office that works. we are committed to changing the regulations. we obviously want to make sure that the liabilities are secure, as well. >> each year, 1000 women died of cervical cancer. in northern ireland, young women can get screened at the age of 20, but in 2004, the government sought to increase the aid to 25. why does the government discriminate this way and will the government consider addressing this injustice? >> we are very concerned to make sure that we prevent and have early detection for as many cancers as possible and in this, we make sure the necessary resources are available and we

have guided in the application of those make sure the necessary resources are available but indicted in the application of those resources by clinical judgments. he is not a scientist anymore than i am but what we have to do is take the best advice and act on it and make sure the resources are there to back it and that is why we have shriveled the investments. ..

>> the government but there is an awareness date on this issue and will respond in due course. >> we need this day even more because it for the curve balls of the earthquake in haiti, we had 200 orphanages and many of them were actually from . orphanages, many of them were funds for child trafficking. since the earthquake, we now have a new problem of 380,000 children at risk. will she speak to her international aid contacts this afternoon and establish a network for children at risk so they have some were safely to

be, until they can trace their own family? or have time to set up some kind of arrangement where their safety can be insured, but traffickers are certainly, we need to make sure they don't attack the children. >> for the work is done is issue and he has consistently and intelligently raise it in the house. and i agree with him that there's work that needs to be done by the police and the place internationally. there's work that needs to be done by prosecutors internationally. and there's work i know that he supports of the voluntary organizations, helping bring out the message to warn people >> each week that the house of commons is in session, we answer prime minister's questions.

at c-span.org , you can find past prime ministers questions. >> up next, former prime minister tony blair answers questions in the british inquiry on the iraq war. later, "q &a" and then your comments and questions on washington journal. >> white house budget director budgetorszag steffes is the 2011 budget proposal. that is live tomorrow at 11:30

a.m. eastern on c-span. >> last week, the british iraq war inquiry commission heard from former prime minister tony blair. the committee is looking at the circumstances. >> today, the iraq inquiry will be hearing from the right hon. tony blair. as in all of our hearings, the right to be heard by all must be respected. this would be overseen and they will be expected to observe this. we will begin evidence entombed -- in two sessions.

this will help to ensure that all those that will be coming for the afternoon session are able to take their places before we start proceedings. >> good morning. >> good morning. >> i would like to start by welcoming our witness and others that joined us at the conference center as well as all of those who are watching this session either on television or through the internet. today's hearing is understandably much anticipated and in these circumstances, the committee thinks it is important.

the u.k. involvement in iraq remains a divisive subject as one that evokes strong emotions. especially for those who have lost loved ones in iraq. as one that provokes strong emotion especially for those who have lost loved ones in iraq and some of them are here today. they and others are looking for answers as to why the u.k. committed to military action in iraq and whether we did so on the best possible flooding. our questions aim to get to the heart of those issues. the purpose of the iraq inquiry is to establish a reliable account of the u.k. involvement between iraq 20001 and 2009 in light of the lessons for future governments facing similar circumstances. the inquiry is not a trial. the committee before you is independent and non-political. we come to work with no

preconceptions and we are committed to doing a thorough job based on the evidence. we aim to deliver our report around the end of this year. this is the first time, mr. blair is appearing before us and we are currently holding our first round of public hearings. we shall be holding further hearings later in the year when we can return to subjects we wish to explore further. if necessary we can speak to mr. blair again. today's session covers six years of defense or complex and controversial. it would be impossible to do them all justice in the time we have available today. the committee is therefore made the decision to center its questioning on a number of specific areas. if necessary we shall come back to other issues at a later date. we plan to focus our questions, first, on the evolution of strategy towards iraq up to

2,002, including key meetings such as those with president bush in april and september 2002 as well as complex diplomatic process at the united nations. we will then look at how the policy was presented to parliament and the british people. it will be followed or the later stages of diplomacy and early 2003. we will then move to the planning for the invasion of iraq in march and april google's and three, its aftermath and the reality that confronted the coalition on the ground in iraq. we plan to conclude with the secure situation in iraq, the levels of secretary of violence in 2006 and 2007 and how the united kingdom responded to this and followed lastly by how the british government provided strategic direction. i say as i do on every occasion we recognize this to lead to

witnesses are giving evidence based on their part of the recollection of events and we can cross check what we hear against the papers to which we have evidence to lead to access. i remind every witness that he will later be asked to sign a transcript of the evidence to the effect that the evidence of it is truthful, fair and accurate. i would like to begin the proceedings by excerpting the broad question by many people who've spoken and written to us so far is why did we invade iraq kuhl y saddam hussein and why march 2003. there's been any public speeches, steegmans, interviews and parliamentary committee hearings about iraq but in fairness to everyone concerned and to the witness we want to today to promote this question that lies behind many of the specific issues which shall be examining in the course of today's hearing and i shall now turn to sir robert to answer the

questions. >> mr. blair i would like to start with the first of the areas, saddam hussein was mentioned, the way that the government under door leadership developed its broad strategy of iraq in 2001 and into the early months of 2002 and if i can just summarize the situation at the beginning of this since 1991 a strategy of containment operated internationally and with the u.n. backing through the embargo trade sanctions, no-fly zones, naval embargo stationing of coalition forces in the region had prevented saddam hussein from threatening his neighbors from developing nuclear weapons but at the same time there were concerns by 2001 as there had

been about his aspirations for an effort to break out, is missile development program, intelligence about his chemical weapons and biological weapons capabilities, the leakage and growing unpopularity sanctions that we've heard from a number of previous witnesses and enforcement of the no-fly zones. we will come in detail on the wmd issues later on. the policy that your government and the united states administration under the newly elected president bush adopted in 2001 through parallel reviews of iraq policy was to reinforce this strategy of containment to strengthen that and the two

governments are putting forward what was called a smart sanctions resolution at the united nations, didn't succeed in getting the u.n. security council to adopt that the summer of 2001 but was eventually adopted in may of 2002 as a security council resolution 1409. in that period what was the view that you took of this strategy of containment or perhaps i could divide the period before 9/11 how did you view containment? >> that's absolutely right to divide our policies up into two separate parts. up to september 11th, after september 11th. optus at embrey leffinge, saddam hussein was still a problem and

a major problem, the sanctions framework was eroding. there were continual breaches of the no-fly zone. we were worried about enforcing the no-fly zone. you've probably seen correspondence from cook at the time. there's an attempt to put in place a different former sanctions so-called smart sanctions and perhaps you can come to that in detail a little later and of course the very first walter reaction i've taken was with president clinton back in 1998 against saddam. >> and we'll come back to that leader, too. islamic that is a very import a moment as well but however i thin -- doing our best and hoping for the best. up until september 11, we thought he was a risk, but we thought it was worth time to

contain it. the crucial thing after september 11 is that the top list of risk changed. >> we will come up on that in just a minute. in the timeframe up to september 11, would be right to say that containment, as a broad strategy, had been affective while still sustainable and immediately reenforcing. it is roughly what we have heard from earlier witnesses. he said that i think it was working, but the cost was quite high and the risks to the various elements to our policy that we wanted to reduce. would that be a fair summary? >> the sanctions were obviously eroding. we could i get support for them. the smart sanctions from work, we actually could not get support for it at that time.

we were in a bit of difficulty . elephant couldn't get support at that time, so we were in a bit of a difficulty there and of course the fact is saddam hussein as we took military action in 1998 there was a long history of course with the dealings of saddam. one of the things i've done for the inquiry is go back through my speeches prior to september september 11th and i've got one or two of them here but it's quite interesting. >> i want to refer to them later as i am sure colleagues will. >> let me summarize the impact. the impact is regularly through 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001i am saying saddam must comply with u.n. resolutions and forces and option but all of this frankly was in the circumstances where this was in the top priority for

us and i remember the very first meeting that we had myself and president bush in february, 2001 just after he had come to power as president of the united states we dealt with iraq with colin powell but it was very much in the context of trying to get a different sanctioned framework in place. >> if i put it in a rather simple terms he hadn't at this point broken out of the box he had been put in although there were some holes in the box. would that be -- >> buckles were quite substantial. >> they needed attention. >> but the critical thing and if you forgive me for interrupting but it's absolutely essential to realize this. a september 11th hadn't happened our assessment of the risk of allowing saddam any possibility of him reconstituting his programs would not have been the

same but after september 11th and if you'd like me to now i will explain what a difference that made to the thinking. after september 11th our view, the american view changed dramatically. >> that is precisely what i would like to come to because we have heard from many witnesses and i don't think anybody is in doubt about this question but 9/11 was a massive hushovd which changed the international environment and particularly with regard to this question and your former foreign secretary spoke about the city tells a we probably don't need to go over all this ground again. it changed the way that the united states received the world. it changed the perception of risk, it changed attitude towards perceived threats and as jack straw was leader to put it to you in the middle of the 25th

march, 2002, summarizing the situation with regard to iraq objectively the threat from iraq hasn't worsened as a result of the 11th of september. what has however unchanged as the tolerance of the international community especially that of the united states and i wonder if you could tell how your attitude toward iraq not that of the united states evolved in the months after 9/11? >> st after 9/11 and in a statement i made to the house of commons, just a few days after, i think on the 14th of september i specifically deal with this issue, to do with weapons of mass destruction and the danger of the link with terrorism. here's what changed for me the whole calculus of risk. it was my view then, it remains my view now. the point about this terrorist

act was that over 3,000 people had been killed on the streets of new york and absolutely horrific event. but this is what really changed my perception of risk, the calculus of risk for me. if those people, inspired by this religious fantasies some could have killed 30,000, they would have. for those of us who dealt with the terrorism from the ira, and incidentally i don't want to minimize the impact of the terrorism, each act of terrorism was wicked and wrong and to be deplored. with the terrorism that an organization like the ira were engaged in was terrorism directly towards a political purpose, maybe unjustified, but it was within a certain framework that you could understand. the point about this act in new york was that had they been able to kill even more people than

those 3,000, they would have. and so after that time, duke was you could not take risks with this issue at all, and one dimension of it because we were advised obviously that these people would use chemical or ideological weapons or a nuclear device, if they could get hold of them -- that completely changed our assessment of where the risks for security and they come and just so that we make this absolutely clear, this was not an american position, this was my position and the british position and very, very clearly so from september 11th and donner words we obviously had to deal with afghanistan but from that moment, iran, libya, north korea, iraq, the machinery as you know of a.q. khan was the former pakistani nuclear scientist and who had been engaged in illicit activities

and disturbing this material, all of this had to be brought to an end. >> so that was your exception of the way the global risks had changed that one had to think about them differently. but saddam himself was not a sponsor of al qaeda. he hadn't been involved in 9/11 in any way, shape or form. had saddam hussein at this point become more of a threat than he was before 9/11. >> i think jack puts it correctly in his letter to me it wasn't the object for he had done for it is that our perception of the risk of shifted and the reason for dealing with iraq, and i think i said this at that time was because it was iraq in breach in the united nations resolutions and ten years of defiance and we felt it was important that we

make it absolutely clear he is to come back into compliance. >> we will come back to the details of this later on. i just want to follow the evolution of your strategy a little further if i may end then i will hand over two colleagues. at this point now let's say in the first half of 2002 where did that leave containment? was it still, if one could reinforce it strategy? >> yes, i think this is a really important point actually, and i've looked at a quite carefully because i did at the time and it's worth reflecting on for a moment now. and that is the nature of this replacement sanctions framework. we know saddam had effectively to erode support for the previous sanctions. he was on some accounts the sums of money buried there were billions of dollars or basically being illicit lee used by iraq.

and frankly, what he had done -- because we gave him the money to buy food and medicines for his people, but he was deliberately not giving them the food or the medicines in the way he should have come and this meant, for example, as i think clare short pointed out to me in early 2003, the mortality rate for children under five in iraq was worse than the congo. >> yes, the sanctions had become very very of a popular. >> extremely unpopular, and he had been successful -- wholley dishonestly i may say but successful in blaming the west for the sanctions. now, the issue was whether this successor, so-called smart sanctions regime from work would be a valid way of containing him. and it's worth just going to the -- and i think that -- forgive me if i mentioned the document and if you haven't -- i think that you've got the options paper we got before --

>> the march options paper is in the public domain. you can get it on the internet. i'm not certain of hand of whether or not it has been declassified. [laughter] maybe i will just -- i will just say -- >> the government was elected under your leadership. >> let me just summarize the affect of it because it dealt specifically as one of the options with this issue of containment. and it described as the least worst option. if you read the paper, what they are saying is it is possible that might work, but equally it is possible it won't. but here is a point i think is really, really important on the so-called smart sanctions, that there was then, following that paper, a whole series of government discussions about these smart sanctions. each of them were indicating that they might work but they

could give no guarantee of it working. the previous regime had obviously not yielded -- the previous sanctions framework had not yielded the benefits that we thought, in terms of sustainability, and the thing that i think is very important about this is the paper which i think has been declassified, because i think that was done just yesterday, which is about iraq, the new policy framework. this is the paper on march 7th, 2001. the iraq new policy framework describes the arrangements that would apply on this so-called smart sanctions framework and, i just want to draw attention to one, because the whole issue about the previous sanctions eroding had been saddam's ability to get stuff in through

the borders of the surrounding countries, and therefore, one very important part of this new sanctions framework was for border monitoring, a limited number of border crossings into iraq from jordan, syria, turkey, saudi arabia, iran. so the idea was, in this new sanctions arrangement, to make sure that you sealed off the borders and around iraq so that it was more effective. the important thing to realize is that when we then came compost 9/11 -- post-september 11th and finally adopted this united nations resolution -- and i think it is united nations resolution 1409 -- the tightening of the borders had been dropped. we couldn't get the russians on board unless we dropped it. and so the very thing that even back then people were born in me, even with this tightening of the borders, it might work, it

might not, that the tightening restrictions had been dropped by the time you get to may, 2002. therefore, you can still argue, i guess, that this sanctions from work would have been successful, but i think i would say it is as least as persuasive an argument that it wouldn't have been. >> trade sanctions were only, as i described earlier, one of my many elements that comprise contant that were keeping saddam in this box. you had some forces stationed in neighboring countries in the region, the americans had a lot of forces as a deterrent. we had the no-fly zones. if the arms and margo had beverley effective, the trade sanctions were leaking. parts of the border monitoring was effective, in the sense that there was a naval embargo which we helped operate through the armilla patrol i think other parts were leaking. was the totality of this

containment -- this remained the official policy of government and at least the first half of 2002. but as a strategy and i am still trying to stem the strategic level did you see this as something at that time first of 2002 this is a strategy which could be sustained over the medium term or did you feel it was a gonchar? >> i think what is being advised and common sense it might have worked and might not have worked but it's as least. and sir roderick if i can make this point because i think fairly draw attention to the range of different measures. the no-fly zones were causing this difficulty and the trade sanctions were a vital part of -- the trade sections where part of the w. indian programs. the whole point about these sanctions were moving from

telling you what you can have then to a different frame work that is much weaker. you can have whatever you like. the trade section is part of this that was breaking under the previous regime was not a peripheral, but an essential part of that framework being valid. the problem was, -- an accurate summary is that containment through sanctions had basically been eroded. these new sanctions from work had been watered down. it was absolutely vital for trade restrictions.

it has been written specifically on the sanctions from work and saddam hussein. . . the sanctions from work and saddam and what he does when he comes to the so-called smart sanctions as he said there were seven preconditions to the smart sanctions and then he goes on to explain one of them what actually happened. >> let's just summarize that then and by all means since the book, please. we have no shortage of material to read what we are always ready for more. contender for is a policy that contender for is a policy that is in question at you are clearly aspirin minister in the first half of 2002 not very -- based on the advice coming to you you are not very happy about the way that it is working. so what are your other strategic options at this point and by what process did you read you what your options were? >> that is the reason we called for the options paper.

i mean, the options were basically these: we had taken the decision, post-september 11, that this issue had to be confronted, and there were a number of different ways it could be confronted. it could be confronted by an effective sanctions from work. it could be confronted by some, allowing the inspectors back in to do their work properly and compliance with u.n. resolutions, or in the final analysis, if he was not prepared -- if the sanctions could not contain him and he was not prepared to allow the u.n. inspectors back in, then the option of removing saddam was there. adoption, incidentally, had always been there. after september 11th what change, as i say, was our calculation, and i think the americans as well, that we couldn't go on like this. >> said the options paper, looked as you say, at continent strengthened as one broad course. an alternative strategy, the possibility of regime change, which by then was being much

talked about in the united states, and then three different ways in which that might be affected. and i don't want to go into each of those at this particular point. i am, as i say, trying to think about the process of formulating strategy. having got that paper, what did you do in order to have it discussed and reviewed and looked at? what kind of meetings to do about it? comb did you consult? >> obviously we were talking -- i was speaking very closely with jack straw, with those who were advising me at the time, we were talking obviously to the ministry of defence people and the defense secretary as well, and we were trying to get an assessment -- that's why, as i say, there were a lot of discussions inside government. is this new sanctions for import really going to do it or not, is this going to be effective? as i say, i think the conclusion was, in the end, you certainly couldn't rely on it.

>> did you have an actual meeting to discuss the paper and take a decision on it? >> we had a meeting, i think -- the options paper was given to us before the meeting with president bush, and i think van -- i'm not sure whether it was before or shortly after but i can look it up for you. i think we then had a meeting of the key people to decide whether we were then going to go. >> i think you got the paper in march. you were seeing president bush in april and before you went to see president bush you had a meeting at checkers with a number of people which was a sort of briefing meeting for crawford by you didn't have anything like a cabinet committee meeting that looked up this paper and had a sort of structured debate about it. >> we have a structured debate. it happened to the cover-up that happened at checkers rather than downing street is irrelevant to it but i think the simple answer is did we consider these other options that's why we had the paper drawn up.

>> when you consider those options, how diverse was the range of advice you were getting on them? or you getting edify said in a from people with a real knowledge in the middle east and iraq or were you having people challenging the paper and pointing out some of the possible down sides if you work this way or that way? >> for one thing i have found throughout this whole matter is i was never short of people challenging me on it. >> can you identify who they were? >> people in the cabinet for example robin cook and from time to time player short. >> they were not at the meeting? >> know what we would discuss this and obviously breyer to the invasion in iraq i think if you will more than 24 different cabinet meetings this was a topic that was right through the mainstream. >> to discuss the paper in the cabinet? >> we didn't discuss the options

paper specifically in cabinet -- >> clear shortstop and to the paper. >> yes but the discussion that we had in the cabinet was a discussion again and again and again and the options were very simple. the options were a sanctions framework that was effective, alternatively the u.n. inspectors doing the job alternatively you have to remove saddam. those were the options. >> what were the downside arguments being put about removing saddam? >> this was partly for example reading telegrams coming from the ambassadors abroad and so on. the downside arguments were obviously going to be that not military action or something that you should consider as a last resort but there were issues to do with relationships and the muslim oral and to do with what the effect would be in the arab world and so on. but what you find in the

situations as you will get a range of different views. some people were saying you must not know account, contemplate military action. other people were saying it's time you acted. so for example and i think made 2002 the conservative party put out a paper saying this is why saddam is a threat and we have to act. i think the others were saying you may be a threat but you shouldn't for a lot of reaction so it isn't as if we were getting the full range of the views. we got the full range of the views from the beginning. the trouble was we had to take a decision and my decision was we could not afford to have the situation go on. how we then dealt with it was an open question. >> what were the views, did they include people warning you what happened after you topple saddam hussein if one did end up doing that would raise some difficult questions and risks of secretary

and strife within iraq. how much was that spelled out in the advice in the time? >> most of the advice was worried about a humanitarian catastrophe and saddam was removed and there was advice and i called for the people papers on this later about what the sunni shia relationship would be and that was obviously an issue we raised within our own deliberations with the americans and elsewhere and so all of these things were factors the we had to take into account. but the primary consideration for me was to send an absolutely powerful, clear and unremitting message that after september september 11th if you were a regime engaged in wmd you have to stop. >> that brings me i think to the final point i want to ask because from the evidence we have heard so far from a large

number of witnesses and from the documents we have read it does begin to appear that by march or april of 2002 you were strongly attracted to the idea and in a sense in doing so you were building on the philosophy of humanitarian intervention that you had first negative set out in a very public way in your chicago speech of april, 1999, and in april of course in 2002 after your meeting with president bush you returned in your speech at the george bush presidential library at college station when he sat talking in general of regime change not specifically in this paragraph about iraq if necessary the action should the military and again if necessary and justified issued involved regime change.

i have been involved as british prime minister in three conflicts involving regime change and milosevich, the taliban and sierra leone. had you reached the point where you regarded within this philosophy removing saddam hussein's regime and i don't think anybody was ever in doubt of the evil mist of saddam's 3g as a valued objective for the government policy? >> no, the key issue was the wmd issue but i think it is just worth at this point and then i will come specifically to the texas speech and to go with this notion that somehow in crawford i shifted opposition. >> we will talk out crawford separately. i'm sticking on the strategy. >> i thought you were -- >> i'm referring to the speech.

this is in the day after the crawford meeting. >> it's in the context of your philosophy of regime change. >> let me make it clear in the chicago speech in 1999, but i was doing was sitting out very clearly what i felt the consequences were of an interdependent world and what i was saying was in the past people might have thought a security problem in one part of the world can be divorced from its impact on another part to and the part that was developing we were no longer able to do that, not financially, not in terms of security in terms of the cultural issues. in other words as a result of an interdependent world it then became in our self-interest not as some moral cause but in our self-interest to regard

ourselves as affected by what was happening in a different part of the world. i actually have the chicago speech if you want me to refer to it. >> i have it, too and have referred to a. >> this is an important speech. >> yes, because if you read the speech, you will see very clearly that the basis for what i am saying is not that i now believe that we should apply, rather ravenna a test of national interest, and morrill test -- i mean, i think there are moral issues to do with dictators and so on. what i was saying was that, from now on, in the new world that is developing, we should realize that is in our national interest to understand the problem is a different part of the world can come back and hit us in the hours. and the reason i was so strongly in favor of action in kosovo, action incidentally to rescue and essentially muslim population from persecution by a country that was a christian

country, the reason was not simply that i felt affronted as i think people shouldn't and did to about the prospect of ethnic cleansing but also because i was convinced the consequences of allowing such action to go unchanged would never stay at the borders of the balkans. that is the basis. when we come to the texas speech it is all that i suddenly say now is the regime change rather than wmd. on the contrary you quoted a passage and i then go on to say we cannot of course intervene on all cases but where countries are engaged in the wmd business we should not shrink from confronting them. some can be offered a way out, route to respectability. i hope in time syria, iran and north korea can accept the need to change their relationships with the outside world.

the new relationship is on offer but the most note sponsoring terrorism or wmd is unacceptable and then i go on to do with iraq. as for iraq i know some precipitous action, they needn't. we will proceed as we did after september 11th in a calm, measured, sensible but firm firm way and i go on leave in iraq to develop wmd and reach them along than nine separate united nations resolutions refusing still to allow weapons inspectors to do their work properly is not an option. now i then want to describe the brutality of saddam but then i come back to the issue of wmd. so free the issue was very simple. it was about the need to make clear from now on view did not defined international community on wmd. i will also like to make one

other point because i read a lot of the evidence that is being given to you. i think there is a danger we end up with a very binary@@@@@@@@d$ the reason i take a hard line on iran is nuclear-weapons it is not just liberation but the nature of the iranian regime makes you worried about the prospect of their owning a nuclear device. >> as you quite rightly say, when you get on to iran in that

speech, you may date your argument. a recent television interview, you are asked if you knew then that they did not have wm days, i you replied that you would have gone to remove them. gone on and still of thought it right to remove him so even without the wmd is you said in december. recently that you would still fall that right to remove him and what i am going for is precisely that point. >> let me deal with britain interview and even with all my experience in dealing with interviews, it still indicates i've got something to learn about it. this was an interview let me explain that was given weeks before your inquiry began. >> know, we'd been doing some weeks by the time we started --

sprick the actual interview was given -- >> it was recorded. >> it was recorded before july of last year. >> not before july but before you began your public hearings. exactly and the point i'm making is simply this i did not use the word of regime change in that interview and i did not in any sense mean to change the basis. obviously all i was saying is you couldn't describe the nature of the threat in the same way if you knew then what you know now because some of the intelligence about wmd is shown to be wrong. it was in no sense a change of the position and i just simply say to you the position was it was the breach of the united nations resolutions on wmd. that was the cause. it was then and it remains. >> in april, my final point before i hand over, of 2002, you are not taking the view that the

need to change the regime in iraq should be the main driver of your strategy because the situation on wmd essentially haven't changed very much over the previous three or more years. >> sorry, the position on wmd have a chance to dramatically as a result of september 11th. >> the fact on wmd hadn't changed. the perception of the risk changed but not the risk itself. >> one of the things you always have to do in this situation and you are absolutely right to draw attention to it, is you have to when you were charged with the responsibility of trying to protect your country and that should be the job of the prime minister, you have to take an assessment of risk. my guess is the first prior to

september 11th was that saddam was a menace, threat, monster but we would have to try to make best. if you ask me prior to a timber 11th did i have any real belief in his good faith, no i didn't. did i think that a new sanctions framework was going to do the trick? no i didn't. on the other hand, precisely because the consequence of military action is so great for me the calculus was look we are just going to have to do the best we can. after september 11th, that changed, and that change is still believe is important for us today. because the reason today as i say i do take such a strong line on iran or any other nation that tries to develop wmd. we cannot afford in my view and other people may have different views but in my view, we cannot afford the possibility that

nations, particularly nations that are breughel, rogue states, states that take an attitude that is wholly contrary to our way of life you cannot afford such to be allowed to develop or proliferate tebeau mt. >> my colleagues are going to come back to this until later on because it is crucially important and i apologize for as it were interrupting at this stage but i think it is time i asked, you carry the story forward a bit before we get back into the detail of wmd if you are content with that? expect the chair wanted to say something? >> the government last night declassified to documents. we were not proposing to put them on the web site because in themselves the ottilie very small part of the story but since our witnesses referred to one of them we shall put both on the website. they are declassified. >> mr. blair, i now want to pick

up the more detailed development in policy particularly in the beginning of 2002 because i think it was eight years ago today when president bush took the congress in his whole state of the union address about the axis of evil, and i think what you're to advisers, mr. powell and david manning said the sum since there was a shift in emphasis particularly when regime change have actually become an active policy for the usa because although it had been -- there had been the liberation and was a policy that was an active policy that actually become an active policy at that stage. when you sensed a shift in policy what was your response in brief to tell and then i want to go on to the preparation from the crawford meeting. >> i would say the shift

happened after september 11th. i think if i may just quote from st. after september 11th what i actually said on this issue, when i reflect on the terrorism we know these groups of fanatic killing without discrimination. the numbers they kill and benefits of killing are not governed by any sense of morality. the limits are only practical and technical. we know they would if they could go further and use chemical biological or even nuclear weapons. we know also there are groups of people vocationally states who will treat the technological capability of such weapons and then i go on to say you have been warned and we should act on this morning but i would say it is not really about the president bush taxes of evil speech or anything else.

i think after september 11th it was clear this whole thing was a different from work. >> but my point was how do we begin to respond to the change, the shift lot of the sinking earlier but how we respond to that. >> we tend to respond with how do we deal with it. >> said that was, the preparation for the meeting at crawford that took place at chequers and according to mr. campbell's diaries he told the meeting it was regime change in part because of tebeau mt but more broadly because of the threat to the region and the world; that is true? >> i think these things were sort of conjoined really. i think the fact was it was an appalling regime and we couldn't run the risk of such a regime being allowed to develop wmd. can i just make one point that i think is quite important as

well? of course it was president clinton in 1998 that signed the i recalibration act and that policy of regime change became the policy of the government. spinach is, i'm aware of that because that became more active as i said. >> but can i make this point because it is important. if you study the detail of that act the reason he comes out for regime change, president clinton, is because the breach of the united nations resolution on wmd, so there is a way i think that you can get a sense and some of this is in evidence as it were the americans regime change dealing with wmd, it is a different way of expressing the same proposition. the americans in this sense were saying we are for regime change because we don't trust the is ever going to give up his tebeau mt conditions. we say we have to deal with the wmd ambitions of that means regime change so be it. so it wasn't that we can at this from completely different

positions. >> in preparation for this meeting at chequers, what kind of conclusions did you reach and what advice for you being given by your advisers? >> well, basically we were obviously now going -- we had the military action in afghanistan. it was obvious the american system and indeed our own system were going to look at the wmd issue and there was advice on options as to contant idf regime change and so on and so forth so all of those options were being explored. and as i say following that meeting and before i went to see president bush there was quite an intense interaction on this issue that sir roderick was raising with me about smart sanctions because i needed to get a sense of whether this policy was a runner or not. >> why was the chief of defence staff present at this meeting? >> a was obvious the american

system certainly wasn't going to for world military action and, you know, from the very nearly stage i could see coming down the track street after september 11th frankly there were going to be very difficult decisions about this in the future. as a, one of the things i always try to do particularly if we were -- of military action was even possible the and the military paper made it clear it was a possibility to get the chief of defence staff right alongside the discussion and the planning and the policy. >> what advice did he give you at that meeting because i think that you asked the foreign secretary and defense secretary to produce papers. >> yes, the defense -- >> but what advice did the chief of defence staff give up that meeting? >> he was laying out options on the military side and expressing his view i seek my boys to do about this in his evidence and -- >> does he remember being at

that meeting as it is in mr. campbell's player resaw afraid we don't have that information. >> i remember him being at it. and as i said, we got the paper from the ministry of defence and that was looking at the various options. but one of the things happening at this time and i think it is quite important to reflect on this is that it is quickly becoming the key issue. people are moving on from afghanistan. it was always going to be on the agenda once you had a september 11th. and as i said a different sense for everybody that we had to act. and so we had, you know, a perfectly good discussion about it and obviously i think from the defense point of view what cbs and the ministry of defence were concerned about was to make sure we got alongside any planning that was going on and did as quickly as possible. >> was the foreign secretary at that meeting? >> i believe he was but let me

go back and check. >> because we heard from jack straw about the advice he gave in advance of that meeting, which is the one referred to. but we have heard that while there might have been some private distances the time between u.s. and foreign secretary or the desired final objective whether the regime change was objective you agree on the tactics, namely that it would be essential to go to the united nations because it would be not possible for the cabinet or anyone else to support the actions. is that a correct -- >> i think the other thing very important at the time was to try to the international community on the same page with the threat in how we dealt with at industry after september 11th people came together behind america.

but i was very aware from the early stages of this that also the american mind set had changed dramatically and frankly mine had as well, when i talk to other leaders particularly in europe i didn't get the same impression really. and so one thing i was anxious to do because we put together a coalition of afghanistan was to put together a coalition again to deal with saddam hussein and theref it was also important because i did not want america to feel that it had no option but to do its on its own.

çóintended to achieve a÷i crawf? >> to get a real sense of "would be best -- of what would be best and get a sense about our own strategy. >> you have a discussion with president bush without any advisers present. was anything decided that these discussions? >> nothing actually decided, but let me be clear -- one thing that is really important when you're dealing with other leaders is that you establish -- particularly for the united states and united kingdom -- you have a relationship. i had one with president clinton and again with president bush. that is important.

states used to launch a strong relationship, i had with president clinton and again with president bush. that is important, some of what you will do an informal meeting but it's also important to be able to discuss and i frankly with the issues were, and as i recall the discussion it was less to do with specifics about what we were going to do on iraq or indeed the middle east because the israeli issue was a big issue at the time. in fact i think i remember there have been conversations we had even with israelis, the two of us while we were there so that was a major part of all of this. but the principal part of my station was to try and say look in the end we've got to deal with various different dimensions of this whole issue. for me what happened after september 11th was i was

starting to look at this whole issue to do with this unrepresented extremism in a different way and i wanted to persuade president bush but also get a sense from him as to where he was on the broad issue. -- what you're suggesting you were having general discussions in terms of getting reviews across to each other trying to understand and establish a relationship. >> yes but also from his -- >> during the course of the discussions do you think you gave him any commitments? >> the only commitment i gave, and i gave this openly in the meeting was a commitment to deal with saddam hussein. now -- >> so when you had to deal with -- >> absolutely and that was public -- >> so you agree on the end but not on the means? >> we agree on both factually as it came through finally but we agreed we had to confront this issue. he had to come back into compliance with the international community and as i said in a press conference with president bush the method of

doing that is open and indeed he made the same point. i just want to make one other point about this. this was about six months from september 11th. one major part of what president bush was saying to me was to express his fear actually that if we were not prepared to act in a really strong way we ran the risk of sending a disastrous signal to the world. >> there is so many people believe that you entered into a firm commitment because some undertakings were given that you were with him no matter what the circumstances. i think it's important the discussions were taking place without anybody being present to understand what commitments did you make to him and why is there a feeling this was quite a critical meeting? >> i honestly can't explain why people have come to a view that

there were different commitments given because i read from time to time people saying things like this is what was agreed at this meeting. what was agreed was set out in a very private note from david manning afterwards and what i was saying to president bush and i wasn't saying this privately i was saying it publicly was we are going to be with you in confronting and dealing with this threat. there was no -- the one thing i was not doing is dissembling in that position. in fact i actually have here i think the press conference president bush and i gave afterwards we talked about i think it was israel came up first but then we went on to iraq and president bush said the premise in by of course talked about iraq and with recognize the danger of a man willing to kill his own people and harboring weapons of mass destruction and goes on to say that he has got to effectively prove that he is in compliance and i then say it's always been

our policy that iraq will be a better place without some of his and there shouldn't be doubt about that for the reasons i've given. and the reasons to do with weapons of mass destruction also deal with the bortolotti -- so, what i say is an you know the reasons to do with weapons of mass destruction also to do with the appaling fertility and recession of his own people but how we proceed in this situation, how we make sure the threat posed by wmd is dealt with that is a matter that is open. éyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéy

what did president bush think you lenders -- what did president bush understand? >> what i said but that the press conference and at the meeting, which is that we would be with them in dealing with this threat. even at that stage, i was ready for the stage of going the un route. >> your chief of staff told us that at crawford and subsequently, you did not see support for the u.s. but you were with them in terms of what you wanted to do, but a sensible way to do it. what you're trying to do, but this is a sensible way to do it. we are offering you a partnership to try and get to a wide coalition. but other witnesses who were also involved in the decision-making process of told us that you set a number of great condition for our support.

which was it? >> it was the former. look, this is an alliance that we have with the united states of america. and it's not a contract. it's not, we do this for you, you do this for us. it's an alliance and it's an alliance icq very openly, i believe in passionately. i had been through with president clinton, xhosa though, and just let me emphasize you that 85% of the assets assets for american asset. i ago difficult to restraining president clinton did was right to go all the way on kosovo and he was in a difficult position. the american people were saying to him, look, displaces thousands of miles away for america. let the europeans deal with it. it's on my doorstep. >> spitzer christopher my year

he did say you were saying yes, but it was not being listened to. >> i don't think he was there at the critical meeting your >> any other correspondence. >> you as i can read it wider. in 2002, not just the meeting. >> yes, but the fact is that that meeting and there are other evidence given to you particularly by david manning. but i was just explaining about the american alliance because it's important in understanding my thinking on this. so i've been through this process with resident clinton. when he, with a lot of courage had committed america. september the 11th happened, i never regarded september the 11th as an attack on america. are regarded it as an attack on us and i said we would stand shoulder to shoulder with them. we did in afghanistan and i was determined to do that again.

>> fine. now, the term used by jonathan powell was that you said for tech go reasons -- so granted for tactile reasons you sent out for the u.s. issues you believe needed to be tackled for the policy to be pursued successfully. but i think i crawford you to discuss u.k. participation in u.s. military planning. what conclusions do you think president bush took from the meeting about your commitment to dealing with saddam hussein to the military action? >> i think what he took from that was exactly what is taken from that which is a potential military action because there was no day of feeling with this diplomatically we would be with him now is absolutely clear because as i've set up publicly, not privately we have to confront this issue. it could be confronted by sanctions framework that would affect this. for the reasons i've given, we didn't have one. it could be confronted by a u.n.

inspections framework. welcome to that. or alternatively, it would have to be confronted by force. i was going earlier -- but i won't do it, but i'm very happy to make it available to comments i made even prior to september 11, 2001, because we have been through this with saddam several times, 1997, 1998, and so on and so forth here you know, the fact is forced with always an option. what changed after september the 11th was necessary and there was no other day way of dealing with this threat. >> so would you say the commitment you gave for attack to go reasons became an assumption in washington and into some extent reduced your leverage for negotiations? >> when you say -- did you say for tactical reasons? >> that is what jonathan powell said. >> it wasn't for tactile reasons. what i believe was that if you wanted to make a real change to this whole issue and again this

is very important to understanding certainly my strategic thinking but also the strategic thinking of many people who looked at this issue. and i would probably have a far greater understanding of it today and even back then. what i believed we confronted with the new threat that was based on political ideology, but i'm religious fantasist on. it was a complete of the proper faith of islam, but it was real and active and they demonstrated their intent to go very large numbers of us that they possibly could you whatever strength you set out, not for tactical reasons, but deeps, strategic reasons is why did we need to do to make a successful assault on this ideology that was a dangerous? and therefore, the middle east peace process for me was not a kind of tactical thing, it was actually fundamental, still is in my view, to dealing with this issue.

>> i think there rodrick wants to comments. >> eisai moment ago you had agreed with president bush, not only on the ends but also on the mean there is that the americans actually have a different view of the means and they were already planning military action and they had an explicit policy of seeking regime change. i mean, did you a crawford actually have a complete identity view with president bush on how to deal with saddam? >> well, we of course were pushing the u.n. route. so the american view is regime change, as i say, because they didn't believe saddam would never, in good faith, give up his wmd ambitions or programs. >> and you are insisting ultimately successfully that this should be done through the u.n. route, so actually george view of the means was actually different from theirs because they would've been prepared -- they weren't that keen on the u.n. view untrimmed route.

>> we did have to persuade them, although i think it's good to say that even at the meeting president bush made it clear that america would have let the inspectors in to function properly. >> another thing -- >> if i can just point this out, several occasions over the next few months president bush made it clear to me that if it would work, then it worked that we would've taken yes for an answer. >> you equally affected him as he just repeated in sf i said earlier they came to military action there would be no way of doing with his diplomatically that she would be with them. >> if we tried the u.n. route and it failed in my view was that would have to be dealt with. >> we will come back to the question where that left you in terms of your legal base quite a lot later on, because i think it's best we take that as a single job checked in its own right and it would be easier for both of us. >> just one more point to rising from crawford, but not just from

crawford. you said -- he reminded us that the arab israel problem was in a very hot state at crawford. he may have even had some conversation with israelis from there and obviously with something that was a part of your conversations with president bush. and i think it's right to say and jack straw said it do you worry that lists in trying to persuade the american to make more and faster progress on the middle east this process. ultimately, jack straw said it was a matter of huge frustration that we weren't able to achieve something which given the support you are giving president bush, why did he repaid that support by acting

more decisively on the crucial issue of the middle east peace process? >> in order to understand my mind, i cannot think about trading this policy for that policy. however, i believe the resolving the middle east is immensely important, and it was difficult. that goes back to something i said before on several occasions -- it was difficult to persuade because this was such a fundamental question. the americans tend to regard these issues somewhat separate. the mitigation of that -- we did get the roadmap at oxford, and the road map is extremely important. and secondly, and again, i know

madoff -- i know more now than i did then. this now than i probably would've know them because of the work i do now. i think truthfully with the intifada still raging in palestine it would've been pretty difficult to have got this thing back together again. however, having said that i was very frustrated about it because they believed then and i believe now that when these are not divisible problems, is one problem with different facets. and one major facet of the whole problem is this israel palestine conflict not because evidently the existence of israel has provoked this conflict. i totally disagree with people who say that that the resolution of the conflict would have been enormously beneficial impact on relations with the muslim world. >> i think, if i recall rightly, you were arguing very strongly

throughout 2002 to the white house and making progress on this problem was that the state not a trade-off, it was because achieving progress on this was going to make a huge difference to opinion in the region, to reactions in the region, to the reactions in the muslim world if it came to the point where you had to take military action against iraq. says he just said, these two things were linked together. but the americans were not able to see the logic of this in the same way. >> well, it was a debate that continued and i think, you know, you've got a point actually, sarah roderic. this is something i think it's difficult with the american system now and i think it was different actually at the end of president bush's time in fact. the reason he launched the annapolis process was because of this. but i think there was a tendency to see these things separately and i regarded them, as i said,

all part of the one and the one thing. and yes i mean i said this at the time and i would say it now. i wish we would've made that are in faster progress? >> but you can make it a precondition with this? >> no, it wouldn't be right to do that either. you should only take the action in respect of iraq of using its intrinsically valid in its own terms. having said that, as i say my whole construct was to get as roddy coalition as possible, and i thought if we manage to get the peace process really pushing forward, were more likely to get a broader and deeper coalition. >> but surely you must assent to them, look this thing is really going to have a chance of working well if we can make this progress down the arab israel track before we get there. >> well, i'm certainly santarem i think this is vital. you can describe it as a broken

record through that. and it actually after september 11th i think after the september 11th the statement to the house of commons in a speech i made to my party conference in the end of september 2001, you know, i had and i have a few and it's i think if we want to deal with iran today and you've got very similar issues than the ones are discussing here which is why learning the lessons of this is so important. again in my view we are better place to do with the random this issue moving forward. >> when he said this is fido was he just taken it for granted we were going to support him on iraq anyway? we are beginning now to join them in military planning. you said you were going to stand shoulder to shoulder with him. and so we would be there anyway, even if he didn't push hard and

get the progress that you are asking for an arab-israeli question? >> when you say we would've been there anyway, i mean, we wanted to go down the u.n. route and i think if we hadn't it would have been very difficult indeed to it however, in respect to israel palestine issue, it's bayern in the record as to how important i thought it was. and to be fair to him, he would say that getting the israelis to agree to the roadmap, because it didn't happen until i think april 2003 was a major step forward. and it was a major step forward. it is so governing documents of the peace process today. it was a big push to get that agreed. to meet with him and him at the israelis. but there was also as i say the intifada be an uprising in the palestinian side that israel was a difficult situation. israel was as a lot of people in terrorist attacks.

there was retaliations against the palestinians. there was a very bloody situation. track this was obviously inflaming emotions in the region, so when it came time that the coalition took action, did the disappointing lack of progress notwithstanding the belated publication of the route map, how much of an element was that in the difficult reactions from a can from the coalition's point of view in the region and in the muslim world to the action that was actually taken? how much did he contribute, do you think? >> it is a difficult passion. i mean, i don't know that a fundamentally would've altered things. >> if i put it together will play around, would've been much better if you got the progress? >> that's why was arguing for it and having said that, i think that had we once the conflict incurred and we had been in iraq

would've been able to at that point i forward. i think that issue would have been taken care of and just to say really, because they may not get another chance to say it, about the reactions of the arab leaders in the region, most of them were glad to see the back of saddam. now, what they worried about with the consequences of doing so, but there was no great support. in fact, when as he is now, king abdullah of saudi arabia launched the crown prince -- peace initiative of 2002. he paid money to the families of palestinian suicide bombers. having said all that coming as of course it would be better if we'd had the middle east peace process moving forward. the only thing i say since president bush was that it was a very difficult moment in that process. if you are trying to do it today, it would be a lot easier than 2002, right in the middle of the intifada.

>> it was pretty disappointing to you that we can push that one further down the road? >> i was always disappointed them frustrated on this. >> i think this is probably the right moment to take aéyéyéyéyéy éyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéy >> mr. blair, before the break he said the military options were discussed at crawford. >> yes, it was obviously a possibility of military action be in the outcome of what was going to happen and so there was a general discussion of the possibility of going down the military rate that obviously we were arguing very much for that to be at the u.n. route failed.

>> i think for reasons we will come to later, i think it would be impressed by the minute ministry of defense to deciding on an 2002 west k-kilo package the u.k. would be prepared to contribute to the event in military action. i think we have also heard there were essentially for possible military packages under consideration with the main discussion focused on the too large and possible packages, the key should be whether we should contribute an armored division. i think her chief of staff told us that the entity had abdicated the largest package. the large land force option because they felt this was important to the relations of the u.s. military and often because they thought it would help army morale. now as he won't know a decision to commit troops to battle, but individual soldiers in harms way, cannot be taken lately.

how do you weigh the risks of troops in lan operation as opposed to the one of the other packages against the importance of military operations with the u.s. and the morale. >> baroness, the first thing to do was to work out whether you believe that you are right to be in this at all. then the next question is if you are right to be in it, what is your level of support? and in any occasion and i ended up on several occasions taking military action, kosovo, sierra leone, afghanistan and iraq. the first thing i do in a sense is to say to the military themselves -- the >> please be significant about iraq because i'm asking how to do with the risks to the troops involved in the situation in iraq? >> when i come to take this decision the first thing i do is that the military for their view

and their view in this instance was that they were up to doing it and that they preferred to be right at the center of things. now actually i'm not hiding behind them because that was my view, too. i thought if it was right for us to be and that we should be there alongside our principal ally, the united states, i thought that in afghanistan and i thought back in iraq also. >> said that was your view, too, so you read one with which you were being advised on? >> correct. >> did resident bush at any stage request a particular form a skill of the u.k. contribution? >> no, he very much like this to us to decide what wanted to do. but i had taken a few that this was something that if it was right to do actually matter to have bred mare. it mattered not simply for reasons to do with -- >> it mattered, but did the skill matter?

to get their different ways in which we could have contributed, they didn't have to be in the large scale that we committed ourselves to? >> you didn't have to be. there were three basic options. >> why did you choose, you were advised, but you were of that view. why were you at that view? >> my view is that it's best for britain to be in there right alongside. and i say that because i regarded this whole issue is a threat to our securities as well as a threat to the security of the united states of america. it's not simply that i value the alliance, although i do value the alliance and as they will say to people you can distance yourself from america if you want to but you'll find at the time way back. i believe it's a vital part of our security i believe if we think it is right, we should be prepared to play our part fully. >> but the reasons given by the chief of defense staff was about

the relations in the morale. was there a question of how much influence we would he able to exercise if we contributed to that large-scale? >> it wasn't so much that. it was a matter of common sense, obviously. if you were there with the bigger force alongside the americans then otherwise, then, of course, you will be more intimately involved, but that's not really the reason. the reason westies i hear we have this situation which we believe is a threat. america believes it's a threat to them are going to accurately. we've acted jointly before and were going to act again. and it doesn't arrive from the importance that certainly i attach they are prepared to do the difficult things. >> you are driven by your sense of the proper policies. >> correct.

you should not do it for influence, but if you make a bigger contribution, you're going to have more to say. >> mr. blair, a light to turn to the issue of weapons of mass destruction. when she decided in 2002 that it was essential to pursue the un route rather than human rights are any other issue, weapons of mass destruction became important. we've been told earlier that the informational available to you on the rocks w m d -- are rocks -- iraq's w