weeks, that they will get regular check-ups and, at the same time, that they will be able to see a doctor at weekends or in the evening. the party that has resisted giving rights to every citizen is the conservative party. >> mr. brian jenkins. >> my right honorable friend is only too aware that we have, regrettably, too many war widows, to whom this country owes a great deal. would he promise, in any administration that he runs, to stop any suggestion to make those people relatively worse off, via the tax system for not being married? >> there should be no discrimination against widows and no discrimination against those who have been abandoned by their partners. that is why we have a system of individual taxation and special allowances for widows. i would hesitate to say that the proposal for a married couple's or married man's allowance would be fair to widows or people who had been abandoned by

their partners. >> mr. mark prisk. >> last year, lord mandelson launched a 1 billion pound strategic investment fund. it was designed to help industries right across the country. i know that the prime minister struggled with 50,000 pounds earlier, but let me try him with this number -- why is it that 90% of that fund does not help industry across the country but has been given to labour constituencies? >> the purpose of all our measures in the recession is to help industry and business out of recession. 300,000 businesses have been helped in all constituencies of the country. the difference between us is that they opposed all our measures and we took the action to get us out of recession. we are taking action to keep us out of recession, while the conservatives do not have a clue what they would do in 2010. >> dr. alan whitehead. >> does the prime minister welcome the proposals for

licensing and planning concerning houses in multiple occupation that were announced last week? will he urge local authorities with a high concentration of hmo's, such as southampton, to make early use of the powers that they will gain? >> i know he has taken this issue up on many occasions and that it is an important issue when dealing with cities such as southampton, where there is multiple occupation. i can assure him that we will be urging councils such as those in his area to take up these proposals with speed. >> order. >> each week the house of commons is in session, we hear prime minister's questions live on c-span2 wednesdays at 7:00 a.m. eastern, and then again on sunday night on c-span at 9:00 p.m. eastern and pacific. at c-span.org, confined an

archive of past prime ministers questions. >> coming up next, former british international secretary clare short speech before the british inquiry into a rock. after that, democratic national committee chairman tim kaine. and then plot -- and then white house economic adviser paul volcker. >> this week on "the communicators," the proposed merger between comcast and nbc universal. monday night on c-span2. >> former british international secretary clare short spoke to members of the and crack inquiry last week, saying that tony

blair and gordon brown misled the panel. she gave testimony of private conversations of tony blair over her concerns of entering war. this is 2.5 hours. >> we will be hearing from clare short, who was secretary of state for international development from 1997-2003, when you resigned over the iraq question. i think everyone in the room will be aware that clare short has written and spoken extensively on her views on iraq, and today is an opportunity to hear those views

within the process of this inquiry and an opportunity for clare short to respond to the many comments made by others about dfid and, at times, by herself. we authority heard twice from served suma chakrabarti, and this afternoon we will be hearing from hilary benn, who was secretary of state for international development from 2003-2007. i see two things at the beginning of a recession -- the first, that we recognize that witnesses are giving evidence based in part on their recollection of events and we cross-check what we hear against the papers. i remind every witness that they will later be asked to sign a transcript of the evidence to the effect that the evidence given is truthful, fair, and accurate. with those preliminaries, i will turn straight away to sir martin gilbert to open the questions. >> in a letter which has just been declassified about one

minute ago, your private secretary wrote to john sawers at downing street on march 15, 2001. all the good of the international development secretary is concerned that dfid was not invited to contribute to the discussions that led to the formulation of the proposed new policy framework on iraq." to what do you attribute this exclusion? >> when dfid was set up in 1997, there were old habits because the old oda had been part of the foreign office, and the foreign office really minded losing control of the budget and the policy. so there were some old habits of not bothering with dfid and there were some of squashing it, because people were annoyed, and in this instance, given the subsequent developments and the delivered exclusion of dfid and a lot of others, i think, and myself, i do not know whether that particular instance was old habits or deliberate exclusion

or mixture of the two. >> when it came to the actual discussion of the new iraq policy framework, we asked mr. blair on friday whether it had been discussed in cabinet, and he replied that he did not been discussed in cabinet, but he went on to tell us, "the discussion we had in cabinet was substantive discussion." the recall such a discussion and what was your contribution to it at that time? >> are you talking about at that time? >> absolutely. >> the first thing to say is that the cabinet does not work in the way, and did not under the whole of the time i was in government, in a way that, according to our constitutional theory, is supposed to work. the meetings were very short. there were never papers. there were little chats about things, but it was not a decision making body in any serious way, and i do not

remember at all iraq coming to the cabinet in any way whatsoever at that time. >> so the phrase of a "substantive discussion" is not as you recall? >> i do not think that there was substantive discussion, i am afraid, of anything of the cabinet. i think the butler report was right. it became a sofa government, and if ever you raised an issue that you wanted to bring to the cabinet, tony blair would see beforehand and cut it off, saying, "we do not want those things coming before the cabinet." he did that to me in july before we broke up to the summer, when the cabinet does not meet, when their stuff in press about iraq, and i said, about what i really think we should have a discussion about iraq, "and he said, "i do not want us to because it might leak into the press." >> that was my next question -- at what point did you raise your concerns about iraq with him? >> i asked in july, because we were coming to the breakup, if

we could have a discussion on democratic republic of congo, i think saddam, and for personal reasons, iraq, because iraq had been in the press, nes to see me before the next cabinet meeting and said, "i promised to cut you about iraq. no decisions have been made, but i do not want to come up to the cabinet because it might leak and hype things up." then there was no cabinet all throughout the summer break, which there is not, you know, and parliament -- >> sorry to interrupt. we are in 2002, are we? >> yes, then we went to mozambique to get the wrong way to the meeting in johannesburg of tin years after rio on the world conference on sustainable development, and i cannot remember whether i ask to see him. he saw me privately there and said, "did not worry, we're going through the wind." i said, "where the military options? i really think we should make

progress on palestine, get the palestinian state, transform the atmosphere in the middle east, get the arab countries to help us with iraq. this would be a better way of doing things." he said, "on the military, i have not had any presentation. i will make sure that you are informed." i think now that that's factually not true. i have a diary, not fancy, but there are contemporary it -- contemporaneously notes of some of these things i'm saying. >> different to the notes in your book? >> the notes in the book are taken from the diary, but they don't include all of it. >> papers to which we had access show that as late as late 2002, you and your senior officials were feeling frustrated by your continued exclusion from other parts of the whitehall planning machine, particularly the ministry of defence. how did you know that you are being excluded? >> from september, i personally, having been to a meeting in geneva, where most of the un

humanitarian agencies -- well, all of them, are based, and we had a lunch and jacob kellenberger was there, the chairman of the icrc, a very fine international agency, and we all talked informally about iraq and whether we should be preparing, and whether if you prepare, it makes war more likely and all that. he said he was absolutely preparing. >> could you slow down? >> sorry. he said, "we are preparing completely. we are preparing people and stocks." and going back from that, i thought, we should prepare for all eventualities, including war, but -- but including the avoidance of war, and not talk it up, so thus making more and more likely. i am sorry, having said that, i forgot what your question was. that was a preamble answer. >> how did you learn that you were being excluded? >> yes.

so following that, looking at all risk, there's the risk of the use of chemical and biological weapons. on this, i was seeing the intelligence. i had always seen the foreign policy intelligence because of the job i was in, and i knew that the intelligence agencies thought saddam hussein did not have nuclear, would if he could, but he was nowhere near it, and were probably laboratories and people trying to have chemical and biological, but it was not saying, "there is some new imminent threat." so i was reading that, but if we were contemplating war, there would be a risk of the possible use, and then at our job is to think about the iraqi people. if it was used, is there an antidote, could we do anything? so we asked for a briefing and we normally everything from defense intelligence on the saddam for and whether either side could win and things like that, regularly, and this just did not, and did not come.

>> so these exclusions were specifically with regard with iraq? you are being briefed and other humanitarian issues around the world? >> oh, yes. i mean, i had close working relationships with a lot of the military over sierra leone the, kosovo, bosnia, east timor and so on. no problem. but suddenly we could not get an answer, and at that stage i did not know why. is it inefficiency? what is the problem? then also, if you are preparing for all eventualities, and given the fragility of the situation in central iraq, all the sanitation and water, electricity systems were poor, and the un system was reporting that, who were providing food for the people of iraq under oil for food -- we needed to talk about, if there was going to be military action, what would be -- what kind of military action, what kind of targeting? was there risk that sewage systems and water systems and

electricity systems would be destroyed? which happened to a considerable extent in the gulf war -- the first gulf war. it became clear that there was some kind of block on communications. >> what did you do than to break the block? >> it was also extended to the intelligence agencies with him we had continuous relationships. it became clear that there was some kind of block on communications. normal communications were being closed down. >> after david manning gave you this assurance, did the situation change? >> i have a couple of meetings and was still seen paper intelligence. -- yes we could talk to the intelligence agencies. by then it was clear that there was some kind of block on communications.

normal communications were being closed down. >> after david manning gave you this assurance, did the situation change? were you satisfied with your access to the intelligence? >> i have had a couple of meetings with c, and i was still seeing the paper intelligence. i think number 10 did not know i saw that or i think that would have stopped, too. >> when did the prime minister himself become aware and how did he react? did you have any direct contact with him to get greater access particularly to the military planning? >> i had the meeting with him in july when i asked for it to come to the cabinet, the discussion in mozambique. >> had been giving it access, these discussions? >> attended the happened was when someone made a big fuss, some unblocking happened.

we got in the end of paper on the risk of the use of chemical and biological weapons, which said it was uncertain, if there was a long standoff around baghdad, it might happen. there was not really an antidote that we could get anyway. you've probably seen it. and everything that has happened since makes me know that there were delivered blockage and there were all sorts of private meetings, and all the normal systems of whitehall are that meetings that might be relevant to your department responsibilities would always be minuted and those minutes would be circulated. phone calls with other ministers internationally, or president bush would normally be minuted in a letter and circulated, all those things closed down. so the normal structures of whitehall communications start to close down. >> raising your concerns at cabinet was not an option? >> i raised my concerns at cabinet repeatedly, but what we had at cabinet were little

chats. there were not decision-making meeting. tony would say, "jack, you have been to see colin powell," and all that had been in the press anyway. "why don't you tell us how the meeting went?" jack would make a few jokes, as he does, and so on. the first meeting of the cabinet after the summer, people did, obviously having read the press, say that this was dangerous. what about the palestinians? can we do that first -- can we not do that first? a number of people said things. tony reassured and said, don't worry, nothing has been cited. thereafter, the discussions at cabinet were little chats about what had been in the media that week. there was never -- and i think this is a very serious machinery of government question that is forming from the conclusions of what went wrong -- there was never a meeting -- i think it should have been defense and overseas policies because there

were all of the chiefs of the defense staff and sis and all the permanent secretaries as well as the secretaries of state to do with foreign affairs. there was never a meeting that said -- what is the opt -- the problem? what we tried to cheat? what are our military and diplomatic options? we never had that coherent discussion of what it was that the problem was and what the government was trying to achieve and what our bottom line were. never. >> my last question relates to timing. by the time that you and your officials were given full access to the military process, that was already well advanced. you feel that you had enough time, when she became privy to the military planning, and now time to make the type of dispositions that you needed to make from dfid? >> i don't think anyone had enough time. we none of us knew what was going to start. there was no imminent threat. there was no reason why it had

to be as quick as it was. so we were good at, and still large, i am sore, funding un agencies. people do not understand this about dfid of. we don't have thousands of people who come over the hill to a humanitarian things. we on the international system, put in more expertise in more money. if something is failing, we have a unit that gets the feedback, and we could do that quite quickly and we are very good at it. so we started putting money for preparations into the international system, including the red cross, and the un had something like 1000 iraqis employed inside iraq distributing the oil for food, because something like 60% of iraqis were depended on that food. that network was all over the country. so we could quite quickly put in place the arrangements for emergency humanitarian responses. that burke -- that bit worked.

i see tim cross said there was not a humanitarian crisis. this was because that was working. the icrc was fixing up the electricity and sewage when it got damaged, because otherwise we would have had cholera, and hospitals were being looted in baghdad and we were saying to boyce, "please get franks to protect the hospitals or protect the icrc suppliers." so i simply want to say the humanitarian thing work because a lot of work was done by a lot of people and we played our part in that. >> but in terms of the aftermath planning and when you would be sending your own people? >> absolutely, absolutely. we were saying then after the invasion, legalities and so on, geneva convention obligations of an occupying power, the duty there is to deal with humanitarian needs and keep

order. so we would expect the military, and the first instance, to make sure that people were fed and to keep order -- the week that they went, our military was ordering food. it was all done on a wing and a prayer, it was incredible. and in terms of reconstruction, we were saying and the treasury was saying, they did a working party -- i could not get any extra money. so we were just into a new financial year and the whole of my contingency reserve was 100 million pounds, and you get other emergencies and other parts of the 40. i kept saying that we needed more money if we are to do more. no answer. then the treasury had a working party and said, "we will need a un lead after any military phase, because then you can get the world bank and the imf and other agencies to come in and we will get money from others." so we were arguing all this, and if you of work -- if you have looked at the papers, it goes on

and on across whitehall and it is just not my department. the treasury is saying it. the foreign office is saying it. we've got to get the un lead. >> thank you very much. i think sir roderic lyne is going to move on to that area. >> before him, i think baroness prashar would like as one question. >> when you went to mozambique with mr. blair, and he assured you that you would be given some briefing about military options. when was that? >> it was september. i have not got the day in september in my mind. >> september 2002? but there had been a meeting on july 23, 2002 where these options were discussed and you were not at that meeting? >> absolutely. he told me in mozambique and there is a note in my diary that i have not had a presentation, because i was saying to him, what are the military options? he said, i have not had a

presentation. welcome back to you. clearly that was one of the misleading things that he said. >> after that september, were you given a presentation about military options? >> the military came to my office -- i cannot remember the name -- a big guy -- about the air targets and how the was going to be careful targeting and taking our point about the fragility of the sewage, water, electricity -- a very impressive man. so we had that, but no presentation of all the military options, but that to reassure us on the worry about the possibility of destroying the infrastructure and leaving iraq in an unholy mess which happened in another way anyway. >> to follow up on that trip to mozambique, i think i am right that this is the one were alastair campbell records discussing with tony blair the dossier, the idea of the production of a dossier.

we'll we're of any of the discussions about how to present policy at that time? >> on the dossier, i am not sure i recall the dates. and the discussion i had with tony blair in mozambique, apart from the things we did in mozambique, was just the two of us. alastair campbell was not present. >> but you did not discuss that issue with him then? >> no, there was a note that went around whitehall about the drawing up of the dossier, and i remember my private secretary asking me if i wanted to engage, and i said in of. there are only so many battles that you can fight. >> i would like to go back into the machinery of government that you mentioned. he said there was not substantive discussion in cabinet, but the argument we heard from mr. blair, from jonathan powell, from alastair campbell, among other witnesses, is essentially that it did not matter if the official cabinet committee did not meet, or

committees were ad hoc, but what that mattered was that policy on iraq was being discussed intensively with the relative -- with the relevant people, with the appropriate formation, with challenge, with risk assessment, with diversity of views. was that the impression you had? >> absolutely not. i believe in the old-fashioned civil service way of running things and i was a private secretary years ago in the home office when sir john chilcot was a young assistant secretary. >> you did better than him. [laughter] >> well, knows? minister should be in charge of the department, but all voices should come to the table, everything should be challenged and looked at. no one gets everything right. you improve things by that kind of discussion, and my department became famous as an effective

organization and i think it was because we did things in that kind of way. the government does not and did not work like that. it is partly that 24-hour news thing. everything it is for the media. power is pulled in the number 10. everything is announced to the media. after the guillotines came in, the house of commons is now rubber-stamp, it doesn't scrutinize, things are guillotined. it doesn't even finish scrutinizing bills before they go off to the lords, to do a better job than the commons. i think the machinery of government in britain now is unsafe and it leads to endless legislation that is not properly considered. that is a general critique. in the case of iraq, there were secretiveness and deception on top of that. i heard tony blair talking when he gave evidence to you about an ad hoc committee. i simply cannot accept that. there were no minutes. it is just not a proper way to proceed. if you are discussing things that other departments are supposed to know about and are

completely excluded from the discussion and do not know what the government is planning, this is a chaotic way of doing things. >> you do not think that there were really looking a range of options and at all the possible risks in this course. >> i presume you are looking at the leaked documents. the downing street memo now tells it all. blair had given his word that he was in favor of regime change and would be with bush. >> u.s. -- we will come back to that. you could see who the people were round of prime minister advising him, although clearly you're not one of them. but was this not a group that was pretty expert and the verse? did it have expertise in the middle east? >> one, i did not know they were meeting. two, it is an in-group. that is the way number 10 worked. you keep tony's favor and alistair doesn't brief against you, if you do whatever you want -- whatever they want, and

challenges the opposite. i at a friend doing research at the time, interviewing people in number 10, and a message came back to me that i should not keep challenging in the cabinet. i was making myself unpopular. >> so you did not see the options paper of march 2003, which is now on the internet, but you did not see that at the time? >> march 2003? >> sorry, march 2002. before the prime minister had his chequers briefing before crawford, the cabinet office circulated something called the options paper. >> we did not see that at all. >> you are clear about that? >> yes, i had seen it since. could i say another thing? the foreign office, as you well know, had some famous arabists, who spoke arabic, who had served in the arab world. i think they were kept

completely marginalized, not allowed to give their it buys. they were seen as dangerous because they might not agree. >> why do you think you were kept out of the policy planning process? was it because it did not concern your department or was it because number 10 did not trust you? >> you have to ask them, and away. you probably got the answer you had from hollister campbell. he and i never got on. i did not obey him and therefore he would brief against you and that is the way the government work. repeat the question? >> was the argument that it just did not concern your department, this planning on iraq, or was it personal to you? >> i do not know, but it did concern the department and both the humanitarian and reconstruction and we were the lead department on the world bank, for example, and had enormous relations with the un and the rest of it.

on me, i believed in what the stated policy was. i believe that the sanctions were causing so much suffering in iraq that we could not just the one. i never heard robin put his view, but i understand -- and that is another example that the cabinet discussions were not very serious. i understand his view was that containment could go on. that was not my view. the unicef figures on child suffering and so on were truly awful. i believed in coming back to iraq, getting the weapons inspectors back in, keeping the un together, if necessary using military action. if need be, i thought we should look at the possibility of getting into the kitchen national court as we had done with most of it. so why exclude me when i believed what they said the policy was? .

i had to decide. and, indeed, that is happy to be paid. it is meant to be a cabinet system, because, of course, if you have a presidential system, you would put better checks in the legislature, so we were getting a view that he decided that he and his mates around him and those that he could trust to do what ever he decided and then the closing down of normal communications and then these things to the cabinet. that is a machinery of government question. there is also a competence of decision making question. because if you do things like that, and they are not challenged, and if they are not thought through, then i think we have seen the error is. >> they endorsed it? >> -- i think we have seen the

errors. >> they endorse it? >> -- interest it? >> by then, everything was -- if they endorsed it -- they endorsed it? >> no. he had got this idea that tony blair had said there was a material breach when the other was saying he needed more time. i think for the attorney general to come and say there was an unequivocal legal authority to go to war was misleading, and i must say, i never saw myself as a traditionalist, but i was stunned by what was in the media. the attorney general coming to the cabinet. it must be right. and i think he was misleading

us. >> any chance to read the evidence from the event attorney-general and also to read mr. tony blair's evidence, which was given last week? >> i have read some. i read all of that carefully. the former prime minister. sorry. you made a rather competent summary. >> this is just a summary of what we have heard in the previous 10 hours. in your book, you wrote about

the lord. you said it is difficult not to believe he was leaned on. the lord has denied he acted under pressure. he said he reached a purely legal decision in his evidence, and mr. blair said he could not recall any specific discussions that he had with the lord at this critical stage. he said that lord goldsmith had given legal advice and that this was, i quote, done in a way which we were satisfied was correct and right. do you accept what lord goldsmith and mr. blair has said about this? >> i am afraid i do not. i think lord goldsmith said that he was excluded. exclusion is a form of pressure. it was then suggested to him that he go to the united states. now, we have got the bush administration. it seems the most extraordinary

place, and the world can go to get advice about international law. i am surprised by his in vice. to save it -- i am surprised by his advice. it is extraordinary. i have never understood it before, and i think that is nonsense. i saw the french ambassador later. so i think all of that was on sending him to america. and i noticed the chief advisor in the foreign office said he had said something, and no. 10 road, "why is this in writing?" i think that speaks volumes about the way they are closing down the normal communications

system. >> in the week before the conflict started, on march 20, it was on march 13 that lord goldsmith came into his office and told his officials that, on balance, he had come to the view that the better view was the argument could be revived with a fork -- for the determination by the security council -- could be revived without further determination by the security council. was he subjected to pressure? was this a decision purely on legal grounds? he has said not. mr. blair has effectively said not. do you have any evidence that in that period, pressures where applied of an nonlegal kind to the attorney general? he had legal discussions with the attorney in february, but i am talking about the period between march 7, when he gave

his formal advice, and march 13, when he had come to this clear, on balance conclusion. >> no, i do not have any evidence, but i think in changing his mind three times and a couple of weeks, and then even -- in order to say unequivocally there was legal authority to require tony blair to secretly signed a document saying that iraq was in material breach, and not report any of that to the cabinet, is so extraordinary, and, by the way, i see that both tony blair and he said the cabinet were given the chance to ask questions. that is untrue. >> that is really my next question, because in march 2005, after you left office, he wrote to lord goldsmith, stating that in the cabinet meeting on march 17, you had attempted to initiate a discussion but that this was not allowed. what was it that you were trying to discuss in the cabinet on

march 17, and why were you not able to do so? >> i had asked for that special meeting with the attorney general, and it had been readily agreed that it would take place. that was the first time he had come to the cabinet that i am aware of. he sat in robin cook's seat. there was a piece of paper in the table, which we normally did not have any papers, apart from the agenda, and it was the pq answer, which we did not know was a pq answer back then, and he started reading it out, so everyone said, "we can read," you know, and then, so he, everyone said, "that is it." i said, "that is extraordinary. why is it so late? did you change your mind?"

and they all said, "itclare!" -- "clare!" and on this, because -- he said he was ready to ask questions, but no report. i did ask him later, because it was in the morning war cabinet, or whatever you call it, that he did come to, and he gave his legal device. he said, "oh, it takes me a long time to make my mind up." >> the argument on this cabinet meeting, we have heard -- >> i would like to ask you for the books. you know, the cabinet secretary keeps a manuscript notes, and there is another private secretary that keeps a manuscript note on this. i think you should check the record. >> we noted that.

the argument has been made that the attorney general is a senior legal officer on the government. when he actually reaches a decision on this, there is no point in the cabinet debating it because he has come to the farmer -- from legal view on this. but you do not agree with that? -- he has come to the firm legal view on this. >> coming to the cabinet to give legal advice, this is a very serious, monumental thing, and that is his advice, and i am very surprised, but we must accept it. that was my view. >> you have now had the benefit of seeing his further advice -- earlier advice he had given, his formal advice, to the prime minister of 7 march. do you think it would actually change the decision of the cabinet if they had been given the chance to see the device of march 7? >> i think people would have

thought -- see the advice of march 7? >> i think people would have thought it was much more equivocal and risky and wanted to be more. i think we should of been told. and i also think, because the side documents, you can tell he was uncertain. he made blair write and sign a document saying they were not cooperating and working in material breach. when blix was saying -- remember, he got rid of the ballistic missiles, and he said these are matchsticks or something, do you remember, and he was asking for more time. so at the time when blix was asking for more time, he was saying he was getting some cooperation, so -- >> that is because resolution

1441 had required a determination that iraq was an further material breach. and the argument, which was made by the foreign office legal advisers and is still made by sir michael would, and had been made by lord goldsmith until february 11 -- made by sir michael wood, was the only the security council could give that determination, but lord called smith subsequently came to the view, the better view, as he called it, that this determination did not have to be given by the security council, but it still had to be given by somebody, so was he not correct in going to the prime minister for that determination? so that, as it had not been given by the security council, it had been given by a member of the united nations? >> i do not accept that 1441 can mean that you have to come back to the security council. i just think that is a piece of nonsense. i think that is unbelievable. >> there are different views on

that. >> yes, i know, but i am just saying that. >> that is your view. >> and it was the view of many other countries and other lawyers, of course. i think the fact that the french asked for a different board and did not did not -- a different word and did not give it -- get it, it does not mean that the opposite holds. therefore, i have as the prime minister to give a written assurance. i think we should have been told that. that was all kept from us, and we were just given the pq answer, no questions asked, no doubt. i do not know. it is misleading. >> can i finally move on to the question that you did refer to earlier that i said we could come back to? in his evidence on friday, mr.

blair gave his view, and i am going to quote here, if we had left saddam there, with the intent to develop these weapons and the know-how and the concealment program, and the sanctions had gone, today, we would be facing a situation where iraq was competing with iran, competing on both nuclear- weapons capability, and competing as well in support of terrorist groups. i have left a few words out in the middle of those quotations where they simply interrupt the flow, but you can see the full quotation in the transcript. now, that is what mr. blair a thing called his 2010 question. -- what mr. blair i think called his 2010 question. was it a question that we actually either had to take the

military action to topple saddam in order to remove this threat, or, if we did not do so, iraq was going to become both a nuclear and a terrorist threat, as mr. blair suggested in his 2010 question? >> no. sanctions forever. they are eroding. there was no evidence of edit -- of any kind. there was no hurry. that was one of the untruths, the exaggerations of the risks of the wmd. to get disarmament and compliance, if you get that, the logic is release sanctions, open up the country, and going along side that, and i am sure that is in the public domain, where initiatives from the saudis and

the jordanians about possibly getting saddam hussein to go into exile, which would have been an attractive option, it seems to me, it was that there was no nuclear, and he did not have the means, so there was no immediate threat there, and the evidence on the chemical and biological was the people thought there are laboratories and people working. there were doubts if it was even weaponized. so, surely, if we had gone more calmly and slowly and got -- i would have liked saddam hussein to be sent to the international court for crimes against humanity and crimes against peace, as we got milosevich. it was never seriously looked at, so i am saying we could've gone more slowly and carefully and not had a totally destabilized and angry iraq, into which came al qaeda, that was not there before, and that would have been safer for the

world and that tony blair's account does not stack up to any scrutiny whatsoever. we have made iraq more dangerous as well as causing more suffering. >> preventing him from becoming a more serious threat. >> saudi arabia and jordan, we're talking about exile. there was the criminal courts. he was not popular in his country. there is an argument about a very strong sanctions that to actually bloc countries and, and it is better to open them up -- you actually bloc countries in -- block countries in. >> what about the argument that he would have become a supporter of international terrorism, saddam hussein? >> first, the american people

were misled by the suggestion that al qaeda had links to saddam hussein. everybody knows that is untrue. there is no doubt that by invading in this bill prepared rushed away, not only did we -- by invading in this ill- prepared, rushed way, not only did because enormous suffering and loss of life, we may iraq more dangerous. >> was saddam a supporter of international terrorism? >> i believe that in no way, shape, or form did he have any links or sympathy with al qaeda- type ideas.

>> we also did not have the endorsement of the security council in kosovo. it was held up as a positive example of regime change. why was it right to use force against milosevic, one of the semi fascist dictators, as mr. blair called them, but not against saddam hussein, who was arguably a more dangerous semi fascist dictator? >> there is agreement among most people, including kofi annan, presented publicly, that military action to prevent a humanitarian emergency is permissible, and i remember the strange president the use to give, tanzania -- the strange precedent they used to give,

tanzania's invasion of uganda, which seems strange. -- seems strange. i think we should of acted earlier to prevent it, -- seemed strange. i think we should have acted earlier to prevent it. it was last minute. it was universally agreed. the refugees were poring over the border -- pouring over the border. of course, there are lots of nasty regimes in the world. but you have to go case-by-case, and you have to look at what your are objective is and what is best for that country and the

world and had you can best act, and you need to do this in a considered way, and what we did in iraq was very dangerous and has destroyed lots of property and lots of people's lives. >> mr. blair and a policy speech said it in texas, "if necessary, the action should be military." he is not just talking about iraq year. "the action should the military, and if necessary, necessary and justified, it should involve regime change." there were three conflicts involving regime change, milosevich, the taliban, and sierra leone. >> sierra leone was a civil war. it was not regime change. >> was this the government's policy now? >> i think it was quite a good

speech. this proposal in the international system, the idea that is the responsibility to protect, that where you have got a government that either cannot or will not protect its people, the responsibility should transfer to the international community. this is due re-devine -- we define the idea of sovereignty, the absolute sovereignty of individual states, -- re-define the idea of sovereignty. and then, they should intervene so it is not military action immediately, to do whatever they can to relieve to the people. military action would be the last option. it should be considered a according to the just war theory, a proportionate, is there any other way -- war theory, a proportionate, is there any other way -- war theory, proportionate.

the mess we made of iraq means there is no trust, especially in developing countries, for the security council members to be paid in a fair way in such matters. -- to behave in a fair way in such matters. >> i want to go back to the with legal and vice was handled in the cabinet, because after that, you wrote to the attorney general, complaining about a breach, and i want to read the relevant paragraph in the ministerial code to check that that is what you were referring to. it says that when advice from the law officers is included in the correspondence between ministers or in papers for the cabinet or ministerial committees, the conclusions may, if necessary, please summarize, but if this is done, the complete text of the advice

should be attached. >> all we had was the parliamentary answer, so -- >> so you did not have any attachments to it? >> nothing whatsoever. the ministerial code says that any form of legal adviser should be circulated, and it was not. of course, it is complex, because he was changing his opinion so quickly. >> then you wrote to the attorney general, but both he and lord turnbull said that this was not a breach of the ministerial coach. was this matter resolved? where did you let it drop? -- or did you let it drop? -- this was not a breach of the ministerial code. was this matter resolved? or did you let it drop?

>> well, the trouble with the ministerial code, because, also, under the ministerial coach, you're not supposed to mislead parliament. -- under the ministerial code, you are not supposed to mislead parliament. he was acting as a minister and not a barrister. i think the complaint -- well, i am sorry. i do not recall. i would have to look up. >> you did not pursue it? >> as far as i could go, and i got rebuffed, and as i say, i think it is a machinery of government question. you have got no way of holding anybody to the ministerial codes.

-- code. unequivocally, no doubt, no question, there is a 44 military action, which i at the time -- there is no doubt, no question, there is authority for military action. >> i think we will take a break and come back in 10 minutes or so. thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >let's resume, and harrod's -- baroness prashar will take up

the questions. >> thank you. we are now slightly going to shift your, and i want to look at -- shift gear, and i want to look get -- at dfid's own planning in late 2002/2003. >> i appreciate the question. there are a lot of people who like to claim that we did not prepare. someone really clarified it for me. they were already preparing, but i thought, no, the right thing was to prepare for all the eventualities. we could have blix succeeding and sanctions being lifted and full international cooperation, so we should prepare for all the eventualities.

the only other question is, because everyone keeps saying, "are you planning? are you planning?" as they are trying to make war inevitable, and i kept saying, "we are planning for all eventuality is." -- for all eventualities." i would like to ask you for publishing just the humanitarian work. it is all there. >> but you said if you are preparing for all of europe eventuality is -- eventuality -- for all of your eventualities, what did you instruct your department to do? >> the possibility of success

and the opening up of iraq, which was the nicest thing to plan for. military action authorized by the u.n., that is much easier because you would give total international cooperation. you would get troops from all sorts of countries. you get all of the international players supporting. the worst case scenario is military action without u.n. authorization, because you are on your own scent, and for the aftermath, you have got the difficulty of getting other players in -- because you are on your own then. this was foreseen as a risk, and under the geneva convention obligations, this is the american and our own military, they should be keeping order.

it is hard to do humanitarian relief when you have got chaos and looting and violence. they did not prepare to keep order and provide basic unitarianism, and that was a military failure. -- they did not prepared to keep order and provide basic humanitarianism. we could have taken longer. >> you had instructed departed to plan for all different scenarios? >> absolutely -- you had instructed your department? >> absolutely. >> i think you have been frequently challenged that you instructed your department not to engage in the cross- whitehall plan for iraq, and you have, of course, repeatedly

denied this charge on public record. did you or did you not instruct them? >> the situation that you have just questioned the on, that we got down to planning against all eventualityies, there was a moment of shocke. that was when suma chakrabarti, whom you have met, who was then my permanent secretary, and nicola rewer, who was then with dfid and is now with our high

commissioner to south africa, said there was a very strong rumor that the attorney general was saying there was not legal authority for war. that became a worry. and i think in the end, the attorney was asked for a view on this. i think some of the doubt might be around the worry is. we never saw anything in writing. and then i absolutely clarified, even if there was an illegal military action, a war of aggression, it is still right to prepare a humanitarian relief. that was clear, and we had to get on with that. on reconstruction, you go through -- there will be a military invasion. the geneva convention to apply, and we need another u.n. resolution. >> we will, on to that.

>> in terms of my protection -- we will come on to that. >> in terms of my protection, and former civil servants, that is clear now. i was thrown into a tizz but the thought i might be asking them to do illegal things, and then it is clear we which should -- we should prepare for humanitarian. it was a big issue for quite some time. >> i want to put something to you, which lieutenant-general sir robert fry said to us. he said they would hardly conceal their moral disdain.

>> we had a liaison person with the military, who was a former military person herself, and i know that the department has gone back to her, and she has said there is no way she showed moral disdain. there was lots of emotion in the country at that time. but dfid is a very professional, high-quality organization, and the liaison person was a former military person. the thing was such a mess. what is that thing? "victory has many parents, and failure has none." that is not the record of what people did. >> so you are saying that your department was clear about your personal views and that did not have a negative impact on planning. is that which you are saying? >> our view, my view -- is that

what you're saying? >> our view, my view was it included the possibility of war authorized by the u.n., so all of my worries were about doing it right, not the possibility of doing it. >> can i come on to the planning with external partners? no. 10 and issued instructions to departments not to discuss plans for iraq -- no. 10 had issued instructions. i think you had shared that sometimes you did not what your department to engage in discussions with external partners. is that the case? >> well, there was the no. 10 blocke. actually, british ngo's had been

working in central iraq. we were in the north, and it is much easier to work there, in the kurdish area. they got more active and gave evidence to the select committee, and so on, so i think they were sort of a bit cross that they were not being included as much as they might have been, and they were excluded initially. but i do not think the ngo's or significant, because they were not big players in iraq, apart from the north, and amar, the one that worked in the south with marsh arabs, i think it is called that.

the u.n. system we did talk to. i think we disobeyed the no. 10 blockade. it said to still be careful, but we could talk, something like that, so that was kind of an official mission. >> just to be clear, so no. 10 had imposed constraints on what you could discuss with external partners, but you personally had not? >> that is right, that is right. >> ok. >> then i, and i think, suma chakrabarti -- for the u.n., it was very fraught, as well, because there was such division around the security council. >> what sort of issues were you

discussing with united nations and when you send people to geneva and to new york to when you sent people -- what sort of issues were you discussing with the united nations and when you sent people to geneva and to new york? >> food, oil for food. 60% of the people are dependent on -- it comes in on ships. if there is going to be military action, can we keep the food rolling? if not, we're going to have a starving country. the world health organization. what about the hospitals? if there are going to be injuries in the war, can we make sure there is enough drugs?

all of these kind of things. >> and what were the united nations telling you about their role at that stage? >> at that stage, it was -- louise frechette was leading it. i think they said in september that they had been working for a year quietly, but she had taken it to a higher level. she was a senior person. they were keeping it quiet. she was a very good official. >> but did they express any view about what sort of role they envision themselves doing? >> everyone in the senior levels of the u.n. was fraught and hoping and hoping that there would only be military action authorized by the security council, but, because of the

media, everyone was worried that that might not be the case, and things might get very messy and difficult, and that was this very fraught atmosphere around the security council, and that flows on to the floor. people were very worried. >> so you're trying to work within this sort of broad context, where there was concern and the drum beat outside in the media was different, and you were trying to plan with the united nations within that broader context? >> we were planning. i was not even trying. all of the other things apart. keeping people fed. not getting cholera outbreaks. getting the water fixed when it was broken. the hospitals were decimated in baghdad, but icrc came with new

supplies. we did plan, and we were to with the u.n., and so on, and the icrc, a very, very important agency. the pre-positioned all sorts of drugs and materials and this tablets to put into the water if the system is contaminated. >> what was your understanding? >> i think the only real issue was the ngo's. and they were not that significant. i mean, oil for food had something like 1000 iraqis employ it. there was a network of people who could deliver humanitarian things, and the british ngo's

wanted to be in on it all, but they were not going to be significant players, especially in central iraq. >> you continue to have conversations? >> that is right. >> thank you. >> ok, let's move on. sir lawrence freedman? >> thank you very much. i want to talk to you about relations with the united states. we have for a lot of about -- we have for a lot about not only the asymmetry -- we have heard not only about the asymmetries in size between the united states and the united kingdom, but also the very different structures of government.

>> well, the head of usaid was andrew natsios, so that was the obvious link. he fought in the first gulf war and was a republican, the head of usaid, and he said the most dangerous possibility is that we get chaos and sectarian divisions, and what we must do is talk the top off the baathists system -- what we must do is chop the top off the baathist system. >> when was that? >> i think it was late 2002, but i could check.

>> you have anticipated my next question, which was about the ship from the state department to the pentagon. when did you become aware of the shifting the focus of the postwar planning -- when did you become aware of the shift in focus? >> i think was fairly said. we all knew it happened. to throw away all of the postwar planning, it takes a bit of time to absorb the information you are getting. it is hard to believe that they would do that. >> i want to come back to tim cross in a moment.

had you seen any of the results? >> i had been briefed on it, and we had had telephone communications with them and some of the other agencies. i mean, there were some that would not talk to us. the germans. i knew the german minister very well, but she was extremely upset and would not talk to us, but we were trying to keep everyone in as far as we could, and we kept in touch with the state department. we became more and more concerned that after an invasion, geneva convention obligations, if we did get some kind of u.n. authorization, we needed to roll over oil for food, because you had to keep

doing that, and that was crucial to keep people fed, but, also, if we did not get some kind of u.n. authorization, which would not get the world bank, the imf. we would not get other countries. so we were working. >> usa i.d. did not have the same sort of clout within the american system that you had within the british system? -- usaid did not have the same sort of clout? >> no, and they are in agency rather than a full government department. >> were you alerted by them in any way about concerns, probably in formerly, about concerns about the impact in terms of postwar planning? >> i cannot personally remember. i just know that everybody was utterly stunned and shocked.

i can remember people's words, but you can imagine. just another setback in this crazy story we are all inside. >> the argument that was used at the time, and which colin powell appears to have accepted, was that the military would have to be doing most of the work. they would have the people on the ground. they had the resources. it made some sort of sense for them to be responsible. so, in part, this is also an argument about the relationship between civil concerns with reconstruction and the military role. now, this is something that you spent a lot of time on. , what with your input? >> -- a lot of time on. what was your input? >> it all happened very quickly,

but the truth is you needed the military to prepare. everything was done on a wing and a prayer and too fast. but if you wanted then the world to come together and support the reconstruction of iraq, you needed to not only have the military. you needed the military to do their bit, and then you needed to bring everybody in, and that is what we were trying to achieve. you had to hand it all over to the military -- sent to handle all over to the military is a bit foolish. -- so to hindand it all over to the military is a bit foolish. >> you mentioned tim ctross. -- tim cross. but i remember tony blair's

saying, "and we are going to send tim cross." i talked to him and number of times on the telephone, initiated by me, and, i think, sometimes by him, and he came to see me, i think, on one of his first trip back and said, "it is terrible. they are still moving the furniture in." i can remember him saying that. i am very surprised by it. i know that it was that we decided not to put a lot of people in and just have liaison. he says he asked for someone from dfid. we had one humanitarian adviser in the ambassador to the u.n., because most of them would be in geneva, but just because such questions might come up, and i,

after tim cross, fast, i asked him to liaise -- after tim cross asked, i asked him to liaise. >> can i just quote from what he actually says in his memo? i think you have just referred to this. "having confirmed with the u.k., i was reinforced with a little support from the fco and some contact with the dfid official

based in new york." >> yes, that is the guy. >> "clare short would not allow him to work with me on a full- time basis because of her well- known concerns." >> that is not true. i asked the department to check that, because i read it, and they said it is not true and that he asked me for some support, and i asked our official to liaise with him. i am sure he believes it. he is a very fine man. but it is not true, according to the records of the department. >> that is very helpful. things were not going very well in washington in terms of postwar planning. >> could i just remind everyone, though, we did not know what the date was going to be of the war,

because now we know it, we can look get this -- because it is incredible. we did not know how quickly we were going to war. >> so you did not know in february? >> i knew from the intelligence people, sis. i think february 15 -- that is also my birthday, so i remember that. given the lack of preparedness, one was expecting the date to be put back, and given that things were not ready, i would not have believed we would have gone that quickly. >> let me just ask again in terms of the scenarios that you were expecting. you have mentioned already or concerns about what would happen with chemical and biological weapons, if they were used, and

the effect on the population. what about other issues, including some that did rise? , a study had been done of that possibility? -- how much study had been done of that possibility? >> that was the catastrophic success scenario, which was a paper i think from the foreign office. that was thought about, and i think that is a military failure. that is a geneva convention obligation, to keep order. i mean, obviously, dfid or un humanitarian it cannot do that. we can only operate if there is some kind of order. >> now, you mentioned your birthday on february 15, the day before is valentine's day, when you wrote a letter to mr. blair.

i think it is a quite important letter. in this story. and you worn in this letter of the risks -- you warn in this letter of the risks of humanitarian catastrophe. the risks of humanitarian catastrophe were well understood, and you have already indicated that your department was prepared for these, gave good advice on these, and, in the end, the immediate consequences of the war for that reason or not as bad as many assumed. i am not saying that because it was an easy thing to do. it was an eventuality that was prepared for.

but there was a concern that we construction itself -- we construction itself -- recons truction itself and the consequences of the loss of law and order, as you describe it, were not fully appreciated. >> i have to do about -- i have told you about andrew natsios. they really believed their own propaganda and thought they could, really quickly and that everything would be easy, and that is why they threw away the state department staff, and it

was clearly a longstanding view of theirs, and they were wrong. that is why we got the problem, because the people who were in charge absolutely believed that there would not be any trouble. >> you're obviously writing at a time when there was still hope and expectation of a second u.n. resolution. your hope was that the u.n. would be able to handle this range of problems, that they would be able to take a leading role in reconstruction. >> well, this is the second u.n. resolution -- well, no, the third. however many. but this is a question of the legalities of reconstruction. it was the same question in the palestinian occupied territories.

an occupying power is required to keep order, provide for humanitarian needs. they're not allowed to change the institutions of the country occupied or its laws. so we knew that if we did not get another u.n. resolution, we were in big trouble. we could do humanitarian, but you cannot reconstruct the country, and that became an absolute obsession of white hall. if you look at the files, there are endless foreign office efforts, and david manning and condi rice and so on -- and i think jack straw was getting frantic because here is another

u.n. resolution that we might all fallout about -- fall out about. then there were opinions by the attorney general. >> this is obviously getting to the postwar situation. there is this letter from a february 14. you're talking about humanitarian risks -- there is this letter from february 14. you make an important point about your budget. you say, "my department has tight budgetary constraints. we have major humanitarian disasters across the world, and my resources are stretched. i am happy to prioritize iraq from my contingency reserve, but i cannot take resources from other poor and needy people to assist posed conflict rat -- post-