into the jrc? >> went -- the answer to that is i don't know.

they were representatives of the jrc at the meeting. what they then did i don't know. then the decision was made on her, trying to remember which this was. i think it was the one and would it be february to washington, we were meant to go to camp david but the weather was too bad and we stayed in washington where the decision was taken that we would give this as a briefing paper to the sunday journalists and press traveling with us on the plane to washington. as it happened it got almost no coverage at all i thought was quite interesting they were -- it was there and informed some of the things they wrote or not, i don't know. but it wasn't -- contrary to the september dossier which a massive global exposure this got relatively little and it became much better known and much more

rather unfortunate controversy when it emerged that actually it was taken off the internet and it wasn't, it was and i am not apologizing, i'm not defending it on these terms by the way that as a matter of fact it was taken from the middle east journal and then once that as it were process became exposed i think it was by four years it was frenzied. >> but can i just go back to what you have just said? the context in which this was being done why was it considered important to have the document at this time? >> because one of the arguments that kept being put is about giving the inspectors more time, given the inspectors more time is the fact in an ideal world great the inspectors go in and do their job but actually the

reason and people say with all of these weapons, why are there more, why have these guys never been able to stumble across as the water around iraq and so because there is this system of obstruction and intimidation so it was informing that part of the debate. >> but this cannot quite critical point in the process. it has been put to us by previous witnesses that there had been a hope a smoking gun would be found and so far the smoking gun hadn't been found. so doubt was all already being raised about these a timber dossier. and it was published i think on the third of february and the pin minister made clear when he told parliament about a couple of days later colin powell was going to begin the presentation

to the u.n. security council it wasn't a real issue at the time to read this was one of the -- this is one of the big issues at the moment. and the dossier doesn't describe facing a pretty hopeless task talking about i think 20,000 intelligence officers, 208 inspectors hiding documents surveillance of hotels and offices -- etc. so was the point of it and given what you said about this being something that was because the prime minister didn't put it in the house of commons -- speed the reason i said that is we gave it to the journalist. it got some very limited attention and i think some of the newspapers. i can't remember but i don't think it was picked up by the

broadcasters but the fact that the prime minister had been away and was going to make a statement on his return to the house of commons and therefore as it was a document we put in the public debate it was put in the library and the house. >> the comments on february and he said we should fill the intelligence of the week and all the infrastructure concealment it is for old when we publish intelligence reports that other people have some sense of integrity of security services and it goes on in a single way says the dossier published last year and again the material we put out over the weekend. it's very clear a vast amount of concealment and deception is going on. so >> it is december 11th or 19th. i haven't been able to get all

the papers. >> the point i was making according to the prime minister was this was presented as if it had a similar status and process to the september dossier. obviously much smaller document. utter hadn't been the same number unwittingly or not give that impression to the commons. >> i absolutely -- the integrity and professionalism and meticulous nature of the september dossier i would defend to the end of my days. in relation to this, somebody within the cic putting it together he made a very simple but quite serious mistake which is that he put information into it and in the accuracy which by the way hasn't been fundamentally challenged was from a leading expert by the

name of doctor, it was part of the historical section and wasn't in the section that had any of the intelligence in it and that is what made it subsequently very controversial. we didn't know that until later in the process in fact we didn't know that until the mid year informers when the story first broke and so that's where the mistake was and fair to say when he talked earlier about interesting that that did not help to put it that way. >> and you've made the point but it's worthwhile underlining that the quality control if you like of these materials is all there and there's no -- although this was -- the question is whether jrc or the community was where the prime minister was going to

present on those terms -- >> can i say on that when these timber dossier that was the purpose of recalling the parliament, that was the purpose of the prime minister's statement. this event, the prime minister is bringing the house up to date on a very important set of discussions with president bush and a very minor part of that was to refer to the factor would release this document and a was in the house. i don't think he made any reference to the content beyond what you've just said politely accept the point about quality-control in fact i read on the seventh february where the very first sentence says i value the work of the cic but the documents show the absolute necessity of quality-control this is particularly important in any document such as this with increasing intelligence assessment and i then set out considerable displeasure to like the fact that it happened and also as a result of that i spoke

to john schuyler and david and richard and the secretary of the foreign office, and we agreed a new set of procedures whereby basically nothing that had any intelligence component whatsoever could be used in any form of public communications out going through the same rigorous process as the september dossier did. >> if i could ask one final question of which his as time passes in iraq, matters -- things aren't found but there is an argument they were not found because the iraqis were good at concealing them. but it must have occurred to somebody at some time that maybe they were not found because they

were not there. was that an issue for you and did you raise it as a problem for somebody concerned with strategic communications? >> that was an issue. it was a big issue. i'm looking for a day because there was a day when jon schuyler stated directly how big a problem is it, and obviously the military for their, but they were looking for weapons of mass destruction and i can remember the reason why when people say you always knew what of the military briefings for the prime minister where the team is

explaining the preparations for our forces in knous to what would happen if and when it can about what weapons would be used against them i can remember the feeling absolutely chilled by the nature of the discussions so our belief that when the forces went in they would find the would find biological weapons and all the stuff being set out in the september dossier it was real, it was profound so knowing as we did this was a hugely controversial decision that large parts of the, large sections of the british public would be opposed to the huge section of the labor party being opposed to be told it is perfectly possible that he might now be facing a situation as if you have problems of the prime minister's plate the situation where you are going to have to accept there are no wmd that was a big issue and a very difficult

situation. >> does this only become apparent after the fighting? we heard general fly. i'm interested in whether or not the possibility at least occurred to you even before the fight. >> again i can only speak for myself april 28 john warned there may be no finding the wmd. i was never in doubt based on what i saw and what i heard and the discussions i was involved in and so it was a considerable obviously as the invasion took place and that was the focus and then there is a i think as other witnesses far better qualified than i have said to you perhaps

the outcome, more quickly than had been anticipated or planned for. but certainly i fully expected and i think the prime minister did that within a reasonably short time frames the military and intelligence had become on the same role hears this and use that and the other end from a couple of laps there wasn't much to report. >> they didn't last a very long. >> so in answer to the question was it yes and had we thought about it to the extent people have been suggested and as it were those who were very strongly opposed as i said to this morning for example when the prime minister was having discussions with jack he was fundamentally opposed to the decision that was finally taken there was no doubt on his mind that yes their weapons of mass destruction -- >> i think vladimir putin did suggest -- >> he did it in a very dramatic

press conference is, he did. >> thank you. >> just one more point and i can come back to the february paper. sir lawrence asked you to what ℠ the use of the intelligence material in the public domain, in that quotation. isn't it a little bit surprising

that the jrc chairman who had led or co-lead the work on the previous dossier wasn't consulted on the new paper that was also using intelligence material and wasn't even copied to him in the draft? >> was copied to him in draft? >> according to your evidence to the foreign affairs committee i don't know perhaps i was -- i didn't see it in the final form he wasn't consulted in the paper. perhaps i'm wrong in entering from that he didn't see it in the draft. >> it's just at the time the systems we put in place subsequently as i say nothing like that would have happened without going through, not as the other intelligence agency leaders as to whether he did as i said he was at the meetings

and was aware he was being done. i just don't know whether those who are putting it together whether he was with sis at that time would have sent it to them. >> right. they should have done. >> and i think that this -- i think that is a lesson that was learned very very quickly from that and was a very -- that was a very difficult episode. >> they should have sent it to him and with him knowing it was happening should presumably have asked to see it to make sure he vetted before it went out in public. >> it may well be because i can't remember exactly who apart from john scarlett and this other person from sis was at the meeting but there may be another member of john's team who were. i just don't know. >> the difficulty is even john scott wouldn't have picked up a plagiarized section. >> no, and when subsequently --

that is the point. they would have been i suspect would have been intent and maybe there was somebody from jic. there were happy for it to be used in the way that it was. again it is the control that came later that if you like contaminated the whole thing. >> i'm surprised that obviously the foreign affairs committee asked you to go back and check and then you will then a supplementary memorandum so you must have checked at this point and must have thought that we'd clearly established that he hadn't actually been in the loop on this and -- panicky had certainly dannel the meetings. >> he knew it was happening -- as you say it should have happened. >> definitely. >> thank you. john's team. i think you are referring to jic. of course of the time he was still the jic chair. >> i was talking about jic. the assistance team, yes. >> we are going to turn the

question now to a different topic. >> i would like to turn from the intelligence aspect and ask you about your work in the period of 2002 and early 2003 with regard to communicating with the ever met iraqi policy to the media and public and answer the public's considerable concerns and questions. the meeting after crawford the prime minister set out certain priorities sometimes in the course conditions of supporting the united states. the top three were taking the u.n. route and advancing the middle east peace process and gaining support of public opinion. in your diary at the beginning of september 2002, you write it was clear the public opinion moved against us during august. i want you to tell us how you said about dealing with this beyond the dossier what were

your methods of dealing with this problem? >> there was nothing terribly fancy. the most unprecedented move was the publication of the dossier. we had at one point with the prime minister came to question as the masochism strategy which was basically to take him out to very hostile audiences because but his view was, and i think that he said this in these terms at one of the speeches it might have been -- people are asking -- you've got some people opposed to what we do there were some of those. there would be some people saying you know why haven't you gone after before this. there were people in the middle

who had a genuinely legitimate questions they were asking. i can remember he referred to general kaufman and another. i've forgotten who it was but he said they both made speeches with a series of genuine legitimate questions. what he's all the communications trying to do was answer some of those questions. so obvious question the u.n.. obvious question is this just about regime change? obvious question are you going to do this, may. what is the impact for the middle east peace process. where is this in relation to what george bush called the war on her so will the parliament have a say. what we are trying to do was answer these questions over time and the thing that decapitating there is no one thing that will get through any one point. you've got to keep sitting of the documents. so we planned this, i don't think he thanked me for that much but we, having so i'm going

to go out and take on the people who disagree with us we sort of for the example i discovered about the feb dossier and its province we were doing a very long and extended program a field with an audience. we had a thing with trevor mcdonald will literally the brief was to go to find women totally opposed to what we were doing, filled the room and the time mr. sits down and takes all of their questions and tries to answer them. so that was a part of the communications. and the rest of it was just the fact every week he is in parliament once a month he's got his press conference fairly regularly before this committee out and about. there was nothing i would say that we had a beyond realizing that we were now trying to bring in a more internationalized

communications, trying to tie in much more closely to the americans because, you know, the reality is their communications can affect hours and they did understand that and i think some more than others and it's fair to say that under donald rumsfeld's name mentioned a few times of this committee and i think there were times when you thought he could maybe have bought a bit more about the impact of public statements and other countries but -- >> again, almost exactly a month after your september by reentry you note iraq is still tricky and just wish the americans would do more to put over a proper message to the world. did you have -- were you able to put this through? >> i did, and to be fair they were always very -- i go back and actually i would like if i can i would like you to see the papers we did our around kosovo in september 11th that developed in this way because i think there was the basis and those

relationships were very good. i spoke most days we had a system whereby if any of us felt difficult requiring immediate attention happened any of us could instigate a confidence call at any time. >> what are the aspects of american presentation that you found disturbing were unhelpful? >> i suppose -- the have a very different political system. you can't choose the leadership of another country. but i think it's that question of not always understanding the statements and positions would have an impact beyond the shores. they felt very comfortable with the idea saying saddam is a bad regime and has been for a long time. was clinton's defense policy to go to the regime change mac. to be fair to george bush, i

think he got this more than others in his administration if i can put it like that. it was at least an understanding there were other countries out there and they had other interests. so, for the simple to give you one example people talk about what was he able to do in relation to george bush. i remember at hillsborough i think of was april 7th or 8th, where the u.n., the issue of the u.n. trawl and in the aftermath was on the agenda for whatever reason at the time. and condoleezza rice was quite insistent any words that were agreed at a meeting of hillsborough were not too forward in relation to the role of the u.n. and she wanted to say it would be an important role, and i can member saying that sounds a bit grudging. it is meant to be and the prime

minister said look this has got to be stronger than this and if i might finally agreed there would be a vital role for the u.n. and that was important when subsequently the u.n. did become involved in the aftermath. so i think the relationship at treetop level between the president and the prime minister very frank, able to have a very open discussions i think it was the same, he is very close and professional relationship with condoleezza rice and i try to do this thing with the communications sold most days i would speak to the opposite numbers in the white house, state department, pentagon and if there were problems say to them there's a problem here and if they would say why do you by skilling about the when the whole time, we try to keep our republican on board for this and that, that is just the way the political exchanges are i guess.

>> one of your problems with the americans was perhaps one which only you could result in your communication strategy, and you described your discussion with the vice president cheney and said how you used the word pissed off in your diary, you said how cross he was when you talk about democracy coming to iraq people just say that's americanization it's not democracy at all. how did you deal with that? >> that was at camp david. the substance that day was the prime minister persuading vice president cheney to go with the president and subsequent visit to get on that route but it was in this broad discussion and again i think out of a genuine sense not only hurt but they were quite -- after september 11th the world loved

america for a while and i can remember the prime minister saying the exchange we refer to earlier said for the rest of the world september 11th was a massive event and the moment but it passed. for the americans it's not really past. it's now part of their psychology. so they couldn't understand why there was so much of this anti-americanism so i thought we had a quite serious discussion when we were getting our assessment what it was about it for a simple i believe this strongly i think it is about the fact that people have grown up on the idea of the two polls, russia, soviet union and america, two great superpowers that can both battle to the death but that is the sort of geopolitical from work. suddenly you, got one superpower and the other countries say okay you've got the power but we want you to understand that means

engaging and involving as well so we've had that sort of discussion and i just made an observation that i felt in the communications that when they talked about we've got to spread democracy back to the point out a message in america and britain might be heard in a totally different way in the middle east or the gulf that they are hearing that they want to bring america here and he was as you put it a little bit pissed off. >> he also expressed your concerns at different times that for the british public there was a feeling, sometimes a strong feeling that britain was only embarking on this course of action united states because it is what the americans want us to do and of course to protect our relationship with the united states. how were you able to establish

that there was a specific british agenda with regard to iraq and what was tha,@@@@@ @ @ the bbc became very hostile and its coverage of iraq. it was quite difficult to get out any messages on diluted on your terms as it were rather than just through the prime minister getting out there and

talking. but it was difficult. it was very, very difficult. and the sense of you can do it, the pri minister and all you can do is explain we are not just doing this because george bush wants us to, we are doing it because we get is in the british national interest. >> it was meant to be a problem at some point if the matter was to go before parliament. it would have had parliamentary support and this would depend on some groundswell of public support. at the end of 2002 you proposed a more active strategy and one in which you wanted the prime minister become even more actively involved. can you give some indication of what that was and in particular what it involved the prime minister having to do? >> by that time i couldn't tell you what proportion of his time this was taking the was considerable obviously, and i think that he accepted, and the

americans i think also realized that there was a benefit to their communications from 20 blair being very pro-active in terms of communicating the issues, the background of the issues and the case we were trying to make savitt involved him having a very regular and sustained set of activities around speeches, physics, interviews, press conferences and so forth. >> how did you assess the effectiveness of this heightened strategy? >> i think that in the end you have to rely on instinct to a large extent. we didn't do. i don't know whether the government, i didn't see as it were other than the public opinion poll my sense was and this often is the case, but in these really difficult in ongoing quite long debates there is always a period which you

since deeper public engagement and then, reflection upon them and it's now sort of routinely stated that there was massive opposition and hostility it is true there was opposition and hostility but there was also a considerable amount of support and i still actually think there still is that there isn't much air time. >> in the work you did on the presentation of communication, and i know this is a topic that you were concerned with, how did usis and deal with the little impact on the public mind of the threat of weapons of mass destruction where at one point you said there was the word fatigue in the public mind on the wmd and on the other hand when you call the unrivaled barbarian regime delete the -- saddam's regime in self. what was the balance between the two?

>> i think they went together all the time. that's why is it is true that when if you actually look at what the -- what is in 1441 and the arguments the prime minister was putting that china was about disarming saddam hussein and his weapons of mass destruction but it's linked into that to other issues. one is the relationship and importance of preserving and maintaining that and seconded the history of the regime. that was an important part of the communications because people have short memories and you have to keep reminding people when we just talk about the early war and say a million casualties people here that and then you have to find ways of saying less than so rather than just say that you might look for a list of all the towns and have

a population of 1 million people and it's just one of those incidents of that's the impact of the time was profound. but now chemical weapons, i remember that. but in a sense you are trying to get over to people that when we say these things, the death squads, intimidation, the taking tonnes out of people who speak against the regime it is worth listening to some of that and understanding that is why the prime minister is so concerned up this regime. the regime that has used chemical weapons before what is to stop it from giving again particularly if the united states runs away from this. >> cory of people listening? were you getting any sense -- >> we are just people it is

about public opinion. that means what people think and we all the different things, no to people think alike on any issue but i certainly had a sense. i remember for example the day of the debate itself i think more than any other debate specific parliamentary debate you've got so many messages from people not necessarily in the political surface you had a sense of the country following that debate as it unfolded i will never forget sometimes i used to run to work and get on the 24 bus and i can remember listening to a conversation not to women on a bus about resolution 1441 on their way they were talking about what resolution, and i thought people were engaging on this in a deeper level. it's gone beyond the kind of flimflam that really represents a lot of what passes for the debate in the media today. people were engaged.

>> my last question on this relates to the extraordinary demonstration of the 15th of february, 2003. and which vast numbers of people including my three children walked through the streets of london protesting about the iraqi border and was said to be one of the largest demonstrations of recent times what account did you take of the strength of public opinion and how did it in form the prime minister's preparation for what was going to be this very important parliamentary debate? >> well, one very specific way i think the day before the march i think we were in scotland -- the march was getting huge publicity in the build up and was clearly going to be an enormous event. but you have got to remember

this is a democracy the prime minister to stand for reelection and she knew this was a deeply unpopular policy with -- not just on a popular like the other issues on popular, tuition fees or whatever it might have been. this was deep. i always have a rule of thumb if someone goes into a march so there's a lot of people who were opposed and i think what it definitely -- there was political consideration. there was a big protest and he thought about that a lot and he was seized of its significance. but ultimately i think it made him think more deeply about issues and the day before i will check this but he did a speech, we met iraqi exiles in a hotel in scotland who got in touch with me and said because they sensed that the human thing going wrong and they came and said look, please, he has got to

see this through. he's got to see this through. we know what iraq is like. you've got all these people. no doubt well-meaning but they do not understand the reality of this regime. and i actually took some of them to see the prime minister. and he then made a speech where the line taken out by the media he made what he called the moral case for the war because people were talking about the moral case, those on the march, the moral case and the prime minister set out there is a different view to take and ultimately he always used this word, he said i don't disrespect those who've come to different conclusions but he is elected as the prime minister and i saw the seriousness and how much weight

upon him but equally ijssel somebody who fundamentally really deeply believed unless the world confronted saddam hussein at that time ultimately in another way because the the blood eckert field than there be a bigger day of reckoning later on and i think he still believes that now. >> was this moral case one that you were then able to in the short time remaining before the debate? you were able to promulgate in some way through your own efforts? >> he made a speech and the speech got considerable public attention and then up to the -- i think i would say at this time that in terms of the big moments yes we all drafted and chipped in and had sources and so forth but when it came for a cable to the speech in parliament that was very much the prime minister's hand and his people would feel what forces and so forth but yes that is why i always think look like him

people reached a different position. you have members -- i remember the monday after the march there were several people within the group who had members in the family who had gone on the march. i think a majority. some people move from within their own household how divisive and how difficult this issue was and that is why i say yes, people can reach the different conclusions but for heaven's sake, let's do away with all of the conspiracy theories about oil and was about george bush telling tony blair what to do. somebody who is been elected prime minister wants to get reelected does not do something as difficult and controversial as the really believe they should be doing. >> you yourself had no doubt about the case? >> i supported him through. i won't pretend i didn't have doubts about all sorts of things throughout the process. of course he did. and one of the doubt is whether he would survive.

i remember myself saying are you sure, are you so sure about this you will put your entire reputation on the line we using to be and i record saddam has been a threat for far too long sometimes you just got to do the right thing regardless of what people around you may be saying and he believed that and i respect him for the we did that and i supported him the whole way through with doubts in on the we of course i had doubts and sometimes did you think that the americans were being and possibly difficult to deal with on this or that? of course you did. but the british government in my view has to stand up for its own policies in its own ways and i think it is wrong for people to say the rest of it and actually i think britain as a country should feel incredibly proud of the world that we played brutal regimes in history and now you

have a few weeks down the line elections which are going to go well. >> i'm going to call a short ten minute break i think to give a solid research and then we will come back for about a final half-hour if that is ok with you. >> what is to go? >> some tidying up. and sir roger i think as a question set to do with government process and whatever. and that should finish it. >> thank you. >> and i will turn st off -- >> the moral case speech was the day of the march. >> thank you for staying on this

long. i've just got a few questions to finish off with. on the question the way the cabinet was involved in the policy as a whole in your diaries are pretty eliminated on the cabinet discussions on iraq straw i think said that iraq -- the cabinet discussed iraq 28 times between some timber, 2002, and march of 2003. but the butler report commented that there was a remarkable absence of papers for these cabinet discussions. why were to their papers for th discussions? >> i don't know. >> you don't know? >> my job isn't preparing papers for cabinet. >> but you are in adviser. he might know why these discussions didn't have the sort of papers of the normal in cabinet, but you don't know?

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>> i think the prime minister once said in a different context that if he thought the first time he was aware of a difficult seed within the cabinet or people strongly opposed what he is the leader of the cabinet in the prime minister was saying or doing, at the first time in about it is when he got to the cabinet table you would think his political systems would not have helped much, so it is true there were lots of-- and i can

see why sometimes people might have thought he is just going to bring it up to date. and sometimes that was all there was to do but i was certainly present at the cabinet meeting as well, really a pretty vigorous said-- conversation and obviously those people foreign secretary defense secretary deputy prime minister, the people who were involved in the ongoing discussion that was 24/7, they probably would be taking the lead but then i think what others were doing where may be directly involved in the day to day formulation of policy were challenging, testing. we thought about where it was david blogged and margaret beckett and others who are raising questions. often, i think it was charles, often he and the chief whip

getting very very frank assessments as to what people were saying, what people thought, what their concerns were and the prime minister then having to engage in that but i mean, you will know from your discussions with them as well that i think sometimes it is said that the last labor government used to have cabinet meetings that were went on for over two days as the prime minister would not think that was a very effective form of cabinet government. he would know what his ministers or his colleagues were thinking, concerns they had and the cabinet table was off to where they were fresh out. >> why wasn't the secretary of state for international development included in this inner circle of people given her department was going to be the lead department on questions to do with humanitarian relief and quite a lot of the dealing with the aftermath of the conflict as well as with its humanitarian consequences? >> that is a very good question and in an ideal world the

secretary state for international development would come and should and could have been in all of those discussions. i mean, how can i put this, i think it is fair to say that when i step back a bit, cav met government and people that talk about rumsfeld and america being difficult for the president sometimes to deal with, the cabinet in the end their appointed from within a fairly narrow pool, certainly a small number and sometimes you have to make political-- cab nets sometimes reporting together different political factors. >> i did not work in the political-- >> know but you know how sometimes how difficult a was to reshuffle and put together a cabinet. the point i am making is to have a collection of individuals of variable competence, of the variable trustworthiness and the

prime minister eyes, and sometimes he would want to have discussions with smaller group of people. >> are you implying in your deeply diplomatic way that the secretary of state for international development was not regarded as trustworthy, or as competent? >> when clear short was at your department or in support of of a government policy or position, then i think she was both trustworthy and competent and i think there are people you can talk to say that she was terrific at every level. i can remember for example during the kosovo crisis, clear did an awful lot with pretty extraordinary work at the time but it is no secret. she was very difficult to handle the times. i think sometimes the military and i think that emerged in the evidence of witnesses, i think

the bond it for quite difficult to deal with. i think sometimes they are probably work concerns at times about whether a very, very sensitive and tightly held conversations as to whether in a political environment, whether sometimes you may be a little bit worried that things would get out into the public demand you wouldn't necessarily want in the public domain. >> because she was difficult, her department couldn't therefore be included fully in the work. they didn't receive, as we have heard from earlier witnesses, the iraq options paper of march 2001. she heard about it later and complained. >> i found that surprising. >> you found that surprising? it was sent out from number 10 but they were not on the distribution. that wasn't a sensitive document. she says in her book in september of 2002 and initially

was told by fsis that she could receive the breathing on orders from number ten. a similar story at the military briefing. what were the consequences of this for the government's aso whole, the ability to plan effectively for the aftermath of the conflict? >> again, i am no expert on that side of government policy and planning. i mean, i think it would be obviously, if you had a really good, strong harmonious working relationship across government then i suspect hopefully our government machinery and its operations would be improved, and i know that there were times when people who were out there and you have heard from some of them who said they sensed some elements were a bit to disengage from the whole thing, whereas in

previous situations where claire short-- claire short was supported. i think it was something that was difficult but i hope correctable in a fairly short timeframe. i don't think for example if you get into the aftermath the don't think and say that is the reason why things went so as badly as they did in the aftermath but would it have helped if we would have had better relations? certainly so. >> turning for a minute to the ministry of defense, were they affected by this inner circle factor as well? the cds that the time, admiral lord boys has told us he wasn't able latell a weatherly stage to talk to the defense logistics. will you conference---- >> they had not been kligman eclair instruction or approval

to do things that might become publicly obvious in the autumn of 2002 when it was publicly fairly obvious that contingencies were being thought about. >> that would be because the prime minister has said, and a sense he has got his diplomatic strategy and possibly that is what he is trying to push the cardes doesn't work. and i can see why. i certainly was aware at times of the military willing to get on with things and i think the prime minister had a very good relationship with cbs. he was able to speak very very openly and frankly and gave the frank assessment of what was going on in what he might need. but i think i don't remember that in detail but i suspect what was happening there may be perfectly legitimate-- let's just hold on for now. but i can remember, before

crawford, his team where at least thinking about planning. just because they knew the americans had been planning. >> so this is right back in march of 2002 that they were thinking about it? >> everybody was aware that the issue was on the agenda. the prime minister was being pretty clear that conflict is not inevitable. it is going to be disarmed and i think in my diaries a meeting before crawford, to his credit and i read this the other night, i think he was right in there saying look at this is going to happen whatever timeframe, we have to start thinking about it now. >> are you encouraging him to be more optimistic in his assessments? he said without naming who said this, when he came to us, that

he had never had any hesitation in making his reservations about what was going on and i think particularly referring to the state of planning for the operation and indeed i quote care was taken aside from time to time to say can't we make it more of a half full rather than a half empty assessment? can you remember that that is the sort of raise you may have used with them? >> after that the "financial times" ran a story saying that was me. i certainly don't remember ever sang that to mike boise. there was a chitchat and you might say the prime minister hinote, in a bit of the mood or fed up with this are fed up with that but as you know i would never encourage anybody to be anything other than totally frank with the prime minister. that was the approach i always took. >> of fica just sort of maladjust turn a little bit to the aftermath.

you obviously were in a central position where one of those were thinking about the aftermath, thinking about the communications aspects of this. and, i believe major-general tim cross at some point i think came and had a discussion with you about the way that the post conflict was being handled and in particular the media team and you said that you were happy to see him and subsequently for you some support for the media team. would you like to say a little bit about your perspective from number ten about how the coalition prepared in the run-up to the conflict for what was going to happen after the military campaign and how up to the time that you left number ten and august of that year, you saw the post conflict situation

being handled by organizations with names like-- which may ring a bell with you? >> yes. as i said, admirable-- admiral boise, the prime minister from very early on, before there was any real understanding that there even would be military action it was plugged into the thinking that should there be military action, the morning after planning has to be done on an ongoing basis and i think there was a lot of planning going on. i certainly saw pieces of work that came down from different parts of the government system. >> where was this happening? >> well, within different departments of government and also i know that we probably were led to believe that the state department was taking the lead on a lot of this and of course they were taking the lead in a military operation and i

think that would lead to an acceptance and understanding that they would be very centrally the dominant way involved in the aftermath and i think. >> when did you discover the americans hadn't been planning properly for the aftermath? can you describe that? >> for me, it was, i mean certainly tim cross, to see me was a bit of a revelation. he was very, very-- he made a big impact on me and as i think i told you, whether there is any space in the prime minister's diary when he came and saw him, because he had been to the states and he had been to that meeting that he described to you with the secretary of state for defense and he just-- i think we have been constantly saying, is the planning, is it being done and getting reassuring noises

back and they think with and what the british government could do i think there was a lot going on, accepting as everyone says that any immediate's situation is going to be lack of clarity, they are going@@@@@ @ r >> i certainlyly think that we saw both in terms of the politics of this that in being seen to try so hard to take it did you know the un route, the un perhaps minus america were understood that would it be referred to the final role. did that affect in terms of

financial planning? i don't think so? but i wasn't really involved in that type of discussion. there certainlyly was a assumption. assumptions were made about department planning. once we had realized that actually the pentagon appeared to be taking the lead on almost level on this aftermath. from that moment on, the prime minister was rattling a lot of cages. he was-- asking for an awful lot of things to be done. [inaudible] >> yes, but not only for reasons that again and gets back to the point of there is only one simple thing. you can say it was all donald rumsfeld rick only claire short have been getting along better with the prime minister at the time-- what happened was perhaps

it wasn't that grip in the immediate aftermath and again i am speaking way out of my knowledge and expertise but there wasn't that grip. the invasion, the people that talk about catastrophic success and it happened very quickly, and then it became a security problem and then once they think, once al qaeda and the iranians in the way they did come alighted upon it in the way they did, a kind of lack of grip security problem became a really serious security problem and that then affected every aspect of what was going on there. again, tim cross, a lot of the concerns he talked about when he first came, i think they were real concerns, genuinely held but probably sort of bull at a fairly short timeframe, once he managed to get people who were capable of sorting.

but once the security security situation developed as it did you didn't have this obviously philosophical difference in approach between the british and americans in terms of fighting wars and peacekeeping, and so for a period of time that it was clearly very difficult. on my side of things in the communications side, i did what i could. i sent half of, one point i was going to go there, but i think there was a worry that it would be seen as-- the americans were sensitive of the britons taking over. tim cross, but he never-- what every needed, i eventually did they plan, which i've been trying to find we have not been able to find it but i did a plan for bremer of communications structures based on what we had done previously and adapted to

it, and then the foreign office went out there. we put together a pretty detailed communications plan. we fill the beds that we want to fill then lots of the bets frankly did not get filled. the guys that we sent did an incredible job in incredibly difficult circumstances but in the bigger picture it became a an incredibly difficult security problem that ticket long time to-- >> you have given support with very great conviction. do you consider now that it being a success and looking back on it, what lessons would you draw from it beyond the points that are already being made for example just know about the aftermath and what regrets, if any, do you have?

>> d.w.i support it? c.s. i think as i said to you just before the break, i think that britain, far from beating ourselves up about this, should be really proud of the role that we played in changing iraq from what it was to what it is no becoming in the potential impact that has on the region. i think for example libya and the moves it made in relation to wmd, i don't know because i wasn't involved in the discussions but i wouldn't be surprised and partnering to say that these guys were serious about this issue. i think, i saw the prime minister as closely and probably as often as anybody else and i saw some really deep conviction and integrity, who was making without a doubt the most difficult decision of his premiership, knowing there were going to be consequences but also understanding there were a

lot of questions. had he taken another decision. i thought-- was glib about the relationship. >> in looking at the huge cost and loss of life over no six and a half years, and the effects on the stability of the middle eastern region, at the development of international terrorism within iraq, do you consider that overall the policy has succeeded? >> i do, but not without reflecting often, and realizing the caveat that you just put into that. i think in relation to the middle east peace process, the road map is still, the outline and the prime minister did give the americans to go down there

and-- for progress. i think in terms of security, yes the death toll has been high. in terms of iraqis, obviously any loss of in the british soldiers like this not just tragic, but obviously weighs heavily on anybody involved in the process, most particularly obviously the prime minister come up but i still think-- i mean, he had and i saw it long before september the 11th. he was going on about a.q. khan and the potential link between wmd, the terror groups, failed states. this is the agenda that he saw that had to be addressed by leaders of the democratic world that he raised its. he raised it in his first meeting with george bush. this is going to be the number-one issue of your time.

that was before september the 11th so i think good things have been done differently? almost certainly. any decision you can go back over it but i think on the big picture, on the leadership he showed, the leadership the government showed, i was privileged to be there and i am very proud of the part that i was able to play. >> final question then. >> yes, can i just ask a couple of questions and reflections from you? the first question, you described to us before the break about the shock in discovering there may not be any wmd. when did you first realize how difficult the aftermath might be ended the strike even the same way?

>> early, seven days, i think seven days after the invasion, there was a meeting in which john scarlett talked about sort of the real difficulties, the sense of the americans really not knowing, not appearing to have a plan that we thought they did, really serious questions starting quite early. >> and what was the response to your concerns? what did you think you could do? >> there wasn't much that i could do. >> or what the government could do. >> from that point on, i have not read all the papers beyond my time, but that there are those who have that will say and certainly i have always kept in touch with the prime minister after left downing street, that i think he was-- yes a lot of

them were very difficult to resolve and at that point there was a period when there appeared to lose focus and not have that staying on top of all of the problems, so there's no doubt there was a difficult period. >> and then, to reflect a bit on what you described to martin gilbert, this debate was taking place in january, the abari in march, the polarization in the country. did that make it difficult within government to have a re-evaluation of where you work, but because the stakes had been raised so high politically, that if you were standing back from it he might even be seen to be hedging back to the other side. >> you see, it is true that the country was clearly very, very divided. the parliamentary labour party

very divided. actually within the cabinet there was a lot of genuine support for the position. obviously old robin cooke resigned and eventually claire short resigned. the questions that were constantly being put in the issues and concerns being raised, they weren't saying let's fundamentally be of value with the position here. the position was said them his the threat. the british government had become a greater threat and it had to be confronted. he had to be forced to face up to his united nation obligations. did it mean that obviously the aspect of policy was look that at different times in different ways? that didn't really change the whole thing. did it make it more typical of the fact that there was so much public opposition? yes. >> did it also mean there was

perhaps more the focus on the war itself then on the aftermath, and on the u.n. process, the big decisions he would have to face? should regime change take place? they were not given the same attention? >> do you mean-- my recollection is that all of those issues were getting very, very large public debate. but it is true, after the invasion and windy inquiries-- again this could be my memory not being that great books my sense is that the aftermath and in a sense it not become as big a media and political issue at

the time. i am being frank, i thought it probably could and should have them and they think maybe if it had, the corrections that had to take place might have happened a bit more quickly. >> this is a consequence of intense political debate that focuses on particular things. >> don't forget as well, within the british political media system, once the bbc broadcast of the report that they did in may when the prime minister first-- that to a large extent completely took over the debate. it was another of the very unfortunate consequences of that. so actually there was probably less attention, less focus on what was then actually happening in iraq on the media level and a political level then there should've been. meanwhile those who were getting into iraq, military and intelligence guys and so forth but also those who were trying

to restore some kind of civil administration and public services and so forth, they had a tough job and i tend to agree not is an expert nor somebody who knows about this much is the people on the panel but i do tend to agree with john straw's assessment that given the circumstances they did a pretty amazing job of getting things u eventually the way that they did. >> i think we have pretty much come to the end of this session. a question to you mr. campbell, have we given you sufficient opportunity to offer us your reflections on the lessons to be learned, real-world lessons about the whole experience? >> real world? >> real world lessons. >> i would just say, as is lessons learned i think looking from where i