get married. and most of the younger people and don't seem very keen on a. my view of conservatives is it's not for us to tell you what to do through the taxes that my wife didn't put up with it because i was the 150 by way of tax. [laughter] >> this is social engineering, for god sake. and when i joined the party we were not in favor of a. from the shadow business secretary. [shouting] >> order. order. order. [shouting]. order. i'm sure the house wants to hear from mr. mark. >> thank you, mr. speaker. the power company has just announced that they will be closing their call-center with a proposed loss of over 600 jobs. given that sad news, can the

prime minister personally assured me that the business department, the job center network will do absolutely everything they can to assist my constituents and their families, and to help them find alternative employment if that closure goes through? >> mr. speaker, i can assure him that the rapid response unit of the department of work pension and a job center will be available to help his constituents if they are looking for jobs. i have to say to him that 300,000 people are leaving the unemployment register every month. pardo result of the action that job center plus is able to take, and we will be able to put to the assistance of his constituents not only advice but health and careers assistance and in some cases working for others who are young people looking for jobs in the future. we will do everything we can. i have to say to him, however, i hope you will note that all these measures are opposed by the leader of the opposition. >> thank you, mr. speaker. is my right honorable friend

aware of the recent research done by the institute for fiscal on how to tackle child poverty and help families? does he share their analysis that the best way to tackle a child poverty is through child tax credits and not through policies obligated by the official opposition? >> mr. speaker, we have a conservative family document published today and it doesn't mention that they wish to cut child tax credits away from large numbers of people. and it doesn't mention that they want to take the child trust fund away from large numbers of people. as for politics, mr. speaker, if you publish a document and you do not tell people what your policy really is, mr. speaker, mr. speaker, last week i said, last week i said they should give up the posters and concentrate on policy. now that i've seen their policy, i've got to say they are just as well with her posters.

[laughter] >> thank you, mr. speaker. can i ask the prime minister to look into the excessive delays within the home office for resolving the outstanding issues of funding for unaccompanied children's silence seekers in the london road with all the financial consequences and possible implications for social cohesion? >> i will undertake to look at this very matter. he's talking about an issue that is obviously very serious for those people who are affected by that and i will look at it very carefully. >> number seven, mr. speaker, on the alternative vote. >> i've given a commitment to referenda will be held early in the next part for the people to decide whether they want to move to the alternative vote system. >> while there is no such thing as a perfect electoral system, the alternative vote would mean that every member of parliament returned would have at least 50 percent of the electorate local supporting the.

it would also maintain and indeed strengthen the constituency link that is so vital for all members of parliament in this house. and like, what the prime minister therefore consider whether he put trust member of this house and ultimately members of the public to have a series discussion on a left world systems and consider what electoral system they should use to send people here are? >> mr. speaker, this was ultimately be decided i members of the public in a referendum. i think the advantage of the alternative vote system is that it retains the constituency link which i believe is important, not just a mbs of the house or butt to the whole population. but given the issues about trust and politics there is a case for every member of this house coming here with the support of more than 50 percent of the electorate as a result of the alternative vote system to work. i believe there is a case for a referendum on this issue and i

believe that those people who wish to see it reformed or wish to see a referendum on that basis. >> the 200 euro dam in my constituency which is an earthworks dam containing a chase water reservoir started to leak. a recent engineer's report says that if it collapses there will be scores of lives lost and a lasting effect on the west midlands as a region. the small district of lichfield hasn't gotten the funds to make the urgent repairs. can the prime minister please use his best endeavors to ensure that this is taken financially over a much broader region? >> of course, sir, i would be happy to look at what he says on the very specific issue. but i do see he is making the case for public expenditure. >> mr. speaker, on friday in

peace and counselors of all parties and local military historians will be gathering to take forward plans to provide a permanent memorial, and an active outstanding courage to what the prime minister though i have written to them on the subject and offer a message of support for our endeavors to mark for ever the gallantry of this truly local euro? >> i agree with him that a permanent memorial would be a great way of expressing, not only our debt to the people that he has mentioned, but are continuing debt to all those who have served our country and have been honored for doing so, would they have showed bravery and demonstrate the greatest of courage that i hope his proposal can move forward and we can do everything we can to be able to help. >> mr. speaker, will the prime minister introduced an annual limit on immigration?

>> mr. speaker, what we've introduced as a point system and on immigration, i believe that points system is starting to work. and i believe he will see from the advancements of coming soon that the number of people that we need to come to the country to meet skills are needed in this country is being substantially reduced as a result of the skills that we are training and the people we are training in this country. so the points system is working in aññyw prime minister's questions airs 7:00 a.m. eastern and then again sunday at 9:00 p.m. eastern. you can find a link to prime minister's comments and website.

geoff hoon testified before the british inquiry to examine british involvement in the iraq war. some of the issues addressed our military readiness and lack of equipment. this is 2 hours 15 minutes. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> i would like to talk briefly about this before. basically, the campaign went extraordinarily well and was much quicker than anticipated. is that right?

>> i think it was very successful. they were able to target with astonishing precision the enemy to the extent that large numbers of iraqi soldiers in various places simply went home. >> had the coalition's military intelligence turned out to be accurate? >> not unfairly, because i was led to believe the republican -- not entirely, because i was led to believe the republican guard

was a sophisticated unit, but what it demonstrates in contrast with the first gulf war and advances in technology and bombing in particular was that more conventional forces, albeit a much bigger size, simply could not resist. >> on the first of may we get a situation where it is declared the mission is being accomplished. >> the war fighting? >> yes, and what was your reaction? did you think the main task was still ahead? >> i was so what -- always aware that in any conflict, it was going to be longer and more difficult. >> one thing it did allow, as

you were telling us this morning is for us to plan to draw down significant amounts of troops we supplied during the campaign -- what governed that decision? how quickly and at what point did you draw down? >> if we go back to the discussion we had about the size of the force we could deploy, one of the consequences of deploying forces that they have to go have a time for recuperation and recovery. they had to get back to their training site, something i did not entirely understand when i first got to the ministry of defence. we were discussing no-fly zones. i assumed before i went to kuwait to talk to the people that flying missions over southern iraq was good training,

but it was only part of the training, and it meant they could not get back to more encompassing training required, similarly with forces in war fighting -- they had to get back to their normal routine of training and deployment when the time came, so the sooner we got them back from their war- fighting role, the sooner they could resume their normal activities. >> down in the east as we discussed, we found ourselves in charge of four provinces, and we discussed a bit the way in which this was not fully anticipated. had we actually anticipated british forces would be taking bows drawn -- taking basra? >> we anticipated we would be

taking responsibility. i certainly expected others would come into this much more quickly than they did, so it was not purely a military response ability. it proved to be longer than i expected. certainly, we were likely to always have been responsible for taking basra, because this central american plan was to move to baghdad and if necessary, to bypass some of the cities on the way, because they regarded baghdad as the key center psychologically and practically of the regime. >> looking back on the successful campaign, what was the reflection on what they prefer to do differently? >> on the war fighting? i am not sure there was a huge

difference i would have made. the war fighting path was remarkably successful. we sustain some casualties, but by and large, it was a success. sir john made reference to an observation. one of the difficulty iies is tt the resistance left in the wake of the front line is being able to attack not the front line and the hard and combat forces, but some of the people as much -- not so much to the reader but in the side, so some of the attacks -- some of those loyal to saddam hussein took some

american prisoners who were mechanics. i think a chef was taken prisoner. they were able to come in to the side of the advance and, and pes those people were not as well- protected. in a provincial case, the front line would have taken all the resistance with it. that may have been an issue. i think the real issue was that those who were ultimately loyal to saddam hussein were not necessarily wearing uniforms. they were not capable of being dealt with in a conventional military way. >> no big lessons to be learned from the war fighting campaign? >> i think the lessons by and large were certainly very

positive, and they were to do with the benefits of very sensitive technology -- precision bombing, precision attacks, the way in which modern warfare can be conducted with the relatively small number of soldiers as opposed to the force originally anticipated in the original american plan for invading iraq. >> i am going to ask you a few questions on intelligence weapons of mass destruction and go on to the much larger questions. if we start with weapons of mass destruction and intelligence, did the demonstration defense have staff, which is bound to be a major input into the process?

did you get separate briefings on iraqi issues including mass destruction? >> i am not sure i can put a finger on it, but there were regular papers looking at issues like weapons of mass destruction and a range of other issues. military capabilities -- i think i did ask if i could be given information about the resilience of the iraqi armed forces, what kinds of capabilities they had, what was the likely effectiveness.

assessment of military capabilities. >> what were your impressions you gained from this about the overall status? >> i was in no doubt from the material that they had those capabilities. they had both chemical and biological capability. >> and with the nuclear question it was some distance off. >> there was a note going back to our earlier discussions that containment prevented them from securing this material, but that they had pursued quite and it -- to quite an extent the technology required to do everything else. they were working hard on

missiles. they lack access to fissile materials. if they could secure fissile material, they would be able to move relatively quickly towards securing a nuclear weapon. i could see that containment had been successful. >> when the question of the bossier came up, -- they dossier came up, were you aware of this? did you take interest? >> i was aware there was going to be adopted. i was also aware there would be consulted in the preparation of the dossier. >> were you aware there were concerns about the language used? >> i was not aware of the details until i think the

bubbler inquiry. i was not aware of the details of the inquiries made. i did see the points made at that time. what i did see was a letter from the policy director on the 20th of september, 2002. he said cdi staff had been closely linked to it. i was given specific advice that dis was content with the dossier. >> as we know, that was the level at which the issue was decided not to take it.

>> when the document was published, one issue was this 45 minute question period were you aware of the misleading impression that this was for a longer range misfiles? >> first, when i saw the draft, the only saying in the draft i had not seen before in terms of my familiarity with this. my experience in dealing with intelligence is that if you saw something new and different, you would ask about it.

i asked what that meant, and i have not been able to find it any it -- in any record. they got someone to explain what that meant, and i had an impromptu meeting in my office to really go through what was meant by a 45-minute claim, and the idea was that saddam had chemical weapons. he could do so again, and 45 minutes was a long time for him to be able to order the shells could be loaded into dun's -- guns. i did not think much more of it.

i know thereafter there was an issue about some newspaper reports. as it turned out, i did not understand why until they put on screen the two newspapers, and i realized at that stage -- i could not quite understand why, but we checked my diary the next morning, and i had been in kiev for a couple days. i simply had not seen these papers. >> you did not get involved in the issue at the time? the final issue is this phrase, beyond doubt.

did you comment on it before? >> i certainly saw the draft. i did not comment on it. it did reflect my view of the information i had been given. i first saw intelligence in relation to iraq in may of 1999. i have asked to see some of that intelligence that the assessments were that iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and those continued throughout my time -. there was -- there was a riding on the 17th of march.

it is clear. iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them, and the capacity to reassess production. the scale is hard to quantify. it is undoubtedly much less than 1991. evidence points out that it is already significant. there was a paper saying iran had stocks of chemical agents and the means to deliver them and pose a direct threat to forces in the middle east. he could produce biological agents without rigid within days. all of that was quantified. >> on this question, as the

forces went into iraq, we have being found. when did you begin to suspect they were not there? >> i daresay i was probably one of the last to conceive. there were stocks of chemical weapons, but those stocks faded from the iraq-iran war, so i began to understand how it could have been that those wanting to pass information back to the united states and united kingdom might have been relying on those

stocks. some were used as improvised explosive devices without any understanding of what was in the shell. and those shells were being used by some of the insurgents in the aftermath of the invasion. without understanding what they were -- i am not suggesting for a moment that there were of recent production, but they were there and in store, presumably in barracks and armories looted in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. >> it took you a while until the report of the survey? >> i think that is when it began to be clear. again, one of the issues i never quite understood -- i think it is a straightforward issue. why if they did not have access to these stocks, did such an

enormous amount of effort go into trying to frustrate the work of the inspectors? there is not an entirely satisfactory answer to that, as far as i am aware, other than that i have speculated people around him knew this production had ended, and no one dared tell him, whether he wanted to keep up the pretense in order to intimidate his neighbors. >> these are indeed matters for interesting speculation, but i think i would like to move on. >> sorry. >> no, it is fine. it is a fair matter to question is a clever man. you inherited a strategic defense -- i think the question is about equipment. you inherited a strategic defense, and one of the main features was focusing on expeditionary warfare.

is that fair? >> yes, i think a series of white papers to -- through my time we publish more -- were moving to the emphasis of the ministry of defence away from the kind of defense of the cold war period to a more expeditionary capability. it requires massive adjustments in capabilities. having a single and relatively relaxed logistics chain, it was necessary to have a series of such support organizations that could move very quickly and very long distance, so instead of having months if not years to prepare for the prospect of an intact from countries --

prospect of an attack from those countries and to have a similar amount to build up our own capabilities, we needed to be able to move people as we did. we took a decision on friday afternoon, and troops would go to sierra leone. they were there on sunday morning. . i visited that exercise and everyone rightly praises their own armed forces, but i came

away with the huge appreciation of their ability to move this force from united kingdom to operate and oman -- in oman and move it back again without any other source -- there is no base that they moved to, they moved to a desert. they set up their camp, they did their training, and then moved back again. it showed me in a very practical way the requirement for successful logistics', which is not something that is widely praised when someone talks about the armed forces, but what would -- but which is a necessity. >> in deed. it also demonstrates the importance of exercises. >> a number of lessons have been frankly catastrophic had we not been aware, we have problems

with air filters on tanks, for example, clogging up with sand. we purchased some of the book skirts" to protect the air inflow. those were relevant to the operation. >> you mentioned the shift in the strategic defense review, which required a lot. was to review fully funded? >> i cannot answer that entirely from my own experience. when i arrived in the ministry of defense in october 1999, there was quite a strong feeling that it was not fully funded. a part of the way that it was that -- funded was by commitment

to a series of the efficiencies in the way in which existing equipment was used in order to release the cash, basically, for some of the new acquisitions. i think everyone accepted that it was a challenging time. >> were told by kevin tebbit that the problem was that it was too small, and this was the case in the run-up to the war. >> certainly in the csr programs we asked for significantly more money than we have been truly received, yes. >> and in your discussion of the negotiations for the 2002-2003 budget, was the possibility of

operations against iraq a feature used in the budget discussions? >> i think that was in july 2002. so certainly we were aware of the possibility. but the answer from the treasury would be that in a sense, there was a separate urgent operational requirements process to supplement the overall budget once actual war fighting in theater. >> go back to july 2002. when you looked at your budget 2002-2003, was your budget under pressure? >> yes. >> the ministry of defense did not expect a fight wars, as she said, out of its budget. there are always going to be

special costs, equipment lost -- so the idea is that this would come out of the treasury reserve? >> that was always the understanding, yes. >> and this is where the agent operational requirements command. again, because it is quite complex and issue, the greek -- the degree to which you would need urgent operational requirements to some extent with respect -- would reflect the size of the defense budget, because had he been able to purchase sufficient stock beforehand, you would be less likely to need urgent operational requirements. >> that would be right, yes. the urgent operational requirements for iraq would desert combat and desert boots. i assume then in the persian gulf war, such clothing was kept in store rooms, ready and

available for operations in the desert. doesn't combat was part of the uor -- desert combat or parts of the uor's. >> of just trying to get the background sorted. >> but if i could put the other side of the case just for the sake of completeness, really, one of the problems in maintaining stores of equipment is that they necessarily deteriorate. i accept that it is a judgment, but that judgment is how long you keep things that you do not use knowing that at some states they have to be replaced simply by the passage of time. the uor process may be a

sensible process in terms of the replacements. >> but it does put a premium on time limits. just-in-time logistics' -- >> that is exactly right. >> when did you start having discussions with the chancellor are the secretary -- or the secretary? >> i cannot precisely the view a date of when we began discussions but i think there was an exploratory exchanges before the summer. the specific question of the list of uor's, i think, but to the treasury and was agreed by the for the october. you had to go process. i'd been a 5 what were the

urgent operational requirements, and then descend at the treasury for their approval, and only once the treasury had approved the list, did we then go well let the contracts. >> with a question in the uor -- were they questioning the uor's? >> i think that there were later -- one of the problems was once you acquire a piece of equipment, it has to be supported and maintained appeared there has to be training. i think there were discussions with the treasury about with the budget could be increased to allow all of that maintenance. that was an area of difficulty. >> the long-term implications

for the defense budget. >> we have acquired some sheen guns -- some machine guns, maintaining them, turning the soldiers, it was the continuing costs, not simply the cost of acquiring the machine guns and the first place. >> and in terms of money, what was the likely projected costs? >> i did not have that figure. the boiler>> would it be betwee0 million pounds and 1 billion pounds? >> i believe that that would be correct. the boilers the strategic defense review set in motion some significant changes in the way we organize our forces.

you had not gone all the money that you would like that. it was a limit on what you could do with existing stocks in 2002- 2003. therefore you had this process of uor's and is required time. >> different amounts of time requiring on the equipment we were trying to buy. >> you expected to require six months to get a division. >> overall. the oilers and there are different items and different timelines associated with them, i agree. what sense did you have of how long you're going to need to get our forces ready for iraq? >> i do not think -- i think we were working to the six-month

timescale. it might have been ever take eight weeks on either side. -- it might have been give or take eight weeks on either side. but six months for the timescale we were working toward. i say that because part of the problem that we were discussing before the lunch break was, at what point where we actually going to make the decision in relation to option #3, in the sense that we always work back -- work backwards from when we thought the invasion was going to begin? if the invasion began in january, working six months back, it was already past six months, so there was no point in offering that.

but when the start date slipped, as we anticipated it would, for military and political reasons, that allowed us to anticipate planning that we get there in time. >> but if your start date is march, it takes you to the middle of september, and no decisions had been taken at that point. >> that is precisely why i was referring to the conversations, that is why we were saying it was a matter of urgency. and i say we, my boss and i, because otherwise we will miss the time date in any event because we simply cannot be ready. >> lord boyce told us that he was forbidden to talk to the chief of defense because the

government was not prepared to move for on this. >> i have tried hard to know that was strictly the case. i think he was describing the general atmosphere. i did not give a specific instruction of that kind. what was happening during that period was that the prime minister and the foreign secretary in particular were fully involved in negotiating a security council resolution. their ambition which i shared that if we could secure such a resolution and resolve this matter peacefully. there for the emphasis on the diplomatic process in september was paramount. at the same time, i and lord boyce was saying if you're going to make addition in time, you better get on with it.

so the two things were at odds with each other. when we went to meetings in downing street saying, look, we have got to get on with this, equally we were told in a sense to calm down, we cannot get on with it lost the diplomatic process is underway. >> did you except that argument? -- accept that argument? military action could affect their readiness of sedan de -- of saddam to comply. >> that is absolutely right in relation to saddam, but the issue in relation to the resolution was other nations in the united nations on the security council -- their willingness to support a last effort to protect -- to persuade

saddam to cooperate. the argument that i was given very clearly from the prime minister and the foreign secretary was that if we work overtly seemed to be preparing for war, that would affect our ability to secure that resolution. this was a diplomatic question. it was not saddam we were trying to influence, but the countries on the security council who had to vote for this resolution. all 15 of them voted for 1441. but the americans suffer the same in addition in their planning? >> all that i know is that mike and i went to meetings in september where we argued the case and that we were both made very well aware of the attitude

in downing street for the requirement for the publicity and avoiding the visibility of preparations. we were both there in these meetings so there was no doubt of the fact that we could not overtly prepare. that is why we had approached some of the's and a particular way. -- some of the uor's in particular way. without affecting that diplomatic process in the united nations. >> and did you make the prime minister and other ministers aware of the risks entailed in this readiness? >> that was central to what we were saying about the need to

get on with preparations. and i think i referred already this morning to the letters that we sent in october, pointing out that because we had not agreed to option #3, the americans were assuming that we were not to be there. >> nonetheless, at this point the view from downing street was that the political gain -- the political game of the un resolution should not be put in jeopardy by readiness. >> that was also the view of a significant portion of the u.s. as well. i went to the united states for the anniversary of 9/11, when the pentagon -- i'm not sure that quite -- not sure that expression, but restored. i had meetings with donald

rumsfeld and others. the state department was completely focused on the need to get a further resolution and for the president to go the un route, as they said. but they were not clear on the ninth as to whether or not he was going to do so. i think his speech was the next day, and the united nations on the 10th. even the american administration was not clear as to what was going to be the outcome. perhaps the best example of all of the prime minister influencing the president of united states into a particular course of action. i doubt that without his efficacy of that resolution that the president would have agreed to it. it was clear -- it was not clear

in the administration even the day before. >> this is an interesting line of questioning, as to whether you think the british government would have been able to take this matter any further if it had not been on move to take this back to the u.n. security council? >> to take it further? >> in terms of military action if the president had not agreed to go back to the security council. >> the hypothetical is if there's no 1441. looking at the attorney general's legal opinion, he refers specifically to 1441 and had expressed some previous doubts about lawfulness of action about a further

resolution. so i assume that i am bound to agree with you, without 1441, there might not have been the ability to bring that into play. >> i want to get back to the question of readiness. we dealt with the seat once before -- the sequence before lunch. you mentioned a meeting in late october. that was largely to offer a division to the united states and principal. -- in principle. but the uor's were not decided until mid-november. >> that is not quite right. as i understand it, the original

request from within the ministry of defense for the uor's came around the 13th of september. i do not know how many. debars 190 in the end. >> and there were priorities, first, second, and so on. there was some indication because of the conversations we had been having with downing street in terms of visibility, how much of possibly -- how much publicity this was likely to provoke. once we get this approval from the treasury -- i think this was the fourth of october -- the overwhelming of the uor's were approved. the work was taken up quite quickly. some of them, partly for reasons

of disability, but also enhanced combat body armor in the second, but in relation to that, there was another issue about how much we already had in storage or how much we actually needed. but nevertheless, only a small number were held back. >> the general told us that he discussed with you in november or early december the mobilization of reserves. were these later down the line? >> that is a slightly separate issue. in september, these are the things that we were discussing earlier, the enhancement of existing equipment, the type of things needed in iraq. shipping -- once you get to the

space -- to the point of bookings based on ships, it is pretty clear what you are up to. >> that was more politically sensitive. >> and that was a separate issue. the timing was much less acute. the time taken to manufacture them as opposed to to hire a ship. >> how long would you like to mobilize -- to mobilize reserves? >> again, that would depend a lot on the kinds of people that we were concerned about. ideally, from my recollection, it -- but it can be done more quickly than that.

there are different types of reserves. there are people who actually engaged in their daytime regular job, but increasingly there are people who are almost full time reserves, who are available for operations and can move very quickly. >> quite a lot can. the situation is that this is getting quite tight. you told us before lunch that the actual decisions were only taken in january about going to the south, sending a division, and that is the announcement the parliament not long after that. so in terms of the planning assumptions about the ministry of defense, we were in

inevitably going to cut corners and push things faster than we would like. >> i am not sure that all except the phrase "cutting corners." there was a process for getting the equipment required into place. it was prioritized. some of these uor's were not necessarily for war fighting, some more for the aftermath. the time taken for making it available depended on whether there was our summon store somewhere at the manufacturer, or if the manufacturer had to begin with scratch. some of the desert uniforms were made, some made it in time and some did not. >> this was a shorter timetable at the very least.

jonathan powell said that they've won a nine-weeks of extra time for diplomatic purposes. would you have found that helpful for military purposes as well? >> undoubtably. >> how concerned were you about the issue that has been raised, about delays, meaning your troops have to hang around an uncomfortable conditions. >> i asked about that on our regular basis and was always told that though it would be uncomfortable, in a sense, that was the benefit of relatively later deployment. the six-month timescale would take place earlier in to the summer. the answer was always that they would be able to wait until the time to go.

obviously, there were considerations about heat and delay, but they were not central factors. had there been a nine-week delay, i think it would have been helpful. but that was not a factor -- affecting whether we went on a certain day in march or not. >> what assurances did you sleep in march 2003 that are forces were in a pit state to fight? the oilers the was a very detailed - -- that our forces were in a fit state to fight? >> there was a process. the chief of the defense staff had to give me a certificate to

say that they had achieved what was known as full operational capability, which is that they had the capability to conduct the operations as described to them. that was achieved, i think -- two days are so before the operation began. >> when you went the full operational capability, how do you understand it in terms of margins for error? >> inevitably i accept that there are going to be tolerances' within that, but i think it is very clear and important that this is a military judgment, a military decision by those expert in the field, that they are ready to conduct the operations that have been specified. i played no part in making that a session -- assessment. it is not simply at the top as i

understood the process, working from the bottom up, giving an indication at every level that those military units and organizations were ready to do the job assigned to them. >> as the senior political menmeber and the ministry of defense, if they were overly optimistic, you have to explain what had happened. were you confident that the military was not encouraging you to believe this because the alternative was that the americans would go without us? >> the psychology of every level. it is going to take a lot of moral courage to say to your commander that you are not ready. >> i except that there is a real

can-do attitude that they can go do this. but in the end, the alternative -- i am sure reinvested getting something in a different way, it would not at all be appropriate for a politician to substitute his or her judgment for the military professional judgment of people who are long experience in the field. i said that there is that risk. we spend a lot of time on insuring that we could deliver this equipment in time. if anyone had said that we have doubts about whether we are ready, then that would have been absolutely a showstopper. >> we heard from a number of the generals giving evidence that the reason that they were confident they were ready was because they were packing --

there were fighting iraqi troops in the condition that they were and since 1991. the deprivation that they had faced. maybe that is why they felt so ready. is that fair? >> in the sense that i have described, there was a process for determining the nature of the task for each of the units involved. the dissatisfied that they were fully ready for those task. necessarily, i assume they would take into account the enemy that they were likely to confront. but at the same time, these are hugely experienced and very successful professional soldiers who are making professional judgments. back to the three legged stool, i relied on their professional judgment and their military capability.

i don't think that anyone would be happy for a lapsed lawyer to come along and say, actually, i disagree with your professional military judgment. >> i think it is a question of understanding what the risks were, being taken at the time. and as we've already heard, the actual operation itself justify it the confidence -- justified the confidence of the armed forces. in terms of readiness of individuals to fight, it may have seemed like a different story. the soldiers being put into battle may not have felt that there were personally quite so ready as the unit as a whole -- is that fair? the boilers that were certainly some complaints, and i've already mentioned desert combats, some going into green

combats, and they did not like it. i understood from some of the lessons learned and the processes after that judgments were made by senior officers that did not affect the military capability. it may have affected more rawl -- morale and being valued and appreciated. >> we can look at this question of clothing and boots as well, are related issue. i think the figure was that only 40% of the extras had been ordered was available by the 13th of april. $40% of what? >> of the extra boots and clothing. this comes from a nao report.

>> again, what i do not know -- boots were more important than clothing, having the appropriate kind of desert boots work important. i have conceded already that clothing was not always available to the extent that the soldiers would have liked. i don't know what portion of that 40% were boots as opposed to clothing $3 i think it was quite similar. stocks were available for about 9000 prior. i think orders were put in for about 30,000. similar numbers of uniforms have to be multiplied by three, because they need extras. i think the numbers of the same.

as to say, boots anare a source of particular irritation. if your boots melting the sun, it is not a small matter. >> i think that there was one soldier who may actually had been in the royal air force, i cannot remember, he took with him the wrong boots. there were not widespread problems of boots melting in the sun. >> so they were not the right boots. >> some soldiers, i am sure, did not have the right boots. >> body armor -- you had mentioned this. what was the problem with body armor as you understood it? >> i think we need to distinguish something. soldiers from years prior to

iraq had body armor. a system of protecting their upper bodies. the difficulty that arose was in relation to a new system called enhanced combat body armor, basically consisting of a vest with a slot in the front and back for a metal plate, kevlar actually, that protected your vital organs. that was a relatively recent innovation. indeed, i think prior to the conflict, i don't think it was mandated. it was something that was thought to be desirable. indeed we knew we had around 30,000 flights, so 15,000 sets of advanced combat armor prior

to the process. -- prior to being uor process. there is a suggestion that we had more than the 15,000 sets, but they were not in stock, they had already been distributed. >that is one of the reasons whyi asked for further questions in relation to advanced body armor, but equally in mind also was the question about visibility and what this would say. this kind of equipment can only really be explained in the context of war fighting. it is not the type of equipment that had been routinely issued to british soldiers. it was available for the

fighting echelons, those likely to be in the frontline. the advice that i got in the course of september was that we had enough enhanced combat body armor for the fighting echelons. the question was, whether we needed more for all the forces likely to be deployed. the request that we should -- i ask for advice partly out of concern about visibility and partly because of the suggestion that we had more already. once we got the agreement of the treasury to proceed with the uor's on the fourth of october, we sent another request saying that in the interim, i trust you will submit for any particularly urgent requirements. we asked if there were anything in all in the list that had not

been approved that was an urgent requirement. then we should be told. not too long after that, we were told that this was a charge to -- "to launchedtranchet two"req. >> who said that? >> my notes do not say but it would be from the logistic steam. -- logistics team. >> from the absolutely urgent tranche to the less certain. >> we had enough in stock for those who are going to be fighting. it was desirable, clearly, to have more available. but the military judge this to

be on a lesser priority. they did not necessarily at that stage say that we had to get this equipment available strip away. >> is that in terms of spending the money that the military has already allocated. >> it is going to the manufacturers and asking for more equipment. >> when was it decided? >> it was decided in november, once the u.s. cr was approved. the rest of the items were approved including enhanced combat body armor. >> so we're back to the question of political impressions being created, because this was seen to be more relevant to offensive operations.

the relevant decisions were delayed. >> what they were saying to me is that we have 15,000 sets and storage. we can use those for the frontline, for the fighting echelons. we would ideally like more but that is a lesser priority than some of the other equipment that we require. there ask about that, and that was confirmed and correspondence. so as soon as the approval from the un resolution was agreed, the rest of those items -- i suspect not many by then -- were agreed to. >> or other problems with the body armor, in terms of getting it to the people that needed it? >> i am not sure the figures but something like 36,000 sets were

shipped to iraq. from the lessons learned process, one of the problems was there was not an effective tracking system once the containers were unloaded. and i suspect what happens is that some units ended up with two loads of everything, and some units ended up with nothing. the distribution was not satisfactory. >> this had been an issue in 1991 as well. it is a bit disappointing that it happened -- that was the result by 2003. >> i agree with that. we spent quite a bit of time looking at the kinds of solutions that the private

sector adopted. i left the ministry of defense some years ago, but one of the ideas was to embedded chip or something into each piece of equipment, allowing you to say where this is stored, how what is being transported, and where it is going through a relatively expensive solution, but as the cost of that produces, it might be a sensible way of proceeding. otherwise, the tracking necessarily is a manual process with people taking pieces of paper, which in the circumstances was probably unrealistic. >> one of the consequences of this problem is that there was not enough of the relevant body armor, so local commanders had to make the wrong priorities about who should get what. in one case that led to a tragic outcome. >> you're referring to sgt

roberts. >> yes. >> as i understood the process and theater, the planning officers made a judgment, consistent with what i have been saying, but the frontline, but fighting forces, would have the enhanced combat body armor. that they would then make judgments about the level of protection available to other soldiers. they already had body armor as such. the distribution was made on the basis of who was most at risk. >> in the nature of the operations which we find yourself, the dividing line between front and rear became obliterated. >> i think that that is absolutely right the rapid advance of the frontline, a point i made earlier. sgt roberts' debt perfectly

illustrates your point. they were being stoned by a man throwing stones at them. as i understand it, he refused to stop doing that. sgt roberts' gun jammed. the machine gunner fired a machine gun. i think i am right in saying that is what killed sergeant robert, because the machine gunner did not appreciate that his machine gun was not accurate close quarters. there was a series -- >> hallowed individual dies is going to be a particular set of circumstances. but that part of the story which explains why he did not have the proper body armor. just one more question about personal payments, and that

would be a good time for me to stop. there are more equipment issues to get into. the protection against chemical and biological warfare. the particular intelligence that saddam might have the stockpiles and use them. or the difficulties in getting the adequate equipment to the troops? >> every one was equipped with the appropriate clothing to protect them. indeed, one of the complaints are received was the fact that they every so often had to train to get into and out of these suits. it is on a regular basis, even though in the and, they did not have to wear them. we were very conscious of that. people were trained and expected to use the clothing.

>> the concerns were that it was out of date. >> i do not recall any suggestion that any of this kit was ineffective. >> it was never tested. >> they may well have been, but as far as i am aware, whenever this was tested, this equipment was for its purpose. >> the biggest difficulty we had with these issues was actually that protection, they say. >> i have not come across anything specific to say that. the protection was available to every soldier that needed it. the most frequent complaint i received was the number of occasions that they had to stop everything and and get into the

kit. it were part of the instructions that came down from the chain of command. >> i do mean to go into this -- i do not mean to go on about this, but the republic accounts, the troops of the frontline did not receive sufficient supplies of the equipment, including enhanced combat body armor and the biological protection. >> i would have to see this criticism and -- in relation to enhanced combat body armor. i had not heard that there was a lack of protective clothing for those who needed it. >> i think will break and we'll come back in half an hour. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> we've come to the final

quarter of the day. >> allied to take a break from equipment issues and look at a very other important issue. how the coalition handled the security from the time after the campaign until the time you left your post as the secretary of state for defence. 2003-2005, a period in which serious problems began to rise. if we go back near the beginning, after the campaign had finished, there was a brief period, and then it was dismissed and mr. brunner, arrived -- brenner arrived, but sir jeremy greene stop working

with them, not officially his no. 2, as he explained. brenner finds that the security situation is beginning to get fried chi -- fragile. the government is very fragile and in his first week, he takes some very big decisions. things like the dedication -- d- bath a vacation --d de- baathification. the army had not been formally dissolved in the was a question about whether it was necessary to do so. you would not have an army to work with to do with your security problems.

what you did you take of these decisions by brenner, which we had heard had been agreed to in washington before he arrived, and the impression that i have on this you wish to correct this is that we had barely been consulted on them at all? >> i referred earlier to the february, an implicit in that paper as far as de- baathification is concerned, although that phrase does not appear, we wanted the iraqi technocrats to be available to administer the system. as i understood it, baath party

membership was a requirement to have a job under saddam. we said that there would be people who had joined the party because they've wanted to be civil servants, not because they necessarily were enthusiastic supporters of saddam hussein. we thought that there ought to be a distinction between those who were enthusiastic supporters and those who simply join the party in order to gain a position, not least because we anticipated some of the difficulties that ensued in administering our rack in the aftermath. the argument arises in relation to the army, which i mentioned earlier, a force of stability. we had not attacked it in some places, specifically in order to try and preserve its coherence.

it could have been reconstituted relatively quickly. some of the security difficulties come in and around baghdad particularly, were the results of the disaffected people no longer receiving their salaried joining the insurgency, and indeed putting their expertise to use in the sense that there was clear suggestion to me that some of the attacks became more sophisticated, as a military people became involved. >> so these decisions, not to put too fine a point on it, were mistakes. >> i think that they were. it would have been better to have the stability in the aftermath. and to some extent, disbanding the army fuelled the insurgency in a way that made it much harder to contain. having said that, at some stage

i did have some discussion about some of these issues. i think the americans are very focused on the fact that someone loyal to saddam hussein could not be entirely reliable. and therefore they felt a fresh start from scratch was a better way forward. i am not saying all the arguments are one way. >> should we have been given the chance to win for -- to influence the debate? the boilers the paper i submitted demonstrated beyond doubt those two points that i said already. >> you could use the republican guard in the sanitized regard. >> the sense that i had about the republican guard is that they were largely composed of professional soldiers.

saddam was supposedly an admirer of stalin. he had political commissars in place. one division surrendered, but then suddenly went back to fighting. partly as i understood because their family was being held in he was told in no uncertain terms what would happen. but nevertheless, our judgment was that by and large it was more important they were soldiers and supporters of saddam hussein. -- and then supporters of saddam hussein. -- there were soldiers than set up -- supporters of saddam hussein. >> it started turning nasty fairly quickly. as you go through to the spring

of 2004, you really start to get a big rise in the level of violence. now how did we react to this? was there a question of sending more forces in to reinforce the troops that we had there, which we had drawn down to a large extent? >> there was certainly a discussion about that. there was also a discussion about getting more contributions from more countries. overall there were something like 30 countries involved in the post-conflict dphase. each country took responsibility for its part of the operation. it was not simply for us to determine that in the south. it was the work that we did in the coalition.

i think equally it is important that the problems that developed in security were not of one kind. the criminality -- letting some of that on said, releasing all his prisoners -- on saddam releasing some -- all his prisoners. some were against the institutions associated specifically with saddam. some were looted because this was the population getting back at saddam and his regime. equally there was some tensions between sunnis and pontians -- and she adds, but not on the scale later. there was real tension within the shiite community.

there was probably some iranian influence as well. there was a range of different causes for the problems. i think the challenge for us was how did we do with that in security terms? >> and what was the answer? >> ultimately the answer was to train and equip iraqis to do both policing and the military part. i don't think it is possible to say precisely where, but i recall warning of this foreign soldiers are perceived to be occupiers, even if they are initially seen as liberators.

that attitude does not last for that long. one of the reasons for iraq to not split into three smaller countries was that there is a sense of iraqi nationalism. there is a sense in which people are iraqis first and shi'a or sunni second. that focus inevitably turns against foreign soldiers. >> the ultimate solution is to train iraqi security forces. but that takes time. so in this period when the security is deteriorating, increasing quite rapidly, and we are waiting for the ultimate period when we have the iraqi security forces to do the job, what did you feel we should be doing about it?