poverty and help families? does he share their analysis that the best way to tackle child poverty is through child tax credits and not through policies advocated by the official opposition? >> we have had the conservative family document published today and it does not mention that they wish to take child tax credits away from large numbers of people. it does not mention that they want to take the child trust fund away from large numbers of people. as for honest politics, mr. speaker, if you publish a document and you do not tell people what your policy really is -- >> [unintelligible] >> mr. speaker -- mr. speaker, last week i said that the conservatives should give up the posters and concentrate on policy. now that i have seen their policy, i have to say that they are just as well with their posters. >> [laughter] >> john randall. >> can i ask the prime minister to look into the excessive delays within the home office

in resolving the outstanding issues of funding for unaccompanied child asylum seekers in the london borough of hillingdon, with all the financial consequences and possible implications for social cohesion? >> i will undertake to look into this very matter. he is talking about an issue that is obviously very serious for those affected and their families, so i will look into it carefully. >> graham allen. >> number seven, mr. speaker, on the alternate vote. >> i have given a commitment that a referendum will be held early in the next parliament so that people can decide whether they want to move to the alternative vote system. >> although there is no such thing as a perfect electoral system, the alternative vote would mean that every member of parliament returned would have at least 50% of the electorate locally supporting them. unlike any proportional representation system, it would also maintain, and indeed

strengthen, the constituency link that is so vital for all members of parliament. will the prime minister therefore consider whether he can trust members of this house and, ultimately, members of the public to have a serious discussion on electoral systems and consider what electoral system they should use to send people here? >> ultimately, this must be decided by members of the public in a referendum. the advantage of the alternative vote system is that it retains the constituency link, which i believe is important not just to members of the house, but to the whole population. given the issues that have arisen about trust in politics, there is a case to be made for every member coming here with the support of more than 50% of the electorate, as a result of the alternative vote system. i believe that there is a case for a referendum on this issue, and that those who wish for reform will wish for a referendum on that basis. >> question eight.

michael fabricant. >> the 200-year-old dam in my constituency, which is an earthworks dam containing the chasewater reservoir, has started to leak. a recent engineers' report says that if it collapses, there will be scores of lives lost and a lasting effect on the west midlands. the small district of lichfield does not have the funds to make the urgent repairs. will the prime minister please use his best endeavors to ensure that this is taken financially over a much broader region? >> of course i will be happy to consider his point, although i see that he is making the case for public expenditure. >> martin salter. >> on friday, mp's and councilors of all parties and local military historians will gather to take forward plans to provide a permanent memorial to

trooper potts, reading's only recipient of the victoria cross, won at gallipoli in 1915 in an act of outstanding courage. will the prime minister, to whom i have written on this subject, offer a message of support for our endeavors to mark forever the gallantry of this truly local hero? >> i agree with him that a permanent memorial would be a great way of expressing not only our debt to the people whom he has mentioned, but our continuing debt to all those who have served our country, including those who have been honored for doing so with bravery and having demonstrated the greatest of courage. i hope that his proposal can move forward. we will do what -- everything we can to help it. >> andrew rosindell. >> will the prime minister introduce an annual limit on immigration? >> we have introduced a points system for immigration, which i believe is starting to work. he will see, from announcements

coming soon, that the number of people whom we need to come to this country, to meet the demand for the skills, is being substantially reduced as a result of the skills and people being trained here. the points system is working -- unskilled workers who are not needed and who cannot make a contribution to the economy are not allowed into the country. >> order. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> each week we air prime minister's questions, why on c- span2, wednesdays at 7:00 a.m. eastern, and then again on sunday night on c-span. at c-span.org, you confine day archive of past prime ministers questions. -- you can find an archive of past prime minister's question.

geoff hoon served under tony blair. he testified at an inquiry to examine the british involvement in the iraq war. this is about one hour and 20 minutes. >> one of the things they kept referring to was a letter in october, on the 29th of october, we wrote that the u.s. planning was increasing, assuming that there would be no

u.k. land contribution. >> let us presume where we left off. >> just following on from there we talk about these options, and the affected two employees were no. 2 and no. 3. no. 2 was a significant maritime a number three was a division. and you've given us some indication of the pressures and considerations for a division. how would -- how word different options and evaluated? you have indicated they had many implications. what was the process by which you assessed which of these

would like to go for? >> in terms of what was actually achievable, i think it was assumed that we would want to be helpful to the united states in the situation, and therefore how would we go about contributing as much as was consistent all along with all of the of the pressures that we faced. >> what of the paper that went through the advantages? >> the letter that i just referred to, the 29th of october, indicates some of those points. not least -- it is written by my private-sector type -- secretary but it is from my office to the prime minister. >> out of interest there -- by

and large your letters came from office to office rather than writing directly to the prime minister. >> it seemed to vary. that never quite understood. i am sure there is some civil servant convention for this, but it tended to be the case that i would write my own personal views directly to the prime minister. if i wrote on behalf of the department, it was more likely to come from my office. >> the different options were set out as late as october 29, which is quite alarming. the assumption that all this had been settled by september, it clearly was not. >> and in response to sir

roderic earlier, there's a sentence here, significantly more expensive in itself, reducing our vulnerability to u.s. requests. oh, sorry. my apologies. it is worth noting while no. 3 is significantly more expensive than package #2, making it available could reduce our vulnerability to u.s. requests to provide a substantial and costly contribution to post- conflict stabilization authorization. that is clearly in my mind as part of the decision making process. >> to clarify on this point, you seem to be suggestion -- to be suggesting before the break that not that we would not be involved in the conflict stabilization, but that our forces would be better prepared

because they would know the terrain and the people. there would be acclimatized. what you just said we would rather be there making a meal than doing the washing up. our forces wanted to be part of the main action and the post- conflict was in the secretary to that -- secondary to that. >> there is also an assumption that we share that the british forces are pretty good at making the adjustment from war fighting to stabilization and to peacekeeping and nation- building. i think that we were pretty good at that. there was a sense and which we are confident that we would do a very good job, if we made that

kind of transition. it would be more difficult if they simply came man for the peacekeeping part. >> just to clarify, you're not assuming that these were alternatives. you either did -- my analogy to cooking, all of the washing but you could do both. >> complicit was the assumption -- implicit was the assumption that if we did the washing, we would have to do that on a larger scale than had we been involved in before fighting stage. >> that is a presumption that other countries are prepared to contribute what could be a challenging task. there would be no guarantees on that. >> no. >> on the weight of the options

reviewed, was the position of no. 10 on these alternatives between no. 2 and no. 3? >> my sense was that, generally speaking, the prime minister wanted us to be involved to the maximum extent that was possible, that he would accept the advice from the military and from me as to what was practically achievable. the prime minister was anxious to do with the united kingdom could to help. >> but over september and into october, there had been concerned about the competing demands of operations, and the americans might go before there was any way that we could be ready.

was it the case that the prime minister was prepared to describe to the americans that number to was a significant contribution? >> i think he would have had accepted it, had it been the case that because of the american timescale or other factors affecting our forces that we could not do option three. he would have accepted that. i was under huge pressure to offer -- i was not under huge pressure to offer no. 3 from downing street. it was my assumption that that is what it wanted. >> it is perfectly reasonable to imagine the uk being quite involved in the american operation, but not to the extent that was eventually the case, not with the division, if

politically unsatisfactory. >> that is exactly the import of the letter we've been discussing, saying the americans are moving ahead, they are assuming that we're not going to be involved on land. >> is it not the case that after this letter, there still was not a final decision taken -- >> it was taken around the 31st, quite soon after that. >> one more thing to look at. can i move to something. you also mentioned before the break, referring to operations in the south as being discussed at this time. i was under the impression that it was still very much on the northern option at this time. is that correct? >> yes. >> at what point were you aware that there were difficulties in turkey giving us cross-nation

support? >> i think that awareness group toward the end of 2002. colin powell had been to turkey and reported back, probably through jack straw, that the turks were quite reluctant, and specifically that the americans might be able to secure some facing and transit rights, that they were pretty uncomfortable with us going through there. you may come on this in the second but that was a particular issue. no, it is more the post-first world war settlement. i went to turkey at the beginning of january and got a rapid history lesson as a result. so we knew that this was born to be a problem, and i've been to

turkey quite a lot, and the new government there, there were issues about this government being as influenced by the military as other governments. they struck me, and i spoke to a lot of them during this time, as being much more democratic and like us in the way that they responded to issues, and therefore the prospect of large numbers of soldiers transiting their country, i can see, was going to cause them some problems. we were thinking that that might be a problem and we were preparing contingency plans if we cannot go through the north. but i do not think that decision was taken, my visit to turkey in the beginning of january. when i came back from turkey, i basically had formed the view that this was not going to happen.

>> in the chronology, it may have been just before, around a third of january. i think there was a question of still needing to work with the turks. >> i have seen the evidence that you have been given so far and i did not agree precisely. we were aware of this, colin powell in particular of alerting us to the particular attitude of the turks toward the british being in turkey. i would specifically to determine that, to decide whether or not we would get those transit rights. turkey never actually said no. they never actually say we could not go through turkey, but i came back partly because of the newspaper there, i gave an interview with the turkish equivalent of "news night," were

all they were talking about what would it was what happened in the 1920's. that britain could not entirely trusted. i warned that the view when i came home that we would never get the transit through turkey. that was the point that we took the decision to ban go into the south -- to then go into the south and reorganize our effort. the united states did not take that view for quite a long time. the fourth division stayed in the eastern mediterranean until after the initial invasion, because the americans assumed that at some stage that turkey would agree. >> i think we would want to check the timing on that. however you look at this, it is quite late in the day to be shifting from one flank to

another. all of our planning up to this point goes on one basis and then all of a sudden, you are now looking at having to explain to members of the government that we're looking at a completely sort -- different sort of option $3 we were already because of the affirmation we previously received, we were getting a feel about what might be involved. we had to discuss with the americans that as an alternative. it was not all the sudden. but the actual decision did not come until i came back from turkey. >> one of the things we heard from jonathan powell was that if we had gone through the north that we might have gone as far as to correct -- tikrit. >> i'm not sure that we got into the aftermath planning as far as the north was concerned.

i remember seeing, prior to him going to tampa, the idea that i mentioned earlier -- to divide whatever force iraq had between the north and the south. on like in the first gulf war, the kuwaiti border was relatively short with their back. since we could not cross the saudi border, the soldiers were being funneled through a relatively narrow area, particularly vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, and the like. there was a lot of concern on a significant force coming to a relatively narrow area.

the advantage of the northern option was that it divided iraq's forces but gave us more space in which to operate. >> and that it went as far as tikrit, are relatively benign area operate. >> we anticipation of the level of security, it would of been inaccurate. >> major logistical issues about going to the south, which could only be resolved with american help, is that correct? >> it was always assumed that you did go to the south and that we would be depended on significant logistical help from the u.s. but the change to the south did not have -- clearly it meant that things had to move slightly

more quickly, but actually i do not recall that anyone has to settle on that. i came back on the night of january, and it did not sail until the 16th of january. one sortie began on the 23rd of january, so in a sense, they were not hanging around, any sort of delay. i could not even imagine that the journey was particularly longer going through the suez canal rather than having to make a long land transit across southern turkey. certainly the relief was there but again, i do not recall any particular anxiety on the part of the military that this could not be done, but -- partly

because the planning was under way because -- before my visit to turkey, and partly because they are pretty good at making those sorts of a adjustments. >> we would like as some questions on the legal dimension. noting that you are a professional lawyer by background, and a constitutional lawyer. >> not an international lawyer. >> in march 2002 you had a conversation with john donne's will be -- thimbles be -- john dimblesby. we understand and we have permission to the classified the expression and the difficulties in that view.

i wonder if you would like to take us through that exchange and to ask initially, were you relying on your own view of the war and what you said to him, or was there a in the deep -- mod do behind it? >> it was a wide-ranging interview. we have long interviews with politicians, not five minutes or 10 minutes. he was able ask a lot of questions. to the best of my recollection, i have not read a transcript. i have not sent writing the letter. -- i have not since i wrote the letter. i was trying quite hard, to put it this way, to answer any questions and that is quite difficult when there are only

two of you having a conversation. as i recall, i think the documentation supports this, i gave an example of self-defense as justification, not requiring a further un resolution. is it be as if iraq attacked british forces, we would be entitled illegally to respond. i'm not sure that i will need for the net. i don't recall getting any kind of detail. the reason why peter goldsmith replied was not, i do not think he was particularly concerned about the nature of my legal observations. i think was more concerned that i might be in effect boxing him and when he came to write his own opinion on the subject, and

so what he wanted to avoid was that out there i had already prejudge this matter legally. but my example, as i say my letter, was about self-defense, not a justification. therefore i do not think i particularly trespassed on his area of proper legal responsibility. >> it should be understood in your interview that this was a subtle form of address. >> i was pretty -- trying pretty hard not to answer his questions. the bush a straw line for a moment under that. we're now in 2003. the invasion and our anticipation is now imminent. i think it is the seventh of march that the attorney of general -- the attorney general

gives advice to the key people of the top of government. it is a finely balanced review of the arguments. it indicates the risks, it is incidentally on the risk of prosecution of service personnel -- >> and the politicians. >> indeed a politicians. any more concerns to commit british troops, or was it something that as a lawyer as well as a politician would expect in terms of advice in that situation? >> i had read at the time a long legal advice. he is a very -- is quite complex and dense and raises a number of quite difficult issues.

i was clear that his conclusion was that there was a legal justification for military action based on 1441, revising the previous resolution. i have in front of me. i accept that a reasonable case can be made that 1441 is capable in principle without a further resolution. that was his conclusion. >> i like to ask you about difficulty or what is needed between off finally argued extended review of the arguments and and on balance conclusion which the attorney general gave in his long version, and the military need for the one line.

we all thought that we needed a one line sign a certificate. >> we would of been in the same legal position as the military if we had taken unlawful action. >> and after the attorneys' advice, there is a meeting on the 11th of march where he would need to have a short line, a short paragraph in its operational directed to the armed forces. captain tebbit said the same. and he received that assurance and a letter from the attorney's office was ending mod on the 14th of march. did you or he had any discussions -- the chief of defense -- did you and he feel

the need or did you sit down and say, this is it? . >> ibm -- our recall being told off rally by my -- that my opinions were too academic. he said the client wants an answer, and in a sense, this was

the answer. the fact that you say it was finally argue did not come as any great suppliersurprise. he came to of view, and it was that you that we were looking for. >> one other dimension to this. you could see in the attorney general's advice of the seventh of march, as with some other of your colleagues including the foreign secretary. many of the cabinet colleagues did not see it, and the discussion was based on something much shorter. it was a draft of the parliamentary answer.

do you think now, or did you think at the time that your cabinet colleagues would have wished to be led into that -- let into the details on the one hand or the other? >> i am not sure that it would be appropriate to have that kind of this discussion. you would be inviting people to speculate on a legal judgment that the attorney general had reached. it is not the same as having a political discussion about options or policies. this is someone whose decision is that this was lawful. i cannot see how cabinet could look behind that. this was not policy advice. it is not on the other hand you could take this course of action. he was saying this was lawful in his judgment. i do not see how we could have

had a sensible discussion going behind that. >> one member of the cabinet did say she would like to have a full discussion, which was not granted. >> i hope for the reasons i just set out, i do not see how you can have that kind of discussion. do you have a vote on whether the legal device is accepted or not? it does not lead anywhere. i can see that you have a discussion about whether it is sensible in policy terms to commit british forces, to take the action we were taking. that was a different matter. having a debate about a legal opinion does not strike me as being very sensible. >> i would like to move on to some other legal issues in a moment. the issue of policy political operation of risk, which is implicit in the legal advice. is it not a proper question for the cabinet to judge, would they

therefore have been aware that there were risks lurking behind a legal of vice? >> i can see further on, i saw this at the time, that in order to justify the conclusion that the attorney general came to, it was necessary for there to be what he described as strong, factual grounds. there needs to be unnecessary underpinning -- gillon >> which he sought from the prime minister. >> certainly we had those kind of discussions. is there sufficient cooperation by saddam hussein and his -- that kind of discussion was taking place.

>> that was the big legal question, but there was a great deal of legal surround to operational and military matters. i would like to ask a few questions, first about the no- fly zones. you gave evidence earlier today about the continuance of the no- fly zones as part of containment. what about the legal justification? it seems clear it was increasingly felled that -- increasingly felt that this was a increasen in lee precarious base. >> as far as on the very specific un security council resolution, this was based on the requirements to prevent an

overwhelmingly humanitarian disaster. nevertheless, it did have an underpinning in a series of un security council resolutions. >> one question that flows from the concerns about the precarious legal base, as time went on for the operations in the no-fly zones -- >> i hate to quibble, but the legal base changed as things went on. the actual operation of the zones change, and i think i touched on it earlier. the legal justification remained. >> successive attorneys general wished to pay closer and tighter attention to the targeted decisions, and so tension

inevitably existed between military need for a swiss -- suisham operation and execution on one hand, and careful legal scrutiny, impact on civilians, etc. did you regard that as a stable situation through the operation of the no-fly zones? >> i think we touched a little on this. the iraqis woulwere becoming moe sophisticated. they were developing radar that could operate from outside the no-fly zone. there were legal issues that were making it more difficult to justify the actions we are taking. were we entitled as a matter of

law, and we probably were, but that is a harder judgment to make to attack radar facilities based outside the no-fly zone, even though they were controlling missiles inside that no-fly zone. they had mobile launchers that slipped into the zone and slipped out again. how were we to determine whether they were legitimate targets or not? >> i imagine you are looking at a lot of this stuff, that it was very hard to assess collateral damage. >> i think 5 miles an hour is the kind of speech we are talking about, but they were mobile. -- a kind of speed we are talking about. they were often located in centers of population. there were serious questions

about the potential for civilian casualties, and i suspect that there were civilian casualties. but nevertheless, that was a judgment that had to be made in light of the risk to raf and usaf personnel. >> the last segment of the legal surrounds to the whole business, looking ahead initially to the campaign of march 2003 before it starts. we understand that he briefed the attorney general on the military objectives, and there are inevitably concerns for the british government, legal as well as policy and military, as we are going in a coalition. two countries, somewhat different rules of engagement, different tolerance levels.

did you and or the attorney identify particular concern is that you felt needed to be addressed? >> our legal basis was always dedicated on the fact that we were disarming iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. that meant that actions had to be consistent from a legal base. that developed once iraq had not taken the opportunity of cooperating with the united states, once it was clear that we were entitled as a matter of law to remove the regime in order to disarm iraq. but that conditionality had to follow. so the legal decisions were consistent with that in terms of targeting, and the meeting with the attorney general would be very much about how we went

about the process of deciding appropriate targets. that again was slightly different from some of the targeting i had done in relation to afghanistan, because the american campaign was different, very much about creating an effect on the ground and making clear to the iraqi people that our target was the saddam hussein and his regime, rather than more conventional military attack on the country as a whole. many of the targets -- the justification was that the targets were associated with saddam hussein and his regime. >> we shared a degree of responsibility as the americans did.

how much interchange would there be, in their political or at the military level between ourselves and the united states forces? on the matter of targeting limits and strengths. >> i think it was a pretty integrated process. once we got to the air campaign and such, because of the modern sophisticated weapons, it was not always known before a plane took off necessarily what its target was going to be. that has changed dramatically from conventional bombing. we had a list of targets, and again, the difference is that i went through them one by one. there was some delegations ultimately, but in the early days, i saw pretty much every target that was going to be

attacked. i did not always know whether we were going to do the actual attack. >> is a speculative, but in the event of something disastrous, there would be at trial to the actual event, but we cannot control the united states. was that a concern? >> that was always going to be a concern, and there were some suggestions in the course of the campaign. there are always those kinds of risks. the advice i received, my job was to minimize the risks as much as possible, although saddam hussein made that as difficult as it possibly could

bite: locating civilian facilities alongside military ones. -- as he possibly could by co- locating civilian facilities alongside military ones. >> was it inevitable in terms of the kind of technology are was describing, where it is possible to have planes in the sky that are then subsequently given targets -- the practicality of modern technology means that is a requirement create was the after the invasion space a lessons learned? >> i think the lessons learned,

and i learned lessons because i approached some of the targets initially very cautiously, if i was told there was a civilian facility alongside the military one. saddam hussein had at least 50 palaces located around the country that he would move from one to the other. we had quite a debate about if we hit one of these targets, what about the people who work there? or they necessarily part of the regime? i think initially i was fairly cautious. one of the things i learned in the course of the air campaign was that modern weapons were increasingly accurate, that it was possible on occasion to hit parts of buildings without causing damage to the other part of the building. as it went on, the lessons we learned were about how much more

accurate modern weapons are than their predecessors. >> with any accurate target, the chinese embassy at belgrade was targeted for a different building. >> that missile or bomber, but not recall which one it was, it went to where it was directed. what's the point to be made it is, the intelligence or factual information becomes as important. >> the advantage we had in iraq, as compared to afghanistan, iraq was probably one of the most photographed countries in the world, so the long history of operations in and around iraq meant that we had a huge amount of information about what it was

that we were targeting. in stark contrast, it was a very limited air campaign in afghanistan, because we simply did not have the same kind of information. >> thank you very much. >> i want to move on to base for military planning. what i would like to hear is what was that time scale that you planned for the involvement with troops on the ground? what was the planning? >> the initial assumption was that once they had deployed, they could remain there until roughly the end of the summer. it was around six months, so the full divisional capability would

remain in place -- i have the phrase late summer in my head. i think we can assume around six months from the initial deployment. >> on what basis was that assumption may? >> on the basis of the strategic defense review assumptions about the length of time we could maintain a large scale deployment. >> did you have any concerns about the phase for planning and what you had heard from washington at the time? >> i think i mentioned already, we were concerned that the planning for the aftermath was not as detailed or is comprehensive as we would have liked, and indeed, in a visit to the pentagon sometime in

february, i took with me a list of things that we hoped the united states would take a hand in. it was a wide range of things. the question of security, the question of how we would deal with the immediate aftermath. above all else at the time, we were very anxious about the extent to which the iraqi people had been dependent on the oil for food program. i have or recollection of being told that 60% of the iraqi people depended for food on the united nations, and there was a clear anxiety that the moment we went in, the un operation stopped. and now we spent a lot of time preparing for the prospect of a humanitarian catastrophe, so

that meant one of the reasons -- we got a ship in very quickly with grain, while we build the pipeline carrying water from kuwait towards basra. the defense minister commented ironically that one of the driest companies was supplying water to a nearby country that had rivers. these were all about making sure that we did not face this kind of humanitarian disaster as a direct consequence of going into iraq. >> he said that she went to the state with a list. what sort of response did you get from them? obviously you express your concerns. what sort of response did you get? >> at the time, a very positive

one. the view was that since the pentagon was given responsibility in the united states for dealing with this phase, they welcomed the suggestions we were making. i accept that not all of those items on my list were followed up in the timescale that we expected. one of the issues was one that went on for some time, the requirement for a further un security council resolution to give legal -- of further legal basis for prisons there. we were very focused upon that. >> this was resolution 1483? >> the legal problem otherwise is that we were essentially covered by the geneva convention. that limited both what we could do equally, it limited the ability of a number of other

countries to come in and help. they require further legal justification to be able to deploy their people, soldiers and others, to assist in the aftermath. even in february, we needed a un mandate to legitimize their international route to sort out sanctions. we were very focused on that. >> what are your expectations about the level of pose conflict? >> our expectations were that all the other might be an initial destruction caused by the invasion, in the sense that the un might then not assist in the delivery of food, that quite quickly we would have expected to get a security council resolution. that would then allow the un to

seamlessly carry-on. until the attack on the un building, that seemed to be happening. it was the attack on the united nations that stopped all that. until then, it seemed to be a reasonable assumption. >> our understanding is that the un was not so keen on un involvement. were you anticipating any conditions with the un, because we do know that president bush used the word vital after some pressure. did you anticipate any u.s. pressure on un involvement? >> you are right that there was some significant hesitation on the part of the pentagon. there was an example where the prime minister did persuade the

president of the importance of this particular course of action. eventually there was such a resolution. from my point of view, i was anxious that we should get a resolution, because i knew how many european countries in particular could not legally under their systems send troops without that justification. we were looking in the aftermath to be able to draw down our forces in iraq. we cannot do that without other countries coming in. if they could not come in without a further a un security council resolution, we had a problem. so the further resolution was important in practice as well as legally, if i can put it that way. >> i know that i saw him in the

course of art meetings. he was present at the meeting with donald rumsfeld were discussed these issues. when you say would instructions i gave him, he was our representative, but at that stage it was the office of pose conflict planning. ? he must of been sent there for a reason. >> he was sent there to help with the process. he was a man i knew pretty well who was a brilliant logistician. he ran part of a good logistics operation in his previous position. his job was to be part of -- i was not actually in day to day contact with him. he was our representative, and

how we judge that he had the right experience and abilities to help make it work. >> he told us that he was passing information back. was that getting to you? >if you knew there was a proble, what steps did you take? did you alerts the prime minister? that fatal errors in planning were made. if you were being alerted, did you inform the prime minister? >> i did not think the prime minister needed separately alerting by me. i accept that there was a mismatch in our system. the lead on civilian construction and development would always be for office of

international development. that is why to some extent there was a mismatch between what was happening in baghdad and what was happening in the south. the natural counterpart in our system -- whereas there were being run out of the pentagon. in a sense, the generals responses will be as much aimed at the foreign office as they were at the minister of defense. his line of communication was not directly through the mod. he was appointed on behalf of the government to do a job inside the office of reconstruction. >> he was really dismayed and astonished by what he found. >> that message came back very clearly. hence the paper, hence the meeting, hence the determination to try and improve that.

>> i want to move on to communication within the u.k. government. can i ask a question about your expectations, about what advice you were receiving on what the forces might fight in the south when they got there? >> i mentioned already, i think our overriding consideration essentially was food, water, and quickly the question of power, electricity supplies. security in the south was a slightly later concern. i do not mean to minimize that. the initial situation on the ground was pretty good. i went to iraq in april after

the invasion, and i walked around with british soldiers. i walked along the side of the waterway. i talked to people. there were children following the soldiers around. there were not following me, but they were fascinated by british soldiers, soldiers who were not wearing helmets. they were wearing berets. it was a very relaxed environment initially. that changed, but in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, as i say, i went to different parts of basra, met people, talk to the local population. there was a very positive feeling initially. >> the point you made earlier about tim cross being there as a representative of the government. where was the need for the

aftermath planning within the government? >> traditionally, it would have been with the foreign office and with coordination. sir john asked me about the differences with the u.s. system and our system. one of the key difference is i learned at the time was that the u.s. department told arrangements were much more self-contained. they were much more the classic silos, not the kind of exchanges that occur routinely between different departments in the british government. it did not appear to be that they had the kind of cabinet structure we are used to, were typically ministers from different departments and civil servants from different departments would meet together. that was a practical problem,

because i knew from jack straw that there was real frustration in the state department. you had much of this expertise, and they were not given much access to that. as far as the uk was concerned, it may well be, and i saw the evidence that we lacked a single focal point of someone willing to do that. the consequence for the ministry of defense is that we became very heavily involved in reconstruction, frankly to an extent that eventually i just was not appropriate, because we are expecting that soldiers would be replaced in some of these basic administrative jobs by civilians, which indeed we had been promised. i got to the point where i actually wrote letters saying we

cannot allow reservists -- one of the things that was happening is that we had reservists carrying out their civilian role civilianbasra and in southern iraq. there was someone from the sea was trying to develop a new currency. there was a teacher who is trying to reorganize the ministry of education in the south. but did get quite frustrated at these people were there for military reasons that had volunteered to serve as reservists for military reasons. they were being asked to carry arab they are essentially civilian role, when in truth a probable quite enjoyed it, but that is not why they were there. i was increasingly frustrated at the failure of the government departments to supply the people who were supposed to come and take over those responsibilities.

>> don rumsfeld had the overall responsible for the u.s. operation, and you are expressing frustration. in our system, there was no ministerial cabinet committee before the complex. would that help if it had a cabinet committee that would have looked at both the invasion and the aftermath? >> there was one set up pretty quickly afterward. i know the prime minister was quickly on to the points that general cross was making. we had regular meetings of the cabinet committee that drew in the different departments. chaired occasionally by me and by others, and it went on for a long time. >> the point is, there doesn't appear to be a single person in the cabinet responsible for

coordinating our approach to the aftermath. >> with the benefit of hindsight, i think that is probably a fair observation. i am not retreating from that. all i am saying is, i was expecting, for all the reasons we discussed, that british forces would take responsibility for the south, that they were good that transition from war fighting to peacekeeping. we put in place quite a number of projects. we could not provide enough people. we call them quick impact projects, were essentially british soldiers -- there was a concern that we were not doing the job of winning hearts and minds. there were a lot of things going wrong with the infrastructure in the south, and they wanted to do something.

they build bridges, the repair some of the sewer systems. they were constantly trying to ensure that the electricity supply was being delivered. a lot of that in the first place was being done by british troops. my concern is that it was going on for rather longer than i anticipated that we should. i expected there to be more help from other departments. you will have to ask other colleagues with the difficulties were. >> the point is, you yourself expressed frustrations, but how would you characterize the relation between the two departments? >> i recall that there were certainly letters offering cooperation, offering to work together. i think she had a particular reservation.

she did not believe that soldiers should deliver humanitarian assistance. she said that out in a meeting. nevertheless, i worked very closely with her. she was very, very committed to ensuring that there was no humanitarian catastrophe in iraq. that is why i recall emphasis on the 60% figure, because that is the figure i got from her. she was very focused on ensuring that the iraqi people were helped and supported in that early period. >> we heard from lord boyce that they were particularly uncooperative, and that he expressed concerns to you. what steps did you take to rectify the situation? >> what i did then was to write

very clearly and to discuss specifically why it was that we were not getting the people, civilians that we had been promised by a certain date, to come in and help deliver the administration of southern iraq, because that was the next stage that had to be developed. in a sense, it had collapsed with the ending of the regime. many of the people i suspect had disappeared. much of that administration would have been in the hands of sunni technocrats, and probably was not a comfortable place for them to be at the time. >> were you aware of that your department was reluctant --

involved in detailed planning because of concerns about security clearance? you were not aware of that? >> let me have a look. i wrote to her on the 16th of january, emphasizing that there was an indication to be represented at the weekly iraq stop taking meetings. essentially, going to military planning meetings in order to get the perspective on the aftermath planning. the letter goes on to say that we would like to attend any equivalent meetings held in your department. what we were doing in correspondence was making sure of the boards were operating together in planning for the aftermath. >> you would agree that the aftermath planning, was not as

well coordinated as it could then? -- as it could have been? cracks in the event of the problems we had to deal with, i would agree with you. the issue is, did we anticipate the problems we ultimately faced. if there is any criticism, we did not sufficiently anticipate the difficulties eventually of security. that was something that developed. in the first place, we probably did anticipate the kind of problems of a humanitarian kine, electricity -- what we did not get right was the extent of those difficulties. electricity is a good example, in the sense that it is supplied to southern iraq -- it always been intermittent and poor. when we took over, they expected everything to suddenly get better, and it did not, because

we were dealing with power stations that had been patched and repaired and kept going. we did some of that as well. the local population quite quickly, perhaps understandably, blamed us for the problems that they had suffered for a long time under saddam. it is not unreasonable. i can see why. they thought that we were helped -- the thought that we are there to help, and it was not happening as quickly as they got. >> tim cross was a representative of government, the sense one gets is that there was nobody taking charge of that. no one was actually saying is these are the issues, we need to take charge of it. >> i keep making the point that

by then, tim cross was in baghdad. he was dealing with the american system -- i am not avoiding my responsibility, but essentially my focus was in the south. we had a huge job in the south to do many of the things they were supposed to be doing in and around baghdad. the situation in baghdad deteriorated much more quickly and dramatically. alta malia, the problems were security problems. >> -- around baghdad, the problems were security problems. >> when tim cross gets to baghdad, he is astonished, he tells us, by the shattered state of the infrastructure, not by a reason of war damage, just the shattered infrastructure.

badges and things tied up with shoelaces. photographic imagery does not disclose that kind of condition of the infrastructure system. is that right? >> the wider point you are making, i agree that we did not anticipate the extent of practical difficulties we were going to face. >> that is where i was heading. it is not just imagery. all sorts of on the ground intelligence, but that picture, insofar as it is put together, the picture of what we would find, turned out to be not what we actually encountered. >> we were always well aware that the shias did particularly badly in the distribution of

whatever finance the regime had. you could always assume that the south would do a lot worse. the levels of poverty and malnutrition and so on in the south were always much higher among some of shia and they were in the center of the country. >> we are coming up to a lunch break fairly soon, but we just need to cover a few more questions before we get there. i would just like to make sure that we are clear about what it was we did anticipate and what we did not anticipate. when did we actually realize that we were going to be in charge in the south in the posed conflict face -- the post- conflict phase, before we even

decided we would do the third option? the third option carried with it the recognition that we would be responsible for this out as part of the plan. >> that is autumn of 2003. in terms of the planning process, that was part of the assumption running through deliberations, but the decision, yes, toward the end of october. >> did we realize at that stage that we would be the occupying power to the selouth? >> that was the reason why we were so keen to see a a further un security council resolution, because of their legal responsibility and constraints upon occupying power and general international law or more

restrictive than we would expect to enjoy under a further un security council resolution. >> going back to this late 2002-2003 time. at that stage, our policy appeared to be under the assumption -- i am talking about the failed second resolution. >> their two debates about a second resolution. there was an operative resolution. >> we were debating that, going to the pentagon by the middle of february. there were two sorts of second

resolutions being discussed. >> if we talk about the resolution that we failed to get in march of 2003, our policy had been based on the assumption that we would get that resolution. that would provide un authority for the action, and that the united nations could come in straight away after the campaign and take charge of the country. so we were not assuming at this stage that we would be the occupying power in this planning cycle? >> i do not think i am disagreeing with you, in the sense that part of what i was talking about in the middle of february was a requirement to ensure that we did not -- we were not the occupying power for too long. whatever the gap was between dalian and assuming those between going in and assuming

those responsibilities, we wanted to keep that as short as possible. >> you say we assume we are going to take charge of the southern region from the stage that we decided to put in the land contribution. but it was only in february that we really started seriously to focus on the aftermath. you made a trip to washington with tim cross, and it was only in mid february that the foreign offices of the iraq planning unit began to coordinate planning of the aftermath. why were we so late in focusing on this question if it had been apparent for so long? >> i think the reasons i have already tried to set out, that british forces are pretty good at this kind of transition. in the first place, the assumption has always been that we would transit very quickly

from war fighting to peacekeeping and to what is often called nation-building. indeed, that was happening from the moment that support was taken specifically to make sure that we had access for shipping to bring in food supply t. from food supplyhe port was taken -- from the moment the port was taken, it was important for thinking about the aftermath to make sure that we had access for deep water ships. i think some work was done on clearing the harbour very quickly in order to get a ship in. the sir galahad got in very quickly with supplies.

>> as you said, this is something very good at. we heard from the commander of the first troops across the border, you quickly become responsible for broke conflicts. straightaway they were into having to administer areas of iraq. as you said, you did not want them to be doing that for too long. >> the answer to your question is that we recognized that they would be engaged in this task, and indeed, you are right, the moment they arrived, there would have been soldiers already engaged in the second phase of operation while some were still fighting. that process was an iterative process that went on until we had taken those four provinces

>> the picture that is being built up by a succession of military witnesses, and not contradicted by anything you have said today, is that effectively we had to make this up as we went along. our military found themselves in charge of civil administration of the southeast of iraq, for which they had not been prepared, which they did extremely well. it was not what they were there for, and had not been planned for. the british government collectively had not anticipated that this was going to happen, and we had nothing planned to put in place. >> i agree in the sense but we had had something planned. my writing letters saying where are these people, to the best of my recollection, i had been given a date. i had been a given assurance that those people would be available. the date had passed, and those people were not in iraq doing

the jobs i had told it would be doing. so there was planning, but for whatever reason, we did not satisfy those targets, those ambitions. we did not have the civilians on the ground doing the jobs that were being carried out by soldiers, by reservists, by and large. >> could that have been because the planning only started very late? >> i think that is probably fair. i do not exactly know what the specific problems were. i do know from other conflicts, particularly in cosimkosovo. it is hard to find people with the right skills to go into what has recently been a war zone. it may be that we did not provide sufficient time lines

for identifying those people and getting them into southern iraq. >> that very much corresponds with what others have said to us. you have reflected the fact you were concerned for a long time about the aftermath, and other ministers likewise. why at cabinet level did we not take more vigorous action to ensure the aftermath planning was done properly? as you say, it is very complicated, and with sufficient time. >> the best of my recollection, we did. i think a lot of work went into -- i am sorry to repeat myself, but into the humanitarian part, into looking at how we dealt with the infrastructure. there was a lot of thought. we had people, for example, that we were going to deploy very quickly who were experts in oil

pumping and delivery. there was concern that the iraqi regime might this have 'attash the oil wells as they had in the first gulf war -- as they had -- they might sabotage the oil wells as they had in the first gulf war. we actually had quite a number of experts in that area who were deployed and were available to do those sorts of things. when things went badly wrong, once the security system started to deteriorate, we were not able to get people to go there because of their increasing worries about security. >> probably need to take a pause

at this point and resume after lunch. we are at the point where planning turns into execution through the invasion happening in the military action being catastrophically successful. i think the chairman would like us to resume after lunch. >> yes, he would. i think sir lawrence would like to ask a very short question, and then we will break. >> we have been focusing on basra and the south in our discussion of responsibilities, but security in iraq is going to depend a lot more on what is happening in baghdad. that was going to be much more of an american responsibility. >> we had some people there, but a very small number of highly specialist people.

>> we have heard a lot about the concerns about how well the americans were prepared for this [unintelligible] was there ever a point where you thought or discussed with colleagues the possibility that the problems that may well result, whatever the quality of the case of weapons of mass destruction and so forth, meant that the occupation of iraq would represent an unacceptable level of risk? >> i referred earlier to a note i wrote to the prime minister, i think it was in march of 2002. i referenced the problem with iran. and i think in that same letter, i pointed out that we had never successfully identify that stage someone who might replace

saddam hussein. there was real concern about what iraq might look like in the aftermath of his regime being removed. that debate was a very live debate, and a lot of discussion about the structure of iraq. that is something we will come onto when we talk about the disbandment of the iraqi army. there was a strong sense that the iraqi army was a forced stability. saddam had not allow the republican guard into baghdad, for example. we assume that is because he did not fully trust will work mostly perpetual -- professional soldiers. in the late stages of the war fighting, we deliberately did not target republican guard units, because we wanted them to be that force of stability in

the aftermath. there was a debate i recall about where we likely to swap one dictator for another. that was clearly a risk. >> afterward we went into war, there's still a debate going on about what it would lead to? >> no, because by then it was clear that the ambition we shared was to have a democratic iraq. but you ask me about prior to that, and certainly there was a lot of discussion. i can recall people suggesting that iraq would fall apart, that the three elements would divide and we would end up with restage rather than one state. there was a great deal of speculation as to what this might lead to, but by the time the war fighting began, it was clear that we saw a democratic

country as being the outcome. >> thank you. we will right now until 2:00, and resume then. thank you very much. >> tomorrow, a couple of programs on afghanistan and pakistan. first, remarks from james jones, national security adviser to president obama on the administration's strategy in those regions. you can see that like, starting at 12 noon eastern here on c- span. senator carl levin, armed services committee chair, talked about his recent trip to those countries. that is live at 2:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> up next, it is "q&a" with status from the washington center discussing politics,