light shone from this accident and others that i felt we needed to improve. so, we've tripled the number of hours in this proposal. i think there is 750 hours and we have a number ofi ñ#w/ñçó/ç jo we offer and welcome the academic community to come forward for us. jo we had a terrible tragedy over detroit on christmas. i know our time is very limited.

your testimony talks about accidents in airline safety. this are other serious threats involving air planes in the air and on the ground. . . ground. and there's been a great deal of media attention continuing in my state on what happened. i don't think we know yet, but i wonder if you could at least comment briefly on the faa's jurisdiction over this type of incident in the air and on the ground and the protocols involved including on the ground i'm sure you've been following that and if you could comment whether those were followed in the air and on the ground. mack guess, sir. your talking about the flight with the attempted tears. >> yes, sir, we of course obviously control that fighter air traffic control procedures and the aircraft landed. they indicated they had a

problem. there's the communication gap between the cabin and the flight deck crew. the flight deck crew reported they had someone who attempted to set firecrackers off. so it didn't elevate to anyone whether it was the cockpit or air traffic control to anything of great seriousness at that point. however, he began to escalate and if you follow the timeline, and if you follow the timeline, we have a very robust system transportation security administration, all of those procedures were tried, followed. we isolated the airplane as it was known to us what were doing. we also then began to very quickly expand notification. we set up using our communication system and a domestic events that were. we reached out to other carriers in the country can't explain to them what was going on and set up procedures so that either we or they could contact their crews to put them on alert for the situation as it develops. >> thank you. within the jurisdiction of this

committee by record the further opportunity to talk about that. another multiple agencies with multiple jurisdictions. the chairman has been very helpful. we immediately had a closed preceding on the matter involving a number of agencies. but it is a grave concern. i thank god there wasn't a loss of life in that situation and hopefully this will be another incident that we can learn from, sir. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> the chair thanks the lady for michigan and i asked the gentlelady from michigan. >> i think the four the testimony and met with many of the members who have suffered a tragic loss and are moved by their efforts to make the skies safer. so we joined them, certainly help we can push the senate to pass with bipartisan airline safety and improvement act. first of all, i'd like to say

administrator babbitt, i am from west virginia and i would like to thank you and your agencies cooperation as you note last month a u.s. airways flight overran the runway, which you don't want to do in west virginia because we're situated on the top of a mountain. we had heard he passengers and three crewmembers. but because our airport hadn't ema s., which then engineered material arresting system, a new technology that halted the plane on the ramp and saved a lot of life in a lot of industries. under the faa has helped with us in getting the rapid rebuild of that system on our airport. the thank you for that. two things i'd like to ask about. but commuting thing that we learned in the tragic accident that the commuting times of the pilot on the one in particular was very lengthy, questionable leading to fatigue. you mention commuting, but is it

possible to quantify the possible hazards and how are you facing this in interfacing us with a conversation i had with my regional air crewmembers on monday that this is going to be an issue that's very difficult for them as they tried to hold their job and live in different areas. so response. >> well, the primary focus that we have is on crews being arrested. we want every crew to show up for work, both mentally and physically prepared to go to work. and that's about exception. that is the charge, that is the challenge and it's our responsibility, shared responsibility with the crews to make sure to not happen. there has been focused on the fact pilots to commute and that happens. different characters handle it different ways. we are literally on the brink and we discussed a little bit of the delay issue. it took somewhat longer, not

dramatically longer. i sat in this very chair in 1992 and testified on this very subject on the air line pilots association. i appreciate how long it has taken. but were talking about delay that's measured in weeks, not years. so we're very close and our proposal, it notice of proposed rulemaking will include a provision where we seek comment on what do people believe is the appropriate thing. how can we limit this? i can give you lots of letters that i received on both sides of this argument. it's a serious issue but were focused on fatigue and management of fatigue in recognizing the fatigue and we've got several ideas on how to deal with that. >> well, i certainly think, you know, i applaud you for that. i'd like is sooner than later in the fatigue issue is certainly hard to quantify for individuals who have different levels of, you know, sustainability research and hours of sleep. the other question that came up repeatedly in the last turn we had were the major carriers mentoring with the regional more

seasoned pilots helping the younger pilots, appearing man. i think we had testimony from numerous people that said that most, the best way to learn after you attain that licenses to have somebody right next to you that can show you the ropes and help you meet the difficulties of any kind of situation that you might be in. as a mentoring program really going to come off here? and are they going to be a situation -- this is what i fear, is it going to be a situation that the carrier said that the more seasoned pilot say that they will mentor but it's going to cost another -- i want to be compensated or mentoring. this is an something i'm going to voluntary do. what is your perspective on not enough on the pilot caring and neither one -- >> the mentoring is a natural event over the course of an oral airline you get tired comings

and a number of years linus copilot and you learn other things. and that's part of the mentoring process. that's where the experience is built up. >> if i could interrupt some of the plane i was on monday i don't know who was mentoring you in the cockpit there. they both looked like my 25-year-old children, quite frankly. >> well, going back and look at one of the concerns we have, the model i describe for you as a traditional airline that has been around for a long time and has been politics that mentor the younger pilots. one of the concerns today is quite offered a new airline will form in order to provide service for another carrier. and every pilot at the airline is new and therefore, how do we ensure that these pilots about that exposure? we know they meet the regulatory requirements. all of them do. so we've asked the carriers and i'm very pleased to say that they are all engaging in this. every carrier in this country today, every mainline carrier

that carries passengers now has a program to exchange their people that the leadership in the union representatives of the other carrier that feeds them at the regional partner. we want to see how that develops. is that providing the information transfer we're looking for? other of their curriculum courses? should we reach adduces into current training. but we also recognize the need for it. it's how best to deliver it and we have better academic tools debut with high fidelity simulation today. we have signs today that we didn't have peers who are going to try to find the best ways to achieve these goals and work with everyone to do that. >> thank you dared >> the chair thanks the gentlelady and now recognizes the gentlelady from nevada, ms. titus. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i like to continue the line of questioning that the chairman started. i appreciate your comment of the fastest way to implement safety improvement program is to be done voluntarily. but at the same time, i share

the inspector general's concerns that when that was the case, that some airlines, one of them regional airlines either didn't respond or responded in some kind of vague way. so i haven't really heard from you what you plan to do next, either through the carrot or the state to get these other airlines to establish the safety programs. and second, i know that many times a program is just written and put on the shelf. to have any kind of timeline are any plans to follow up with those airlines they did submit programs to see that they really are being implemented? >> is a very good point. and yes, ma'am, we have first off remember that we pressed this into service very quickly. we wanted a very rapid amount of focused attention on everybody in the industry. we want to get their attention. in the program i think again a misconception might be that we were going to go out and evaluate other programs. and that's not what we asked to

be done. we asked to confirm the existence of programs. the follow-on now that everyone is confirming guess we're going to have these programs, the follow on is to now go back and say how is this program? are you just fill in a square for us or are you actually developing a program? we can see some of these programs. some of them are very robust. some of them aren't. will have to go back with our inspectors. we did hear -- remember what we asked these inspectors again to do to confirm that there was an active program they did that. we asked them to look at some of the programs. some of the elements of over us to look at simply don't exist. so yes, we did get some answers. this is not applicable and not observable because they may not do that particular mover at the carrier. so yes, we got some vague answers on things, or you need to put them in the context of what our inspectors were looking not. remember these are -- we have

and i'll put something else in context for you. we use a system of calculated risk. i was part of a review team that went out and review the risk management that we use in this country to ensure the safe levels. we focus on areas if someone didn't have a program, we put them on notice you were going to a focused attention. if you don't have a program, you are be going to suggested for further scrutiny from us. they usually say, you know what, maybe it's better we do the program. and that's exactly what we want to inspire. >> i would assess the inspector general to comment on that if you have a suggestion to rethink that's going to be adequate or a timeline with which we need to do this. >> thank you, ms. titus. i appreciate the opportunity. i would commend faa under mr. babbitt leadership for pursuing remedial training programs. i'd like to remind the committee

the remedial training programs were first suggested is an guidance from faa to the aviation industry in 2006. it was suggested, it was put on record as guidance at that point. it wasn't mandated. yet under the urgency of the call to action initiative, which again i give credit to mr. babbitt for initiating. it was discovered that a sizable number of airlines at that point in jets have remedial training programs. they do now. so they've certainly checked the box to use mr. babbitt sprays. they have something on the shelves on it to use your phrase and we would encourage faa diligently to follow up sooner rather than later in evaluating the effectiveness of those programs aired and the guidance that faa headquarters provides to its inspectors in the field will be absolutely key. >> thank you.

>> the chair thanks the gentlelady and now recognizes the gentleman from missouri, mr. graves. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to clarify what i was sitting earlier because i still believe this is about quality of training and not quantity of training. i heard to comment about this is in just a number of hours. and i agree with that because we have other things in here obviously high-altitude training, whether training, besides being an att. that's been in an att that is the biggest limiting factor here together takes 1500 hours. with all due respect, the statement made earlier, a combat veteran who's got 300 hours in a plane in all the training in the world isn't just learning how to fly. they are very qualified individuals and i do not want to limit those two folks that only have 1500 hours within apt certificate. getting in apt certificate doesn't make you a good pilot.

what makes you a good pilot as a whole lot of other things that are out there. we need to be concentrated more on hiring practices with some of the airlines and weeding some of these folks out there do not belong in the cockpit. every person in this room that the pilot knows their people and the cockpit today who do not belong there. i don't want them commanding an aircraft that i've come a family on. even if they haven't atp certificate and abet high-altitude program and de-icing training and severe weather training. there is also people out there thatúpúúpppúpúvppúú÷ i understand what we are talking about here. i know it is not just about the

number of hours. that is a huge limiting factor on the pope's out there that we should have in theñ$(jt)trá as ñixdçóçóñiñiñiñixdñiñri amçó cul ñb÷ñthe total number ofñi hoursu mentioned it 750, is that just something you threw out or is that a recommendation? >> i believe that the number we put in. that is three times the amount of time. with that, goes a requirement of a number of trading elements and academic requirements. an example. in 1974, i was a fairly young, imagine that, copilot for eastern airlines. and we burst with an airline called care bear. care bear flukes lucidly out of san juan, puerto rico all

through. the integrated into her seniority list and i began to fly with the care bear pilots. but i was surprised when i first went to new york with the care bear pilots who had never seen snow fall on an airplane. only five years of experience, 15,000 hours, the pilot wasn't trained for the mission. conversely, we began to fly in air operations. my entire life i had on the east coast a lot of approaches. finally we are on a radio controlled environment. i wasn't trained for that mission. and i had plenty of time. this is what i'm trying to shed the light on is just accruing hours doesn't necessarily assure us the u.s. been exposed to the things that i personally believe. and i would tell you the simplest thing i can say is that 1500 hours -- i don't believe that. ..

but, i think the comments acknowledge at least some of the initial work that needed to be done. in light of that however,

mr. scovell in his testimony has said very specifically that the faa has not implemented key rulemakings onya crew fatigue in training requirements. dfa a special investigations of air carrier training programs were in effectively designed and implemented and then the other key that i wanted to highlight that he noted is that faa has missed its milestone for establishing programs to improve pilot professionalism and although you have talked about some delays, i think for the american the flying public, tolerance is not acceptable and it is not okay to say that we are doing better. we have to fix it and we have to fix it now. so mr. babbitt what would be our response to mr. scovell's testimony? >> first, i have a great deal of respect for the general and i have a great deal of respect for the observations and i find them very helpful. obviously i can't watch everything that the fda does.

i have my own goals and we try to do things and i appreciate the put some bright lights on some things we have not done so well and we take those things they suggest to us very seriously. >> do you agree with them? >> let me take the fatigue as an example. i came to the faa for months after this accident happened. i have been here seven and a half come eight months. and that eight months were promulgated for rules i have outlined a number of things we have done and i've tried to convince people horridly shed some light on in that eight months we are going to release their role in another month. now, this is a very deliberative process and rulemaking is a collaborative process, making legislation as it delivered a process. the work the ntsb does. this accident happened year ago and it took a year-and-a-half for a hearing. i appreciate what they go through. >> mr. babbitt, i apologize, being a relatively new member i only have to and half minutes in my question is do you agree with

mr. scovell's assessments and all the things to take a while i will also tell you that as a new member, i sat as many of my colleagues did when we got a call from secretary paulson and bernanke in saying this guy was-- and we had to react in two days. so sometimes depending upon the issue of the reaction has to be different. babbitt you or do you not agree with the testimony of mr. scovell which are not just limited to rulemaking and now i have a minute and 47 seconds. >> in 15 seconds i get an a-plus on milestones for professionalism. training i get an incomplete and i get a b on fatigue. >> do you agree with his assessment? >> i agree with some of his assessments. >> look forward to your immediate reaction to them and i would say, i would rather see you come to us and be creative in think out of the box and maybe have to figure out how we

can do things differently because i think the confidence of the american public is reducing every day that we delay, and i think there is room for us to think creatively and do it different and i look forward to helping you. >> thank you very much. i appreciate that. >> i thank the gentlelady and >> i thank the gentlelady and th from ohio, mr. bush shahri. >> thank you for attending this hearing today. mr. babbitt last spoken to offline a number of times and i appreciate the professionalism you are bringing to the agency and your sense of urgency to tackle some of these big issues that should have been addressed decades before your arrival here before this committee today. and i want to just stress some things that i think are very key to this discussion we are having right now. number one, we are talking about pilot experience and we are talking about something that is even proposed in the notice by the faa to train like you fly in

fly lucky train. these were very experienced pilots by some measure, 5600 hours between them but even the best pilots to have hundreds of thousands of hours, it they climb into an airplane and they are not trained on the safety procedures and the safety equipment in that airplane, i don't care who they are, they are going to have trouble recognizing and implementing recovery procedures and in fact, the ntsb report suggested q400 check pilots interviewed demonstrated instruction of the aircraft pushers system is not even part of the training syllabus at colgan air. in 1991, 200204, 05, 06 and 07 the captain of this airplane failed his check rights. and complete come a lack of retraining of remedial training. this was a tragic accident but it was completely avoidable in my opinion.

since 1973, the ntsb has been required and asking the faa to implement procedures that advises the training should go beyond the approach to the stall to include control stall training recovery from a full stall condition. the ntsb has further said that these are open and unacceptable responses by the faa. all this happen before you got here but the inspector general just reported that over the last year, a year later the faa has not finalized the rule as established for training requirements as established in the call to action. since 1973 the ntsb has had a call to action. in the last year, nothing has happened. even though in october this congress and the u.s. house of representatives passed a resolution to testing they will recognize and avoid a stall of the aircraft and it would require simulation. so i want to know why after a year, after decades we are not

having any movement with respect to this, sir. >> it is a very valid question and one of the things, if i could take you to the timeline a year ago january the new roles that cover training were submitted and comments were taken. the volume of comments was absolutely incredible, 3,000 pages of observations came in and they ranged from training and they ranged from training procedures questions about what we were proposing, lack of technical capability to do it. similars did not do necessarily everything in their plan can do everything in their plan can do so to ask simulator and the simulator is not capable of doing that that someone would raise their hand and say we can't do that because the simulator want replicate that. however we are on the verge of high fidelity simulator that actually can and i know you are a seasoned pilot yourself. a seasoned pilot yourself. we wouldn't put airplane in harm's way.

i have actually done a full stall in a 777 and it is one of the most violent maneuvers i have ever been in and number two it damages the airplane. it damages the airplane. you would never sell airplane fdu stall that it is so big but that doesn't mean we can simulate it and that is with this rule proposes. we put a supplemental out or a supplement to will be going out and i look forward to having that out also the spring and put this to bed. >> we need to put it to bed after decades and decades of non-action by the faa with respect to this. in fact the ntsb has said the issues in the cold and investigation are not new ones are unique to regional airlines and impact when they further press kogan why they did have a part of their safety features of this airplane is part of their curriculum, they suggested the faa did not require them so where we have seen these regional airlines were now doing more takeoffs and landings than are large airlines around the country, they have met and exceeded them in the past.

they are now shooting for the minimum set by find this completely unacceptable when the minimum stone include in any of the training syllabus requirement for understanding and recognizing and recovering with the safety features on the airplane. airplane. i expect the faa to move to rnt lexton a good job of moving and shaking in showing the sense of urgency but it is very clear in here that this will be part of simulation and we are not going to rest until this is passo i look from four to further committeeman herrings rory press this. >> thank the gentleman and the chair recognizes the gentleman from california, mr. guerra mundy. >> thank you. i am exceedingly new to this job, just three months. i understand your situation, but when i looked at your name i thought perhaps i had gone back to where was in the mid-90s will secretary babbitt when i was his deputy secretary. we did it lot of rulemaking at

that time. and it is a process that can be exceedingly slow. have you set out a definitive timeline? >> with regard to the fatigue rule, yes sir and i will offer you the same apologies that i offered this committee. we set a timeline. i asked for a timeline that we would have a rule out by the end of 09. i was overly ambitious. i was not aware, and we ran into some technical issues. is an incredibly complex rule. this for the first time we are going to take science into consideration. we will take input from management carriers as well as the pilots themselves in various unions involved. so, it took us longer and we do plan to have it out this spring which will be eight months from when i indicated we would try. >> i am really not surprised. my own experience of writing

rules is that the unanticipated is guaranteed to happen. and the delays will always be and the delays will always be more than you therefore, my question goes to the legislation that this committee has passed, that the house has passed and is now on the senate. do you support that legislation? >> i do. >> i do. if you the elements that we tried to advance, we certainly took you know a great deal of guidance from the legislation. we felt we could perhaps move these things along. i understand legislation itself as the deliberator process and if we could be moving these if we could be moving these th privately but the chairman i wo privately but the chairman i passed all these things and they key to the faa that got them done. done. i would love for that to >> do you support the legislation publicly and in the senate? >> i have not been asked by the senate, but yes sir. we support the goals that you

have set forth here, yes. >> do you support the legislation then? you do support the legislation? >> yes sir, i do. >> i think you may find as low as the senate is it may be faster than the regulatory process. >> i mean, our goal here, what is interesting that think everybody but certainly the inspector general who i have a greatço/ó/ñ/ñ/ñ/ñ/ñ/ñ/ñ=ñ/o/ñ/ñ/

that have unknowns and deep additional information may be left out for a later time. are you considering that process as you go through your rulemaking proposals? >> yes sir and i think, and i love the-- would love to talk and we have more time but one of the things we have tried to do is take and use and chairman oberstar's words the bully pulpit to get people's to do things voluntarily with a lot of visibility. i published the names of every carrier who did not respond to us. us. we m you would turn us down at your risk if you chose not to comply, so we did as much as we could do voluntarily because we could do that quickly and put many of the that quickly and put many of the things we are trying to do wi regulation or with the help of your legislation are in place but we want as much as we get

done on a voluntary basis to take immediate action. >> my point more than that is my experience in writing regulations is it sometimes it is better to separate issues and to write one set of regulations to write one set of regulations immediately for which there is knowledge and information and knowledge and information and sometimes if you wait for the last these there are quinn to be a lot of dead people. a lot of dead people. thank you. >> chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the gentleman from oregon, mr. defazio. >> thank you mr. chairman. mr. scovell in your testimony where you are talking about the special inspections air carrier training programs were in effectively implemented i find disturbing elements in there and i would like you to expand on them a little bit and then i will ask the minister babbitt to respond. it says faa, when talking about responses, only captured the responses and a true appelee

which of the air carrier training program should have included effective this not just compliance with requirements i.e. we check the boxes that you know did it take, did it work, did we get the desired results? what sort of measures should there be? i mean how would we get to measuring effectiveness? how with the faa to that and why don't they do it? >> sir, we have a project underway to assess faa's the underway to assess faa's the termination of the validity of training programs and we intend to follow up on that point. on this key one i will note that duest backs, the first goes to a point that mr. boccieri raised earlier and that is the court-- pour performing parlett and the pilot in the colgan crass that repeatedly failed certain training of aleutians. we got the direction to faa inspectors in the field in phase one of this focus inspection initiative was to assess how

carriers are able to identify track and manage load time pilots and pour performing pilots. faa use specific guidance to its inspectors in the field on how to define a low-tech pilot. faa did not issue any guidance to inspectors on how they should identify whether carriers are properly following for performing private. as a result of my team went to the field we found disparate approaches between inspectors at different locations. how did one team identified poor performance? it calls into question the validity of that part of this initiative. >> infectivity to set elsewhere dew of them have an automated system to track poor performance and/or prevent the pairing of two poor performance pilots. is that correct? >> that is true for scheduling purposes. >> are there requirements coming along that are going to make them establish systems and some

of our regional airlines, the better ones that figured out how to do that? why do we allow the substandard wants to continue? mr. babacan response to that? >> yes, sir. one of the things-- >> i would assume khaldun false in the category of not having the program. the program. >> you are absolutely right. flight operations that addresses this and recommends that everyone and gives them the basics of this. >> the call to action at that >> the call to action at that point in time, weeks on the job call to action was to go out and find out who has these programs and who doesn't have them. to put scooby on those who don't. the good news is they now have all begun to move that direction, and i mentioned direction, and i mentioned earlier in minot have been in here that our next phase is to go back and next phase is to go back and are the elements you are tracking and make certain that

we have a good solid program in place and we will audit that but place and we will audit that but the good news is now they all have a program. how robust it is remains to be seen. >> okay, so i mean that does not get me tremendous confidence. i mean, it is improvement, but we need some sort of reportable metrics it seems to me from how many pilots have identified that are having performance problems. there should be some sort of requirement it seems to me that what steps are taken or have taken with those pilots in order to give them remedial training or perhaps to curtail their duty or only pair them meskel pilots. what sort of steps are taken actively once they have identified problem people? that seems to me there should be some burden on the airline's to identify these people, track them and report to us why do you have got and what you are doing about it. are you envisioning that?

>> yes sir i could agree with umar and i do think one of the things we have said all along, part of what will come of this in time is increased in time is increased responsibility on behalf of the carriers. yes, in this case we identified some errors that the pilots made. but there's an obligation on the carriers to make certain that they have the quality training, that the tools are out there and it is our obligation to make certain they provide the highest standard for possibly can so it is a burden on all of us. >> i would go a little further and i'm not sure what you mean by carriers. in this case we have a contract carrier for a major airline. i would say the responsibility goes to both come of a contract carrier and to the major airline. there should be some responsibility instead of going for the lowest bidder, there is responsibility for them to determine this lowest bidder is actually a qualified bidder. and i don't think we really have that kind of system now except for the market-based system

where people say, gee a big loss, they have a crummy regional carrier and i think that will stay away from that airline. >> and i appreciated and we have certainly got a lot of comment and dialogue on that issue. i do think when we talk about you know the carriage rights and those types of things we are on the safety side. this agreements made between commercial operations are probably at a higher level in the department of transportation. >> but at least notification. we have fought over this for years. you think about a ticket on continental but actually you are flying with khaldun. just at least that level of disclosure i think would be useful in perhaps, i don't know whether that is within the jurisdiction of the faa directly or whether that comes from some other party. >> there is a requirement that the requirement is rather small and often after-the-fact where you are right at the gate. you are right at the gate. you are obliged to tell y

notification it is being operated by-- >> it is delayed at that point i mean i think the original idea was people been notified at the time of booking. time of booking. isn't so i guess we need to figure out a way to translate that because what i want to do is i want to advantage and then it that those regional carriers that are doing better and not allow them to be out competed and drove down by out competed and drove down by the ones who aren't. today, lowest common denominator both the already a and the big association, the ata and i have said that to a number of said that to a number of directors over you do not benefit. you are a high-performing airlines by representing the lowest value people in your organization. i know you want their dues but these other people we need to be bringing them up. the current system tracks of the

people down and we have got to fix the problem. part of that is what we are arguing over hours in training so they can shortcut there but part of that goes to some of these other things. there has got to be some chain of responsibility, so thank you mr. chairman. >> chair thanks you and you are correct in your assumption about the bill that we have passed out of the house with just two things. number one there is a tradition that says truth in advertising and mandates web sites that sell airline tickets is close to the purchaser, the air carrier that operates each segment of the flight and also make them printed on the ticket as well. so the chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes gentlelady from texas. >> thank you very much >> thank you very much mr. chairman and i apologize being late but dr. ehlers and i have been running between committees. i would like to ask unanimous consent to put my opening remarks in the record. >> without objection.

>> administrator babbitt i know that your hands are probably fall but keep in mind that people are increasingly concerned about flying and that we don't want to see that stop. could you tell me what your review and tails when you repeal the crewmember training, the qualifications in management practices? >> sure. when of the areas that we are very focused on and are actually working with congress in this committee on is to remove the possibility that someone in the hiring process doesn't have or someone who is responsible for the hiring come before the acquisition of a new pilot, that that person, he or she has the complete record of this pilots history and that would include the pilots military history, their history within the faa, their history at the other air carriers. we have realized unfortunately

three tragedies that that wasn't always the case and be passed the pilot record improvements act, which gives the carriers that, but we left an unintended consequence there that the pilot has to come out because of freedom of information issues, the pilot has to give people the permission to do that so we are trying to work so there should be one place where you can say, i am about to hire this pilot. i would like to know their entire record. we have uniform traffic violations. if i get a speeding ticket in texas and another one in texas and another one in virginia is going to show that is what we want to see here. the problem we have seen, oh well they have failed one check ride. bayfield one in the military into in front of the faa and to into in front of the faa and to warrant their less is a trend that is what we need to be able to put light on. >> thank you. the focus strickland pilots?

>> these bills, yes maam. it is focused on pilot hiring. >> because the other crewmembers >> because the other crewmembers should have some training well. mr. scovell, you made your statement that you cannot regulate professionalism and you regulate professionalism and you are exactly right, but action if any can faa and the industry take to address the key safety concerns? >> ms. johnson, thank you. i think my statement and my oral statement was we cannot mandate professionalism. mine reinstatements says regulate. to draw that distinction more finally i think that certain key aspects of professional behavior can be regulated and on occasion should be. mr. babbitt has outlined a voluntary approach and consensus building approach to enhance professionalism across the

aviation industry theroux pilots and we certainly endorse that. we would urge the agency as well, when significant safety problems are identified, in the professional-- professionalism area that regulation be considered truly as a tool in the toolkit rather than exclusive reliance on a consensus or voluntary approach. consensus or voluntary approach. >> thank you very much. >> the chair thanks the gentlelady and it is good to see you back with us. the chair now recognizes the gentleman from michigan, dr. ehlers. >> thank you mr. chairman and i apologize, as the gentleman from-- gentlewoman from texas has. i did want to comment on something that disturb me very much. i read most of the transcript, all the important parts of the

colgan incident and i would just absolutely astounded and dismayed at the lack of professionalism that was displayed in the transcript. and i think that is a very key factor. now, i am familiar with some pilots who have gone to probably the bestaá allowed in the cockpit that displayed the lack of

professionalism and a lack of confidence that the colgan pilots did. the question i think we have to worry about is how do you teach professionalism? i have not sure you can. how do you communicate it? i think you can do that by example, and perhaps the best example, and perhaps the best way is the r with excellent pilots nlf seat, who have exemplary teaching skill and even if they are not part of the same particular airline, but usually it is airlines are related so perhaps commuter airline candidate would fly with some of the larger planes for a brief time in just observe what the experience of a well-trained pilots do and i am well-trained pilots do and i am sure for example the current administrator of the faa was an airline pilots association and i have talked to

him about the good old days when i used to be able to fly in the i used to be able to fly in the cockpit, as the rest committee was, and it was just so clear the incredible professionalism of the average pilot in the airline industry. and, perhaps, maybe the candidates for positions have to candidates for positions have to ride for half a year in jumpseat of the large jet and watch how careful jumpseat of the large jet and thoughtfully the experienced pilots operate and the professionalism that they have. i don't think you can teach i don't think you can teach professionalism in a you can teach responsibility, and then give them the opportunity to work directly or observed directly well-trained pilots who led been in the business along time. i think that would certainly do a lot more than require more hours, but i think it's a pilot is not well trained you can require more hours but it is the

same bad habits. so, having rambled for a bit i appreciate the comments of the their witnesses on the points i have raised and potential solutions i have offered. ..

>> what i wanted is one violates the sterile cockpit rule says excuse me we are below 10,000 less finish the decline. somebody has to be reminded. what we have is in some cases come elapses like we have seen. it is put the bright lights on its i think we can do a lot with trading or by simply bringing it to their attention. you use the phrase that i like. practice makes permanent. we want to practice the right things and use procedures and the right way to be a professional and the cockpit. we will bear fruit with it i see a lot of interest in it. i know myself we did not have to write quote the

day's ride for half a year but have the month just sit in said john c. but today they have the initial operating experience and sits in the seat, but those to programs we can find what works better and enhance them and expand on them. >> i completely agree with you. >> mr. scovell? >> i would agree with mr. babbitt. babbitt. mentoring, leadership by can look back no matter our field and recognize the value that kind of experience has brought to us to enhance our own professionalism. the ntsb point* is good with the ntsb point* is good with their didn't crash released the day before yesterday the specific aspects of behavior like leadership training and workload management ought to be required a mandate in training programs. also the fact we are victims

also the fact we are victims a day o potentially distracting electronic potentially distracting to us. most unfortunately in the cold in crash there is evidence the first officer evidence the first officer had been test messagi she should have been observing this sterile cockpit rule. she was not called on it by her pilot but if there were a rule banning such devices as ntsb has recommended recommended, perhaps she would have followed that rule. no guarantees but as part of a rule or training or follow-up by a diligent pilot come and maybe that particular aspect of the colgan would not have happened. >> given the transcript i read i am not sure it would have felt that much. what i was trying to get out when observing the pilots, it would not help

much for a colgan pilot to observe another 214 pilates because that is not much out. and other pilots with 5,000 hours and knows the rules very well. most everyone who was in charge of the pirates would charge of the pirates would know who is who is not a grumpy pilots or snarl at is the newcomers but to be very friendly and enjoy teaching, , etc.. it is not too hard to identify those and that would be a plus. i yield back. >> the chair thinks the gentlemen and now recognizes the ranking member mr. petrie. >> just a question to follow-up on the concerns expressed buy mr. defazio and others how you have

economic pressure but yet have an economic framework that protects and ensures safety rather than put under increasing pressure to cut corners and the results is what we all fear which is increased in accidents and loss of life. the industry has a hierarchal relationship with the national carriers than the subcontractors sometimes one side more than one carrier to provide regional service and so on should we build on that and rely the major carriers? or should we be making sure the federal government regulates everyone? or the way they contract with each other? do you have a comment on how we can deal with a

hierarchical situation and the pressures put on with the performance of the regionals? >> that is a tough question. >> that is a tough question. let me take a first off by statute come as a primary mission is aviation safety. that must extend throughout that must extend throughout the aviation the committee rate-- may recall 10 years ago at the congress request my office did work concerning their responsibilities of u.s. carriers with regard to carriers with regard to international co-chair concern was there were safety concern was there were carriers had no role responsibility to see those were mitigated. the rules have changed now the rules have changed now and u.s. have the obligation to audit the safety and training and made its programs of their

international partners and that is a model i think may have led to chairman oberstar and chairman costello reap spawns to my office yesterday that we look at the domestic market wite u.s. may nine characters -- carriers should have such a relationship with their domestic regional partners as well. we just got the request yesterday. we will turnover rose too expeditiously we hope to have stated that will be helpful to the committee. >> it is complicated because it is not just one carrier. its may be an additional safety, but it could not be a primary delegation of oversight or would ever. you have to respond to that question but this is a concern whether there should concern whether there should multiple regulators

regulators, hierarchy of regulation, we would appreciate your thoughts on how we should make sure we get to the highest, not -- common denominator rather than the flight to the bottom of the fear with competitive economic environment. >> guy vander stand we will do our best. >> let me think you mr. scovell for your good work has always. you have testified before the subcommittee many times did we give you plenty of work to do. i can assure you we will continue to do that as we send our latest request yesterday. administrator mr. babbitt i said earlier that i know there are people including myself that get frustrated because of the process and the time that it takes to get something done, but i

have dealt with a number administrators' on this subcommittee and you have acted very quickly. and bureaucracy is as it is we have had some success because of action and that airlines voluntarily do things we should have been doing on our own the four. and we trust you will follow up as we well to make certain what the airlines have agreed to do that we do follow up and carry out. let me also say in spite of your best efforts it will take legislation to address some of the issues. that is why we have introduced legislation. introduced legislation. we have several times about a number of issues in the legislation. i am pleased to stated today your support for the your support for the legislation and i would

, the senate to act so we can move forward and actually passed legislation and get conference to the president. i appreciate your support and trust you will continue to work with us to perfect to work with us to perfect in legislation we might bring through to the congress. congress. to the families, let me say here today. we appreciate your continued we appreciate your continued support to time out of your lives to be here to push the legislation and push and not only the agency, faa's into action and i would encourage you as well to contact your united states senators to encourage them to address the airline pilots and safety issues we have put in our bill to stress the importance they

need to act so we can move legislation or move it into law. let me again think you mr. scovell and administrator babbitt for being here and that concludes the hearing. we stand adjourned. [inaudible conversations]