afghanistan. we will have seth jones and mike moyer, author of "a question of demand." he was in afghanistan, where he met with gen. mccrystal. for other programs, go online to "booktv.org." >> your onw-stop shop -- your one-stop shop for everything c- span is at c-span.org. .

ulia from: tauscher, followed by the russian ambassador or to the united states. this is one hour. >> i am the president of the exchange publication, the publisher of nuclear weapons and materials. welcome to you all to that, to talk about an issue that should be front-page and we need to bring attention to, and that is looking at what we are going to do with nuclear weapons stockpiles. the leadership in this area is, ñras it always has been, when we started dealing with nuclear weapons, between the u.s. and russia. today we are starting off with

news from the u.s. and russia. i just wanted to point out our first speaker today will be sitting next to the russian ambassador and not on this side, at a sign that we need to have a partnership. i would like to think today's supporting partners such as honeywell and others. with that i would likeñi to introduce our first speaker whor was our first keynote speaker when wexd started this series bk in 2000. she spoke in albuquerque, new mexico through satellite television. it was impressive to me when she has done a number of -- when a number of high-level ceo's came up to me and said she is really smart, we need to talk to her

more. over those eight or nine years since then, she has definitely been a leader in dealing with nuclear weapons issues and nuclear power and has done it not in a parochial fashion to support her laboratory, which is in her district, but as a national congressman. i giveñiçmó you undersecretary f state ellen tauscher. [applause] ñr>> good morning. thank you very much, ed. i forgot that i was that your inaugural meeting in 2000. it goes to show that no good deed goes unpunished. and i'm back here today in a different jobñi and in a differt role. i want to thank you, ed, very much for your hard work and your commitment to the issues that are so complicated and opaque at times, and for your patriotism.

i also want to tell everyone how honored i am to share the podium with my good friend, ambassador sergey keslyak of the russian federation. we got to spend a lot of time together. we do this because we need to andñiñi because we are all workg on so many critical issues. more importantly, the ambassador has the best chef in washington. [laughter] so it is always wonderful to be invited over to the ambassador's residence to have lunch or dinner, because he is a fabulous host and a great friend. good morning to all of you. some of you know me from my previous lives. my last life i was a member of congress from california, congressional district, 13 years. i was chairman of the strategic forces up the mission, the house armed services committee. are represented the smartest people in the world, the people in the 10th congressional district, who are the people

who worked at a laboratory in california. it was my honor to represent them for the last 13 years and then be invited to come into the obama administration a year ago. i am happy to speak with you as a former member of congress and as a current member of the obama administration. i am really happy to see you because this is not a health- care town hall. [laughter] but i guess it is most important to remind everybody that it is really great to work in the obama administration because we have a president who is so animated and interested and has talked about so early in his presidency the issue of elimination of nuclear weapons. the president is not the first president to talk about these issues, but is the first one to talk about it so early in his

presidency. he is certainly one that is truly animated about this. president obama did not need to hear about this from a staff member. this was not a paper given to him on the campaign trail. this is an issue that senator obama and state senator obama appeared about prior to the presidency. if something he talk about a lot on the campaign trail. it is something he has supported a long time. i think it is a to say that he truly understands the issue. some of you may know that last week or actually the week before, i was on an eight- country, a 10-day trip through the snow belt that included paris and bucharest and places that are supposed to have snow and even included atlanta georgia, because i cannot get back to washington. in your for this conference and another. the people i spoke with in

paris and the folks that are inside the industry and understand nuclear-weapons and worked at doe and at the labs and work in the industry, you are two different audiences, but the nice thing is i can give you the same speech. my core message about these issues is always the same. the obama administration will work to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons worldwide, while ensuring that our nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, and effective, so long as there are nuclear weapons. there is nothing contradictory about decreasing the size and role of our nuclear weapons and increasing our confidence and investment in our deterrent. our growing knowledge of the liability of our stockpile through the storage program enables us to safely continue reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons that are a legacy of the cold war. too many weapons of that era

remain even though the soviet union no longer exists and even though we are moving from an era of mutually assured destruction to an era of mutually assured stability. our primary focus today is no longer deterrence of large-scale nuclear conflict between two superpowers, but preventing the use of even a single nuclear weapon. that is why i am working to implement the president's agenda. as the president said, we might not achieve the goal of a world without nuclear weapons in his lifetime, but it may take patience and persistence. but the journey is perhaps more important than the destination. as i said in paris earlier this month, we do not view nuclear disarmament as the holy grail. instead, it is the concrete steps we take to enhance our national security on the road to zero that will reduce risks and

increase national stability. let me describe several of those steps. we are at the end game. we see the finish line of negotiating a start follow on treated. our intent is to include an agreement that will help preserve stability and predictability at lower nuclear levels than ever before. while i will not negotiate with myself in public or with sergey keslyak at lunch, i assure you this treaty will be verifiable and will advance our interests. we would celebrate our efforts to transform our nuclear weapons if posture through the nuclear posture review, which will be submitted to congress next month. and we will continue our work to keep hon. nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists, by preparing for a successful nuclear security summit in april and the nuclear non- proliferation posture review treaty in may. at this point i do not want to talk about the stockpile -- i

do want to stop about stockpile management because it is just starting to get to the attention from congress and to the media even though it is something everyone here has paid attention to and about four years. this is where i should start by reading an editorial written by four of our wisest statesman. george shultz, henry kissinger, sam nunn, and bill paris. they understand the importance of moving to eliminating nuclear weapons while being sure that we have a deterrent that protect us and our allies. you are correct in saying that our scientists and engineers at 3 national labs deserve to be "applauded for the success they have achieved in extending the life of existing weapons." their work has led to important advances in the scientific understanding of nuclear explosions and obviated the need for underground nuclear explosive tests.

that was what they said. they went on to argue that we will need to invest in our nuclear complex. i cannot agree more. i did my best as a member of congress to support the complex because i know like you do, whether we have 2000 weapons or 20 weapons, we will need if the personnel and infrastructure to keep our nuclear deterrence safe, secure, and effective. as you know, president obama's budget devotes $7 billion to maintain our nuclear weapons stockpile and complex. that is $600 million increase. a $600 million increase. over the next five years we intend to boost funding for these imports activities by more than $5 billion. now it is up to congress to do their job and appropriate the money. we are fully funding stockpile management to increase the reliability, safety, and

security of our nuclear stockpile, to reduce the likelihood that we might resume underground testing, to achieve reductions in the future size of the stockpile, and to reduce the risk of accidental detonation as well as the risk of nuclear terrorism. i am not saying anything new. all of view -- all you have to do is read the 2010 defense bill that both chambers voted on and approved with bipartisan support and that president obama signed. it is the law. i hope that we can work together and make sure congress does its job as well. members of congress need to know and this audience includes some of the best messenger is possible, that we must continue to attract, develop, retain the best scientists, engineers, and technicians to maintain our nuclear deterrent, whatever its size. the result will be a more credible deterrent. i want to emphasize again at

this point that rrw is dead and is not coming back, but maintaining a credible deterrent means having a sound nuclear complex that can confidently and safely extend the lives of our existing weapons as required. our military leaders responsible for the darrent also supports this sensible approach because they do not need new nuclear weapons capabilities. they just want to be confident in what we have. another thing that a credible deterrent does not depend on his testing. the this administration supports a comprehensive test ban treaty not on the because it serves our national interest but because we possess sufficient knowledge and understanding on how our nuclear weapons work. we simply do not need to test to maintain our deterrent. as i said, by smartly managing our nuclear stockpile, we can move forward on other parts of

the president's nuclear agenda. if we can seek senate ratification of the ccbc. let me return to our defense posture. while nuclear-weapons have a clear role, our deterrent extends beyond nuclear-weapons. it includes developing better and more effective local defense systems and strategies. it includes bolstering our conventional forces interoperable d., their position, and their reach. are improving conventional capabilities, make it possible to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons for some targets and missions. as our conventional weapons have become more precise, we do not have to cling to nuclear-weapons to accomplish our objectives. our military men and women operating on battlefields strive every day to reduce collateral damage and prevent the loss of innocent lives. arak -- our strategic planners should be guided by the same goals and seek alternatives to

nuclear weapons to hold certain targets at risk. that does not mean we should explore smaller yield or more usable nuclear weapons or anything of the sword. a nuclear weapon, no matter what its yield, is still a nuclear weapon. the firewall between nuclear and conventional weapons must remain bold. we are not in the business of seeking new nuclear capabilities. they're not needed to preserve a strong,ñi credible deterrent. let me close, as i began, just to be clear, this administration will work toward a world without nuclear weapons and we will continue to maintain a safe, secure, an effective deterrent as we proceed toward that goal. it is a pleasure to be here again today. i know that dr. sergey keslyak is going to be an enjoyable speaker. thank you very much for your attention. i'm happy to answer any

questions you might have. [applause] ñi>> questions about? --ñrñiquestions? the microphone. any on this side? please hold your hand up. >> tied jacobson with nuclear weapons and materials monitoring. you mentioned that you expected to report to be issued next month. how confident are you in the march 1 date that had been talk about? is there any possibility that date could slip? your opinion on that? >> i cannot tell you the date other than it is targeted toward the first week of march.

the parameters are to deliver after the president has made its decision. so we are ordering collaborative least with the state to permit and the defense the problems and others to deliver those options to the president. i am not responsible for the date, but they said the first week of march and i expect that is when they will try to deliver it. >> stephen young. >> good to see you. >> on the npr, we have been hearing rumors thatçó it will ba rather modest document. will there be anything interesting or compelling? the president spoken brought about transforming nuclear- weapons. [unintelligible] you were only one of the people to support the changing agenda in this administration.

many of them are traditional thinkers. really changing the postern dramatically, what is your sense of that? can we hope this to be more transformational? >> at my age it's nice to be known as new for anything. we are working very hard to deliver to the president of the options the president has asked for in his presidential review directive. i think that, because it is a classified document, speculation about it is what it is, speculation. considering the president's speech in prague and its energy and animation about this issue, i would say that this is going to be a more about document. we will have to see. >> anybody on this side? >> elaine rosman.

-- grossman. i was wondering what the obama administration policy might look like in terms of dismantlement of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons that have been taken down. are you looking to take a deeper cut or faster rate of the settlement of the warehouses? >> that is a question for tom, who will be here later today. last year when i was in congress, in the house we increased the amount of money for dismantlement, specifically. so i think that is a better question for tom, since that is his responsibility. obviously, all of the pieces, all of the elements from cradle to grave of dismantlement or disarmament need to be addressed in funding. >> arms control t associationarmsom colino --

arms control association. can you classify the bulgaria missile defense situation that's been getting some play in the press recently? >> hart teams are in geneva. they're working hard to conform the streaky, it's a protocol, a technical elements are very important because in the verification treaty all of these things are necessary to get the job done. i would say that both sides are interested in moving forward. i think we see the finish line. i am not going to tell you that we have a specific time line to get this done. both president obama and presidentçó medvedev have been very involved inñvó]iññi this. they have instructed us to get someñi principles and elements that are still yet to be finishodñ negotiations. but i am confident that our teams are workingñi=)ñ hard ande

finish line is in sight. onñrñi bulgaria, theçó u.s. hast spoken to bulgaria's specifically about missile defense. we spoke to bulgaria lot. we have not made an offer to bulgaria about hosting any elevator unfazed to a dat approach. -- the phased adaptedñi approac. there are four stages. in 2011, part of that in the mediterranean and arrayed are deployed in the area of southern europe. 2015, sm3 land-based, blockñr 1a and b in romania. and then in poland. in 2020, the opportunity, as it

advances, blach 2a and b. this is a nato system that protect the invisibility of nato. it is targeted against and a deterrent for short or medium range weapons coming out of the middle east. it is not targeted towards russia at all. we are hoping to have advanced cooperation with russia. the countries involved right now that have agreed to those sites are poland and romania. >> any other questions? this one in the back of the room. >> the james martin center for nonproliferation. >> good to see you. >> the non-strategic nuclear- weapons we have in europe, your colleague, bob, suggested at a conference last year that the u.s. will not be opposed to withdrawing weapons from europe.

meanwhile we have people in your who said this would be a poor idea, specifically withdrawing weapons from germany. i wonder how the administration plans to tackle the issue and respond if perhaps to the criticism by lord robinson. >> the u.s. will do nothing precipitously or unilaterally without consulting our allies. nato is going through a strategic planning exercise called the strategic concept. that is an over the horizon review that is being done, led by a number of different panels. one by seformer secretary madeleine albright. it is clear that of the 26 in europe, there are lots of different opinions, but we will do nothing unilaterally or precipitously, but in

consultation with our allies over the next months and years to be sure that the deterrent that we have extended are as strong as ever and work within the framework of the agreements that we have. >> any other questions? >could you hold up your hand so we can give you a microphone? >> gary vanvalen. does the obama administration plan to revisit the clinton administration policy's pdd-15? >> what is that? >> it deals with test readiness. cos has invested a lot of money to

make sure that the nevada test site was within a range of months capable of testing, but the obama administration's commitment to ratify and the ctest ban treaty is -- we will engage the senate and work to ratification cannot go for a vote until we have the votes. that will be over the horizon, my guess is. i think there is a balance between investing in the test site apparatus and infrastructure to make sure that we don't get surprised and also not tripping over the wire, looking like we will be testing in the next month or so. i think it has taken something like -- we have never tested in something like 13 or 14 or 15 months, as long as 20 months. so the key is to find that

bubble where we could make that investment. when i was in the house i had an agreement with duncan hunter, who was on the armed services committee, to make sure we were investing to keep the test site in a reasonable set -- reasonable state of readiness. but this administration's commitment to the ratification is unambiguous. >> any other questions? thank you. >> thank you very much. i brin>> i bring you the russian ambassador, sergey keslyak.

>> i do not believe i am expected to give you good advice on how to manage your nuclear stockpiles. but i'd like to say that the environment is discussed back home, the same things. [unintelligible] the negotiations that are being conducted in geneva are difficult, but they are conducted in absolutely different environment from what i have learned during my arms control career during the cold war. it is no longer a discussion between the pros. it is no longer an attempt to manage the hostile relations between the two of us. it is more like dealing with the vestiges of the cold war that we have accumulated and you have accumulated enormous quantities, far beyond the necessary requirements of deterrence.

so, what i would characterize this new environment, these new negotiations as a kind of responsible way of addressing the challenges that we all face , maintaining nuclear-weapons in a way that would notñi be leadig to a confrontation, in a way that would be decreasing the chance of a confrontation, but still with us living in the real world, where deterrence has not been abundant. so each government, yours and hours, has a responsibility to maintain the deterrent in a state that would be assuring the deterrents while we are working on the goal of reducing them, hopefully abandoning nuclear weapons throughout the world. we do share the goal of abandoning nuclear weapons. moreover, i would say that, even at the times of the soviet

union, we had goals several times, but nobody would pick it up seriously. no meaningful discussions were ñrconducted like we have now. so, we all understand that neitherçó your government or hos are willing to live withñr th!ì+ kind of capabilities for eternity. we also understand, like your government, that it's not going to be wished away. you need to deal with them in a responsible way.

if that is the case, the psychology of the negotiators, that needs to be addressing the issues of deterrence in a way that would be quite different than had been the case. is it going to be easy? i would say no. our relations have always been very complex. we have had a lot of stereotypes toward each other. as far as i'm concerned, i think the biggest problem that still

exist between russia and the united states are [unintelligible] when russia does something, there are a lot of people in this country who is tried to interpret that as a doomsday scenario and the end of our relations. i would say that we are not immune from the same type of mentality either. it will take time and it will take a lot of working together in order to address the kind of problems that still exist in our relationship. arms control is part of it. we are both victims of the stereotypes and an instrument that can help with overcoming stereotypes. we are working now, the major project with the u.s. and its falling to start. i fully agree with almost each and every word that ellen tauscher had to say about the way it's being conducted.

we are trying to do it honestly. it does not mean it is easy, the negotiations. we have a lot of concerns that need to be dealt with. the closer you come to the end game, the bigger each and every small detail becomes. ellen tauscher said that the u.s. wilre that the treaty will be verifiable and advance u.s. interests. i can subscribe to this, substituting russia for the united states. that means it needs to be verifiable. we want to understand what is happening in the united states in order to able to go with the reductions that will be envisioned by the treaty. and, yes, it needs to advance our interests. here is one of the problems, because our respective interests are not necessarily fully compatible. i would not say that they exist,

but they're not fully compatible all the time. if you compare the current situation of the negotiations with those that existed 15 years ago, when we started to negotiate, mind you, we started even during the cold war with lenin. but we did it in a little bit of a different strategic environment. we have the treaty to ban some missile systems globally for both russia and united states. that kind of environment gave us a sense of predictability, as we had an environment. we have completed the reductions that could be investenvisaged ie treaty.

the u.s. also did. the treaty is one of the big successes in arms control history between our two countries. but currently we work in a different environment. the u.s. just withdrew from the adm treaty and in climate has changed. now we're working on the issue of reducing nuclear weapons. the environment for the u.s. is introducing some capabilities. this particular issue has its own history. we are talking to the obama administration and we find a number of decisions they have made more reassuring and giving more of a sense of predictability. but we are not sure that we fully understand how things will develop. we are yet to learn more what practically is envisaged. reports from bulgaria that there

will be a new site in bulgaria. reports from the czech republic, there will be a new site in the czech republic. we are not sure of the stories we are hearing, whether that is the story that will develop in the time span of the treaty, which is 10 years. so we are working with the administration and i'm extremely happy, honored, and delighted as a human being to work with ellen tauscher because it's always a pleasure to talk with such a knowledgeable and open person on these issues of security. it is not on the ellen tauscher and myself and our negotiators, it is a big government in this country and the big government in russia that needs to a curious george -- that needs to be reassured that they need to be building down the strategic capabilities that we are working on. as a person who has been watching the negotiations

through all these months on a daily basis, i would certainly agree that we will make its and we will make its own. i cannot give you a timeline because neither side has established this artificial deadline. we have set aside that the progress is ongoing and, having spent all my professional life in arms control, i would say the amount of work that's been done in geneva, four months up to five months, is fantastic. when negotiating started, i never realized we would be at this point by february of 2010. having said so, i would not discount the remaining issues, as i've already indicated. because you go to the end of it, the more important the existential small things become, but they will be resolved. the environment at the table in

geneva was satisfying. i am satisfied by the way our respective foreign ministers deal with the issue. in a professional and honest way. honesty is also a new commodity in arms control that is a new feature in our relations. i hope this will be sustained. when we talk about nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear disarmament, especially when you discuss the goal of going to 0 zero, we need to also realize it's not only the u.s. and russia that has nuclear weapons. we have five nuclear weapons countries that are recognized by the nonproliferation treaty. we have a number of others who possess nuclear weapons outside of the treaty. we have a number of countries that are considered to be or at least considering as the

ultimate option to acquire nuclear capability as a demonstration of ultimate might and independents at least in their regional countries. so when you talk about zero for the u.s. and russia, who possess the big stockpiles, you need to also address the question of what to do with the rest of the world. you cannot go to zero unless you are sure that the others are on board with you. if that is the case, a new question will arise for the u.s. and russia as to how to deal with the other countries, how to engage them. because without them joining us in the process, neither the u.s. or russia will be able to go close to zero anytime soon. if you are unsuccessful to bring everybody on board, three additional recognized countries

and the others, you need also to be assured that while all of the possessor countries, we reduce the chance others do not have weapons where they are nonexistent today. non-proliferation is more than just a treaty for us, it has become more important as one of the preconditions for our collective ability to get them down. that is why we are very much satisfied for russia and the u.s. working together in order to ensure that the treaty not only survives, but survives in a reasonable state and continues to be kind of global code of conduct in the nuclear sphere. the treaty is i think the most adhered to treaty in the world,

except maybe for the u.n. charter. it is second after the u.n. charter in terms of numbev of countries that have adhered to the treaty. in the same context, i would also address a number of other issues that need to be for us to be serious about in going down on nuclear weapons. cbdd has dealt with nuclear- weapons and we have talked with mr. obama's administration to ready that treaty. because we are already a country that has ratified the treaty. we are interested in seeing that the u.s. and the others join us. the provisions of the treaty are worthless unless all the countries that have nuclear weapons are there, the treaty would never enter into force. a very simple formula. if the u.s. has not joined the treaty, we will have no chance

not only to get the treaty functioning, we will have no chance of bringing additional important countries on board, thus who has not done it so far. if the united states joins the treaty, it is not guaranteed that we will have the others involved immediately, but at least we will have an excellent team of nuclear weapons countries having joined the treaty, working together in order to make sure that the treaty works. it is of paramount importance. because as far as we are concerned, cdbd is an instrument that puts a cap on the development of new nuclear weapons. it is totally efficient, at least in the way it exists now. and regarding voluntary decisions between countries like

russia and the u.s. not to test. we see that from january 20 last year, the u.s. has started working or actively in geneva, the mechanisms being developed from the treaty to function and that can be enforced. while we are talking about nuclear-weapons, i would like to address another issue that is of quite importance when we are thinking and working on nuclear security problems. i would say that it is increasingly important for us and for the united states and that is the possibility of nexus between terrorism and nuclear materials, let alone nuclear-weapons. it is increasingly dangerous for the situation, because we know

that terrorists are seeking out nuclear materials. the united states knows this as well. we were the first to propose an international convention on combat of nuclear terrorism at the u.n. and it was adopted by the u.n. then president putin was the first to sign it. the american president, president bush, was the second. if it was a very important thing that we were pushing together. immediately afterwards, both russia and the united states have launched a new initiative to combat nuclear terrorism. we launched it in 2006 at a summit. the u.s. and russia. by the end of the g8 summit we had all g8 countries on board. in three months ago chairmanship

of the u.s. and russia -- under the co-chairmanship of the u.s. and russia, we have 16 countries. we bring together countries that are important in order to build a firewall between nuclear materials and terrorists, denying them access to these materials, denying them transit routes, denying them the knowledge of how to deal with them. it is based not only on the kind of legal instruments that we negotiated for years. it is based on a a responsible stage to get together and inshore best practices -- share best practices, share knowledge, establish links between law enforcement, and new networking in addressing the new challenges of today.

i am very proud of russia and the united states, not only launching this together and even today we havare two co-chairs of this and supported by the united nations. our goal, shared by the u.s., is to achieve full membership, compare gol with that of the non-proliferation treaty in this initiative we have lost. since we need to be recognizing the fact that this is not only about space we need to deal with when it comes to nuclear security, we have to deal asingly with the problem of reactors as it is put into the international discussions. i understand that i need to

leave time for questions and answers and i'm willing to entertain them. in summary, i would like to say that i am glad that i have lived to the time where we are working as partners. both on issues that divide us, both on the issues where we see eye to the arctic, like nuclear nonproliferation. i am certain that we will succeed in arms control negotiations, however difficult to they might look for the negotiators. because both of the government of the united states and governments of the russian federation want this and that is the most important. when we are successful of achieving this on an mcclear basis, fully respecting interest of both sides and not only one side. when the u.s. government will be able to bring it as a success and the russian federation government will bring it to

russians as a proof of success and a document advancing russians interests, the russian federation's long-term interests, that will be a good achievement that will open up the way of moving further together. thank you. [applause] orme >> hold up your hand to get the microphone for questions for the ambassador. we have a very active side on this side. there we go. >> our country's --- >> could you identify yourself? but our countries are clearly making substantial progress in reducing numbers of strategic nuclear weapons. we have not had any substantial

progress on controlling the numbers of non strategic weapons. my question to you would be, do you see in the future a form or process to begin to try to control those numbers in the same way that we are trying to co'trol the strategic weapon numbers? >> first of all, i do not agree that no strategic weapons will remain the subject of mutual arrangements. not necessarily of legal agreements, but the arrangements have been adopted by two sides in the form of unilateral statements of the russian and american presidents. and it seems the times -- since the times of the soviet union, we have reduced our tactical weapons significantly, something like three-quarters of it have

already been eliminated. at the same time, it is an issue that needs to be dealt with. one of the issues that i think can be easily done, something that we have advanced as an idea for a long time is what we call -- i will try to translate from russian -- to repatriate all the technical weapons. we have removed long ago all the nuclear-weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons from countries other than thq russian federation. each and every nuclear weapon that has been produced in the soviet union has been successfully repatriated to russia and accounted for. it's there. so russia does not maintain any

nuclear weapons, including tactical weapons in the territory of other countries. and we have always insisted that if all countries do the same, that would be the first step in addressing the problems that do exist with tactical weapons. as to the dealing with them like we do with the strategic weapons, if you mean can they become subject for negotiations, probably yes. the question is, under what conditions we can go for negotiations in reducing them. can you do it today or the death tomorrow -- or the day after tomorrow? i don't know, because the conditions need to be created. you need to be aware of the

security situations for russia. in europe we have not overcome all the security risks that exist. but we see production of weapons on the nato side. nuclear deterrence has not been. that is going to be a factor on how we can deal with this situation. so it is a complex issue. but it certainly can be an issue that needs to be negotiated. most probably we will have to discuss a little bit more than just this tactical weapons per se as the subject for further negotiations. >> i've a question on that side. >> good to see you again, ambassador. [unintelligible] you have heard in some of your interactions in the united states, there are some here who alleged that because othe

document does not describe what a nuclear explosion is, even though it prohibits nuclear explosions, some states like russia believe low yield nuclear explosions are permitted under the treaty. when one ambassador was asked a question about this in the 1999 hearings on the senate foreign relations committee, he made it clear that there was an understanding on all states that the treaty bans all nuclear test explosions. your government reported in 2000 that its understanding of the treaty bans all nuclear test explosions. could you clarify once and for all russia's understanding about what the document prohibits? >> first, you tried to impose on me, at times i think it's a little too occult.

that's the biggest statement, "once and for all." [laughter] but i would say that in an environment of unilateral moratorium, that is coming from t!%uju)árjjju$e treaty. we do not conduct nuclear testing. we do not conduct anything leading to nuclear yield. we believe that is the same in the united states. that is the only reading of the treaty that i have. thank you. >> any other questions? in the back of the room there. and we have one up here, also. to low, mr. ambassador. i appreciate your remarks on keeping terrorism as far as the nuclear materials far down as possible. the most dangerous nuclear material in terms of terrorism is highly enriched uranium. yet russia has probably the

largest share of research enriched uranium in the world. will russia converge or eliminate those facilities? what can you say about what russia will do to move forward on those facilities? >> we're working with the united states by removing in rich uranium from other countries together. it's a joint program. maybe one of the big successes in a joint efforts that is not widely known. we have been doing this for 10 or more years. 10 or 15 years together. we, also, are working on the russian reactor is one by one. i would not say we are the biggest holders of enriched uranium reactors. but ours are well protected and we are pretty much constable that there is no chance in the foreseeable future that those

reactors can be the source of terrorist activities. but we are mindful of the problem and we're working on this. it is a technical and an economic issue. >> last question. >> the concerned scientists. thanks for your remarks. the first question, tactical nuclear weapons. there have been discussions about a fall on start treaty that might include tactical nuclear weapons, further cuts in strategic weapons, and [unintelligible] can you give your take on what you think the next tree after this next treaty might best do and what russia oppose the goal would be for that treaty? >> are you inviting me to negotiate with ellen tauscher in front of the cameras? we will work on this issue. i think one by one we will have to address all the problems, including tactical and relationship between dmd and

strategic weapons and with dmd and conventional aland nuclear- weapons and weapons in and the region and weapons in other countries. it's a process. as we do negotiations, we will sit together and sort out what are the next priority items. one of the priority items for us will be to decide how do you involve all the nuclear-weapons countries and to dispose of them. you cannot afford to wait too long. you need to build momentum that will bring the nuclear weapon countries support. >> thank you very much. i wonder if you might share with us, you're speaking with us about confidence-building and the start-, without negotiating in public, could you walk us through your sense as to

whether there might be in the new treaty some acceptance, sharing of data or unencrypted tests that might be included as part of that package? >> yes, this philosophical concept we have is that we need )= make best use of the practie and experience that we have accumulated in the 10 years of jointly implementing start. it is an interesting thing, because during 10 years we have created a culture working on the arms control and verification. some of them were easy to do and some things were difficult to do in those 10 years. overall, it was more or less successful. sometimes it was excessive. but the start treaty was fine at

the time when we were looking but at each other, it was still hostile relations we were trying to manage. currently we need to be sure that while we are reducing, the u.s. and russia, we need to have enough access to information and have enough access to the facilities for ourselves to be able to show our parliament and our civil society that the treaties are serving our long- term interest. so there will be verification. verification has to be efficient. but its does not have to be as it was in the previous case. it's a basic philosophical approach. things need to be negotiated in geneva. i cannot negotiate year in this

room. if you are asking me do we allow for some exchange of data? of courqe, some encryption removal and some exchange of data, yes, of course. but the other things have to be the determined during negotiations. thank you. [applause] host [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] .