operated and speaking the same. to me, microrim doesn't mean very much unless you understand what you are talking about. a low-dose dental x ray, the dose that you get is about 4 rem of expose your. . .

>> i think the ansi standard is below the threshold we have to keep track of how many times you go through the screening process at the airport. >> anyone else? >> i spent most of my career working in radio activity and radiation physics we have been involved in many years of working with regulatory agencies in being involved in the health-a dose effect

relationship. how accurately can you measure the radiation? the health effects as regulated by the food and drug administration and osha and the regulatory commission. the federal guidance in this country for health effects comes from the national council on radiation protection and measurements. those offices follow that guidance. this is not coming out of nist or tsa. there is an american national standard and i think this is a great example of the cooperation here. there were four members from nist and members from different parts of dhs and two from tsa. that is the standard for the safety aspects of the deployment

of these x-ray scanners. many folks are pushing for the military -- millimeter wave scanners. there are no radiation affects associate with that. >> anyone else wishing to comment? if not, that's fine. thank you, mr. chairman, i will wait for the next round. >> bank you very much. -- thank you very much. >> thank you and thank you to everyone who is here today. as we talk about these technologies, i appreciate the fact that i read about the technology that was developed in the los amigos national laboratories discussed in a few of the testimonies. the ultimate objective with their work with homeland security is to get the department to establish a longstanding, running relationship between the laboratories and the department of science.

currently, i think you work with them from time to time when there is an issue specifically to identify such as, if there is a terrorist raid, they you may use liquid explosives and what will the damage be to the airplane as to oppose -- as opposed to how can we get a mike -- molecular footprint. we can identify any liquids that have even a notion of being used in that way. although we are focused on passenger screening, i have been impressed with the briefing i received with the magna technology. it has been demonstrated in a pilot. your predecessor saw the pilot demonstration. knu explain what the dha plans are for the implementation of this technology? >> i would be pleased to.

magna is one of those emerging success stories with their partnership with the national laboratories it is short for magnetic visibility and uses technology similar to a hospital mri machine. to look for and identify liquid brady difference would be the different fields without the high costs of mri's. we demonstrated this technology and albuquerque one year ago last december. it was very successful in identifying dangerous liquids in a small bottle among non- hazardous liquids in the standard tsa-sized screening

ball. owl. can we do that with an entire trade-sized application? if that is successful, how can we be successful in doing that with the regular baggage couple carry-on baggage? we are looking at this in a phase increment. we are confident enough now that the technology has great potential for success and we're looking for commercial partners. at the end of the day, the commercial partners are who we need to get these things produced en masse. let me talk about your broader question of partnership that the national labs. i will go into more detailed than when i did in my oral comments. we have recently established to

this. it is up and running. it will provide a senior level of undersecretary level mechanism to focus the utilization of the national labs on this very important problem. we are looking at three -- you can do all the governments you want but you don't get down to the working groups and the people who know how to bring solutions to the table, you'll never get anywhere. we're looking at three years to focus what is the systems analysis of aviation security from an aviation security bases and an engineering standpoint when you get to a passenger screening checkpoint. for example, was the optimal configuration and what are the trade-offs among the technologies. the national labs are uniquely positioned to help was there. that effort will be led -- co- led. >> one thing that i want to

point out is that one thing we learned from the failed attempt on christmas day of this last year is that metal detectors did not do the job. there has been an investment in the commitment going forward with metal detectors. we need to make sure we are looking at these technologies to be able to identify these materials and to understand how we take into consideration the complexities associated with chemistry and the value of getting a molecular footprint. this way we can prevent them from moving forward and having people move them on their body. i will pursue that line of questioning as we move forward. i hope we can get to that point. >> thank you very much. we will return for the rounds of questions.

>> was a 25,000 micro rems per year? >> that's right. > it is at -- it is actually 8000 per hour. >> i am not going home this weekend. what is the status of explosive detection? dr. albright, you discussed this in generality but how long do we have to wait and what is the status and will it be possible? >> that is a great question. it was pointed out by me luhan, our present situation is revolved around a metal detection. the thing you look for -- you walk through is looking for metals. that may have made sense when we

were worried about people bringing guns on board aircraft but it does not checked for explosives. even with the carry on baggage systems that we have deployed, without going into classified details, they have utility in detecting explosives but they're certainly not at the performance ì(lc@&c+ here at the table would like. we have tried to move on to other ideas. whole body imaging is certainly one that has been put in play. that is a technology that was developed at the civic northwest national laboratories and was transitioned into the private sector. the difficulty with explosives is that -- there are two problems. one is that they're not volatile for they don't put out signs.

this is the kind of things you would detect in a remote environment. they are not very volatile. you would not want to have an explosive that rapidly turned into a vapor and mixes with the atmosphere for that would not be a very stable environment to operate in. they tend to have -- be hard to detect for you have to detect the solid somehow. that is the basis of the scanning systems that they use and secondary inspection. the second difficulty is confuse jurors. you have a lot of -- many of you have probably gone through çósecondary and have been scared and and had your luggage handler-swept and it has become positive. the question usually is if you played golf today. you could possibly have picked up fertilizer and that will sometimes confuse the system. there are many computers.

nfusers. euna but looks like explosives to those systems. those kinds of issues -- peanut butter looks like explosives to those systems. what has changed over the last few years is the plethora of explosives we have to deal with. we had originally had a fairly short list of explosives were concerned about and now there are dozens that show up on the internet that have to be in books that people sell. they tell people how to make homemade explosives. the list is fairly long and getting lower and these have to be evaluated as was pointed out, the signatures have to be identified what they look likeñi to our chemical systems, the whole body image years, this collection of centre systems that we are trying to deploy prevent has to

be worked for. we have to endure a long twilight struggle that we have to be faced with. the current status is not where we'd like to be. it is a very hard problem. nonetheless, there are many ideas for how to improve a variety of technologies. >> i will have time to go into all these other questions but it seems to me that as this whole explosive thing really gone to the dogs? >> that came up after december -- after the december 25 incident. there are not enough dogs. these dogs have to be trade. >> we could deal with that issue. >> it takes a long time to train these dogs. there maybe three or four sites in the country that train these

dogs. they get tired easily. they're not necessarily as reliable as people think they are. when you work that through, the standards that apply to dogs -- we will have to evaluate dogs but people have been working hard on this. none of these ideas have worked a particularly well. >> i will open two other subjects. on the science side of it, we are talking about social science but it seems to me that the visual screen,ñi that is to look at someone and take a look as individual has a role and there are others in other countries that do that to a great extent. i would be interested in the social science piece of that. a final question that i would like to get to, the christmas issue really was more about the data bases, was it not, and the

compatibility of the interaction of databases. the question arises as to computer science and the ability for computer science to deal with the multiple databases and integrating them. >> thank you. >> thank you. before i get on to my next set of questions, i want to finish up with further information on the last question. after my discussion with the committee staff two days ago, they went to the archives and found two surveys, both done after the christmas incident. both were released january 11. one survey by cnn finds that full body scanners should be used, 75% should not be used.

there are no back up numbers on that so we don't know what the opinion of the traveling public is as opposed to a non-traveling sample. the gallup-usa today organization found, let's see -- there are a variety of findings here. the majority, 67% say they would not be personally uncomfortable undergoing such a scan, the full body skin. 48% said they would not be uncomfortable at all. 10% say they would be very uncomfortable if subjected to such a search. the prior preferences were comparing full body scan bursas

a complete package down. -- versus a complete pat down. there is a difference between women -- men and women. in their sample, they found -- and take a moment here to find a sample information because i thinkxd it is very important to our consideration. ok, results based on a total sample of national adults, 95% confidence. based on five of the 42 adults who have taken more than two air trips -- based on 542 adults who have taken more than two air trips, there is no frequency as

to how the frequent flying trips intrude on personal the cnn survey says the frequency of flying was really quite disparate about 50% fluty there frequently or occasionally and the other 50% flu never or rarely. you can fit all the frequent passengers into the don't scream a caten me category or the other ones who do not fly. it is important to determine whether we are addressing a real problem or not. mr. buswell, i guess you'll have that information broken out for us? >> i will take that action. >> thank you very much.

let us assume that this is a problem, that public acceptance is a problem the 1996 national academy study an airline passenger screening discussed the importance of understanding the health, privacy, convenience, and comfort of screening and the report 11 years later said very little work had been done in these areas i want to ask our three witnesses, why have these recommendations been ignored by your respective agencies, in one sense or another? >> i guess i would respectfully disagree that the recommendations have been ignored there are a number of recommendations of that in fact have been adopted for example, the recommendation that we consider privacy filters to mask portions of the images,

whether those be private areas of the body or faces so that those would not be displayed together. the fact that images are not stored, images of the traveling public are not stored as a recommendation that came from that report that was adopted. putting the screener out of sight of the individual was one of the recommendations. that was adopted by tsa. the fact that automatic target recognition which is our highest resource priority for tsa would allow images not to be viewed of all of us in response to an alarm is one of the things we are pursuing. i think the most important recommendation we have adopted is the recommendation to assess as early in the development process as possible the potential for community resistance to the implementation

echnologies. we have a formal process in place to understand and incorporate community perceptions in the development and deployment of critical technologies. we called the technology acceptance and integration program. they look at civil rights and convenience and comfort, complexity, usability, and the perception of progress for safety >> before my time expires, i will give dr. hyland an opportunity to comment. i'm a general list. -- i made generalist. in 1996, the committee found there have been very little work done to study the public acceptance of screening technologies. with this topic was revisited in 2007, that had not changed. dr.ghyland would you care to

comment on the public acceptance front? >> i would like to say that when we said in 2007 that we found no update -- perhaps there is information being done internally that was not in the public realm. we may not have seen it. it was of concern to us that there was nothing in the public ations that had address this. >> you would not expect nis to have a large role in this part we have a factor -- we have a very effective group in usability gori >> i am never surprised at whatmnis is involved

this is partially supported by dhs. >> this is work funded by s &t. it comes to the idea of afforded. when you come up to a piece of equipment, you instinctively understand what you are being asked to do or do you have to have someone instruction in doing that. i think the public acceptance, to some extent, will happen in usability studies. this particular one was very helpful. >> did you ever compare a mac within ibm? [laughter] ñrjust kidding. >>ñi ñiand modeling

simulation and computing capabilities especially within our national laboratories, can you be specific to how valuable those are as we move forward about how this can be incorporated into looking at technologies and creating a safer flying environment for passengers? and >> let me focus on what specific examples. ñrone basic concern you have whn you're thinking about deploying a next generation of any kind of system is what is the minimum amount of explosive you need to detect. we're not very much interested in very, very small mouth. the question is, what do these systems have to be able to do? we only way to really know that is to ask yourself what is the vulnerability of the aircraft to various explosive formulations placed at various parts of the aircraft? one way to do this is you could

go out and buy a bunch of old airframes and blow them up. we actually do a little bit of that. that is not a very efficient are cost-effective approach the other approach is to use some of the exquisite models and super-computing capabilities that exist at places like los alamos and to do structural modeling of the air france. and then you ask -- air frames. then you ask questions if you will get a rupture. that is actually pretty hard to do. it does require a validation through some experiments. all the laboratories have the ability to do in support of this program. we actually occasionally go out

and blow up an airplane. we show that we got the right answer. nevertheless, that is a broad campaign. every airplane is different. there are differences between different embodiments of the 757 stretches for they all have different structural responses and you have to have an understanding see you can ultimately set requirements for what that explosive detector has to be able to find when you get to the passenger point. >> we have seen the importance of making sure we are looking at simulation modeling, super- computing capabilities to assist us as we identified the molecular footprint of some of these very destructive weapons- based materials to do harm. the department, security has

engaged to in gauge a more senior level 2 and work with our nsqa laboratories. we identify where we were weak during this december 25 incident specifically, if we can get a commitment from dhs that this is one area where we can work with our national laboratories to truly understand the whole system to identify weaknesses so we can have systematic approaches to solve them before we identify a weakness that comes forward from a failed attempt like this. >> i could notñr have said it better myself. that is exactly the focus of the systems analysis portion.

san dia national level be leading that effort. we also have the idea of emerging technologies. what do we not know is out there? every time i visit a national lab, i am amazed at the treasure chest of technologies and science that is going on their parade how do we bring that to bear and other homeland security problems? that work will be co-led by pacific national laboratories. >> just another example of how we are looking to our brightest and best across the country to identify solutions to problems were given the ability and the necessary environment to support

the r&d, so we can understand the complexity of some of the algorithms used by financial markets with the devastation those of causes as well thank you for bringing this to the hearing. ñi>> thank you for your contributions to this subcommittee. san dia has had goodñr fortune n many different respect and you are one of them. >>los alamos as well. [laughter] i have best youth -- >> i have best you before about the role of comprehensive risk assessment. at one point or another, there was some concern that technologies were being developed and risks were being addressed based on how the vice

president was feeling that day. the prior -- the current vice president might assess those things different than the previous one. we want to have a steady hand guided by a real risk assessment. i would like to ask you to address that, the role of comprehensive risk assessment in creating a multi-tiered approach and how this dovetails into using different approaches, such as using canines, using personal interviews, the april detection as well as the technological approach. >> the risk assessment process -- i think the last time i was here, we discussed the importance of an overall risk assessment. i am pleased to see in the

review report that was released earlier this week that the need for a national risk assessment framework was identified as one of the highly important things we need to go forward with. i know the secretary understands that. she is engaged in that broader national risk assessment we discussed earlier. >> can you send back a report to this committee on the progress of implementing these systematic risk assessment methods? >> i would be pleased to. the systematic risk assessment is led by the office of risk- management. i will be happy to work with them to get to that information. when it comes to the aviation risk assessments, the gsa has done a lot of work in this regard -- tsa has to lot of work here.

i would be pleased to coordinate with tsa to bring to the committee that risk assessment that they doxnregularly and a revisit it regularly based on the threats that are emerging. at one time, there were very few things that we were worried about as far as people bringing in guns and military-grade explosives on an airplane. now, that list is quite long. prioritizing the things we have to look for and prioritizing or establishing the amounts of these various substances that we need to look for is high and the list of things we need to do and is fundamental to the risk assessment. i would be pleased to coordinate that engagement with the committee. tsa has done some work in this area i think you would be pleased with. >> thank you very much.

i want to return to a previous point. we have a society that really focuses on technology. it has served us well and so many different ways. dr. albright mentioned in several different ways wide detection technology is very challenge to by the nature of the current threat. you ask about dogs somewhat seriously and somewhat humorously. i remember being at an airport in canada and having this friendly little dog, lon come ag and i was disappointed that went right by me. it looked at a nice young man and a nice young man was promptly taken away. i doubt that it was explosive.

i suspect it was something more fragrant. the dog was up to the test but it is not just our brethren north of the border that do this. if you drive your car over to the capital here, they will stop you and run a mirror to look on the underside of your carçó and then a dog comes. my kids and i refer to that as getting your carñi dogged. i don't know how affective that dog is. i do note that that dog works in daytime andxd nighttime,ñi low temperature, high temperature, when it is dirty, when it is snowing, etc. the machines that were deployed on an experimental basis, i believe 100 back of them were deployed around the country on a trial basis? ñithe figures that we have saved those were $150,000 or more

each. i am told -- i have not seen the puffer machines in a while. i am told that why they were pulled was because of humidity and dust caused puffer confusion. i am not sure that a dog would have the same problem and my impression is that $500 buys you a pretty good dog. granted, you have to train the dog but the puffer machine was difficult to maintain. why are we building an artificial dog knows when we havnose when we have pretty good dog noses? >> we have chemists working on both of those problems closely with the science and technology directorate. specifically with dollars, the interesting thing i've found;ors

that the range of different threats that the dogs are being trained for can be different any mass transit environment than an aviation. some dogs are trained for narcotics and others are trained for money and others are trained for cadavers. there's a group called the swig dogs that has a series of committees that looks at training standards for these dogs. there is a lot of basic science to be done here. we don't know if the dog is reacting to the particles or to some of theñ vapours associate with solvents that were used. >> a lot of life is empirical. we need to work out how a dog does this. the rubber hits the road in finding whether dogs can detect

explosives, the kind of explosives we are concerned about on a reliable basis. my arithmetic indicates that if you have a $500 puppy, you get 300 of them for a puffer machine. the question is, are the dogs more useful than one puffer machine. you address the technical issues earlier. can you address this more? >> we don't really understand very well why the dogs are as good as they are. >> yes, but the question is are they good? >> that is a good point. it sometimes depends on the testing methodology. i could regale you on my experiences at the white house about revealing the anthrax-

smelling dogs. they could not do the job. >> if i were a dog, i would not be -- i would not want to be sniffing anthrax, either. [laughter] >> i was the evaluator. that is a whole other story. they tire very easily. a dog is really only good for about three or four hours before they start to >> that's why i say $300 for one puiffer machine. >> and the training they have to go through. >> i realize that. >> there was a range of explosives that is not known how broader range including how many explosive they can actually detect. these have to be dealt with. the investment that would have to be made to really populatevwd our explosive detection

infrastructure with dogs to the numbers we would need to do it -- >> we have not done a very good job of populating airports with usable detection technologies that cost $200,000 each. i realize there are challenges an acquisition and maintenance. sometimes, in our society -- and died a money technology committee -- and i might technology committee, we have a love affair with whiz bang gadgets and sometimes it turns out that something simple and inexpensive and deployable is being overlooked because we have made assumptions. it was in this complex of buildings that a nobel physicist dumped and o-ring into

a glass of water and said that's what the space shuttle may have blown up. sometimes we have to review our assumptions and our inclination toward complexity. if i should be worried that the dogs' courting the u.s. capitol or sniffing cars out there that they are not doing a good job and are not reliable and that they will get tired, you should tell me that is a case. it seems to me that those dogs are out there 7-24. i know the capital is not several thousand airplanes flying around the usa but you cannot tell me that a country that can deploy millions of troops overseas during world war two cannot deploy a few hundred dogs in civilian airports in the continental u.s. if this is truly the twilight struggle that

some people aboard was to believe it is. >> the only point i would make is that a lot of the systems analysis you refer to has been done and was done in the early days when we were concerned when people were looking for solutions in the early days. i have to confess that i have not looked at it in a while. as to whether the trades between the thousands of dogs you have to deploy in an airport environment and technology that we are deploying. i would point out -- i beg you made this point -- the operating environment out here driving into the capital is a very different environment at the passenger checkpoint. the point is a good one and it is probably a good idea to dust off some of those systems studies and ask whether maybe we are missing something. >> i think it is really

important to try to review some of these assumptions. we need to test them again. we have to ask if it works. it is really nice to understand how and why. ñiif you understand that before you deploys something that works, you may not win some struggles that you might otherwise be able to win. i have never been a conspiracy- type person. as a society, we naturally favor technology and son -- and sometimes it is more expensive than other things. i do want, on this record, make the observation that these technological means -- they keep

the daschle laboratories occupied. they keep the producers of the technology occupied. some of these manufacturers have representatives in washington, d.c. and i don't think the kennel club is very well represented here. i don't know if that has anything to do with it. i would sure like to have some of these easy assumptions revisited or else i would like to have puffer machines at the u.s. capital rather than what they are currently doing. one of the challenges here is that we fly a lot. congressmen fly a lot. we think we know everything there is to know about flying and being a passenger. we have all had experiences

where something that is detected at one airport or on one given day is not detected on another day. ñiyou try to take everything out of the bags but you have a four- ounce bottle of floyçófluid andn other days it is not detected. i do not always travel with a laptop but sometimes i do. every once in a great while, i forget to take it out of the pocket of my. carry-on my as often as not, and i don't know if they just wait it through. it seems to me that when they catch it, sometimes they don't catch it. if i am in a hurry, i am grateful3 . most of the time i feel concerned that this is not

caught. can the panel account for this disturbing variability in the screening process at our airports? >> let me jump in. this is an important point. you said you are the science guy and you don't know some of the operational things. that is a very important problem we are trying to address. you are not producing stuff into a vacuum. it is not about the gizmo. it is about the effected service that that gismo provides.

you really do have to account for all the operational factors. if you produce a weapon but the operators don't know how to operate it or, like the russian tank that is manually loaded, but you can only manually loaded with a short russian who is left-handed, that causes a real problem. what we are trying to hook up is a technology that is actually implemented all in the real world. >> sure, and my point was that the operational requirements that tsa establishes and what we do our research and development to meet. you bet, there is a variability across a range of things. one of the things that we are working with tsa to do is the

idea of automatic target recognition so you are not relying so heavily on the screener who may have been there for some period of time and is 50 to end may -- and is thought teat and may miss something. we're trying to develop these technologies that will help the screeners be more effective. we are trying to look at, from the behavior detection standpoint, can we identify people who intend to do harm before they ever get into this point process. we are looking at things like -- you look -- you make a good point with the dogs -- there is no silver bullet. that is why tsa employs 700 dog teams. they believe that capability is real. training occurs at bose -- both ends of the leash. one of the problems is that there is no way to calibrate the

device prior to use. if the dog having a good day or a bad day, there are limitations but we have to understand that and built them into the system. >> you said there is no way to calibrate for is that true? >> that is absolutely true. >> can't you walk the dog bite y experiment? you could calibrate the dog on site is what i mean and determine whether the dog is tired and should be pulled off the line. >> if you have a training device on site with which to do that. one of the things that tsa has as much to do is to develop low- cost training devices where we do not hate it -- have to take the dogs back to the training center to weaken more frequently train them to do the sort of things. there is research and development going on and all of these areas that try to mitigate or minimize the probability that

things will slip through. this is a layered approach to security that includes dogs and technology and people and all of those things that make it maximally effective. >> i think the court's concern is that based on individual experience and what is reported in the news media, the american people have a legitimate concern about whether all of this inconvenience is producing a result that we all want. that really is the core inquiry. i know mr. smith said he had to attend to certain things. the transportation security screening apparently consider the needs of dha offices like tsa but i am told they do not look at the concerns of other

customers like the traveling public, airlines, and airports. is this true and if it is, would considering these other concerns such as customers, the traveling public, would this have surfaced some of the problems earlier? >> i would like to say yes but i think taking into account the public's perception of the operators of the machine are also in baltimore whole aviation security technology. deciding the machine so that they get specific information about what they are looking for as opposed to seeing anything to bring in a bag, that has been driving the tsa activities.

it is only one part of the travelling public has come to expect that variability. i think that is unfortunate. >> i would just further elaboration on the community acceptance of technology panels that i mentioned earlier. we run these panels based on technology that will have to be accepted by the public. we have done a series of these with some pretty good results. we intend to do more. we held a panel on microwave vehicle stoppage. in other words, law enforcement needs to stop vehicles, can use

a microwave device to do that and what would be the concern that people would have. the panel includes sociologists "april scientists, consumers, and public interest representatives, civil liberties sorts of groups and privacy groups. each of these technologies will include specific subject matter experts. on the vehicle-stopping technology, we had a member of the american automobile society as a member of the panel. you also have the coast guard and others in law enforcement that would be interested in using the technologies. a series of these would focus on screening technologies. we have done several on mobile biometrics and they allowed us to understand and modify the technology development in a way that makes it more likely it

will be able to be deployed by the operators at the end of the development process. i think we have a real success story there with these public acceptance efforts. this gets to the point that was in the national academy, engage early in assessing the public acceptance of technology. >> i hope that you are able to come back in a month or two and tell us you have the data in hand about what problems actually do exist and what people will accept and will not be overly intrusive. to the extent that to actually involved passengers in your group, that is commendable. to the extent that you are counting on the opinions of folks who are opining about people, that is a risky thing to do.

apparently, there are at least two surveys here where they actually asked people and got answers. i don't have the regularity in the data to unpack the significance of these utáu&ts about the traveling public and the frequent fliers parses the never-fliers purses the sometime fliers. there really is no substitute for asking. there really is no substitute for accurate data. i think that is true i whole bunch of fields of size and it is true in your field and true in mind, also. i want to express my deep appreciation to each and every one of the witness says here today. we are engaged in a very important colie@z endeavor. it is about convenience and public acceptance and economics for airlines that if you sum up all the financial activity over

the history of airlines, it is not clear that there is $1 of profit in there. they are living on the edge. if we want to have a privately owned air transit system, we should help them do their job rather than put on a reasonable constraints in their way. the endeavor we are engaged in is more important because it is about public safety and we face all sorts of different risks. currently, folks are very much focused and appropriately so on this terrorism threat and the threat of human incidents and airplanes. we need to address that as aggressively as the american people want us to. i think most fundamentally, this is about whether this government's can do a job.

can do any job, can do a job well because what is most corrosive is that experience at the airport that there is incredible variation in the service at that security checkpoint. if any other business entity had that much variability -- mcdonald's has a hamburger standard you do not get a different amber and you don't get a different hamburger if you wanted in the afternoon evening. at a more elevated level of conversation, we need to do this task well because it is important for its own sake. ultimately, we need to do it well because it is the only

reason why there is a bond between ourselves and the government. some believe -- iñi think john kennedy said that if i wanted to make a difference in the way people perceive the federal government, i would start by changing the postal service. that is with all respect to my friends in the postal service. i have a riff on that -- and by the governor of oregon, i would change the public perception by working with dmv to brighten up the service they're buried the american people come into contact with the federal government as much through the tsa and airports as any other place. let's do our best to get right. thank you very much and the written questions will be submitted by the staff and by

members. again, thank you for being here. we really want to work with you to make sure that you have the legislative support and the fiscal support to get these very, very important tasks bright. we will come back to this in due course. thank you all very much. this hearing is adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> a film was the focus of a

recent supreme court decision on campaign finance. we will talk about that sunday night on cspan's "q&a." tune into book tv for a three- day presidents' day weekend. we will have henry paulson talking to warren buffett on the economic collapse. we will have garry wills on how the atomicçó bomb change the presidency and the role of the u.s. in the world. all day monday, books on american president's persts. for the complete schedule, go to book tv.org. >> your calls and headlines are coming up as we discussed congressional efforts on jobs and health care.