1990's, since then, the deficit has exploded. the pulses of dealing with that is as is fraught with terps choices. that is where these gentleman alan simpson and erskine bowles taking on the impossible. it will try to restore reason to the fiscal debate and come up with answers asñi chairman of te national commission on fiscal i am asking them to produce clear recommendations on how to cover the cost of all federal programs by 2015. . .

our fiscal challenge is too great to be solved with any one step. that is why last week i signed a bill into law which says that the united states of america should pay as we go and live within our means, just like responsible families and businesses. this law is what helped get deficits under control in the 1990's and produced surpluses by the end of the decade. it was suspended in the last decade. by reinstituting it, we are taking an important step toward addressing the deficit problem in this decade and decades to come. it is why after taking steps to cut taxes and increase credit to small businesses to jump-start job creation this year, i have called for a three-year freeze on discretionary spending starting next year. this freeze will not affect medicare, medicaid, or social security spending. it will not affect national

security spending, including veterans benefits. all other discretionary spending will be subject to this freeze. these are tough times. we cannot keep spending like they are not. that is why we are seeking to reform our health insurance system. if we do not, soaring health- care costs will become the single largest driver of our deficits. legislation in the house and senate would bring down deficits. i am looking forward to meeting with both parties and both chambers next week to try to get this done. that is why this year we are proposing a responsible budget that cuts what we do not need to pay for what we do. we have proposed budget reductions and terminations that would yield about $20 billion in savings. we are ending loopholes and tax giveaways for oil and gas companies, and for the wealthiest 2% of americans. taken together, these steps would provide $1 trillion in

deficit-reduction over the next decade. that is more savings than in any budget over the last 10 years. the deficits have stirred debate. some on the left believe this issue can be deferred. some on the right will not issue into serious discussions without preconditions. those who preach fiscal discipline have to be willing to take the hard steps necessary to achieve it. those who believe government has a responsibility to meet these urgent challenges have a great stake in bringing our deficits under control. if we do not, we will not be able to meet our most basic obligations to one another. america's fiscal problems will not be solved overnight. they have been growing for years. they will take time to wind down. with the commission i am establishing today, i believe we are finally putting america on the path toward fiscal respired

-- fiscal reform and fiscal responsibility. i want to thank them for taking on what is a difficult and perhaps thankless task. i am grateful to them for their willingness to sacrifice their time and energy to this cause. they are going to take up their work with a sense of integrity and commitment that america's people deserve and america's future demands. i think part of the reason there will be effective is that although one is a strong democrat and one is a strong republican these are examples of people who put country first. they know how to disagree without being disagreeable. there is a sense of civility and a sense that there are moments where you set all things aside to do what is right. that is the kind of spirit that we need. i am confident that the product they put forward is going to be honest, is going to be clear, is going to give a path to both parties in terms of how we have to address these challenges.

thank you very much. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [shutters of cameras] you guys are going to do great. everything is on the table. [laughter]

>> we will have live coverage throughout the conservative political action conference. tonight at 830 eastern -- at 8:30 eastern. throughout this week, "book tv" is going prime-time. they talk about the current situation in afghanistan. "book tv" is on c-span2. >> if you were writing fiction, you could not make this story up. >> ken gormley on "afterw ords."

your one-stop shop for everything c-span is at c- span.org/store. you will find nearly every c- span program along with books, prints, coffee mugs, and other accessories. look for these and other gift ideas at c-span.org/store. >> health and human services secretary kathleen sebelius unveils a report on requested increases in several states. this comes after anthem blue cross announced plans to raise rates on california customers by as much as 30%. this is 30 minutes. >> good morning, everyone. i am kathleen sebelius, secretary of health and human services. i want to talk to you for a few

minutes today about a new report that we are releasing. you can get hard copies here or visit our website, health reform.gov. theñr report is titled -- insurance companies prosper, family suppeffer. this documents the extreme premium increases that some of america's largest insurance companies have requested over the past year, to shine a spotlight on what is happening to families and small business owners across the country. in this last year alone, the largest insurance company in michigan requested a 56% rate hike. in connecticut it was 21%. in oregon, we saw a 20% rate hike. manie, it was 18.5% last year, which was denied.

this year, they have come back and asked for a 23% rate hike. recently, which has gotten a lot of attention, is the anthem request for a 49% rate hike which would affect 800,000 individual market customers. to give an example of what that means if you are dealing with this as an insurance customer, we have a letter from a mother in california whose premiums have been raised 38% recently. that translates to her family $7,000 more a year for the same benefit package she had last year. one of her sons has type 1 diabetes, so she has almost no choices in the marketplace with a child with a pre-existing condition. it is impossible for her to find other coverage. she can pay the $7,000 extra or drop coverage altogether. we are seeing at the same time

an economic downturn around the country. we know that insurance companies are not suffering that same downturn. the five largest insurers in america have declared more than $12 billion worth of profits in 2009. wellpoint posted a $2.70 billion profit in the fourth quarter of 2009, just a week before they filed for a 39% rate increase. last week, i sent a letter to the ceo of income -- of anthem, which is a blue cross co. under the parent of wellpoint. i asked for an explanation of these rate increases. in response, the company has suggested they will delay the increases for two months, responding to the california insurance commissioner, our

request, and members of congress. i think these kinds of rate increase give a highlight to why the president said a year ago, "we need to address health reform as part of addressing the economy." we will not fix the economy without fixing our health-care system. it is why he has invited, a week from today, leadership from the democrats and republicans in the house and senate to sit down, roll up their sleeves, and talk about a comprehensive health reform plan moving forward. it is why he is urging congress to continue on the job they started until they finish this project for the american people. the plans that are pending in congress would give some additional authority to this agency, providing oversight on insurance companies across the country, making transparent the kind of rate increases that are

filed on a routine basis but often hard to determine and hard to highlight. they would have to be available to americans. we would be able to see not only the rate increases that are pending but the justification for those rate increases. both the house and senate bills contemplate medical loss ratios. companies would have to spend the majority -- the vast majority -- of the money coming in the door on paying medical benefits, not on overhead, advertising, or ceo salaries. we would have a new consumer friendly marketplace. would have choices for customers like the mom in california who is really caught. finally, there continue to be examples out of california. we have a woman who saw and some -- who sought anthem -- who saw anthem raise her rates over

30% last year. she is pretty typical of the 800,000 customers caught in that individual market plan, but also consumers across the country who have no affordable options and no way to avoid the kind of rate increases they are seeing. we think it shines a light on the urgency for health reform. again, the report is available on healthreform.org or here in hard copy. with that, i would be pleased to answer some questions. yes, sir. >> [unintelligible] there are other names in the latest reports that have come out. are you going after specific targets to pressure them on holding the line on the rate hikes? >> there is not an intent to select certain companies. unfortunately, this is pretty

widespread. we are talking about the data that is available and acceptable and the companies that we know have filed these rate increases, but unfortunately they are not isolated cases. we would like transparency for every country -- for every company in every state in the country. this would not be picking and choosing. in most places in the country, these marketplaces are very concentrated. the largest companies in every state but one are the company's we selected for the rate increases. they dominate the market. >> as you pointed out, this is a problem the president has talked about for more than a year. everybody understands the problem. can you talk about what democrats are going to present as their solution to getting this done, to getting reform finished next week?

>> the democrats have actually been engaged in working on solutions for over a year. comprehensive legislation has passed both the house and the senate. a lot of it is very similar. as the president said, he wants to hear some solutions from the republicans who suggest they are also interested in health reform. so far, they have not come to the table with any kind of comprehensive proposal. the opportunity is there next week to talk about the principles the president feels are important -- lowering costs for families and businesses. again, the congressional budget office has suggested that if you look at just the individual market, which our report focuses on, and look at the impact of the health and senate bills on the individual market, comparing similar benefit packages and what will happen with health reform, premiums will go down between 14% and 20% just by

passing the bill. addressing costs, addressing long-term sustainability, does not lower health-care costs over the long run and does not get rid of current insurance practices which lock people out of the marketplace. >> you were an insurance commissioner. do not states have the current authority and ability to take a hard line against these kinds of rate increases? if so, why are we not seeing more activity from the state's to manage this? >> some states do and some states do not. in california, they have the so- called file rating authority. a company puts a rate increase in place, files it with the insurance commissioner's office,

and after the fact the commissioner can go back and denied it or lower it if it does not meet -- and deny it or lower it if it does not meet a loss ratio of 20%. laws vary around the country. in maine and a few other examples, the rate had to be filed in advance and the insurance commissioner did take action. what we would anticipate -- what health reform anticipates -- is that the first line of defense would be the state insurance commissioners. they are on the ground. they have data collection ability. we would have also is transparent process nationally, with not only rates being filed in advance. there would be transparency for the justification of those advances. there would be a national loss ratio which would be tougher than california. companies would be expected to

live up to that. finally, there would be a specification that if a company wanted to participate in the new exchanges, in the new marketplaces once they were set up in 2014, one of the criteria would be to examine the practice between the time the legislation was signed and the time the market place got set up to see what they have done to their customers in the intervening period. huge profit margins and huge rate increases would make a company an unlikely participant in the new marketplace. >> you allege in your report that this is profit motivated. the insurance companies, to a large extent, are saying this is just health care costs. they are left with pools of people who are sicker. it is pure economics. what is your response to the argument that it is a pure economic decision on their part? >> i think that while we do not

want companies to be insolvent, because no claims get paid, and there is always a balance between making sure there is enough money in the door to pay claims and the ability in the future to pay claims. insurance companies in the health-insurance market have made 250% profits over the last eight or nine years. the five biggest companies in 2009 alone, at a time when we saw a huge economic downturn, when the gdp posted a-% increase, -- posted a minus percent increase, which had held insurance companies with $2 billion in profits. to think this is in line with health care costs, which are still exceeding typical inflation costs, these profits are wildly excessive. they are way over anybody's

estimate. they are also companies were the top executives of are paid up to $24 million each, a huge overhead costs, lots of advertising budget. i think the ability to say what percentage of what you are collecting is actually spent on health payments -- providers, hospitals, medicine -- and what percentage is either profit or administrative overhead is something that a light should be shined on. that is really part of what this transparency would be about. i know we have some callers -- no we do not. never mind. >> madam secretary, up to now we have to democratic bills -- a house bill and the senate bill that are significantly different. is it your expectation that there will be one democratic

proposal next week, or are we going to look at two? >> the president has indicated that he intends to have a proposal which he will put on the website and available for public consumption before the summit. there will be one proposal. >> that one proposal will be coming from the president? would it represent the best of the two bills? >> i hope so. i think it is the president's. the idea is that it will take some of the best ideas and put them into a framework moving forward. >> two questions. these premium increases -- are they primarily affecting people who are in an older market? are they affecting people who are in employer plans? >> all individual market.

>> which is approximately which percentage of americans who have insurance? i am trying to get a sense of how many americans are being affected by these increases. why do you think health insurance companies are doing this if they are making such a big profit? >> i am not sure. i do not want to give you an accurate number. millions of americans are affected by the individual market. it is the least secure marketplace and the one where people have virtually no options. they do not have an employer negotiating for discounts in providers and discounts in pharmaceuticals. they do not have group protection. they do not have group writing laws that exist. i do know it affects millions more now because a lot of companies have dropped their group coverage. more people are in the individual market place. insurance companies are often

responsible to shareholders as well as policyholders. there is sort of a dual responsibility in terms of fiduciary -- making money. frankly, when you are selling health insurance, you make more money by having people who do not get sick than people who do get sick, by paying less in benefits, by having a market strategy that has a healthier market place instead of a sector marketplace. -- a sectoicker marketplace. these strategies are involved in the individual market, where there are not necessarily rules of the road that govern it. people are out there on their own, often medically

underwritten on their own. your personal health history is what may determine your cost. clearly, there is still a profitable marketplace to be had. knowing that a lot of these customers have no choice -- their only choice is to pay the increased rates or drop the coverage. they do not have a shopping place to visit. >> [unintelligible] it repeatedly uses the singular in referencing the health insurance exchange. is that a signal that that is what the senator -- that that is what the president wants? >> i think that what the press release is indicating is what are the common features of the house and senate bills.

the boss contemplate exchanges -- they both contemplate exchanges. there are different versions. the house contemplates a national exchange. the senate contemplate state exchanges. at the end of the day, you have a fairly similar framework depending on how many states would meet the framework. having said that, i do not think the final version has been specifically determined. but it will be available before the 25th and it will be on the website. that will be done in the next couple of days. i know it will be before the meeting on the 25th. i cannot tell you exactly when it will be posted, but it will definitely be posted before them. thank you all for coming. and again, healthreform.gov.

>> today on c-span we have had live coverage of the conservative political action conference, cpac. the group is holding its annual conference in washington, d.c. today's speakers -- dick armey, mark rubio, and former vice president dick cheney. you can check our web site for video, which you see there, at c-span.org. our live coverage continues tonight at 8:30 eastern with columnist george will. saturday, the group hears from newt gingrich and glenn back. -- len bekc. --glen beck.

on c-span 2, a discussion of the war in afghanistan. our live coverage begins at 8:00 eastern on c-span 2. >> this weekend, first lady michelle obama on preventing childhood obesity, and more on education policy. the national governors' association, live throughout the weekend on c-span. >> earlier today, vice president biden spoke about the administration's nuclear security agenda. he talked about how the president's budget request will support a reduction of nuclear dangers facing the u.s. robert gates introduced the vice-president. this is 20 minutes. [applause] >> please be seated. it is an honor to be here today

at disesteem institution. before going on, i would like to knowledge the presence of two special guests, nobel laureate and secretary of energy stephen chu, and general james cartwright. [applause] to be ndu community, thank you for all you do in service of our country. students, i wish to the best as you prepare to take on leadership positions. i know you are here to listen to the vice president, so i will be brief. the topic, the role and future of nuclear weapons, is one that is critical to america's national security and strategic strength. president obama has helped focus our attention on the challenges

of reducing nuclear dangers and taking concrete steps toward the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. at the same time as he as the vice president have said -- as he and the vice president have said, nuclear weapons are required to defend ourselves and our allies. before becoming vice president, mr. biden served for 36 years in the united states senate, representing the state of delaware. in the senate, he was chairman of the judiciary and foreign relations committees. over his career, he established a reputation as being one of america's experts on international affairs. as vice-president, he has provided leadership on issues relating to proliferation, deterrence, and the state of our nuclear enterprise. we are honored that he has come to jdndu to share his thoughts.

it is my pleasure to introduce the vice president of the united states, joseph biden. [applause] >> thank you very much. thank you all very much. it is an honor to be here. it is an honor to be introduced by bob gates. secretary gates and shoe, general cartwright, and vice admiral and members of the armed services, students -- thank you all for coming. frankly, this speech was a collaborative document. bob gates could deliver this speech. general cartwright could deliver this speech. they could probably do it better than i will. the fact of the matter is that at its founding, the former secretary of war gave this

address. he said it was not to promote war but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation. that is what this is all about. that is what i think the speeches about. for more than a century, you and your predecessors have heeded that col. there are fewer contributions that could be greater -- that any citizen could make -- than to aspire to meet the goal of this university. many statesmen have walked to this campus and pronounced states meant better than i have -- statesmen better than i have. [laughter] i told you but could give this speech better. you taught them well.

a scholar and diplomat lectured here in the late 1940's, just back from moscow, in a small office not far from here. he developed the doctrine of containment that guided a generation of foreign policy. some of the issues that arose during that time seem a distant memories now. i see old colleagues from the senate foreign relations committee days, and some of them seem very distant. the topic i came to discuss with you today, the challenge posed by nuclear weapons, continues to demand our urgent attention. last april, in prague, the president laid out his vision for protecting our country from nuclear threats. he made it clear that we will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons while retaining a safe, secure,

and effective arsenal as long as we need it. we will work to strengthen our nuclear non-proliferation treaty. we will do everything in our power to prevent the spread of weapons to terrorists and to states that do not already possess them. it is easy to recognize the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, but we must not underestimate how proliferation to a state could be destabilizing to an entire region, which is critical to our security and may prompt the neighbors in that region to feel they have to garner nuclear weapons themselves. our agenda is based on a clear- eyed assessment of our national interests. we have long relied upon nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries. as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways

to accomplish the same objectives. the quadrennial defense review and the missile ballistic defense review which secretary gates released two weeks ago presented a plan to strengthen our conventional forces so they can defend our nation and our allies well into the future. capabilities like and adaptive missile defense shield, conventional warheads with worldwide reach, and others that are developing and being developed, will enable us to reduce the role of nuclear weapons as other nuclear powers begin to draw down even further, just as we which to do -- as we wish to do. even with the nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong and in the position to defend our interests against all our enemies. as we have said many times, the spread of nuclear weapons is the

greatest threat facing the country, and i would argue facing humanity. that is why we are working both to stop the proliferation and eventually to eliminate them. until that day comes, we have to do everything in our power to maintain our arsenal and make sure it is reliable. at the vanguard of this effort, alongside our military are our nuclear weapons laboratories, national treasures that deserve our full support. there invaluable contributions range from billing -- range from supercomputers to robotic telescopes. the labs are best known for the work they do to secure our company -- to secure our country. we have asked our labs to meet urgent strategic needs. time and again they have delivered. in 1939, as fascism began its

march across europe, asia, and africa, albert einstein warned president roosevelt that not seas were racing to build a weapon the likes of which -- the nazis were racing to build a weapon the likes of which the world had never seen. under oppenheimer, the physicists of los alamos one that race and changed the course of history. it became our premier facility for developing the non-nuclear components of our nuclear weapons arsenal. a few years later, an institution took root in california. during the arms race that followed the korean war, it developed warheads to keep our nuclear capability second to none. these examples, and many other, illustrate that everyone in this room -- what everyone in this room knows but many in our country do not.

the past centuries deciding -- defining conflicts were decided not just on the battlefield, but in classrooms and laboratories. as a visionary once argued, the first world war was decided by braun. the second world war by logistics'. the third world war would be different, he predicted. it would be won by brains. general arnold got it almost right. great minds like oppenheimer helped win the cold war and prevent a third world war altogether. during the cold war, we tested nuclear weapons in our çóñiatmosphere, underwater, and underground. ;orñr][=we confirmed that theyd and evaluated advanced concepts. but explosive testing damaged our health, disrupted our environment, and set back our

nonproliferation agenda. 18 years ago, george h. w. bush, president bush, signed a nuclear testing moratorium enacted by congress which is in place this very day. under that moratorium, our laboratories have maintained our arsenal's through what is known as our stockpile stewardship program. they are able to do that using techniques that are successful and cutting edge. today, the directors of the nuclear laboratories, all of whom i had a chance to meet, tell me and the president that they have a deeper understanding of our arsenal from stockpile stewardship than they ever had when testing was commonplace. let me repeat that. our labs know more about our arsenal today than when they were able to explode weapons at

our facilities on a regular basis. with our support, the labs can anticipate potential problems and reduce their impact on the arsenal. unfortunately, during the last decade, our nuclear experts were neglected and underfunded. budgets forced more than 2000 employees at los alamos and lawrence livermore to lose their jobs between 2006 and 2008, including highly skilled scientists and engineers. some of the facilities we used to handle uranium and plutonium date back to the days of harry truman, winston churchill, and joseph stalin. the signs of age and decay are becoming more apparent every day. because we recognize these dangers, in december, secretary chu and i met at the white house

with the heads of all three weapon laboratories. they described the trouble they are having to manage our arsenal without testing. they say the situation is a threat to our national security. president obama, secretary chu, and i all agree. we announced a new budget that reduces the last decade of dangerous decline. it devotes $7 billion to maintaining our nuclear stockpile and modernizing our nuclear infrastructure. to put that in perspective, that is $624 million in congress approved last year, and an increase of $5 billion over the next five years. even in these tight fiscal times, we will commit the resources needed to maintain our security interests. this investment is not only

consistent with the nonproliferation agenda. we argue it is essential to pursue a nonproliferation agenda. guaranteeing our stockpile, coupled with broader research and development efforts, allows us to pursue deeper nuclear reductions without in any way compromising our security. as our conventional capabilities improve, we are going to continue to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. we will be able to continue to redue ourñrñi reliance. responsible disarmament requires a percentile specialists who are able to manage -- reqñiutj versatile specialists who are able to manage our armament. they will be able to safely dismantle it tomorrow. chemists have developed forensics to track missing nuclear materials and catch those who are tracking it. our goal is a world without

nuclear weapons. it has been endorsed by leading voices in both parties. those include two former secretaries of state -- henry kissinger and george shultz. secretary of defense bill perry under president clinton, and my former colleague senator nunn. they called for eliminating nuclear weapons. the call it a bold initiative consistent with america's moral heritage. during the 2008 presidential campaign, both president obama and my friend senator mccain supported the same objective. we are going to continue to build support for this emerging bipartisan consensus, like the one around containment of soviet expansion that george kennedy inspired.

to that end, we worked tirelessly to implement the president's agenda. in september, the president shared a historic meeting of the un security council, which unanimously embraced the key elements th=g key -- the president laid out in prague. as i speak, u.s. and russian negotiators are completing an agreement that would reduce strategic weapons to their lowest levels in decades. it is verification -- its verification measures are going to provide confidence that the agreement will be met. the reductions will be conducted transparently. they will be predictable. it will promote strategic stability and bolster non- proliferation by showing that the leading powers are committed to reducing their arsenals.

it will build momentum for the collaboration with russia on strengthening the global consensus that nations to violate the npt's obligations should be held accountable. the strategy is having results. we of tighten sanctions on north korea through the most restrictive un security council resolution to date. the international community is enforcing the sanctions as we speak. we are working with international partners to ensure that iran also faces real consequences for failing to meet its obligations. in the meantime, we are completing a government-wide review of our nuclear posture. already, our budget proposals reflect some of the key priorities, including increased funding for our nuclear complex, a commitment to sustain our heavy bombers and missile

capabilities under the new start agreement. this review has been a full interagency partnership. another way of saying it to the average citizen -- everybody is on the same page. we believe we have developed a broad and deep consensus on the importance of the president's agenda and the steps that have to be taken to achieve that agenda. the result will be presented to congress soon. in april, the president is going to host a national security summit to advance his goals of securing all hon. nuclear material within four years -- all of vulnervlulnerable nuclear

material within four years. we cannot wait for a disaster to raise security standards. we will seek firm commitments from our partners to do that in april. in may, we will participate in a nonproliferation treaty review conference. we are rallying support for stronger measures to strengthen inspection and to punish cheaters. the treaty had a basic bargain. it was that nuclear powers will pursue disarmament and non- nuclear states will not acquire such weapons while gaining access to civilian nuclear technology. that is the cornerstone, and has been the cornerstone of the regime. before the treaty was negotiated back in the early '60s, president kennedy predicted that the world would end up with up to 20 nuclear powers by the mid '70s. because of the nonproliferation

treaty and the consensus it embodied, that did not happen. 40 years later, that consensus that constrained that kind of development and spread, is framed. it is time to reinforce this consensus and to strengthen the treaty for the future. while we do that, we are going to continue our efforts to ban production of fissile material that can be used in nuclear weapons. we know that completing that treaty will ban the production of fissile material. it will not be easy to do, nor will it come quickly. the conference must resume its work on this treaty as soon as possible. the last piece of the president's agenda from prague was the ratification of a test panel. a decade ago, we led the effort to negotiate this treaty. people forget why we did it.

it was designed -- the treaty was designed in order to keep emerging nuclear states from perfecting their arsenal and preventing our rivals from pursuing ever more advanced weapons, as well as those who were not nuclear states. we are confident -- we are absolutely confident. we have undertaken reviews to make sure our instincts are right. we are confident that all reasonable concerns raised about the treaty back then, concerns about verification and reliability of our own arsenal, have now been addressed. the test ban treaty is as important as ever. as president obama said in prague, "we cannot succeed in this endeavor alone." the endeavor meaning a reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. he went on to say we can lead it

and we can start it. that is what we are doing. some of my friends in both parties have many questions about various aspects of our approach i have just laid out for you. some in my own party may have trouble reconciling and investment of $7 million in our nuclear complex with a commitment to arms reduction. some in the are other party may -- some in the other party may worry we are relinquishing capabilities which have kept our country safe. with both of these groups, we respectfully disagree. as the only nation which has ever used a nuclear weapon, and as a strong proponent of nonproliferation, the united states has long embodied a stark but inevitable contradiction. the horror of nuclear conflict may make its occurrence unlikely, but its very existence -- the very existence of nuclear weapons leaves the human race

ever at the brink of self destruction, particularly if the weapons fall into the wrong hands. many figures of a nuclear age group ambivalent about aspects of this nuclear order. proponents of nuclear deterrence argued passionately, but with utility, against the development of the hydrogen bomb. robert oppenheimer famously lamented, after watching the first mushroom cloud erupt from a device he designed, that he had become "the destroyer of worlds." president obama is determined, i am determined, secretary gates is determined, our entire government is determined that the destroyed world oppenheimer feared must never become a reality.

that is why we are pursuing the peace and security of the world without nuclear weapons. the awesome force at our disposal must always be balanced by the weight of our shared responsibility. every day, many of you in this room, in this audience, help bear that burden with professionalism, courage, and grace. a grateful nation appreciates your service. but together we have to demonstrate to the world that we are going to live up to our responsibilities. together, we will leave this world toward less reliance on nuclear weapons. thank you for all that you do for the country. i thank you for taking the time to listen. may god bless america. may god protect our troops.

thank you very, very much. [applause] [march music, john phillip sousa] >> the american conservative union holds its presidential banquet this evening. the featured speaker will be george will. our live coverage begins at 8:30 eastern. >> sometimes, i think history is a series of accidents. it is like a pileup of cars in a snowstorm. >> how did the u.s. and up in

vietnam? sunday, pulitzer prize-winning author ted morgan on the valley of death and the battle that ended french colonial rule in indochina. >> chairman of the joint chiefs of staff mike mullen is in saudi arabia meeting with allies in the region. pentagon press secretary jeff morrell discusses that and other topics. this is 20 minutes. >> that is why i had to read so quickly. >> there are reports coming out that snipers are alarmingly accurate, more so than we have seen in the past. is this an issue that has risen to the level of the pentagon? have you been aware of this? >> luckily, you guys have the benefit of briefings from the arce south commander closer to the operation than i am. the secretary did receive a

briefing this morning from general mcchrystal on the ongoing operation down in helmun, as well as other issues related to afghanistan and pakistan. i do not believe q is briefed specifically on the sniper threat. i think the characterization offered to him was similar to the one offered to you all by the commander. this afghan initiated and afghan led operation is having great early success, but i stress early. we are just six days into this. we're still very much in the clearing phase. we do have assets in place and ready. we are preparing to begin the hold and build up phases. as i think general carter

mentioned, they are meeting stiff resistance. it is not very coordinated, but there are holdouts who have remained in helmund. they are clearly going to fight to the bitter end. we have been sustaining casualties. yesterday, we lost two coalition forces and a couple of afghan forces. we mourn those losses. on the whole, everybody is pleased with the rate of progress we are seeing. the biggest threat, as i understand it, is really from the slew of ied's and mines and other explosives that have been left in the wake of the fleeing taliban. those who left -- we are having to proceed at a painstakingly slow rate to insure that neither our forces nor any civilians are

harmed by the bombs that have been left behind by these fighters. a long way of getting back to your specific question with regard to the sniper threat is that it is not something i believe has been raised to his level, although i have read in some of the press accounts that some of the sniper issues. we clearly are engaging in some small arms battles with the forces that have remained behind. it has not been an issue that has been highlighted, as far as i can tell. >> can you talk about the significance of this capture in pakistan of the afghan taliban commander? >> let me add one thing. one of the reasons we are enjoying the success we are thus far into this operation has been the extraordinary cooperation we are getting from the afghan locals. they have put us in a position to identify ied's before we

happened upon them. their cooperation, their assistants, -- there assistance is saving our lives and their fellow citizens lives. we are very appreciative of that. it is our highest priority to minimize civilian casualties. we had an unfortunate incident a few days ago in which we did suffer civilian casualties. that investigation is still under way. i think it clearly indicates that although civilians were in that house that was struck that there were also insurgents who had been firing on our forces. the pickups in pakistan -- i am not in a position to speak to any of those with any specificity. what i would offer is that

between the ongoing operations that we have throughout afghanistan, but particularly in taliban strongholds, particularly in prc south and east, as well as the sustained efforts by the pakistan military and intelligence services, the telegram is clearly being squeezed. it is being squeezed by our forces in afghanistan. it is being squeezed by pakistan in forces in pakistan. we have to see what the impact will be. our hope is that this is creating a certain amount of discontent, worry, and turmoil within the organization. . .

>> between the concerted efforts and pakistan, and the efforts we are undertaking in afghanistan, the squeeze is being put to the taliban. >> there has been a concerted effort to grab for capture or kill some of the local shadow governors are around

afghanistan. can you talk to us a bit about what those captures mean, and exactly what the shadow governments around afghanistan have been doing? >> again, i fundamentally addressed this point. i think -- we believe, we hope that these combined efforts on both sides of the border are going to reverse the momentum taliban has enjoyed. i cannot speak to the particulars of these cases. i would urge you to talk about -- talk to the pakistani government about who they have and the significance of whom may have picked up. you've heard me say over the last several months, we are pleased and gratified and heartened by the fact that the pakistani government, pakistani military, intelligence services

appreciate the threat that exists within their midst and is doing something about it. that is reflected in the fact that they have an extraordinary number of forces deployed on the border region in the west. it is reflected in the fact they are taking action against taliban leaders. there is a host of examples of their recognition that this is -- this threat within their borders is every bit as much a danger to them as it is to was. >> can you tell us what impact the shadow governments have been having on the effort? >> i would only say, mike, that clearly, any attempt to undermine the legitimate governments, the democratically elected government of afghanistan is counterproductive. this is a fledgling government as it is. it is a government that has trying to get on its feet in the midst of war, in the midst of

the enormous economic hardships. the fact that there are those with in the country trying to undermine it and set up alternative forms of governments are simply not helpful. the more pakistani leaders and shadow governors wanted the future leaders who are picked up, taken out, killed, or arrested, whatever @ may be, or want to lay down their arms and recognize and support the democratically elected government, the better. on this, i do want to know, for those of you who were with us in istanbul, you heard the secretary talked about the need for more trainers in afghanistan. the need for countries supplying additional forces to afghanistan to look at their mix of forces appeared to figure out if it might be better if the overall effort could provide more traders then -- trainers in

fighters at this point. the italians have adjusted their mix. they are sending additional 75 trainers. he that is on top of the 1000 additional forces they have pledged. -- that is that, they are adjusting the mix. general mcchrystal, in response to the direct requests made by robert gates, and in our visits to rome a couple days later. let's finish this. we have a couple minutes to get to you. >> do we attributed this week to increase cooperation by the -- do we attribute -- is this lucky intelligence? >> i would not attribute any is

particular operation to any particular motive. i am speaking generally about the way the pakistani government and security services have responded to this threat over the last several months. >> critics are saying with the timing of this is suspicious. the fact that so many of these big fish are being hawked at the same time this is raising questions -- is raising questions about pakistan's motives. it comes days after they say they want to be involved in reconciliation. "the new york times" says now that mullah abdul ghani baradar is one of the most approachable members of the taliban. people are wondering that pakistan has a motive to gain political favor. >> i will not speak to specific motives, specific operations or captures. what i will say is that we are enormously heartened byç the ft

the pakistani government and their military and intelligence services increasingly recognize the threat within their midst and are doing something about it. iraq, he said, is that right? >> there is reports of another bomb in romani. you described these attacks as few and far between, high profile. is there going to be any change of the u.s. preparations for the elections because of these? are more troops going to be sent down? >> not that i know of. i normally would not speak to this. but secretary gates got an update yesterday. the general will brief you on monday morning here. no, in fact, he met with the secretary shirley after the publication of that front page "the washington post" story, the sky is falling, sectarian

violence is about to break out again, we will never repeat of 2006 in baghdad. he could not disagree any more strongly with the story. he can point to any number of examples to why it is not a can in any way -- akin to the horrors we saw in 2005-2006. let's remember the context. we are a few weeks away from a major election in baghdad. as horrific as some of these attacks have them, it is not unexpected. this is the kind of pre-election tension and violence that had been anticipated. frankly, it has not been to the levels that some might have expected. we are heartened by the fact that, unlike 2005, there is no

credible called for boycotting the elections by any noteworthy politician. in fact, a leading politician is encouraging widespread city participation in the election -- suni participation in the election. all the major coalitions involved in the election understand the importance of trying to form of government as quickly as possible after the election, so that there is not this period of uncertainty and potential turmoil in the wake of it. they all recognize that it is going to have to be some sort of coalition that is billed among competing parties. -- built among competing parts city -- parties. even as new-sectarian violence remains low. we are always heartened by the fact that there is no evidence thus far that the iraqi people are in any way losing confidence in their security forces. or that shia militias are

starting up. or that the sunis are turning to al qaeda. even if they were too, al qaeda has been so decimated they are not in a position to undermine things to the extent they did it back in 2006. yes, i come back to the same point we made time and time again, al qaeda has been diminished to the point where they have to husband its resources, ammunition, personnel and large high-profile attacks in an attempt to reignite sectarian violence. time and time again, they have done that. it is not resulted in the outcome they had wished. >> are you aware of any military resources assisting with this plane crash in austin, texas? >> i am not. as i understand it is a homeland security issue, as fate issue.

even -- an faa issue. i think it would be for others and not us to deal with. >> of west point study out says that al qaeda support and muslim countries has dropped coú:ñsubstantially that would - that would be heartening news to the u.s. and its allies. do you have an explanation or do you want to comment on that? >> i would defer to the study. they are the experts. there has been a number of studies, there is an anecdotal evidence to suggest this bankrupt ideology has certainly not ben winning over people -- not been winning over people in the past 10 years. it is then on this most recent offensive. -- has been on this most recent offensive. i'm speaking off the top of my head here. the fact is what they are

preaching and promulgating is not consistent with the tenants of the koran and what this otherwise peaceful religion is about. i do not think resonates with the vast majority of muslims around the world. in addition to the fact that the proprietors of their attacks, it seems, are so indiscriminate in nature that there have been an untold number of muslim victims as a result of their campaign of terror. i do not think they have done anything, and my last point off the top of my head would be, that there is nothing here that they are offering to anyone, other than death and destruction. there is nothing as an alternative to this western way of life that they so despised. there is no hope, there is no future, no building, no education, no promise. those combination of factors are rooted in why it is not taken

off as they wished it would. five more minutes. tony. >> war tinker issue. -- war tanker issue. what steps has the pentagon taken to mitigate loinsing in a protest? >> i will not go through specific steps. what i will tell you is what i have told you some variation up before. when we did the draft rpf process. we want comments from industry, from congress. those comments came in in abundance. we then took those comments and are reviewing them. many of them are good and helpful. as i told you before, we are making adjustments to be rpf -- to the rfp to reflect the fact that there were errorsç pointed

out to us. there were a suggestion that we were making adjustments to one party or the other. i can tell you definitively there could not -- that could not be further from the truth. we are trying to be as fair as humanly possible about this competition. our only goal is to get our war fighters and new tanker so that they can have the support they need to be successful. and to get the taxpayers the best deal for their money. we do not have a dog in this fight,ç otherwise. we do not care who wins. we want the war fighter and a taxpayer to win. we want to design a competition that is as fair as possible. you will see a formal rfp , released in the following week. we hope to god that however many competitors wish to bid see it as what it is intended to be, which is a fair incentive to

produce a competition that provides our war fighters with the best plane possible and that taxpayers with the best value for their money. that is it. no more, no less. >> last week, the famous airborne laser were shot -- shot down a missile. well that success force the secretary to rethink his opposition to the program? >> he was never opposed to the program. he had issues with the platform. it did not work. you have to hover a seven at 47 in enemy territory to shoot down a missile in its boost phase, at extraordinary cost of these planes were going to be built that. he has always said the technology is important. although we did away with the platform, we are still investing in technology. directed energy still shows the most promise for dealing with the boost phase of missile defense. we continue to the best there. it is reflected in the budget

proposal. i would take issue with your characterization that he had an issue with the abl. he had an issue with the platform. we want to pursue development of this promising technology, and we will figure out, down the road, whatç the appropriate and cost-effective platform is. i have time for one or two more. go ahead. >> two weeks ago, the secretary testified to the house armed services committee that he had not been consulted on the administration's decision to cancel and as the's constellation program. -- nasa's constellation program. >> were catching me blind sided. that is so esoteric from my knowledge base, that you are better to get me off line that up here. i have no idea, but i am happy to help you afterwards. >> has there been a decision

made to change within the pentagon, to trained -- change the dress code for military. if so, what was the thinking behind that? >> there has not been a decision from on high about the spirit to give you a quick history of this, the secretary has for a long time and thinking aboutçó making a change in his office. when he came back from christmas vacation, she asked his military steps to switch out of their bdu's, out of their fatigues and into dress uniforms, their more or corporate work uniforms. his thinking was that this is the headquarters of united states military in our nation's capital. he hosts leaders from around the world. the people we do business with, from across the river, the professionals that come to see us are all dressed in business attire. he thought it was time for his office to be addressed accordingly. he understands fully why this

building changed in 19 or did in 2001. into its this -- in 2001 into fatigues. we were at war. it showed solidarity with the war fighter. we are at a point now where he believes, at least, that what one dresses in does not necessarily reflect their commitment to the war fighter, and there are other ways to demonstrate their solidarity. frankly, it is by doing everything you can once you walk in the store to make sure they have everything they need to succeed. this was not a mandate for the building as a whole. this was meant for his staff. if others make adjustments, that is their decision. u.s. seen some offices go about that. -- you have seen some offices go about that. you will see pgblic affairs dressed in their business or dress attire. iw3 think it will likely see otr offices in the building as well.

it was not by fiat. it was not mandated. you have probably taking notice of the change upstairs' and reevaluated their own policies. >> on c-span today, the conservative political action conference. our conference continues with columnist and george will at 8:30, eastern, here on c-span. more from the conference on saturday. we will have former house speaker newtmç gingrich, live a 2:00 p.m., eastern, and glenn back at 6:00 p.m. eastern. see it here on c-span. >> this weekend on c-span, first lady michelle obama on preventing childhood obesity. in secretary arne duncan on education policy. part of our coverageçó of the winter meetingç of the national governors' association, live on c-span throughout theç weekend. >> have you visited the c-span website lately? you will find video of the

events we have covered today, speeches from the conservative political actionç conference, the president's signing an executive order creating a debt commission, and remarks by the dali lama after his meeting with the president. that is at c-span.org. now brigadier-general jonathan vance talks about canada's role until recently, he was the commander of the canadian-made a joint task force. this is about 30 minutes. -- ?ndshe was the commander of e ;>[canadian-natoçç jow3t(çink force. national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> good morning. welcome to the atlantic council. i'm the vice president and director of the international security program at the council. i am delighted to welcome you to this forum.

ççqbefore introducing our distinguishedç guests, i want o underscore for a0moment how ths and that fits into our programmingw3 at theç atlantic council in four ways. has been putting on afghanistan- pakistan issues. the council spoke out pretty strongly on the issue of afghanistan in early 2008 when then itç chairman, general jim jones, issued a report on saving afghanistan. it is a report that came out that had anç impact on the debe here in united states and helped çto focus our political discoue on the fact that we were not succeeding in afghanistan and needed to redouble our efforts. we put out comparable reports on pakistan, following through with the creation of a south asia center, led by my colleague. ççi]this events had said in ad way to to put a highlight on

canada's role within the alliance. canada has raised its profile on many of the nato alliance issues, where is the strategic concept, hosting the halifax for, or afghanistan itself. we had the pleasure to host the canadian chief of defence staff less debt -- last september who gave a discussion about how canada's armed forces have transformedç from peacekeeperso becoming more fighters. canada has been involved in afghanistan since after 9/11, firstç as a coalition partner. from 2003, as a nato ally and a contributor to the international security assistance force. canada has close to 3000 soldiers deployed in afghanistan, mostly in the south. this contribution makes canada one of the largest troop contributors.

canadian forces will be lead elements in kandahar province this spring, along the lines of the operation unfolding in helmand now. there were engaged in heavy fighting it in 2006. 140 soldiers have died in afghanistan, making it one of the heaviest tolls taken. there is a political deadline of december, 2011. this is an event that is part of a broader discussion called the nato forum. it is emerging as a trans- atlantic community, as a premier venue for discussion, debate and analysis related to the alliance. it began with senator richard lugar and rasmussenç çwho inaugurated the forum last

fall. daschle security adviser jim jones, chuck hagel, -- and national security adviser jim jones have also participated in the forum. we have heard from the canadian foreign minister in o's role in east europe. -- nato's role in east europe. we are delighted to have general fans to join the ranks of this distinguished group. this is sponsored by bae systems. this is part of the council's effort to bring voices from the field to inform the washington policy debate, particularly of our coalition partners to have been in the fight with us< there has been an unfortunate meredith in washington focused on the american leadership -- unfortunate narrative in washington focused on the american leadership, sometimes to the detriment of the wall or

coalition forces have played. we are trying to bring voices of that -- from the field, ranging from dutch commanders in afghanistan, general van loon, commander of command south in afghanistan. general david mcnielleill, commander of isaf. and the former pakistani chief of staff. we are very pleased to host jonathan vance today, one of canada's leading counterinsurgency practitioners. a specialist. in one of the interviews i read before the event, he referred to himself to a chief cheerleader, to a chief mourner, to a general manager. he is an infantry officer of yhuri he has experience, having

deployed in croatia in 1994. he deployed in support and operation of the not in 2003. he took the -- the first -- operation athena in 2003. task force kandahar also includes about 1000 u.s. soldiers. he deployed to afghanistan in the wake of the man report that demanded new assets for canadian forces -- the manley report. we are also pleased to host the general because he has a track record of being thoughtful and outspoken on the challenges of fighting in coalitions. thank you for joining us today. we look forward to your friend, outspoken comments today. the podium is yours -- we look

forward to your frank, outspoken comments today. >> what a pleasure is to be here today. i have been on a monthlong speaking tour. it is a pleasure for me to see and witness a higher-minded debate amongst organizations such as atlantic council, thoughtful work being done to look at afghanistan. it is a thinking person's game. what we are trying to accomplish in afghanistan does not fit within the norms of warfare, as most of our societies know it. i am grateful for the invitation. i am proud to represent the soldiers, sailors who serve in tax force -- task force kandahar. i will tell you the story today.

it describes the afghan mission as i saw from my spot in kandahar. how devolved in 2009, and there are some schematics -- thematics that are critical in terms of how i described it. one is, when did we really start prosecuting this war correctly? when we reach adequate lead resource to do it? when did we start doing counterinsurgency, transitioning from the days, post-9/11, where we were in a counter terrorist operation. i will also speak to how our public is proceeding how we are doing. and the challenges with trying to have forces conducting complex operations, where our publics are not in a position to understand it or be adequately involved in the debate, such that those who are not responsible for the war can

effect that debate-lee. i have a short video. i dedicated to my soldiers into one we lost on the july 3. it is four minutes long. i have a 30 minute presentation. -- to talk about kandahar in 2009. i would like to introduce two people very important to me, like command sergeant major. please welcome him. he kept me alive and kept me sane. and our chief of civil military affairs at our headquarters. good to have them. can we rolled the faces of afghanistan, 2009? -- role the "face of afghanistan, 2009?"

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>> thank you very much. the troops shows that song on purpose, i have a little faith in them and in this enterprise that we are undertaking. particularly, as we look at 2009 and beyond. if we get the presentation of here, we will -- çso, i am going to talk to you about operations in kandahar in 2009. i know much of what translates on the ground in our experience translates well to central helmand, basically this out, not necessarily to the rest of afghanistan, but that the moscow. the counterinsurgency themes count. -- the themes count.

there are differences in the tribal and political makeup as you move around the country, as changes also are evident in the enemy forces. next slide, please. ok. so, i start by showing a map of kandahar province. it is a great big place. larger than the province of nova scotia in canada. what i think is essential to understand about the war is there -- it divides itself up into three broad periods. the first period is that immediate time after 9/11 it through to about 2006, where the operations in afghanistan started off as those designed to depose the taliban regime to deal with the al qaeda threat. that was a counter terrorist

strategy. it was an act against the potential to export terrorism. what happened between 2001 and 2006 is in insurgency emerged. and grew stronger. we still live with the effects of that period of time. when we are arrive in a country to start conducting counter- terrorism operations, and cannot predict an insurgency will ensue, perhaps some of the partners to make early on in operations really end up being a disadvantage to you later on as an insurgency breaks out. that first period was relatively small forces, designed to conduct counter terrorist operations with the afghani regime and the al qaeda threat.

underresourced for counterinsurgency, and indeed, when we started counterinsurgency operations versus two -- nurses counter terrorist operations, is up for debate. -- versus counter terrorist operations, is up for debate. then after that, we knew we were to conduct counterinsurgency operations. every commander knew what the right thing was, but we did not have the resources. kandahar province. the size of the province of nova scotia had one battalion in it. 1.5 billion people, between 1.5 and 1.8 million afghans. in insurgency that was growing in strength. and one battalion to try to see to this security element of the equations of a counterinsurgency fight. impossible to do.

so that resulted in the canadian forces in kandahar having to deal with the most the merchant, critical threats on any day. it produced combat. it produced a three-period of -- 3-year period ofçqçót( combat e thereçok were fewqç?;çç pos that resulted. çs/3we were not able to taka battle and turn it into a changed environment where the social,q political, and economic fabric would start to recover. we were too small. the enemy, although not likely to win, was certainly -- at our daily attention. as i was preparing for this operation, and worked upç in naval postgraduate school in montereyç, in a gathering of

academics then do a lot about afghanistan, and i one of them put his arm around me and said, son, you have two jobs. do not leave this the city and do not lose the airfield. -- do not lose the city. when we arrived in 2009, we were under resources and have been for a long time, toçç nobody's fault. it isçç just the way it was. t(ççi suppose we could look bd say we should have beenççç dg in 2009, the reality was that we were dealing handily with i]insurgents,ç the military as. we were losing ground in the insurgency. t(çççwe did not lose, but wet winning.

in 2009, we were in stalemate, both in the minds of afghans and our whole populations, certainly in canada. ççwe had not translated mility çaction, the loss of blood and treasure into something positive on the ground. çwe were in some trouble. we also have, for canada, very would be the end of our military commitment. there was a time factor, as well. so this period demanded transition. we needed to change operations quickly. resource limitations were going to change. obama had been elected. the previous administration had but one surge in t, and critical to the equation was the changed focus of the u.s. administration from exclusively focused on iraq, with afghanistan as an

economy of force effort, to a more determined focus on afghanistan. and that really marks the third age, 2009 to whenever. we are adequately resource, both on the military and civilian fronts, where the alliance will be able to do all the right things, in terms of sectorial reform and in terms of military condition-setting it said that afghanistan can begin to recover. those three distinct ages, that third age started as we arrived. we could foresee it. the story i am telling you is really what we perceived before we arrived. i will tell you what we did about it. kandahar city was becoming a vitally important. we knew that.

it was very plain to us that, as the lens shifted from iraq to afghanistan, it would tighten down on kandahar. that is the epicenter of the insurgency. i do not quibble at all about the assignment of resources to helmand or kandahar, but the vital ground is in kandahar. the international community started to discover what the challenges were there. it would become the report card of the alliance, in terms of its operations. success or failure in kandahar, is is -- is success or failure in this mission, brought the speaking. for me, as a commander about to land in kandahar, some military factors were uppermost in my mind -- time and forces available were my -- were the

most important. we were definitely running out of time. the afghan and canadian and other domestic populations were growing weary of a lack of definitive, tangible results. i think it is axiomatic in warfare that one must protect, through positive results, the opinion of your population. we were not getting those. we were up quitting ourselves well in battle, but that was not translating into something that meant something. we had no evidence of ford momentum, and something as complex as a counterinsurgency, we had no forward momentum. indeed, we are about to be reinforced. we had been reinforced with an infantry battalion, late inq 208 which doubled the canadian

capacity. we were soon to get far more forces into kandahar. the insurgency, therefore, was being defeated every day militarily, yet the insurgency spread through that insidious fearç that froze the population into inaction. they could not commit. there was only enough military force to achieve comeback victory, and their lives were not changing. -- to achieve, that victory, and their allies were not changing. if you were in a -- if your family, hearing about the millions of dollars being poured into kabul, but you are not seeing it in your home town, you are like any population that here's a government program, but you are not getting any of it. we deal with it. many of the dynamics that occurred in afghanistan, we can relate to at a community level. our whole of government efforts,

those u.s.a.i.d., ceta, state department, all of those civilian actors had been brought into kandahar and afghanistan were working very hard. talented, hard-working people. but the results were not producing tangible change for communities. no community could feel the some of the parts of international engagement. therefore, we were losing, or we were not winning. it is a fine line, i know. next slide. i want to tell you about the insurgency. militarily, they are not a particularly good insurgency, in my mind. on a historical plane, they will not stand out as a great insurgency. militarily, they are marginally effective. they use some weapons to effect, including ied's.

they have advantages -- it safe havens, to work in the population, to keep a population intransigent or incapable of committing, spreading fear and so on. they are and remain good bets. they have a serious problem. although -- they are and remain good at that. but they have a serious problem. they do not have a plan to take them to the next debt. what would happen if their violence was to result in them having some element of power? they do not have a message. they are not attracting the populace. 5% of the population of kandahar province is ideologically aligned with them. the vast majority are frozen into inaction, and able to commit. the taliban have a problem, because they have no platform that would attract the

population to say, let's use them. they have already had their go and it was largely rejected. not a popular movement. they are a spoiler. that is key to understanding the dynamics, when you start making military plans. next slide. a simple view of the insurgency which show you that, on the ground, they staged their resources such that they threatened to isolate the city of kandahar. they operate from the north, the south, and largely in the west. they tried to strangle the city, threaten the seat of power, threat to afghan security forces. discredit government. -- threaten it afghan security forces. discredit the airline's effort. it is impossible to deal with, if you are not large enough.

if you have then they sent afghan police force -- a nascent afghan police force that on any given day causes more problems than it is worth. it allows a certain freedom of movement of the taliban. next slide. what is essential to understand in kandahar is where does the population live? if counterinsurgency is about population, you must know where they are. that slide share issue that 85% of the population lives in or within 40 kilometers of kandahar city. we fought for three years, well west of that, in central zari, because that is where the greatest threat was. that is where they were preparing themselves to operate against the population. in the course of that three years, the population became more at risk. that middle period, that

population was undermined. so we knew that population needed to be serviced. i want to tell you why a paul broun view -- homegrown view of the counterinsurgency fight. what does it feel like? imagine a community at risk. we have them in north america. communities of severe risk, where you have a fracturing of the restructured, a lack of education, gangism, disenfranchised youth, drugs, lack of prospects for the future, desperate poverty. we have communities like that in canada and in the united states. throw into that mix a heavily armed by the gang that would stop you from doing anything about that. that would prevent you from physically extending government services or any benevolent acts

to that community, just so you look bad. and go fix that fast. cadile that quickly, surrounded by 1000 other communities at risk in a country at risk and put it 15,000 kilometers away and do with that quickly. that is what we are dealing with. this is as much about the social, political, and economic fabric of the country, in terms of the fight, as it is about the taliban. they are a spoiler, and can prevent the achievement of this repair, this recovery of these communities. the life expectancy in kandahar province is 46 years of age. this country has been at war or been in a period of conflict for 33 years, almost everybody alive in the province has been doing nothing but surviving their entire lives. in that environment, your

loyalty structure starts to change. you are loyal to yourself, your family, your sub-trot, your trod, and your business. -- your sub-tribe, your tribe, your business, before you are loyal to any national agendas. this population has been badly damaged on every level. look at the united nations indices and were afghanistan it sits at that -- in that. bottom of the pile. it is not an armed struggle along. it needs to be a combined effort. it is repairing those communities and those communities and living in that 85% around kandahar city that needed to be the focus. next slide. i am not going to try to make all of you experts about counterinsurgency today, this is

my view of how this works. suffice to say, that if you want to move from a failed state to something that is stable enough to allow adequate government services to extend to its population, then there are a lot of people at play. there are a lot of actors that must, who is defects must be aligned and working together in harmony such that you can produce some element of human security and stability. i learned something about security. the word security. it is not a good word. we use it all the time. i think we understand it. but it is not a useful word in a counterinsurgency environment. it points to one facet of the challenge. i found the provision of security is elusive. it does not really exist. it can be easily compromised. security at the end of a gun is

not security at all. it is defense. and no community is impressed when they have to be defended. if you're wrong town was being defended by your police, then i daresay you -- you are not living in a good home town. afghans think the same way. if they have to be defended, if there is nothing that happens beyond armed defense, it is a problem for them. you need to move very quickly from that sense of military security into something resembling stability. stability can only be brought to bear if you have all of those actors -- afghan government, international government, ngo's, all of those people that can bring to bear the tools, the expertise and the funds that will allow for the repair of that social, political and economic fabric that is vital. when you do that, that community starts to get involved. they do not get involved in

armed defense. but they do get involved and stability. when they have a vested interest in their town, when they start to see it is worth their while, and the risks, to get involved, to be employed, to work with government, to take advantage of the international community is aspirations about how things can improve, then they start to get involved and what we would call that one-dimensional aspect of security. they start to call in. there is a guy in my backyard with a gun and i do not know who he is. the phone in, there is an ied on the road right there. communities involved, motivated in their own destinies, in partnership with their government and the alliance forces for as long as we are there, our communities that will defeat the insurgency. there is no other way.

next slide. so we learned that battlefield success does not equal success. populations only celebrate results. in canada, we do not celebrate a battle because we dealt with in a salad. we celebrated because it was the beginning of the birth of our nation -- not because we dealt with it well. we celebrate d-day because it was the beginning of the liberation of europe. no population celebrates battle. for three years, we sat and only had battled to celebrate. yes, there were some incremental improvements and some sectoral reforms. you could not feel it. and counterinsurgency is so complex. remember that community at risk concept. were you show the high points of

success? in unraveling the challenges of the damage community? how'd you get a population to celebrate that? they would celebrate in lanier warfare. when you are defeating an army -- and they would celebrate in it linear warfare. we crossed the rhine today. you feel like you are winning. there is nothing in here, in counterinsurgency, that makes you feel like you are winning. we had to think about that. how do you engage your own populations, and the population of the insurgency to recognize the success and invest themselves in it, politically or materially on the ground? it is true in warfare that we attack and defend it centers of gravity. the center of gravity we are servicing is the population in

kandahar or in afghanistan. that which we are defending, and it is true in every aspect of warfare, is your own population. to protect your populations motivations, public will and understanding of the environment. in my view, we have failed. we have failed badly. our populations do not understand this war. they do not understand counterinsurgency. to the extent that public policy options begin to close. a population disengage or uninformed or seen only one small side of the equation -- seeing only one small side of the equation will not be engaged enough to commit to the long term or to the depth and detail that you need to be engaged in. we needed in 2009 to transition it such that battlefield success was not all that we were trying, that we could celebrate something that came as close as

possible to that liberation of a town in holland in world war ii. we had to give something along those lines to our population so they could really start to understand what was going on. next slide. the slide previous to this, of the map, you had a lot of enemy, red lines on this. this is how i looked at kandahar on any given day. where were we going to build? where would we use military force, and that offensive for selectively to achieve effects that would protect that which we were trying to build and hold? next slide. the intent, therefore, for my headquarters and my team as they wanted was to stabilize. that was a new policy. it is not easy to enter into a stabilization mode, because it demands action on multiple partners that are not necessarily accustomed to getting military orders. it had to be combined.

stabilize and protect the population and disrupt, using military force, by exception when we need to. i assure you, there was lots of that. because in 2009, it was also an age where everybody was trying harder, including the enemy. the efforts to discredit the election. on the day, it would have been a disaster, had we left the taliban unmolested as they prepared for that day. next slide. also keep western -- -- also key was to concentrate the forces and put our area of operations on to that population. that is a subset of the province, within 40 kilometers of the city. critical. dant, damont and the city itself, critical. i can tell you that that odd-

looking shape there, it looks like a human organ of some sort, that contains 85% of that 1.8 million people. that is what needed to be serviced. concentrate our efforts there, at least to get some traction. next slide. huge challenges. tangible, rapid effects, coordinating military and civilian activities, ngo's. there are lots of ngo's, god love them, they do amazing work. they are not easily aligned with military activity. their ideological differences. there are programming differences. there are ways of looking at the to rein in kandahar that vary between actors, but you need an area of precision and harmony as you try to unravel something as complex as the social ills that beset some of these communities. and you cannot do it alone. it needs to be in partnership

with the military. also, most agencies, civilian agencies of government, do not have at their disposal -- they have bright people, to amend his aspirations, but they do not have the tools that allow them to produce a tangible, technical defects in conflict state department -- state department, aidç agencies are not designed to produce technical effects. i have to tell you something. the operational art, that which wins wars, translates effective tactics into strategic effect -- objectives. you couldç have no discussion about counterinsurgency without getting into the tactical details. you must use the right techniques with the right people in the right amount on the right path population. . . .

there are so many facets to that, so many threats to the population, while others are more insidious that are imbedded in the population. afghan governance suffers from a lack of its ability to extend because omuch of the white collar imagination has left afghanistan. they have fled in the face of the enemy or it has died off. to take a good idea, for the mayor of kandahar city to say i need to do this, there is a lack of capacity to address that. i found that the canadian

perception of the complicity -- the complexity and the ambitions of what we were doing were seriously out of step of what was going on on the ground. that is dangerous, of course. those people who are not accountable would throw things into the mix, throw ideas into the mix, that would confuse the population. why are you here when you could be here? why do this when you could do that? that was without any idea of what they were talking about. so the challenges for us was to try to address that iconic image that sits in the canadians mines about this mission. -- canadians maulingminds abouts mission.

i am deeply grateful for how well we treat our fallen warriors and their families. but we have made 140 deaths into such a monumental number without anything else to celebrate. that is what people focus on. the iconic image of this mission needs to change or needed to in 2009. it was from as appearing as victims to producing the effect on the ground, that liberty chip -- that liberation, where everybody goes is it worth it? they could be at least will informed. most of that is what we were thinking before we went in. the thing about warfare is that you have to become specific at some point. we had to come up with a how and where? how do you really do this? most of our mandel's talk about

principles and so on. but how do you really -- most of our manuals talk about principles and so on. but how do you really do it? it is a fairly straightforward equation. [unintelligible] you need to have an appropriate balance between the urban and rural centers and so on. add in the sensitivity to travel next and the ability factor -- and the doability factor and this is what we did. it is a fairly straightforward idea. it is infinitely complex in its execution and it does not always work well. when you start to invest yourself into a population, they are a little bit more forgiving and they develop partnerships with you and help you the next

time. stabilization, the first town south of kandahar city, the seat of district government, which still has craters from soviet artillery around the town, what was really required was a good analysis before we went in, a thoughtful approach, detailed consultation with all actors, political and non- governmental, and then moved through the town so that you can assure yourself that there is no armed presence -- armed threat present. and there was not. we told them that we were coming. they sprinkle añixd few i edie's around. they are because you shape to the environment and you have

given them an indication of what you are about. for the first time, they start to see something other than warfare. i maintain that canada's greatest strategic asset is the smiling canadian soldier who has ridden the town of its minutes, walked up to a tribal elder, shook his hand, and says that i am here to stay and i will help you. and he is at the tip of the spear of all the good things that can happen in that town and to prepare the infrastructure. we've set conditions for the afghans to do it themselves. employment, the micro-economy starts to bounce back. kids go to school. they can get the polio vaccination. the medical clinic opens up. as that starts to happen, the environment improves such that non-government actors say they can go there.

the u.s. shows up. those marquee ngo's with expertise and deep pockets start to show up. and that town and the towns the fall of start to invest yes, there are setbacks. yes, the enemy comes back. in fact, the taliban hits this because they have nothing to counter it. -- the taliban hates this because they have nothing to counter it. they have difficulties with attackingñi this on a street military perspective. just like you cannot win if you do not do this, you lose. this is the essence of what general mcchrystal has been speaking about and what the intent is for central helmet right now. this will grow in the future. it grows fast.

up in the upper right hand corner, it grew to other villages rapidly. it is a galvanizing influence. the population starts to see the some of the parts. so this is what you are about. it is not just gunfire in my backyard. there's more to this point there government shows up. it starts to become exciting. you need a little bit of excitement. winning a counterinsurgency is very much like making political excitement occur. people have to get motivated. and it grew more. taking a town, one of the most difficult challenges was one of these towns here. on the day, the villagers will come to the units and commercial the more the iud's were, and said, let's get to work.

we were able to visualize this. this is what we thought of as we were going into afghanistan. you have to start somewhere. it grows very quickly. you do some shipping operations and a custom the population to their responsibilities and obligations to be involved in this. pretty soon, they get back -- pretty soon, you get that. imagine that occurring in a city to the north and to the west. that, in my opinion, is our strategic deliverable, a stabilizing trend in 85% of the population. we want to do that by 2011. that is what we have to try to achieve. that is consistent certainly

with general mcchrystal and general rodriguez. set conditions. stabilizing, not civilized. upward trend, positive movement, doing the right things, firing on all cylinders, afghan government performance, and the population stars to come along. -- the population starts to come along. future operations later on this summer will solidify that and perhaps be able to expand. i end the presentation on this slide. the single most persistent threat will be the afghan people and their government.

it is not that they do not deserve to win or do not deserve to have a country that works. but remember the shattered society, the skewed loyalty structure, add to the mix the selfish powerful actors, had years of warfare where we have not been producing results -- that affects the public mind. when will they commit and how will they do so? let's not forget that this population adequately motivated can do pretty much whatever it wants. it is getting it motivated. a fairly small group as the law- and-order party rid themselves of which had been -- of mujahadeen fairly quickly.

afghan government responsibilities, non-current responsibilities, societal obligations to each other -- non-government responsibilities, societal obligation to each other. we have suffered a lot of casualties. the ied is the weapon of the insurgency. it is their mine. it is just a weapon. it is easy to make. it is widespread. the defeat of the ied is not an arms race ever meant for your trying to find a better methods to detect them. they have got to do that.

but it will be defeated when the insurgency is defeated. the population will defeat the ied. they know when they are being made when they are buried. it is really about the population. ied's, like crime, can happen. yorktown's are safe where you live not because of deep -- your towns are safe, where you live, not because of the police, but because of you. ladies and gentlemen, i think you very much for your attention. [applause] >> general, thank you very much for that outstanding presentation and discussion. i would like to get into a bed

of a conversation drawing from your presentation -- into a bit of a conversation drawing from your presentation. first of all, the impression you left on me from some of the key things you said, we did not lose, but we did not win. battlefield victories, but the taliban is a spoiler with no plan. the challenge of aligning ngo's with the military and the towns changing the iconic image of the mission from that of a victim to calculation and is it worth it? i wanted to kick off our conversation by asking one question about the coalition perspective and another from the afghan perspective. you said that the iconic image

was the canadian soldier walking in and smiling and saying that i am here to stay. >> and that i am going to help. >> exactly. once we had to chat about before today's reception is that the perception by villagers in afghanistan is are we there to stay? given the announcement of the u.s. surge came in with a drawdown. canadian forces have it december 2011 date as well looming on the horizon. how has that translated into a perception on the ground in afghanistan in terms of our resolve to stay and how does that impact your cooperation with the coalition? >> it was remarkable to me how

well informed a lot of the afghans were. i am sure there were some lights and reformers that were not so where. they are well aware. their astute and capable in disinformation environment -- they are astute and capable in this information environment. i think the afghans are a little bit more hopeful or at least positive, a little more trusting. they do not necessarily commit until they see the results. but 18 months is a significant amount of time.

when we would speak to them, it was not that the alliance is going to disappear in 2011, but there needs to be a pyrrhic of time when afghans start to -- needs to be a period of time when americans start to manage this, when the population needs to get involved. you cannot subcontract success to somebody else in this environment. it cannot just be the job of the police or the ministry of the interior. everybody can do this. by 2011 and beyond, they can do this. will they? they will do it if they are adequately motivated. there is a fine balance. there is the never-ending contribution at the level that we are at. at some point, they need to take it over. in the back afghan mine said,

u.s. them, do you want us here? of -- you ask them, do you want us here? of course not. but if you listen to the rest of the sentence -- we would rather you not be here, but we're glad that you are here now and we look toward your departure. nothing is said so simply as a sound bite. we tried to sound bite it back in their own capitals. -- back in our own capitals. they deeply appreciate our intent. they're looking forward to the day that they can take over. >> before i open it up to the audience, i would like to follow up on that. you concluded your presentation referring to one of the greatest threats that still remains, the

lack of an accepted governance. obviously, your operation was to create the conditions [unintelligible] there has been a lot of focus and discussion over the concern of afghan ministries in government and being able to pick up that part of the equation. how did you see this as you were winding a pure tour given part of the ability to withdraw successfully and having the afghans picked up the responsibility. what you see coming out of cobkabul compared to a uc from [unintelligible] -- out of kabul compared to what you see from [unintelligible]

in many of our capitals, there is concern about corruption and the lack of effective governance and personalities involved in this process. what do you take away from your experience in kandahar? >> i see that it is entirely possible. at the local, an end at the district level, there is cooperation. that low tactical level should be the response to that. whether the afghan and she has the capacity to extend -- afghan ministry has the capacity to extend the physical capacity,

whether or not they will take full advantage, full responsibility for the nature of the insurgency as it is today and start to campaign adequately along these multiple lines of efforts that need to occur remains to be seen. it is an emergency. it needs to be dealt with. they have an enormous problem. rebuild their government in their country. it is a monumental effort. i believe that they absolutely have the desire. they lacked capacity. there are some mechanical blockages in their society with some of these powerful actors to act selfishly first. whether that manifest itself in corruption or in bad business,

that needs to be dealt with for sure. ultimately, i think it comes down to motivation. if there truly motivated at all levels of government and society, i am optimistic that it can happen. >> let me bring in some members to this discussion. let's start with the board member in the front row. who has the microphone? terrific. thank you. >> thank you very much for your outstanding presentation, general. there has been significant talk around here -- >> please introduce yourself. >> [unintelligible] there has been talk about the desirability of working with regional leaders, sometimes known as war lords and the

terminology, to give them an incentive to work with us. in other words, to have them be agents for change. you cannot buy them, but you can rent them for a while. what do you think about that as a strategy? >> to extend the analogy, i do not think that renting is a long-term answer. whether it is home ownership word dealing with warlords -- sometimes you have to partner with those who are able. those who are able have survival skills that have lasted multi- generations. those survival skills are not necessarily a benevolent and benign in the eyes of the rest of the population this would characterize some of the -- rest

of the population. this would characterize some of the partnerships we had early on. these are not bad people. they have been shaped by their environment. it is important that we focus our efforts on the legitimate institutions of government, both official and a tribal, help them repair their societal fabric as they would have it done, and aid them. we deal with very powerful people. ship them such that they do not exceed cultural norms. this is what has happened across the country. some of the most powerful and perhaps more selfish have exceeded cultural marks so that the society recoils. there it is an element of how they do business that will

always be present. but if you are constantly exceeding cultural norms and the population is getting no material benefits or support, bottom of the u.n. indices, then the population is essentially despondent or revoked. you have to manage those relationships carefully. we tried to. on any given day, if you need those powerful actors, sometimes they need you. over time, it is the president and his regime that needs to manage how they work with these unofficial but powerful actors, just like we do in our societies. >> i am from "the sunday times of london." i was interested in your

presentation. it was fascinating. i was intrigued when news said that you saw in the third and current stage [unintelligible] there will be 140,000 troops. other military commanders i know who have served in afghanistan say that they would need 500,000 troops to deal with the taliban. you said that the taliban are spoilers and do not have a message. this is one of the problems we have underestimated the taliban. now. the have been more effective than we have given them credit. in that context, you did mention pakistan, but they have the a vintage of having a safe haven. [unintelligible]

i was there when it happened. it was because they had pakistan's support behind them. in this case, they are on the other side. if you could comment on those things, thank you. >> all right. where to start? >> in dealing with troop figures is a bit of a mug's game. but given x number of soldiers, you need to use the following techniques. a lot of times, people will " the larger figure -- people will quote the larger figure.

i come from a school where the taliban will be made irrelevant overtime through the population. you do not necessarily best creek irrelevance -- best creative irrelevance just by putting more soldiers on the ground. -- best create irrelevance just by putting more soldiers on the ground. i certainly, this question from the angle of what techniques when i use with those forces? this is what the soviets did not think initially. they did not necessarily or

uniformly use all of these techniques. there may be differences to this equation elsewhere in the country, in the east and in the north, but in the south, a technique matters. no amount of force, if used exclusively, will felled this government. if you do defeat to the taliban militarily, you still have this fractured and small society that would be right for other insurgencies -- and mauled society that would be right for their insurgencies. they are not working on a positive messaging campaign with the population. they can spread fears and

implant-ideas. but they -- implant negative ideas. i think they are underestimating their own population. they are certainly it underestimating us. we ought not to ever underestimate them. i do believe that pakistan is essential to the equation. ultimately, as has been mentioned by the current administration, it is a regional approach that is essential. so we started in a town. the alliance is starting with afghanistan and stabilizing that and stabilize the critical parts of the population. i believe that there will be an element of insurgency in

afghanistan probably forever, just like there are in some european states. is it politically relevant? is it harmful to the population? does the country remain on the bottom of the u.n. indices' forever? >> there is someone on the side of the room. >> thank you, general, for your talk at your service in kandahar as well. you emphasize that counterinsurgency requires a number of tactics. i wonder if you could address the actual tactics when it comes to managing relationships with some of the figures you alluded to?

how does one actually go about restraining these figures, restraining some of their worst abuses, and turning them into forces for good, services -- forces for us. >> that is a good question. the actual methodology that i have found is that, first of all, you have to work at all levels old ones. from the president's palace to the living room, there has to be consistency among all parties engaged. public policy at the national level down to the province and down into the district and then to a town, the aspirations and the expression of government needs to be consistent. there is a role to play by military and non-military actors to help draw down forces in some

respects, coerce, to bring critical activities such as health and education to bear. it is not an easy thing. we could say that we are ready. but if they say they're not, then they're not. you have to get over this one- sided view of battles basis as a military guy. it needs to be stable. that is the first world. once you start to breathe a that stable environment, it is working -- once you start to breed ithat stable and berman, t

is working. you can put government services where they ought to be. it can be done to mentoring or through sponsoring activities. on the 25th of all this, after we had been working in the first district for a while, unama left kandahar city for the first time in several years. the secret is to make it -- to sponsor conditions for the indigenous governments to deal with it. we cannot possibly engineer their governance. we can show them some best practices, but we cannot do it for them. the advantage to work at all levels all at once, particularly at the grass-roots level village, is that you bypass a

lot of potential corruption. it is a direct injection of funds and activity at the lowest level. you are conscious of where and who you contract with to help get things done. ideally, you are using local capacity. if you're working at the lowest level and it starts to work and the population except sit and is happy and it starts to grow, then those who were corrupt in their midst will stand in with the population and thrust. that gives us the opportunity to follow-up. >> you mention the the civilian side of the equation. [unintelligible]

given the dramatic mismatch of the forces and the disparity in resources, do you think that civilian agencies across the lines are coming in in an incredible way to back up what is happening with the military surge? >> i would not something i would describe around the word "credible." you are not necessarily thinking of them working their knowledge and achieving a fax in a compound somewhere in kandahar. they're not trained for that. but they learn quickly. they understand. the first and most important saying it is the team. it is a military and civilian team that must produce effects.

that is not a view that is totally agreed upon. it is my view. the fact is that the team results are the ones that are far more enduring and sophisticated than doing one element at a time. it is not linear. do they have the actual tool set to do something immediate or tangible or of value? yes, they do. in that community, what is the infrastructure like? how is the health? why is the health bad? what is the cultural -- the agricultural chain? in a few short months, you can turn things around locally.

that may have been little town in an otherwise unhappy district. so you have to work at all levels. there needs to be engagement at all levels. at the national level, it does not necessarily trickle-down to make families happy. so you have to work at the lower level to connect all of these stovepipes. i believe that they credible. i think that many civilians who arrive understand very quickly and that, although they may come with a mandate, there is a war on. that one needs to be one or at least stabilized to the extent of that some of those other national or nation-to-nation engagements can gain their fruit. so are you there as a civilian

as a counterinsurgency effort or are you there to build afghanistan? the answer is yes. >> may be the gentleman in the front and then the colleague in the back. >> as tip o'neill famously said, all politics is local. how were you able to deal with tribal politics without undermining governmental authority? >> [unintelligible]

we talk about the center of gravity in the afghan population. it seems like there's a second, the western democratic population. how fast can we get our job done their to outpaced the dissatisfaction that is growing even as we announced the surge? we had polls saying that most americans are dissatisfied, tired of the campaign there. i agree with you. it seems that the perception in the west is terribly mismanaged with what is going on in the ground. how do we do that? what kind of operations do we need to mount to make sure that we have support for a simple

democracy? if that support is not there, everybody gets jammed. >> that is a great question. i will try to address it in part. i will start by saying that we have someone failed in this regard. but i do not think that you and i are in the business of convincing the population. what we need to make sure is that the truth is being seen, that the population is able to digest and the debate using facts, using that which is true. sure, ideology comes to theibea but the populations we come from corporate smart. given the facts, given transparency and so on, they will make up their mind. whenever their mind is, so be

it. i'd do it -- whatever their mind is, so be it. i don't think we are in the position to convince our population of the validity of what we're doing as a military force. we need to be part of a larger machine that makes sure that the population is well informed. the population has not been well informed. what we need to make sure of, un die on the military side, is that we need to be very careful -- you and i on the military side, is that we need to be very careful -- there was an economy of force efforts globally where we knew we were under-resourced to achieve permanent effects, where its military force, only achieve so much before the situation changed.

that honest dialogue with their population occurred, but it was also interspersed with a success and the success and a success. we did some bricks and mortar work here today. we were generally saying that it was successful and that it was going in the right direction and that we were on track. i don't know if there was enough dramatic on track or success for real -- success or real sustainable success. the others can discredit everything you say. not only the taliban, but our internal de vista voices would -- our internal de vista of --

pit omyrour internal divisive vs would do so. you have several elements. it is just like your, but it is there. tribal groupings can be replaced by other loyalty structures, but they exist. they are very tight. they need to be involved. but there is not -- but they are not nearly as fractious as you described. there is not a johns between the tribe and legitimate governments -- there is not a

challenge between the tribe and legitimate governmance. they are very good sorting and some things that would probably go to civil litigation in our society. they have satisfactory cultural results. those are tribal issues. they are dealt with by the family. it is not challenging government. it is a part of that. what we also need to recognize is that government, the way you and i see it, is not the same. we cannot use our lens for this situation. you have to recognize that it is going to create a whole that works for them and our obligation is to provide the

support to do that. we make lots of mistakes. we talk to the wrong people. but we learn. when you're doing something that involves the some of the parts of all of your ambition together -- the sum of the parts of all of your ambition together, it is a very personal, close-up type of conflict. all parties have the right to be involved. including the tribe's. >> general, to give very much. we have a series of other questions of whether. -- questions out there. [unintelligible] >we are delighted to continue

using the forum and having an allied commander coming out of the field and to offer your insights and perspective at a time when our alliance is engaged in a fierce offensive. thank you for your time and your insights and your presentation. it was a pleasure to have you here. >> same here. same here. [applause] >> attorney general eric holder spoke to date. -- eric holder spoke today. >> our responsibility to ensure that the fairness and integrity

of that system is paramount. i would argue that it is one of the most praiseworthy. that said, we must face facts. the facts prove that we have a very serious problem on our hands. nearly half a century has passed since the supreme court's decision in the gideon vs. wainwright. the court followed with other decisions on right to counsel. today, despite the decades that have gone by, these cases have yet to be fully translated into reality. that is a fact. but you already know this. all of you have read the report. all of you know the data. many of you have learned this truce in the hardest of ways, by experiencing it on the ground.

in too many of our counties and communities, some people have been accused of crimes, including juvenile, and may never have a lawyer, either entirely or during a critical stage of the proceedings against them. in fact, the juveniles sometimes waive their right to counsel without ever speaking to an attorney to help them understand what it is they are giving up. this is simply unacceptable. our courts except these waivers. meanwhile, recent reports state that the system is replete with defendants who have languished in jail for weeks or even months before counsel was appointed. when lawyers are provided to the poor, too often they cannot represent their clients properly due to insufficient resources and inadequate oversight. that is without the building

blocks of a well functioning public defender system. the type of system set forth in the 10 principles of the american bar association and the national juvenile offenders center. as we all know, public defender programs are too many times underfunded. too often, defenders carry huge caseloads. it makes it impossible for them to fulfill their legal and and local responsibilities to their clients. -- legal and ethical responsibilities to their clients. they cannot conduct fact investigations or spend the time needed to apply for additional grant funding. the problem is more about anything than just resources. primary institutions for the delivery of defense to the port, basic public defender systems -- to the poor, basic

public defender systems, simply do not exist. public education about this issue is critical. when equal justice is denied, we all lose. as a prosecutor and a former judge, i know that the fundamental integrity of our criminal justice system and our faith in it depends on effective representation on both sides. i recognize that summit perceive the goals of those who represent our federal, state, and local governments and the goals of those who represent the accused are forever at odds. i reject that premise. [applause] although we stand on different sides of an argument, the prosecution and the defense can and must share the same

objective, not victory, but justice. otherwise, we are left to wonder if justice is truly being done, left to wonder if our faith in ourselves and our system is misplaced. the problems in our criminal defense system are not just morally untenable. they are also economically unsustainable. every taxpayer should be seriously concerned about the system a cost of an inadequate defense for the poor. when the justice system fails to get it right the first time, we all fail. poor systems of defense do not make economic sense. where do we go from here? i want to speak with you clearly and honestly about this. in the last year, i have said about and studied and had discussed the current crisis in our criminal defense system. what i know for sure is that

there are no easy solutions. there is no single institution, not to the federal government, not the department of justice, not a single state that can solve the problem on its own. progress can only come from a sustained commitment to collaboration with the verse partners. i expect every person in this room to play a role -- with diverse partners. i expect every person in this room to play a role. some might wonder what the united states attorney general is doing at a conference largely about the defensive back poor people receive in states and local courts. likewise, many of you have gathered here today and have not traditionally been engaged in a discussion of the right to counsel. it must be the concern for those who work on behalf of public

good and the pursuit of justice. ñithat is what this conference s all about, expanding and improving this worked, learning from each other, recruiting partners, and making sure that the government is viewed as an ally and not as an adversary. our commonwealth must have the specific areas of focus. first, we must commit to an ongoing dialogue about these issues. we need partners at the federal, state, and local levels, both within and outside of government, to be involved, by sharing information and by working together. i believe that we can build on the good work that has gone into developing model standards for our public defense system. second, we must raise awareness about what we are against. americans understand how some of

their fellow citizens experience the criminal system. they would be shocked. they would be angry. third, we must expand the role of the public defender. we must encourage defenders to seek solutions beyond our courtrooms and ensure that they are involved in shaping policy that will empower the communities that they serve. i am committed to making sure that public defenders are tabled when we meet with other stakeholders in the criminal justice system. it would include members of their public defense system. we will also involve members in conferences, in review panels, and other venues where the public defense perspective would be valuable every state -- valuable. every state should have a public defender system.

every state. [applause] >in all of this, i stand with you and anyone who is committed to standing up for the sixth amendment right to counsel. last year, when i became attorney general, i took an oath to support and defend the constitution of the united states of america. i also made a promise to the citizens i served and the colleagues i work alongside. i promised to guard the rights of all americans and to make sure that in this country the indigent are not invisible. let me assure you today that this is not a passing issue for the department of justice. i have asked the entire department of justice, in my office, it in that of royal robbins, and for those in legal

policy and the criminal division to focus on this with a sense of urgency and to implement solutions that we need. in the coming weeks, we will take steps [unintelligible] we will have a focused effort by our leadership office. they will surely get the attention they deserve. once again, we stand at the beginning of a new decade. we must seize this opportunity to return to the beliefs that guided the nation's founders. i have every expectation that our criminal defense system can and will be a source of tremendous national pride. i know that achieving this requires the best that we, as a profession a