tsunami, the coast guard played a vital role during hurricane katrina when it rescued 25,000 people and medically evacuated 10,000. the coast guard is assisting in the haiti earthquake aftermath. include search and rescue, marine safety, polar ice operations and national security. all of us can relate to the polar ice part. today, admiral allen is speaking on the state of the coast guard and his future. let us extend a warm welcome to the commandant of the united states coast guard. . . [applause] >> thank you very much for that kind introduction. i would like to have a couple of comments. i have two very different to

have joined us here today. nancy and i met last august when we traveled to the north slope of alaska together to witness firsthand the implications of an ice-diminished the arctic in the summer and its impact on the indigenous populations of there and some of the environmental cda&# @ @ @ @ a@ @ n @ @ @ @ a) a background and a concept for something called marine spatial planning which will take a look at how we deconflict uses in the water. so i want to thank nancy for being with us today. thank you, nancy. [applause] .

from tucson, arizona. she has the unfortunate background of having gone to tucson high school and went to jan will be headed back to tuscon at the end. we do not have a better friend in the department of homeland security and i did not have a better friend than her. thank you for being here. [applause] let me thank the national press club. we have changed the format of this event over the use to coincide with the national press club series. this allows us access afforded by c-span and we think the national press club. we would like to acknowledge another guest here. we have a unit here today that

responded to the initial crisis. . [applause]

it was attempting to rescue and we keep them in our thoughts here today as well. if i could set the scene for my remarks, let me take you to the 452 on the 12th of january when the earth quake de stated port-au-prince haiti. medical supplies, and most importantly hope. hope for the haitian people and a promise that the world had not forgotten them.

air station clearlywater helicopters also arrived at first light and evacuated the first american citizens, conducted damage, and made arrangements to transimportant the director from miami to port-au-prince. within 24 hours coast guard men and women created the art of the impossible. before many knew how many were hurt, haitians were thanking our people for providing life-saving first aid. the mohawk create a clinic. armed with only a limited supply of equipment, they broke off branches for splints. dinner officers described his initial impressions. -- one of the junior officers described his initial impressions. i knew i was walking into a bad situation, but nothing could prepare me for what i saw at the clinic our guardians pushed forward and there were countless

stories of lives being saved and those that were lost. there were stories of being brought into the world amidst the other -- there were stories of new lives being brought into the world of its utter devastation. will you please stand again? [applause] this officer treated over 300 critically wounded patients in one case. he spent six hours inserting 60 sutures and 20 staples into the head of an injured man appeare. will you please stand? [applause]

. it should also be clear that the response included superior team play by all of our homeland security partners and components from the standup of the homeland security security task force southeast to cured nate the evacuation to the work of t.s.a., ice, cis to prescleen and preclear haitian orphans. we worked as a team, one that i'm proud of.

as i deliver my final state of the coast guard address, i would like to narrow my focus and be glad to expand topics in question and address three major forces that are shaping our current environment. there are budget requests for fiscal year 2011. the significant progress that has been made in modernizing the coast guard over the last years and the condition of our aging cutter fleet of concern to me. these forces in combination create challenges and opportunities to ensure we optimize the resources available to us and at the same time create the conditions for future success we need a very clear understanding of our priorities. so what is the state of the coast guard? in two words, ready and resilient. we are ready and resilient. we demonstrated that in view of the entire world in the first

hours and days following the haitian earthquake. we were there first because our forces are agile and flexible. authority to move forces dell gated outside our head quarters so we can act immediately. our forces are working hard to sustain current operations maintaining cutters until new ones are delivered. so let me turn to the force shaping our force. the 2011 budget request. i have communicated openly of our intent of the 2011 budget. as president obama remarked in the state of the union speech, it is important to understand we are in a constrained budget environment. he said, families across the country are tightening our belts. the federal government should do the same. as the command date i have rodgerd for this message. the request currently before congress does reduce personnel in the coast guard by 773 but most importantly allows us to remove cutters and aircraft

from service that are aging and in need of replacement. some of these are being replaced and some are laid up to allow us to maintain our existing fleet. the good news is the budget contains nearly $1.4 billion to allow us to continue replacing assets. the budget contains $538 million to buy the fifth national security security cutter to continue our replacement of our high-endurance cutters. it includes money for fast response cutters. $40 million there for maritime control aircraft and we are especially appreciative for the president's and first lady's support and for the $14.9 million for acquisition of housing to support our families. families. and we thank them again. as commandant, i supported this budget as it supplied us the ability of -- recapitalizing

finding reflects hard choices, choices that best position the coast guard to optimize our performance to protect the nation within the funding provided in still replace aging cutters and aircraft. our intent is to manage current operations as funded in order to sustain our recapitalization program. the president's budget does this. this represents the best way forward given a constrain funding level. it is the coast guard's responsibility to manage current operations with the foresight instructor provided in the budget. we can and will do this. we could use some help as well. two things come to mind on my wish list. first, we would appreciate an acknowledgement by all our partners of the following attributes of our service. we are multi mission, service agency that has the capability to respond along our coast and

offshore for any nondefense related incident related to our national interest. we support nearly every department specialized agency of our government. we are federal first responders for the nation. we are prepared to do our job with the resources provided in the budget under operating principles that have served us well for two centuries. we must seek to balance our operations across all of our missions. we should resist the urge to parse our missions. what do our missions have to do with: security? the answer is provided in the homeland security review that is provided on land. security and resilience of global movement systems, effective emergency response, and continuity of functions. all those relate to the home -- part of homeland security.

we can expect constrained budgets for the foreseeable future. we are prepared to support these budgets and manage operations. we would ask that consideration be given to creating multi-year estimates that allow us to plan our acquisitions against a predictable funding stream. we have gone to extraordinary lengths to restructure and build an organization to meet oversight requirements and standards. our acquisition baselines' lack credibility when they are not supported by a five-year capital investment plan provided to congress in a timely manner. to our congressional partners, we are working to change that. we understand and support the budget, and we are prepared to execute it. let me turn to the second force impacting our service, which is coastguard modernization.

in my first state of the coast guard speech in 2007, i said there were three things the coast guard must do to position service for future success. modernization is in all three. first, we need to understand or dramatically change the operating environment. second, we must change to sustain and improve mission execution. third, we must be more responsive to the needs of the nation. i said our challenge going forward would be to adapt our forces so that we would be nimble, flexible, and capable of operating with multiple partners. search operations -- loss sustained performance and our traditional missions. that was the cause for action and the value proposition of coast guard modernization. it is no less valid today than three years ago. what about today?

that is a fair question. let's hear some highlights of what has been accomplished. we replaced the organization with a simplified construct that focuses on the operational unit. we have established logistics centers for aviation facilities, cover and small boat fleet, cyberspace sensors and information technology. any unit in the coast guard with a support issue as a single point of contact. we are moving to induct our legacy assets into a new system that will be used by all logistics centers. for those of you from a larger military organization, this is tantamount to a logistical tree of less failure within the coast guard. for support not centered on an asset, as a ship, aircraft, or

small boat, we have created service centers. we have completely revamp our support structure for our reserve component and reallocated positions that support our reserve is closer to the delivery point. we are looking ahead to future mission demand. the deployable operations group has distinguished itself. we are reducing the total number of deployable units, but let there be no mistake to the value this unit brings for the coast guard and for the entire nation. our unit stands the watch in the port-au-prince harbor.

this organization has taken on some of the more perplexing problems in our service, including consolidation of inspections and visits require our operational commands. the first remaining challenge for the services the integration of support across turn to program lines at the unit level. it is complex, but the solution in concept are simple. we are replacing regional support command with part of a -- it allows for a small boat product line manager to synchronize his responsibilities with one court

communication on the small boat. i established a goal at the outset of my term that i will not seek accomplished. the solution lies in the transition to new financial accounting system being developed by the part of public security. the system is under development and it did not make sense to procure a new system for the coast guard when we would have to replace it several years later. there are numerous areas where recant address material weaknesses and improve our representation to the auditors, we are doing just that. the final step in modernization involves congress. there are four actions i cannot take and the coast guard cannot take absent congressional authorization. one is the proposed roll right synchronized operations. -- world wide synchronized operation.

one is the upgrade of the vice admiral to rebel. i lay out these intentions in february 2007. the request to allow full implementation of coast guard modernization is the passage of authorizing legislation so we can move forward. finally, i would like to talk about cutting readiness. -- cutter readiness. the current condition of our high endurance cutters is a serious concern to me. following extensive repairs over the last 18 months, which continue to experience increasing casualties, which is indicative of overall declining readiness.

the tension between current support levels and the need to bring new cutters on line was critical in our decision to decommission high endurance cutters. as we support the existing fleet as they are relieved by new cutters, we have transitioned the support to our new logistics' organization. the new structure allows us to provide better support and create synergies not possible prior to modernization. our ability to implement this new support structure will be more critical in advance of the offshore patrol cover procurement that will began in 2012 and 2013. we are also facing challenges with an aging great lakes ice breaking. the coast guard operates one of the oldest fleets in the world. no amount of maintenance can keep pace with the ravages of

age. of the 12 major cutters assigned to haiti relief operations, 10 have suffered casualties. two were forced to return to port for emergency repairs. the process was coordinated closely within our new logistics' structure. the response was a triumph for the organization and _ the condition of our fleet. i would like to say week over extended, but we will always to avert an respond. we will take every resource we have and throw it at the problem. the condition of the cutters that responded is indicative of the overall readiness of the fleet. the average age of our cutters is over 41 years. the condition of our fleet continues to deteriorate,

jeopardize in our ability to do the job. that is why we must address future readiness, as we have in the president's budget. we played to our strengths and punch above our weight. as we continue to adapt to change, there remains certain aspects of our service that are timeless. our core values and operating principles that guide the men and women of the coast guard. these people remain undaunted and they do not need directions and higher authority to ask. a third class petty officer said this in an e-mail to his mother. today was the first day i have truly been thankful to be an american, not because of our infrastructure but because as a

country, we will be there when a country of less fortunate is in need. heydey rarely exports anything to our country. -- haiti rarely exports anything to our country. we will stand aside and put aside are different opinions and help those in need. these are remarkable words written in such a concise and meaningful way. it tells me that the state of the coast guard is reflected in our people and in their resiliency. the coast guard today remains true to our model. we have made significant cultural changes and structural enhancements to sustain readiness in the face of ever increasing demand for our services. the state of the coast guard remains strong and brazilian today -- strong and resilient today.

we are up to the challenge. thank you, and i would be glad to take any questions you have. [applause] >> there is no shortage of questions that have come in today, many from service members. we appreciate their contributions as well. our first question is, as a veteran of disaster response, please compare and contrast the challenges of the situation in haiti with the situation in louisiana and mississippi after hurricane katrina. >> that is a terrific question. let me start with the response model for haiti. we are dealing with a foreign, sovereign government. the entire national committee is trying to support it. the way the u.s. accomplishes that support is through our chief -- most emcees are not

staffed to handle certain operations. usaid dispatched a senior official down there to assist the ambassador. that is the person who focuses response by the american government for the government of haiti. in support of that effort, to make entities were established -- to entities were established. a team of folks was sent down by the department of homeland security and other agencies. in katrina, the people we were supporting or the local and state governments, the mayor and the governor. in the u.s., their federal prohibitions regarding what the federal government can or should do. my role as a principal federal official was to work with the

task force commander as we put together a response package for the mayor and the governor. there are similarities, but the overall governing structure is different. >> president obama has vowed no cuts to defense, and the department of defense is seeing a small budget increases for fiscal year 2011. other home and security agencies are adding jobs. how is it that is taking a 3% budget cut and losing nearly 800 jobs in contrast to other agencies that are gaining? >> what is important about the president's budget is that it has allowed me the flexibility to focus on recapitalization and to manage current operations with the funding provided. we can argue about funding levels. everybody always wants more. the real issue for me in this budget is can we continue to recapitalize the coast guard?

>> this message came from the parent of a recent coast guard recruit. how can you justify recruiting procedures when there is a backlog of fully processed recruits being told a could be delayed for a year? why spend the time and money to continue to process records that have nowhere to go and place their lives on hold with a potentially empty promise of enlistment? >> we need to understand what the budget is right now. the president's budget request is on the hill and has to be acted on by appropriation committees and then reconcile. we do not know until close to the beginning of the fiscal year what are funding level will be and our ability to manage the work force close in is constrained by what is

appropriate. while we have people waiting to access into the coast guard, until we know what is appropriate, we cannot take the final steps. this creates concerns about the future and what is going to happen and how we will implement this. as i told my entire work force, we will manage the personal impacts associated with this and pass information as soon as we know it. we will be totally transparent. in the meantime, we will have to manage a workforce that is larger now than we will be able to support in 2011. we will do that in a totally transparent manner. >> as the need for budgetary cuts it grows, has any consideration been given to cutting costly officer billets and replacing them with less costly and listed counterparts? >> it is a question of interest to the field.

in the personnel -- there is a reduction of over one else in military personnel, mostly related to the ships that are being played up and taken offline, that will allow us to recapitalize the fleet, as i noted earlier. in addition, there are over 300 civilian positions being added on. there is a conversion. -- there is a conversion of some positions from military to civilian. as far as the officer to enlisted ratio, of all have our budget people determine that for the outcome of this budget and put it on the block for everyone to read. >> given that the fiscal crisis is not going away anytime soon, is there a possibility that cuts could come to retirement

programs? >> i don't believe so. i think the president has made this clear, the commitment to our men and women in the military is very strong. it is very strong with secretary gates and chairman mullen. it is central to make sure we find full entitlements. that is where restored building the budget, and it will not be diminished. >> how will the lack of funding impact coast guard operations? >>nis is a way for us to receive transponder locating its permission from vessels.

we think it is a critical piece of maritime domain awareness. is competing with other items in our recapitalization agenda right now. our aging cutters are our number one responsibility. we'll have to revisit what we think about maritime security in this country as it relates to the ais system and how we want to conduct operations that support level. we have not had any viable threat to our ports since 9/11. that does not mean there will not be one in the future. right now the discussion is whether or not there is a credible enough maritime security need to build those out, and we believe there is. >> do you foresee expanded opportunities for the coast guard auxiliary to deploy and assist the active coast guard in situations like haiti? >> we love the coast guard auxiliary.

they are of great benefit to the nation. they come from the local communities where we operate. they work for psychic income. we give them but stipe been to report -- we give them a stipend, but this is a labor of love for them. around the world during our cover deployments, we have created a program to provide translating capabilities. we apply their skills where we can match them up with the coast guard. >> how extensively can you use them to make sure that they still love you? [laughter] >> it is kind of a dance. i spent a lot of time going around and talking to the auxiliaries, telling them how much we appreciate their services.

when they found out what our modernization plans were, since they are not constrained by title 14 changes, the auxiliary has already modernized. they have already gone to the structure that we are proposing to congress. i think it is a great partnership. >> web 2.0 is gaining more exceptions. can you explain how the coast guard uses it? does it help the u.s. coast guard carry out its mission more effectively? >> i believe that the convergence of computation and internet data transmission has produced an equivalent in our

social environment that is the equivalent of climate change. a doctor said last fall in a speech to the coast guard that there are three ways to adapt to climate change. you can suffer, adapt, or manage. this is a fundamental change in our social atmosphere. i have tried to move the coast guard into the managed category. we have facebook, quitter, youtube, and video libraries and so forth. this is the way we produce social outcomes. it is part of the work force, and we have to adapt to meet it. >> given that you are making this transition, what impacts had he seen negatively and what

are some of the positive impact? >> the responsibility for the fidelity, veracity, true, accuracy of any thing you see on the internet rests with the reader. there are no barriers to entry. that space can be populated by anybody. it is being populated by people that do not like us very much. information out there may not be correct. you can either let it stand and suffered, where you can adapt, or you can manage. we chose to fill the space with our information. you cannot control their injury or what they put out there, but you can control what you do, and you can fill the space. >> you made reference to climate change. what are some specific steps the

coast guard is taking to become more green? >> we have been representing the it task force on ocean policy. beyond that we are doing work at the international maritime organization. i leave the u.s. delegation on behalf of the state department. in november, after piracy, climate change in air emissions were that number to issues -- issuesnumber 2 issues. we have issues with invasive species. we are working to endo international standards -- to

invoke international standards. if you look at the north slope of alaska, there are a lot of arguments about the science. i said before, i am agnostic to the science. there is a territorial sea and an exclusive economic zones. we cannot abdicate that responsibility. i have been told it is not our responsibility, but that is not true. it is a national responsibility and something we have to have a serious policy discussion about. >> with each answer, there are a couple more questions. it is fun to keep shuffling cards. given the importance of merchant commerce to our nation, wide international seafarers have difficulty getting access to shore leave?

>> that is a question i have taken up over the last 18 months. a couple of things are complicating this period: security and the coast guard have been working for several years on rules that would implicate -- that would implement an identification card. anyone who has access to secure space is has to carry one of these cards or be escorted. in some cases, there has been an instruction for crew changes, people trying to get to shore for shore leave, or just doing logistical work when they are in port. we are looking at this, and facility operators need to demonstrate that they have a plan to provide seafarer access to shore. anyone who runs into that kind of problem needs to contact the captain of the port.

these people need to have shore leave and access to shore. we support that and make the changes necessary to make sure they have that. >> why can the international community not put an end to piracy? >> to have an act of piracy, it takes a portable ship and a pirate. there are not a lot of consequences attached to the behavior of pirates. we have taken extraordinary measures over the last 18 months and are putting out guidelines on how to hardin defenses of ships that are slow and more vulnerable to attack. i have issued a maritime security directive that requires u.s. black ships around the horn of africa to do assessments for piracy -- u.s. flagships.

this has been enormously successful but only accounts for 1% of that is shipping at the war of africa. the head of the u.s. transportation command and others predict that have to include legal sanctions for holding people accountable in a court of law someplace. we have an mou withkenya that allows us to prosecute their. >> how will budget cuts impact coastguard operations aimed at intercepting drug smuggling?

>> when we allocate resources, it is always a risk evaluation process. we take a look at the intelligence, the threats that are out there, and allocate resources to meet the highest needs first. countered drugs is an important mission to us. to the extent we have capabilities, keeping drugs from entering central america or mexico. trying to capture a multi ton quantities before they get to central america and mexico is the most effective way to intercept drugs from south america. operational model is sometimes more important than the funding level. it is our freedom of degrees of movement. one of the opportunity costs for haiti recovery was the movement

of the coast guard cutter hamilton from the pacific ocean to the panama canal to assume command and control of port-au- prince. those are the trade-offs we make in conducting current operations. does not matter what the resource level is. the process by which we do it, the intelligence we bring to it is what is most important. >> because of the way the military is organized, the coast guard adheres to the don't ask don't tell policy by agreement, not by direction. the coast guard is able to allow gays to serve openly. even if not ordered to by president obama, will you reversed don't ask don't tell? >> first of all, i cannot reverse it. it is written in the statute and would take repeal of the law to reverse that.

under title 10 as a military service and following the direction of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, regarding this, a review is under way to take a look and build knowledge of how we might fulfill the guidance provided to us by the project -- by the president in his state of the union address. our goal is to create as much knowledge as we can about the implications of the implementation of the policy guidance provided by the president's once it is converted into legislation. >> this questioner says he will provide you with his full contact information if you are interested. despite the two people implanon opportunity complaints and numerous consultations with military and private attorneys, the problems of discrimination toward hispanics in the coast

guard persists. is the coast guard going to augment its senior libbers -- leadership with more his bank american membership to reflect the changing demographics? >> i will be happy to take the intermission and follow-up on the complaint. we seek diversity in the coast guard. all different viewpoints and walks of life, all religions are important to us because they create cognitive diversity. that is people with different viewpoints. if you agree on a central goal and you have different viewpoints, it is like getting a multi line fix. it gives you a higher fidelity solution for what you are trying to do. we want a more diverse coast guard and we are working toward that in our recruiting. it is not restricted to one nationality or ethnic group. we needçó diversity across the board, and that is our goal.

>> this question comes from a civilian naval architects and baltimore. in your efforts to constrain government spending, i am concerned the decommissioning of the cutters might affect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @r so i don't see any negative @ @r impact at this time for our civilian workforce. >> please update us on the internal review of ship inspection procedures. what is the stoottuss of that? -- status of that? >> i'm going to take a stab at what they're talking about. operations and how our engineering staff on ships handle oily water discharge and bilge water.

what we have done is to make sure we are living by the same standards we hold industry to. i have dispatched inspectors to go on board and inspect our cutters to make sure the same standards we apply to the private sector are being held to. >> the average navy ship is 14 years compared to 41 for the coast guard. we continue to have enough ships that can keep pace with the navy to be operationally effective? >> we will if they are properly maintained. that is one of the reasons we have to lay up the old ships and build new ships. the old ships cannot participate as they have in the past and continue in the future. we are seeing increasing levels of casualty reports and difficulty in trying to support them.

we will operate with the navy. our quest is to migrate to the new fleet as fast as we can. >> the 2010 ice season has been detrimental to cutters. is there a anything in place to recondition them? >> we have had some problems with reliability of our ice breaking tugs. that is a growing concern for us now. our new logistics' organizational structure is taking a look to see if there is a systemic some components or parts of the ship that may be in demand across the fleet that we need to look at. once the assessment is done, we will have to come up with the way forward. that is what planning against it

is so important. >> how important is the ratification of the international treaty to maritime security? >> it is extremely important. i have supported for a number of years. we do a lot of things out there related to governing what is the last global maritime commons. we do it out of practice. we have not ratified a sea treaty. we need to create a traffic separation scheme in the bering straits so we can separate north and southbound traffic to improve the safety of that waterway. a transit strait connects to international bodies of water. it can only be done in accordance with provisions of the law of the sea treaty. we continue to act unilaterally out there using the law of the

sea treaty as cover for what we are doing without ratifying the treaty. it is time we ratified the treaty and using it as the government's model for how we operate. >> other nations naval forces in postcards have spent more resources on the arctic and the united states. should the u.s. be paying more attention to the arctic? >> yes. we have a looming crisis. that is the condition of our polar icebreakers and how they fit into the future capitalization needs. we need to have a policy discussion about what the status of our icebreakers is going to be and what are our intentions. i have been told we need a policy discussion and i believe that is true before we make a monumental decision. we need to understand what we are trying to do in the arctic

and a consensus on how we are born to move forward. that discussion cannot happen soon enough. >> given everything have spoken about today, in five years of, if there is another of haiti or katrina style disaster, how would the response be different than it is today? >> there are some things that should change and some that should not. what should not change our are operating principles. that is the principle of restraint and the principle of unified operations. that is a proven model. what will change is technology, communications, and how we apply the operational model with the forces we have to become more effective and do a better job for the nation. as i said in my remarks, i would

resist the urge to mess with our operational model. what i mean by that is, if we start parsing our missions and trying to do a litmus test of whether someone else can do them, we break down the value added proposition for this country. we can always do the best job we can with the resources we have under our current business model. i look for changes in technology and maritime domain awareness, unmanned systems. our basic operating concepts should not change. >> we are nearly out of time. we have a couple of important matters to take care of. let me remind our members of future speakers. on february 23 we will have tom vilsack highlighting the obama administration's shell nutrition act -- child nutrition act.

on february 26, francis collins will be speaking on a new era of quantum leaps in biomedical research. on march 5, mitt romney, former governor of massachusetts, will discuss the case for american greatness. an announcement for our audience, members of the press who are here. there will be a question and answers session for press only. the election would be complete without the traditional presentation of the national press club's beloved mug to our speaker today. [applause] as noted, this is the last of your for state of the coast guard addresses.

it will soon be selling to other stores, and we don't really know where they are. they said a happiest days of the sailor's life or the day he buys his first boat and the day that he sells it. as you prepare to leave the coast guard, what are you looking forward to, what will you miss, and would you consider other forms of government service sunday such as secretary of the department of homeland security? [laughter] >> with all due deference to my future appears in the room, i have a saying that the smartest apples i have ever met are retired. i hope to increase my intelligence quotient and the 26 of may and become one of those. it has been a great time for me in the coast guard. when i was born, my father was deployed on a high endurance

cutters. he was not there when i was born. i am 61 years old and have had 47 addresses. i intend to keep working. i have an interest in not for profits, in doing the kind of work we have word makes the most difference. i will remain busy, and i do not intend on buying a boat. [laughter] >> we would like to thank you for coming today, admiral allen. [applause] i÷we would also like to we would also reich to thank the club for organizing today's event. for more information on joining the press club, please go to

our website. thank you. this meeting is adjourned.

>> coming up next, a look inside north korea and its military capabilities. then senators shumer and chris valholen talk about the recent supreme court ruling on spend ing. today on america and the courts, the panel of law professors discuss fellow panelist barry freedman's new book, "the will of the people." america and the courts at 7:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span. updated and rereleased just in time for president's day. c-span's, who is buried in grant's tomb? a tour of presidential grave sithes. the book is a unique and comp

hence yi guide to the resting places of this country's presidents. >> it's a wonderful way to humanize and personalize the past. to take events and movements that otherwise might seem impossibly remote. there's something universal about the fact that we're all going to one day be on our death bed, we're all going to face growing old. we all have to wrestle with questions of immortality and mortality. and those are some of the themes that run through all of this. but it's also, frankly, an entertaining book. there are lots of stories, aneck dotes designed to humanize all of these people. >> available now at your favorite book seller or order from the publisher at public affairs books.com.

>> coming up nesk, a detailed view inside north korea including a look at its military capabilities. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> well, thank you for that introduction. and i'm pleased to see that you have the same pronunsation of the marine corps or corps that our president does. but i am very happy to see all of you here. thank you for braving the horrible weather to come out here and listen to all of us speak. i'm also grateful that i'm sitting here on this panel with so many people that i admire so much, trule. and, finally, i'd like to thank dr. kim and icas for giving me the honor of coming to speak here on the subject matter which i think is very serious,

although not talked about a lot. and finally, before i get into the meat of my discussion, i need to pass on that the views that i present here today are my own and do not necessarily represent the policy or position of the marine corps university or the united states government. well, let's talk about the north korean military threat. i think that the movie we had before all of us took the panel today was very compelling. i would only say that it becomes even more compelling if you tie a nuclear capability to the missiles, particularly type owe dong which is something they're years away from achieving. i'm not going to talk about that today because i think the moveie did a good job. what i'm going to talk about are two things. first, the north korean threat to security and stability of the korean peninsula and as that follows the region as a whole. and i'm also going to talk more shortly but in some detail

about the north korean threat for proliferation and support to terrorism. so let me talk about the military first, if i may. many assume that north korea's military like its people has been starved by the regime's isolation. but in fact the opposite is in many ways true. the key reason why the populous is so short on resources, particularly fuel and food, is because the majority of these have been routed directly to troops. as easy as it seems to dismiss a starved country and its often sick leader, north korea's military has adjusted to dire times and is far more capable than many realize. the armed forces is not just its nukes could wreak hah von on its region. there are two aspects that warrant a careful look. the first is the near two decades old buildup of north korea's asymmetric forces. and what i mean by that in this case is force that is carry out unconventional missions.

the second matter is reorganization. much of which has resultd in a significant portion of the conventional forces being moved closer to the demiliterized zobe such that they are perpetually poised to attack the south. . . to practice that same two p-words together by the way. ..

many of the systems are assessed to be equipped with chemical ammunition. the potential damage from artillery alone, according to estimates from south korea in u.s. defense officials, could reach 200,000 casualties, just on the first day of an attack. if war broke out, north korea's artillery could shell sold and south korea's political, commercial, and commercial center could be sent back to the 18th century in a matter of hours. it short-range ballistic missiles of the second component of their arsenal. pyongyang has worked to enhance its ballistic missile capability in numbers, command,

control, and doctrine. the north koreans possess 200 no-dong missiles and 600 scuds. north korea has also added the ss 21 system, an old soviet platform. this indigenously produced a version of the ss 21 uses solid fuel and can be moved very quickly. it has a range of 120 to 160 kilometers. it could easily target u.s. missiles south of seoul. these first two components, artillery and missile, would be used in tandem, if an attack took place. thanks to a reorganization of the military during the late 1990's, both types of forces are

now commanded by artillery officers who would, in accordance with their training doctrine, consider and missile systems to simply be artillery systems with a longer range and would target them accordingly. in an attack, many of north korea's artillery systems would aim for seoul and much of the surrounding province, while simultaneous missile attacks would strike many other places of south korea. south korean estimates place their number as high as 180,000 men. a special operation forces are probably among the best trained, best bed, and best motivated of all forces and their military. they routinely undergo intense training, including carrying 50 pounds of sound for 10 kilometers in one hour, hiking in extreme cold weather, martial arts methodologies including fighting with three to live 15 opponents, and even using spoons

and forks as weapons. they engaged in intense marksmanship training and knife throwing. they can attack quickly. they have tunnels in the dmz. there is a very interesting quote about north korean sof in the white paper. let me read a short excerpt from that document. it talks about special operation forces strength it reaches approximately 180,000 by creating light infantry divisions in the forward area and augmenting the light infantry divisions to regimen class. they concentrate massively on enhancing capabilities of special warfare, as evidenced by the setting up of nighttime and street worker training. -- st. warfare training --

street warfare training. it is possible and even likely that enough cracks might open in south korea and united states defenses that no. maneuver forces, and inventory, armor, mechanized forces, to move forward and take ground. it is no coincidence that over the past 15 years, north korea has moved many of its conventional forces of the asian corridors along the border. there are two primary commission corridors along the border that you can see on your map. -- primary invasion corridors along the border that you can see on your map. an attack would inflict casualties in the hundreds of thousands. the majority of them would be civilians and many of them would be in the seoul.

speaking of those reorganized maneuver forces that have been moved closer to the attack corridors, let me read another quote from the iraq white paper. the army reorganized unit structures by reinforcing the firepower of the first echelon in the front line area. they obtained a surprise effect with overwhelming combat power in the initial engagement. for those of us who study their military, it is important to note that is the most important engagement. it would be what took place over the first hours and days of an attack. it is very important stuff. what has the north korean army, military, if you will, been doing thus far? we know that december through march, the winter training cycle, they can run armor, self

propelled artillery, troops. they are not harvesting crops, not planting crops. the train a lot. what happened this winter? it is only about halfway through the cycle. it has involved infantry, special operations forces, armor, in an unusually large exercise involving the present red guard -- peasant red guard. in addition, long-range artillery live fire drills occurred on the west coast, north of pyongyang. it featured the rocket launchers i spoke of earlier. those systems are capable of hitting seoul. those are rather large exercises compared to what they have done in the past. another unusual event that has occurred in south korea -- and

south korea has observed with interest is highly unusual live fire drills on the northern limit line. it features a variety of systems over three days that fire more than 350 artillery shells, which is a lot, very close to the northern limit line, some as close as 1.5 kilometers. the drills conducted near that line were reportedly time on target exercises. and other words, it involves simultaneous malis of rounds landing on a single target and that the shells must be fired at different times with systems farther away firing first. it takes a lot of coordination and planning, especially considering the high amount of shelf they fired. several different calibers of what -- ammunition were used. very interesting stuff and there

may be some questions about that afterwards, obviously. why is this important? these three pillars, if you will, of north korea's asymmetric capability, special operations forces, long-range artillery, and short-range ballistic missiles, including rockets over ground and the kn- 2. these are the primary threats that would open up the war with south korea. why is this so compelling? in my view, it is because of south korea's capabilities right now, which are lacking in many ways. let me address this one by one. the srbm threat involves protecting south korea from that. it involves two types of ballistic missile systems, essentially. the first is the patriot missile system. the south koreans just recently, in the past year or so, have

started to use the antiquated missile system. it uses a shotgun type a blast to try and take out incoming ballistic missiles and is not very effective, particularly against the tide of scuds that north korea had. the upgrade is the most effective and they have none of them. they may have some in a few years, but they do not now. the only pac-3 systems are armed by u.s. army personnel on u.s. bases. what is the problem here? south korean population centers and military bases without american troops are very susceptible right now to attack from ballistic missiles by the north koreans. in addition, as i mentioned earlier, the north koreans have about 200 no-dongs. it is true that it is a threat

to japan, but they will also likely be fired at southern areas in south korea. the best way to take one of them out is using one of those systems that we heard described earlier, the s m three missile package -- sm-3 missile package. it is very accurate for taking out a higher-tiered missile. the japanese have this system already. they already have them on ships to protect their population centers and military bases. south koreans do not. this is a problem. that is why the short-range ballistic missile threat is particularly compelling. let's talk about the special operations forces threat. they have grown by about 50%,

although there is some disagreement on that. i concur with this out there -- with the south koreans. most of that has been through light infantry degrades -- brigade. they are very similar to u.s. rangers. the way to counter that, one way to counter that is with south korea's boehner -- own sof forces. they are severely lacking. when i spoke of this at a conference a year and a half ago at nyu, a scholar from the university said to me, when i was in that army, i was a special forces guy. i remember sitting on the tarmac to wait for americans to fly from okinawa to pick us up, because we did not have enough

of our own. this is a problem. i've talked about as r.p.m. -- srbm, but i have not talked about long-range artillery. as you know, the north koreans think of artillery and srbms's in the same mold. you can see pictures of those on line. those guns -- the most important thing that we have to do with those is the ark kantor -- counter battle tactics. that is a very big concern. the mission was traded from the united states to the roc infantry units or the counter battery mission. the problem is -- and this is another issue the south korean military has -- they do not have the proper equipment to do a

good counter battery mission. if you are talking about a time to target mission, according to recent reports, sometimes it takes as long as an hour for them. that is unsatisfactory. excuse me. thank you, sir. another very important aspect is integrating it with air. united states military operates with -- when you get fired from artillery, you coordinate with your own air. the artillery and air both fireback. they do not have the capabilities yet, though they are working toward it. their best capability is called american c4-i, an american united states air force aircraft. why do i bring this up? these three keep asymmetric

threats, which we're not even talking about right now, i bring this up because, a few days ago, admiral blair, director of national intelligence, testified before congress. let me read what he said. "because of the capability gap between north and south korea becoming overwhelmingly great, the prospects for reversal of this gap are so remote. pyongyang relies on its nuclear program to deter attacks on the state and its regime. although there are other reasons for the north to preserve its nuclear program, redressing weakness is a major factor and one that the successors will not likely easily dismissed." admiral blair's remarks are particularly disturbing and misleading. they say specifically that the conventional capabilities gap between north korea and south

korea has become so great. please allow me to point out that the military of south koreans is really well-equipped to take on the maneuver force dominating north korean army of the 1990's. [no audio] >> those maneuver forces can then be unable to take over places where cracks have developed. specifically, when it comes to these three pillars of asymmetric capabilities, short- range ballistic missile threat, long-range artillery threat, special operations forces threat, the south koreans have a lot of capabilities that they have yet to develop and are very weak in those areas especially.

the non-nuclear forces that north korea has taken so much care and spend so much resources on to continue the threat in the south, it remains an ominous and impelling threat for variety of reasons. many of which are in the paper that will be posted on the icas web site, if you would like to read more details. some of what i have discussed already -- those who have carefully analyzed the correlation of forces, opposing our power ratios, or to rein- dominated strategy on the korean peninsula, and the order of battle and disposition of forces of the north and south korean militaries realize that the rok military alliance can and should take the no. 3 in non-nuclear threat seriously. please allow me to take a sip. people keep telling me to quit smoking cigars.

there are just wrong. the second military threat i would like to discuss from north korea is that a proliferation and -- in support of terrorism. i will do this country-by- country. i will take less time to discuss this. most of you are more knowledgeable on this than you were on some of the military issues i discussed. i will probably hit on things you have heard. everyone knows about the nuclear reactor that syria had, which was essentially -- which is gone now, thanks to israel. everyone knows that from the report we have read it was essentially a copy of that in the desert. they built a fake route over its people could not see it from the air. there was lots of great stuff on that. the bottom line is that north korea proliferated their

plutonium based nuclear program to syria. it is not a smoking gun. it is a smoking howitzer. they also proliferated chemical weapons systems. they have actually helped syrians build their own chemical weapons factories. speaking of artillery and missiles, the north koreans have proliferated every single type of scud they have built to syria. in fact, if you tie that chemical weapon and missile thing together, about two good years ago, a bunch of the syrian technicians and engineers were killed, as were i iranian technicians and engineers when they were trying to test a missile that had a war had on that that was poisonous gas.

reportedly, there were north koreans present at that firing. the proliferate other weapons as well -- they proliferate other weapons as well. if we're going to talk about proliferation of nuclear technology, plutonium for syria or iran, there is probably more than what i know about, because i do not sit in a skiff all day. one thing that is for sure is that dozens of north korean technicians, scientists, engineers, have gone back and fat -- back and forth to iran for a time of several years now, going back to at least 2002. that should be important to us because of what happened in 2002. that is when north korea and pakistan were forced to break off the nuclear cooperation. this collaboration has been going on since at least then, probably more intensified because of what happened with

pakistan. we also know that the north koreans and iranians are collaborating on a 500 kilogram warhead for the missile, presumably the no-dong. there is that. speaking of missiles, there is no one that north korea sells more missiles to then iran. every scud i mentioned and the no-dong, and 18 systems that were devised from the old soviet ssm-6 system, which was a submarine-based missile. they converted back to a land- based missile and sold 18 of them to iran. it has a range of about 4,000 kilometers. just using that missile, the iranians can hit europe.

of course, they could already hit israel. when it comes to conventional forces, the north koreans sell the iranians all kind of stuff, including artillery and long- range guns, small arms, naval craft, including submarines. there is more to this picture than that. i will get to that in a second. north korea proliferates conventional weapons and ballistic missiles to a number of countries in the middle east, south asia, and africa. it leads me to terrorism. when it comes to supporting terrorism in very recent years since 2005, north korea has provided weapons and training to both has blocked -- hezbollah and others. they have recalled -- they have provided a number of equipment

to the tigers, up to the time they were almost destroyed by the sri long been army -- sri lankan army. they have built tunnels for the hezbollah. they have provided them a small arms, including rockets that are fired into israel. the evidence points to the dealings with hezbollah continuing to go on right now. they have dealt with them largely through the syrians and iranians, especially through the iranians and particularly through the irgc. in the case of the iranians, the north koreans have dealt with hezbollah primarily through the irgc, a relationship that appears to be ongoing. they also deal with and collaborate with them on a variety of arms deals with iran.

it is well known for this. thus, when it comes to supporting terrorism, the north koreans are either providing support for collaborating with two documented terrorist supporting groups. hezbollah and the irgc. this is well known and continues today. it is rather disturbing to me that north korea has not been put back on the list of nations supporting terrorism. dealing with hezbollah and the irgc, it is not a minor infraction, and the dealings with them have not been minor or short. both relationships have been ongoing for a number of years. north korea's proliferation to grow nations and terrorists groups is a threat, to not only the u.s., but to our allies. those are my comments on two very serious threats that i see

emanating from north korea. not even talking about the long- range missile threat or the nuclear threat. i see proliferation and support to terrorism as a very important to read. i also see the often not talked about threat aboard korea's conventional forces against a south korean military as a very important and compelling threat. that completes my presentation. >> thank you. >> thank you, bruce. the floor is open. >> these are my personal opinions and not those of the department of defense or the u.s. government. you make a compelling argument. north korea it is a complex and very difficult threat. it is still a threat to security in the peninsula and, i think, a

global threat. you point out, in the face of their economic problems, that their military is still transforming and evolving. they are dealing with their problems and becoming and remaining a formidable military. the problems -- the challenges in the north are multiple. the missiles, the estimates to -- the asymmetric threats, the proliferation to terrorism, and when you did not mention -- a threat near and dear to my heart -- the placental for regime collapsed -- the potential for regime collapse. i am concerned about the dual use of asymmetric threats, in particular, and what happens when there is a regime collapse. many of those threats,

particularly the nuclear, what happens to those missiles, that technology, those weapons of mass destruction when there is no longer central control by the regime and military go rents? what happens? -- and military procurements -- coherence. their emphasis on developing special operations forces -- what do you foresee when the regime collapses as the kind of security challenges that the international community will face in the north with those threats? not to discount the conventional attack or the decision to go to war, which i think we have to deter and prepare for, but the long-term threats will exist. those same threats could exist

in post-conflict or post- collapse. i would be interested to hear in that. i take exception to one thing you said about special operation forces. if they're going to conduct counter soft operations in south korea, the most effective air platform is not the sea 130, but a helicopter. it is the helicopter force made -- mobile capability to counter. that is important for infiltration into the north. it is helicopter capability that is most important for mobility in the south. last week, i would ask you -- given that we're in the winter training cycle. looking at that overtime and that they seem to be doing some very sophisticated time on target -- it is very difficult

to do. it takes a lot of training and capability. in this winter training cycle, as they seem to be doing more than they have in the past, and we know they go in cycles, overt time, do you assess this as being more unusual than normal, especially given their economic challenges they have? they are still able to commit the resources and training to be able to execute a fairly high- level of training, by any standard. do you foresee that as continued creeping normalcy? they shift their forces south and develop capabilities to be ready for some kind of eventual attack. >> why do you not take it?

>> excellent comments. for those of you who do not know, he is a very respected analyst on north korean issues, particularly soft issues, so i would deal to him on those issues. he brought up a question of would like to ask him. the threat from soft after the attack. we do not know for sure, but there is an interesting corollary we can look at. that is what happened with the romanians after the attack. the romanian army, when the communist government collapsed, it essentially -- they turned it over to the people with one notable exception, there special forces guys. as some of you probably know, tim -- kim il-sung and kim jong il studied the romanian

collapse because it bothered them. they're not only well-trained, but more brainwashed then the remainder of the north korean army, certainly most of it. if one is to look at past presidents, it is very interesting. -- past precedent, it is very interesting. when that submarine was captured and washed up on south korean shores, a lot of crew members killed themselves, instead of being captured. these guys are pretty serious. i think that the majority of the north korean army, should we fight a war, and i hope that does not happen as much or more so than anybody else, because i understand the destruction it would involve. should we have to, heaven forbid, fight a war, many of their army units when they look like they're going to be debated -- defeated, will

surrender -- will not surrender or given. another challenge is that of missiles. you did not bring up missiles. but if there is a collapse of the south korean regime and there are forces competing for power in south korea, and one of them is trying to get outside powers involved, one of the most frightening scenarios would be if they decided to shoot a no- dong off at someplace like japan. it is really very frightening. folks on active duty and in planning circles are preparing for that. i would ask how capable is the helicopter lift for the south korean military. we could talk about that offline. that was a very interesting point you brought up.

you ask me something about the winter training cycle. was it more unusual than normal? it is a very good question. i have an answer for you. the north koreans -- i have been watching the north korean winter training cycle since i was a lance corporal in 1978, before some of you were born. it has always been -- what will be the gee whiz thing that he does to make us say, that is interesting? it used to be kim il-sung, but now it is kim jong il. we're talking about hundreds of tanks. some of them were so close to the dnc that you could look down and it was very interesting -- dmz that you could look down and

it was very interesting. they have had large mechanized training exercises which were unusual. there have been lots of stuff. this winter training exercise they did a very clever thing, in my view. up to 400 shells have been fired so far and they may fire more. that is a lot of artillery firings. they have been trying to find a way for the past two or three years to intimidate south korea over the nll. they did not want to take a lot of casualties. they did a pretty good job of doing it. some people think -- i have not seen this in the press, but i think it has a lot to do with the fact that the general, who used to be, as some of you know, and the general staff, was

put into a position that some people thought was a demotion. i think he was made the corps commander. the fourth corps is the corps on the northern limit line. he is a smart guy and one of the most trusted. he was made the corps commander about nine months ago. what they probably did was planned as intimidating exercise predict are firing shells right up to 1 kilometer away from this border, in order to show us they have this great artillery capability and to bring up the issue of the northern limit line again. it did not take any casualties. the first day, the rok marines fired off a few shells and after that they did not do anything. was it unusual? yes. is it unprecedented? no. next year they will probably try to do something unusual to get our attention the north korean

army -- to get our attention. the north korean army is something they continue to work on and spend a very big amount of resources on and a capability that continues to evolve, in order to threaten the south. that is their specific intent. we should take it seriously. great comment, thank you. >> do you want to join in? there is a button. push its. . >> ok. let me say a couple of words about purses, non-proliferation -- about bruce's comments on non-proliferation. president obama came out with a statement a few days ago that

there were no statutory reasons -- no reasons in u.s. statutes to put north korea back on the u.s. list of states sponsoring terrorism. a high-ranking administration official was quoted as saying that north korea has not supported terrorism or terrorist groups since the 1980's. the reason for this decision really is a decision to try to sustain the nuclear talks that the administration is trying to revive with north korea, aimed at getting north korea back into some kind of participation in the six-party talks. that was the rationale for the bush administration removing north korea from the terrorism list of 2008 and is the same

rationale for the president's statement, that there is no statutory justification for restoring north korea to the terrorism list. i wish the administration would be honest enough to state this reason. this is the real reason why they do not want north korea on the terrorism list -- rather than disputing what he has laid out, quite accurately, about the factual nature of north korea's support, and cooperation with the iranian revolutionary guards and through them its active arms and training support for hezbollah. we need look no further than

these north korean shipments to iran, which have been intercepted this year, in the last six months -- the big six -- the big shipment that was seized in dubai i july, and in bangkok, they were huge shipments of rockets, rocket launchers, short range, surface to air missiles, tons of this stuff. what does iran used such large quantities of these kinds of weapons for? this is what the iranian revolutionary guards sent to hezbollah -- send to hezbollah. this is what hezbollah is armed with. these north korea and rocket launchers and short-range

sherpas to air missiles are exactly those kinds of weapons. -- surface-to-air missiles are exactly those kinds of weapons. to argue that large quantities of those are not ultimately bound to hezbollah and possibly ahamas goes into the ludicrous realm. the israelis know all about this. the israeli brass talks about this all the time. the only reason the israeli government does not come out publicly and lay out what it knows about all of this is that it does not want to embarrass the u.s. government and its policy of keeping north korea off the u.s. list of states sponsoring terrorism.

not embarrassing the bush administration and not embarrassing the obama administration. remember looking back at the bush to administration that it was only after some very strong threats from congress that the bush administration revealed any information at all about north korean involvement in that circassian nuclear reactor that we have been told -- in that syrian nuclear reactor that we have been told about even then, i would argue that the bush administration did not tell the whole story, which was also about a run -- iran's involvement. the israelis have photographs iranian officials visiting the

reactor. iran was the finance year -- financier for that reactor. there is really an issue of truth-telling here, in terms of the real reasons why north korea is not on the u.s. list of state sponsors of terrorism. on to the north korean military -- i will take a little bit of a contrarian view. we need to say a little bit more about their weaknesses. the weaknesses of north korea and conventional forces which are severe and are deepening year after year, since the collapse of the soviet union at the end of the 1980's. i will briefly go over 3 points.

north korea and conventional forces have no sustainability and could not wait a major war after just a few days. yes, the army gets more food than the masses of north koreans. but their caloric intake is only 600 to 700 calories per day, compared to 200 or 300 for the masses of north koreans. this is not a sustainable diet in a war situation. part of the reason the north koreans rank and file troops were getting more food over the last few years than the north korean population as a whole was getting was that south korea was providing much of this food. we saw the photographs, in march, 2008, of those north korean trucks delivering

south korean red cross bags of rice to their troops on the dmz. this is an example of what poor shape they are in. another related element in sustainability is what i think are greater limits on their ability to exert special operations forces in south korea. the information i have is that for the last two years, those infiltration aircraft, which our military leaders used to stress so much in their testimony to congress, as part of the north korean conventional threat, have been shut down for lack of fuel. they are no longer able to operate and train with these aircraft on a sustained basis.

but perhaps the greatest weakness lies, i think, in their armor and massed infantry. here i have a different view in terms of their ability to penetrate to any degree south korean territory across the dmz. i believe they have lost much of this capability. their armor is extremely old, a vintage 1950's and 1960's, for the most part. their inventory is made up of those 16-year-old draftees who have come up through years and years of malnutrition. four years ago they reduced the minimum height requirement from 4'11" to 4'2". there is only one explanation

and that is now nutrition. food and fuel requirements go way up for a force like the north korean military in a war- fighting capability, compared to their requirements for food and fuel in a peacetime capability. they do not have the fuel and food to boost their resources in a war fighting situation and they know it. moreover, bruce mentioned u.s. air power, a very good point. the combination of hundreds of tactical finders -- fighters that we could deploy within two to three days of the outbreak of a conflict, plus squadrons of mass heavy bombers that we would bring over there within two to three days, would obliterate

their massed armor and massed infantry, before they would have a chance to make any kind of significant penetration into south korea. we need to accurately assess the north korean military threat, all of its components, for no other reason than the requirements on our military globally are so extensive now and the strain on our military is so great, be it afghanistan, iraq, iran, yemen, that we need to accurately assess come out exactly what we need to contribute to south korea's defense. in the past, there has been a tendency to exaggerate the north korean threat of an all-out

invasion of south korea. for too long, the pentagon ignored the evidence of deterioration of north korean's conventional military. the pentagon is beginning to talk more about this and make your judgments on that basis -- and make more judgment on that basis. there is another side to what bruce said. south korea needs to take many of the steps he laid out and the united states needs to keep a very robust presence in south korea and off shore of south korea. send the right kind of message to the north koreans. president obama promised south korea discussions on enhanced deterrents. i do not know whether those discussions are underway or not,

but we need to get them under way because it seems to me that there are some things that the united states could do to enhance our deterrence capabilities, especially with regard to our naval and air power, and in doing so, send a stronger message to the north koreans. if they should ever contemplate attacking south korea, they will be obliterated. i think that is the message we need to keep sending to them. i think there are some things we could be doing that we are not doing now to send a stronger message in their direction. >> thank you very much. let catherine respond. >> it is a great pleasure to be here. thank you for organizing another very interesting and worthwhile seminar. thank you to bruce for answering

a question i have had for a long time about the current state of conventional armed forces. i really appreciate your good work on that. i would like to add one brief comment to what larry said about the weaknesses of the soldiers. i was struck, when i was in north korea the summer of 2008, by the appearance of soldiers. i saw quite a number of units of soldiers in the southern part of the country north of pyongyang, all the way down to the dmz. all of the groups of soldiers that i saw on the road, at the dmz, wherever, were considerably

thinner and more obviously malnourished than older -- ordinary people i saw in pyongyang or on the road or just walking along the road or fields in southwestern -- in the southwestern part of the country. i was surprised by that. the soldiers' faces were drawn and their bodies were extremely small. when we talk about diverting food to the military, something else is going on other than that soldiers are being well-fed. my other comments are about the issue of intent. i will try to say this briefly. we are running out of time, i think.

it is well-known, when we talk about a threat, the threat is the combination of capabilities and intent, not simply capability. that is where i think we need to focus a bit more attention as we discussed the north korean threat. my field is history. what i have done is study the history of communist countries, particularly the soviet union, china, and north korea. also eastern europe. i look at them over their whole trajectory and teach about it this way. i see it in terms of evolution. these countries always have evolved, as all countries do. we have a tendency in the case of north korea to treat it as some sort of static phenomenon, partly because we do not know enough about the to not think of

it that way. if we look a bit as a static thing, we are inevitably going to miss read -- misread the situation. what i see from the historical evidence is that by the 1980's, the regime realized their system was not working and that they could not provide economically for their people. this is what he said in no uncertain terms to gorbachev, in a confidential conversation that we have records of now. the overwhelming reality, already, by that time, was the need to protect themselves, given the fact that they were not able to succeed economically at even a basic level. with the collapse of the soviet union in 1991, the overwhelming

reality was extreme economic boehner ability with a loss -- vulnerability, with the loss of the soviet support. the reaction, to put it simply, was naturally to enhance their security by the kinds of steps that bruce has outlined. they wanted to enhance their economic situation by the means of proliferating. as we seek to counter the very real negative consequences from their proliferation and the very real potential threat that

exists simply by virtue of their remaining economic -- military capability, if we're going to do that skillfully and effectively, we have to understand what is actually happening inside the country, among the elite. we're going to strike a bargain with them -- we need to understand the motivations to do so. there is ample evidence today that the elite have lost confidence in the ideologies, i would say, quite -- absolutely, that the ideology is dead and they are aware that their system is not working. they are very actively seeking to gain the skills, the contacts, and the resources needed to survive in the larger

world as individuals and as a country, primarily as individuals, however. they are very actively engaging with people in china, vietnam, and a number of european countries, and attempting also to enlarge their engagement with institutions and individuals in the united states, in order to survive, in order to have the kind of skills that will enable them to cope with the larger globalized economy, as an individual and also for their country, as long as it remains. it is really essential to understand that this process is already happening in north korea.

what we have is an opportunity to harness that, to make it more profitable for them to expand this kind of learning that they are doing and collaborating on all kinds of peaceful enterprises, agriculture, energy, all sorts of things -- and make the cost of the negative and threatening behavior is such as proliferation increase. if we attempt to simply stop proliferation without providing any effective alternatives for them economically, that is unlikely to succeed. i will stop with that. >> bruce? >> i will keep this brief. larry and i have a lot of

respect for each other's analysis, but we disagree on the north korean military and we argue about it frequently, including the last time when it was over a lot of beers in atlanta. let me address some of his well- thought out comments, specifically on weaknesses. sectors i have talked to say a few days is what they're planning for. they think they can take seoul under the right conditions. south korea of then will no longer be the country with the 13th largest gdp, they will be back to being a third world country. the food coming from south korea -- absolutely, i concur. the north koreans take food that they get from everybody, no matter who it is and give it to the army. they got a lot of food from

south korea, particularly during the sunshine policy on steroids. as far as how these platforms of that training for the north korean special operations forces -- certainly, i have heard the same rumors that they have not flown them a lot. they do not use gas. it flies of kerosene. -- flies off kerosene. the pilots may not have had a lot of training, although i am not sure how much actual training a pilot needs to fly a plane that is essentially a crop duster that carries troops. it is a biplane. that has not affected the jump capabilities of the special operations forces, because like their south korean counterparts, a big jump of the balloons or off towers, almost not ever out

of aircraft. pilot -- it does not effect pilot proficiency or special operations forces themselves. thought i'd pass that on. much of their armor is old. the difference between their armor and north korean armor is that they have more. .

>> the first thing our guys will go after its air superiority. the north korean air force is big with about 740 fighters. we could probably take them out quickly, it depends on how fast they could move to the valley and corridor after they have provided the softening up from the artillery and missiles. it is also based on the hope that when the maneuver forces and infantry get down and start moving, that is assuming they will not stop of a grocery store and get something to eat first. it is interesting stuff. what you said about the pentagon exaggerating the decline of the north korean threat, i agree. during the 1990's, it was a constant fight. i was an analyst back then at our nation's defense intelligence agency. we were saying they were evolving and changing. their focus was not on the

forces anymore. nobody wanted to admit that. that was wrong. the forces have evolved. it is also wrong to go in the other direction and say that they've had food and fuel problems, therefore they cannot fight anymore and are not capable. that is not the case. they know the resource problems. they know the issues they face. they have made a concerted effort to adjust. i think we should keep that in mind. i agree with the strong response. i would ask that we all keep in mind that if they fight a war, the north koreans do not need to take the whole peninsula. they just need to wipe out the province. having that threat means that we have mutually assured destruction in miniature on the korean peninsula with the face- off between the north and south korean militaries.

when it comes to a asymmetrical forces, the south koreans are at a disadvantage. great stuff, larry, as always. this is great stuff to talk about trad. catherine brought up something like to comment on. that is intent. -- kathryn brought up something i would like to comment on. that is intent. the north koreans know that they cannot be combined rok-u.s. force in war. therefore, the intent is to get the u.s. off the korean peninsula. when and if this happens, the. i am changes significantly. north korea has not given up the extreme of defeating or dominating south korea. this is why every time the north koreans topped the south koreans, and frequently when

they talk to us, they say they need to ask the americans to leave. when the americans are not there and we do not have a real commitment to south korea, the. i am changes considerably. that is why it is dangerous to downplay the capabilities of the north korean army. -- the. i am changes considerably. they have strengths and weaknesses. that is something to keep in mind. that is it. [applause] >> thank you. at the end of the day, there are two risks on a friday that stem between everybody and their dinner and going home and having a degree of built-in redundancies to a presentation so many of the issues that the panelists addressed touch on what i will be presenting. i hope it will help you to understand. i will preface this by saying i

am not a policymaker. i am not here to reflect the policy of the united states, nor am i here speaking for the intelligence community per se. most of my comments will track pretty much with the ways that we tend to see this country. -- most of my comments will track pretty much with the ways that we tend to see this country. hopefully, we will gain more insight into what people call the intelligence black hole. i will be informal in my presentation. the black hole analogy on north korea is quite unfortunate when you think about it. it implies that our policy towards the democratic people's republic of korea it is somehow based on a lack of information or less information necessary than to make a wise policy. i would argue that our policy makers do of a great amount of

insight into north korea's capabilities and intentions. it really underestimates the efforts of the 16 agenciesñr tht work against the north korea target within the intelligence community. ñrtheir office within the direcr of national intelligence. it has been established to coordinate and integrate the efforts. rather than the black hole, i tend to see black hawk -- north korea as a puzzle. it is a puzzle where we have enough pieces to see a picture. it is a picture that is comprehensible. it is a picture that speaks adequately to the two elements of the threat of capability and intent. we do not have all the pieces to the puzzle. we do not like the picture that we often see if north korea. we sit in curse the absence of

the pieces missing when we actually have most of the big pieces necessary. i would like to give some historical perspective. in order to understand the north korean issue from a strategic perspective, we need to know that we're dealing with a nuclear capability. they have wmd's nuclear capability that track back to the 1980's. you could actually see the 1960's when north korea first into the nuclear field. -- you could actually say it goes back to the 1960's when north korea first entered the nuclear field. north korea made a decision at the peak of the cold war. they were able to survive based on the largess of moscow and beijing. they were able to play off both of them in the finals of the conflict. in the middle of the cold war, largely protected by security

treaties and alliances with both of those countries, north korea pursue the capability that is intended to give it a degree of independence and self- determination. it gives it an ability to call the shots. it is an ability to large to mitigate any external pressure on the state to change and reform to get into this capability we have the end of the cold war at the beginning of the 1990's. that raises even more exponentially the value and criticality of this capability of this survival of the regime. it entered into the framework in 1994 with united states. it brought to the end the production of plutonium in the critical elements of the nuclear weapons program. throughout that time, we continue to see refinement of its capabilities. the high explosive testing taking place to perfect the design of a weapon.

there was continued pursuit of messiah capabilities. bruce spoke of the short-range ballistic missiles and the long- range ballistic missiles. all of these capabilities continued to be developed during what is arguably the golden years of dprk-u.s. relations, often referred to as the agreed framework years. people often do not remember the events as they infolded. during these golden years in the final years of the clinton administration when you have the advent of the sunshine policy, the visit of the no. 2 man in north korea to washington, secretary albright visited pyongyang , during these very years, north korea

had already embarked on an alternative path with its highly enriched uranium program. north korea had already started cooperation with syria to support the production of its pyongyang ii. even during the key years of cooperation when you could say the u.s. did not have its hostile policy and an administration that is not hesitant to use terms like "axis of evil" and other derogatory terms, even during those years, north permit demonstrated strategic intent to pursue this nuclear capability. with the 2000's you have the public breakout. by then the assistant secretary jim kelly with the state

department appointed demarcation where north korea initially confirmed the existence of the program. there was a possible decision hastily made overnight. they admit to secretary kelly that they do have a program and then shortly overturn the decision and decide instead to pursue the plutonium break out. in 2003, we see the first reprocessing campaign in north korea. they add a couple of weapons worth of plutonium to its arsenal. in 2005, there was another reprocessing campaign. you have this break out where intermingled with dialogue and the negotiating process, even during this negotiating what time is taken to improve technical capabilities and these

breakout of nuclear tests and missile launches to demonstrate these capabilities. let me read briefly from the threat assessment. i will not " the conventional capabilities -- i will not quote the conventional capabilities. "it was consistent our longstanding assessment that it produced a nuclear device. we judged the test itself to be a partial failure based on the less than 1 kiloton equivalent yield. the probable nuclear test in may 2009 supports the claim it has been seeking to develop weapons with a yield of roughly a few kilotons' equivalent. he was apparently more successful in 2006. we judge that north korea has tested two devices. while we do not know that they have produced nuclear weapons, we assess the do have the capabilities to do so. it remains our policy that we will not accept north korea as a nuclear weapons state."

after denying of highly enriched program since 2003, it is acknowledged in 2000 and it was developing capability to produce fuel for a light water reactor. reactor's use low enriched uranium. you have the capability ostensibly for commercial capabilities that also proves the capabilities for weapons application when taken to the highly enriched uranium level. in september 2009, north korea claimed the research it entered into completion phase. the exact intent of the announcement was unclear. the intelligence community continues to assess with high confidence that north. it has pursued capability in the past. we assess it was for a weapon. we judge that kim jong il seeks recognition of north korea by nuclear weapons power by the united states and the international community. the pyongyang intent in pursuing

dialogue is to take advantage of what it sees as an enhanced negotiating position, having demonstrated its nuclear and missile capabilities. 2009 was truly a pivotal year. as an analyst was followed the issue since it began to unfold, a lot of the critical questions we havd was whether this was being developed as a negotiating card or a capability that it knew it would have to give up to pursue the economic recovery and development that everybody in pyongyang must know that they need. or was this the capability that north korea intended to develop and keep? as the new administration entered office with a demonstrated willingness to reach out a hand to countries that would open their fists, north korea responded quickly to

president obama and his are reached hand with a series of steps. they not only to find a strategic intent and were also designed to set the tone for the obama administration treated three days before the inauguration of president obama, the dprk foreign ministry issued a statement that made these things clear. it is best to use pyongyang's onwards to understand the intent. this is the u.s. is mi -- it says the u.s. is miscalculating if it sees this as reward for nuclear abandonment. the dprk has made weapons to defend itself from a threat, not in the anticipation of things like a normalization of relations with the u.s. order assistance. it is the reality of the north korean peninsula that we can live without normalizing

relations with the u.s., but we cannot live without our nuclear deterrent. we have lived witfor decades without normalized relations with the u.s. with dignity. if there's anything we desire, is not to normalize relations between the dprk and the u.s., but to boost our nuclear deterrent in every way to more firmly defended the security of our nation. that is what we witnessed in 2009. there were not as quatorze steps per se or provocations, although we to argue they were provocative. the launch demonstrates the same capability that when applied to an icbm system, they checked all the boxes which states that all

missile activities are prohibited. north korea says we are a sovereign state. you launched satellites, we want to launch satellites. one month later, it conducted a second nuclear test as the declared nuclear state. you test your nuclear weapons. we test our nuclear weapons. 2009 largely ended a lot of the analytic debate even buy it the people who were otherwise optimistic. i will not call the apologists, but they would otherwise be optimistic about denuclearization and to the september 2005 statement from north korea. -- under the 2005 september statement from north korea. the statements that followed in the sanctions were placed on north korea have clearly stated that it rejects the get negativlegitimacy of the securiy

council resolutions. he rejects the legitimacy of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a monopoly of the superpowers for justifying their capabilities while denying others the right to theirs. it has reticulated the september 2005 statement referring to the denuclearization of the korean peninsula. it has reiterated commitments to nuclear is asian of the world. on one hand, it is encouraging statements. who can be against world peace? on the other hand, it clearly demonstrates north korea's position that they will denuclearize when that united states, china, when all the world powers denuclearize, when the united states finally does something about israel, when india and pakistan get rid of their nuclear weapons. this is north korea's clearly

articulated position. is that position sustainable? that is the question. that is what makes 2010 a definitive year for the world. if 2009 was a key year for pyongyang to make its statement, 2010 is the key year for the world to demonstrate non- tolerance of a nuclear north korea. kathryn touched briefly on the domestic context. that is where we need to focus. we assessed that kim jong il after a stroke in 2008 with diminished physical capability has more or less recovered. there was an initial rush to move forward with the succession process in some activities that appeared to demonstrate an expedited process with him having questions about his mortality. his recovery is not overturned the decision, but it has clearly slowed down the process.

as you have a succession process being carried out at a faster pace, if you have a lot of room for discontent, uncertainties, and perhaps even policy debate in north korea. it is a dire situation that the secession process is unfolding under. every year, north korea fails to meet its domestic population's requirements are roughly 20% -- by roughly 20%. every year, there 20% short of feeding the people. a system depends upon the state been able to monopolize the production and distribution through its public distribution system to maintain loyalty and control. the state is unable to feed its

people. it is not a highly sustainable model. less than 1/4 of its industries function. we can speak about the fuel shortages and the six supply shortages. there are difficulties of exploiting the one thing that north korea is known to have. that is mineral resources. that is because of the completely broken down infrastructure. there's no way of going in and in extracting -- and extracting resources. the currency demonstrates the degree of desperate as on north korea's part to do something to rein in the capitalist activity that had begun to unfold in north korea. it also demonstrates the ability of the state to bring it under control. the impact of the currency

revaluation is making two things clear. the state cannot bring the economy back under its control. the economy had become too monetized. the coping mechanisms that allow north korea to survive the famine years since the 1990's and onwards with the local farmers using their household plots and selling those on the markets. when you do an action like currency revaluation, cut off the entrepreneurial activities at the knees. in the near term, north korea may be successful at containing this. the longer-term implications of the elite -- not so much for kim jong il. i think he has established a degree of legitimacy based on his pursuit of a nuclear program. the propaganda throughout the whole 1990's and the 2000's were

based on the idea that they would have to sacrifice. they know we would not have the necessities they need. we know we will not be an economic superpower. that is not will be what prevents us from the state of the socialist bloc countries. it will be the nuclear capability. that was manifested and evidenced in the nuclear capability. that degree of legitimacy kim jong il jo, coupled with a strog security and intelligence apparatus with affected. control mechanisms, people have been willing to suffer through the arduous march and live with these circumstances under kim jong il. the question is whether that kind of sustainability of the regime in these economically dire conditions is transferable

to any successor. most importantly, this is where the hope -- and i do have to believe that there is some. for north korea to come to the same calculation about its nuclear weapons capability that gaddafi did in libya, that south africa did and abandoning its capabilities, in order for north korea to come to the same strategic calculus, there has to be a revaluation of priorities from the league. they have to see that ultimately this is a matter of a trade off. they cannot have their cake and eat it too. they cannot remain a power that is not denuclearizing and gain acceptance into the international community and the

support from the republic of korea. they cannot have the degree of normalized relations with united states to gain international credibility to restore its financial image, etc. let me close by looking at the north korea issue within three contexts. what can we do about north korea? what are the options that the united states and the six-party partners may face? let's look at it in three broad context within the peninsula, the regions, and the international context with an emphasis on proliferation. earlier, there was an animated debate on the conventional capability. it mirrors what takes place behind the green door and

outside. this is a very robust debate. if we agree it is not just nuclear weapons but the entirety of the piece magical capability -- but the integrity of the asymmetrical capability deployed as a terror weapon by its ability to threaten seoul and large populations, the special operations forces, chemicals, and nuclear weapons. these all provide a capability to unleash credible damage on our allies in the republic of korea. in the zero some competition, it remains. i noticed they will into the olympics under different flags

for the first time in two or three olympics. it really is still a zero sum game. north korea has not abandoned its goal of having the capability to affect the unification process in a way favorable to it. i use that language deliberately. i think it may be kind of an anachronism to say that north korea still has a goal of unifying the peninsula through force. that implies capabilities to come south and occupy the peninsula. larry spoke to some of the difficulties with that. they certainly want a military capability allows it to determine the outcome of the end game. there is uncertainty associated with the succession process that makes it highly unstable. dave mentioned the scenario and

how we prepare for that. i think the key to the peninsula context regardless of scenario, the key to this is close corporation and alliance management between the united states and the republic of korea. we are on the most solid ground we have been on in a number of years when we look at the cooperation and coordination that takes place between seoul and washington within the six- party talks and the bilateral context. the key to deterring north korea is a strong and engaged and committed blue house and white house.

if i look at this objectively, we're at a very good time in rok-u.s. relations. the context is a newly emerging threat. a war on the peninsula would have been regionally destabilizing treen north korea development's of nuclear capability with missiles and other types of icbm's makes a nuclear north korea very destabilizing for regional perspective. the early presentation was the key because it spoke to the capabilities that ballistic missiles defense bring to the united states and in our partnership with japan and other countries to counter the ballistic missile threat. ultimately, the key is

diplomacy and how the united states is able to cooperate with the other six-party partners, particularly china. party partners particularly the people's republic of china and its role in the six-party talks process, the country with a historic relationship with the dprk, the country with a demonstrated commitment to seeking a non-nuclear korean peninsula and a country that is critical to work with in the future, and secondly it is clearly as importantly relationship with japan, and i think here again in spite of some difficulties with the transaction of governments on both sides and anytime you have a transition you have a period of getting to know each other on this issue, on the north korean nuclear issue has been a solid partnerships throughout the whole period of the six-party

talks. japan has its own critical interests in relation to the issue. i think it has been a faithful partner in the six-party talks and has clearly shown as much concern as the target perhaps even more so than other countries in the region because the ballistic missile capabilities but the real target of the north capability as my japanese colleagues like to remind me a missile with a nuclear warhead is really the most serious and real threat we face from a nuclear north korea. and that is not only the

taepodong threat. and north korea wanted to break the alliance as a goal of getting u.s. forces of the peninsula they certainly would like u.s. forces out of japan to get pyongyang's constant goal has been to drive a wedge between washington and seoul on the one hand washington and tokyo on the other and certainly any trilateral cooperation between the countries, and in this regard again, not to throw optimism where optimism isn't due but clearly we have a strong trilateral cooperative relationship on this issue. finally let me go let me move on to the international context because people are correct in pointing to the proliferations concern as real. north korea demonstrated a willingness and the capability to proliferate nuclear technology and it's important to syria and its construction of the rea dirt to how the war. its history of exporting will stick missiles to iran, syria

and other countries. it's long roster of activities, counterfeiting of the u.s. currency from international narcotrafficking. it's clear north korea place by a difference in the international norms of behavior than other countries do and while we want to provide for north korea and opportunity to normalize its behavior and opportunity to pursue a path that doesn't require the proliferation of these types of weapons, these types of arms, these types of illicit activities, and while we continue to pursue that within the six-party talks context, as we keep for north korea all the benefits it would have by pursuing the road it has yet demonstrated unwillingness take over denuclearization. in addition to all of those benefits we have a very strong

set of monitoring sanctions right now that have proven successful as we have seen in the turn of the boat which was headed to south asia the detention of their plant in thailand that was headed to the middle east. we've seen it samples where the united nations security council resolution 1874 print please with close cooperation with the six-party talks partners with russia and china where putting the sanctions in to the police have had an affect of deterring the likelihood of not only conventional arms proliferation, not only making it more difficult to prove with trade ballistic missiles, but helping ensure our capabilities and make it that much more difficult for the sum of all fears scenario that is the number three of the wood to a desperate act which would be certainly an act of desperation i think even with

treen as the cost of this of proliferation beyond what has done to date. and this is life in this regard within the international context the sanctions put in place on these companies that are associated with north korea's weapons of mass destruction program, the companies in the so-called second economy coming your omnocons and companies that sell for entry lot of people here, these are the companies selling the missiles they are attempting to sell the arms and likely would be the ones the would sell even beyond that. and it's better that we cooperate internationally the greater likelihood we have of reducing the type of proliferation which obviously would be unacceptable. in summary we've seen in north korea of lead, we could

reiterate its commitment to the multilateral dialogue toward the denuclearization carefully chosen words, a bit of assistance to return to the six-party talks which it had probably seen consensus that grew into those in line among the other parties of an intolerance of the nuclear north korea and unwillingness to give in to their traditional negotiating behavior to his of the commitment to the multilateral dialogue towards the denuclearization and a broad sense however. denuclearization of the peninsula. removal of the nuclear umbrella from the republic of korea, removal of real and imagined threats in reality. it's a difficult road ahead but it's good north korea continues to be articulate its commitment

to the articulation. we need to build upon that in order to help lead north korea down the road leads to head. unfortunately there isn't appeared to be a strategic decision by pyongyang however at this point and that is why the intelligence community as reflected in director blair's comments doesn't place a high probability that kim jong il will give up his nuclear weapons which he personally sees as crucial to his security. and that's why we move on to the third point which is why we need strategic patients. strategic patience is the key to reach out to the elite. strategic patients engagement a reiteration of our commitment to the six-party talks partners' commitment to number one move north korea towards the road of

denuclearization of also to show where all the benefits that can have by that denuclearization. kathryn, i think you're right, you've got an elite that many of them have lived overseas return to pyongyang. they are younger. information penetration of north korea is greater than it's ever been in history. they know what the outside is like. they all know the potential benefits of the denuclearization. kim jong il i believe has made the decision that the nuclear weapons are more beneficial than all of its potential benefits and it's hard to argue with somebody like that. you've got the same situation to the degree between japan and north korea with all this potential assistance to readers progress on the issues and yet they refuse to do even that. how much harder would be for them to give of their nuclear

weapons particularly kim jong il for the economic promises. but the next generation may be different and that is what we look to. that is what we follow closely and that in itself is why we have to continue to articulate to north korea of our intolerance of its nuclear capabilities as well as the benefits that it would gain should it choose the right of the denuclearization. now i will wrap up their and open for questions and comments. >> thank you very much. one by one. okay claudia, you raised your hand first. clotting. would you please come up here. we have several microphones here. i believe they are -- you can just turn on. sure. very for all.

on c-span, push the button. yes. >> [inaudible] -- was the only boy joint venture [inaudible] >> there's absolutely no reason to think that north korea having crossed the line wouldn't do it again as course -- >> [inaudible] >> possible signs. >> we watch these activities on a global scale and obviously i think everybody in this room knows a lot of the stuff that is in the media, possible potential cooperation with burma and other countries. the difficulty with north korea of course is it is a fascinating topic given all the amount of disinformation and speak to that of reporting that's all there it's really difficult to sort through the full array of information and disinformation that's available and i am not

meaning to outright discount all of that information because clearly what we are seeing the thing is unprecedented for you of third country open source invitation it was mentioned earlier. other countries reporting -- i just assure you because of this precedent we watch very closely. >> just to follow up on a quick follow-up on that. could you name, understanding that you are not going to make spectacular news this afternoon by telling us you actually spotted one summer else but could you name five places that bear closer looking? you know about burma that north korea is extremely busy in many parts of the world. we just heard larry niksch tallest the bush administration never came clean about their guerini in connection. i personally have wondered because there's all sorts of evidence that there was

brokering going on between syria and north korea and iraq over syria at the same time the reactor was being built. so could you take us further afield from a latin america, africa, elsewhere in southeast asia, some places where you keep an eye even if you are not seeing anything yet. >> not in an effort to dodge the question, but to artfully dodge -- you know, there are two dimensions to and issues such as this. first is to forget the third countries' intentions. what type of countries would be willing to pursue this capability? one distinguishing mark about north korea's wmd experts particularly the dismissals is it is countries that can't acquire police anywhere else that turn to north korea. north korea is not the provider of preference if you are a

legitimate country looking to build a decent system or this is not diminished some of the quality of their exports, but when you were dealing with north korea, you are risking the isolation, you are making a strategic and that meant you are willing to be labeled the paray of that comes with dealing with north korea. so we look at those countries that would be like that and we do also follow closely where i would also say another reason why i definitely do not want to speak too much on this question is that our ultimate success at detecting this is based upon an ability to attract -- track this without a large amount of attention coming to it. in the case of syria it was an

intelligence success story of how we identified it and worked through that issue. i will leave it at that. it is an issue we are extremely focused on within the larger context of any rogue state wanting to pursue either the plutonium route or a covert uranium enrichment program. >> thank you. very artful. >> we heard the fascinating discussion about the capabilities and frailties of the north korean military. when we talk about that, should we not also talk about the friends of north korea? north korea and china are each other's only military ally. china is north korea's primary diplomatic backer and provides a lot of material assistance. i know it sounds inconceivable that the people's liberation

army would help the north koreans, but in the last couple of weeks, we've seen the statements by chinese generals in the asian media about taking on the united states, being willing to fight, and preparing for it. can someone talk about how the people's liberation army might interact and help the korean people's army? this has happened before in the 1950's. army after all this is something that has happened before in the 1950's and so it would seem to me that this would be an important part of the discussion in terms of thinking about conflict on the korean peninsula. >> thank you, gordon. anyone else? >> i would say from an intelligence committee perspective or actually when you look at china first of all but squier china isn't a monolith if you scour the open source writings and various voices out

there i think you get a diversity of opinion but what is clear is that beijing and washington have an important relationship and that one would find it difficult -- and the prc has led the six-party talks process to legacy the commitment to maintain stability in the region. both by pursuing the difficult task of the denuclearization and also dealing with north korea that times to throw temper tantrums and make everybody's life difficult. in that regard would be difficult for me to conceive of any type of cooperation between the two countries the was designed either to destabilize the region or shift the balance of power on the peninsula.

>> you have a followup, gordon? >> all right, mike. >> [inaudible] first, i'm not a military specialist. i work on the affairs of the commerce the part of commesso for professor behtol, an dittman that irg ze refers to the iranian revolutionary guard. second, for both professor bechtol and syd, what impact has had on the north korea's position on its nuclear program? because it seems to have pretty dramatic effect on the arms

trade trafficking, and last for syd you mentioned succession and i was at a wilson center even a couple weeks ago on curry and there was a lot of discussion about which regime to negotiate with or you know, which would be more effective to negotiate with the current one, the kim jong il regime or the successor regime and i would like to get your thoughts on that. thanks. >> thank you, mike. but bruce take that first and then syd. >> command control computers, communications and intelligence. how am i doing? that is the sea for life. if you really want to complicate things like the military commanders like to, usually on the advice of guys like dave used early in the audience our command, control, computers come intelligence --

>> [inaudible] >> right. essentially what it means is let's go back to before we had the modern communications. the reason -- i live in fredericksburg virginia the cultural center of the universe, about 10 kilometers from my home in the county is chancellorsville where he defeated an army twice his size. he was able to do so because he was able to control his troops better than the union commander was, and that hasn't changed. he or she was able to control their troops the best, move them the quickest to the most effective spot has the best c4i and in today's technology c4i has become the aspect of winning the war not shorter in duration lummis you are counting counterinsurgency. does that make sense? i didn't articulate very well. i saw this world peace, syd

might have seen this contract, from a think-tank in stockholm ten days ago that said the weapon sales for north korea had gone down by 90%. please allow me to say i doubt that. i think the two things come 1874 is very important. that is what you're asking about and i think that psi is very important as well because we are never going to stop but we can certainly hurt them. i think you've seen that 1824 has done something i think is very important and we have gotten nation's, we haven't traditionally played a big role in things like the psi or the united arab 35 tons of military equipment is a lot to lose. so i think it has has some of fact. i have no idea how much effect but it's certainly at the very

least force to the north koreans to look at using the new tactics, techniques and procedures when they run these types of programs and something that is fascinating to me as i am sure you've been reading the press about what happened at thailand, how the shipment was supposed to go from north korea to thailand, sri lanka to somewhere else eventually to torian they were using front companies in five different come trees to discuss the six countries. it boggles the mind. the plane built by the russians, ansar, georgia. very interesting stuff. the north koreans are very smart at doing this stuff. so we are going to -- obra government and folks like syd he works with have to continue to be very smart to come out how they run these operations because they're very sophisticated. >> [inaudible] >> part and me? >> is it impacting korea's

nuclear position? >> i think that larry can answer that one. >> larry? >> you talked about whether it would be more difficult or less difficult between negotiating with kim jong il and negotiating with a successor regime. it seems to me the position that north korean government has laid out in the last few months including what syd talked about, this denigration of the importance of diplomatic relations also the revival of the peace treaty agenda, the attempt to roll the nuclear issue and to a peace treaty negotiation rather than a sixth party negotiating, demand that sanctions be lifted, we saw the

development of some of these positions actually early in 2009, january and february. there were a number of important north korea policy statements related to their negotiating positions. it began to leave these things out. now, that was the period when kim jong il seemed to have been incapacitated because of his stroke period from september until probably april or may of this year. and we had in effect a collective body of leaders now taking over at least part if not all of the policy formulation process during the period. these policies which have been

-- which continue to have been built up and do the book and have been laid out to the obama administration now seems to be a case in which the north korean government now with kim jong il apparently back in charge of the policy formulation process has carried over the agenda that the what you might call successor collective leadership began to put forth early 2009. that tells me that the influence and power that these leaders and one expression that has been described to group has been for generals, now there may be a few

more officials added to the group of five that have been described to. it seems to me that even though kim jong il seems to be back in charge of the policy formulation process the power that this group accumulated during this seven or eight month period in which they were running the policy formulation process their power has not reseated all that much and he has to listen to them now more than he did perhaps before the pre-stroke period, and again i think the negotiating agenda on the nuclear issue that they are laying out which is a very difficult one especially the peace agreement i think reflects the influence of the group and influence which i think remains at a high level.

>> thank you. mike? >> apologizes for being here late. i could not get away before. i have a question and a couple of observations first. these are my observations. it seems that the internal situation of north korea is extremely volatile at the present. a lot of the policies we see are to keep a lid on that volatility. as mr. seiler mention, north korea is now more open to information from the outside. as a result, people know the south. it is much better off than north korea. they know about china. people went into china during the famine in the 1990's.

they know that life there is much better than in north korea. there is an awareness that north korea is not what people were told it was in the past. i think that gets reflected in popular attitudes. i am not talking about a political protest movement. some years ago, i spoke to a mongolian senior legislator. mongolia has very open relations with all of korea as well as being close to the u.s. it is very useful. he said he was a private businessman and had employed north korean laborers. the north korean laborers come to mongolia and get work there. he said they had no work ethic. they do not understand what is to show up on time and work on

time. he said after they have been in mongolia about a year, they start to catch on. i have heard similar things from members of the south korean unification ministry about north korean workers. the people do not have anything like the work ethic that south korean workers do. it reminded me of eastern europe workers, and particularly russian workers under the soviet union. people said that we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us. in the working population, there is clearly extensive demoralization. when it comes to the elite, who stands where among the elite? it is clearly not the monolithic body. it is probably mostly of young third-generation who are looking to the future and realizing that the present situation is not

sustainable. perhaps an older generation of military leaders want to hold on to the legacy and protect it and the nuclear capabilities as an insurance for that. to wind up. -- to wind up, my mongolian legislature said that he -- legislator said that he and the legislature regularly receives parties from north korea. he said that one of the first questions they ask in private conversation is what happened to your communist party, what happened to the members of the mongolian communist party. did they get shot? or they put in prison? no, they continued in the political process and got back elected into government in post- communist history. there is clearly a concern

there among officials at the mid-level of what their future will be lighke. be like we for sea change is there hope to hold onto what we've got. in terms of a question i would particularly like mr. seiler to answer, the dni does a lot of work on the military intelligence. how much do you know about different attitudes and different groups within the elite, so the social and political attitudes within north korea? thank you. ..

of a hardliner versus moderate debate as a negotiating tactic to read outside of see that type of diversity. there is bureaucratic competition. history of foreign affairs loves it when there's dialogue ongoing. that's their bailiwick. and certainly the science and technician is responsible for the rogue ram and like it when they get to launch a missile or when they get to make a nuclear device go boom in the hole in the cave. but all the sad that there is a

good amount of consensus. i would actually say that the scenario that ics is that what we saw in early 2009 is really planned toward the end of the bush administration when it became clear that we did at the six-party talks for a lot of the analysts thought we would deadlock which was on this issue of verification. in the sampling and access required in order to one cummock and from daschle plutonium production and also to gain insight into the highly enriched uranium position. and this is exactly where the agreed framework had stumbled when you look at the iaea is ability to get the inspection ready to clear the delta between what north korea had declared it actually produced in the way of plutonium and what the iaea and others thought they might have had, which was a few brands, a few dozen grams of plutonium versus kilograms, weapons worth.

and so, the six-party talks process had run its course as far as they could go. and north korea could spend to really listen going to get a lot of support for a liberal verification regime. and this is after the president in north korea from terrorism and then the whole issue of what type of action but we have on the ground becomes central. i would've prine at that time north korea makes a decision that it's going to embark on this path with the new administration bitterly on its nuclear power. to demonstrate early on-q have to pay attention to us, to demonstrate early on as the strategic capabilities and are probably thinking to as the new administration is so committed to dialogue, why not walk into such dialogue with the greatly enriched and? the question is what did they do to this plan?

it may have impacted the timing. i'm not so certain what you saw is the ascendancy of a collective leadership that taken in a difficult art direction. as early on in this whole cycle we were expecting that the possibility of a second tape it on much march diluted basically where we were after this escalatory cycle. north korea's behavior today is what i urge our analysts in particular to stop looking at the tactical question. we are often driven and this is no claim on the press because you guys are just running your story spared the winner of the north korea's coming to talks. one of the six-party talks come again? they were an objective in themselves. that's how it is her in so many questions just for coming back to the table. and this is where the interesting thing in a little ears with everybody calling for strategic patience now in

telling north korea joined that going to be rewarded simply for coming back to the talk. what is north korea's behavior at this point? will it continue, you know, will it so compelled to us again do some type of provocative action or will it actually fear from this and comply with it? and this goes back to the question, which regime do you negotiate? you negotiate with them all, not necessarily exclusive. you negotiate with the current regime because it's the reality at hand. it's the reality that we gained a lot of benefits of the six-party talks process. we do somewhat mitigate some of the more provocative behaviors that north korea. i think the consensus we have in the region helps us of the proliferation issue of concern and we keep putting that message on the table. peace treaty, normalization, all

this other stuff, it's all there, just come back, beijing, back to value type. and kim jong ii could care less about that, maybe he just wants the capability. the rest of the alito is saying where it is their future by? is this sustainable? particularly if the other six-party types remain firm in their position. and i would add to that tehran is watching. other potential proliferate there watching. the whole credibility of any post-cold war npt centric had the nonproliferation regime hinges on how well we handle this issue. other countries are watching a. so it's a multidimensional issue that sometimes week korea hands

talk about anaheim third alliteration. there's a long rambling answer to a very simple question. i apologize for but that's basically how we saw some of the leadership dynamics play out over the past year. >> larry. a >> i just want to make a brief comment about what we've seen in the last month or so. with north korea appeared in three things that seem very different in north korea since the beginning of the year. i don't know what the future will hold, what effect these three developments will have, but the first of these is the statement that is reported that kim jong ii made in january in which he admitted to failing to adequately feed his people. then you have the apology by the

prime minister, kim jong ii, about a week ago before what is reported to have been a very, very large meeting of local communist party officials in pyongyang and an apology about the economic mess caused by the currency change and also by the restrictive measures against the private markets in north korea. and now you have the reports that the regime has begun to lift her straight chance on the market, which it imposed in 2009, actually going back to some degree into 2008. and also it is now allowing people again to trade in foreign currency, which in december was banned as part of these economic

measures, the regime put forth. all of this or at least the last two elements in these three changes coming out of pressure public grassroots pressure on the regime. now, i've never seen anything like this in north korea before. i don't know what it means. but it's something i think we have to watch really carefully. and if something really develops from this comment it seems to me u.s. policy makers really need to examine the question of how do we incorporate a new trend along these lines in north korea into our diplomatic approach to north korea. i would watch this very closely now over the next few months in

terms of whether this is just a momentary blip on the screen or whether it's going to be something more fundamental in terms of real change in north korea. >> thank you very much, larry. leonard. >> okay, from the korean embassy -- [inaudible] i put the question toward dr. bechtol. dr. bechtol clearly explained the immediate threat to the area or so -- with the practical measures for determining the 15th u.s. in korea. the main issues to operational

opportunists in 2012 april is just the two years away from now. so my question is, what are the implementation for the suggestion. there are many people with suggestions and they are requesting reconsideration or more discretion -- thank you. >> let me address that question at two levels. the first level is just approaching this from a general look at unified command. and one of the principles of war is unity of command. so i think unity of command is a vital aspect of any coalition warfare. in nato we have a guy who's in charge. all of the nato forces answer to

him. i believe that in a bilateral relationship as important as the one we have with our allies in south korea, unity of command is very important and i don't think the combined forces command of the two separate commands as they will become in 2012 will function as well when they don't have unity of command, frankly. so that's the first level. the next level is just a more practical level at the operational level of war. when we're talking about warfare, were talking about the street level four, the operational level of work on the tactical level four. the operational level of war is typically the level at just about court, and echelon about court. and at the operational level of war, the south korean military simply is not ready should take over many of the functions that they're expected to by 2012. it onto the seafloor i think everybody now knows was before i heard they don't have the seafloor are that they made.

it's very expensive and it's very necessary. they don't even have the joint seafloor c4-i system. it's become so obvious that the south korean air force cannot function the way it needs to come in the way was originally intended to under 2012 change that they barta said okay, we're going to let the two >> they have already and knowledge of that the rok marine corps and navy cannot cannot or leavitt amphibious operations -- cannot conduct or lead amphibious operations. there are many challenges the rok military will not be able to meet by 2012. i understand the politics of this. let's talk sheer practicality of capabilities of systems to meet

the threat. the south korean military will not be there by 2012, that is a fact. i want us to talk about reaching capabilities -- regime capabilities. the best bridging capability is to leave it as it is. it is approved and combine compare and -- combined command that has deterred them. until they have the ability to assume command, my suggestion is to leave the structure in place, pushing back the date of 2012 until the rok military has those capabilities. >> back to the minister. >> i would like to first point out something we talk about. we talk about the opcon issue

and say that they are under the u.s. opcon, which is not really true. p of the national command authorities of both countries. now there is a u.s. general in charge of combined forces command, but he answers to the military committee of both countries. and u.s. forces korea does not tap up compos korean forces. so i think that's important to remember. the other thing i think it's interesting to look at our linux over the last 60 years and our military, the development of our military capabilities has been very symbiotic. that is really what we have in how we have developed the combined command in the strengths of both countries taking place for the weaknesses there. and the symbiotic relationship has in many ways not allowed a

south korean unique military culture to develop because the standard by which south korea and the combined forces command judges military operations is the u.s. standard. and as process taught us, u.s. c4-i is very expensive. because the standard by which they've grown up with is the u.s. standard they have to invest a tremendous amount of resources to develop staff by a stand-alone capability separating the combined command. so it's a real challenge and it becomes a resource and time question. can they commit the resources developed a unilateral capability and do they have the time to do it. again i caveat that if, my personal comments, not official comments, but i would say my personal comments, i think it is

correct and it is for the future of particularly what happens in the regime collapse scenario that the korean military be in the lead. it is important for reunification of the peninsula and what happens in the north than it is the south korean military in the lead for legitimacy purposes and the only way to counter the 60 years of propaganda indoctrination of the north wind people. because of the u.s. forces to leave, it can have a live. but the challenges timing and how we're going to do this. and i think the symbiotic relationship that we have had is a difficult one to break and it's going to be a real challenge for us in the future. back thank you, david. speak up. >> i would just add to what

david maxwell just said, over the last 60 years. since the korean war, american troops have been in korea in that same mode, cooperating with republic of korea military. during this time, there was a transition from president singer read to 1989 into a democratic government. this was at least a 35 year transition with a lot of patience, a lot of development and cooperation. part of it was called military civic action. it was building roads and schoolhouses. it was what we call now infrastructure development and so forth.

the status that has been achieved during this military relationship accompanied in the air and enormous progress in industry and technology. in south korea today is one of the foremost advanced technological countries on the planet. it has a very your, which is accompanied by that democratic process. i find it somewhat surprising that the military has not progressed to the same extent and david maxwell just explained i think the reason why. but the potential is there. and i think the policies, goals, and object does which seemed to be clear, need a strategy in

korea for the private sector to help support the development of the capability for the protection of the company. >> thank you, leonard as always. and kathryn, you have something to add on? [inaudible] >> fine, it's open. push her back in. >> the question about china that she raised as a very good question. i would just say that i think the pretty solid consensus of opinion is that china is aimed with regard to north korea is to prevent instability in border regions, the region that borders korea because of the large korean minority that lives there. so there's a tremendous concern about the consequences of an implosion of the north korean estate on china's own internal

stability, internal security. and so rather than supporting north korean adventurism militarily, it would use whatever leverage it has by way of supplying north korea with significant resources to restrain and there's really no support for the idea that its alliance with north korea on paper would leave it to supporting any kind of military action. >> thank you, kathryn. [inaudible] >> i understand the chinese concern about korean population on the border area. what if there were an implosion in korea, north koreans would go north into china. they would go south into south

korea. and we've already been mined three passengers to the dmz. i think the chinese have much different motivations for what they're doing. they see some short-term advantage certainly in the dublin of south korea and japan and getting concessions out of the united states because they have been promoting dialogue in the six-party talks, not a solution. and so there's a lot going on there which i think that we are willing to talk about thomas certainly not in public and perhaps not even in private regarding the way china and north korea interact. i think it's very important that we let get this especially because fuji and how -- hu jintao has pointed out there've always been correct and therefore has an affinity towards the north korean solutions. i don't want to prolong this, but i think there's a lot more do we really need to look at in terms of north korea. because it's not just north

korea. it china as well. >> thank you as always, gordon. interesting insights and comments. with that, t ñi>> today on "america & the courts," we discussed the new book "the will of the people." it discusses the supreme court and popular opinion. it is at 7:00 eastern on c-span. sunday on a "washington journal." we discussed the new role on a think tank and the federalist reserve efforts on the u.s. economy. jawy newton-small circuses

recent relief efforts in haiti. that is live on c-span. >> it is the only collection of american prisoners -- presidential portraits painted by one artist. see the entire collection online at c-span's website. >> new york senator chuck sumer said congress will introduce legislation addressing the recent rulings on campaign spending. corporations and unions can spend unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns. he is joined by maryland democratic congressman chris van hollen. this is about 20 minutes.

>> i want to thank him for being here and his contributions to this legislation. as you know, last month, the supreme court shattered nearly a century of u.s. law designed to curb the influence of corporations in our election process. today, we're beginning to pick up the pieces. the truth be told, chris and i and many court watchers have been bracing for an unfavorable decision ever since the court decided to re-here is the decision -- re-hear the decision this fall. the ruling surpassed our worst fears. with the stroke of a pen, they

overruled a decade-long ban on expenditures and override the will of millions of americans who want their voices heard in democracy. this is at that time when americans are so worried about special interests having too much influence in washington. the court inexplicably open up the floodgates for much greater special interest influence than we have ever seen before. the decision was corrosive to our -- to our democracy and hard to understand. if you love the way this country has been built up as a democratic nation, it wasn't -- it was an interesting decision. in my view, it was one of the most wrongheaded decisions in court history. it will go down in the annals as not a proud moment for the court. the american people apparently agree, according to a bipartisan

poll released on monday. americans oppose the ruling by a better than two-one margin. 64% disagreed with the decision. it is rare that the court decision has so many people taking a position so soon, especially one that is complicated like this. i think the american people knew that special interests could not -- should not be encouraged. in the poll, the majority of republican voters rejected the court ruling -- 51 percent of them thought it was improper. to say the least, the high court in the land is at odds with public opinion and the constitution, which labours strenuously to keep all equal. will not let this go unchallenged. today, the congressmen and i are announcing a framework for

comprehensive legislation that we intend to introduce in our respective chambers when we get to recess. unlike most bills introduced in congress, this one has a deadline for action. if we do not act quickly, the court ruling will have an immediate and disastrous impact on the 2010 elections. our goal is to advance the legislation quickly. otherwise, the supreme court will have a pre-determined the winners of next november's election. it will not be republicans or democrats -- it will be corporate america. speaker pelosi has encouraged us to assemble and move this legislation. the need to act quickly is in part what motivated our decision to not go the route of a constitutional amendment. others in the house and senate are preparing plans to pursue that pass. we believe we have to press ahead immediately. in the weeks since the decision

came down, we have, together with our colleagues and the white house, finalized a legislative approach we think represents congress's best remedy to this act of political overreach by the court. our bill takes five steps. we ban foreign corporations from influencing our elections. foreign leaders like hugo chávez and regimes like the chinese should have no backdoor ability to undercut our democracy. secondly, we stop bill recipients or government contractors from spending unlimited amounts, because taxpayer money should not be used to promote a company's political interests. third, we impose new disclosure requirements. fourth, we impose new disclaimers on tv ads to drill

down deep so that the real person must put forth the money and has to disclose and this claim. we require candidates to have reasonable access to tv air time. i am going to discuss the last three and chris will discuss the first two in some detail and then we will answer your questions. let me talk about disclaimer's -- disclosure. our bill will follow the money. our legislation imposes a series of new disclosure requirements that will create an unprecedented paper trail to track the activities, not only of corporations, but all tapes -- all types of organizations that have previously operated in the shadows. under our bill, for the first time, all corporations, labor unions, and 501c3 organizations would be required to disclose

accounts designated for the broadcast with the federal election commission. if you put the ads on tv, there will be a separate track for the money that you are required to disclose. every dollar that goes into that account and the name and organization of the person who put it there must be reported. every dollar that is spent out of the account and the nature of the activity is paying for must also get reported. furthermore, and this is really important, any transfer of dollars from these accounts to other accounts would also need to be documented and reported to the fec. we will drill downs of the ultimate funder of the expenditure is disclosed. we will not let corporations or anyone else hide behind them in groups called citizens for a better america or what ever. i did not mean that one in particular, if that is a real one. any bundling of resources by

particular company cannot escape detection. these requirements will not been political activity, but the level of transparency will, at the very least, make corporations realize that everything they do in the nature of political advocacy will be published. that will make them think twice before spending unlimited sums to influence elections. the deterrent effect should not be underestimated. in the realm of disclosure, our bill require corporations to disclose their expenditures on their website within 24 hours to their shareholders on a quarter -- within 24 hours, to their shareholders on a quarterly basis, and in their filings to the fec. we also imposed new tough disclaimer requirements for political ads. everyone is familiar with the rules of how politicians appear on camera. at the end of that adds they

appear and say, i am so and so and i approve this message. any corporation that buys airtime -- we will propose the same stand by your add requirement to the company seale -- company ceo. our rule would require that they were identified in any ad they put on there. we will drill down to the ultimate funders of the expenditure is the closed. the ceo who goes on the air will be the one who spent the most money, not some shell group. we require the top five corporate funders to be identified by company name on the screen and the corporation that is the most will have its ceo appear on camera to give the stand by your add disclaimer. this is how the state of

washington handles these ads. we have a blueprint that has been effected. if more than one company is given an equal amount, a coin toss with the curve -- determine who goes on the tv ad. the corporation buys airtime to run ads on broadcast cable or satellite television to support or attack a candidate, that candidate and a political party is given a fair chance to respond by receiving the lowest ad rate for that media market. we have found this to be very effective in terms of the so- called millionaire amendment. we are applying the same type of rules here and that is constitutional. overall, the supreme court decision to open up a floodgate to a torrent of corporate money. that is the bad news. the good news is that there are solutions that can help

repackage -- re-patch the dam. we will work diligently to patch those holes as quickly as possible. chris. >> thank you, senator schumer. i want to thank my friend for his leadership on this issue and for moving together so quickly. it was a radical supreme court decision that does open the floodgates to big corporate special interest money being pumped directly into elections in an unrestricted manner. we need to move very quickly to blunt their gross of impact -- their gross of the -- the corrosive impact that will have on our system. i wanted think the members of the tax forced -- a task force.

-- i want to thank the members of the task force. i want to talk briefly about the two provisions dealing with preventing foreign interests from dumping millions of dollars into u.s. elections. as he pointed out, you have many u.s. corporations that are based in the united states but controlled by foreign interests, whether it is hugo chávez, the sovereign will funds of the chinese government, or many others. those are just some examples. i would hope that every american would agree that we do not want foreign interests spending money to influence the outcome of american elections. understandably, those foreign interests would put those

foreign interest first, not american interest first or the air -- or the interests of american citizens. we prevent those entities from spending that corporate money on these elections. our task is threefold. if foreign ownership is 20% or more, that constitutes a corporation that controlled -- that is controlled by foreign interests. if a majority of their board of directors is made up of foreign principals, that also constitutes a foreign-controlled interest. there is finally an objective test. in cases where you have foreign ownership below 20%, but where it is clear that the effective decision making with respect to political activity and the expenditure of funds for political activity is made by foreign interests. those are the components that

will be considered in this legislation for determining whether -- where the ban will apply. secondly, with respect to what we call pay to play transactions, every american would agree that we do not want a federal contractor who is getting taxpayer dollars to be able to then turn around and essentially use those taxpayer dollars to fund a campaign. federal contractors have been treated differently in other parts of the campaign finance law. we believe it is important to extend that treatment with respect to these expenditures we're talking about here. if you are a federal contractor, by definition, you are therefore receiving taxpayer dollars. you cannot turn around and spend money to try and elect or defeat candidates directly through your corporate funds.

secondly, if you received t.a.r.p. money, if you are aig or a big wall street firm or other firm that has received park money, until you pay back that park money -- that t.a.r.p. money, you cannot use corporate funds. we do not want a big firm like and to be able to take taxpayer dollars and turn around and use those to defeat candidates who set forth regulating wall street or other big financial interests. that is wrong and we want to make sure that does not happen. finally, let me say a word about the disclosure provisions. following the money is extremely important. we should be able to agree -- everyone in the country should agree that the american people should know who is paying for this political advertisement. people should not be able to hide behind dummy corporations

or shell entities that is set up. the voter has a right to know about those disclosures. when it comes to corporate spending, shareholders also have a right to know and are required under this legislation to make disclosures to shareholders. we will also look at the possibility of a component that requires some form of shareholder approval. barney frank, mike capuano and others have been looking at that. that is a possibility down the road, if they can devise meaningful structure to accomplish that purpose. that will be included, if they can work something out. we all think it makes sense going forward. again, i want to thank the members of the task force. it is important that we moved expeditiously.

the supreme court decision will open the floodgates and it is not in the interest of the american people. we need to act quickly. >> what do these provisions look like to unions as well? >> every provision would apply to unions. every single one. and to 501c3's and 527's. we do not want a corporation to hide by funneling money into one of these. >> what about the option of shareholder approval? is there a way of doing that by competing membership? >> it is a difficult issue. in both of our bodies, the banking committee has jurisdiction over shareholder issues. we're working with our colleagues there to see what we can come up with.

>> any republican support? >> we believe we will get some republican support here, because it is very hard for me to see how people would be against this closure or allowing foreign corporations to influence our political process or allow and even domestic corporations to try and use the supreme court decision to get government contract money. we have tried to limit this. we could have gone broader. we're trying to limit the areas where we think there will be broad consensus and we're hopeful that we can get some of our republican colleagues to support it. we spent most of our time drafting this legislation. we wanted to leave you the broad outlines -- the specific outlines today. we want to get reaction from people over the next week while we are on recess. >> we will continue to reach out in the house to try and obtain support from every member.

as he said, this should not be a partisan issue. if you look at the public service, it is very clear that republicans and democrats and independents alike believe this was a bad decision that opens the door to special interest money. i think this should provide help. the supreme court decision came down and senator mccain said he was disappointed in the supreme court decision and then said he was not sure whether or not we would be able to do anything about it. we provided a very targeted option for doing something about it. we hope our republican colleagues will do something with us. >> to real-time disclosure requirements -- with these require certain time. -- what did these require certain disclosures in a certain

amount of time? >> it has to be posted within 24 hours withi. >> you mentioned the white house was involved in this. can you give us any more details about that? >> the white house has been very much involved. our staff has had several meetings with the white house. they're generally supportive of the sperm -- of these provisions. we're looking this sit a little bit and wait for suggestions. soon, hopefully by the time we're ready to come back here. i would expect we will get white house support. >> when will it come? >> we want to move it quickly.

they asked us to put in the proposal quickly. thank you, everybody. >> what about the jobs proposal? >> one question but we have to go. but any idea how many jobs might be generated? >> the schumer action proposal is not supposed to be a panacea, but a quick effect on corporations of all sizes that are on the edge of being -- the stimulus money is being spent out. maybe this will push them over the edge to hire someone. we expect it will be very successful at getting many unemployed people off the payrolls. you do not know how many. many other jobs tax credits in the past were both slow and not aimed at the unemployed. we have tried to correct both of those things here. a small business with five

people does not have to fill out a large -- they do not need to hire -- hire a lot of people. that deters them. i will not talk about that. i do not make any. bamut is the jobs bill coming down today on the floor? -- >> is the jobs bill coming down today on the floor? >> today on "america & the courts," they discussed "the will of the people." it weighs the relationship between the supreme court decisions and popular opinion. it is at 7:00 p.m. eastern on c- span.

sunday on "newsmakers," bob corker discusses the bill to regulate wall street. >> there is the issue of consumer protection. having a freestanding agency is anon-starter with me. i do not have to be more clear on that. i think senator dodd knows that. i didn't want to speak for him, but i think he knows that a bill is not going to pass the senate to have a freestanding consumer protection agency. i sense a willingness on both sides of the aisle to seek a balance of consumer protection. it is increase. it does not in any way overwhelm the safety and soundness side of bank regulation. we cannot let it from the safety and soundness side.

i sense there is a desire to seek that balance. to me, what we need to do in negotiations is build a little trust. we need to work through those issues on the front end that we know we can reach pretty easy consensus on. i think jack reed and judd gregg are going to reach a consensus. i think we will get to assist -- consensus on systemic risk. the whole notion of too big to fail -- people know that if a company fails, it is going to fail. >> you can see the entire interview on -- on "newsmakers." that is sunday at 6:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. but it is the only collection of american presidential portraits painted by one artist. it is by a renowned painter and sculptor. see the entire collection online.

>> and now the nevada gov. jim gibbons state of the state address. he is in the final year of his first term in office and spoke about nevada's economy and his battles with the state legislature. he speaks from the media center in the state capitol in carson city nevada. it is about 25 minutes. >> hello, i'm governor jim gibbons. i am always honored to speak directly to you. but the truth is, i would rather that the circumstances did not compel me to address you tonight. the great inventor and statesman thomas edison once said, "opportunity is missed by most people because it comes dressed in overalls and looks like work." this insight means a lot to me. my staff has been hard at work reviewing the state budget, the services our state government provides and the dramatic shortfall in state revenues. we are working on solutions to turn this recession into an opportunity to reinvent our

state's government. we may never have an opportunity like this again. the dire economic situation we are facing now requires immediate action. while there is some evidence to suggest that our nation is approaching the end of this economic decline, the fact is, this recession still has a crippling hold on nevada. nevada's unemployment rate is 13%. that's the second highest unemployment rate in the nation. more than 140,000 nevadans have lost their jobs, and 90,000 more are projected to join the unemployment rolls over the next 18 months. recent data shows a 4.6% drop in personal income for our residents. for almost all nevadans, their greatest asset is their home. home values in nevada plummeted 24.5% in the third quarter of 2009.

that's the steepest decline of any state and more than 6 times the national average. nevadans are losing their homes to foreclosure at a rate that is four times the national average. these are just a few of the economic indicators showing the devastating impact nevadans suffer each day. but you and i don't need statistics to understand the pain. each of us knows someone who has recently lost a job. each of us knows a family who has lost their home because they couldn't pay their mortgage. all across this state tonight families are sitting at their kitchen table talking about what they can and cannot afford. all across the state tonight, small business owners are making tough decisions, such as choosing between cutting benefits or keeping loyal employees. as your governor, my job is no different than that of your

family or your business. you have your checkbook in one hand and your bills in the other, and you do your best to make ends meet. nevada's general fund revenues -- money which we use to pay for important services like education, public health and law enforcement -- dropped 17% in 2009. between now and june 2011, the state general fund will fall about $1 billion short of its $6 billion budget. just like nevada's families, just like nevada's businesses -- it is time for nevada government to face facts and make tough choices about the services we can and cannot afford. this unprecedented economic situation is a crisis. therefore, i will be issuing a proclamation convening a special session of the nevada

legislature on february 23. this is not a responsibility i take lightly, this is an extraordinary time and we must take action. this is not the first battle nevada has faced. in fact, from our humble beginnings nevadans have always beaten the odds. the first nevadans survived overwhelming hardships to move west and seize the privilege of being the first to say "home means nevada." our state joined the union in the middle of the bloodiest war ever endured on american soil -- the civil war. over the last 145 years, the independent spirit of nevada has led us from tragedy to triumph time and time again. we are survivors. there is a reason our state flag says battle born. our state, our people do not back down from a challenge. neither will i.

in 2007, nevada's economy began a downturn which i knew was not temporary. the executive budget i prepared in january of 2009 scaled back state government to weather this crisis. more importantly, the balanced budget i submitted imposed no new taxes and allowed no expansion of state government. the nevada legislature disregarded my solution. they raised taxes one-billion dollars, and they made government bigger. they made the wrong call. i vetoed their new taxes and their inflated spending. i thought it was wrong then. i know it's wrong now. i planned responsibly. they gambled on new taxes and we all lost. despite the legislature's new taxes, our state revenues continue going down.

more taxes have not helped nevada's economy. they never will. even with $1 billion in new taxes, the state budget is now nearly $1 billion short. you tell me, did raising taxes work? no. now, the state of nevada must reduce spending by nearly $900 million. i recently released dozens of proposals to get our budget back on track. i'd like to talk about a few of them with you tonight. last year i recommended 6% salary reductions for all state workers. the legislature imposed furlough days instead. the furlough program is not working. it is unfair because some state workers have pay reductions and some don't. as we work through this budget, we will look for every way to

save money. many private businesses across the state have cut salaries in order to reduce layoffs or stay in business. new across-the-board salary reductions for state workers may be necessary, but that will be a last resort. and just so you know, my entire has had their pay cut 6%. i am donating 6% of my own salary back to the state to be used for special awards for exceptional teachers. it is with deep sadness and disappointment that i must propose laying off several hundred state workers. just like the layoffs in the private sector, state government must do the same. my heart is heavy about this because these are hard-working public servants who will have their lives severely impacted.

we are doing everything possible to absorb people into other positions helping in our state safety-net of programs assisting those in need, but some layoffs are inevitable. the nevada state prison in carson city is 140 years old. it has outlived is usefulness. it is no longer safe and its operating costs are far too high. i am proposing closing the prison and moving the inmates to other facilities in the state. unfortunately, the gravity of our situation is so dire, we will have to make reductions to some healthcare programs. we are trying to combine programs that duplicate health services and we are making every effort to minimize the

impacts of these reductions. i will protect programs that protect our youngest and most vulnerable citizens. i am also introducing the education gift certificate. these will be available at many state facilities, like the dmv, or you'll be able to download one off my website. you can use the gift certificate to donate money to a non-profit organization that will make sure your money is spent only on teachers' salaries. for those of you who can afford to help our teachers, i encourage you do it. i have had the honor of serving nevada in both our legislature and in the united states congress. when i ran for governor in 2006, i traveled across nevada and spoke with many of you. i made you a promise. i guaranteed you i would not raise your taxes.

unfortunately, in the politics of today, such promises are a dime a dozen. but mine is not just a promise, it is a principle. in this tough economy, we cannot ask our citizens to pay new taxes. they have nothing left to give. we cannot ask our businesses to pay more taxes. many of them are struggling just to stay open. the only thing we can do -- the right thing to do -- is what you did at your kitchen table tonight. we must cut our state spending. we must reduce the size of state government. "no new taxes" is not a cliche. to me it means more than that. it is a plan. a plan that means limiting government to its core functions.

. >> just as nevada's real-estate market inflated values to an unsustainable level, so has our state government. that is population and job markets and no longer pays for the bloated governments that was

funded when nevada's economy -- more government spending and more government mandates are never the answer. with 13% of our citizens unemployed, nevada cannot continue to fund government as it is today. society is changing. state government must change with it. we must focus on important services that ensure life, health, education and public safety. we will have to eliminate programs and services that make some people feel good, but which we simply can no longer afford. we must cut government spending h burden on our citizens and our businesses. washington has failed -- nevada ranch near the bottom of per- capita federal spending. we ranked dead last in per-

capita stimulus funding. although there is a perception that nevada has clout with this administration, washington has turned a deaf ear to our problems. as yourñiñi governor, i wake up every morning determine to get the bottom of the employment line, back into jobs and back into their homes. we cannot rely on washington, d.c to lead us out of this crisis. we cannot leave on county and city governments. no government alone can lead us out of this crisis. only our people will, our businesses will, of independence. well. nevadans will solve nevada's problems.

the lieutenant governor, state and local officials, and mice that are making to our region working tirelessly to bring new businesses that bring good paying jobs to our hard-working families. we are looking to bring new, green energy jobs to nevada. in addition to building facilities to generate solar and geothermal power, we are working to establish research and development abilities for a newer, better, green energy technologies. this will not only help our environment, it will create new, long-term jobs for nevada. more new jobs and green energy jobs will come with the establishment of nevada as the recycling capital of the world.

new recycling facilities will create jobs and generate clean, green, energy. right now we are working with carson city officials to make their community the first pilot project for this technology. when we launched this program statewide, we will eliminate landfills as we know them today and stop nevada from becoming the dumping ground for california's trash. creating jobs and attracting tourists to nevada or two of my top priorities. i have ordered the nevada commissi[z to present me a report within 30 days with their ideas and plans to get more visitors to come to nevada. it will take quick and creative thinking toñr get results, but t is time for quick and creative action that gets results.

also, i have ordered the nevada commission on economic development to present me with their report within 30 days with their ideas, plants, and projects presently in the pipeline to encourage companies ocate or even relocate to nevada or encourage existing nevada business to expand. i want you to know that nearly every day i meet with nevada business owners to see what i can do as governor to get them to expand theirñi businesses, to locate here or to create new jobsxd here. ñ!ówe must take advantage of the tourism convention and construction infrastructure we already have in place right here in nevada. a core function and of nevada state government is education. our schools in the nevada system of higher education make up 54% of all general fund spending.

we cannot solve the $1 billion hole in a $6 billion budget. one half of that budget is off the table. in 2004, i co-authored an education first initiative to prevent them from holding education hostage in budget xdñri am firmly committed to improving case through 12 (qp ñrour education system is the fr structure for nevada's future. improvement will require new ideas and fresh result. it is time to stop whining that education in nevada does not work because of lack of education funding. we need to quit pro money at programs that have not worked in

don't work for our children. in early january i unveiled an educational reform plan. my plan calls for parents, teachers, and communities to be responsible for their local schools and in control of their children's education. bureaucrats and politicians in washington d.c. and carson city whose idea of educationa$()eform starts and ends with writing a blank check have no business dictating how your child is educated. we need to empower local school boards and parents to make decisions which are right for their children so they can decide how their children are educated. nevada taxpayers spend billions of dollars on education. it is time to let local school boards, teachers and parents have a voice in how that money is spent. the cookie cutter, one-size-

fits-all approach to public education has proven that it does not work anymore. what works in las vegas may not work in nevada. despite 20 years of state imposed a student teacher ratios and first, second, and third grade, student achievement in nevada has not improved. the nevada the part of education recently announced 142 of the 613 public schools in nevada qualify as the worst schools in the nation. that means 23% of our public schools are failing. i will not accept that. if 142 of our schools are not making the great, what we are doing does not work.

throwing more money at this system will not change anything. continuing to allow unions to dictate education policy does not work, either. we need to reform. we need change. we need to rethink how we deliver public education in nevada. we need to make better use of existingñiok resources. we need to empower local school boards to use their money to deliver the right programs to our children so they can achieve the best results. programs like class size reduction and full day kindergarten are based on good intentions, but programs cannot be judged on their intentions. the must be judged on the results. and my education reform plan, these programs will not be eliminated, only the statutory mandates for coarsen city will.

if a local school board decides the program works for their children, they can do it, and they will have the flexibility, not because the government tells them, but because they decide it is the best program for their students. for the past 25 years, nevada schools struggled with increasing enrollment. the fundamental issues like having classrooms for students and scrambling to get desks and test -- text books became the issue of the day. in the current school year, student population has actually dropped. we now have a golden opportunity to catch our breath and to rethink how we can best provide education to our children. i request in might education reform plan a fair hearing in the upcoming special session. the economic crisis we face cannot be fixed with gimmicks or

gadgets or temporary patches. the problem is our system. we must find a permanent solution. we must commit to fundamental evaluation. what problems occur government intervention and what problems we must fix ourselves. we must accept that limiting government means expanding personal responsibility. nevada state government cannot afford to be all things to all people. i am asking state employees to do more with less. i am asking our teachers to do more with less. i am asking our legislature and constitutional officers to do more with less. i am demanding or programs work or be eliminated. i will ask our citizens to accept less from government and to take more personal

responsibility. government must make sacrifices, just like your family and just like our businesses do. there are no easy answers. anything easy has already been done. we have to make hard choices, and we need your support. i am up to this challenge. i will never surrender. i am not a quitter. i have already released many of my recommendations to reduce state spending, and i will continue to release the facts, details, and plans to solve the immediate fiscal crisis. i staff continues to work to develop a long-term, sustainable plan to reduce the size of state government and of services we offer so that our revenue will match and support the government services nevadans truly need.

we are in the middle of the greatest economic crisis of our generation. it will not last forever, and there will be recovery. maybe not tomorrow, maybe not next week. things may get worse before they actually get better, but we will survive. we will overcome, and we will emerge with a state government that is leaner and smarter, a state government that works for and not against us. i am convinced better days and a brighter future are ahead for all of us. together we share the same spirit. we are one nevada. god bless our great nation, god bless our troops, and god bless our great state of nevada. thank you, and goodnight. >> today on american and the courts, the panel of law